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NATO Strategy and the 'Neutron Bomb'

COLIN S. GRAY

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Paperwork**

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Policy Review is published quarterly by The Heritage Foundation, 513 C St., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002 (202/546-4400). Subscription rates are \$12 for one year, \$21 for two years and \$30 for three years (\$25 a year for libraries and institutions). Add \$5 a year for foreign air speeded delivery. Introductory copies are available for \$2.

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Inside Policy Review

COLIN S. GRAY is a professional staff member of the Hudson Institute of New York (directed by Herman Kahn). He is the holder of a D.Phil. degree from Oxford University and has served as an assistant director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He is the author of *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (1976) and of the forthcoming work *Strategic Studies and Public Policy*. He is also a co-author of *U.S. Strategy in the Decade Ahead* (1978).

NATO, "less than a very serious military organization," according to Mr. Gray, must take more seriously the likelihood of war, should engage in serious and realistic campaign analysis that looks out beyond the opening pre-planned round, and should consider sensible war aims. NATO's central strategic concept, flexible response, is "bankrupt," due to the absence of a dramatic reversal in favor of the West in the strategic nuclear forces balances and NATO's Long-Term Defense Program takes "an expensive and largely irrelevant incremental approach." If the U.S. is unwilling to fund a favorable reconstruction of the strategic force balance, then NATO must devise a strategy that can hold without the need to invoke strategic nuclear assistance. In this context, Mr. Gray discusses the ER weapon ("neutron bomb") controversy, arguing for its deployment and citing President Carter's decisions and announcements concerning the "neutron bomb" as appropriate for "the case file of classic examples of how not to approach arms control negotiations."

JAMES T. BENNETT is Professor of Economics at George Mason University. After obtaining his Ph.D. in economics from Case Institute of Technology in Cleveland, Ohio, Dr. Bennett taught at George Washington University. He has published about forty articles in many journals, such as the *Journal of Political Economy*, *Southern Economic Journal*, *Economic Inquiry*, and *Public Choice*.

MANUEL H. JOHNSON is Assistant Professor of Economics at George Mason University. Dr. Johnson obtained his Ph.D. in economics from Florida State University and has published articles in various journals, such as *Public Choice* and *Journal of Social and Political Studies*.

The co-authors note that according to the Federal Paperwork Commission, government paperwork cost the government itself \$45 billion in 1977, but, they claim, most of the total cost fell on the private sector, especially small businesses, in completing the myriad forms and reports. Thus, claim the authors, "government paperwork discourages small business enterprise and contributes to the nation's unemployment ills . . . To the extent that paperwork reduces economic incentives to produce goods and services, inflation is also exacerbated." Efforts must be made to provide positive disincentives for the bureaucracy to generate paperwork, to educate the public about the size and scope of paperwork, and to create external checks to monitor bureaucratic output.

This *Policy Review* article is based upon a longer and more theoretical

treatment of bureaucratic paperwork by the authors which will be published in a forthcoming issue of *Economic Inquiry*.

CHARLES M. KUPPERMAN is Defense Analyst and Research Associate for the Committee on the Present Danger, in Washington, D.C. Formerly an Instructor of International Relations at the University of Southern California, he received his B.A. from Purdue University, his M.A. from the University of British Columbia, and is currently a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Southern California.

Mr. Kupperman, in this article, discusses the differing world views of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., a realization of which should influence future U.S. policy. The Soviet Union, whose goal is global dominance, has used "detente" to its advantage, finding no inconsistency, says Mr. Kupperman, in following, on the one hand, the policy of "detente" while, on the other hand, engaging in the most massive strategic buildup in history. Many Soviet officials, taking the possibility of war at all levels far more seriously than the West whose goal is to avoid war at all costs, see "detente" not as a relaxation in the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S., but as an intensification of the struggle. The U.S., characterized by a decline in "political will" and "strategic lethargy," should take immediate steps, recommends Mr. Kupperman, to reverse the adverse trends in the military balance, as the recent Soviet military superiority has been "basic to all else that has happened, or may happen in the way of a shift in the balance of world forces."

JULES B. GERARD is a professor of law at Washington University School of Law in St. Louis, from which he received the A.B. and J.D. degrees. He is a co-author of *The Sum and Substance of Constitutional Law*, the editor of *One Hundred Years of the Fourteenth Amendment*, and the author of many articles in the field of constitutional law.

The proposed D.C. Representation Amendment, states Mr. Gerard, overshoots its stated goals: granting District residents a vote in congressional elections and participation in the constitutional amendment ratification process. "Not only are District residents to vote in senatorial elections," under the terms of the proposal, "but they are to be represented by two senators; not only are they to have a voice in the ratification process, they are to be counted as a separate entity in determining whether three-fourths of the 'states' have ratified a given proposal." The proposal would appear to be constitutional, Mr. Gerard argues, only if it can be limited to the District of Columbia, but it cannot be limited by the "principle of necessity" because alternative solutions avoiding this problem are available. "The claim that this device will be limited to the District of Columbia," states Mr. Gerard, "flatly contradicts our unwavering history."

MARGO CARLISLE is the Executive Director of the Senate Steering Committee, a position she assumed three years ago. Prior to this, Mrs. Carlisle was on the staff of Senator James A. McClure (R-Idaho).

Mrs. Carlisle received a B.A. in English and Philosophy from Manhattanville College and did graduate work at Boston University.

In this article, Mrs. Carlisle discusses probable issues which will face the 96th Congress on the subject of the Senate rules, particularly Rule XXII, which describes the procedure for cutting off debate. It is likely, Mrs. Carlisle predicts, that Majority Leader Byrd will introduce a variation on S. Res. 5, his 1977 proposal to reduce parliamentary options in post-cloture filibusters, united with a proposal to reduce the cloture requirement. Mrs. Carlisle argues in favor of filibusters, pointing out that "they generally result in the kind of compromise typical of the Senate"; they are "intrinsic to the large state/small state balance fundamental to the Senate"; and they ultimately signal to the American people that an important issue is under discussion, giving them a chance to be heard.

RICHARD F. STAAR is a senior fellow and principal associate director of the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University. He has edited the *Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* since 1969 and is author of *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe* (3rd revised edition, 1977), both published by the Hoover Institution Press. Before moving to California, Mr. Staar taught political science for ten years at Emory University in Atlanta, held the Chester W. Nimitz Chair of Political and Social Philosophy at the Naval War College (1963-1964) and served as a visiting professor at the National War College (1967-1969). He is currently on the adjunct faculty, USMC Command and Staff College, and holds the rank of colonel in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

In this article, Mr. Staar discusses the growing rivalry between Moscow and Peking for influence within the world communist movements. In the Far East, states Mr. Staar, neutralist and pro-Chinese parties together more than counterbalance those of the Soviets; in South Asia and Australasia, these forces are more or less evenly balanced; and in Latin America and the Middle East, pro-Moscow communist movements predominate. In a future split in the Third World between moderate and radical states, predicts Mr. Staar, the U.S.S.R. may find itself supporting the former and the P.R.C. the latter.

DONALD LAMBRO is a Washington reporter for United Press International and the author of several books, including *The Federal Rathole*, an analysis of waste in the federal government.

The "Beltway Bandits," explains Mr. Lambro, is the notorious nickname given to Washington consultants who fill "their corporate saddle bags" with an "annual haul of tax dollars." Government departments and agencies, such as HEW, HUD, and the Department of Labor, and consulting firms, such as the Urban Institute (which receives 86 percent of its income from the federal government), Mathematica, Inc. (which receives 80 percent of its income from federal contracts), Rand, Brookings, SRI International, and others, Mr. Lambro states, operate on a "revolving door basis," forming a network, particularly pervasive within the field of social welfare policy, both inside and outside of government. In recent years, government consulting has multiplied into a "\$2 billion-a-year growth industry."

Mathematica, Inc., the Urban Institute and government civil servants who have supported the guaranteed income concept for the past decade have been particularly influential in implementing the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME), which Mr. Lambro calls "conceivably the biggest welfare program in the history of the nation."

Reviews of books were written by MICHAEL B. DONLEY (editor of *The National Security Record*), THOMAS SOWELL (professor of economics at the University of California, Los Angeles), THOMAS R. ASCIK (policy analyst in education at The Heritage Foundation), JERE REAL (a former editorial writer and journalist who now teaches English and contributes to a variety of journals) and MARION GREEN (editorial assistant at *Policy Review* and a recent graduate of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).

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NATO Strategy and the 'Neutron Bomb'

COLIN S. GRAY

It is difficult for Western commentators to accept the proposition that *the* critical region of Soviet military superiority is intellectual rather than material. Soviet soldiers are not ten feet tall (which is fortunate given their armored-vehicle dependence), but they are potential instruments of an intelligent theory of theater war. It is important for NATO to recognize that its Warsaw Pact opponent takes seriously the prospect of armored warfare and has devised a doctrine which amounts to a great improvement on the *Blitzkrieg* practice of the Wehrmacht in World War II. In the apt phrase of a leading American defense analyst, Soviet military operations, in the event of war on NATO's Central Front, would depend upon the working of an "echelonned piledriver."¹ In the context of Soviet military posture and doctrine, NATO simply is less than a very serious military organization. Indeed, in peacetime, NATO is only a planning organization. It is painful to discern the paradox that the Warsaw Pact is potentially fatally vulnerable to bold NATO execution, yet the cautious conservative stance of the Western Alliance virtually precludes the development of an intelligent strategy for NATO.²

Sad to say, the study of military history is distinguished by its near absence from the professional preparation of officers in major NATO countries. NATO deployment and doctrine (at all levels) appears to have been designed by a committee ignorant (or disdainful) of the military history of World War II. As Dr. Steven Canby has said on many occasions, the Soviet High Command has to consider the "Manteuffel" possibility.

1. Steven Canby, *Rethinking the NATO Military Problem* (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, The Smithsonian Institution, 1978). My debt to Dr. Canby is pervasive throughout this article. Also see his study, *The Alliance and Europe: Part IV: Military Doctrine and Technology*, *Adelphi Paper* No. 109 (London: IISS, Winter 1974/75).

2. A major potential vulnerability of the Soviet Union lies in the fragility of its defensive glacis of reluctant "allies" in Eastern Europe. But, for NATO to harness the frustration and hatred in Eastern Europe, it has, first, to defeat a Pact attack westward and then insert large forces into Pact territory.

More directly expressed, General Hasso von Manteuffel, first as a division commander (7th Panzer) and then as an army commander (5th Panzer Army), provided classic illustrations of how deep armored penetrations by an enemy could be negated and turned to his disadvantage as an offensive becomes over-extended. The British Army of the Rhine (BAOR) and the Bundeswehr may not have a Manteuffel (or two) waiting to demonstrate his tactical genius, but the likely relevance of some of the Eastern Front experience of World War II is difficult to ignore. The essence of armored warfare, as indeed of all warfare, is not so much the destruction of enemy assets; rather, it is the disruption of enemy plans. Tactical improvisation is, alas, very difficult to teach. Hence, NATO cannot assume, as it anticipates its initial military withdrawal to the Weser-Lech, then to the Rhine, and ultimately to the Channel and the Pyrenees, that it will be aided by the tactical genius of a Manteuffel. Manteuffel saved a noteworthy fraction of the Wehrmacht in its retreat across the Ukraine; formal qualifications in the physical geography of Western Europe are not required for one to appreciate that the space likely to be available to NATO for timely armored counterstrokes would be very cramped indeed.

NATO Strategy in the Mid-1970s

The mid-1970s saw a flurry of attention to NATO's military problems which, by way of an outcome, certainly has catalyzed an official multi-national response — the so-called Long-Term Defense Program.³ But, alas, the critical deficiency remains unaddressed. Specifically, NATO continues to decline to perform, or at least to act upon, serious campaign analysis. How would the war be fought? That question points to the fundamental reason that NATO's military posture and doctrine continue to be inadequate. Few, if any, politicians seem able either to think beyond peacetime deterrence or to try to think *through* a period of actual hostilities. The proposition that predicted plausible war-waging efficacy might feed back benignly into prewar deterrence remains largely alien in the West.

3. See Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 February 1978) pp. 37-40, 237-43; and *The Department of State Bulletin*, July 1978, pp. 1-4.

“Campaign analysis” for NATO tends to be discouraged by the (often) tenuous realization that at least three reasonably distinct military balances should influence the course of events – the conventional, the theater nuclear, and the strategic nuclear – and by the sheer technical and political complexity of the subject. Predictions of NATO’s campaign performance are significantly scenario-dependent. NATO, obviously, should be ready to meet a series of “bad cases” up to and including the “worst plausible,” but – rather strange to say – it is less than totally clear as to just what would constitute the worst plausible case. In very recent years, the conviction has grown that the Warsaw Pact could launch a surprise attack in Central Europe from very close to a standing start – without prior forward deployment of forces from the three westernmost military districts of the U.S.S.R.⁴ Such a gamble, to attack with only a third to a half of the forces that could be deployed, given time (two to three weeks), might yield the advantage of catching NATO in an unhealthy early phase of its mobilization.⁵ But, to set against that consideration, there is the view that NATO’s intended war-ready deployment plan is so unsound that the greater the measure of surprise achieved by the Pact, the greater the prospect of NATO weathering the storm.⁶

The paradox may be explained as follows. In peacetime, naturally enough, most NATO formations are deployed well

4. A strong statement of this possibility may be found in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services, *NATO and the New Soviet Threat*, Report by Senators Sam Nunn and Dewey F. Bartlett, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 January, 1977). On the surprise attack issue see Colin S. Gray, *Defending NATO-Europe: Forward Defense and Nuclear Strategy*, DNA 4567F (Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, November 1977) pp. 19-31.

5. To attack with only the forces normally deployed in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland would yield a theoretical first and second echelon totalling 27 Soviet divisions and perhaps a half to two-thirds of the 31 East German, Polish and Czech divisions. Under the cover of “exercises” and the large-scale annual rotation of troops and tactical aircraft into and out of Central Europe, a “surge deployment” could be achieved which would not look like a mobilization for war.

6. NATO believes that its intelligence concerning the readiness of Pact ground and tactical air forces is very good. The surprise attack debate of 1976-77 in NATO appears to have been resolved with the emergence of a consensus to the effect that NATO would acquire a minimum of five to six days notice of attack.

to the rear of their designated wartime deployment areas. For good (and really non-negotiable) political though questionable military reasons, NATO forces are to be deployed in a roughly frontier-hugging mode by national corps areas (the so-called "NATO layercake").⁷ This means that most of NATO's armor-heavy (and hence counterattack capable) formations have fairly far-forward wartime assignments. (Politically, the "NATO layercake" is the product both of history⁸ and of West German insistence that its eastward rampart be manned by as many different allied contingents as possible — to affirm the solidarity of the multinational commitment to the forward defense of West German soil.) Behind the national corps contingents, pre-committed forward, is very little, particularly in the critical NORTHAG (Northern Army Group) region of North-Central Germany. In the theater, though quite far distant, there is the French Army — which may or *may not* be available to SACEUR.⁹ There may be large numbers of West German reservists,¹⁰ but they could accomplish little if they

7. From North to South in West Germany, the national corps areas proceed as follows: West German; Dutch; West German; British; Belgian; West German; United States; United States; and West German.

8. The various NATO national contingents in West Germany have a long-established logistic structure to the rear of their deployment areas. Hence, any attempt at radical change in NATO's deployment would involve massive infrastructure costs. Also, such deployment would be bound to involve large amounts of new construction requiring the acquisition of land. Probably sensibly, NATO countries have long agreed that although its strongest formations are not deployed in the most ominous threat corridors, redeployment — with all its costs and upheaval — would be worse (for many years, at least) than the disease it would be intended to treat. The token deployment of a U.S. brigade to the NORTHAG region is not a harbinger of things to come. From the neglected aspect of strategy, it is not obvious that a large scale redeployment of the best units of the Bundeswehr and the U.S. 7th Army to North Germany is desirable. Such a move would serve to accentuate the importance of the opening couple of days of a war and could deprive SACEUR of the strong counterattack forces that U.S. and German formations in the south might otherwise constitute.

9. The French Army has two mechanized divisions deployed in south Germany. Should a Pact offensive achieve notable initial success, SACEUR would sorely need the authority to direct the four armored divisions (plus supporting formations) that are deployed in France. Indeed, their potential importance is augmented by their distance from the early battles.

10. The Bundeswehr has a nominal reserve strength of close to 500,000 men.

are not trained and equipped appropriately in a heavily anti-armor role – they certainly could not function, on little notice, as a “masse de manoeuvre” (if only for the elementary reason that they lack armor and firepower) – and, at noteworthy distances, there is American and British reinforcement.¹¹

Prudently, NATO has to assume that the Warsaw Pact will succeed, initially, in penetrating deep into West Germany. The attacker has the initiative. Theater-wide, in a (close to) standing start attack, the Pact would lack any decisive advantage in manpower, but launching an assault in echelon against carefully selected narrow areas of the NATO front, the Pact could achieve a series of decisive local superiorities in men and equipment. Current NATO planning, including the much (and over-) heralded Long-Term Defense Program, virtually ensures that if and when NATO loses the battle of the frontiers, the game is up; SACEUR would not have at hand the armor-heavy, high-quality, mobile forces in reserve needed to effect counterattacks against deep-penetrating Soviet armor.¹²

Those who have attended to NATO issues over the past several years should have noticed that the one subject which continues to elude serious discussion by officials is strategy. Instead, NATO seems determined to focus upon secondary issues. Everybody, so it would appear, acknowledges that the Soviet military threat in, and relevant to, Western Europe has been increasing at an unacceptable rate and that NATO's erstwhile trump cards – American strategic nuclear intervention, clear theater-nuclear superiority, and the quality of much of NATO's conventional material – no longer exist. How does NATO respond to this gross change in military circumstances? Instead of debating the possibility of developing strategic nuclear forces that would be usable in crises emerging out of

11. As a prominent part of its contribution to NATO's Long-Term Defense Program, the United States plans roughly to double its rapid reinforcement (7-10 days) capability. Just how smoothly this would proceed is an interesting question (in bad weather or if shooting had started, the reinforcement would have to be less than rapid). Also, unless the reinforcements were married to a more intelligent NATO strategy than is the case at present, the net result would probably be an increase in the size of the Pact's POW “catch.”

12. Interesting and educational fictional illustration of this argument is provided in Sir John Hackett and others, *The Third World War, August 1985* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978).

a European context,¹³ or of confronting the real issues pertaining to the potential value of modernized theater nuclear forces, or even of debating the basic non-nuclear strategy of the alliance, NATO has taken an expensive and largely irrelevant incremental approach heralded as the Long-Term Defense Program.

'Flexible Response'

NATO has a track record of solemnly embracing basic strategic concepts at the point at which they lack credibility. The current concept, flexible response, was sanctified in the authoritative, though less than detailed, document MC-14/3 in 1967. The fundamental idea is that deterrence should be thought of as a seamless web of ever more threatening possibilities and that an aggressor in Europe would face the prospect of tripping a series of ever more destructive Western responses. Flexible response presumes that an American President would be willing to initiate theater and, if need be, strategic-nuclear employment in the event of an unfolding catastrophe for Western arms in NATO-Europe. Such a prospect was not totally implausible in the mid-1960s, but the military underpinning for such a strategy (to stretch terminology a little) has vanished over the past decade. In the absence of a dramatic reversal in favor of the West in the strategic nuclear and theater forces balances, NATO's central strategic concept, flexible response, is bankrupt. It envisages the possibility of the deliberate escalation of a conflict in a situation in which the West could secure no military or political advantage from such action.¹⁴

Underlying most of the causes of deficiency in NATO is a fundamental lack of seriousness about the likelihood of war. This harsh judgment does not apply only to NATO preparations; it could, with equal justification, be leveled at the United States with regard to its strategic nuclear planning. NATO and the U.S. need a concept of war as a whole, should engage in

13. See Carl H. Builder, *The Case for First-Strike Counterforce Capability*, P-6179 (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, July 1978).

14. See Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," *Foreign Policy*, No. 25, Winter 1976/77, pp. 195-210; and Colin S. Gray, "The Strategic Forces Triad: End of the Road?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 4, July 1978, pp. 773-776.

serious and realistic campaign analysis that looks out beyond the opening pre-planned round, and should consider sensible war aims. "Great debates" on NATO issues seem never to advance to the point where contenders debate rival theories of victory, or victory denial (for an unsatisfactory, though possibly more realistic concept), for the alliance. Instead, heat is generated on such topics as standardization and interoperability, the proper employment modes for tactical air support, the value of new anti-armor technologies, and the misnamed "neutron bomb" (correctly, the enhanced radiation [ER] warhead). There is no mystery concerning why issues of *strategy* are distinguished by their near-absence from NATO-related debate. First, to think about strategy requires that we think seriously about war in Europe — and very few people in NATO are willing to accept the discipline that such an exercise, honestly conducted, would involve. One wonders why. A good part of the answer probably reposes in the strange distinction that exists in the minds of many between deterrence and war-fighting. If the name of the game is deterrence, and if deterrence can be secured by means of promising to effect societal damage, then why agonize over the likely military course of a war? Unfortunately, Western theories of deterrence lack for adherents in the U.S.S.R.¹⁵ and make little sense even on their own terms. Deterrence theory, as intoned by Western scholars and officials for nearly thirty years, seems to have had the anaesthetic effect of persuading people that there is no need to seek to penetrate the mysteries of actual warfare in a nuclear age.

Second, to discuss strategy is to threaten the political consensus upon which peacetime NATO is built. NATO's military aspects are designed to facilitate intra-alliance accord in peacetime; they have little to do with NATO's ability to defend Western Europe in time of war.

In practice, NATO has two generic alternatives if it wishes to prepare a serious defense of Western Europe. The first is to plan for a war of armored maneuver — to hold tank-heavy reserves under centralized control and commit them when the Pact's initial thrusts have begun to falter (one hopes). The second is to seek to apply the precept of forward

15. John Erickson, "The Chimera of Mutual Deterrence," *Strategic Review*, Vol. VI, No. 2, Spring 1978, pp. 11-17.

defense in a somewhat literal way, by means of the application of such a weight of firepower on and behind the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA), from the very outset, that a Pact offensive goes and remains off schedule in a catastrophic way.

Given that forward defense, at least as a firm commitment in peacetime, is a political necessity and that the military case for anything short of a forward defense is less than robust, NATO needs to think long and hard about its alternatives. At the present time NATO invites defeat, since its planning does not rest upon a realistic assessment of the change in its military environment. As Paul Nitze has argued forcefully, the Soviet Union, through its strategic forces buildup since the mid-1960s, has removed the very foundations of NATO strategy.¹⁶ If the United States is unwilling to fund a favorable reconstruction of the strategic force balance, then NATO has to devise a posture and strategy that can hold without the need to invoke strategic nuclear assistance. This is the context within which the ER weapon controversy must be appraised.

President Carter's 'Neutron Bomb' Decisions

Most of the facts of the ER weapon case are not in doubt or dispute. With singular ineptitude, President Carter announced, on April 7, 1978, that he had decided to defer production of the ER elements for *Lance* short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) warheads and for nuclear artillery shells. In and of itself, that decision was foolish. However, far more damaging was the apparent vacillation of the President. The Carter Administration had recommended funding for ER weapon production in 1977, had spent the better part of a year seeking to persuade NATO allies that ER weapons were vitally necessary to help offset the Soviet armor advantage in Central Europe,¹⁷ and it was common knowledge that the Secretaries of Defense and State and the President's Special Assistant on National Security Affairs were all strong advocates of ER weapon production. To make matters worse, rumors circulated for several days prior to the April 7th announcement to the effect that the President was wavering between a decision for

16. Nitze, *supra* note 14.

17. NATO has 7,000 main battle tanks in Northern and Central Europe; the Warsaw Pact has 21,100.

outright cancellation and for deferral.¹⁸ One hesitates to assert that it appeared as if the President might change his mind *again*, for it seems likely, in retrospect, that the President did not decide until very close to April 7th that he would prefer not to authorize ER weapon production at that time. The point was that the United States' NATO allies, having been subject to intensive and official American pro-ER weapon lobbying, had every reason to believe that the Administration was determined to proceed with production. The President should not have sanctioned the intensive sales drive, with the momentum of allied expectation that was bound to be created, if he was not convinced of the prompt necessity of moving to production. At the time, it appeared very much as though President Carter was edging towards the cancellation of the ER weapon project, but that he bowed to pressure to soften that option by adding the deferral qualification.

The circumstances of the President's announcement could scarcely have been less favorable. The Soviet Union had orchestrated a massive international campaign against "the killer warhead" and "the capitalist bomb" (which kills people but spares property – as if there were some virtue in destroying property) – a campaign in which the Soviet Union picked up many well-meaning, if imperfectly reasoning, supporters in the West. In short, the Soviet propaganda barrage was at least a partial success and, much worse, it appeared to the whole world to have been a partial success. Rightly or wrongly, few people were much impressed by the distinction between a decision to defer, as opposed to cancel, production. The weakness of the President's decision was highlighted by his attempt to explain the circumstances in which a different decision might be reached in the future. In the President's inimitable words:

I have decided to defer production of weapons with enhanced radiation effects. The ultimate decision regarding the incorporation of enhanced radiation features into our modernized battlefield weapons will be made later, and will be influenced by the degree to which the Soviet Union shows restraint in its conventional and nuclear arms programs. . . .¹⁹

18. Richard Burt, "Pressure from Congress Mounts to Reverse Ban on Neutron Bomb," *The New York Times*, April 6, 1978, p. 1.

19. "Enhanced Radiation Weapons: Statement by President Carter," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 78, No. 2014, May 1978, p. 31.

How much restraint and over what time span, we are not told. Administration officials encouraged (or did not discourage) the idea that the possibility of an arms control arrangement with the Soviet Union, involving some form of non-deployment trade between ER weapons and the SS-20 IRBM, might be explored. If such an idea were a topic of *serious* official American interest (and there is scant evidence that it ever was), clearly the worst possible time to raise it publicly was just following the President's announcement of April 7th. It is an insult to Soviet diplomatic intelligence to expect Moscow to be at all interested in restraining a real program of its own (the SS-20) in return for restraint upon a program that the U.S. President has just deferred indefinitely. The "neutron bomb" episode is one for the case file of classic examples of how not to approach arms control negotiations. Whatever the President's innermost reasoning was on the content and qualification of his ER weapon decision, he should have foreseen that the vaguely mooted SS-20 arms control connection looked like a very inept and *ad hoc* rationalization.

Almost certainly the Carter Administration knew that there was no half-way plausible arms control nexus that could be established between the ER weapon and the SS-20. The two systems are totally unlike and it is highly probable that the raising of a putative arms control connection was based on thought as casual as it was irresponsible. This appears to have been yet another example of arms control possibilities being deployed in the interest of saving political face — stemming from a serious breakdown in policy. One is tempted to observe that had the Soviet Union made a public overture welcoming the prospect of "businesslike" discussions on ER weapons and the SS-20, there would have been acute embarrassment in Washington.²⁰

A more intelligent use of the arms control theme was reported as having been outlined by Carter Administration officials to NATO ambassadors in Brussels on February 24, 1978.²¹ At that time, so the story goes, arms control cover

20. For the Soviet reaction to President Carter's decision, see "Soviet Scoffs at U.S. Decision on the Neutron Bomb," *The New York Times*, April 9, 1978, p. 19.

21. John Robinson, "Neutron Weapon Deal Urged," *The Washington Post*, March 10, 1978, p. 1.

for ER weapon production was to be provided by making an explicit offer (which was expected to be rejected) to the Soviet Union that such production would not be ordered provided either that the SS-20 program were cancelled or Warsaw Pact troop levels were reduced; having demonstrated their good arms control credentials, the allies could then proceed with production and deployment. The contrast between this somewhat cynical ploy and the actual course of President Carter's policy could hardly be more stark.

Moving on from the diaphanous arms control cover(-up), one truly major, very damaging, and even dangerous, consequence of the ER weapon episode was that it fueled the already very substantial doubts held in NATO-European capitals over the quality of the current American leadership. No President's reputation for basically sound judgment and for being in command of his ship could survive many episodes like this one. To repeat, President Carter's reputation suffered not so much because of the content of his decision, but because of its apparent incongruity with the thrust of Administration argument over the previous year. Also, there was the special circumstance that three weeks prior to the ER deferral announcement, the President had made the first reasonably tough-sounding speech on defense issues of his Administration. At Wake Forest University, on March 17, 1978, the President spoke as follows:

. . . even as we search for agreement on arms control, we will modernize our strategic systems and revitalize our conventional forces. We shall implement our policy in three ways:

By maintaining strategic nuclear balance;

By working closely with our NATO allies to strengthen and modernize our defenses in Europe; and

By maintaining and developing forces to counter any threats to our allies and our vital interests in Asia, the Middle East and other regions of the world.²² [emphasis added]

Within three weeks of speaking these words, the President, without appropriate consultation with his European allies, had reversed what NATO-Europeans thought was firm U.S. policy

22. "Excerpts from Carter's Speech on Defense Policy and Soviet Ties," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1978, p. 9.

vis-a-vis a class of weapons which they had been told, repeatedly, was absolutely essential if NATO were to have a credible theater deterrent.

Without denying the weak and shifting character of American policy during this episode, it should not be imagined from the content and tone of this discussion that noteworthy virtue reposed in any other NATO capital. Every major NATO government, so it seems, wanted somebody else to take the public lead, and hence most of whatever criticism would follow, on ER production for deployment. The next most important NATO capital to Washington was, of course, Bonn. Chancellor Schmidt and his government colleagues apparently were persuaded strongly of the military, and hence deterrent, value of ER weapons. But they resisted tenaciously both the American requirement that they encourage, as publicly as practicable, American production of the weapon and the even stronger American insistence that very firm guarantees be offered concerning the local (West German) willingness to permit deployment of the weapon once produced.²³ Senior politicians in some major NATO-European countries endorsed ER weapons enthusiastically in private, but balked at showing more than equivocal interest in public. President Carter's very well-known anti-nuclear sentiments (an unknowable, but probably substantial element in his ultimate decision) could not have withstood *public*, authoritative, NATO pressure for ER weapon production and deployment. Overall, the Carter Administration does have noteworthy cause for dissatisfaction with the lack of courage shown by most of its allies. It would appear that NATO Europe as a whole and the West German government in particular desired to achieve the least visibility with reference to the ER weapon decision as could be explained as being consistent with national dignity.²⁴

The ER policy story continued with the announcement on October 18 that funds for production of ER elements would be requested, but that for the time being such elements would not be fitted into weapons and deployed in NATO-Europe.

23. See Richard Burt, "President Decides to Defer Production of Neutron Weapons," *The New York Times*, pp. 1,7.

24. The most informative contemporary account of the ER weapon controversy was "Furor Over the Neutron Bomb," *Newsweek*, April 17, 1978, pp. 34-35.

This decision had nothing to do with the grounds for production deferral cited in April. ER component production is clearly intended as a move to support the SALT Treaty. The decision, being of a pro-defense character, may help change the less than robust image of the President on defense issues, while it is bound to be deployed as a useful offset for the NATO-damaging aspects of the SALT II package that the President expects soon to pass to the Senate. It will be argued by opponents of SALT II that the United States is signing on for (temporary, perhaps) restrictions on cruise missiles which will remove much of their value for NATO countries, while the Soviets are left free to deploy deep-strike systems threatening to NATO allies (such as the SS-20 IRBM and the *Backfire* Bomber). In that predictable context the Administration will be able to point to its ER component production decision as evidence of its concern.

Enhanced Radiation Weapons

The great "neutron bomb" debate of 1977-78 was, almost literally, the creation of one man, Walter Pincus of *The Washington Post*. ER weapons were revealed by Mr. Pincus before a startled world in an article entitled "Neutron Killer Warhead Buried in ERDA Budget."²⁵ The title tells all: not all the truth, but all of the intent of the author. Right-thinking people, one must presume, would be shocked by the idea of a "killer warhead" (though one wonders what other kind of warhead there could be), while the burying of such a program clearly implies official chicanery. Just what had Mr. Pincus discovered?²⁶

He revealed that the Administration was requesting funds to produce nuclear weapons designed to kill, incapacitate and impair people primarily through the agency of neutron flux.²⁷ The so-called "neutron bomb" is a thermonuclear (or fusion)

25. *The Washington Post*, June 6, 1977, pp. 1,9.

26. A laudatory and informative, though highly journalistic, account of Mr. Pincus' brand of investigatory journalism is Robert Anson's "The Neutron Bomb," *New Times*, August 5, 1977, particularly p. 30.

27. For technical details on the relevant weapon effects, see S.T. Cohen, "Enhanced Radiation Warheads: Setting the Record Straight," *Strategic Review*, Vol. VI, No. 1, Winter 1978, pp. 9-17; and Arnold Warshawsky, "Radiation Battlefield Casualties — Credible!!", *Military Review*, Vol. LVI, No. 5, May 1976, pp. 3-10.

weapon triggered — as with all fusion reaction, to date — by a fission device. Compared with a “conventional” fission tactical nuclear weapon, the ER warhead (for the same yield) would reduce blast and heat effect by a factor on the order of two and a half, but would effect a neutron radiation increase on the order of a factor of ten. The neutron particles produced in a fusion reaction are more energetic than are those emanating from a fission reaction (by a factor of five), while neutron radiation diminishes in its effect very rapidly once it has proceeded more than a few hundred yards. The standard, simplified example probably offers the most graphic illustration of the capability of an ER weapon. A one kiloton (having an energy yield equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT) ER weapon has roughly the same kill and impairment potential against military personnel shielded by armor as does a ten kiloton “conventional” fission weapon. However, unlike the ten kiloton weapon, the ER weapon produces dramatically reduced heat effects (and therefore a blast wave) and radioactive fallout would be trivial or even nonexistent if the weapon were airburst. In short, with ER weapons one kills tank crews without melting or blasting the tanks — and everything else in the vicinity (and that vicinity is very likely indeed to be NATO-European territory).²⁸

The ‘Neutron Bomb’ Debate

There have been exaggerated claims on both sides of the ER debate, though they have been far more gross on the part of the detractors. The case for ER production and deployment is sufficiently sound that excessive claims are not all helpful. First, an ER weapon *is a nuclear weapon*. Some fraction of the arguments directed against its production were variants upon the theme that ER weapons, being small and *relatively* benign in terms of inflicting unwanted collateral damage (West German civilians and NATO soldiers killed and maimed, urban areas devastated, agricultural land rendered radioactive, and so on), would erode the critically important distinction between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons.²⁹ This claim is simply false,

28. An excellent description of ER weapon effects may be found in Cohen, “Enhanced Radiation Warheads”; and in an unpublished paper by my colleague Donald Brennan (to whom I am grateful).

29. “The neutron weapon erases the line between conventional and nuclear weapons.” V. Milovanov, “The Three Faces of the Neutron

both technically and politically (or psychologically). There is sufficient indirect evidence available to suggest persuasively that the yields for the ER warheads to be delivered by *Lance* and by eight-inch artillery would be noticeably larger than are some of the lower yield options already available to NATO's nuclear capable artillery.³⁰ There is no reason to believe that an American President would be in any doubt that he would be moving a conflict into a qualitatively different region should he authorize ER weapon employment. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon is a nuclear weapon.

Second, although the ER devices in question are designed for reduced heat and blast effects, those effects still would not be trivial. It is certainly correct to claim that ER weapons would do less damage to structures and to people (beyond the immediate short neutron kill radius) than would most other nuclear weapons – but that is a qualified claim. Third, to reunite this somewhat technical discussion with broader issues, ER weapons are not and cannot be a panacea for NATO's ills. In any debate there is an understandable tendency both to denigrate unduly and to over-sell. The most that can and should be said on behalf of ER weapon deployment is that it would be useful given NATO's existing posture and doctrine (in support of which contention one needs merely to cite the ferocious barrage of Soviet and Soviet-encouraged criticism – and, no less telling, the evident recognition of the value of radiation weapons in Soviet military literature).³¹

ER weapons are efficient special purpose devices that offer what should be very obvious attractions to a side seeking to deter attack by a tank and armored fighting vehicle-heavy opponent. ER weapons are not unique in that tactical nuclear weapons have been deployed in Europe since 1953; all tactical nuclear weapons produce neutron radiation, so called; and,

Bomb," *Voyennyye Znaniya* (Moscow), January 1978, in *Translations on U.S.S.R. Military Affairs*, No. 1336, March 10, 1978, p. 5.

30. Some of these are known widely to be below, even well below, one kiloton. The primary anti-personnel weapon effect of these existing weapons is neutron flux.

31. See Cohen, "Enhanced Radiation Warheads," p. 14. In Soviet perspective, ER warheads would permit the "area kill" of the crews of NATO anti-tank weapons, without – as a byproduct – creating vast areas of rubble and intense radioactivity that would be difficult for Soviet armored columns to cross at any speed.

the weapons in question are not at the lowest end of the yield scale. So why the debate and the official embarrassment?

To some commentators, ER weapons appeared largely as a moral issue. Walter Pincus' writing of the "killer warhead" in *The Washington Post* suggested just the tone needed to launch the Soviet campaign to mobilize "progressive people" against the "barbaric new weapon."³² There are no moral questions particular to the ER case. We may have highly individual views on the subject of coercion, but — as a collectivity — NATO is, in very good part, in the business of discouraging Soviet military adventure. If the electorates of NATO members wish to cease providing the military instruments of discouragement, that is their privilege — though then some wider moral issues intrude. To simplify greatly, this author has some personal difficulty with the proposition that it would be ethically preferable to permit a Soviet Gulag to embrace all of Western Europe than to kill some Soviet tank crews with neutron radiation. A strategist, *qua* strategist, is not equipped to cope with that kind of ethical choice. If our society has genuine moral qualms about producing ER weapons, then it should organize an honest debate about the acceptability of weaponry in general (to be threatened/used in self-defense, or not?) and nuclear weapons in particular. One cannot have a meaningful ethical debate focused upon ER weapons.

There is a sense in which strong advocates of ER weapon deployment may be charged with having sought to square a circle. On the one hand they have argued that ER weapons strengthen deterrence (indeed, this is the strongest single refrain from pro-ER weapon circles), while on the other hand they have insisted — as did this author, above — that the availability of ER weapons would not, in any plausible way, lower the nuclear threshold. If ER weapons were to be no easier, politically and psychologically, for an American President to release than other tactical nuclear weapons, then the deterrence argument for deployment might be eroded, though not destroyed. One can attempt to slide around this logical

32. Language quoted from Milovanov, "The Three Faces of the Neutron Bomb," pp. 1,2. A high moral tone may also be located in the *Tass* (official Soviet news agency) statement on Walter Pincus' stories in *The Washington Post*. See "Tass Statement Condemns Neutron Bomb," *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXIX, No. 30, August 24, 1977, p. 4.

difficulty by arguing that the enhanced deterrent effect claimed refers to the Soviet contemplation of a more effective NATO tactical nuclear arsenal and not to the likelihood of an earlier NATO nuclear response (because our ER augmented arsenal would be more "usable"). However, that defensive line of argument is distinctly fragile.³³ Deterrence is a function of anticipated weapon effectiveness and likelihood of employment.

Politicians and officials deem it politically advisable to deny that ER weapons derive much of their deterrent merit from a Soviet perception that a U.S. President (and NATO) armed with such weapons would be less inhibited over the timing and extent of an initial nuclear release decision. However, an "outside" defense analyst is at liberty to state the following: in practice, (sensibly) fearful politicians probably would not endorse ER weapon use any more readily than they would endorse the use of other low yield nuclear weapons, but ER weapons are a near perfect counter to Soviet armored formations, should be usable with precision³⁴ and a minimum of unwanted side-effects, and hence should be more attractive to employ than would "conventional" tactical nuclear weapons. Finally, regardless of whether or not the so-called "nuclear firebreak" is raised or lowered by their deployment, few serious commentators have challenged the claim that ER weapons would help enhance military stability in Europe.

Strong critics of ER weapon deployment confronted the problem that it was difficult to argue *both* that 1) ER weapons would do little or nothing for deterrence (because men of goodwill and common sense appreciate that a nuclear weapon

33. Readers may recall that this aspect of the debate is an almost exact parallel of the debate which then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger launched, when he announced the revision in U.S. strategic nuclear targeting doctrine which favored "limited nuclear options" (LNOs). LNOs are designed to enhance deterrent effect because their execution would be far removed in scale from an all-out SIOP (single integrated operational plan) attack. But, if LNOs increase deterrence because the Soviet Union would perceive them as rendering U.S. strategic forces more usable — are those forces more likely to be used? — answer: not if deterrence of or in (theater) war is enhanced.

34. This is not true if they are delivered by current generation *Lance* SRBMs used at extreme range. The CEP of *Lance* at 70 miles range is close to the lethal radius of the ER warhead.

is a nuclear weapon, and hence the escalation ladder to the fiery furnace is so lacking in robust barriers that the prospect of ER use would not be uniquely deterring to the Soviet Union) and 2) ER weapons are singularly dreadful. It is perhaps worth noting that a great deal of the anti-ER propaganda, and even attempted argument, was so flawed technically and logically that it is almost trivially easy to score points on the pro-ER weapon side. Indeed, the ER weapon debate was so unbalanced in terms of the inherent superior merits of the arguments of the pro-production camp that it is easy to neglect the largely inchoate, but truly important concerns which (one hopes) lurked beneath the surface of the scattershot of the honest anti arguments.³⁵

The ER debate touched on the periphery of very serious matters of enduring importance. For examples, where should ER weapons, in particular, and battlefield nuclear weapons, generally, fit into NATO's concept of war in Europe? Might a thoroughly modernized NATO tactical nuclear arsenal (embracing both short and long-range delivery systems and low and high yield warheads) permit wholesale revision in NATO's defense posture and theater-warfare doctrine? What likely impact would ER weapon deployment have upon Soviet combined arms doctrine for theater warfare? Very generally, can we devise a theory for the conduct of *bilateral* nuclear war in the European theater (and in and over the sea lanes of direct relevance to that theater) that offers at least modest prospects of success for NATO arms? How do we (and the Warsaw Pact) conduct conventional operations under the shadow of possible surprise nuclear attack? How do we (*and they*) effect a tolerably orderly transition from conventional to nuclear operations? Is the concept of theater (with what geographic boundaries?) nuclear war a viable one?³⁶ — and so on.

35. For a brief sample of the anti-ER weapon literature, see George B. Kistiakowsky, "Weaponry: The Folly of the Neutron Bomb," *The Atlantic*, Vol. 241, No. 6, June 1978, pp. 4-14; Alton Frye, "The High Risks of Neutron Weapons," *The Washington Post*, July 17, 1977, pp. B1, B4; and Joma K. Miettinen, "Enhanced-Radiation Warfare," *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, Vol. 33, No. 7, September 1977, pp. 32-37.

36. See Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., *The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive, Studies in Communist Affairs*, Vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976); and *A Soviet Selective Targeting Strategy*

Questions such as these are of the utmost importance, yet the great tactical nuclear debate, focused upon ER warheads, shed little or no light upon them. Had "the neutron bomb" debate, for all its irrelevancies, served to energize disciplined discussion of such issues, then it would have served a very useful purpose.

A Serious NATO Defense?

The muddle that is NATO's posture and doctrine may well be "good enough" to ensure whatever deterrent effect is required in the appropriate Soviet minds. NATO has a semi-serious conventional defense capability, a tactical nuclear arsenal that lacks a reasonably coherent employment doctrine, and an overarching theory of deterrence that requires, to be not-incredible, the backing of a U.S. strategic force posture which could be employed in limited ways in a first strike — while deterring a devastating counterforce attack upon itself by way of a Soviet reply. As Kenneth Hunt has implied (at least), perhaps it is enough that NATO's military posture serve simply to guarantee that any Soviet move westward would necessarily produce a "major war."³⁷ In other words, NATO is not, and perhaps need not be, seriously in the business of promising theater defeat for Pact forces; instead, it ensures that there are no cheap and low-risk military options. The scale of fighting that NATO's conventional forces would guarantee must pose the prospect of escalation to unknown and unknowable regions of potential damage.

It is not obvious that deterrence through the threat of escalating damage is appropriate for the 1980s. Moreover, given the new conventional³⁸ and nuclear weapon technologies available, it is not at all self-evident why NATO fails to address itself vigorously to the task of planning the actual, in-theater, defeat of any Soviet military adventure. Almost certainly this could not be secured by conventional means alone — if only because a Soviet Union sufficiently motivated to attack a

Toward Europe (Arlington, Va.: System Planning Corporation, June 1977).

37. In *The Alliance and Europe: Part II: Defense with Fewer Men*, *Adelphi Paper*, No. 98 (London: IISS, Summer 1973).

38. See *New Conventional Weapons and East-West Security*, Parts I and II, *Adelphi Papers*, Nos. 144-145 (London: IISS, Spring 1978).

heavily nuclear-armed NATO would be certain to have pre-assessed the potential value of nuclear employment (to both sides) in the event of a failure of nonnuclear arms. If NATO's theater nuclear weapons are to deter Soviet use of such weapons, then a far more survivable and usable nuclear posture is required. In this context, ER deployment makes every kind of sense.

It may be the case that NATO embraces such a mixture of diverging national interests and that its societies are so unwilling to think beyond prewar deterrence (or to consider how the prospect of effective *defense* in war might strengthen prewar deterrence) that the design of a militarily intelligent posture and doctrine is impossible.³⁹ Nonetheless, NATO should be urged to try.

39. See Colin S. Gray, "Theater Nuclear Weapons: Doctrines and Postures," *World Politics*, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, January 1976, pp. 300-314.

The Political Economy of Federal Government Paperwork

JAMES T. BENNETT & MANUEL H. JOHNSON

By almost any method of measurement, the amount of paperwork created by the federal government bureaucracy is enormous. During 1972, more than two billion pieces of paper were processed, filling about 4.5 million cubic feet of file space.¹ The National Archives and Records Service estimated that 11.6 million cubic feet of records were held in storage centers around the nation at the beginning of fiscal year 1973.² To make these numbers more intelligible, it is useful to employ the volume of the Washington Monument as a basis for comparison — its total volume is just about one million cubic feet. In terms of the “if they were all laid end-to-end” cliché, the volume of paperwork in 1972 produced by the federal bureaucracy alone would girdle the earth at the equator about fourteen times (assuming, of course, that each piece of paper is the standard size, 8.5” x 11”).

The financial aspects of government paperwork are equally awesome. The National Archives and Records Service estimated the costs of major elements of paperwork in the federal government for fiscal years 1955, 1966, and 1973, as shown in Table 1.³ Two facts are immediately clear. (1) The cost of paperwork is substantial, for the \$15 billion spent in 1973 represents six percent of all federal expenditures in that year, and (2) the costs are growing rapidly. Between 1955 and 1966, total costs more than doubled and, in the seven years between 1966 and 1973, an additional 86 percent increase occurred. Although substantial, the costs shown in Table 1 represent only a fraction of the total cost of federal government paper-

1. U.S. Congress, Select Committee on Small Business, Subcommittee on Government Regulation, *The Federal Paperwork Burden, Hearings, Parts I and II* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972) Part I, p. 469.

2. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, *Improving the Coordination of Federal Reporting Services, Hearings* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974) p. 221.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

Table 1.
 Cost Estimates of Federal Government Paperwork
 by Type of Paperwork, FY 1955, 1966 and 1973
 (millions of dollars)

Type of Paperwork	1955	1966	1973
Correspondence	\$ 1,000	\$ 1,500	\$ 2,790
Reports	700	1,000	1,860
Forms	867	1,000	1,860
Directives	100	1,000	1,860
Files	650	1,500	2,790
ADP Paperwork	-- --	1,100	2,040
Other ^a	683	960	1,800
Total	\$ 4,000	\$ 8,060	\$15,000

^aIncludes office copying, microfilming, records disposition, vital records, and paperwork automation.

work, the tip of the "iceberg," because the costs imposed on the private sector have not been included. In October 1977, the Commission on Federal Paperwork,⁴ in its *Final Summary Report* concluded that:

The total costs of Federal paperwork are difficult to determine; but, as best we can estimate, more than \$100 billion a year, or about \$500 for each person in this country, is spent on Federal paperwork. Our estimates of costs to some major segments of society are:

- The Federal Government: \$43 billion per year
- Private Industry: \$25 to 32 billion per year
- State and local government: \$5 to 9 billion per year
- Individuals: \$8.7 billion per year
- Farmers: \$350 million per year
- Labor Organizations: \$75 million per year

According to the Federal Paperwork Commission, the burden of federal government paperwork cost the government itself

4. U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, *Final Summary Report* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) p. 5.

\$45 billion in 1977, a 186 percent increase over 1973. In candor, it seems that the Paperwork Commission's estimates are, at least to some degree, exaggerated. One thing is clear, however — paperwork is a pervasive characteristic of the federal bureaucracy which has grown rapidly in recent years in both financial and physical terms.

This article explores the role of paperwork as a tool employed by the government bureaucrat to exploit the private sector and increase both bureau budgets and the perquisites of office. Section II provides an historical perspective on efforts, totally futile, to control paperwork. A case study of energy paperwork documented in Section III illustrates the waste and inefficiency associated with bureaucratic forms and reports. In Section IV, it is shown that bureaucratic self-interest is the motivation for the proliferation of paperwork. The last section contains conclusions and policy implications.

Efforts to Combat Government Paperwork: An Historical Overview

Since the late 1880s, a host of agencies, boards, bureaus, committees, commissions, departments and task forces have undertaken appraisals, analyses, hearings, investigations, and studies that have resulted in directives, executive orders, legislation, reports, and recommendations to control federal paperwork — all to no avail. Indeed, in his seventh annual message to Congress in 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt, apparently in a fit of (not infrequent) over-exuberance, boldly stated that “Antiquated practices and bureaucratic ways have been abolished, and a general renovation of departmental methods has been inaugurated.”⁵ Every President since Roosevelt has taken a stand against excessive paperwork in the federal bureaucracy, but the continuing stream of congressional hearings and reports bears ample witness to the futility of past efforts.

A partial listing of major efforts to control federal paperwork is given in Table 2; executive orders of Presidents and directives of cabinet secretaries are too numerous to even consider.

5. U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, *What the Federal Government Has Tried to Do About Paperwork: A Technical Report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) p. 3-1.

Table 2
Major Federal Government Attempts to Control Paperwork
1887 - 1975

Year	Effort	Concern
1887	Cockrell Committee	High Cost of Copying, Paperwork
1893	Dockerz — Cockrell Commission	Carbon Paper/Letterpresses
1905	Keep Committee	Filing; Establish National Archives
1913	Taft Commission	Records Depositories, Filing
1942	Federal Reports Act	Forms Control and Clearance
1949	Hoover Commission I	Better Organization for Record Management
1950	Federal Records Act	Promote Records Management
1955	Hoover Commission II	Reduce Paperwork and Cost
1965	Paperwork Jungle Hearings	Reduce Paperwork Burden and Red-Tape
1973	Paperwork Burden Hearings	Reduce Paperwork Burden and Red-Tape
1975	Commission on Federal Paperwork	Reduce Paperwork Burden and Red-Tape

Of all the attempts to control paperwork, the most far-reaching was the Federal Reports Act of 1942 (Public Law 831, 44 United States Code 3501-3511). This first legislation which attempted to reduce the federal paperwork burden by controlling government forms, declares that it is:

. . . the policy of the Congress that information which may be needed by the various Federal agencies should be obtained with a minimum burden upon business enterprises (especially small business enterprises) and other persons required to furnish such information and at a minimum cost to the Government; that all unnecessary duplication of efforts in obtaining such information through the use of reports, questionnaires, and other such methods should be eliminated as rapidly as practicable; and that information collected and tabulated by any Federal agency should insofar as is expedient be tabulated in a manner to maximize the usefulness of the information to other Federal agencies and the public.

Specifically exempted from the provisions of the Act are the General Accounting Office, federal bank supervisory agencies, and agencies within the Treasury Department including the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Public Debt, the Division of Foreign Funds Control, the Bureau of Accounts and the Comptroller of the Treasury. The “teeth” of the Federal Reports Act are found in Section 5:

Sec. 5. No Federal agency shall conduct or sponsor the collection of information, upon identical items, from ten or more persons (other than Federal employees considered as such) unless, in advance of adoption or revision of any plans or forms to be used in such collection,

(a) The agency have submitted to the Director such plans or forms, together with copies of such pertinent regulations and other related materials as the Director shall specify; and

(b) The Director shall have stated that he does not disapprove the proposed collection of information.

Basically, any government agency that wishes to collect data from ten or more persons (“persons” is loosely defined to include individuals, corporations, associations, and the like) on either a repetitive or a one-time basis must obtain approval from the Statistical Policy Division of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) by filing Standard Form No. 83, “Clearance Request and Notification of Action,” in triplicate, naturally. This form, *inter alia*, specifies the nature of the data to be collected and the estimated respondent burden which consists of the number of responses and the total number of man-hours required to complete the form each year.⁶ OMB reviews the request and, if the form is approved, an approval expiration date is specified. A form may not be used if OMB does not consent or if the approval has expired. Thus, the OMB review process, in theory, controls federal forms and, thereby, reduces the burden placed on the private sector.

6. Standard Form 83A, “Instructions for Requesting OMB Approval Under the Federal Reports Act,” contains a detailed review of the contents of Standard Form 83. For Interagency Reports, Standard Form 360 must be filed with the National Archives Records Service, which also receives Standard Form 152 if the form is a Standard or Option Form in public use that requires OMB approval. Elaboration of these matters is beyond the scope of this paper.

A wide gap exists, however, between theory and practice. There is no evidence to suggest that OMB is necessarily concerned about the reporting burden in the forms review process; very few forms do not receive OMB's blessing. During the fiscal year 1972, for example, a total of 2,193 repetitive-use forms were submitted to OMB for review; 733 of these forms were new, whereas the remaining 1,438 were revisions to or extensions of existing reports. Only 22 repetitive use forms were disapproved — one percent of the total.

Energy Paperwork: A Case Study in Bureaucratic Ineptitude

Even though OMB rejects almost none of the forms submitted for approval, this does not imply that all approved forms are essential to the functioning of government. In fact, there are numerous illustrations of redundant or even useless information being collected at substantial costs to the private sector and the American taxpayer. As an example, consider as a case study the paperwork related to petroleum import data. Obviously, given the U.S. dependence on foreign sources of crude oil, accurate and timely data on petroleum imports are of vital significance. As the record shows, however, such information is not forthcoming from the federal bureaucracy, even though tens of millions of dollars are spent each year in collecting various statistics on crude oil imports.⁷

In 1975, at least four government agencies which were concerned with energy policy published estimates of the amount of oil brought into the U.S. from abroad. It is interesting that, for the same month, each agency often reported different estimates of the volume of imports. For January 1975, the Bureau of the Census reported imports of 9.1 million barrels per day (bpd), while the Federal Energy Administration estimated 6.8 million bpd and the Bureau of Mines indicated imports of 6.6 million bpd. As is evident, the discrepancies among the various estimates can be sizeable; in this one month, the Census' figure exceeds FEA's by more than one-third — hardly the degree of accuracy desirable for the conduct of national policy.

7. The materials on energy paperwork are taken from U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, *Energy* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977) *passim*.

At least part of the problem can be attributed to the mystifying morass of forms and reports on oil imports which existed at that time. FEA had nine distinct reports, one of which was shared with the Bureau of Mines; a tenth report was carried over from the defunct Federal Energy Office and, finally, the Bureau of Customs provided its own forms. Both OMB and FEA have investigated the sources of divergence among the oil import statistics reported by various agencies. Many factors accounted for the differences including, but not limited to, incomplete data collection, the use of different commodity class criteria, differing treatment of imports into the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, and late data collection. FEA reasoned that many of the discrepancies could be attributed to the use of different dates of importation for the same shipment of oil. A complete explanation is far beyond the scope of this study, but, briefly,

- the Bureau of the Census uses the date on which the importer files official entry papers with Customs;

- the Bureau of Mines remains flexible by using information from three sources: the importer, the Bureau of the Census and FEA. The actual date employed by BOM can vary from the date that unloading operations are completed; and,

- FEA, of course, uses two different systems, each of which, naturally, must employ different dates;

- the system used to collect oil import fees employs the date when custody of the shipment is given officially to the importer by Customs;

- the refining and importers systems uses the same date as the Bureau of Mines (see above for clarification).

Evidently, even the bureaucrats at FEA became befuddled and, in ostensible desperation, turned to the private sector for assistance in improving the paperwork. On November 4, 1976, FEA issued Request for Proposal No. 70013 which asked contractors to submit proposals by December 7, 1976, to "Identify and Correct Faults in Energy Data Systems Forms and Instructions." The RFP describes the project, in part, as follows:

Recent studies conducted in the Office of Energy Systems have revealed faults in a number of energy data systems which may have an adverse impact on the quality of the data. These concern the use of vague, incomplete, missing, and inconsistent reporting instructions.

* * *

The contractor shall prepare a report for each of ten FEA data systems which identifies and corrects faults in the reporting instructions. The contractor will peruse the forms and reporting instructions used to collect energy data for the ten systems and will identify vague, incomplete, missing, and inconsistent reporting instructions. The contractor will devise corrections for the identified faults and will document the fault and the correction thereto. The above shall comprise Phase I of the contract.

At the option of the Government, the contract may, with 60-days advance notice to the contractor, be extended to perform the same tasks for an additional ten data systems.

This RFP was withdrawn and no contract was ever awarded, for, apparently, the public admission that energy paperwork problems were beyond the expertise of the bureaucrat would have been, to say the least, embarrassing.

In terms of complexity, energy paperwork may be considered relatively straightforward in comparison to the bureaucratic blizzard produced by the Internal Revenue Service. About 35 percent of all federal forms involving the general public are generated by this one agency.⁸ In testimony before the Senate Committee on Government Operations, IRS stated that it used 13,200 forms, including form letters which are given form numbers.⁹ However, as any experienced taxpayer is aware, a single "form" may have many separate "schedules" attached to it which are not assigned separate numbers. The best-known example is the Individual Income Tax Form 1040 that has 10 schedules attached: Schedules A, B, C, D, E, F, G, R, RP, SE and TC. *Your Federal Income Tax Return*, 1978 edition, lists no less than 41 forms "commonly used" in tax preparation.

There is ample evidence that voluminous paperwork is an inherent characteristic of government bureaucracy and, for decades, has defied all attempts to control or reduce it. One can, therefore, conclude that there are powerful incentives

8. U.S. Congress, *The Federal Paperwork Burden, Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 34.

9. U.S. Congress, *Improving the Coordination of Federal Reporting Services, Hearings, op. cit.*, p. 59.

in the structure of bureaucracy which make paperwork pervasive.

Paperwork and Bureaucratic Self-Interest

The bureaucrat's penchant for paperwork is motivated by the incentive structure which exists in government. Unlike private industry in which individuals are promoted and rewarded for reducing costs and increasing efficiency, the bureaucrat is rewarded for expanding the size and scope of government. As Paul Craig Roberts has observed:

[P]recisely because they do have special interests offering them identifiable gains, bureaucrats and their beneficiaries have incentives to enlarge the scope of government. Today legislation is originated by bureaucrats who unlike politicians are life peers and cannot be voted out of office. Some people are sufficiently sophisticated to notice that bureaucrats are quick to use every opportunity to feather their nests and enlarge their budgets and powers. But I am saying more . . . I am saying that government social and economic policy is the tool of bureaucrats for self-aggrandizement and is inimical to the public interest.¹⁰

The government bureaucrat receives promotions and increases in pay, prestige, and authority by expanding the agency's budget and the number of workers under his supervision. In order to justify additional budget allocations and to secure positions for these workers, it is necessary to convince Congress to initiate new government social and economic "programs" and to show that the bureau is taking steps to deal with the social and economic "crises" that plague the nation. Since the bureau itself rarely produces an easily quantifiable output — government is service-oriented rather than product-oriented — the bureaucrat must provide some tangible evidence that the agency is performing some activity. This tangible evidence takes the form of paperwork which the bureaucrat uses to support his claims for additional appropriations.

However, the bureaucrat prefers to spend as much of the congressionally-appropriated funds as possible to enhance his own self-interest. Because his salary is fixed, aside from kick-backs, the funds cannot be diverted to the bureaucrat's own

10. Paul Craig Roberts, "The Political Economy of Bureaucratic Imperialism," *The Intercollegiate Review*, 11, Fall 1976, p. 3.

use except through the purchase of perquisites, such as travel to conferences in places like Hawaii. Thus, the "feather the nest" syndrome encourages the bureaucrat to exploit the private sector as much as possible by shifting the burden of paperwork to the private sector which is not compensated for the time and effort expended in filling out government forms.¹¹

There is ample evidence that new programs have been instituted which greatly increase the private-sector paperwork burden. Table 3 contains a partial list of the major programs

Table 3
Major Increases in Reporting Burden from New Programs
Begun Between December 1966 and June 1973

Program	Agency/Department	Man-hours
Food Stamps	Agriculture	1,976,000
Student Loans	Health, Education & Welfare	1,214,000
Basic Educational Opportunity	Health, Education & Welfare	8,600,000
Medicare-Medicaid	Social Security Admin.	1,539,000
Black-Lung Benefits	Social Security Admin.	200,000
Supplemental Security Income	Social Security Admin.	7,500,000
Equal Employment Opportunity	OEO ^a and Labor	1,928,000
Environmental Protection	EPA and AEC ^b	2,056,000
Occupational Health & Safety	Interior, Labor, AEC ^b	3,790,000
Price Controls	Wage-Price Council	5,600,000
Airway & Airport Development	FAA/Transportation	788,000
Highway Safety	National Highway Safety Admin.	182,000
Revenue Sharing	Treasury	228,000
Meat, Poultry & Egg Inspection	Agriculture	144,000
Freight Loss & Damage Claim Report	CAB/ICC	876,000
Total		36,621,000

^aNow referred to as ACTION.

^bNow referred to as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

11. For a more detailed discussion see James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, "Paperwork and Bureaucratic Behavior," *Economic Inquiry*, forthcoming.

begun between December 1966 and June 1973 and the paperwork burden measured in man-hours associated with each program.¹² During this period, the programs listed required an increase of 36.6 million man-hours to complete the bureaucratic paperwork resulting from these new activities. Many of these forms are complicated and impose onerous requirements on individuals and businesses. The Federal Paperwork Commission, for example, found that:

The paperwork in licensing a single nuclear power plant frequently exceeds 15,000 pages and may cost \$15 million to the utility applying for the license. This paperwork takes the form of reports, questions and answers pertaining to these reports, and transcripts of public hearings. Most of the applicant-prepared material is printed in batches of 300-500 copies for distribution to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, other Federal agencies, State agencies, and interested members of the public.¹³

The paperwork burden attributable to these new programs is small in comparison with the total paperwork burden which is shown in Table 4.¹⁴ As of June 30, 1972, a total of 5,567 repetitive-use forms were employed by the agencies of the federal government which are subject to the Federal Reports Act of 1942. These forms generate more than 418 million responses and require an estimated 145 million man-hours of private-sector labor to complete.

In a new Report by the Comptroller General of the United States entitled "Federal Paperwork: Its Impact on American Businesses," published November 17, 1978, GAO estimates that "businesses take about 69 million hours annually at an estimated cost of over \$1 billion to respond to more than 2,100 U.S. reporting requirements [excluding the IRS]." According to this report, fourteen federal agencies account for 86 percent of these reporting requirements and costs. A congressional report entitled "Improving the Coordination of Federal Reporting," states that "HEW accounts for 37 percent of the responses and about 31 percent of all man-hours."

12. U.S. Congress, *Improving the Coordination of Federal Reporting Services*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

13. U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, *Energy*, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

14. U.S. Congress, *Improving the Coordination of Federal Reporting Services*, *op. cit.*, pp. 82-88.

Table 4
 Number of Forms, Estimated Number of
 Responses and Man-hours for Repetitive Federal Forms
 By Agency as of June 30, 1972

Department or Agency	Number of Forms	Number of Responses	Number of Man-hours
Agriculture	831	35,670,047	9,227,958
Commerce	554	25,560,587	4,711,308
Defense	247	15,331,660	6,010,567
H.E.W.	983	157,310,878	45,633,808
H.U.D.	302	7,204,978	5,693,600
Interior	339	4,842,480	2,946,277
Justice	142	13,111,851	2,322,304
Labor	266	43,647,103	18,857,593
State	37	4,747,090	1,410,428
Transportation	286	16,409,584	4,815,182
Treasury	135	25,275,988	3,413,529
A.E.C. (ERDA/NRC)	63	274,830	1,472,528
EPA	67	636,600	1,156,368
EEOC	7	268,180	1,357,840
FCC	109	1,308,651	1,733,245
ICC	97	998,889	2,771,365
Selective Service	42	9,883,152	2,899,100
Civil Service	83	18,219,409	8,671,166
Veteran's Admin.	282	24,671,163	7,729,974
All Other Agencies	695	12,756,285	12,477,650
Total	5,567	418,129,405	145,311,790

The potential for the misuse and abuse of this information is enormous. In this regard, Roberts notes that:

A person born before the turn of the century was born a private individual. He was born into a world in which his existence was attested by his mere physical presence, without documents, forms, permits, licenses, orders, lists of currency carried in and out, identity cards, draft cards, ration cards, exit stamps, customs declarations, questionnaires, tax forms, reports in multiplicate, social security

number, or other authentications of his being, birth, nationality, status, beliefs, creed, right to be, enter, leave, move about, work, trade, purchase, dwell.¹⁵

The right of the private individual to exist without bureaucratic intervention and manipulation of every aspect of his private affairs has been abrogated by the bureaucrat seeking to serve his own self-interest.¹⁶

There are a number of factors leading to the conclusion that the true size of the burden is, in reality, much greater than that reported in Table 4. First, the estimated man-hours required to complete the various forms are provided by the bureaucrats themselves. In order to insure that OMB does not reject the forms, it is in the bureaucrat's self-interest to underestimate substantially both the number of responses and the man-hours spent in completing the forms. Second, many forms are used without OMB clearance by consultants, contractors, and others in the bureaucratic retinue. Also, forms which have expired and are no longer included in the OMB inventory are often used. Third, the forms reported in Table 4 are all repetitive-use forms; millions of responses are generated by single-time special surveys. Finally, as noted earlier, many agencies, in particular the Internal Revenue Service, are exempt from OMB surveillance and are, therefore, not included in our data. The U.S. Comptroller's report of November 17, 1978 cites an estimate by IRS that "its reporting and recording requirements result in about 613 million hours of burden annually on business and individuals." The omission of these figures from OMB's data produces a tremendous underestimate of the private sector burden, as indicated by the following citation:

. . . the Individual Income Tax Return . . . accounts for over 73 million returns annually. The U.S. Information Return for dividends and interest, Form 1099, contributes more than 100 million additional responses each year. These figures, however, are dwarfed by the number of responses which are required by the various forms used exclusively by businesses.

15. Roberts, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

16. The interested reader should consult Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).

Estimates, [of the costs], run into the billions of dollars. Compliance with Form 941 alone is estimated to cost small business over \$235 million per year.¹⁷

Because of the factors discussed above, it is clear that the bureaucratic paperwork problem is much more serious than available data indicate. The incentives for the bureaucracy to employ paperwork as an essential tool in furthering their own goals are apparently very powerful and, over the span of almost a century, have consistently overcome all efforts to control the proliferation of paper in the federal government. More recent data are not available in sufficient detail to provide comparisons with earlier data. The Commission on Federal Paperwork reported that as of June 30, 1977, a total of 5,473 repetitive-use forms had been filed with GAO and OMB; these forms generate about 427 million responses annually which require 210 million man-hours.¹⁸ Although the number of forms was about 1.7 percent lower at the end of June 1977 than at the end of June 1973, the number of responses increased by 2.2 percent while — in only 4 years — the reporting burden in man-hours increased by 44.5 percent. On March 1, 1976, the President ordered the number of forms in use reduced by 10 percent in relation to the number of forms in use on October 31, 1974.¹⁹ The federal bureaucracy achieved this reduction, but increased the man-hours required to complete the forms in the process.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This study has surveyed the magnitude and scope of the paperwork problem in the federal bureaucracy and the burden imposed on the private sector. Because bureaucrats are able to use paperwork to justify larger budgets and staffs, there are strong incentives for bureaucrats to increase the number of government programs. By shifting the cost of paperwork to

17. U.S. Congress, *The Federal Paperwork Burden, Hearings, op. cit.*, pp. 34-35.

18. U.S. Commission on Federal Paperwork, *A Summary of the Federal Paperwork Burden as of June 30, 1976: Special Summary Prepared for the Committee on National Statistics* (Washington, D.C., 1977) (Mimeographed) p. 2.

19. President Ford's letter is reported in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 10, March 8, 1976, pp. 324-325.

the private sector, the bureaucrat has more discretionary funding to spend on perquisites of office. As noted earlier, these costs are enormous and, for all intents and purposes, represent a hidden tax on both individuals and businesses which may stifle economic incentives and impair efficiency.

The paperwork burden falls disproportionately on small firms and individuals who lack the resources to deal with bureaucratic demands for data. Thus, government paperwork discourages small business enterprise and thereby contributes to the nation's unemployment ills among those workers who produce useful goods and services. To the extent that paperwork reduces economic incentives to produce goods and services, inflation is also exacerbated by the reduction in supply. Therefore, the indirect costs of paperwork make the total burden even larger and contribute to social and economic problems.

The historical record shows that the bureaucracy has outwitted the numerous attempts to reduce paperwork in the federal government. Not only are there benefits to the bureaucrat for instituting paperwork, but there are also powerful constituencies created by the paperwork burden and the accompanying complex forms and regulations. As a notorious example, consider the myriad of firms and individuals who reap profits from guiding individuals and businesses through the labyrinth of tax forms generated by the Internal Revenue Service.²⁰ A second example is provided by the coterie of contractors and subcontractors who survive as parasites by responding to the bureaucratic demands for economic and environmental "impact" statements. Ultimately, of course it is the consumer who pays the cost of all the government programs that generate the bureaucratic blizzard of paper.

Because of the costs and the potential for abuse of the information collected through the paperwork process, some method must be instituted to control bureaucratic appetites for paper at all levels of government. A central tenet of any strategy must greatly reduce the current incentives or, better, provide positive disincentives for the bureaucracy to generate

20. A detailed treatment of bureaucratic imperialism by IRS is given in James T. Bennett and Manuel H. Johnson, "Bureaucratic Imperialism: Some Sobering Statistics," *The Intercollegiate Review*, 13, Winter-Spring 1978, pp. 101-103.

paperwork. A first step in this process is to educate the public about the size and cost of government paperwork so that public attitudes can be focused on the problem of creating incentives for congressional action. Of course, the central issue is to identify the appropriate actions for Congress to take to reduce the paperwork burden. Our recommendations are preliminary and should be considered suggestive rather than exhaustive, for research on bureaucratic incentives is currently in its infancy.

In general terms, it is necessary to design a "tax" on the bureaucracy which forces the agencies to absorb the costs of paperwork rather than pass these costs to the private sector. As an illustration, if an increase in the paperwork burden generated by a bureau is linked to a reduction in funds available for travel or other perquisites of office, the bureaucrat will have less incentive to create paperwork. Another possibility is the creation of external checks on bureaucratic practices which would identify and lead to the elimination of redundant and useless collection of information. Gordon Tullock, in *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, describes the system which existed in imperial China where a group of censors were created to monitor continuously the functioning of the government bureaucracy; promotion and increases in pay for the censors in the Imperial Chinese Censorate was dependent upon the ability of a censor to detect and expose misconduct and waste.²¹ In a similar, but more facetious vein, Gilbert & Sullivan in *Utopia, Limited* created two characters who served as "public exploders" to monitor the activities of King Paramount and to blow him up with dynamite if his actions were untoward. Humor, or perhaps ridicule, may also be an effective weapon against bureaucratic excesses. For example, if more exposure were given to the number of forms and the paperwork burden generated by individual agencies, bureaucrats would have a greater incentive to economize on paperwork because of the concern that such unfavorable publicity could incur the displeasure of Congress and lead to reduced budgets.

One final note: it is clear that an additional government bureau with the same incentive structure that currently exists

21. Gordon Tullock, *The Politics of Bureaucracy* (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1965) pp. 215-216.

is *not* needed, for commissioning an unmotivated bureaucrat to monitor paperwork is like hiring a fox to guard a henhouse.



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The Soviet World View

CHARLES M. KUPPERMAN

The Soviet concept of what is "strategic" is much broader and more dynamic than the U.S. concept of "strategic." While the U.S. tends to compartmentalize the world, the Soviet Union views the world as a single strategic theater for the historic clash between capitalism and socialism. The basic strategic objective of the Soviet Union is to position itself as the dominant global power. This means possessing the capability to control global economic, political, and strategic affairs directly from Moscow. This can be accomplished only by eliminating the U.S. as its major competitor, by undermining U.S. power at minimal costs and risks to the Soviet Union.¹ This strategic objective becomes quite evident if one examines the strong synergism between Soviet political policies, strategies and tactics, and their enormous military programs.

The Soviet effort to achieve its basic strategic objective has been massive in scope and tempo and consistent over time.² The Soviet Union also utilizes increasingly sophisticated strategies to achieve this objective.³ In pursuit of this objective, the Soviet Union requires less political and strategic "modeling" predictability than the U.S. and, therefore, approaches its strategic objective with the open-ended and firm conviction that strength and superiority over the U.S., wherever attainable, is highly desirable and definitely usable. It is a matter of Soviet policy to seek such strength.

In the Soviet world view, conflict and competition with the U.S. are normal states of affairs; these types of relationships

1. "Highlights of Selected Factors and Issues Bearing Upon Soviet Perceptions and Assessments Relative to the 'Correlation of World Forces,'" A Paper Prepared by the Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, June 1975, p. 7.

2. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978).

3. Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey (eds.), *The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow: A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow*, Monographs in International Affairs (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1975) p. 4.

must be anticipated and preparations must be made that will produce Soviet victories. And "since the Soviet leadership has gone to great lengths to spell out what it means by 'peaceful coexistence,' the limits of that concept, as well as its implications for Soviet foreign policies, there is no reason, as Soviet spokesmen themselves point out, why the West should harbor any 'illusions' about it or persist in basing its expectations on different assumptions concerning Moscow's policies and actions."⁴ Indeed, "the main problem is not that the Soviets do not tell us what they are doing, but that we are reluctant to believe they mean what they say."⁵ The result is a highly aggressive Soviet drive for global dominance and continued U.S. strategic lethargy.

The basic outcome of the U.S.-Soviet conflict is, for the Soviet Union, non-negotiable. There can be no common set of security interests between the two nations defined by the U.S. "Equal" security for the Soviet Union translates into absolute insecurity for all other Western nations. From the Soviet perspective, all that is negotiable for the long-term is the method the West prefers that will ensure its collapse.⁶ Thus far, the Soviet Union has structured the spectrum of choice from appeasement to preemptive concession to "conceptual breakthroughs" to surrender to strategic superiority. Basic Soviet policy will continue to pursue the spectrum.

The Soviet Union views the ultimate long-term clash as a "zero-sum" game in which a U.S. loss is counted as a Soviet gain and a Soviet gain is counted as a U.S. loss.⁷ There is no Soviet sense of "fair play" or "spirit" about splitting the political, economic, social, or strategic differences that would transform the

4. Leon Goure, Foy D. Kohler, and Mose L. Harvey, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, Monographs in International Affairs (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1974) p. xxi.

5. Foy D. Kohler, Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure, and Richard Soll, *Soviet Strategy for the Seventies: From Cold War to Peaceful Coexistence*, Monographs in International Affairs (University of Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, 1973) p. 6.

6. Colin S. Gray, "War and Peace — The Soviet View," *Air Force Magazine*, October 1976, p. 30.

7. "Highlights of Selected Factors and Issues Bearing Upon Soviet Perceptions and Assessments Relative to the 'Correlation of World Forces,'" p. 6.

epic confrontation into a “non-zero-sum” game.

During the conduct of these “games,” the Soviet Union will exploit all opportunities and internal divisions within the Western bloc by maintaining a flexible negotiating strategy and military capability that support their requirements for waging political warfare. The Soviet approach deplors rigidity and doctrinairism and emphasizes adaptability. It also demonstrates no hesitation to use illogical argumentation or inconsistency as long as they serve their strategic objective. For the Soviet Union, consistency is not a virtue in its own right.

Global Competition – A ‘Realistic View’

The central concept in the Soviet world view is the “correlation of world forces,” which the Soviet Union defines as a dynamic mixture of political, economic, social, and military factors. The “correlation” is fundamental to any Soviet assessment of its relations with the U.S. Of equal importance to this unifying concept is the Soviet perception of the movements or trends in the “correlation of world forces.” The Soviets do not view the “correlation of world forces” as an abstract concept but, rather, as an “objective” assessment reflecting the “realities” of the world. In the Soviet world view, the major shift in the “correlation of world forces” has been in favor of the Soviet Union and at the core of this belief is the perception that the changed balance of U.S.-Soviet military power has been the key to Soviet ascendancy. The SALT I Agreements of 1972⁸ and the Final Act of the C.S.C.E. signed at Helsinki in 1975⁹ are frequently cited as *hard* evidence of these new “objective realities” which influence U.S.-Soviet relations and which have actually “forced” the U.S. to adapt itself to Soviet initiatives.¹⁰

The cutting edge of the “correlation of world forces” is

8. William R. Van Cleave, “Political and Negotiating Asymmetries: Insult in SALT I,” A Paper Prepared for the Sixth International Arms Control Symposium, Philadelphia, November 2, 1973; and Donald G. Brennan, *Arms Treaties with Moscow: Unequal Terms Unevenly Applied?* (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1975).

9. George W. Ball, “Capitulation at Helsinki,” *Atlantic Community Quarterly*, Fall 1975, pp. 286-288.

10. G. Arbatov, “The Strength of A Policy of Realism,” *Izvestia*, June 22, 1972, and *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, July 17, 1972, p. 4.

Soviet military power, and “. . . the Soviet authorities leave no doubt that they consider as basic to all else that has happened, or may happen in the way of a shift in the balance of world forces, the growth of Soviet military power, and more particularly, Soviet nuclear power.”¹¹ “Soviet strategic nuclear power has been the elevator of Soviet status in international politics.”¹² The state of the military balance and perceptions of this balance are critical factors in determining the character of U.S.-Soviet global competition. These assessments have important ideological as well as strategic implications and the Soviets pride themselves on their ability to make accurate and timely evaluations of the “correlation of world forces” and, more precisely, the military balance.

Briefly then, in the Soviet world view, “detente” was forced upon the U.S. due to the enormous across-the-board increase in Soviet military power, accompanied and reinforced by a precipitous decline in U.S. political will. Despite the enormous increase in Soviet power, the Soviets believe that “deterrence” is fragile and could fail — the result of U.S. resistance to Soviet initiatives. Therefore, Soviet leaders take the possibility of war at *all* levels far more seriously than their Western counterparts, whose guiding premise is to avoid war and particularly “nuclear” war at all political and strategic costs. In order to strengthen “deterrence” and assure the survival of the Soviet Union should “deterrence” fail, the Soviets emphasize the need for expanding and enhancing their military power, the combat readiness of their forces, the morale and vigilance of the Soviet citizenry, and the vigilance of their “allied forces of Socialism.”¹³

With this perspective, there is no inconsistency for the Soviets to follow on the one hand, the policy of “detente” while, on the other hand, engaging in the most massive strategic nuclear buildup in history.¹⁴ Such a policy is in strict accord

11. Leon Goure, *et. al.*, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, p. 2.

12. Colin S. Gray, “War and Peace — the Soviet View,” p. 28.

13. *Communist of the Armed Forces*, November 1975, in Paul H. Nitze, “Deterring our Deterrent,” *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1976-1977, p. 197.

14. Leon Goure, *et. al.*, *The Role of Nuclear Forces in Current Soviet Strategy*, p. 23.

with common and monotonously repeated principles of Marxist-Leninist “dialectics.” For the Soviet Union, military “sufficiency” is only a relative state, not an absolute benchmark of security. The Soviet world view does not regard strategic nuclear weapons as negative instruments having limited applicability to international politics. They are perceived to be important diplomatic instruments that can be utilized to further foreign policy goals and restrict U.S. international political and military activity. Above all else, the Soviet world view incorporates the desire to survive any potential political crisis or war with the U.S. and the Soviet approach is now being evaluated by more strategists on its own terms. A fundamental question remains — why the long delay?

Erroneous Perceptions of Soviet Strategic Doctrine

During the 1960s and even at SALT I, the U.S. exhibited a tendency to project Soviet force planning and strategy primarily on the basis of preferred U.S. concepts and assumptions. These “mirror-image” assumptions included such levels of ethnocentrism that U.S. strategic planning was actually an exercise in planning for both sides — hardly a competitive view of strategy — but entirely consistent with the American “hostility to hostility.”

Another fundamental assumption of the “mirror-image” concerned the so-called U.S.-Soviet arms race.¹⁵ The basic premise in this chain of logic was that the U.S. was the initiator of arms “race” activity, while the Soviet Union was the reacting party. In order to break the mechanistic operation of the “arms spiral,” unilateral U.S. self-restraint would (naturally) induce Soviet restraint. Such restraint would subsequently produce a strategic nuclear relationship in which each side would possess a highly survivable “assured destruction” capability that must not be threatened by the other side’s strategic forces. There

15. The classic “mirror-image” texts are: Robert S. McNamara, *The Essence of Security* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968); and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper and Row, 1971). For refutations of these action-reaction arms race models see, Albert Wohlstetter, “Is There a Strategic Arms Race?”, *Foreign Policy*, Spring and Fall 1974; and Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race* (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1976).

would be no need to procure strategic forces beyond those required for the statistical assured destruction mission. Because of the American belief that strategic forces had no extracurricular political utility, additional strategic forces were considered irrelevant.

Even when "unique" Soviet strategic programs began to appear in the mid-1960s, they were not evaluated on their own characteristics or strategic implications, but were forced to fit the conceptual model of the assured destruction mirror-image. Despite the obvious differences in throw-weight, warhead yield, and strategic doctrine, the Soviet Union was still stereotyped as an assured destroyer. In order to accommodate this strategic and intellectual confusion, new rationalizations had to be developed. Although the Soviets *might* be different strategic adversaries, nuclear technology was assumed to be immune to ideology, and it was, therefore, perceived to be the common denominator in the action-reaction model, which would soon produce a "plateau of stable deterrence."

This plateau, however, would be accompanied by the loss of American strategic superiority. For, by the late 1960s, U.S. officials saw "rough strategic parity" as the condition that would stabilize the then doubled Soviet threat and concluded that their Soviet counterparts would reciprocate the "mirror image" phenomenon. American analyses of Soviet strategic doctrine during this period were not derived from either a critical or comparative analysis of Soviet views. Soviet strategic thought was perceived to be backward, quite unsophisticated, and in dire need of an American strategic education. Little consideration was given to the basic propositions that the Soviet Union might have its own set of strategic approaches and strategic objectives and that these might not conform to American expectations or preferences.

In order to rescue the mirror-image model, the discrepancies among Soviet literature, official Soviet pronouncements and strategic programs and U.S. concepts were rationalized away by the arguments of the "strategic educators."¹⁶ These analysts

16. Jeremy J. Stone, *Strategic Persuasion: Arms Limitation Through Dialogue* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); Roman Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Union and Arms Control: A Superpower Dilemma* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970); and John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973).

argued that the Soviets would eventually change their views once they appreciated the foundation and merit of the U.S. assured destruction model and that it was only a matter of time, monotonous repetition, patience, and *more* strategic self-restraint for "strategic convergence" to occur.

Soviet convergence, however, did not occur, as explicit Soviet strategic doctrine demonstrated no equivalent concepts of mutual assured destruction (MAD), any sensitivity to the varieties of stability — strategic, arms competition, crisis, or sub-strategic (all of which are considered "reactionary" contradictions of "correct" Marxist-Leninist ideology), "deterrence," or "parity." Furthermore, the Soviet Union did not endorse the false distinction between deterrence and defense, but continued to develop and deploy strategic nuclear forces of a "war-fighting" nature.

Despite the fact that American strategic superiority had been the predominate condition of international politics for the previous fifteen years and had brought stability to international politics, America's faith in the non-utility of strategic nuclear superiority could not be shaken and the Soviet strategic buildup was seen as an opportunity to institutionalize a "new structure of peace." If one, however, had argued that "the Soviet Union has no inherent right to strategic parity or to a place in the sun co-equal to that occupied by the U.S.,"¹⁷ one would have been forwarding a minority opinion, one which was outside the predominate view which defined strategic nuclear weapons as *sui generis* instruments of policy.¹⁸

Some "strategic convergence" has indeed occurred, but it has occurred in the opposite and unexpected direction of U.S. strategic thought converging with Soviet concepts. The present period of official strategic debate and academic ferment indicates the rapidity of the adverse shift in the central strategic balance. This state of affairs has forced the U.S. to rethink, re-evaluate, and reformulate its basic concepts of nuclear strategy and its requirements for "high quality deterrence" in light of a severe Soviet threat.

17. Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race*.

18. For a list of the Western analysts who acknowledge the political utility and military relevance of strategic nuclear forces, see Colin S. Gray, "The 'Second Wave': New Directions in Strategic Studies," *RUSI Journal*, December 1972.

The shift in the U.S. approach toward Soviet strategic doctrine represents the reaction to "discovering" an enormous gap between U.S. expectations of Soviet behavior and actual Soviet strategic programs. It has been the Soviet Union which has increased the American learning curve and forced a new appreciation for Soviet strategic objectives and preferences. Unfortunately for the U.S., this education could be costly because, if not promptly offset, the dynamism of Soviet strategic programs indicates the emergence of a period of unprecedented strategic insecurity for the West — 1980-1982 — when the Soviets' new generation of large throw-weight fixed land-based MIRVed ICBMs are fully deployed and operational.

Examining and Evaluating Soviet Strategic Doctrine

It is possible to analyze Soviet military thought and strategic doctrine as they are revealed in their military literature, military exercises, and strategic force deployments. Despite certain gaps in our knowledge, it is possible to reach reasonable conclusions about Soviet strategic doctrine — and it is indeed necessary — for to wait for the threat to appear is to court disaster and forfeit by default any compensatory countermeasures which could reduce or rechannel the threat. Furthermore, it is impossible to indoctrinate, train and equip the Soviet military establishment without utilizing specific doctrinal literature and this requires Western analysts to be discriminating when examining Soviet military literature and also to evaluate the content based on its intended audience.¹⁹

A complementary method of analysis is to examine the strategic capabilities the Soviet Union has procured and continues to develop. With this type of analysis, it is also possible to make reasonable inferences about Soviet strategic doctrine and, if there is congruence between Soviet military literature and strategic force deployments, it would seem to be entirely logical to postulate conclusions about Soviet strategic doctrine.²⁰ This method of analysis is further

19. William F. Scott, *Soviet Sources of Military Doctrine and Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company Inc., 1975); and Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., "Soviet Military Thought," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1976.

20. William R. Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy: A Developing American View," in Lawrence L. Whetten, ed., *The Future of Soviet Military Power* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1976) p. 43.

strengthened if there has been continuity and consistency in both the literary areas and actual force deployments.

It is crucial not to confuse the terms Soviet "doctrine," "military strategy," "military science," and "military art."²¹ At the supreme level of this verbal hierarchy is Soviet "doctrine." Soviet strategic doctrine is "a single system of national directions free from individual views." Soviet strategic doctrine is the product of a command political system and is formulated at the highest political level in the Soviet Union. Soviet strategic doctrine has the official approval, the political imprimatur, of the ruling elite of the CPSU — the Politburo. Soviet strategic doctrine is fairly immutable, not subject to ex post facto debate,²² nor is it a negotiable item with the U.S. Contrary to the role of the U.S. military, the Soviet military enjoys a significant political decision-making role in the formulation of strategic doctrine.

Despite the vertical chain of command, Soviet doctrine does not deprive the Soviet Union of enormous flexibility in shifting tactics in order to take advantage of real and perceived changes in the "correlation of world forces." Soviet doctrine, therefore, incorporates an extremely sensitive appreciation of the relative trends in military capabilities.

Soviet military strategy, military science, and military art are all subordinate to political considerations. At these levels of thought, differences of opinion are possible and even encouraged in order to insure the proper synthesis of military thought. These three categories of military thought represent "the fundamentals of preparing for and waging war as a whole and its campaigns."²³

On the U.S. side of the doctrinal ledger, few believe that any Soviet-American armed conflict is at all likely. In the U.S., there has been made a sharp separation between the concepts of "deterrence" and "defense." The U.S. has emphasized pre-war deterrence while neglecting the basic preparations and

21. V.D. Sokoloskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, edited, with an analysis and commentary by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 3rd Edition, 1975).

22. William F. Scott, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy: Realities and Misunderstandings," *Strategic Review*, Summer 1975.

23. V.D. Sokolovskiy, *Soviet Military Strategy*, p. xvii.

planning necessary to assure national survival and recovery from a strategic nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The basic belief has been that "deterrence won't ever fail" and that strategic nuclear war is, therefore, "unthinkable." Furthermore, strategic nuclear war *must be avoided at all costs* and this objective has become an end in itself. Until very recently, planning to prosecute different types of strategic nuclear war was secondary. The dominance of a simple single-exchange assured destruction nuclear war model, a basic revulsion against actually thinking through various hypothetical breakdowns in deterrence, and a substantially reduced Soviet threat all contributed to this American strategic doctrinal malaise.

The U.S. approach to arms control was also insensitive to either the stakes involved or the benefits of a coherent negotiating strategy. Rather, it was based on the erroneous perception of mutual U.S.-Soviet interests in solving each other's strategic problems, which were always assumed to be identical anyway. For the U.S., arms control was an end in itself, divorced from the political realities of U.S.-Soviet enmity and somehow placed within the preferred U.S. framework of the "harmony of interests." Arms control developed into a substitute for prudential U.S. national security policy and planning.

Soviet strategic doctrine, to the contrary, stresses the advantages and desirability of real and perceived strategic nuclear superiority. In the Soviet view, "to press hard in strategic weaponry pays dividends,"²⁴ and the acquisition of strategic nuclear superiority over the U.S. can serve three interrelated objectives.²⁵

First, strategic nuclear superiority confers on the Soviet Union the ability to prevail in strategic nuclear war with the U.S. at a tolerable cost to the Soviet regime. Second, the acquisition of strategic nuclear capabilities unmatched by the U.S. should yield significant military and political advantages that will either deter crisis situations or win them short of strategic nuclear war. Finally, the acquisition of a strategic

24. Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race*, p. 64.

25. Colin S. Gray, "Soviet-American Strategic Competition: Instruments, Doctrines, and Purposes," A Paper Prepared for the National Security Affairs Conference, "Long-Range U.S.-USSR Competition: National Security Implications" (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, July 12-14, 1976) p. 38.

force posture that looks more substantial and capable than the U.S. force confers additional usable political status on the Soviet Union.

The most important asymmetry between Soviet and American strategic doctrine is the Soviet Union's policy to design their strategic forces to fight and "win" a general nuclear war.²⁶ The Soviet war-fighting capability and doctrine are designed to achieve the most favorable post-exchange(s) balance and leave the Soviet Union as the dominant global power. When evaluating its strategic capabilities, the Soviet Union assesses the cumulative capabilities of its strategic forces and related programs. Unlike the U.S., the Soviet Union does not over-isolate its strategic weapons systems but emphasizes the synergistic qualities of its strategic forces, programs, and doctrine.

Soviet Strategic Programs

Soviet strategic forces are designed to maximize qualitative improvements and flexible war-fighting operations. Soviet strategic doctrine has an unmistakable counterforce emphasis and a premium is placed on surprise and preemption — from the highest political level to the lowest operational level. The Soviet Union is dedicated to the strategy of firing the first salvo, thereby linking counterforce and damage limitation.

Soviet targeting priorities cover the spectrum of counterforce targets: U.S. strategic nuclear missile forces; SAC bomber bases; SSBN bases; nuclear weapon facilities; general purpose forces, bases, and overseas deployments; military command, control, and communication centers; political leadership; and defense industry (particularly war-supporting industry).²⁷ Soviet coverage of U.S. military targets will grow categorically and geographically as Soviet targeting capabilities continue to expand.

The Soviet Union has invested heavily in its land-based ICBM force and this program has three major objectives: "expanded

26. Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," *Commentary*, July 1977.

27. William R. Van Cleave, "Soviet Doctrine and Strategy: A Developing American View," p. 51; and Colin S. Gray, "Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces: Military Capability, Political Utility," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1978.

target coverage (particularly countermilitary) with MIRVs, improved pre-launch survivability with the new hard silo designs, and the attainment of a significant hard-target kill capability.²⁸ The fourth generation of Soviet land-based ICBMs – the SS-16, SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19 – are MIRVed or MIRVable, have substantially greater throw-weights than the third generation of missiles, and incorporate all the advanced technologies necessary for high accuracy.²⁹ All are designed for a first-strike, hard-target, counterforce mission and the Soviet Union is deploying these systems at a rate of 100-150 a year.³⁰

The Soviet Union “has made more rapid strides in accuracy than is generally appreciated and has shown an intense interest in various applications of terminal guidance.”³¹ New reentry vehicles with much higher betas are being developed by the Soviet Union. These RVs are designed for improved accuracy and will increase Soviet hard target, counterforce capabilities. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the current deployment program of fourth generation ICBMs will give the Soviet Union the potential to attain “high single-shot kill probabilities against U.S. silos.”³²

By the early 1980s, a small fraction of Soviet ICBMs could reduce the number of surviving MINUTEMAN to very low levels.³³ Soviet ICBM accuracies approaching 0.1nm have been

28. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and FY 1977* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1975) p. II-14.

29. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and FY 1977*, p. II-6. This includes on-board software for guidance, a new inertial guidance system, and a new bus system.

30. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978) p. 49. According to this report, “there now are over 100 SS-18 launchers converted from SS-9 launchers, along with more than 60 SS-17 and over 200 SS-19 launchers converted from SS-11 launchers.”

31. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and FY 1977*, p. II-8.

32. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979*, p. 63; and “SS-17, SS-18, and SS-19, All Potential Single Shot Silo Killers,” *Defense Space Business Daily*, March 8, 1978, p. 43.

33. James R. Schlesinger, *Annual Defense Department Report FY 1976 and FY 1977*, p. II-9; and Colin S. Gray, “The Future of Land-Based Missile Forces,” Adelphi Paper #140 (London: IISS, 1978).

achieved in recent tests of the SS-18 and SS-19.³⁴ The Soviet Union also is developing the fifth generation of ICBMs (possibly four new missiles) with improved accuracy as a major program objective.³⁵ One fifth generation missile is a single large-yield RV SS-19 type missile and is designed to replace part of the SS-11 force.

The SS-20 "variable" range, mobile MIRVed ballistic missile has a multiple refire capability and is another important Soviet initiative. The SS-20 consists of the first two stages of the SS-16 and uses the same transporter/launcher. The third stage could be quickly added, thereby converting the SS-20 to the SS-16. Additionally, there are payload, fuel, and basing modifications that would give the SS-20 intercontinental range even without adding the third stage of the SS-16.³⁶

The Soviet SSBN/SLBM program is another major strategic nuclear offensive force initiative. The Soviet Union has developed and deployed improved versions of the modern DELTA-class submarine. These submarines are armed with the intercontinental range SS-N-8 SLBM and are a significant improvement over YANKEE-class submarines armed with the SS-N-6 missile. Two new MIRVed SLBMs, the SS-NX-17 and SS-N-18, also having intercontinental ranges, have been developed. There have been reports that the SS-N-18 is already operational and deployed on DELTA-3 class submarines.

The SS-NX-17 appears to be the replacement for the SS-N-6, while the SS-N-18 is designed for the DELTA-3 submarines.³⁷

34. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Soviets Boost ICBM Accuracy," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 3, 1978, pp. 14-16. There have been 6 recent ICBM launchers from Tyuratom to an impact area on the Kamchatka Peninsula — 4 tests of the SS-18 and 2 tests of the SS-19. The accuracy for both ICBMs approached 0.1nm CEP. This puts the Soviet Union at least 3-5 years ahead of Carter Administration estimates of Soviet missile accuracy.

35. Colin S. Gray, "Soviet Rocket Forces: Military Capability, Political Utility," p. 50.

36. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Public, Service SALT Guidance Diverges," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 6, 1978, pp. 16-17. A CEP of 400 meters (1,312 feet) has been reported. See, "SS-20 Deployment Confirmed CEP of 400 Meters," *Defense Space Business Daily*, April 10, 1978, p. 228.

37. See "Newest DELTA Sub Pivotal in Latest SALT Violation," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, May 24, 1976, p. 20; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "SALT Stance Allows New Missile," *Aviation Week &*

The Soviet TYPHOON is a 24-tube submarine that is similar to the future U.S. TRIDENT. The intercontinental ranges of the SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 permit the Soviets the flexibility to launch these missiles from home waters around Murmansk, protected by Soviet land-based air and surface combatants.³⁸ Beyond the SS-N-18 (Soviet designation RSM-50) is yet another SLBM, the RSM-52, an advanced missile for the TYPHOON.³⁹

The Soviets have from 10 to 20 DELTA and TYPHOON boats in various stages of production and they continue to maintain the capability to produce at least 8 modern SSBNs per year.⁴⁰ They have already exceeded the SALT I limits on SLBM launchers and SSBNs (950/62). According to the Department of Defense, however, two Soviet DELTA-class SSBNs "are not yet operational" and are, therefore, exempt from being included in the Soviet ceilings.⁴¹

The BACKFIRE bomber is another strategic nuclear offensive threat to the U.S. BACKFIRE is a swing-wing (supersonic) bomber that is two and one-half times the size of the FB-111, about 80 percent the size of the B-1, and similar to the Soviet MIYA-4 BISON "heavy" bomber in range. BACKFIRE can deliver a sizable payload of 2-AS-6 ALCMs or many gravity weapons against U.S. targets without refueling.⁴²

Space Technology, April 24, 1978. The first public reference to TYPHOON was "New Soviet Sub," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 6, 1977.

38. U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Policies," 93rd Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office) p. 48; Norman Polmar, "The Soviet SLBM Force," *Air Force Magazine*, March 1978; and Richard T. Ackley, "The Wartime Role of Soviet SSBNs," *U.S. Naval Proceedings*, June 1978.

39. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "SALT Stance Allows New Missile," p. 16.

40. "Subs Raise SALT Observance Question," *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, April 3, 1978, p. 17.

41. *Ibid.*, and "Soviets Building SLBM Force Beyond SALT I Limit," *Defense Space Business Daily*, March 1, 1978, p. 1; "Soviets Reach, Begin Exceeding SALT I SLBM Limits," *Defense Space Business Daily*, March 3, 1978, p. 17.

42. Georg Panyalev, "BACKFIRE — Soviet Counter to the American B-1," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 5, 1975, pp. 47-50; and Alexander Malzeyev, "Soviet Air-Launched Cruise Missiles," *International Defense Review*, Vol. 1, 1978, pp. 41-45.

Soviet Defense Capabilities

Soviet programs for strategic defense are no less impressive than the strategic nuclear offensive forces. These programs — ABM, air defense, civil defense, and related war-survival measures — are integral components of Soviet war-fighting, damage-limiting, and war-winning doctrine, and could have significant political and strategic impact. Soviet active and passive defenses are designed to defend against a residual U.S. second strike and to exploit the synergism of the various defenses.

While the U.S. has sharply reduced its ABM research and development program, the Soviet Union continues to expand its ABM research and development program as well as upgrade the GALOSH ABM-1B system and develop a new ABM system with new interceptors and associated radar components.⁴³ The new X-3 system, a phased-array “transportable” ballistic missile defense radar, is operating at Sary Shagan and on Kamchatka Peninsula.⁴⁴ This system appears to be designed for terminal defense against U.S. ICBM and SLBM warheads using the long-range missile for interception between 100,000-200,000 feet and a new hypersonic high acceleration interceptor for altitudes below 100,000 feet.⁴⁵

The Soviets could stockpile the long lead-time X-3 radar components and survey potential sites around urban-industrial areas, which could provide the Soviet Union with a strategically significant, rapidly deployable ABM “breakout” capability for the aerospace defense of the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ In terms of air

43. “Although limited today by the ABM Treaty, a crash Soviet development and deployment program could provide many operational ABM sites by the early 1980s.” See, “Pentagon R&D Chief: Soviets Could Have New ABM Operational By Early 1980s,” *Defense Space Business Daily*, May 15, 1978, p. 81.

44. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “Soviets Grasping Strategic Lead,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, August 10, 1976, p. 14.

45. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-16. According to the study, “Defense of Soviet Cities,” this system could defend the 100 most populous Soviet cities and sharply reduce the number of penetrating U.S. warheads.

46. The low-altitude hypersonic interceptor also would have the capability to intercept U.S. cruise missiles. Soviet active defense technology is eroding the distinction between “air defense” and “ballistic missile defense.” The flexibility of Soviet active defense could provide an integrated system for the “aerospace defense” of the Soviet Union.

defense, the Soviets have deployed 6-6,500 air defense radars, 10-12,000 SAM launchers (many with multiple rails and all reloadable), and approximately 2,600 manned air defense interceptors. Soviet air defense radars and software are being hardened and netted and some are being made mobile, producing a more efficient air defense system against all air-breathing threats and improving the inherent ABM capability of these systems. Another recent development in Soviet air defense is the SA-X-10, a system which employs a new MACH 6+ hypersonic interceptor missile superior to the U.S. SAM D.⁴⁷ Soviet deployment of 500-1,000 SA-X-10 systems would provide a very effective active defense capability against a variety of U.S. strategic offensive threats.⁴⁸

The Soviets also are developing new manned air defense interceptors. The MIG-29 (or "super" MIG-25) will have a new radar with a "look-down/shoot-down" capability and a new missile — both could be highly effective against the future U.S. cruise missile threat.⁴⁹

Soviet space programs are major initiatives and the Soviet Union continues to exploit military applications from its space program. An operational anti-satellite (ASAT) capability has been deployed and the Soviet ASAT program is expected to be "substantially improved by the mid-1980s."⁵⁰ Soviet efforts in the area of anti-submarine warfare (ASW) are equally impressive. The Soviets are pursuing advanced ASW technologies that could monitor the acoustic energy of SSBNs and SSNs and their hydro-dynamic signatures caused by their propulsion through the water. Laser technologies, optical sensors, scanners, advanced radars, and infrared systems are also being developed in the Soviet ASW program.⁵¹

47. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, March 20, 1978, p. 11.

48. For a review of the SA-X-10 controversy see, "Congressmen Carr and Downey Err on Significance of New Soviet Surface-To-Air Missile," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 124, No. 21, 95th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, February 21, 1973) p. H1322.

49. *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, November 21, 1977, p. 11.

50. Harold Brown, *Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1979*, p. 30: "While eventually the U.S. ASAT capability may be technologically superior, a definite U.S.-Soviet asymmetry currently exists in this area."

51. See "Move Toward SLBM Reliance Seen 'Fraught With Grave Dangers,'" *Defense Space Business Daily*, March 17, 1978, pp. 98-99.

Soviet passive defenses, in conjunction with active defenses, are designed to reduce Soviet vulnerability to U.S. second-strike forces. An extensive network of blast shelters and evacuation procedures exists to protect the Soviet leadership and civilian population from nuclear weapon effects.⁵² The Soviets estimate that population losses in a major nuclear war with the U.S. could be held to 3-4 percent of the urban population and 6-8 percent of the total population.⁵³ While any quantification of the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense is sensitive to basic assumptions about the scale and nature of the attack, the perception of having this damage-limiting capability (buttressed by strategic nuclear superiority) could have significant political and strategic impact.

The Soviets continue to stockpile, harden, and disperse their industrial and economic assets. Further, the Soviet Union has "established a goal to store reserves of grain adequate to feed the entire population for one year by the end of 1981."⁵⁴ These programs not only undercut the military effectiveness of the U.S. deterrent, but also undermine U.S. political will.⁵⁵

52. "The Soviets probably have sufficient blast-shelter space in hardened command posts for virtually all the leadership elements at all levels (about 110,000 people). . . . Shelters at key economic installations could accommodate about 12 to 24 percent of the total work force . . . and a minimum of 10 to 20 percent of the total population in urban areas (including essential workers) could be accommodated at present in blast-resistant shelters." This figure could increase to 15 to 30 percent by 1985. See Director of Central Intelligence, *Soviet Civil Defense* (Washington D.C., July 1978); and Leon Goure, *Shelters in Soviet War Survival Strategy*, Monographs in International Affairs (University of Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, 1978).

53. P. T. Egorov, I. A. Shlyakov, and N. I. Alabin, *Civil Defense* (Moscow: Publishing House for Higher Education, 2nd Edition, 1970), translated and prepared by Oak Ridge National Laboratory, October 1972; U.S. Congress, House, Hearings by the Civil Defense Panel of the Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services, "Civil Defense Review," 94th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976) pp. 268-290.

54. Statement of Lt. General Samuel V. Wilson, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee, "Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China - 1977," 95th Congress, 1st Session (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977) p. 83.

55. *Ibid.* According to Lt. General Wilson, ". . . Soviet civil defense, in conjunction with various offensive and defensive measures, has the

There is no indication that the Soviets are reducing their defense research and development or industrial capacity in order to divert it to other areas.⁵⁶ The achievement of superiority in deployed military technology by the early 1980s remains a basic Soviet objective.⁵⁷ In terms of defense spending, in 1975, the CIA revised its estimate of Soviet defense spending — from 5-7 percent of their GNP to 11-13 percent of their GNP — and this revision contained the major caveat that “the new estimates should be viewed as interim and subject to change as work progresses.”⁵⁸ Soviet defense expenditures now exceed those of the United States by a margin of between 20 and 40 percent and by 60 percent for strategic nuclear offensive forces.

The Soviet Union also has utilized another strategy in its drive for global dominance — “detente” — and like U.S.-Soviet strategic doctrines, there are striking asymmetries between the two nations’ definitions, approaches, and expectations for “detente.”

‘Detente’: The U.S. View

In the official Kissingerian view announced 19 September 1974,⁵⁹ “detente” was described as a continuing process, not a final condition. America’s basic purpose in pursuing “detente” was to “encourage an improvement in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.”⁶⁰ In seeking this “atmosphere,” the U.S. would provide as many incentives as possible in return for Soviet actions most conducive to peace and individual well-being.

Progress created in one area, it was argued, would lead to

potential to alter the strategic military relationship, possibly by the mid-1980s.”

56. Statement by Sayre Stevens, CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence, in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearing Before the Joint Economic Committee, “Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China — 1977,” p. 19.

57. Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., “Soviet Press Technology Gains,” *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, February 9, 1976, pp. 12-15.

58. Central Intelligence Agency, *Estimated Soviet Defense Spending in Rubles, 1970-1975* (Washington D.C., May 1975) p. 1.

59. Statement by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, “Detente: The American View,” *Survival*, January-February 1975, pp. 35-42.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

momentum in other areas: "by acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation." Inherent in the original U.S. notion of "detente" was that it was "indivisible." Kissinger's earlier assessment that, "a tactical change sufficiently prolonged becomes a lasting transformation,"⁶¹ sought to *adapt* the Soviet Union to preferred U.S. norms of peaceful international behavior.

Another of Kissinger's basic assumptions about "detente" was that "unfortunately the temptation to combine detente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union will grow. Such an attitude will be disastrous. We will not accept it from Moscow; Moscow will not accept it from us."⁶² The original primary criterion of the success or failure of "detente" was U.S. insistence on responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union:

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions could destroy detente as well. If the Soviet Union uses detente to strengthen its military capacity in all fields; if in crises it acts to sharpen tension; if it does not contribute to progress towards stability; if it seeks to undermine our alliances; if it is deaf to the urgent needs of the least developed and the emerging issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such efforts to overcome.⁶³

The Soviet Union, contrary to original expectations, has refused to comply with the U.S. definition of detente. Kissinger's definition posed a false alternative between "detente" and "cold war," a dichotomy which also remains the perception of the present Administration. President Carter has stated that detente must be "broadly defined and truly reciprocal" and that "neither of us should entertain the notion that military supremacy can be attained or that transient military advantage can be politically exploited."⁶⁴ This political rhetoric is devoid of operational meaning and is categorically rejected by the Soviet Union.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 40

62. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

63. *Ibid.*, p. 42.

64. U.S. Department of Defense, "Selected Statements" (Washington D.C., July 1, 1978) p. 12.

Despite nearly a decade of "detente," the U.S. formulation of that concept continues to obscure the reality of Soviet imperialism and its threat to the West. The fundamental weakness of the U.S. approach to "detente" is that appeasement was and remains an integral part of it.⁶⁵ However, such a policy will not appease the Soviet Union.

'Detente in Soviet Strategy'

For the Soviet Union, detente is an offensive strategy designed to expand Soviet power while continuing to exploit the West.⁶⁶ The Soviets use the term "detente" almost exclusively in commentaries directed at Western audiences; the word rarely infiltrates Soviet literature. Although the latest Soviet policy of "detente" received its political imprimatur at the 24th Party Congress in 1971, "detente" is not a new element in Soviet strategy.⁶⁷

What is unique about the present Soviet strategy of detente is that the Soviet Union can bring unprecedented power against a U.S. that lacks the political will necessary to contain Soviet imperialism. For the Soviets, the key is to exploit these opportunities without "overplaying" the assault. The Soviets do not want to provoke a strong U.S. counterresponse that could delay or deny the Soviet drive for global dominance.⁶⁸

In the Soviet view, detente is not a relaxation in the struggle or a reduction of tension with the U.S.; it is merely one form of the struggle — a dialectic complete with Soviet rules, perceptions, and tactics. Detente is, in fact, an *intensification* of the struggle between the two antagonists. The Soviet interpretation and policy of detente requires that the U.S. accept certain "objective" conditions. The first condition is that the U.S.

65. Theodore Draper, "Appeasement and Detente," *Commentary*, February 1976.

66. Norman Podhoretz, "Making the World Safe for Communism," *Commentary*, April 1976; Mose L. Harvey and Mark Miller, "Detente Without Mutual Restraint: Fateful Choices for the United States?" Research Notes on U.S.-Soviet Affairs, No. 1 (University of Miami: Advanced International Studies Institute, July 1978).

67. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency, *Detente in Soviet Strategy* (Washington, D.C., September 1975) p. 4.

68. Leon Goure, "An Overview of Soviet Perceptions on the U.S.S.R.'s Position and Prospects in the Current International Situation," A Discussion Paper Prepared for the CAIS-ARPA Workshop on Soviet Perceptions," University of Miami, January 26, 1966, p.4.

must continue to recognize the state of U.S.-Soviet military parity while the Soviet Union continues to seek strategic superiority. The second Soviet condition for detente is U.S. recognition of the Soviet political sphere of influence — a sphere which now includes the preservation of the territorial integrity of nations well beyond the contiguous borders of Warsaw Pact nations.⁶⁹ Such a recognition reduces “detente” to the avoidance of a direct military collision between the U.S. and U.S.S.R., but leaves everything else wide open. The U.S. is expected to cease and desist in “exporting counterrevolution” into third world areas while permitting the Soviet Union and its proxies to support “wars of national liberation,” free from the threat of U.S. opposition including the use of military power. Finally, Soviet detente is designed to slacken and choke off Western military programs and reduce Western defense expenditures. The Soviets clearly seek to continue their military build-up and, thus far, “detente” has proven to be *another* useful strategy for achieving the Soviet strategic objective.

The Soviet strategy of detente also includes several inter-related objectives that can assist in the drive for global dominance. The first and foremost objective is to foster the continued recession of U.S. power in Europe and replace it with Soviet power. To produce the power vacuum, the Soviet Union seeks the disintegration of the Western Alliance structure. Examples of Soviet activities designed to undermine and outflank NATO include its role in the 1973 Mid-East War, including the oil embargo; continued support for “Eurocommunism”; the MBFR negotiations; Soviet-Turkish negotiation of a “non-aggression” treaty; Soviet-Cuban conquest in Africa; and coups in South Yemen and Afghanistan.

The attainment of qualitative nuclear superiority, as well as the maintainance of quantitative superiority, is necessary to meet theater objectives. The growth in Soviet military power allowed the Soviet Union to issue its first explicit nuclear threat to the U.S. during the 1973 Mid-East War (which, itself, became a road test for Soviet policy in Angola in 1976). The Soviet Union has manipulated “detente” to mask the enormous

69 “A Brezhnev Doctrine for the World,” *Foreign Report*, May 26, 1976, p. 1; and Avigdor Haselkorn, *The Evolution of Soviet Security Strategy 1965-1975* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., 1978).

expansion of its military power and has aided the modernization of its strategic and conventional forces.

Securing access to Western (including Japanese) credits, capital goods, and technology to alleviate chronic Soviet economic problems is another important Soviet objective. This type of assistance also aids and abets the Soviet military buildup by subsidizing inefficient Soviet managerial sectors. Overall, this assistance helps the Soviet government to sustain high levels of military spending without forcing *more* difficult resource allocation decisions. Western technology transfers solve short-term Soviet problems, reduce research and development time, costs, and effort — and produce significant military benefits for the Soviet Union.

The fourth and last major objective of the Soviet strategy of detente is the isolation of China. China is perceived by the Soviet Union to be a long-term security problem, but basic remedial steps taken now could reduce some of the pressures of a classic “two-front problem” and insure future Soviet dividends. For the present period, China remains primarily an ideological rival to be isolated, and this can be accomplished by reducing the appeal of “Chinese Communism” while making the world more amenable to the Soviet brand.

Conclusion

Thus far, “detente” is clearly working to the advantage of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has made few (if any) concessions and has secured the West’s acceptance and endorsement of the Soviet right to control and expand its sphere of influence with means that would have been totally unacceptable in the days of “cold war” or “confrontation.”⁷⁰ The Soviets have demonstrated their willingness to exploit crises to their advantage and, according to one strategist, “if this is detente, it would be interesting to see the kind of military program Soviet leaders would endorse for a renewal of the cold war.”⁷¹ As long as “positive” benefits, as defined by Moscow, continue to accrue from “detente,” it will continue to be endorsed by the Politburo as one strategy designed to produce global dominance.

70. “The Kissinger Memorandum,” *Foreign Report*; April 7, 1976. This report presents the “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine” and its bureaucratic evolution under the direction of Kissinger.

71. Colin S. Gray, *The Soviet-American Arms Race*, p. 73.

Unless the Carter Administration takes immediate steps to reverse the adverse trends in the military balance, views the world as a single strategic theater, and *leads* the West, international stability could be the result of a *Pax Sovietica*.

The proper intellectual epitaph for present U.S. policy can be found in the wise counsel of Mr. Walter Lippmann who wrote these lines over thirty years ago:

I do not find much ground for reasonable confidence in a policy which can be successful only if the most optimistic prediction should prove to be true. Surely a sound policy must be addressed to the worst and hardest that may be judged to be probable, and not to the best and easiest that may be possible.⁷²

72. Walter Lippmann, *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947) pp. 11-12.

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On Treating the District of Columbia 'As Though It Were a State'

JULES B. GERARD

In the 160 years between 1791, when the Bill of Rights was ratified, and 1960, only twelve amendments were added to the Constitution, and three of them were residue of the Civil War. In the eighteen years since 1960, Congress has proposed six additional amendments. Four of them have been ratified by the states. The fifth, ERA, is pending. The sixth and latest, submitted to the states in late August, proposes that the District of Columbia be "treated as though it were a state" for certain purposes. The question is whether or not that proposal should be ratified.

Decisions on whether or not to ratify proposed amendments traditionally have been guided by a few commonly accepted principles. (1) The goals sought by the proposal must be desirable ones that cannot be attained by means less drastic than amending the Constitution. (2) The changes wrought by the proposed amendment should be limited to those that are necessary to achieve the desired goals. Unessential changes increase the possibility that the amendment will have undesirable consequences. If there are objectionable effects, they must be identified and balanced against the desired goals. Only if the proposal's benefits outweigh its detriments should it be ratified. (3) Proponents bear the burden of persuading by clear and convincing evidence that the proposal satisfies these requirements. The question never is "Why are you opposed?" The question always is "Why are you in favor?"

What are the goals of the D.C. Representation proposal? The question is deceptively simple. Its answer depends upon whether those goals are to be defined by the proposal's terms, or by its proponents' rhetoric, or by the reasons offered to justify its ratification. Separating these three strands of the argument is vital to a reasoned analysis of the proposal, for there are vast discrepancies among the different goals they identify. No one can quarrel with the lofty principles invoked by the proponents' rhetoric, but analysis reveals that the proposal's terms fall woefully short of satisfying them. Nor would very many people object to giving residents of the District a vote in congressional elections and a voice in the

amendment process, but analysis discloses that the proposal's terms exceed anything needed to accomplish those modest goals.

That portion of the D.C. Representation proposal relevant to identifying its goals reads:

For purposes of representation in Congress, election of the President and Vice President, and Article V of this Constitution, the District constituting the seat of government of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.

The goals of the proposal according to its terms, then, are to permit voters in the District of Columbia: (1) to elect two senators; (2) to elect as many members to the House of Representatives as the District's population justifies; (3) to participate in Presidential elections; and (4) to participate in the ratification of constitutional amendments (Article V is the provision dealing with amendments).

Supporters of the proposal rarely acknowledge these specific goals, however. Instead, their flamboyant rhetoric consists mainly of appeals to "basic principles of democracy" and "fundamental human rights." "We want no more and no less than that to which all Americans are entitled," proclaimed Walter Fauntroy, the District's non-voting delegate to the House, in hearings and during floor debate. The amendment is needed, sponsors say, to end the "second class citizenship" of District residents.

It certainly is true that District residents are denied attributes of citizenship that are taken for granted by other Americans. Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution gave Congress the power

to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular states, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the United States

This provision had two consequences. First, its direct result was to deprive District residents of any authority over local affairs, except as Congress chose to give it to them. Never, for example, have they been able to establish a structure of government, levy taxes, or zone land without explicit congressional approval. Second, because the District was not a part of any state, its residents have never been able to vote in congressional elections

or participate in the consideration of proposed constitutional amendments. Until the 23rd Amendment was ratified in 1961, they could not even vote in Presidential elections.

Some Problems with the Proposal

The D.C. Representation proposal does nothing to correct the problems created by the first consequence of the Article I provision. That is one major discrepancy between the proposal's terms and its purposes, as defined by its supporters' rhetoric. If those purposes truly are to give District residents a voice in their government like that of other Americans and to eliminate their second-class status, an amendment to Article I would be required. But the proposal doesn't pretend to make such a change. One of the admitted reasons for this failure suggests how fervently the principles that allegedly support the proposal are held by the Members of Congress who approved it. The Home Rule Act of 1975 accorded District residents a greater voice in local government than they had ever had before. But Section 602 (a)(5) of the Act specifically forbids the District Council to levy a tax on the incomes of nonresidents earned within the District, a tax that is commonplace in metropolitan communities across the nation. That the purpose of this prohibition is to prevent the District from taxing the salaries of Members of Congress who live in the suburbs is conceded. The principles, therefore, apparently are not important enough to require Members of Congress to pay a fair share of the cost of the District services they use almost daily.

That leaves the problems created by the second consequence of the Article I provision. Whether the Founding Fathers intended to disable District residents from voting in congressional elections and from having a voice in the amendment process or whether these were the unintended results of an oversight is a matter of dispute among constitutional historians. Neither side has any conclusive evidence to support it. Most Americans today believe that the disability, whether or not intended, is an injustice that should be removed. And there is only a slight doubt that it requires a constitutional amendment to do so. Thus, the first of the traditional principles guiding the ratification of constitutional amendments seems to be satisfied.

The second principle raises harder problems. It is one thing to say that District residents should vote in congressional

elections, which is the goal proponents claim they seek. It is another thing entirely to say that they should elect two senators, which is the change the proposal would make. The proposal and the goal coincide only if the latter cannot be achieved without the former. But this plainly is not true, which is the other major discrepancy between the proponents' rhetoric and the proposal's terms.

At least three alternatives to the proposal were suggested. The first was to make the District, or all but a small part of it, a state. Because of the unique way in which the District was created, this probably would require a constitutional amendment, although the question is not entirely free from doubt. Excluding the area which surrounds The Mall and contains most of the buildings and monuments commonly associated with "the seat of the government" would meet the objection that making the District a state would destroy "the capital." A second suggestion was to retrocede all but that area to Maryland, thus converting residents of the District to citizens of Maryland. A third was to assign District residents to Maryland for purposes of voting in Presidential and congressional elections and of ratifying constitutional amendments. None of these alternatives was given serious consideration; all were said to be either "impractical" or "too complex." "Impractical" apparently meant, as to the first alternative, that the District could not be financially self-supporting, and making it a state might call into question continued federal support of its governmental functions. As to the other alternatives, "impractical" apparently meant that the Maryland congressional delegation and the District government opposed them. But since when has that mattered? Were the liquor-producing states given a veto over the submission of the prohibition amendment? "Too complex" apparently meant that it was unreasonable to expect Congress to do the detail work necessary to resolve this intricate problem. These reasons for rejecting the alternatives provide additional evidence that Congress gave little weight to the principles invoked in support of the proposal. The point, in any event, is that no one suggested the alternatives were not permissible. Since a constitutional amendment was required in any case, such an argument would have been ludicrous.

All of the alternatives would have given District residents a vote in congressional elections and a voice in constitutional amendments, like other Americans, and thus would have

achieved the identified goal. Furthermore, all but the third would have given District residents control they now lack over their local government, which the proposal doesn't pretend to do. The alternatives, therefore, would have provided a match between the changes being recommended and the rhetoric being used. In that respect, if in no other, they would have been improvements over the present proposal.

Under-Inclusive and Over-Inclusive

The proposed amendment, then, is both under-inclusive and over-inclusive. It is under-inclusive because it fails to accord District residents control over their local government that other Americans take for granted, a failure that reduces substantially the benefits to be achieved from ratification. It is over-inclusive because, alternatives being available, it makes more changes than are necessary to permit District residents to vote in congressional elections and participate in the ratification process. So, the question becomes whether or not the proposal, stripped of the misleading and inappropriate rhetoric accompanying it, contains features that are so undesirable as to outweigh the limited benefits that would accrue from its ratification.

The first of these undesirable features is that the proposal itself may be unconstitutional. The statement that a proposed constitutional amendment might be unconstitutional may appear, at first glance, to be absurd. But the Constitution contains, in Article V, one provision that cannot be amended in the regular way: "no state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." This language is susceptible to three interpretations, and the proposal conflicts with two of them. The interpretation favored by those who support the proposal is that the clause means only that every state shall have the same vote in the Senate as every other state, that it does not prohibit giving votes in the Senate to entities that are not states. The validity of this interpretation may be tested by supposing a proposition to treat Dallas, Fort Worth and Houston "as though they were states" for purposes of representation in the Senate. If that proposition violates the "equal suffrage" clause, then so does the present proposal, unless there is some principle that requires the District to be distinguished from other cities, a matter to be discussed presently. A second interpretation of the "equal suffrage"

clause is that only representatives of states were to have votes in the Senate. There is no dispute that this is what the framers thought it meant or that the proposal offends this interpretation. The third interpretation focuses on the unquestioned purpose of the clause, which was to implement the compromise without which this nation would not have been founded. Every schoolchild knows that that compromise resolved the dispute over allocating power between the large states and the small ones. The purpose of the clause, in other words, was to guarantee that power in the Senate would never be allocated on the basis of population. Granting senatorial representation to cities with large populations "as though they were states" clearly violates that purpose. So the constitutional question would seem to turn on whether a principle can be found by which to limit the "as though it were a state" device to the District of Columbia.

Although they had no precedent to guide them, a number of constitutional experts testified that the proposal does not offend the "equal suffrage" clause. Their opinions, however, were based on the dubious assumption that the District of Columbia is the only city in the nation that could qualify to be represented "as though it were a state." The Justice Department, for instance, testified that the District was unique because it could not be added to the roster of states without a constitutional amendment. But neither could Dallas, Fort Worth or Houston. Granted, the constitutional impediment is different for the latter cities than for the District. But the Justice Department did not offer, and I have been unable to think of, any reason that the location of the constitutional barrier should be important as a matter of principle.

Advocates of the proposal argue that the District is distinguishable from other cities because residents of other cities already vote in congressional elections. That distinction would have merit if the proposal were to incorporate District voters into the electorate of an existing state, as two of the alternatives would have done. But the proposal is not simply to give District residents a vote; the proposal is to give the District representation "as though it were a state." No other American city of any size is accorded that representation.

Nor do the three reasons offered in support of the proposal serve to distinguish the District from any other major city. The first is that residents of the District pay substantial

amounts in federal taxes. The second is that District residents served and died in the armed forces. (Resident aliens pay taxes and served and died in the armed forces also.) The third is that the population of the District exceeds that of some of the smaller states. (Recall the purpose of “equal suffrage” provision.) All three are persuasive reasons for permitting District residents to vote in congressional elections. But none of them justifies separate representation in the Senate. On that issue, they are all equally applicable to Dallas, Fort Worth or Houston.

Summarizing the Proposal: Rights Without Obligations

If the constitutionality of the proposal depends upon the ability to articulate a principle that would restrict the “as though it were a state” device to the District of Columbia, the proposal fails. Less drastic alternatives that would have achieved the same purposes claimed for the proposal were available. So the “principle of necessity” cannot be a limitation. Nor, on the issue of separate representation in the Senate, is the District distinguishable from any other major city, in either theory or fact.

The inability to limit the “as though it were a state” device to the District is objectionable even if it does not constitutionally invalidate the proposal. It would change fundamentally the federalism that was one of the Constitution’s main contributions to the art and theory of government. News reports already have made it plain that Puerto Rico and Guam are interested — not in becoming states, but — in being “treated as though” they were states. Why should any political entity wish to become a state if it can be “treated as though it were” one? The latter gives it all the advantages of statehood: representation in the Senate and the House on the same basis as states; the right to be counted as an entity in determining whether three-fourths of the “states” have ratified a constitutional amendment; and a voice in the election of the President. But it does not impose any of what usually are presumed to be the obligations of states: creation of a local government satisfactory to local residents that will contest the federal government’s drive to centralize control over human affairs; and support for that government with local resources. No stopping point on the use of the “as though it were a state” device is readily apparent.

Furthermore, if the history of this nation teaches one lesson

above others, it is that a constitutional principle, once set free, is hard to confine. An instructive example is at hand. The 23rd Amendment was ratified for the purpose of giving residents of the District a voice in the election of Presidents. In committee hearings and during floor debates, advocates continuously cited that amendment as precedent for the propriety of the D.C. Representation proposal. It hardly can be fanciful to suggest that this proposal, if ratified, will then provide the needed precedent to extend the “as though it were a state” device to other entities with substantial numbers of residents who pay taxes and served and died in the armed forces. The claim that the device will be limited to the District of Columbia flatly contradicts our unwavering history.

For a century and three-quarters, Congress has exercised suzerainty over the District of the Columbia as though it were a fiefdom. In the process, District residents have been denied rights that other Americans take for granted. But the question is not whether this deplorable state of affairs ought to be corrected. The question, rather, is whether the proposed D.C. Representation amendment is an appropriate correction. I believe it is not. First, it does not correct the residents’ lack of control over their local affairs. It perpetuates a system of denying those residents some of the most fundamental attributes of citizenship. Second, it goes beyond anything needed to achieve the limited goals claimed for it: a voice in Presidential and congressional elections and in the amendment process. It does not treat District residents like other Americans; it treats them in a particularly beneficial way that no other similarly-situated group of Americans is treated. Third, both of the first two problems would have been resolved by adopting one of the suggested alternatives to the proposal. There is a chasm between the identified problem and the proposed solution that no amount of eloquent rhetoric can bridge. Fourth, ratifying the proposal will incorporate into the Constitution a device — the “as though it were a state” scheme — that would, if extended, destroy federalism as we have known it. The device itself may well be unconstitutional. If it were held invalid by the Supreme Court, the consternation and confusion that would result as Congress attempted to unscramble the egg would be horrendous. Fifth, alternatives that would have avoided these problems were available. So it is impossible for advocates of

the proposal to bear the burden, as they should be required to do, of making a clear and convincing case that the D.C. Representation proposal should be ratified.

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Changing the Rules of the Game in the U.S. Senate

MARGO CARLISLE

*The difference between a lynching and
a fair trial is one of mere procedure.
Anonymous*

There are indications that the 96th Congress will begin with an effort to change the Senate rules, particularly Rule XXII, which describes the procedure for cutting off debate. While such debate will occur in an obscure and parliamentary context, it will address the basic question of balancing the rights of majorities and minorities. Whatever decision is made will have a direct, practical impact on American life for some time to come.

The number of senators needed to pass a measure or break a filibuster has determined the fate of many controversial bills in recent history. Filibusters are frequently decided by a two or three vote margin. Thus, lowering the number of votes needed to end a filibuster affects whether a labor bill, a new weapons system, an Alaska land bill or a gas deregulation effort will pass.

Organized labor, which understands the significance of minority debate and which is skilled in political organization, has formed an alliance which includes a "political reform" commission dedicated to "an end to the filibuster." A union planning document describes the procedure as an "undemocratic and archaic tool of reaction" and a "pernicious device" employed by "bitter and selfish" people to abuse "the victims of racism and sexism; the poor; the handicapped; the aged; children; the sick; the cities, and the workers."¹

Filibusters are indeed tools of political minorities — their numbers and membership ebb and flow with the issue, but are more likely to consist of liberals and conservatives than centrists, who emphasize, instead, keeping the flow of legislation steady and procedure of the Senate orderly. The contend-

1. "UAW Issues Call for Meeting to Consider and Plan Formation of a New Alliance of Progressive Forces," *News from the U.A.W.*, 26 September 1978.

ing forces of "ideological" vs. "mechanical" senators provides an internal check and balance in the system. Any change to the Senate rules must be scrutinized for preservation of that balance.

The Senate has traditionally accomplished the nation's business while tolerating organized and individual dissent, even dissent at gunpoint.² It often appears inept, dawdling, raucous or senile, but has over the years proved to be an institution capable of writing laws while accepting the individual and political eccentricities of its members.

Many serious and efficient men have joined the Senate determined to change its fusty ways, to speed up and systematize its procedures, to mechanize, modernize and especially to eliminate that ultimate enemy of the schedule, extended debate (as the filibuster is called), only eventually to observe with Senator Hoar, a dedicated liberal from Massachusetts:

There was a time in my legislative career when I believed that the absence of a cloture rule in the Senate was criminal neglect, and that we should adopt a system of rules by which business could be conducted; but the logic of my long service and observation has now convinced me that I was wrong in that contention.³

The mythology of filibusters has a group of southern senators talking in rotation for months against a civil rights bill. Actually, only twelve percent of the filibusters in the country's history dealt with this subject, and the last took place in 1968. Yet the myth is pernicious and of long standing. According to William S. White, "Liberals of 1949 had to make the most comfortable rationalization they could of the fact that considering the whole slope of Senate history the filibuster has been more often a liberal than a conservative device."⁴

With regard to time, under the double tracking system introduced by Majority Leader Mike Mansfield, many of the days officially spent on filibusters were in fact devoted to totally unrelated measures, at times to the exclusion of any debate at all on the bill being filibustered. If filibusters now

2. Franklin L. Burdette, *Filibustering in the Senate* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940) p. 31.

3. Burdette, *Filibustering in the Senate*, p. 113.

4. William S. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate* (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1956) p. 64.

take longer it is because while one vote on cloture used to be normal and more than two never occurred until 1965, recently four and five cloture votes have become common. Since a day must intervene between votes, successful filibusters, through no desire of their originators, are automatically longer.

Finally, it is not historically correct to say that filibuster efforts are comprised of a "handful" of men. The *average* number of senators to vote against cloture since 1919 has been thirty-seven.

While strong forces exist in favor of changing the rules, there are also factors supporting their retention. Men who have lived through filibusters recognize that they generally result in the kind of moderate compromise typical of the Senate, notwithstanding the perception of the filibuster as a radical procedure. Indeed, of eighty-three actions filibustered through 1976, ultimately only twenty-one failed to pass the Senate.⁵

Other institutional pressures include the Senate's historical comity, which has provided latitude for John Randolph, who strode the Senate floor with his dogs; for a debating senator who referred to a colleague as a "skunk"; for Senator Benton, who physically threatened Senator Foote; and for Senator Foote, who drew a gun in response.

On the more theoretical side, many senators appreciate Alexis de Tocqueville's insight in observing:

In my opinion the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States . . . [arises from] the very inadequate securities against tyranny. . . . If ever the free institutions of America are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the unlimited authority of the majorities, which at some future time may urge the minorities to desperation. . . .⁶

At the same time, unlimited debate has traditionally been regarded as vital to the maintenance of the large state/small state balance fundamental to the character of the Senate. William S. White has described the heights to which a senator from a small state, Idaho, was able to rise:

A Borah from the remote, ill-populated and then utterly

5. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Rules and Administration, *Senate Cloture Rule*, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 1977, pp. 53-54.

6. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Vol. I (Canada: McClelland & Stewart Limited, 1945) p. 270.

insulated state of Idaho once held a commanding power over the foreign affairs of the United States before which even Presidents had to pause. . . . The Borah voters would have been lost in any small part of any one of the five boroughs of New York City; they were important to Borah, but Borah was important not because of Idaho but because of what the Senate is. . . .⁷

Just as small state senators cherish their ability to rise in the Senate unencumbered by proportional representation, they regard the protection of extended debate as a safeguard against being trampled by large state interests.

Modern filibusters are no longer North/South battles, but involve coalitions which shift geographically and ideologically with the legislation. The Senate came close during the 95th Congress to an East-West confrontation.⁸ Similarly, liberals in the recent past have filibustered a measure sanctioning the supersonic transport airplane, the Supreme Court nominations of G. Harrold Carswell and Clement Haynsworth, and the deregulation of natural gas.

An increasing number of liberal senators have begun to perceive the right of unlimited debate as a First Amendment issue. Perhaps William S. White best summarized this argument:

It is perhaps often forgotten that the democratic ideal is not all majority. . . . The right of Congress by majority vote to make the laws is admirably planned. But twenty Congresses supported in their actions by ninety percent of the American people will twenty times make their enactments and twenty times have them thrust aside if they seek to abridge the right of a single American to publish his little paper, however strange. . . . The price, sometimes, is high. The time killed, sometimes seems intolerable and dangerous. The license, sometimes, seems endless; but he who silences the cruel and irresponsible man today must first recall that the brave and lonely man may in the same way be silenced tomorrow.⁹

Finally, Senator Norris Cotton of New Hampshire developed

7. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate*, p. 15.

8. This clash was over a bill which would have closed between eighty and one hundred twenty million acres of Alaska land to development.

9. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate*, p. 19.

an interesting perspective on filibuster opponents during his twenty years in the Senate. He argues that these constitute not majorities, but minorities representing special interests:

There is much propaganda to the effect that the Senate, like Gulliver, is tied down hand and foot by its own rules and that many evils have come from the difficulty of limiting debate — a situation that has resulted in the defeat of many meritorious measures, by simply talking them to death. This gospel is usually preached by those devoted to particular causes who want to whip Congress into faster and more feverish action on their pet programs. These crusaders have found ready response from many good people who sincerely believe that you can reform the world, amend human nature, and enforce the Ten Commandments by acts of Congress.¹⁰

An increasing number of senators agree with this analysis.

The Procedural Setting

Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution provides that “each House may determine the rules of its own proceedings.” In 1917 the Senate adopted a procedure for shutting off debate in response to a filibuster that had killed a priority White House measure. This Senate Rule XXII provided for cloture¹¹ on measures if two-thirds of the senators present and voting approved.

In 1949 Rule XXII was amended for the first time. Motions¹² were included under the cloture rule, and as a compromise the number of senators needed to end debate was increased to an absolute two-thirds of all senators (then sixty-four) regardless of absenteeism. Only debate on proposals to change Senate rules were not subject to cloture.

Until 1953 it was universally accepted that the Senate, which retains two-thirds of its membership from Congress to Congress, was a continuing body whose rules remained binding until

10. Norris Cotton, *In the Senate* (New York, N.Y.: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1978) p. 123.

11. “Cloture” is the name given to the act of shutting off debate.

12. Until that time, dissenting senators could filibuster the bill itself, subject to cloture, but as a separate matter could even filibuster the very motion to bring it up. Until this change in the rules took place, it was impossible to invoke cloture on such a filibuster.

specifically changed. In that year a faction arose which argued that no such continuity existed, that a new Senate convened biannually without ties to the past and free to create its own rules. This theory arose in response to what filibuster opponents perceived as a stumbling block; under Rule XXII, cloture could not be imposed if a proposal to change the rules drew a filibuster. So the non-continuity theory, stripped of its rhetoric, constituted a maneuver to circumvent Rule XXII. Accordingly, a motion was made that year to consider adoption of a new set of rules notwithstanding Rule XXII, but it failed by a 70-21 vote.

Non-continuity has been the focus of intense debate since and was the subject of three Chair rulings and two Senate votes between 1957 and 1974. Of the former, two supported non-continuity, but both the third ruling and the two Senate votes affirmed the Senate as a continuing body.

In the midst of this debate the requirement for cloture was again lowered in 1959 to two-thirds of those present and voting, with the same procedure extended to rules changes for the first time. A clause was also inserted in Rule XXII which, according to Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, established for all time that the Senate was a continuing body.

In 1975, however, the non-continuity theory was again invoked during debate to lower the cloture requirement. In a ruling read from a prepared document, Vice President Rockefeller sustained the concept that previous rules are not in effect at the beginning of a Congress and cited a complicated theory the effect of which was to allow cloture in a rules debate by as few as twenty-six senators.¹³ Many senators, led by James Allen of Alabama and Majority Whip Robert C. Byrd were outraged; the latter declared the Senate would "rue this day."

The bitter, lengthy debate that followed ended with a compromise calling for cloture after a vote of a constitutional three-fifths and an affirmative vote of two-thirds of those present and voting for cloture on changing the rules. The Senate then went through certain parliamentary proceedings

13. As Congress had been in session for over six weeks, it would have been appropriate for Rockefeller to define when the beginning of the 94th Congress ended, which he did not do.

which some claim, although no one is certain, reversed the Rockefeller rulings.

The 96th Congress may have to address unanswered questions raised in 1975. If no rules exist at the beginning of a Congress, under what procedures can debate on the adoption of either permanent or interim rules occur? In 1975 "tabula rasa" senators adhered to all Senate rules except Rule XXII, the existence of which they disavowed even as they sought to change it. But, during the debate, an important railroad bill came up on which Senator Allen refused to accept a time agreement. As Allen expected, those senators insisting Rule XXII did not exist filed for and obtained cloture on the railroad bill under the provisions of the presumably non-existent Rule XXII, which Rockefeller justified by a distinction between "motions submitted under the rules" and "Constitutional questions."

Finally, "when does the beginning of a Congress end?" While this sounds like Lewis Carroll's answerless riddle, "Why is a raven like a writing desk?", it is important. Supporters of rules changes by majority vote believe that such changes may only be made at the beginning of a Congress. The 1975 rules debate began in February, arguably if not literally the beginning of the 94th Congress, but continued into April, after dozens of other measures had been passed and hundreds of committee meetings held. Filibuster supporters asked repeatedly when the beginning of the Congress would end and were never answered.

Twelve filibusters have occurred since, two of which have affected the rules. Through one, a whole new era in American parliamentary history began. The architect of the filibuster on the anti-trust bill of 1976 was James Allen of Alabama. Senator Allen was a daguerreotype figure whose exquisite courtesy never permitted him to precede anyone through a door and whose remarkable legal mind drew universal, if sometimes grudging, respect.

The 'Post-Cloture' Filibuster

Until 1976, the fate of a filibuster was determined by the success or failure of cloture. If cloture was invoked, final passage was always voted shortly thereafter. This was a function of habit rather than rule, as under Rule XXII there are few post-cloture limitations beyond a one-hour time limit

on debate for each senator. Senator Allen, however, developed the "post-cloture" filibuster by offering amendments and motions *after* cloture, thus continuing legally to delay a final vote. His efforts increased after several examples of what he regarded as unfair behavior by the leadership. He said that Senator Robert Byrd had once improperly received recognition over him to conduct key business (Byrd later implied that Allen was correct).¹⁴ On another occasion Senator Jesse Helms revealed that the anti-trust bill had not been legally reported prior to an attempt to invoke cloture on it.¹⁵ He was informed that "If there was inadvertence and the bill was not reported, the Chair rules that that does not change the fact that the bill was before the Senate."¹⁶ The Senate then invoked Phillip Hart, whose colleagues saw the bill as a memorial.

The anti-trust filibuster was radically different. It was led by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota, whose style had nothing in common with that of the scholarly Alabaman. He is abrupt, direct, impatient and the senator least likely to be approved of by Emily Post. Beneath the surface, however, these two senators shared a characteristic which few men and almost none of their colleagues had in common. Only a man impervious to criticism can lead a filibuster, especially a post-cloture one, and neither Allen nor Abourezk was overly concerned about what others thought of him.

Several unusual factors affected the Abourezk-led post-cloture filibuster on the Natural Gas Pricing bill (S. 2104). The technique had recently been demonstrated by Allen, and the retiring Abourezk had nothing to lose by using it. Also, President Carter had reversed his campaign position in favor of deregulation and Abourezk anticipated his support.

This filibuster is interesting less for the technique

14. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Robert C. Byrd, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 28 May 1976, *Congressional Record*, p. S8202.

15. When legislative committees vote out bills as a preliminary step to floor consideration, they are said to "report" them out. In connection with this incident, Helms objects because, at the time that steps toward cloture were being taken on the floor, the anti-trust bill was technically still in committee.

16. U.S. Congress, Senate, The Presiding Officer, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 3 June 1978, *Congressional Record*, p. S8507.

employed¹⁷ than for the rulings it prompted. Presiding over the Senate, Vice President Mondale issued rulings which cut the ground out from under the two senators and imposed what many consider to be draconian limitations on debate. The effect of these decisions on Abourezk, who regarded Mondale as a representative of the President, was immediate. After calling the President a liar, he ended the filibuster. But the rulings will have a long-term effect on the rules of the Senate and the way they are formulated.

Under Rule XXII there can be no dilatory business after cloture. Citing this, Mondale developed a list of "do's and don'ts" sharply limiting parliamentary action. Furthermore, his rulings made the Chair a more active participant, allowing him to take the initiative in ruling business out of order, rather than waiting for points of order from the floor. Through the Mondale decisions the Chair established itself as the final arbiter on majority cloture, since a simple majority may sustain (or overrule) the Chair. Formerly reserved rights of the minority were thus limited.

Until 1976 senators of both parties alternated in the Chair, but only Democrats have been allowed to chair the Senate since. Some senators also have suggested that a person not a senator be appointed (presumably by the Sergeant at Arms) on a full-time basis to preside over the Senate whenever the Vice-President is absent.¹⁸ The Mondale rulings and the increasingly firm grasp of the Majority leadership on the Chair and the parliamentarian indicate a trend to a more "efficient" Senate, but also to a Senate less interested in compromise and minority rights.

Parliamentary developments during the debate on S. 2104 created both new rules and new procedures for establishing them. Broad rules policies were turned into detailed caveats by the Chair, unchallenged from the floor. Some new procedures flatly contradicted existing practice, thereby strengthening the activist role of the Chair, regardless of the

17. Devices used included demanding quorum calls, offering amendments and making various kinds of motions.

18. U.S. Congress, Senate, *Towards a Modern Senate, Final Report of the Commission on the Operation of the Senate*, December 1976, p. 34.

injuries inflicted on parliamentary procedure. Identical points of order drew different rulings from different occupants and even from the same occupant of the Chair. Some procedures were defined as inappropriate and later were found to be acceptable on the same day. Little attempt was made to determine the legitimacy of rulings and little regard was paid to consistency, despite the fact that presumably rulings should be based on the Senate rules and their accepted interpretations in precedents. In the debate on S. 2104 it became clear that no code establishes the weight of different precedents; a ruling based on one precedent is as valid as one based on a tradition of 150 similar precedents. The Chair stressed that its own personal opinion can be the basis of a new ruling, thus creating a precedent.

As a check on abuse, members have the right to appeal rulings of the Chair, thus assuring that the Senate remains its own arbiter; nevertheless, weaknesses remain. On procedural points of order, senators tend to vote their opinion of the bill rather than the procedure; late night or dawn voting tends to encourage exhausted senators to accept anything which will shorten debate; senators are reluctant to disavow rulings made by presiding colleagues. And increasingly, Congress tends to write floor procedure into its legislation despite the fact that it may bind future Congresses.¹⁹

While Senators Allen and Abourezk totally disagreed on the merits of gas deregulation, their cooperation (Allen provided his colleague with significant parliamentary assistance) may have presaged future liberal/conservative coalitions on free speech issues. During this debate such a coalition overwhelmingly defeated a threat to the traditional right of senators to overturn rulings of the Presiding Officer. Liberals and conservatives again protested the Majority Leader's calling up of 33 successive amendments and, by prearrangement with Mondale, disposing of them as out of order for various technical reasons, while ignoring the other senators seeking recognition. This tactic thereby rendered the right of appeal, as reestablished by the previous day's vote, moot.

Senator Paul Sarbanes reacted by stating that he did not

19. Examples are the Alaska D2 bill and also the Budget Act, Marine Sanctuaries and the Humphrey-Hawkins bill.

“understand that the custom which entitles the Leader to recognition . . . extends to the point that the Leader can make a point of order on any other motion and the ruling of the Chair . . . is not subject to an appeal by Members of the Senate.”²⁰ Senator Muskie protested, “You cannot tell me that what is going on now is a single application of the rule,” and Senator Hart insisted that “the rules of the Senate state that decisions of the Chair are subject to appeal. . . . The appeal must be taken before other business intervenes.”²¹

Senator Javits raised the strongest and most influential objection by lodging a point of order against the Majority Leader’s actions, which he later withdrew when satisfied that the right of appeal would be protected.²²

Debate on Quorum Calls

During the same debate many senators were disturbed by rulings related to quorum calls. Under the Constitution a quorum must be present for the Senate to conduct business and any senator may ascertain the existence of such a quorum by demanding a roll call. But quorum calls have been ruled dilatory under certain situations after cloture, and a number of recent rulings have sharply limited the times when they may be suggested. These rulings, intended to speed procedure, may have created a problem of a different nature.

During an energy tax bill filibuster in 1978, Senator Proxmire, who desired to speak on an unrelated matter, suggested the absence of a quorum, explaining, “After all, you are here not because you want to hear your echo, but because you want to persuade your colleagues.”²³ Under the precedents established in the S. 2104 debate, his request was ruled dilatory. On the same point at a later time he protested:

. . . there are only seven Senators on the floor, and no

20. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Sarbanes protest, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 3 October 1977, *Congressional Record*, p. S16155.

21. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Muskie protest, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 14 October 1978, *Congressional Record*, p. S16156.

22. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Javits protest, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 3 October 1977, *Congressional Record*, p. S16157.

23. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire on echo, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 October 1978, *Congressional Record*, p. S18771.

matter how you count them, I think we learned in the first, second, or third grade that the arithmetic is that seven is not fifty-one. We do not have a quorum present — and now an eighth Senator has come into the Chamber — when we declare that eight Senators constitute a quorum. It does not.²⁴

The fact that this second request was ruled dilatory caused some to conclude that the new right to conduct business efficiently without a quorum takes priority over rights written in the Constitution.

The new Senate will soon convene and will doubtless once again review the rules. Since the Majority Leader decides what measures come to the floor, it is important to consider Senator Byrd's recorded views. He has addressed the matter several times. On September 21, 1978, he stated:

I wish I had the rules of the House over here at times. If unanimous consent to proceed to the consideration of a matter met with an objection . . . it . . . would be open to only forty minutes of debate and a showdown. . . .

There are lots of rules over there I would just love to have. And by the way, when Congress comes back in session next January at the beginning of the new Congress, it may be time to take a good look at the rules.

I for one have never been one who favored changing the rules by a majority vote at the beginning of a new session. . . . I have never been for that. But . . . I have come to be so fed up by . . . what I consider to be the abuse of the rules here . . . that I am ready for my part, to change some of those rules so that the Senate can act.²⁵

At the start of the 95th Congress, Senator Byrd proposed S. Res. 5, a compendium of changes which would substantially have limited the options available on the floor, especially following cloture. The resolution was filibustered and died, but may be reintroduced. In addition, the sweeping rulings of the Chair during the natural gas debate had the full

24. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Proxmire on counting, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 14 October 1978, *Congressional Record*, p. S18772.

25. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Byrd on wanting the House rules, 95th Congress, 2nd Session, 21 September 1978, *Congressional Record*, p. S15706.

concurrence of Senator Byrd. He took an active role in debate, insisting that since precedents provided the basis for rulings, new precedents leading to rulings which would speed up procedure could and should be set.²⁶ Shortly thereafter, a stream of new and more convenient precedents (discussed earlier) began flowing from the Chair.

The prognosis for the 96th Congress remains unclear. It is probable that Majority Leader Byrd will introduce a variation of S. Res. 5, his 1977 proposal to reduce parliamentary options in post-cloture filibusters. He could couple this with a proposal to further reduce the number of senators required to invoke cloture.

Some observers believe that the leadership may propose cloture by a simple majority. Although the House uses this procedure, if adopted by the Senate, it would drastically alter the character of that body. Therefore, it would not be enthusiastically received even by some senators opposed to unlimited debate. Many of these would probably prefer cloture by three-fifths of senators present and voting (as opposed to the sixty now required).

This solution, however, could result in tyranny of a different and unexpected sort. Senate attendance frequently drops below eighty-five percent, and three-fifths of those present and voting could be as few as thirty-one senators. Their sixty-nine colleagues could oppose cloture, but if a sufficient number were absent a bare third of the Senate could limit not only the rights of the minority but those of the majority as well. This might sound far-fetched, and one might say that senators should refrain from being absent, especially for important votes. But we have already seen that it is now Senate tradition to expedite business even in the absence of a quorum. Furthermore, weekend snowstorms in the west, electrical failures in the east and many other legitimate circumstances could prevent the return of many senators to Washington.

There is an underlying problem with the rules, however, which is unlikely to be resolved during the 1979 rules debate. The 1975 debate on changing Rule XXII and the 1977 debate

26. U.S. Congress, Senate, Senator Byrd speaking about new precedents that could be set, 95th Congress, 1st Session, 27 September 1977, *Congressional Record*, p. S15770.

on natural gas show the degree to which accepted procedure can be violated by a few men with the acquiescence of enough apathetic followers to compose a bare majority, and that those senators aware of what is happening are helpless so long as they are in the minority. This is more than a technical matter; procedure can affect the degree to which legislation may be modified, and can even determine its final success or failure.

While the matters debated in 1975 and 1977 were resolved by compromise, precedents were set for the violation of procedure and the manipulation of the rules in the interest of expediency. These precedents still stand. They may never be used, but if they are it will be in relation to the most controversial, and probably most crucial, issues before the Senate.

A filibuster ultimately accomplishes only one thing. It signals to the people of the United States that an important issue is under discussion giving the majority of Americans, who do not follow the day-to-day stream of legislation, a chance to be heard. Only they have the right to make the final decision on great political questions. Democracy is a cumbersome system and it takes time to work fully and properly.

The Senate in 1979 will be deciding whether or not to elevate the goals of efficiency over the goals of democracy.

The Bear Versus the Dragon in the Third World

RICHARD F. STAAR

The growing rivalry between Moscow and Peking to "win hearts and minds" throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America raises the question of respective achievements in this international competition. Russian and Chinese perceptions regarding the Third World substantially differ, and their experiences have not been the same. One might even hope that success may prove ephemeral over the long run. During the next two decades, however, the U.S.S.R. will continue to enjoy a preponderance of strength over Red China, especially in the ability to move resources and people by means of a burgeoning navy and merchant marine.

Belief Systems

The founder of the Soviet state described the colonies as "the weakest link" of imperialism, but he never could take advantage of this weakness. Stalin did almost nothing to promote this precept of Lenin's strategy. It remained for the ebullient and unpredictable Khrushchev to lay the foundation for a policy that, ever since, has been exploiting the issue of so-called national liberation movements in the lesser-developed countries (LDCs) of the Third World. This new alignment of forces, namely states within the Soviet bloc plus the LDCs, fitted logically into Khrushchev's plan to shift the world balance of power away from the West. Brezhnev retained the same basic ideological perspective¹ and applied it to project the image of global power which supposedly will soon eclipse that of the United States, as well as that of the Soviet Union's threatening neighbor, Red China.

Peking's ideological view is based not only upon Lenin's teachings, but also on the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung. Central to this outlook is Mao's theory of three worlds² in which the

1. U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, *The Soviet Union and the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977) pp. 83-101.

2. "Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds Is Major Contribution to Marxism-Leninism," *Peking Review*, 4 November 1977, pp. 10-41.

so-called hegemonic powers, the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., comprise the first zone; the developed countries of Australasia, Canada, Europe, and Japan the second; and the remaining lesser-developed states in Africa, Asia (including China itself), and Latin America the third. Peking alleges that alliance between the second and third groupings of states has been frustrated, because a reactionary affiliation with "imperialism" exists in the second zone. Hua Kuo-feng, the new Chinese leader, endorsed the foregoing in his political report³ to the most recent national party convention held at Peking.

It is obviously impossible for the U.S.S.R. to accept such a conceptual framework which places it in the same category with the United States, that is to say, in a situation in which both are to be isolated when the other two worlds unite against them. For this reason alone, Sino-Soviet competition is bound to continue in the decades ahead and may even include more examples of proxy warfare, apart from the current one involving Vietnam and Cambodia.

Africa in Sino/Soviet Strategy

It appears that much of what the Russians are doing in black Africa has been motivated by and, indeed, remains directly related to strategic military objectives. Any global projection of Soviet power by means of naval forces will require overseas bases or, at the very least, secure anchorages and an access to friendly ports as well as ultimate control over some of the world's maritime "choke points."⁴ Until recently, for instance, Soviet use of air facilities in Guinea permitted surveillance over the Atlantic Ocean sea lanes. This technique was especially useful in tracking U.S. carrier task forces, and the U.S.S.R. still maintains some naval and air presence in that country.

Russian facilities on the Gulf of Aden in Somalia, however, have been lost since the November 1977 expulsion of Soviet advisors, owing to Soviet support for Ethiopia. Moscow's

3. "Political Report to the 11th National Congress of the Communist Party of China," *Ibid.*, 26 August 1977, p. 41.

4. Map in Paul B. Ryan, *The Panama Canal Controversy: U.S. Diplomacy and Defense Interests* (Stanford, Ca.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977) p. 137. Also see Peter Vanneman and Martin James, "Soviet Intervention in the Horn of Africa," *Policy Review*, Summer 1978, pp. 15-36.

treaties⁵ with Angola and Mozambique do not provide for base rights, although they could be available as part of secret agreements. In addition, the foreign legion of more than 50,000 Cuban military and civilian mercenaries, present on the territory of sixteen African states,⁶ does guarantee Soviet access to at least some of these countries.

Russian competition with Red China can be seen also among the African guerrilla movements. Peking had given military aid first to the National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) during the 1960s and then to the National Front for Liberation of Angola (FNLA) through 1975. It continues to supply arms to the ruling Front for Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of Rhodesia, and the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO). In the meanwhile, Moscow has supported competing organizations such as those now guiding the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) as well as surpassed Chinese aid to SWAPO in general and to FRELIMO since Mozambique's independence. Larger amounts of military equipment from the U.S.S.R. plus expendable Cuban soldiers have helped the Soviet-backed movements prevail against those assisted by Red China.⁷

Considering southern Africa as the next target of assault by the "new tsars," the People's Republic of China (PRC) channels aid to ZANU whose leader, Robert Mugabe, visited Peking in June 1977. The New China News Agency quoted him as criticiz-

5. Texts in *Pravda*, 9 October 1976 and 4 April 1977 (Moscow). For American interests, see Herman Nickel, "A Sharper Focus on U.S. Policy in Africa," *Fortune*, 14 August 1978, pp. 132-140.

6. *Prensa Libre*, Guatemala City, 1 June 1978. One should also mention East European support in terms of manpower and funds, discussed by the *Baltimore Sun*, 1 July 1978.

7. Apart from weapons, military advisors, and foreign mercenaries, Moscow has provided more economic aid to the lesser-developed countries than Peking. From 1954 through the end of 1976, with the exception of the period 1967-1969 when Chinese assistance to Third World countries nearly ceased because of the "cultural revolution," offers of foreign aid by the U.S.S.R. totaled almost three billion dollars compared with \$2.2 billion from the People's Republic of China. It should be noted, however, that the year 1970 saw an escalation of PRC aid to more than came from the entire Soviet bloc. Central Intelligence Agency, *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World* (Washington, D.C., August 1977) p. 3.

ing the "insidious and dangerous menace of Russian imperialism." This he denied at a press conference in Libreville early the following month and gave the U.S.S.R. credit as the principal source of external support for the Patriotic Front, which consists of ZAPU as well as ZANU. With traditional Russian backing of the former, it looks as if the Soviets now provide most of the supplies to the Rhodesian guerrilla movement.

The 1,160-mile long railroad from Kapiri Mposhi in landlocked Zambia to the port of Dar es Salam in Tanzania, completed in 1976 by 16,000 Chinese workers, was financed with a \$447 million PRC loan and represents the principal monument to Peking's foreign assistance in Africa. Relations with President Nyerere of Tanzania are close. Ties with Zambia are less so, although much of China's imported copper comes from that country. Sudanese resentment over the role which the Soviet government reportedly played in the military coup, alleged to have been supported by indigenous communists but frustrated by General al-Numairi, also has led to closer bonds with Peking.

The Chinese are still active in the Congo, but give higher priority to Zaire,⁸ whose President Mobutu has been, more recently, a special target of Soviet verbal attacks since the twice-repeated failure (1977 and 1973) to topple his regime by Katanga gendarmes. The PRC also gained from the sudden decline of Soviet influence in Somalia, whose president visited Peking during April 1978 in the hope of securing military equipment against U.S.S.R.-supported Ethiopia. The following August, Deputy Premier Chen Mu-hua visited Somalia⁹ as well as Gabon and Cameroon.

Asia and the Pacific

If the U.S.S.R. exerts more influence than the PRC in most of black Africa, it suffers from serious disadvantages through-

8. A group of Chinese military instructors arrived at Kinshasa, and another high-ranking delegation from Peking promised to deliver tanks and artillery, as well as patrol launches, according to Moscow radio, 23 June and 3 July 1978.

9. *Newsweek*, 13 February 1978, pp. 47-48, printed an interview with President Barre who stated that Russians had begun treating Somalia like a puppet state. At the end of October, a firing squad executed 17 army officers who allegedly had been instigated by the "new imperialists [read USSR] to overthrow the government" of Somalia.

out those parts of Asia that have been influenced by the Chinese empire for centuries. Moscow maintains close relations with Vietnam and Laos, both of which are ruled by communist parties that are becoming more pro-Soviet. In mid-summer of 1977, for example, Cambodian diplomats left Russia without giving any reason. Phnom Penh broke relations with Hanoi six months later because of pitched battles involving tanks and aircraft. The U.S.S.R. sided with Vietnam and the PRC with Cambodia, which led President Carter's advisor on national security affairs to describe¹⁰ the fighting "as the first case of proxy war between China and the Soviet Union." It is not inconceivable that these developments may provide the Russians with a naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.

A radio station in Moscow also has accused Peking of supplying "arms, ammunition, communications means and propaganda literature as well as training commanders" to the New People's Army in the Philippines.¹¹ This is true, although the PRC more recently has launched a diplomatic campaign to establish friendly relations with neighboring countries of the Pacific basin.

The attempt to extend Soviet influence throughout Asia, of course, is looked upon as a direct threat by Peking. Thus, in contrast with its past efforts to subvert non-communist south-east Asian peoples and governments, the PRC recently has given strong endorsement to the five-member Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN). PRC Deputy Premier Li Hsien-nien praised ASEAN during his visit to the Philippines early in 1978. Chinese leaders also have wooed Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia, the other members of this organization. ASEAN, however, cooperates in combating communist-led insurgencies which, in most cases, are supported by the PRC.

Principal deputy premier, Teng Hsiao-ping, visited Burma and Nepal also in early 1978. Both of the latter two states are

10. The PRC reportedly is supplying Cambodia with T-60 tanks, heavy mortars, recoilless rifles, anti-tank weapons, as well as instructors, by sea. More than two dozen Soviet flights replaced Chinese technicians with Russians but also brought arms and ammunition to Vietnam. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Douglas Pike, "Vietnam-Cambodia Conflict," *Report* (Washington, D.C., 4 October 1978) p. 18.

11. Radio Peace and Progress, 11 March 1978. This Moscow station broadcasts primarily to the Third World.

located along mainland China's periphery, and the trips obviously had as their objective a common strategy to block Soviet influence. In the case of Burma, President Ne Win certainly would have given much to have Peking-supported rebels¹² cut off from Chinese sources of supply. On the other hand, at the end of 1977, for the first time in about five years, Peking had sent official greetings to the communist party of Thailand on its 35th anniversary and praised it for "encircling the cities so as to seize political power." This occurred at a time when the PRC appeared to be encouraging neighboring communist-ruled states to improve their relations with Bangkok. Deputy Premier Teng Hsiao-ping also was scheduled to visit Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore in November 1978.

The U.S.S.R. has accused Peking of inciting bloody clashes in Malaysia, where some thirty-five percent of the population is Chinese, and infiltrating special agents into Indonesia. Of the twenty-five million overseas Chinese (*hua-chao*), about three million live in Indonesia. Nearly one-third are PRC citizens, about 800,000 remain stateless, and the rest hold Republic of China passports. They supposedly control an estimated four-fifths of all private capital. About 1,250 persons from the Mainland, who had entered Indonesia illegally, are supposed to have been jailed recently.¹³

The Indian Connection

The most important target, of course, is India which had been defeated by Red China in the October-November 1962 border war. The latter has been accused of illegally seizing 15,000 square miles of India's territory, and the current prime minister, Desai, recently stated that complete normalization can take place only after the border dispute has been settled. However, during the summer of 1976, Peking already had stepped up its overtures toward Delhi and exchanged ambassadors. Earlier this year, the PRC sent a trade mission to explore an increased exchange of commodities. Subsequently, India's

12. Intensification of White Flag (pro-Peking) communist activities in Burma allegedly resulted in about 100 deaths per day, according to Radio Peace and Progress, 25 March 1978.

13. Moscow radio, 17 February, 8 March, and 29 May 1978; V. Kassis, "Stake on Nationalism," *Izvestiya*, 20 June 1978, p. 5. The Chinese have gained more influence than the Russians throughout the islands of the South Pacific, according to *The Washington Post*, 31 August 1978.

foreign minister was invited to visit China which he did on 30 October 1978. At the same time, Naga and Mizo tribesmen allegedly were being supplied with PRC automatic weapons and grenades.¹⁴

The Chinese have been unable to compete on equal terms with the Russians due to the sheer magnitude of Soviet assistance which has included construction of the huge metallurgical complex at Bokaro in Bihar state and other projects involving heavy machinery, oil, coal, nonferrous metallurgy, communications and transportation. On the other hand, the U.S.S.R. did miscalculate in India by maintaining close relations with the administration of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Moscow compounded its error by fully supporting the state of emergency imposed in the summer of 1975, while ignoring contacts with other political parties and the Indian people themselves. None of this helped the Russians to obtain naval privileges at Vishakhapatnam, which they had hinted at on several occasions.

Only after the March 1977 national elections and subsequent change in government did the Soviet press and radio begin to criticize "mistakes and excesses" made during the emergency. Imprisonment of opposition personalities by Mrs. Gandhi earlier had received Soviet approval, those affected being denounced as "fascists" and "anti-national demagogues." When Foreign Minister Gromyko visited Delhi, a joint communique¹⁵ with the new administration emphasized the strengthening of cooperation in the spirit of the 1971 treaty between the two countries. Three new agreements were signed, including one for a trade increase of twenty percent between India and the U.S.S.R.

One should mention recent developments in Afghanistan, where a coup on 27 April 1978 resulted in an estimated 10,000 deaths and forcible installation of a communist regime. The new prime minister, Nur Mohammad Tarrakki, and all twenty members of his cabinet belong to the Marxist-oriented People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).¹⁶ The Soviet

14. Moscow radio, 14 May 1978, citing an article in the *News of Delhi* which had appeared in April.

15. *Ibid.*, 28 April 1977. India's foreign minister visited Moscow the following year and Delhi radio, 18 September 1978, carried the communique.

16. The communist newspaper in India, *New Age*, asserted on 9 April 1978 that the PDPA is "the party of the working class of Afghanistan."

Union was the first to recognize the new regime in Kabul, and other communist-ruled states followed suit. Tarakki is a veteran Marxist.¹⁷ Within a few months, the number of Russian advisers had quadrupled to about two-thousand. However, in June 1978, PRC deputy premier Keng Piao opened the 800-kilometer long Karakorum highway built by some 2,000 Chinese workers. The following month Moscow gave Kabul \$257 million in credits for a steel mill.

Toward the south, the part of Baluchistan that is within Pakistan lies between Afghanistan and the Arabian Sea which offers warm water ports; the same can be said for the part of Baluchistan on Iranian territory. If these areas are penetrated, Moscow may be able to command the head of the oil-rich Persian Gulf by means of bases near its exit through the Strait of Hormuz. Surveillance over East-West shipping also would be facilitated from this vantage point.

The Middle East

Communist rebels are again active in the Sultanate of Oman, where Iranian forces supposedly had suppressed the national liberation front guerrillas in mountainous Dhofar province some time ago. This may have been a topic for discussion between the Shah of Iran and Hua Kuo-feng when they met at the end of August 1978 after the PRC had established diplomatic relations with Oman. Peking and Teheran both have a common interest to prevent Moscow from dominating Oman which, together with military facilities in Iraq, could give the Russians preponderance in the Indian Ocean. Soviet influence continues in the People's Democratic Republic of (South) Yemen, the only Marxist state on the Arabian peninsula and the one which controls the port of Aden.

The PRC announced that three countries in the Middle East had revolted against Russian "hegemonic acts." Egypt (1976) and Somalia (1977) both abrogated their friendship treaties with the U.S.S.R., and the Sudan also expelled Moscow's

Both the Soviets and the PDPA itself play down the latter's status as a de facto communist party.

17. His biographic sketch appeared in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 17 May 1978 (Moscow). *The Washington Post*, 1 May 1978, described Tarakki as chairman of "the new, united communist party formed in 1977." See also *Times*, 2 and 3 October 1978 (London).

military advisers during the latter year. "As a result, the Soviet Union had to withdraw from these strategic positions which control the Suez Canal, the mouth of the Red Sea, and their neighboring regions."¹⁸

Peking gave its support to Anwar al-Sadat's peace initiative vis-a-vis Israel, received an aide to the Egyptian president in early 1978, and sent a military delegation to Cairo in July. During the preceding two years, the Chinese had delivered thirty engines for Egypt's MiG-17 and MIG-21 fighter aircraft plus shipments of spare parts. PRC leader Hua Kuo-feng in August 1978 accepted an invitation to visit Cairo.

Regardless of the huge disparity of resources between the U.S.S.R. and the PRC,¹⁹ Peking has established a diplomatic presence in all of the "front-line" states facing Israel. These include Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Only the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the remaining peninsular oil-producing states continue trade relations with Taiwan and refuse to exchange diplomats with the PRC. Moscow and Peking both support the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) while condemning outright acts of terrorism, like assassinations. PLO executive committee chairman, Yassir Arafat, however, leans toward the U.S.S.R. When he visited the Soviet Union (twice in 1978), he praised²⁰ that country as "the most sincere, most loyal ally of the Palestinian people. . ."

Much wealthier in economic resources, Russia far exceeds China in providing economic aid to the Middle East as well. Such countries as Syria, Iraq²¹ and, more recently, Libya,

18. New China News Agency, 3 December 1977. In Somalia, the U.S.S.R. lost naval and communications facilities at Mogadiscio and Berbera, plus airfields at the latter, and Uanle Uen which adversely affected Soviet ASW capabilities in the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean.

A plot by South Yemen to assassinate the president of North Yemen succeeded in June 1978, but an attempted coup by four battalions of the army and military police at Sanaa failed later that same year. *The Washington Post*, 17 October 1978.

19. The massive weapons transfer by the U.S.S.R. to the Third World totaled \$17.2 billion in value between 1955 and 1976. By comparison, only \$600 million could be supplied from the PRC during the same twenty-year period. Central Intelligence Agency, *op.cit.* (in note 7 above).

20. Moscow radio, 6 March 1978. Early in November, the PLO chief again conducted talks with Soviet leaders at the Kremlin.

21. Iraq has been even-handed. Despite the April 1972 treaty with the U.S.S.R., it executed 21 pro-Moscow communists who had tried to

have received huge amounts of assistance from the Soviet Union. With Soviet aid, the port of Latakia in Syria is being expanded, more than 1,400 kilometers of its railway lines have been built, and about fifty industrial projects are completed or under construction in the same country. In June 1978, however, authorities banned ten journalists suspected of pro-Soviet views from writing for government-controlled Syrian newspapers.

Headed by the erratic Colonel Qadhafi, who provides asylum to Third World terrorists, Libya will soon receive a plant producing five million tons of steel per year. The Soviet Union also has agreed to help develop the natural gas industry of Libya over the next two decades, and Russian geologists are already exploring for more oil there. An atomic power station and two transmission lines also have been promised. Within the past year, the number of Soviet advisers stationed in Libya has doubled to more than 2,200 military personnel. However, the PRC established diplomatic relations with Libya during the summer of 1978.

Wooing Latin America

Here, too, the U.S.S.R. appears to be ahead of the PRC in extending its influence. For example, in late 1976 an agreement was signed²² in Moscow by the president of Venezuela to provide Cuba with 20,000 barrels of crude oil per day, thus relieving the Russians of that much of their burden. As part of a larger three-year agreement on economic cooperation, the U.S.S.R. also sells manufacturing equipment to the Caracas government and is in the process of training skilled workers at numerous locations throughout Venezuela.

About the same time, a military agreement with the Soviets extended Peru's credit line to \$700 million over twenty years at 2½ percent interest. The first shipment of T-55 tanks has been purchased already, and 200 more are to follow. SAM-2 and SAM-3 type missiles were to be provided immediately, with SAM-7 later. The arsenal includes 155 mm. self-propelled artillery, a Russian-supplied radar network,

subvert the army but also confiscated approximately \$90 million in Red Chinese arms destined for the PLO. *Baltimore Sun*, 1 August 1978.

22. *New York Times*, 10 December 1976.

about a dozen patrol boats, four frigates, some thirty Sukhoi-22 fighter planes, and several YAK vertical take-off aircraft.²³ Peruvian pilots are being trained by Russians in Cuba. At the same time, several hundred Soviet officers and technicians have arrived in Peru to give instruction in the use of these weapons.

On the other hand, the PRC is accused of maintaining close ties with the Somoza dictatorship in Nicaragua. According to Moscow radio, China also pursues political, diplomatic, and economic contacts with the "fascist junta in Chile."²⁴ Whether these charges are accurate cannot be ascertained. It is safe to assume that these moves are an attempt by Peking to block extension of Soviet influence throughout Latin America.

The Russians have one great advantage, namely, the existence in the Western hemisphere of their Cuban ally. The Castro regime has been tied formally since 1972 to the bloc's Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which absorbs 70 percent of its foreign trade.²⁵ Havana owes Moscow an estimated \$4.8 billion, which probably amounts to eight billion dollars, if accumulated subsidies are added to the debt. About \$700 million in convertible currency has been given by the U.S.S.R. as payment for sugar over the past two years.²⁶

It is undoubtedly this largesse which has induced the Castro brothers to be responsive to Soviet desires, as is evident from their abandonment of guerrilla-sponsored activities throughout Latin America in favor of full-scale war in Africa. As an example of its own cooperation, the Kremlin has arranged for Cuban reconnaissance planes to be flown over the Caribbean and the South Atlantic by Soviet air force pilots who replace Cuban aviators now engaged over Angola and Ethiopia. Peking has no such foothold or base in the Western hemisphere, although it does contest leadership over individual communist movements also in this geographic region.

World Communism

The struggle for influence between the Russians and Chinese

23. *Le Nouveau Journal*, (Paris), 6 January 1977.

24. Moscow radio, 26 May and 6 June 1978.

25. R.F. Starr, *Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe*, 3rd rev. ed. (Stanford, California: Hoover Press, 1977) p. 240.

26. *New York Times*, 18 December 1977.

continues on a global basis within the world communist movement.²⁷ In the Far East, neutralist and pro-Chinese parties together more than counter-balance those of a Soviet persuasion. In South Asia and Australasia, these forces are more or less evenly balanced. In Latin America and the Middle East, pro-Moscow communist movements far and away predominate.

Among the dozen or so international communist front organizations, the Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau²⁸ and the Afro-Asian Journalists' Association have been controlled by Peking since 1963; neither has had more than a shadowy existence. By contrast, certain Soviet fronts (especially the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, and the World Federation of Democratic Youth) have been quite active in linking pro-Moscow leftists of the Third World with their counterparts in the developed countries; others, like the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, have had a solely Third World focus from their very beginning.

Conclusions

One of the fundamental differences between Russian and Chinese efforts at intervention in Third World affairs obviously revolves around the disparity of resources. Not only can Moscow deliver at short notice vast quantities of weapons from its own arsenal at home, but it also disposes of client states that are willing to release U.S.S.R.-supplied military equipment when urgently needed in return for newer models. The PRC has neither this advantage nor the supplies that make for such a wholesale approach. The same is applicable in the area of foreign economic²⁹ and technical aid in which Moscow's assistance program is literally worldwide and includes on-the-

27. Based on fraternal greetings sent to the 11th Communist Party Congress in Peking, about 49 countries either have pro-Chinese splinter groups or ruling movements neutral in the Sino-Soviet dispute. R.F. Staar (ed.), *1978 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs* (Stanford, California: Hoover Press, 1978) pp. xx-xxv.

28. This is not to be confused with the (pro-Soviet) Afro-Asian Writers' Bureau operating out of Cairo as an adjunct to the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization. *Ibid.*, pp. 453-454.

29. Foreign trade totals with the LDCs during the latest comparable year showed the U.S.S.R. with \$9.4 billion compared to the PRC's \$2.4 billion. Central Intelligence Agency, *China: International Trade, 1976-1977* (Washington, D.C., November 1977) p. 10; CIA, *Changing Patterns in Soviet-LDC Trade, 1976-77* (Washington, D.C., May 1978) p. 9.

job training in the recipient countries, as well as in the U.S.S.R. itself.

This preponderance has been most effective in Africa, the Middle East, and certain other parts of Asia. However, the Soviet Union has lost its previously strong foothold in such countries as the Sudan, Egypt, Somalia, and, to some extent, India. It is not at all certain that the other Middle Eastern, African or Asian regimes, which currently accept Moscow's assistance, will continue this relationship once they have developed their economies or solidified internal power positions. Foreign aid has not paid off significantly in terms of military bases.

Peking on the other hand, may have more appeal than Moscow, vis-a-vis the Third World, because it is an Oriental rather than a European power and also a lesser-developed country itself. Psychologically, this makes for easier acceptance of the PRC by the Third World and closer identification and empathy on the part of the PRC with local problems in the Third World, empathy for which the Russians are hardly noted. The PRC is offering assistance without any strings, although it has effected significant cutbacks due to a crash program of modernization which by 1985 will have cost an estimated \$350 billion.³⁰

According to an old Chinese proverb, it is difficult to prophesy, especially about the future. However, a possible scenario for developments to come might be suggested in terms of the following. The Third World could split between moderate versus radical states over the long run. In such a case, the U.S.S.R. may find itself supporting the former and the PRC the latter.

This theory coincides with the ideological imperative which has driven Peking on several occasions in the direction of domestic revolutionary upheaval. During the years ahead, a future communist leader may provide strong support for those foreign terrorist movements which attempt to paralyze and then topple governmental authority, as could be seen recently in the Federal Republic of Germany and in Italy. How much easier this task may be accomplished in a lesser-developed country does not require elaboration. It is an idea that China-watchers in Washington, D.C., should be mulling over as they look into the future and make contingency plans.

30. *The Wall Street Journal*, 18 October 1978.

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In and Out at HEW: Doing Well by Doing Good Through Consulting

DONALD LAMBRO

To the unknowing eye the gathering of 142 professionals strolling about the comfortable Orcas Island resort looked and acted much like any other business group out on an all-expense-paid weekend where work and pleasure are painlessly blended in just the right proportions. The spacious and well-appointed suites overlooking the breathtaking waters of Washington state's fabulously scenic San Juan Islands, the shrimp and prime rib dinners, the yacht trips around the islands — all reflected that special attention to details and lavish extras which IBM or General Motors might provide for their top brass on a similar "business" weekend in the grandeur of the northwest.

Surely no one would have guessed that this was a gathering of well-paid consultants and federal and state bureaucrats who had been summoned together to grapple with the problems of the poor — who seemed a million light years away from this pristine locale which had once been the magnificent estate of a wealthy shipping magnate. Nor would anyone have suspected that the entire weekend's tab was being picked up by the United States Department of Health, Education and Welfare, courtesy of the American taxpayer.

The occasion for the conference was to discuss the results of the government's experiments on the poor in Seattle and Denver where low-income families have been provided with a guaranteed minimum income for the past five years. The experiment, involving nearly 5,000 families, is in the words of one prominent consultant "the biggest social experiment in the history of the human race." And indeed it is. Conceivably the biggest welfare program in the history of the nation hangs in the balance, not to mention many millions of dollars in future revenue for the consulting firms that have been nurturing and feeding the guaranteed income concept for the past decade and more.

But, for the consultant companies that attended the Orcas Island conference last May on the Seattle and Denver Income Maintenance Experiments (SIME/DIME), along with the HEW and Labor Department representatives, more than just money was involved. For many of those who were there, SIME/DIME is more than just an experiment. It is a cause.

Most Americans have never heard of SIME/DIME and would be surprised to hear that the federal government was providing a basic guaranteed annual income to the poor. Wasn't this Richard Nixon's ill-fated Family Assistance Plan (FAP) which had died ignominiously in the Congress? Wasn't this, furthermore, the very proposal Gerald Ford had adamantly rejected in his campaign to retain the Presidency? And, finally, wasn't this the type of costly proposal which Jimmy Carter had told HEW Secretary Joseph Califano the nation could not afford?

And yet, here it was, being kept alive administration after administration, like some comatose patient who has been declared clinically dead, but whose life support functions are being artificially sustained by machine. A very different kind of machine is keeping this proposal alive, however, one that is peopled by a shadowy network of liberal planners, economists, sociologists, data analysts, and thinkers. Most of them at one time or another can be found working in the type of consulting firms represented at Orcas Island or somewhere within the federal bureaucracy. And most of them through the years have moved with ease through a "revolving door" system that takes them from consulting into government and back again.

But, to understand the enormous influence which major consulting firms have over government policy, it is absolutely necessary to understand how pervasive government's use of consulting has become.

The Silent 'Industry'

Though not widely perceived beyond the banks of the Potomac, government consulting in Washington has multiplied into a \$2 billion-a-year growth industry in which major corporations like Rand, Brookings, SRI International (formerly Stanford Research Institute), Mathematica, Inc., and the Urban Institute, among others, have grown rich and powerful. And, by becoming increasingly dependent upon them, government has been able to get around maximum personnel ceilings simply by farming out more and more of its work, research, evaluation, and, in many cases, even program administration. For all its importance as an experimental project, SIME/DIME is being fully administered, not by HEW, but by SRI and Mathematica. The National Institutes of Health farms out much of its administrative work to consulting firms. So do many other agencies.

There are no accurate figures on the number of consulting firms doing business with the federal government. One partial survey found that 64 departments and agencies were paying consultants nearly \$2 billion a year under some 34,000 contracts. Last year, the government placed some 18,000 consultants on its payroll, but this represents only the tip of an unseen iceberg. It is estimated that if consulting firms and their employees were factored in, in addition to state and local employees whose salaries are paid by the national government, the federal government's true employee level would be approximately three to four million more than the nearly three million now officially given. Incredible as it may seem, the federal government has only the vaguest idea of how many workers in this country are paid by federal funds. According to Spencer Rich (writing in *The Washington Post*, July 18, 1978, p. A1), a good estimate would be that from three to four million persons are paid by the federal government through consulting contracts, research grants and payments made for the wages of state and local government employees. Secretary Joseph Califano of HEW recently testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee that his Department pays the salaries of 980,217 persons who work for private think tanks, universities and state and local governments. This is in addition to the 144,256 "regular" HEW employees. The Department of Defense estimates that it pays the salaries of an additional 2,050,000 people through consulting contracts and the like. This figure does not include 2,049,000 military personnel who are also federal employees.

Yet, the growth in government consulting remains in part a mystery because of the widespread unanimity both in and out of government that a great deal of their work is of negligible value. In its fiscal 1978 report on HEW's appropriations bill, the Senate Appropriations Committee confessed it was "unaware of any instance where a consultant's recommendation has produced a significant program improvement."

The Committee stated:

An analysis of the itemized contracts let during fiscal years 1976 and 1977 indicated that many of these contracts may have been inappropriate in the context of (a) agency missions and priorities; (b) previous contracts performed for the same purpose; and (c) duplicative contracts being let simultaneously within other parts of

the Department and Federal Government.

Nonetheless, HEW's consulting costs, like those of virtually every other federal agency, continue to climb. In fiscal 1977 HEW's consulting bill was at least \$94 million. By 1978 it had grown to \$194 million. (It was probably higher since much work that was in reality "consulting" was not listed as such.) At the end of 1978 Congress limited HEW to a tightened budget of no more than \$194 million for consulting services.

"They are like parasites who feed off the government," one committee investigator said. "They keep coming back year after year."

It is not surprising, therefore, that so many consultants have earned the notorious nickname "Beltway Bandits," a title which accurately characterizes both the annual haul of tax dollars that fill their corporate saddle bags as well as their office hideouts — the beltway encircling greater Washington from where many of them conduct their business.

"They have become," said one former HEW administrator, "like another branch of government, an unseen branch, advising bureaucrats, developing policies, propelling programs through the machinery of government. But what is most disturbing is the network they have formed among themselves, both inside as well as outside of government."

Another former HEW administrator, John Svahn, who headed the Social and Rehabilitation Service, found this network to be particularly pervasive within the field of social welfare policy. "You see the same individuals dealing with the same programs on literally a revolving door basis," he said. "And it's true that there has been a sort of interlocking directorate among them. The same people tend to stay within a penumbra of social policy, whether they are in government or the private sector — except the people who are awarding the contracts one day are picking them up the next."

Two Prime Examples

Perhaps two of the most influential consulting firms in Washington in the field of social welfare are the Urban Institute and Mathematica, Inc.

Sparked by his then-special assistant, Joseph Califano, President Lyndon Johnson pushed for the creation of the Urban Institute over ten years ago, believing that the need

existed for a liberal think tank in Washington to research and analyze domestic programs and proposals. With the help of several million dollars in federal seed money, the Institute was founded and is today one of the major contractors with Departments such as Housing and Urban Development, HEW, and Labor. This year HEW has given the Institute nearly \$3 million in contracts.

With a payroll of almost \$7 million a year, the Institute provides work for 300 researchers, data analysts and others whose work brings in \$11 million annually in revenue. If the Institute is not exactly an extension of the federal bureaucracy, it might as well be considered so because more than 86 percent of its income comes from 22 federal departments and agencies. The balance is derived from state and local governments, foundations and private corporations.

Besides its prolific studies, the Institute is equally admired in Washington's upper circles for its elegant, catered dinners where government policymakers, administrators, members of Congress, academics and fellow consultants gather to hear speakers and exchange views on everything from housing allowance experiments to microanalytic simulation.

A guest of the Institute described one of its recent "welfare symposia" affairs this way: "Cocktails began at 6:30 p.m. There were bars everywhere. This was followed by a buffet served by tuxedoed waiters, most or all of them Spanish-speaking. The menu included boeuf bourguignon, watercress salad, eclairs. The silver was Reed and Barton."

Mathematica, Inc., was established in 1958 by a group of Princeton professors who occasionally did some data analysis for the government and found that consulting for the government was much more lucrative than teaching at Princeton. Last year the firm and its several subsidiaries in Washington and Princeton, New Jersey, earned \$23 million — 80 percent of it from the federal government.

Armed with a staff of 600 employees, Mathematica's annual report told shareholders that the firm has "opened new business potential in information processing for government agencies."

Both the Institute and Mathematica have played a significant though little-known role in the shaping of welfare policy and welfare reform proposals over the past decade. Their influence is derived in large measure from their development of a highly sophisticated data model used to project costs of everything

from food stamps to welfare reform to a guaranteed annual income.

Called the Transfer Income Model, or TRIM, the model was initially developed by a group of Urban Institute economists under a \$1 million government contract. Many of these key economists, including Jodie Allen who is now a special assistant for welfare reform to Labor Secretary Ray Marshall, were hired away from the Institute by Mathematica and took the TRIM model with them. With the support of additional government financing, primarily from HEW and the Office of Economic Opportunity, both firms improved the TRIM model (Mathematica renamed theirs MATH) and began selling its data to any federal agency needing reliable cost estimates on income transfer programs. Thus, TRIM and its successors have been used to estimate, and in many ways shape, virtually every major welfare proposal for the past ten years. HEW, Labor, the Internal Revenue Service, HUD, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service are just some of the agencies which have used its data.

"There was enormous power being wielded here by these two consulting firms," one congressional investigator said. "The decisions that Nixon made on FAP and Ford on his income supplement proposal, plus other actions by the Congress on food stamp reform and social welfare were by and large based on the figures derived from TRIM."

Said another congressional staffer who has followed the battle over welfare reform closely, "In every battle over a controversial proposal the side that usually wins is the side with the best information, the most convincing statistics. Right now consulting groups like the Urban Institute and Mathematica have control of the best data available."

Svahn agrees that those who control to a substantial degree the input of information control the decision-making process of government. "You can't argue with a computer," he says. "But the models are not totally objective because they are based on certain biased assumptions." These assumptions have been made by people in and out of government who are champions of the guaranteed annual income concept.

Revolving Door Politics

Even the most cursory review of the last ten years of welfare reform proposals finds the same names cropping up again and

again, crisscrossing both government and consulting fields as if they were one and the same — frequently occupying key positions of authority and influence. Virtually all of them represent one common point of view — a club within a club.

- William Morrill, HEW's assistant secretary for Planning and Evaluation between 1973 and 1976, whose office contracted for much of the research that contributed to the development of FAP, is now a senior fellow at Mathematica.

- Michael Barth, HEW's deputy assistant secretary for Income Security Policy, was one of the chief architects of the guaranteed annual income proposal. He worked under Morrill as an economist in HEW during which time he wrote *Toward An Effective Income Support System* which resurrected the FAP proposal Nixon had originally turned down. Barth's book was published by the University of Wisconsin's Institute for Research on Poverty which has done considerable consulting work for the government.

- John Palmer, who supervised Barth in HEW's Office of Policy Evaluation and who with George C. Carcagno co-authored the book on FAP, is now at Brookings. Carcagno is a senior vice president with Mathematica.

- Henry Aaron held Morrill's old job as HEW's assistant secretary for Planning and Evaluation and has worked for several major consulting firms, including the Urban Institute, Brookings and Rand. He recently announced his decision to return to the Brookings Institution.

- Jodie T. Allen served as chief of research and policy coordination for the Family Assistance Plan in HEW from 1969 to 1970, later becoming senior vice president at Mathematica from 1974 to 1977. She is now Labor Secretary Ray Marshall's special assistant for welfare reform.

- Richard Nathan served as a deputy undersecretary for welfare reform under HEW Secretary Elliot Richardson and was a major force behind FAP. He has returned to Brookings.

- Susan Woolsey, Morrill's top assistant at HEW, is now associate director for Human resources at the Office of Management and Budget, a position Morrill once held.

Elsewhere, one finds numerous examples of revolving door practices through which consultants become government policymakers and vice versa.

- Raymond Struyk, for example, a former Urban Institute official, is now a deputy assistant secretary in HUD's Office

of Research and Demonstration which last year did \$3.1 million worth of business with his former organization.

- Carolyn Merck, a Food and Nutrition Service specialist in the Department of Agriculture who worked on food stamp reform using data provided under a \$660,709 contract to Mathematica, left her government post to take a job with Mathematica.

- Ernest Stromsdorfer, a former deputy assistant secretary of Labor who was in charge of "research and evaluation," is now with Apt Associates, a consulting firm in Cambridge, Massachusetts, which is a major government contractor.

All of this raises substantial questions about inherent conflicts as well as about the ability of top government officials to make fair and dispassionate decisions and judgments on tough and highly controversial issues. Much of the available evidence points too often to an almost incestuous relationship between two spheres of influence: government and consulting firms. How can we expect officials within the Departments of Labor and HEW to examine the results of major social experiments and deliver to us an unprejudiced evaluation based solely on the facts? On the contrary, it appears that in the long, painful struggle over welfare reform an overwhelmingly biased point of view has survived within the bureaucracy to keep the concept of a guaranteed annual income alive.

Moreover, how can we trust the conclusions of experiments like SIME/DIME when the consulting firms performing the work are peopled and run by individuals who once had a profound interest in their success as public servants? If social "experiments" administered by consultants under government contracts are worthy of their name, then they should be truly experiments and nothing more, for strict scientific procedure requires that the outcome of any social experiment must not be tinkered with or prejudiced in any way. Yet, there is reason to doubt that this is the case with the negative income tax entitlement project as well as with the manpower provisions of the program.

In an interview with Jodie Allen, during which she went to great lengths to demonstrate her total uninvolvedness with her former firm, she made a remark about her present task in the Department of Labor that I think revealed a great deal about the outcome of the jobs component of the welfare

reform program.

Ms. Allen said, "I want to make it work. I want to see it succeed." One cannot blame her for such enthusiasm, but neither can one help wondering how such an "experiment" can be truly impartial and unprejudiced with one of its chief administrators actively working in its behalf.

Four months after he took office, Jimmy Carter issued a memorandum to the heads of his executive departments and agencies saying, "There has been and continues to be evidence that some consulting services, including experts and advisors, are being used excessively, unnecessarily, and improperly."

Among many areas of abuse, Mr. Carter cited "Revolving door abuses whereby former government employees may be improperly favored for individual or contracted consulting arrangements."

Earlier this year a *Washington Post* investigation found that top officials of the Appalachian Regional Commission had received fat consulting contracts when they left the anti-poverty agency, considering them nothing more than a thinly disguised form of severance pay. Harry Teter Jr., who resigned in July of 1978 as executive director of the agency, was given \$35,000 for a six-month review of his years at the commission. Other top officials who resigned or retired received similar consulting contracts, in one case as high as \$75,000.

At the same time, an HEW investigation discovered that friends and relatives of officials at the National Institute on Drug Abuse had obtained millions of dollars in consulting contracts. HEW Inspector General Thomas D. Morris said there was "a substantial appearance of impropriety," and HEW Secretary Joseph Califano stated that he was "deeply disturbed with the loose management practices and evidences of cronyism" his investigators had uncovered.

All of this has reddened the faces and raised the eyebrows of several congressional committees that have quietly begun investigations into Washington's largely hidden world of consulting contractors. Shocked by the \$200 million HEW wanted to spend on consultants in fiscal 1979, the Senate Appropriations Committee's Labor-HEW subcommittee has begun probing the Department's consulting contract awards. Simultaneously, the Committee's special investigative unit has been conducting probes of its own. The still-secret investigation will culminate in Senate hearings early next year.

Yet despite this activity, little of substance has been done within the administration to end the apparent conflicts and revolving door abuses over which Mr. Carter has expressed clear and deep concern.

"It's a very cozy group over there," said one former HEW official of his old alma mater. "When you look at the assistant secretaries, the deputy assistant secretaries, the same crowd is still there, many of them since Johnson, doing the planning and policy analysis, pushing their causes in little increments. Most of them came out of the consulting industry in this town and know that they can return to it anytime they want. And they maintain their relationships with their former firms. It's a very cozy relationship."

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A Grand Strategy for the Western Alliance

STRATEGY OF SURVIVAL. *By Brian Crozier.* (Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1978.)

There has been no greater indictment of Western political strategic thought than the manifest inability of the U.S. and its allies to deal with the Soviet problem. In successive stages, most Western intellectuals and strategists have failed to understand the nature of Soviet thought, the methods of Soviet power, and the scope of Soviet intentions. Finally, as Foy Kohler has noted, when all is laid bare, the West's finest minds have failed to observe the obvious or, upon seeing it, have failed to believe it.

One of the more perceptive efforts to understand the Soviet Union was reflected in NSC-68, a 1950 report of the National Security Council which outlined some characteristics of the Soviet problem and the courses of action available to the U.S. Despite the fact that its recommendations were never implemented, it nevertheless stands as an attempt to describe the comprehensive scope of Soviet intentions and the broad nature of its threat to the Western world.

Also along the way, various scholarly works on the more specific aspects of Soviet foreign policy and ideology have captured in one or several instances some central features of Soviet thought: the interplay of ideology and geopolitics; the unity of Soviet foreign policy and international socialism; and the purpose of "co-existence" with the West.

Mr. Brian Crozier is the Director of the highly-regarded Institute for Conflict Studies based in London. His book stands between these approaches. His presentation is neither a piece of meticulous scholarship nor a concise description of foreign policy options. Yet, it was not his intention to write either one or the other. The book represents an effort in Grand Strategy and, at the very least, is evidence of a revival in the West of this complex and intriguing mode of thought.

One of the more interesting aspects of the book is its comprehensive nature. Grand Strategy is, if nothing else, an attempt to develop and implement a certain global perspective, an attempt to take the many facets of foreign policy

and to unite them as one global policy. In Colin Gray's *Geopolitics in the Nuclear Era*, one sees that a geopolitical perspective is not at all out of place in modern strategy. Crozier provides a necessary service, but certainly a controversial one, by including a prescription for Western internal security. Its mere inclusion is illustrative of the West's two-fold problem: an external Soviet threat and an internal problem of division, doubt, and decay.

To his credit, Crozier is aware of the contradictions involved. The fundamental problem of the liberal democracies, so well presented in this book, is that the remedies available to combat the threat to their existence are measured against the liberal ideal rather than against the common sense requirements of the real world. It needs to be considered that the security of the West, while representing this liberal ideal, surely cannot be based on the Jeffersonian proposition that the best ideas will always flourish in the free market of opinion.

Ideology in hand, the Soviet Union presents a threat to liberal political thought which places a premium on the value and worth of the individual. The political and economic system it represents is the antithesis of those which reward the individual for his initiative, his enterprise, and the quality of his work. Its social system is an anathema to one based on freedom of movement, expression, and thought.

Stripped of its ideology, the Soviet Union remains a potent force in international relations with clearly defined geopolitical objectives. Having embarked upon a more imperialistic phase, it poses a formidable threat to the security and stability of the world. Whatever the Soviet creed, whatever its motivation may be, the Western countries should feel obliged to resist the rise of Soviet power and influence if only because of their own national and cultural interests.

Strategy of Survival, despite its sense of urgency, probably does not correspond with contemporary attitudes. Under the persistent aura of "detente," open conflict appears "unthinkable" and subversion seems incredible. They are subjects about which most people give little thought. For those such as Mr. Crozier, the handwriting may indeed be on the wall, but the organization and implementation of unified Western policies — both foreign and domestic — remain unlikely under the present conditions of rationalization.

The nature and scope of Soviet objectives is perhaps becom-

ing more widely perceived, but the *determination* of the Soviet Union to achieve these objectives and the possibility that they could succeed are not yet taken seriously.

Michael B. Donley

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On Race and Class in America

THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE. *By William Julius Wilson.*
(University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978.)

Lurking somewhere in this book are the makings of a good article — or an agenda for a multi-volume study. But this book itself is an attempt at an economic-sociological-political history of American race relations, combined with a testing of Marxian hypotheses, and including a cursory treatment of such complexities as the racial impact of minimum wage laws and technological unemployment — *all in 154 pages of text.* It boggles the mind.

The important thesis of this book is that, within very recent times, the socio-economic prospects of blacks have come to depend more on class origins than on race itself. If this is true — and there is weightier evidence than this book that it is — then the implications for social policy are enormous. In a world in which class characteristics (low job skills, undisciplined life style, poor school work) are more of a handicap than color, the anti-discrimination thrust of government and civil rights organizations might be more productively redirected toward creating better skills, discipline, and general work orientation. Of course, that could mean writing off as obsolete equipment much of the political, legal, and rhetorical skills which have been built up during the long years of struggle to end racial discrimination. Economists say, “sunk costs are sunk,” when urging the writing off of obsolete equipment, but that is only one of many reasons that economists are unpopular.

Realistically, for both psychological and political reasons, the anti-discrimination crusade is going to continue — long after having reached diminishing returns, or even negative returns. Therefore, any writings which bring out the facts about the relative importance of racial versus social characteristics must be welcomed as an offsetting force toward reality and progress. Whether that is enough to make it worthwhile to slog through all the arbitrary and idiosyncratic statements in this particular book is another question.

Despite his refreshing thesis, Professor William Julius Wilson also perpetuates old canards. For example, he claims that 19th

century immigrants' "political mobility frequently translated into occupational and status mobility." This ignores the well-known fact that the Irish were politically the most successful of the European immigrant groups and economically one of the least successful, while Jews were economically upwardly mobile long before they made their first political gains, largely under the tutelage of Irish political bosses. Professor Wilson also perpetuates the unexamined assumption that black businesses were unable to get started or to be successful because they "could not obtain credit from white banks." It so happens that a black economist named Abram L. Harris shot down that theory more than 40 years ago, and a sociologist named Ivan H. Light demolished the same idea again more recently in an incisive study entitled, *Ethnic Enterprise in America*. First of all, most small businesses — of whatever race or ethnicity — usually do not get started with bank loans, so the policies of white banks have little relevance to that particular question. Moreover, both Harris and Light found that black financial institutions in an earlier era had *excessive* investment funds relative to the amount of entrepreneurship available and were themselves dragged down to financial disaster by the failure of risky ghetto business ventures that they financed. Today successful black banks are more likely to put their money into government bonds or General Motors.

Neither the Harris nor the Light studies are discussed in the text, nor even listed in the bibliography. They are in distinguished company. Professor Wilson also does not mention another study that gives far more factual support than he does to his central thesis that class characteristics are now more important than racial characteristics in the economic sphere. Harvard economist Richard Freeman's *Black Elite* shows that young adults with the same cultural exposure in childhood and the same formal education now earn the same incomes — whether they are black or white. This has been true only recently, but it is of enormous importance in understanding how far we have come and in understanding how to approach the still large, unfinished tasks in the racial area. Similar empirical results, showing the importance of individual behavioral characteristics, are found in inter-ethnic comparisons of entrepreneurship — including successful entrepreneurship by West Indians and Black Muslims — in Ivan Light's study which Wilson ignored. Also missing from the discussion and the

bibliography are such other landmark studies as Stephan Thernstrom's *The Other Bostonians* and Gary Becker's *The Economics of Discrimination*.

Instead, there are arbitrary assertions garnished with selected numbers and selected quotations. Some pages look like cut-and-paste jobs. Yet some of the conclusions are valid, courageous, and important. They are simply not adequately supported by either systematic analysis or empirical data — though both are available in the literature.

Many interesting facts are found in *The Declining Significance of Race* which are overlooked or even misstated elsewhere. For example, many readers will be surprised to learn that (1) there has been a high level of residential integration and voluntary removal of racial barriers by white electorates in northern cities in the last quarter of the 19th century, and (2) the black-white teenage unemployment rate differences that we now take for granted are of relatively recent vintage. Nothing much is done with either of these remarkable facts, however. What Professor Wilson calls "the brief period of fluid race relations in the North from 1870 to 1890" is nowhere examined in terms of its having occurred at a time and place of black political powerlessness, when restrictive covenants were legal, with an absence of "fair housing" laws, with federal governmental apathy, and with little or no judicial concern for black rights. In short, this period of general racial progress in northern cities — including greater residential integration than exists today — occurred in the absence of all the things which are regarded as prerequisites. *How* and *why* might throw some light on our presuppositions about race relations or even about social processes in general. But Wilson never gets into that.

Similarly, the rapid increase in black teenage unemployment over the past 30 years is given no systematic analysis. It is arbitrarily attributed to demographic trends in the text, and only in a footnote in the back of the book does the author even mention the alternative hypothesis that minimum wage escalations have priced black teenagers out of the job market. Walter Williams' *Youth and Minority Unemployment* is also missing from the discussion and the bibliography, and it might at least have clarified some of the issues.

The exposition is not helped out by such truisms which state that "slavery is severely restricted black vertical and

horizontal mobility,” that residential segregation “contributed to the growth of urban ghettos” or that the “increased voting power of urban blacks derives from changes in the racial composition of central cities.”

Despite the author’s willingness to take a fresh look and to challenge popular beliefs — often justifiably — the signs of haste and over-ambitious conclusions are pervasive.

Thomas Sowell

On Consumer Choice in Education

BLACKBOARD TYRANNY. By *Connaught Coyne Marshner*. (Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y., 1978.)

FAMILY CHOICE IN EDUCATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE. By *Onalee McGraw*. (The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1978.)

In *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* (1925), the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional an Oregon law that required all parents to send their children to public schools. The Court declared that "The child is not the mere creature of the State." Nevertheless, the battle between the state and parents for authority over the nation's children has only intensified and become more desperate since that decision.

With Thomas Jefferson's oft-cited advocacy of public education as its justification, universal education has nowhere been advanced with as much determination (it might be said with as much vengeance) as in the United States. Students, teachers, and school administrators now compose 29 percent of the population. Nationwide education expenditures are at \$132 billion, running neck and neck with health as the most expensive enterprise jointly funded by government and the private sector. Education consumes 37 percent of the yearly budgets of state and local governments, by far their largest single outlay. In addition to preempting these vast resources, education has become, along with the activist judiciary, the prime instrument of social revolution. Long gone are the days when community education, existing in the context of customary values, concerned itself with literacy and the honing of the intellect.

Today, social projects such as racial and sexual engineering, busing, sex education, and values education have all but supplanted the three Rs as the major emphases of education. Under federal programs, the idea of education has become mixed with the idea of welfare. So it can hardly be surprising that SAT scores have declined steadily for fourteen consecutive years, although they appear to have leveled off this year.

In the midst of all this, the uniquely American notion of local control of schools has been, perhaps, fatally wounded. Control of schools and school policies is moving increasingly to the center. As the ideas of teachers have become more

homogenized because of unionization, the federal and state governments have taken over more and more of education and the inevitable decision-making authority that goes with it. This combination of education bureaucrats and nationally unionized teachers, both of whom have identical backgrounds and ideas, has become an immobile and nearly invincible education establishment. Those on the supposed winning side of the *Pierce* decision, parents, have watched their interests and intentions for their children fading. In their incarnations as taxpayers, they have turned against school bond referenda to the point that in Ohio almost every school district finds itself in danger of collapse because of nine straight years of rejected school bonds.

The bibliography of books proposing alternatives to the education establishment is starting to become large. Two recent additions written for parents are *Blackboard Tyranny*, by Connaught Coyne Marshner, an experienced writer on education matters; and *Family Choice in Education: The New Imperative*, by Dr. Onalee McGraw, education consultant to The Heritage Foundation.

Dr. McGraw has two major points to make. The first, not often heard in the current education debate, is a call for a consideration of first principles. Dr. McGraw contends that any particular theory and practice of education is based on a particular conclusion about the nature of man. Therefore, education cannot, is not, and can never be value-free. Starting from this premise, Dr. McGraw attacks the pretensions of modern educational theorists who contend that contemporary education, divorced from Western intellectual traditions (most prominently religious traditions), is in fact value-free. Our contemporary educators go to great lengths to uphold and defend an education that allows students “to make up their own minds” about values, morals, and allegiances — both secular and divine. In fact, such an attitude teaches, at best, an indifference to and, at worst, a denial of God, morality, and civic duties. Parents who advocate religion and the morality based upon it find their local schools undermining their efforts to bring up their children in this tradition.

Dr. McGraw’s second point, perhaps surprisingly, is a call for judicial remedies: litigation based on the notion of parents’ rights in education by way of the free exercise of religion. Of course, the courts are more notorious for recent decisions

that have weakened parents' rights and local control of schools. Over the past twenty years, the courts have prohibited voluntary school prayer, have ordered busing, have upheld and even invented numerous "students' rights," and prescribed elaborate due process for teacher dismissal.

But Dr. McGraw cites *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* (1925), in which the Supreme Court struck down an Oregon law which required parents to send their children to public schools until they had completed the eighth grade, thus preventing their attendance at accredited parochial and other private schools. In *West Virginia v. Barnette* (1943), the Court invalidated the power of state authorities to exclude children from the public schools for their refusal, on religious grounds, to salute the American flag during school exercises. The Court declared that any official effort to prescribe orthodoxy in politics or religion, or to force citizens against their will formally to profess adherence to such orthodoxy, is a violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In *Wisconsin v. Yoder* (1972), the Court granted Amish parents an exemption from state compulsory attendance statutes that would have required them, in violation of family customs based on their religion, to send their adolescent children to high school.

Dr. McGraw foresees a kind of freedom raid on the education establishment. Using the foundations laid down by the above-cited cases, law suits could be brought challenging the public school monopoly, the accreditation and compulsory education laws, the whole system of educational finance, and federal control of private schools through the tax laws. Such a campaign would skirt the much-abused Fourteenth Amendment and, instead, appeal to the all-but-neglected free-exercise clause of the First Amendment.

Mrs. Marshner's effort might well be the most comprehensive and accessible book in print on the current state of education and how it got that way. Here is the whole story of the decline and fall of education in the United States. Fully half of the book is devoted to a chronicle of the history of public education; the rise of federal involvement and the move to federal domination of education; the incestuous relationship between the education establishment and the National Education Association, that power-house teacher's union and forger of education policy. Mrs. Marshner gives an account of all the issues and how they developed: the loss of local and church

control of schools, busing, the NEA's political activism and the consequent control of education votes, the loss of discipline in schools, illegal teacher's strikes, curricula and textbooks.

The other half of the book is a consideration of possible remedies to reestablish local control, protect parental rights, and resurrect both freedom and quality in education. Mrs. Marshner takes the reader through a step-by-step guide of how to organize parents' oversight groups to monitor local education policies. Included are numerous examples and stories of successes and failures, such as the famous parents' rebellion in Kanawha County, West Virginia, in 1974. Finally, Mrs. Marshner spends some time considering the pros and cons of antidotes to the current state of education affairs: alternative public schools; the voucher program; private schools, old and new, Protestant, Catholic, Jewish and non-sectarian; proprietary schools; home instruction by parents, and the repeal of compulsory education laws. Although squarely on the side of local control and parents' rights, Mrs. Marshner has no inflexible ideological position to sell. Her treatment of all the issues is very even-handed and based on the possible.

Thomas R. Ascik

The Press of Events

ON PRESS. By Tom Wicker. (The Viking Press, New York, 1978.)

AIR TIME. By Gary Paul Gates. (Harper & Row, New York, 1978.)

About two hundred years ago, Voltaire observed that “to pick up the pen is to be at war.” Certainly, that remark, when applied to contemporary journalism (both written and electronic), could be taken as a truism for much of the recent controversy surrounding the role of the “media,” as we call it now in our McLuhanized age.

Since the adoption of the United States Constitution with that First Amendment provision that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . .,” there has been controversy over just exactly how much freedom and how much restraint the American press ought to enjoy in the affairs of our society. It is this issue that forms the focus of *New York Times* columnist Tom Wicker’s recent book, *On Press*. Wicker, in his somewhat autobiographical analysis of his own media experience, begins with the event that he feels marked the emergence of the press as a major issue in recent American political life. Wicker dates this issue — or at least the public’s perception of it — from the Goldwater Convention of the Republican Party in San Francisco in 1964. Wicker recalls the GOP delegates’ outrage at the press galleries when President Eisenhower, speaking to the convention, criticized the media by referring to “sensation-seeking columnists and commentators.” As Wicker recalls it:

In retrospect, that moment in the Cow Palace seems to me to have marked the emergence of “the press” as an issue in American life and politics. . . . So, far from being “observers” — like sportswriters in the press box at an important football game — reporters, by 1964, were coming to be seen by millions of Americans as players in the game itself.

Wicker goes on to make some interesting distinctions between the traditional manner of objectively reporting such an event as the Eisenhower speech and what would today be called a more “interpretive” style of reporting. He points out that the Eisenhower speech — not the delegates’ reaction to it which seems to him the more important aspect of the event —

was reported the next day in papers all over America. Today, he points out, many of those same papers might lean toward the more interpretive, evaluative kind of story. It is just such revelations that make Wicker's book fascinating both for those who may agree with his view of the news and the way it is reported and for those who, doubtless, will disagree.

Wicker takes his reader through a varied press career with an ease of style that has made his column so readable over the years, even when filled with opinions that might make a rational man shudder. At the end of his book, he lands squarely in the corner of the new-style, interpretive journalism. He is also an advocate — as are most serious journalists — of investigative journalism, the kind of reportorial digging that leads to the uncovering of government corruption, scandals, and, of course, Watergate.

By contrast, Gary Paul Gates' book, *Air Time*, is an elaborately detailed compendium of "inside" information about the history of CBS News, but, unlike Wicker's book (which makes valid as well as controversial points), here the emphasis is more on data and less on evaluation. Gates, who co-authored an earlier book about the Nixon White House, *The Palace Guard*, with newscaster Dan Rather, offers considerable insight into the internal politics of network news gathering, but that too often seems to be the book's primary interest. There is, for this reader, too little discussion of how network news-gathering policies are determined and how they have been carried out. In short, Gates' book lets us see how the men at CBS operate without giving us much about "why" or the effects of that major network's policies. The effect is that we see one of dozens of new prima donnas attempting to outmaneuver one another for the anchorman spotlight. Yet, when read with Wicker's book, Gates' work does shed additional light on the controversial aspects of the media today.

Wicker's book, naturally, is an effective counter-volume to the view of Kevin Phillips' *Mediocracy* of a few years back in which that author accused media men of being hostile to middle American traditional values and perceived the new media as essentially a hostile segment in today's society, as a "new elite" that tried to direct, rather than inform, the public. Wicker urges the media to "take an adversary position toward the most powerful institutions of American life":

An adversary press would hold truth — unattainable and

frequently plural as it is — as its highest value, and knowledge as its first responsibility.

That point of view is not new with Wicker. It is held by most serious journalists, of whatever shade of political opinion. Indeed, Joseph Alsop, writing in *A Reporter's Trade* back in the 1950s, stated it clearly and succinctly:

Let the truth be open. Let all of the press have easy access to it, instead of forcing highly specialized reporters to fight to get the truth. Then the truth will always be known and will always be debated by the whole nation. Let the whole nation debate the truth. Then the intending deceivers of the people will find their task too difficult. Let prolonged deception of the people again become too difficult. Then gross errors at the top will again be self-correcting, before they have produced irremediable disasters.

Alsop's statement was made in response to the Administration of Harry S. Truman and its secretiveness about certain matters. But the injunction of that writer — like most good men of the media — best states both the value and the highest aims of a free press.

Jere Real

New Books and Articles in Public Policy

William R. Allen and C. Lowell Harriss

Two Essays on Corporate Philanthropy and Economic Education (International Institute for Economic Research, 1100 Glendon Avenue, Suite 1625, Los Angeles, California, 1978).

Gerhard Anders, W. Philip Gramm and S. Charles Maurice

Does Resource Conservation Pay? (International Institute for Economic Research, Los Angeles, California, 1978). This is the 14th Original Paper in a series.

Robert J. Barro

The Impact of Social Security on Private Saving: Evidence from the U.S. Time Series (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978). This is the first in a series of studies on the effect of social security on saving and capital formation. For further information contact AEI, 1150 17th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

P. T. Bauer and John O'Sullivan

"Foreign Aid: For What?" (*Commentary*, December 1978).

James Bennett and Manuel Johnson

The Efficacy of Bond-Finance Fiscal Policy (George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1978). This study contends that deficit spending by the federal government can lead to lower levels of output, income, and employment rather than economic expansion.

The Energy Crisis in the U.S.: An Economic Perspective (George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia, 1978). This study examines recent public policy actions related to energy issues in light of the evidence on the economic scarcity of oil, natural gas and coal.

Richard Bishirjian

The Development of Political Theory: A Critical Analysis (The Society For the Study of Traditional Culture, Dallas, Texas, 1978). A young political philosopher has written a perceptive and important analysis of the ideas on the nature of man and society which govern men.

Ake Blomqvist

A Market View of Health Services (The Fraser Institute, 626 Bute Street, Vancouver, B.C., Canada). This new study for The Fraser Institute examines the role of government in the health care profession.

Karl Brunner (ed.)

The First World & the Third World: Essays on the New Economic Order (Center for Research in Government Policy and Business, Graduate School of Management, University of Rochester, New York, 1978). These essays include contributions by Peter Bauer, Harry G. Johnson, Senator Daniel Moynihan and Rachel McCulloch.

Ray S. Cline

"CIA and the News Media" (*Journal of International Relations*, Summer 1978).

S. T. Cohen

Enhanced Radiation Weapons: Technological, Military and Political Issues (Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Central Plaza Building, 600 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Massachusetts 02139, 1978).

Committee on The Present Danger

An Evaluation of "U.S. and Soviet Strategic Capability Through the 1980s": A Comparative Analysis (Committee on The Present Danger, Washington, D.C., 1978). An analysis of the Arms Control and Development Agency's study which was released in August 1978. For further information, contact the Committee on The Present Danger, 1028 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Is America Becoming Number Two: Current Trends in the U.S.-Soviet Military Balance (Committee on The Present Danger, Washington, D.C., 1978).

William Fellner

Contemporary Economic Problems (American Enterprise Institute, 1150 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 1978). This AEI study edited by William Fellner contains the work of ten major economists writing on subjects ranging from inflation and price-fixing to national immigration policy and health policy.

Milton Friedman

Tax Limitation, Inflation and the Role of Government (The Fisher Institute, 12810 Hillcrest Road, Dallas, Texas, 1978). These essays represent an inaugural effort by The Fisher Institute to disseminate the thoughts of major economists.

Foundation for International Studies

"Iran: A Growing Giant" (Foundation for International Studies, Box 13064, S-200 44 Malmo, Sweden, 1978). This timely paper examines the development of the Iranian state during the reign of the present Shah.

Damodar Gujarati

Pensions and New York City's Fiscal Crisis (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978).

Thane Gustafson

"The New Soviet Environmental Program: Do the Soviets Really Mean Business?" (*Public Policy*, Summer 1978).

Patrick Hendershott

Regulation and Reform of the Housing Finance System (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978). This study maintains that the nation's housing finance system fosters regressive redistribution of income.

Martin F. Herz

Decline of the West? George Kennan and His Critics (Ethics and Public Policy Center, Washington, D.C., 1978). This monograph, edited by Ambassador Martin Herz, disputes Ambassador Kennan's views about Western decadence, the futility of nuclear deterrence, and the character of Soviet leadership. Included are excerpts from Kennan and essays by

Hugh Seton-Watson, Richard Pipes, Michael Novak, Eugene V. Rostow and others. For further information, contact the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Suite 509, 1211 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

How the Cold War is Taught: Six American History Textbooks Examined (Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1978). The editor of this publication examines how six widely used textbooks present recent historical events that have shaped the world.

Melvyn B. Krauss

The New Protectionism: The Welfare State and International Trade (New York University Press, New York, 1978).

This is the first book published by the newly-founded International Center for Economic Policy Studies (20 West 40th St., N.Y., N.Y. 10018). A professor of economics at New York University has written a lucid and compelling analysis of how a new mercantilism is slowing our economic growth.

Herbert M. Levine

Point Counter-point: Readings in American Government (General Learning Press, 250 James Street, Morristown, New Jersey, 1978).

This textbook includes contributions in public policy debate format by Senator Barry Goldwater, Eugene Rostow, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as well as Henry Kissinger, Andrew Young, Jacob Javits and others. The debates are serious and fairly balanced; this book of readings would be ideal supplementary reading for courses in public policy.

Russell Lewis

Tony Benn: A Critical Biography (Associated Business Press, London, 1978). This is not only a fascinating biography of the leader of the left wing of the British Labor Party but also a brilliant critique of the ideas which have reduced the economic growth of Britain.

Thomas E. Mann

Unsafe at Any Margin: Interpreting Congressional Elections (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978). The Assistant Director of the American Political Science Association has prepared this analysis of congressional elections focusing on the advantages of incumbency.

Raymon H. Myers

Two China States: U.S. Foreign Policy and Interests (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978). This new book contends that America should adopt a balance-of-power "equilibrium strategy" in eastern Asia.

Michael Novak

The American Vision: An Essay on the Future of Democratic Capitalism (American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., 1978). The author examines the competition which exists between the business elite and the "new class."

Policy Studies Organization

Policy Research Centers Directory (Policy Studies Organization, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, 1978). This is the first edition of a recurring directory designed to describe university and non-university centers, institutes, or organizations that conduct policy studies

research.

Rockford College Institute

Corporate Responsibility: The Viability of Capitalism in an Era of Militant Demands (Rockford College Institute, 5050 East State St., Rockford, Illinois 61101). This publication contains addresses delivered on June 1, 1978, at a conference held on the Rockford College campus. Yale Brozen, William C. Mott, Leopold Tyrmand and Jeffrey St. John are included among the major lecturers.

Kay Lehman Schlozman and Sidney Verba

"The New Unemployment: Does It Hurt?" (*Public Policy*, Summer 1978).

Hugh Seton-Watson

The Imperialist Revolutionaries: Trends in World Communism in the 1960s and 1970s (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978). This publication analyzes and interprets the trends in the international communist movement over the last decade.

Harvey Sicherman

Broker or Advocate: The U.S. Role in the Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973-78 (Foreign Policy Research Center, Science Center, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1978).

Lawrence H. Silberman

"Will Lawyering Strangle Capitalism?" (Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1978). This article appeared originally in *Regulation* magazine.

Thomas Sowell and Lynn D. Collins

American Ethnic Groups (The Urban Institute, 2100 M St., N.W., Washington, D.C., 1978).

Arianna Stassinopoulos

After Reason (Stein and Day, New York, 1978). A brilliant young author perceptively analyzes the failure of the political leadership of our time and shows how the preservation of human freedom (the goal of Western society) must rely more on spiritual than political strength.

Roger Swearingen

The Soviet Union and Post-War Japan (Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace, Stanford University, Stanford, California, 1978).

Taxing and Spending

(Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California). This premier issue of a periodical to be published five times a year includes articles by Gordon Tullock, Milton Friedman and Alan Campbell.

Edward R. Tufte

Political Control of the Economy (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1978). This study considers electoral-economic cycles, political parties and economic outcomes in Western democracies, voters and the economy, and rational economic policy in a democracy.

Philip van der Elst

British Collectivism: The Bitter Harvest (American Conservative Union Education and Research Institute, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003, 1978).

Paul H. Weaver

“Regulation and the New Class” (Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 1978).

Murray L. Weidenbaum

The Case for Tax Loopholes (Center for the Study of American Business, Washington University, Box 1208, St. Louis, Missouri 63160, 1978). This study examines the various loophole arrangements and their impacts on the tax system.

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“The Strategic Importance of Turkey and the Arms Embargo” (*Journal of International Relations*, Summer 1978).

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
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
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