

April 10, 1981

## **EL SALVADOR'S MARXIST REVOLUTION**

### **INTRODUCTION**

Within the last few months, the events in El Salvador have come to the forefront of American foreign policy. Since the bloodless coup in October 1979, which ousted General Romero and many of the leaders of the armed forces, El Salvador has undergone an escalation of violence from Marxist and rightist groups resulting in approximately 10,000 deaths during 1980. This already steep death toll increased further in January 1981 with the "final phase of the general offensive," a military attempt by the leftist forces to gain control of El Salvador prior to the U.S. presidential inauguration. The failure of the January "general offensive" has brought about a campaign to muster international support to pressure the Salvadorean government to reach a negotiated political solution with the leftist forces. This study examines the evolution, composition, political orientation, and objectives of the revolutionary left in El Salvador, composed of the DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate), a coalition of "Marxist-Leninist" guerrilla groups, and the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front), the international arm of the DRU.

### **ORIGIN OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY**

The communist movement in El Salvador originated in 1921 with the formation of communist cells and Marxist labor movements by a mix of university students and peasants inspired by the Soviet Revolution. They established a formal, overt party in 1925. The most prominent leader of this movement, Augustin Farabundo Marti, was captured by the Salvadorean government in 1932 and sentenced to death. This followed the communist inspired uprising that year which claimed up to 30,000 Salvadorean lives, including not only students and peasants, but also soldiers and others within the Salvadorean society. Since 1932, the PCS

(Communist Party of El Salvador) operated primarily in a clandestine fashion, infiltrating political parties and student groups. They also formed front organizations, which concealed their Marxist orientation, and used them to foment unrest.

Following the 1959 Cuban Revolution which brought Fidel Castro to power, the communist parties throughout Latin America reassessed their strategy, and most of them concluded that power could be best attained through a prolonged armed struggle. This brought about a dispute within the PCS over whether the party should attempt to gain power through elections or through an armed revolutionary confrontation. This quarrel over tactics resulted in the formation of two factions within the PCS. The first faction, comprised of intellectuals headed by Shafik Handal, proposed to work through the electoral process. The second group, headed by Cayetano Carpio, included most of the younger members within the PCS, and favored a prolonged armed struggle to destabilize and overthrow the Salvadorean government. For the radicals within the Carpio faction, Cuba became a nearby center of indoctrination and military training.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF THE FPL

In spite of the Cuban support for terrorist movements, it was not until 1970 that the FPL (Popular Forces of Liberation Farabundo Marti) was formed, through a breakup of the two PCS factions. Through this split, Cayetano Carpio became Secretary General of the FPL, while Shafik Handal assumed full control of the remains of the PCS. The FPL, the largest and most influential of the Salvadorean guerrilla organizations, has conducted numerous terrorist operations, including assassinations, robberies, kidnappings, assaults and extortions. This guerrilla organization was largely responsible for the deterioration in the relationship between El Salvador's business community and the military government, primarily due to the government's failure to solve any of the many criminal acts committed against the private sector entrepreneurs. This mutual distrust increased due to FPL operations in which the guerrillas wore Salvadorean military uniforms, creating suspicion among the business community that the FPL was integrated with members of the Salvadorean security forces. This suspicion was further reinforced by the May 1977 kidnapping of Mauricio Borgonovo, a prominent Salvadorean businessman, who was abducted by persons referring to each other by military rank. The FPL later claimed credit for this abduction.

In 1975, the FPL set up a front organization to carry out its propaganda activities. This front organization, the BPR (Popular Revolutionary Bloc), was formed through a coalition of FPL supporters, primarily groups organized by Father Bernard Bourlang, a French Jesuit. Juan Chacon, Facundo Guardado, and Julio Flores, three of the four members of the Central Command within the FPL National Masses Committee, became the leaders of

the BPR, while the fourth member, Oscar Bonilla, became Secretary General of AGEUS (Association of University Students of El Salvador). Both the BPR and AGEUS were housed in the same office in the National University of El Salvador. The BPR has conducted many strikes, marches, and occupations of embassies and churches. The strong anti-U.S. sentiment and Marxist-Leninist ideology of both the FPL and the BPR are revealed through their publications, including the Red Star, Popular Combat, Guerilla, and The Rebel.

#### THE EMERGENCE OF THE ERP

During the early 1970s, a second guerrilla group was created by "dissatisfied members of the PCS."<sup>1</sup> This group, the ERP (the People's Revolutionary Army), currently under the leadership of Joaquin Villalobos, followed the Maoist line and developed ties with several guerrilla organizations in Latin America, including the Tupamaro National Liberation Movement of Uruguay, the People's Revolutionary Army of Argentina, and the Leftist Revolutionary Movement of Chile (MIR). The ERP has carried out terrorist operations similar to those committed by the FPL, including an October 1979 kidnapping of a prominent Salvadorean industrialist, Jaime Hill, by ERP guerrillas dressed in army and police uniforms.

The ERP formed its front organization, the LP-28 (Popular Leagues of February 28), in 1977 to carry out the organization's propagandist activities and for recruiting purposes. The LP-28 and the ERP promote their Marxist philosophy through their publications, Proletariat Thought, Communist Press, Red Flag, Wake Up Peasant, and The Power is Born from the Gun. The ERP and LP-28 undertook an important role in subverting the human rights movement in El Salvador by promoting an ERP member, Norma Guevara, into a position of leadership within the Salvadorean Commission of Human Rights (CDHES).

#### THE EMERGENCE OF THE FARN

The last major guerrilla organization was formed through the ERP's assassination of one of its members, Roque Dalton. This created a split within the ERP in 1975, resulting in the formation of the FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance). The FARN has conducted numerous kidnappings of foreign businessmen and charged exorbitant ransoms ("payment of the war tax"), becoming the wealthiest of the Salvadorean guerrilla groups. FARN's former leader, Ernesto Jovel, who was recently killed in action, has been replaced by Ferman Cienfuegos.

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<sup>1</sup> "Communist Interference in El Salvador, Documents Demonstrating Communist Support of the Salvadoran Insurgency," U.S. Department of State, February 23, 1981.



To carry out its propaganda activities, the FARN took over the FAPU (Unified Popular Action Front), which had been formed in 1974 by the ERP and two Catholic priests, Higinio and Jose Inocencio Alas. The FAPU, whose theme is "armed struggle today, socialism tomorrow," has conducted numerous strikes, marches, and propaganda distribution projects. This group has been involved in El Salvador's labor movements and has worked particularly closely with STISS (Union of Workers of the Salvadorean Institute of Social Security). The Marxist ideology of FAPU and FARN has been extensively publicized in their publications, Pueblo and For the Proletariat Cause, which have also conducted a vitriolic campaign against the Salvadorean security forces, the Salvadorean business community, and particularly the United States.

#### THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF EL SALVADOR

The Moscow-oriented PCS remained active in El Salvador's political system through its "recognized legal front," the UDN (National Democratic Union).<sup>2</sup> It was through the UDN, formed in 1970, that the PCS took part in the 1972 and 1977 Salvadorean presidential elections through the coalition of opposition parties known as UNO (National Opposition Union). The UDN is comprised of several Marxist labor and peasant groups, including CUTS (Salvadorean Workers Confederation), a Marxist labor conglomerate.

Under El Salvador's labor laws, ten unions are required to form one federation, and three federations form one confederation. The PCS, which has been involved in El Salvador's labor movement for some years, formed its third controlled federation, FUSS (United Trade Union Federation of El Salvador), in December 1978. With FUSS and two other federations, FESTIAVTSCES (Federation Union of Food, Garment, and Textile Industries Workers) and FENASTRAS (National Trade Union Federation of Salvadorean Workers), the PCS achieved control of its first confederation, the above-mentioned CUTS. The unions under the direction of CUTS have frequently taken over industries through violent tactics in cooperation with the guerrilla front organizations (BPR, LP-28, and FAPU). The role of these unions in El Salvador's Marxist struggle was highlighted by the Secretary General of FENASTRAS, Hector Bernabe Recinos, who declared in a radio interview, "The next move by FENASTRAS will be minor rebellions to give the people fighting experience and the staging of simulated uprisings in several towns."<sup>3</sup>

Even though the PCS inspired the formation of the FPL, the ERP, and the FARN, their respective front organizations, as well

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<sup>2</sup> Karen De Young, "El Salvador: A Symbol of World Crisis," The Washington Post, March 8, 1981, p. A21.

<sup>3</sup> "FENASTRAS Preparing General Strike, Rebellions," FBIS-LAM-80-151, August 4, 1980, Vol. VI, No. 151, p. 12.

as other smaller terrorist groups such as the PRTC (Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers) and its front group the MLP (Movement of Popular Liberation), the PCS exercised very limited control over these groups. These groups, despite their similar ideologies, developed a strong rivalry for leadership within the revolutionary movement, and the PCS went so far as to label them "ultra-leftist."<sup>4</sup> To reduce this friction, the Cubans "tried to play the role of peacemaker between the terrorists and the Communist Party of El Salvador."<sup>5</sup> It was not until 1979 that the PCS joined the guerrillas, and became directly involved in El Salvador's "subversion and terrorism" through its militant arm, the FAL (Armed Forces of Liberation).

#### UNIFICATION OF THE SALVADOREAN INSURGENCY

In January 1980, largely through Cuban initiatives, the three guerrilla front organizations (BPR, LP-28, and FAPU), together with the PCS and PRTC front organizations, the UDN and the MLP formed an umbrella organization, the CRM (Revolutionary Coordinator of the Masses). Likewise, in a May 1980 meeting in Havana, as "a precondition for larger-scale Cuban aid," the leadership of the FPL, the ERP, the FARN, and the PCS set aside their ideological differences, united and formed the DRU (Unified Revolutionary Directorate).<sup>6</sup> "The DRU is the unified and military command of the revolution," and currently is composed of Cayetano Carpio, Shafik Handal, Joaquin Villalobos, Ferman Cienfuegos, and Roberto Roca, all of whom "describe themselves as Marxist-Leninist."<sup>7</sup> In November 1980, a subordinate group of the DRU was formed, the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front), by the four DRU members and the PRTC. The FMLN is responsible for coordinating and executing the leftist military struggle to depose the Salvadorean government.

#### DIPLOMATIC FRONT OF THE SALVADOREAN INSURGENCY

Due to the obvious Marxist orientation within the CRM, a front known as the FDR (Democratic Revolutionary Front) was formed in April 1980 "to disseminate propaganda abroad" and to isolate the Salvadorean government from the international community. The FDR, a coalition of the CRM and the FD (Democratic Front), brought in a small "non-Marxist" element "for appearances sake." The FD, which also came into existence in April 1980, is composed primarily of Marxist groups such as CUTS, STISS, and AGEUS, and three small non-Marxist-Leninist political parties. These three "small" leftist leaning parties are the MNR (National

<sup>4</sup> NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 2 (March-April 1980), p. 20.

<sup>5</sup> Samuel T. Francis, The Soviet Strategy of Terror (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981).

<sup>6</sup> "Communist Interference in El Salvador."

<sup>7</sup> NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol XIV, No. 4 (July-August 1980), p. 25.

Revolutionary Movement), the MPSC (Popular Social Christian Movement), and MIPTES (Movement of Independent Professionals and Technicians). The CRM is composed solely of Marxist groups. The AFL-CIO arm for Latin America, the American Institute for Free Labor Development, which has been involved in El Salvador's reform programs, described the FDR as "composed mainly of Marxist revolutionaries, but also containing elements of the democratic left which have joined the FDR in frustration at the inability of the moderate junta to gain full control over the government and military."<sup>8</sup>

The FDR chose Salvadorean multimillionaire Enrique Alvarez Cordoba, a member of the so-called fourteen families and long-time supporter of the guerrilla movement, as its first president. In 1979, Alvarez joined the BPR in the occupation of the Cathedral of San Salvador; and according to Julian Ignacio Otero, a high-ranking FPL defector, Alvarez contributed money to the guerrillas for the purchase of arms.

Following the assassination of Alvarez, Guillermo Ungo, another individual born into a wealthy Salvadorean family, was appointed to the FDR presidency. Ungo, the leader of the "small" MNR, confirmed during a July 1980 FDR press conference in Washington that he traveled to the Soviet Union in the 1960s. Accompanying him on the trip was Fabio Castillo, who currently is the Secretary General of the Marxist MLP. Ungo, who served in the first Salvadorean government junta for two months following the October 1979 coup, described to NACLA his motivation for resigning: "[A]s the right gained more military control, we came to see that regardless of what we or the left did or said, the military would go right ahead with its plan to exterminate the guerrillas. These groups are so close to the popular and democratic organizations that the repression fell on us."<sup>9</sup>

As with the Nicaraguan Sandinistas, the Salvadorean Revolutionary Movement has developed a decoy, the FDR, made up of an overt leadership of non-Marxist leftists. Their purpose is to give the insurgents international credibility despite the fact that these leaders have no significant power base independent of the Marxists who control the FDR.

#### THE SALVADOREAN CATHOLIC CHURCH


Prior to Archbishop Romero's assassination, the hierarchy of the powerful Salvadorean Catholic Church was divided into three factions. The most liberal of these factions included Archbishop Romero and Bishop Rivera y Damas, the centrist faction was led by

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<sup>8</sup> "U.S. Labor's Role in El Salvador," Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, Free Trade Union News, Vol. 36, No. 2 (February 1981), p. 2.

<sup>9</sup> NACLA Report on the Americas, Vol. XIV, No. 4 (July-August 1980), p. 25.

**CHART OF THE SALVADOREAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT**



\*FD members under Marxist control.



Bishop Revelo, while the most conservative of the factions included Bishops Aparicio, Alvarez, and Barrera y Reyes. However, within the rest of the clergy and religious community there were other factions, including a small group which not only collaborated with the Marxist guerrillas, but actually participated in the armed struggle with the guerrillas. This collaboration and involvement in El Salvador's subversion, particularly by "foreign Jesuits," was condemned by Bishop Aparicio. The prelate has recommended that several of these foreign priests, including Fathers Jerez, Sobrino, de Sebastian, and Hernandez, be deported.<sup>10</sup>

Following the assassination of Archbishop Romero, Bishop Rivera y Damas was appointed Acting Archbishop of San Salvador. The liberal position of Bishop Rivera y Damas should not be misconstrued as supportive of the Marxist guerrillas. In fact, Bishop Rivera y Damas, has openly stated that the Salvadorean Church "does not morally support the popular insurrection being carried out by leftist organizations." Furthermore, Bishop Rivera y Damas said that "the Salvadorean left has not been honest with the people" in that they are all "inclined toward communism."<sup>11</sup> The recent FDR statement claiming that the Church supports the guerrillas in their fight against the junta was vigorously denied by the Salvadorean bishops. The bishops said "The fact that a small number of priests, nuns and laymen in the so-called 'peoples church' have followed a specific political option and have made a public commitment to the FDR is no reason to assume that this phenomenon is representative of the Salvadorean Catholic Church."<sup>12</sup>

#### THE GUERRILLAS' MILITARY STRATEGY

From 1970 to early 1980, the Salvadorean guerrilla organizations had concentrated their terrorist attacks primarily against selected targets within the armed forces, the business community, and the diplomatic corps. By 1979, this selected terrorist strategy began to affect a larger sector of the Salvadorean populace as business operations closed, exacerbating the country's unemployment situation. As violence spread, increasing numbers of casualties were suffered by innocent bystanders as a result of the frequent shoot-outs between the guerrillas and government forces. This guerrilla strategy of selective terrorism, however, was modified during the early part of 1980, when the guerrilla organizations started to cooperate with each other. They decided to attempt to depose the Salvadorean military-civilian junta through a major military confrontation, and "establish a democratic

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<sup>10</sup> Paul A. Fisher, "Clergy and Religious as Marxist Revolutionaries," The Wanderer, March 26, 1981.

<sup>11</sup> "Archbishop Says Church Does Not Back Insurrection," FBIS-LAM-81-013, January 21, 1981, Vol. VI, No. 013, p. P18.

<sup>12</sup> ACAN/EFE: January 30, 1981.



revolutionary government" free from any U.S. dependence. (See Appendix I.)

By July 1980, a high-ranking guerrilla leader, Jacinto Sanchez, defined three problem areas for the guerrillas that needed to be resolved for their strategy to succeed. The first such problem was to achieve a "unified leadership" of the revolutionary movement. This, according to the guerrilla, was "progressing rapidly." The second problem dealt with logistics, namely increasing "the fire power and strength of the armed revolutionary organizations" by training "more men for the war," obtaining additional "provisions, weapons and ammunition," and improving "communications." The final area of concern to the guerrillas was "to gain international recognition," and thereby isolate the Salvadorean government from the international community. Furthermore, Sanchez echoed the guerrillas' repetitive statement that the Salvadorean crisis could "only be solved militarily" because there was "no longer room for a political solution."<sup>13</sup>

At the same time the guerrilla organizations were sorting out their internal problems, they sought to expand the areas under their control from the unpopulated guerrilla-dominated zone along the Honduran border. This military expansion plan, implemented during mid-1980 (as revealed by Napoleon Duarte in a November 1980 Washington meeting), consisted of assuming military control of the mountain range which divides the eastern region of El Salvador from the central and western zones, thereby splitting the country in half. This strategy collapsed because the guerrillas, numbering approximately 6,000 militarily trained individuals, were no match for the 16,000-man Salvadorean armed forces. Therefore, the guerrillas adopted a temporary strategy of "hit and run" terrorism while they continued to improve their military capabilities for the "final phase of the general offensive."

#### THE GUERRILLAS' JANUARY 1981 GENERAL OFFENSIVE

By December 1980, the guerrilla forces announced that they were "in the final phase of the general offensive," since the FMLN had acquired "enough war material," including "rocket and grenade launchers," capable of destroying "military fortresses and armored equipment."<sup>14</sup> Nevertheless, the most important factor of the guerrillas' timing of the "general offensive," which was set for January 10, 1980, was the result of the U.S. presidential election. This was pointed out by an FDR-FARN communique, which announced the general offensive "for the days

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<sup>13</sup> "PRTC Leader: Situation Can Only Be Solved Militarily," FBIS-LAM-80-144, July 24, 1980, Vol VI, No. 144, p. P5.

<sup>14</sup> "Weapons Claims," FBIS-LAM-80-253, December 31, 1980, Vol. VI, No. 253, p. P4.

prior to the presidential inauguration of the fanatical Ronald Reagan."<sup>15</sup> The guerrillas' strategy to overthrow the Salvadorean governing junta consisted of militarily confronting and weakening the army, acquiring popular support for a general strike, and isolating the Salvadorean government from the international community.

In spite of the massive international support for the guerrillas, the January 1981 "general offensive" failed because of four reasons. First, the guerrillas experienced logistical problems which prevented some of their units from receiving weapons in time for the offensive. Second, many of the weapons received were more sophisticated than the guerrillas had previously used; and, therefore, they were not familiar with their optimum use. Third, the guerrillas failed to incite the population for a general uprising and strike, which "the Salvadorean people completely disregarded" according to Acting Archbishop Rivera y Damas.<sup>16</sup> Fourth, the guerrilla hard-core cadre had recruited poorly trained youngsters to serve in the front ranks of the offensive; and once these children got killed in battle, the more experienced cadre pulled back rather than expose themselves to hostile fire.

#### COMMUNIST SUPPORT TO EL SALVADOR'S INSURGENCY

With fully documented evidence collected during the Carter Administration, the Reagan Administration has shown that El Salvador has become the object of an international campaign by communist governments to destabilize the Central American region. This evidence, consisting largely of captured PCS documents, reveals the Communist bloc's involvement in supplying El Salvador's insurgency with arms and training. These captured documents disclose the trips made by Salvadorean guerrilla leaders, including Shafik Handal, to communist countries (Cuba, Nicaragua, East Germany, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ethiopia, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union), to procure Western-manufactured arms for the Salvadorean guerrilla movement. (See Appendix II.) These commitments of nearly 800 tons of modern weapons by communist nations consisted primarily of supplying El Salvador's guerrillas with American-made arms and ammunitions which had been captured or inherited by the present regimes of Vietnam and Ethiopia.

This documentary evidence has been partly confirmed by captured arms en route to El Salvador traced back to Vietnam. In a report by the U.S. Department of State, it is revealed that:

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<sup>15</sup> "FDR, FARN Communiques," FBIS-LAM-81-005, January 21, 1981, Vol. VI, No. 005, p. P7.

<sup>16</sup> "Archbishop Says Church Does Not Back Insurrection," p. P19.

in late January, Honduran security forces uncover an arms infiltration operation run by Salvadorans working through Nicaragua and directed by Cubans. In this operation, a trailer truck is discovered carrying weapons and ammunition destined for Salvadoran guerrillas. Weapons include 100 U.S. M-16 rifles and 81mm mortar ammunition. These arms are a portion of the Vietnamese shipment: A trace of the M-16s reveals that several of them were shipped to U.S. units in Vietnam where they were captured or left behind. Using this network, perhaps five truckloads of arms may have reached the Salvadoran guerrillas.

A similar seizure was made in El Salvador in which a plane carrying "numerous weapons" was captured. The pilot, a Nicaraguan government employee, admitted "flying two earlier arms deliveries" to El Salvador.<sup>17</sup>

#### THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION TO EL SALVADOR'S CRISIS

Negotiations to form a coalition government between the FDR and the current ruling junta are being advocated by a variety of groups around the world as their concept of a "political solution" to the crisis in El Salvador. Perhaps some of these groups honestly believe that the FDR is the "moderate opposition" or "the democratic left," as it is being called. Those who understand the FDR seek such a solution in order to shift the focal point of the Salvadorean political spectrum to the left and, thereby, accomplish through negotiations what the Marxist guerrillas have not been able to achieve militarily. Furthermore, even if successful, these negotiations would result in a government similar to the junta which succeeded the Romero government, which collapsed after two months due to the many differing ideologies among its members -- including persons who are currently affiliated with the guerrillas and their front organizations.

The "political solution" being advocated by the Duarte government, and supported by the Reagan Administration, is a two-phased electoral process: in 1982, general elections for a constitutional assembly, and in 1983, presidential elections. In preparation for this process, Duarte has reorganized the Central Electoral Council. Its head, Jorge Bustamante, has invited all Salvadorean political groups, including the "Marxist parties," to participate in both elections. However, the Marxist parties, which are under the DRU/FDR, have shown no enthusiasm for this course.

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<sup>17</sup> "Communist Interference in El Salvador."



## U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES

The current overall U.S. policy toward El Salvador has to deal effectively with the existing military and political crises. Only after the military struggle with the Salvadorean Marxist-dominated guerrillas is resolved, will the Salvadorean government be able to initiate a process leading toward democratization. Thus, the principal political role of the U.S. in El Salvador should concentrate on militarily defeating those elements opposed to the democratic process, so that an atmosphere conducive to elections can be created in time for the 1982 voting for a constitutional assembly.

The military role of the United States needs to be re-examined. Under the Carter Administration, the United States pursued a policy of total constraint in supplying military equipment to the governments of El Salvador. From the overthrow of the Romero regime in October 1979, until the eve of President Reagan's inauguration, the Carter Administration maintained a complete embargo on the supply of lethal military equipment to the government of El Salvador. Instead, the U.S. policy attempted to rely on economic assistance and the pursuit of social reforms to undermine guerrilla attacks on the Salvadorean government, and encourage a political settlement of the conflict. However, rather than cooperating with these policies, the guerrillas and their overseas Marxist supporters increased their determination to seize control of the country through military force. The Carter policies terminated with the January "final phase of the general offensive" designed to topple the Duarte government. Only in the aftermath of this full scale military assault, and after Communist bloc intervention was detected, did the Carter Administration finally allow limited lethal military equipment to flow into El Salvador. In spite of the unsuccessful outcome of the guerrillas' final offensive, they have continued to pursue a policy designed to overthrow the Salvadorean government through military force.

The Reagan Administration should continue and even expand support for the Salvadorean armed forces, by providing the necessary lethal and non-lethal military equipment and military advisors to offset the estimated 200 tons of military equipment already delivered to the Salvadorean guerrillas by the Communist bloc. More importantly, the U.S. should assist the Salvadorean government in preventing the delivery of the remaining 600 tons of military equipment committed by communist bloc nations, but not yet received by the Salvadorean insurgency. To halt these weapon and ammunition smuggling operations, the U.S. should continue exerting pressure on the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. Likewise, the U.S. should supply the Salvadorean armed forces with the surveillance equipment and training necessary to detect these weapons smuggling operations into the country. Honduras should also be encouraged to increase surveillance along the Salvadorean and Nicaraguan borders in order to uncover the infiltration routes used to supply the Salvadorean insurgency with weapons and ammunition.

Politically, the Reagan Administration should encourage the Duarte government to proceed with its plans to hold supervised elections for the constitutional assembly in 1982 and the presidency in 1983. This plan provides a reasonable framework for any groups interested in pursuing peaceful political changes in El Salvador. In the meantime, the U.S. should continue to discourage negotiations to form a coalition government between the Salvadorean junta and the FDR, which is merely a facade for the guerrilla-controlled DRU. In addition, the U.S. should encourage the ruling junta in El Salvador to suspend any reform programs yet to be enacted until after the elections. Through the elections, the Salvadorean people will be able to choose the political party offering those reforms or other programs they desire. It is the electoral process which provides the the most viable basis for both ending the fighting and encouraging the development of a pluralistic democratic society in El Salvador.

A final area of concern to the U.S. should be the Salvadorean private sector, the first target of terrorism by the Marxist guerrillas. During the last decade, the Salvadorean private sector has deteriorated to the point where its existence has been endangered, and therefore is in need of a program to help in its recuperation. The Salvadorean government, in cooperation with other countries and international organizations, should enact a program to revitalize El Salvador's private sector. In the long run, a strong private sector will make El Salvador less dependent on foreign economic assistance.

## CONCLUSION

The Salvadorean guerrilla organizations, which compose the leadership of El Salvador's revolutionary movement, came into existence through the various sub-divisions within the PCS (Communist Party of El Salvador) during the last decade. In 1980, these splinter groups reunited along with the PCS, as a precondition for large scale military aid from Cuba. However, even after their abortive January 1981 attempt to topple the Duarte regime, the guerrillas have persisted in advocating a military solution to the Salvadorean crisis. This is in spite of the Salvadorean government's invitation to the Marxist groups to participate in the upcoming elections. The guerrillas' refusal to take part in the elections is understandable, since their popular support has fallen, and is estimated currently at approximately 80,000 people.

The misleading assumption abroad that the Salvadorean revolutionary movement attracts the majority of the Salvadorean people and represents most of that country's democratic sectors, is a product of a skillful international campaign by the FDR. This campaign has included providing an impressive list of organizations composing the Salvadorean revolutionary movement. In fact, some of the groups listed by the FDR consist of as few as a dozen persons, while other groups have overlapping memberships. The irony of the Salvadorean insurgency is that they have acquired

a measure of international credibility as representatives of the moderate, democratic opposition although the vast majority of its members describe themselves as "M-L."

The U.S. should continue to support efforts to bring about a "political solution" to the existing Salvadorean crisis through the electoral process. Through such elections the Salvadorean people can decide for themselves the political orientation and programs they wish to pursue. Thus, if any group believes it speaks for the Salvadorean people, it should be demonstrated through the planned elections.

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## APPENDIX I

The FDR's platform is spelled out in great detail in its official publication, "El Salvador On the Threshold of a Democratic Revolutionary Victory," published in El Salvador in January 1981 by the FMLN-FDR. The tasks and objectives of the FDR are:

1. To overthrow the reactionary military dictatorship of the oligarchic and U.S. imperialism, imposed and sustained against the will of the Salvadorean people for fifty years; to destroy its criminal political-military machine; and to establish a democratic revolutionary government, founded on the unity of the revolutionary and democratic forces in the People's Army and the Salvadorean people.

2. To put an end to the overall political, economic and social power of the great lords of the land and capital.

3. To liquidate once and for all the economic, political, and military dependence of our country on U.S. imperialism.

4. To assure democratic rights and freedoms to the entire people -- particularly for the working masses, who are the ones who have least enjoyed such freedoms.

5. To transfer to the people, through nationalizations and the creation of collective and socialized enterprises: the fundamental means of production and distribution that are now hoarded by the oligarchy and the U.S. monopolies, the land held in the power of the big landlords, the enterprises that produce and distribute electricity and other monopolized services, foreign trade, banking, and large transportation enterprises. None of this will affect small or medium-sized private businesses, which will be given every kind of stimulus and support in the various branches of the national economy.

6. To raise the cultural and material living standards of the population.

7. To create a new army for our country, one that will arise fundamentally on the basis of the People's Army to be built in the course of the revolutionary process. Those healthy, patriotic, and worthy elements that belong to the current army can also be incorporated.

8. To encourage all forms of organization of the people, at all levels and in all sectors, thus guaranteeing their active, creative, and democratic involvement in the revolutionary process and securing the closest identification between the people and their government.

9. To orient the foreign policy and international relations of our country around the principles of independence and self-determination, solidarity, peaceful coexistence, equal rights, and mutual respect between states.

APPENDIX II

Excerpt from "Communist Interference in El Salvador"  
U.S. Department of State, February 23, 1981

DOCUMENTS DEMONSTRATING COMMUNIST SUPPORT  
OF THE SALVADORAN INSURGENCY

Two particularly important document caches were recovered from the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS) in November 1980 and from the Peoples' Revolutionary Army (ERP) in January 1981. Only a very small portion of the total documents recovered are attached. Many of the documents are written using cryptic language and abbreviations. A glossary is provided before each document to define selected relevant terms.

CHRONOLOGICAL KEY TO THE DOCUMENTS

--December 16, 1979

Representatives of the Communist Party of El Salvador (PCS), National Resistance (FARN), and Popular Liberation Forces (FPL), writing in Havana, thank Fidel Castro for his "help, and the help of (his) comrades of the Party" in establishing a unity agreement among these armed groups (see Document A).

--April, 1980

"Requests" (possibly for arms) are made in a meeting at the Hungarian Embassy in Mexico City with representatives of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, Poland, Vietnam, Hungary, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. (see Document B).

--April 28, 1980

In a meeting of the Political Commission of the Salvadoran Communist Party, Party leader Shafik Handal notes the need to take advantage of possibilities for help by the "socialist camp." Their attitude is "magnificent," he says. Handal also notes desirability of involving "everyone of the area" (i.e., Central America) as suggested to "Fidel." (see Document C)

--May 19 - 31, 1980

Popular Revolutionary Army (ERP) is admitted to the guerrilla coalition after negotiations in Havana. Coalition leadership, which assumes name of Unified Revolutionary Directorate (DRU), meets with Fidel Castro on three occasions and with visiting German Democratic Republic leader Eric Honecker (see Document D)

--May 19 - 31, 1980

Guerrilla leadership meets twice with Cuban Directorate of Special Operations (DOE - clandestine operations/special forces unit of Cuban Ministry of Interior) to discuss guerrilla military plans. In addition, they met with the Cuban "Chief of Communications." (see Document D)

--May 30, 1980

Shafik Handal departs from the Havana meeting for Moscow. (see Document D)

--June 1, 1980

Guerrilla leadership, minus Salvadoran Communist Party chief Handal, arrives in Managua. Joint Directorate of FSLN: (a) offers a headquarters for the guerrilla directorate "with all measures of security;" (b) states that it is disposed to "contribute in material terms;" (c) assumes "the cause of El Salvador as its own;" and (d) offers "advice and exchange of opinions" to the guerrillas. (see Document D)

--June 2 - July 22, 1980

Salvadoran Communist Party Chief Shafik Handal visits: (a) the USSR, (b) Vietnam, (c) the German Democratic Republic, (d) Czechoslovakia, (e) Bulgaria, (f) Hungary, and (g) Ethiopia.

--June 2, 1980

Handal meets in Moscow with Mikhail Kudachkin, Deputy Chief of the Latin American Section of the Foreign Relations Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Kudachkin suggests that Handal travel to Vietnam to seek arms and offers to pay for Handal's trip. (see Document E)

--June 9 - 15, 1980

Handal visits Vietnam where he is received by Le Duan, Secretary General of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Xuan Thuy, member of the Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, and Vice Minister of National Defense Tran Van Quang. Vietnamese, as "first contribution," agree to provide sixty tons of arms. (see Documents E and F)

--June 19 - 24, 1980

Handal visits German Democratic Republic where he is received by Hermann Axen, member of the GDR Politburo. Axen states that the GDR has already dispatched 1.9 tons of supplies to Managua. (On July 21, GDR leader Honecker telegraphs GDR Embassy in Moscow, indicating that additional supplies will be sent and that the GDR will provide military training, particularly on clandestine operations. GDR telegram adds that, although Berlin possesses no Western-manufactured weapons (which the Salvadoran guerrillas are seeking), efforts will be undertaken to find "a solution to this problem.") (see Documents E and F)

10. Through all these measures, to assure our country peace, freedom, the well-being of our people, and future social progress.



Handal visits Czechoslovakia where he is received by Vasil Bilak, Second Secretary of the Czech Communist Party. Bilak notes that some Czech arms circulating in the world market will be provided. Transportation will be coordinated with the GDR. (see Documents E and F)

--June 27 - 30, 1980

Handal visits Bulgaria where he is received by Dimitir Stanichev, member of the Central Committee Secretariat. Bulgarians agree to supply German-origin weapons and other supplies. (see Documents E and F)

--June 30 - July 3, 1980

Handal visits Hungary where he is received by Communist Party General Secretary Janos Kadar and "Guesel" (probably Central Committee Secretary for Foreign Affairs Andras Gyenes.) The latter offers radios and other supplies and indicates Hungarian willingness to trade arms with Ethiopia or Angola in order to obtain Western-origin arms for the Salvadoran guerrillas. (see Documents E and F)

--July 3 - 6, 1980

Handal visits Ethiopia where he is received by Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam and Berhanu Bayeh, Executive Committee member. Mengistu indicates that Ethiopia will supply "several thousand weapons" and ammunition. (see Documents E and F)

--July 22, 1980

Handal is again received in Moscow, this time by Karen Brutents, Chief of the Latin American Section of the CPSU Central Committee. Brutents indicates that the Soviets agree in principle to transport the Vietnamese arms. (see Document E)

--July 23, 1980

"Comrade Bayardo" (Bayardo Arce of FSLN Directorate) meets in Managua with a delegation of the Salvadoran guerrilla Joint General Staff. Arce promises ammunition to the guerrillas and arranges a meeting for them with the FSLN "Military Commission." Arce indicates that, since the guerrillas will receive some arms manufactured by the communist countries, the Sandinista Army (EPS) will consider absorbing some of these weapons and providing to the Salvadorans Western-manufactured arms held by the EPS in exchange. (see Document G)

--July 22, 1980

Guerrilla military leadership meets in Managua, Nicaragua with PLO leader Yasar Arafat. (see Document G)

--July 27, 1980

Guerrilla General Staff delegation departs from Managua for Havana where Cuban "specialists" add final touches to their military plans. (see Document G)

--August 15, 1980

Ethiopian arms depart for Cuba. (see Document F)

--September 5, 1980

Vietnamese arms are scheduled to arrive in Cuba. (see Document F)

--September 24, 1980

Guerrillas receive and distribute five hundred thousand dollars (\$500,000) logistics donation from Iraq. Funds are distributed to the Nicaraguan FSLN and within El Salvador. (see Documents A and J)

--September 26, 1980

Guerrilla logistics committee informs its Joint General Staff that 130 tons of arms and other military material supplied by the communist countries have arrived in Nicaragua for shipment to El Salvador. According to the report, this represents one-sixth of the commitments to the guerrillas by the communist countries. (see Document I)

(NOTE: To get an idea of the dimensions of this commitment, the Vietnamese offer of only 60 tons included 2 million rifle and machine gun bullets, 14,500 mortar shells, 1620 rifles, 210 machine guns, 48 mortars, 12 rocket launchers, and 192 pistols.)

--End of September, 1980

Nicaraguan FSLN suspends its weapons deliveries to El Salvador for one month after the United States Government protests to the Nicaraguan leadership over the supply activities. (see Document J)

--End of October, 1980

The Nicaraguan FSLN provides the Salvadoran guerrillas a new delivery schedule and resumes weapons deliveries. (see Document K)

--September - October, 1980

Guerrillas begin preparations for infiltrating weapons and equipment into El Salvador by land, air and sea. (see Documents J, L, M, N and O)

The guerrilla General Staff is informed that there are approximately 120 tons of military equipment now in Nicaragua ready for shipment to the Salvadoran guerrillas. By mid-November, the guerrillas indicate that 300-400 tons of weapons and material will be in Cuba ready for subsequent transfer to Nicaragua and then, clandestinely, to El Salvador. (see Document K)

--October 29, 1980

Guerrillas decide to open "clandestine" radio station in Nicaragua with the help of the Cubans and Nicaraguans. (see Document P)

--November, 1980

Beginning in November, the FSLN sends to El Salvador more arms than the guerrillas can receive and distribute. The guerrillas note that the boats are being overloaded in Nicaragua and ask that the FSLN better coordinate its delivery activities with the guerrillas. (see Documents Q and R)

--November 1, 1980

Salvadoran guerrilla logistics representative in Managua calls on armed groups in El Salvador -- the "last link" in the supply "chain" -- to work harder to absorb more arms shipments. The communist countries in some cases, the representative notes, have doubled their promised help. (see Document K)

--November, 1980

Due to overloading problems, the guerrillas raise the need for talks on delivery arrangements with the FSLN. (see Document S)

--January 10, 1981

The guerrillas launch their "general offensive" against the Salvadoran government. It failed.