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JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY

INTRODUCTION

During the late 1940s, the United States, responding to a variety of pressures occasioned by the Sovietization of Eastern Europe and the Communist takeover in China, came to desire Japan more as a stable friend than as a defeated enemy. One of the most important manifestations of this new American policy was an intensification of efforts from 1947 on to secure and negotiate a peace treaty with Japan. On the same day that the Peace Treaty was finally signed in San Francisco in 1951, a bilateral security pact was simultaneously entered into between the United States and Japan.

It has now been thirty years since that original Security Treaty was initialed. Since that time Japanese defense policy has been formulated on the assumption that the Soviet Union posed the principal potential threat, both externally and domestically, to the security of Japan and that a continuing defense relationship with the United States was not only beneficial, but essential.

In specific, practical terms, these defense policies for the past thirty years have been reflected in the original Security Treaty of 1951, a subsequent revision -- The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security -- in 1960, and the reaffirmation of the latter in 1970.

The essence of Japan's post-Occupation defense principles first appeared in the form of a document labeled Basic Policies For National Defense issued by a newly formed Japanese Government Defense Council in May 1957. These principles have, in turn, been elaborated in subsequent years through a series of defense plans and programs offered by the Self-Defense Agency. However, four basic principles of defense enunciated by the Defense Council over two decades ago continue to guide modern Japanese defense planning:

Note: Nothing written here is to be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of The Heritage Foundation or as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill before Congress.

- (1) to support the activities of the United Nations and promote international cooperation;
- (2) to stabilize the public welfare and enhance the people's attachment to their country, thereby establishing a sound basis essential to national security;
- (3) to build up effective defense capabilities progressively within the limits necessary for self-defense, with due regard to national resources and the prevailing domestic situation;
- (4) to cope with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-United States security agreement pending more effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.

The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) to discern and evaluate Japan's security relationship with the United States and the adequacy and effectiveness of its Self-Defense Forces; (2) to discuss and assess the implications of the ever-changing military balance in the Far East and the Pacific and its impact on Japanese security; and (3) to suggest areas of possible improvement in Japanese defense efforts and the security relationship with the United States in order to meet potential threats in the future.

JAPAN'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES

In the aftermath of Japan's defeat and surrender in 1945, the ultimate objective of the Allied Occupation forces stationed in Japan was to foster those conditions which would ensure that Japan would not again become a "menace to the peace and security of the world."¹ Among the measures set forth and enacted, in accordance with the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, were: "the abolition of militarism and ultra-nationalism in all their forms; the strengthening of democratic tendencies and processes in governmental, economic and social institutions; the encouragement and support of liberal political tendencies in Japan; and the disarmament and demilitarization of Japan, with continuing control over Japan's capacity to make war" (emphasis added).² This later point was institutionalized in the Post-War Constitution promulgated on November 3, 1946 and put into effect on May 3, 1947. Article IX of the Constitution states:

¹ Cf. paragraph 3a of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive 1380/15 entitled Basic Objectives of Military Occupation of Japan, November 3, 1945.

² Ibid.

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding...land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.³

While the primary emphasis of the Occupation policy continued to be, from 1945 to 1952, a prevention of Japanese revanchism,⁴ concern began to be expressed in Washington, especially during the late 1940s and early 1950s, about "Russian expansive tendencies,"⁵ the Communist takeover in China, the outbreak of the Korean War and their collective impact on Japan's external security.

On September 8, 1951, concurrent with the signing of the Peace Treaty in San Francisco which restored Japan as an independent and sovereign nation, a security arrangement was initialed guaranteeing Japan's external security. This bilateral security pact between Japan and the United States provided for the continuation of U.S. military forces and installations in Japan, the use of such forces to help maintain peace and security in the Far East, and the deployment of American military personnel and equipment to quell domestic revolts should Japan request such assistance. Although there was no explicit statement in the treaty which obligated the United States to defend Japan, the presence of American forces and bases most certainly served to deter an armed attack on Japan from without.

As this treaty contained some "unequal" aspects, it is hardly surprising that the Japanese reaction to such an agreement was not one of unqualified acceptance and appreciation. The Japanese sense of nationalism was offended by the presence of foreign troops and bases. There was also dissatisfaction and controversy with those arrangements in the treaty providing for the use of Japanese-based American troops to suppress domestic rebellions, jurisdiction of American personnel involved in crimes against Japanese citizens and property, and the possible storing and use of nuclear weapons by American forces stationed in Japan. These dissatisfactions eventually resulted in protracted negotiations between the two countries looking forward to a more equitable revision of the 1951 treaty.

³ U.S. Department of State, Publication 2836, Far Eastern Series 22, 1947, pp. 2-3.

⁴ Tetsuya Kataoka, Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor" - Japan Debates Defense (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980), p. 9.

⁵ Cf. George F. Kennan (Mr. "X"), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July 1947.

On January 19, 1960, a new Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan was agreed upon. Some five months later, on June 23, the Treaty entered into force. Unlike the first which had no terminal date, this treaty was to run for ten years. However, after this initial ten-year period, either "Party may give notice to the other Party of his intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given" (Article X). While the United States expressly agreed to defend Japan, the Treaty did not commit Japan to the defense of the United States.⁶ Japan was to act only in those territories under its control and to the extent allowed by its Constitution. For purposes of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States was granted continued use of military facilities in Japan (Article VI). The Treaty stipulates that major changes in the deployment of American armed forces and equipment or the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations requires prior consultation with the government of Japan.

Though the treaty negotiations were conducted in a politically fragile environment, in which anti-military sentiment ran especially high,⁷ the ensuing decade was considerably more tranquil. Such a dramatic "atmospheric" change was attributable, in large measure, to a significant policy shift on the part of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In prior years, up to and including the administration of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi (the negotiator of the 1960 treaty), the LDP platform had among its stated goals the twin pillars of constitutional revision and rearmament. Following Kishi's abrupt resignation, Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and his followers in the LDP successfully rewrote the platform to include a politically low posture profile, the separation of politics and economics and a desire to double the national income.⁸

The decade of the 1960s has been aptly termed, by Professor Tetsuya Kataoka the "golden age of pacifist commercial democracy."⁹ Describing that era, Professor Kataoka poignantly observes:

With singleness of purpose and energy seldom paralleled elsewhere in the world, the whole nation pursued the

⁶ "Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes" (Article V -- emphasis added).

⁷ Because of the massive demonstrations against the Kishi government, President Eisenhower was forced to cancel his goodwill trip to Japan. Immediately following Diet approval of the 1960 Treaty, Prime Minister Kishi resigned.

⁸ Cf. Kataoka, Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor," p. 20.

⁹ Ibid., p. 21.

goal of expanding trade and manufacturing. The policy of growthmanship combined with "political low posture" may have been forced on the LDP government at its inception, but it was also a deliberate policy pursued with skill and energy. The architects of Ikeda's policy justified small defense outlays as a booster of economic growth, and the defense budget was allowed to decline from 1.2 percent to 0.8 percent of the GNP during the 1960s. Successive LDP governments, in their dealings with Washington, began to point to the sensitivity of the left on matters of defense in order to stave off U.S. pressures. The United States, for its part, learned not to rock the boat....¹⁰

During the 1960s, Japan pursued a somewhat paradoxical approach to defense issues: pacifism and protectionism. Symbolic of the LDP-leftist collaboration in pursuit of pacifism were the policies of the Three Principles of Nuclear Disarmament¹¹ and of pegging the defense expenditures at 1 percent of the GNP. Similarly, throughout the 1960s, Japan sought further assurance of American protection against threats to its security. On January 13, 1965, President Lyndon Johnson, in a joint communique with Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, reaffirmed "The United States' determination to abide by its commitment under the treaty to defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside."¹² Subsequently, President Richard Nixon, in a joint communique with Prime Minister Sato in 1969, agreed to the reversion of Okinawa,¹³ and the restricted use of bases there to the terms applicable to the home islands.¹⁴ The joint communique is important for a number of other reasons. Both parties reaffirmed their desire to continue the Mutual Security Treaty for an indefinite period. But more importantly, Japan, for the first time, officially recognized that their security was intimately tied to the peace and security of the Far East, and most particularly to Korea. The golden age of pacifist commercial democracy, dependent as it was on America's military might, was soon to be shaken at its core.

The adverse psychological effects in the United States following the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive (1968) prepared the

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Japan will not possess, manufacture or introduce nuclear weapons on her soil.

¹² Quoted in Fred Greene, Stresses in U.S.-Japanese Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 33.

¹³ Actual reversion took place in 1972.

¹⁴ Article VI of the 1960 Treaty granted the United States the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas on the home islands of Japan. The use of these facilities and areas was governed by a separate agreement. In extending Japanese jurisdiction to the Ryukyus, Japan was made responsible for the defense of the area and by implication of the U.S. facilities on Okinawa.

way for the so-called Nixon Doctrine, first announced at Guam in July 1969. While the Nixon Doctrine needs no elaboration here, its major principles are nevertheless noteworthy: the United States could and should enter into an era of negotiations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China; negotiate with North Vietnam to bring about peace throughout Indochina; lower America's military posture throughout the world, while at the same time maintaining our commitments, i.e., the mutual security treaties with our allies. Generally, the Nixon Doctrine was received by Western allies, including Japan, with doubt; developing into shocks and suspicions, especially after the February 1972 U.S.-PRC meeting and its accompanying Shanghai communique. Tokyo, for one, was not informed by Washington in advance of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's visit to Peking, though a pledge had been given privately to the Japanese government a few years earlier that it would be notified in advance of any major change in American China policy.¹⁵ There were other tensions generated during the 1971-1972 period. In the spring of 1971, Nixon began to support legislation to impose quotas on imports of Japanese textiles and rejected conciliatory measures proposed by some members of the House of Representatives.¹⁶

A more serious problem was the massive deficit in the American balance of payments with Japan, estimated to be between \$3 to \$4 billion per year. To help eliminate such, President Nixon announced on August 15, 1971, a program of wage and price controls, suspension of the convertibility of the dollar, and a ten percent surcharge on import duties.

These Nixon-Kissinger "shocks," casting doubts as they did on the wisdom of the alliance with the United States, were later followed by the Arab oil embargo shock. By late 1973, the Japanese had become fully aware of how dependent they were on their energy imports, 85 percent of which came from the Middle East and the Persian Gulf. Not even Japanese trade and payments balances could absorb the 4-5 times price increase and the galloping inflation of 1973-74.¹⁷ Though the Japanese economy survived the oil crisis, the earlier economic policies were called into question. These successive "shocks" sounded the death knells of the pacifist commercial democracy era in Japan.

It was not until that latter part of the 1970s, following the fall of Saigon (1975) and the Lockheed Scandal (1976), that serious discussion relative to Japanese defense issues and needs materialized. In October 1976, the "National Defense Program

¹⁵ Harold C. Hinton, Three and A Half Powers: The New Balance in Asia (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 134.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Cf. Frank N. Trager and William L. Scully, "Asia and the Western Pacific: A Time of Trial," in RUSI and Brassey's Defence Yearbook, 1975/76 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1975), p. 171.

Outline" was accepted at a Cabinet meeting of the government of Takeo Miki. The Outline did not simply estimate quantities of defense capability in light of potential threats, but rather aimed at "even in peacetime, a balanced defense posture with effective organizations and functional positioning of units and equipment which are capable of coping effectively with aggression ranging from conventional warfare with smaller scale than limited wars to aggression of more smaller scale with limited geographical expansion, objectives, means and duration."

One of the assumptions underlining the Outline was the notion that international geopolitical developments often involve factors of uncertainty and unpredictability -- e.g., the Nixon Doctrine. Two years later, in November 1978, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee approved a counterpart to the Outline, namely the "Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation." These Guidelines endeavor to achieve a posture for cooperation between Japanese Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces in such areas as operations, intelligence and logistics.¹⁸

Since the 1950s, popular attitudes toward defense issues in Japan have on the whole been emotional and negative. During the past several years, however, Japanese attitudes toward defense problems have undergone a gradual but significant evolution. Growing public awareness of defense issues and acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces and the Mutual Security Treaty do not mean that attitudes about the role and missions of these forces have changed. Japanese willingness to assume increased responsibility is still subject to post-war constitutional restraints and remains today a very serious political problem.

JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Article IX of Japan's Constitution is truly a monumental landmark in the annals of international law. No other nation in history, let alone a major power such as Japan, has gone so far as to renounce war as a sovereign right, while denying itself the maintenance of armed forces or the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes. As straightforward as Article IX appears to be, there have been a multiplicity of interpretations which have besieged the Article since its implementation. However, no objection is raised by the Constitution to the right of Japan as an independent nation to defend itself from any foreign invasion.

The Japanese Supreme Court, in a ruling on the Sunagawa Case in December 1959, stated that pacifism as defined under the Constitution does not stipulate non-defense or non-resistance on the part of Japan. Indeed, the preamble of the Constitution

¹⁸ In addition to the above, the Guidelines specify actions to be taken in response to an armed attack against Japan.

specifically states that "the people of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want." From this perspective, it is "not justifiable to consider the Constitution as prohibiting the maintenance by Japan of the minimum required level of preparedness against situations in which the 'people's life, liberty and pursuit of happiness' as guaranteed by the Constitution are seriously endangered."¹⁹ The Japanese government has consistently held the view that Japan's national defense capabilities must be exclusively for self-defense, and that any action exceeding this limit is strictly prohibited, constituting as it would the creation of a "war potential."

It was not until the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 that a basic structure for Japan's Self-Defense Forces began to be devised. Upon instructions from General Douglas MacArthur, a 75,000-man National Police Reserve Force was established to "deal with international disorders." Following the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-United States Security Treaty in 1951, lively debate ensued within the Japanese Diet over the establishment of defense guidelines and a gradual buildup of defense capability as proposed by the Liberal Party (Jiyuto) in the fall of 1951. In April 1952, a Maritime Safety Force, later renamed the Coastal Safety Force, was established to deal with maritime security. In August of the same year, a Safety Agency was formed to administer the nascent military forces (Police and Coastal). Finally, on October 15, 1952, the Security Agency (Hoancho) was established with jurisdiction over ground and maritime forces and capabilities sufficient to "maintain internal order." The size of the armed forces was then increased to 110,000 men.²⁰

With the passage of defense bills in both houses of the Japanese Diet (May and June 1954), a new security agency, the Defense Agency (Boeicho), was formally established on July 1, 1954. Similarly, the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces were also inaugurated.

In 1956 the National Defense Council, an advisory body, was created with responsibility for formulating defense policy and recommending the size, shape and composition of the Self-Defense Forces. In May of 1957, the "Basic Policies for Defense" -- previously noted -- were drawn up within the terms of the Constitution and provided the foundation upon which all subsequent defense programs have been built. The expansion and modernization of those Forces were achieved by means of a series of four programs, the first of which was introduced in 1958.

¹⁹ Defense Agency of Japan, Defense of Japan, 1978 (Tokyo, 1978), p. 57.

²⁰ Cf. Rodger Swearingen, The Soviet Union and Postwar Japan: Escalating Challenge and Response (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978), p. 203.

The First Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1958-60) was designed to "construct a fundamental ground defense capability in order to cope with the rapid reductions in U.S. ground forces stationed in Japan."²¹ The plan also aimed at establishing maritime and air defense capabilities. During this period, Japan anticipated leasing some ships, aircraft and substantial equipment from the United States. The plan also called for recruitment of 180,000 ground force personnel, construction of about 124,000 tons of shipping and acquisition of about 1,300 aircraft.

The Second Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1962-66) aimed at strengthening that defense potential "to the point of capability in meeting conventional aggression on a scale no greater than localized conflict."²² Especially important here was the call for qualitative improvements in the basic defense capability in light of the development of scientific technology. Among the major goals of this Plan were the programmed replacement of obsolete equipment, the introduction of ground-to-air missiles, and the institution of an ongoing R&D program.

The Third Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1967-71) was aimed at consolidating the defense potential of each of the various services. However, special emphasis was placed on strengthening maritime defense capability within Japanese coastal waters and air defense capability in key areas.

The Fourth Defense Buildup Plan (FY 1972-76) was essentially a follow-up program of the previous plan. Once again emphasis was placed on the modernization and replacement of outmoded equipment, improvements in maritime and air defense capability, and specific increases in the various armed forces levels. Some of the goals of the Fourth Plan were unattainable, particularly arms acquisition, due in large measure to the economic situation resulting from the oil crisis. In the period that followed, the defense budget was not substantially increased and was limited to, what Professor Kataoka calls, Miki's canonized "1 percent of GNP" uncrossable barrier.²³

Given the fact that a Fifth Buildup Plan was economically untenable and politically unfeasible due to the mounting pacifist opposition to enlarging the SDF, the Miki government espoused a new program which, in their minds, could provide for external defense and satisfy pacifist opposition.

In October of 1976, the Japanese government abandoned the various Buildup Plans, opting instead for a "National Defense Program Outline." Unlike the previous plans which had set specific objectives for defense buildup within a fixed time frame, the

²¹ Defense of Japan, 1978, p. 63.

²² Ibid.

²³ Kataoka, Waiting for a "Pearl Harbor," p. 47.

"National Defense Program Outline" was designed to set fundamental guidelines for Japan's defense posture in the future.²⁴ The Outline no longer simply estimated defense capability in light of any potential threat, but aimed at providing, even in peacetime, a balanced defense posture capable of coping effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small scale aggression, rather than maintaining a defensive force capable of surviving a full-scale conventional war as had been previously emphasized in earlier government plans. Whereas previous defense plans have been specifically detailed (see accompanying chart), the new Outline spoke more in generalities and referred to the overall mission of the Self-Defense Forces rather than stipulating the exact nature and composition of each branch.

The Defence Buildup 1958 to 1976

		1st Plan (1958 - 1960)	2nd Plan (1962 - 1966)	3rd Plan (1967 - 1971)	4th Plan (1972 - 1976)
Self-Defence official quota		170,000 men	171,500 men	179,000 men	180,000 men
Units deployed regionally in peacetime		6 Divisions 3 Combined Brigades	12 Divisions -	12 Divisions -	12 Divisions 1 Combined Brigade
Ground defence Basic Units	Mobile Operation Units	1 Mechanized Combined Brigade 1 Tank Group 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Group 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Group 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade	1 Mechanized Division 1 Tank Brigade 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade
	Low Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	-	2 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalions	4 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups (another group being planned)	8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
	Maritime defence Basic Units	Anti-Submarine Surface Ship Units (for mobile operation) Anti-Submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional District Units) Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Land-Based Anti-Submarine Aircraft Units	3 Escort Flotillas 5 Divisions - 1 Flotilla 9 Squadrons	3 Escort Flotillas 5 Divisions 2 Divisions 2 Flotillas 15 Squadrons	4 Escort Flotillas 10 Divisions 4 Divisions 2 Flotillas 14 Squadrons
Major equipment	Anti-Submarine Surface Ships Submarines Operational Aircraft	57 Ships 2 Submarines (Apx. 220 Aircraft)	59 Ships 7 Submarines (Apx. 230 Aircraft)	59 Ships 12 Submarines (Apx. 240 Aircraft)	61 Ships 14 Submarines (Apx. 310 Aircraft)
Air defence Basic Units	Aircraft Control and Warning Units	24 Groups	24 Groups	24 Groups	28 Groups
	Interceptor Units	12 Squadrons	15 Squadrons	10 Squadrons	10 Squadrons
	Support Fighter Units	-	4 Squadrons	4 Squadrons	3 Squadrons
	Air Reconnaissance Units	-	1 Squadron	1 Squadron	1 Squadron
	Air Transport Units	2 Squadrons	3 Squadrons	3 Squadrons	3 Squadrons
Early Warning Units	-	-	-	-	
High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	-	2 Groups	4 Groups	5 Groups (Another group being planned)	
Major equipment	Operational Aircraft	(Apx. 1,130 Aircraft)	(Apx. 1,100 Aircraft)	(Apx. 940 Aircraft)	Apx. 490 Aircraft (Apx. 900 Aircraft)

Note: Parenthesized numbers of operational aircraft denote total numbers of aircraft including trainers. The numbers of units from the 1st to 3rd Buildup Plans are as of the end of each plan period.

The Outline further states that if greater than a "limited and small-scale aggression" is encountered, the standard defense force should be capable "of continuing effective resistance until such time as cooperation with the United States can be introduced, thus rebuffing such aggression."²⁵

In essence, the Outline aimed at a qualitative, rather than quantitative improvement in Japan's defense posture, emphasizing improvements in logistical infrastructure, maritime surveillance and air defense. The Defense Agency, having lowered their sights to attainable goals, was now able to lay down for the first time rather specific levels of arms maintenance, replacement schedules and accompanying budgets. It remains to be seen, however, whether such qualitative changes have significantly improved the capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, and whether these changes are sufficient to meet the changing military balance in the Far East.

THE CHANGING MILITARY BALANCE IN THE PACIFIC

Contemporary Japanese defense planning remains rooted in the Standard Defense Force Concept enunciated in 1976. Essential to an understanding of this program, particularly its emphasis on repelling only limited, small-scale aggression, is its evaluation of the domestic and international situation at the time. This perspective assumed that no major changes were anticipated in the domestic and international situation in the foreseeable future,²⁶ and that any aggression requiring advance preparation would allow time for the arrival, deployment and use of adequate U.S. forces. While such assumptions may have been valid in 1976, developments over the past five years call into question the continuing legitimacy of such premises.

The most significant change in the past five years has been the continued and unrelenting buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear military power,²⁷ and the increasing interference, through surrogates such as the Cubans, in the internal affairs of other nations (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Afghanistan).

The dimension of the Soviet military buildup is particularly revealing when one examines overall Soviet defense spending. For each of the past twenty years, Soviet defense spending has increased steadily and significantly by an average of 4-5 percent a year. According to CIA estimates, the Soviets allocate 12-14 percent of their GNP to defense, whereas the United States spends only about 5 percent. The discrepancy is all the more remarkable

²⁵ Ibid., p. 202.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 69.

²⁷ The Organization of Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Military Posture for FY 1982 Supplement, p. 1.

when one considers that the Soviet GNP only ranges between 50 and 75 percent that of the United States. According to former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, the Soviets spent about 50 percent more than the United States on defense in 1980 (using estimated dollar costs).²⁸ In terms of investment efforts (research and development, procurement and military construction), the statistics are similarly revealing. Only a decade ago (1970), Soviet investments began exceeding those of the United States; today, Soviet investments are 80 percent greater than those of the U.S. While over the past decade U.S. investments have fallen some 20 percent, Soviet investments have risen 50 percent. From 1968 to 1979, Soviet investments are estimated to have been \$270 billion more than those of the United States.

Throughout the past decade the Soviets with their commitment of massive resources have continued to strengthen and modernize their armed forces in all categories. As to their strategic offensive forces, the Soviets have now completed deployment of their fourth generation of intercontinental ballistic missiles, including the SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19. There has been a twenty percent growth in the size of the Soviet SSBN force in the last five years alone, accompanied by a 356 percent growth in the DELTA SSBN force (from 9 to 32 units today). Their theater nuclear forces have been considerably augmented by the BACKFIRE bomber and the MIRVed SS-20 missile. Similarly, conventional forces have been upgraded, thereby enhancing their ability to conduct distant operations.

Especially noteworthy is the recent assessment offered by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their Military Posture Statement for FY 1982. The posture statement notes that "the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union continues to shift toward the latter." Nowhere is this shift more evident than in the Far East.

Of the total Soviet ground forces, consisting of 173 divisions and approximately 1.83 million men, 43 divisions are deployed along the Sino-Soviet frontier, two are on Sakhalin Island, and one on Kamchatka. In the area east of Lake Baikal, over three-quarters of the total land force -- 34 divisions, comprising some 350,000 men -- are deployed. Most of these ground forces consist of motor rifle divisions, with modern equipment, armored mobility, heavy fire power and good air defense capabilities.²⁹ Few of these divisions, however, are fully combat ready by U.S. standards.

The Soviet Pacific Fleet, more than any other branch of the armed forces, has been visibly upgraded. In 1979 alone, the

²⁸ Report of Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1982 Budget, January 19, 1981, p. 15.

²⁹ Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980 (Tokyo, 1980), p. 30.

Fleet received as many as eight new ships, totaling 81,450 tons, raising its total strength to 785 vessels, or 1,520,000 tons.³⁰ Among these additions were: the Minsk, the second of the Kiev-class aircraft carriers (32,000 tons); the Petropavlovsk, the fifth Kara-class missile-carrying cruiser (8,200 tons); the Ivan Rogov, the first of the new amphibious assault transport/dock ships (11,000 tons); a Ropucha-class landing vessel (3,450 tons); a Dubna-class supply ship (12,000 tons); the Tashkent, a Kara-class missile cruiser (8,200 tons); and two missile destroyers of the Krivak I and II-class (each 3,300 tons).³¹

The Fleet itself has a total of 507 combat ships, comprising 110 submarines³² (including 30 carrying strategic missiles); one ASW aircraft carrier; 78 cruisers, destroyers, and frigates; and 318 amphibious ships and boats, patrol boats and mine warfare ships. Of the Fleet's 169 attack submarines, ASW aircraft carrier, cruisers, destroyers and frigates, approximately one-fourth are equipped with missiles carrying nuclear or conventional warheads capable of attacking surface ships and submarines. The Fleet flag is at Vladivostok, with most of the surface combatant ships, as well as half of the submarine fleet, attached to the southern segment of the Fleet stationed in the Sea of Japan.³³ The Northern segment of the Fleet, primarily stationed at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula, is heavily weighted with submarines. (See map of major Soviet naval facilities in area surrounding Japan.)

Soviet air strength in the area is approximately 2,060 aircraft. These include about 450 bombers, 1,450 fighters, and about 160 patrol planes. Capabilities for attacking ground targets and ships have been enhanced, as has their stand-off attack capability.

In terms of theater nuclear forces, the Soviets have now deployed the TU-22M BACKFIRE bomber, a small number of which are stationed around Irkutsk, and the SS-20, deployed east of Lake Baikal. The SS-20 is a mobile, solid-fuel-propelled IRBM with three 150-KT nuclear MIRVed missiles with a range capability of some 5,000 km. These missiles and bombers are capable of reaching almost any part of Asia, including Taiwan, Korea, China and Japan.

Of particular significance to Japan has been the increased Soviet presence on the Northern Islands (see map insertion) about


³⁰ Ibid., p. 31.

³¹ Ibid., p. 36.

³² Some estimates give 130 submarines. See, for example, Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 9, 1981 and Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, May 2, 1980.

³³ According to Soviet Analyst, Vol. 8, No. 3 (8 February 1979), two new submarine bases are being constructed near Vladivostok for the use of Delta II and Delta III types.

MAJOR SOVIET NAVAL FACILITIES IN AREA SURROUNDING JAPAN



10 kilometers off Hokkaido. Immediately after the end of World War II, the Soviets invaded the northern islands and stationed a corp of troops and MIG-17 fighters on the island of Kunashiri and Etorofu. Such a military presence was to remain until the summer of 1960 when Khrushchev announced a decision to cut Soviet armed forces by 1.2 million men.

However, the Soviets began reintroducing ground troops and creating military installations on the two islands from around May 1978. Since the summer of 1979, they have extended their operations to the island of Shikotan (which never had been occupied). The combined total of Soviet forces on these islands approaches the size of a division -- circa 6000 men. Divisional headquarters is on the island of Etorofu. The troops are equipped with tanks, surface-to-air missiles, and other weapons of a motor rifle division, as well as with large-caliber 130 mm guns. Armed helicopters with anti-tank missiles have recently been sighted (12 MIG-24s). The Air Defense Force comprises approximately 24 MIG-17s.³⁴

In contrast to the slow but steady upgrading of Soviet forces in the Far East is the somewhat static position of U.S. forces. U.S. troop strength in the Pacific has shrunk from a level of 250,000 in 1964, the baseline year before the Vietnam buildup, to some 130,000 today. U.S. force levels currently are at their lowest in three decades. The only readily available major maneuverable force west of Hawaii are the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea and the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa.

Correspondingly, only seven amphibious ships are assigned to the Pacific Fleet -- four of which were assigned to the Arabian Sea during part of the Iranian Crisis. In mid-1964, the U.S. had 15 Air Force fighter squadrons; today, their number has been reduced to five. While the Pacific Fleet, composed of the 7th and 3rd Fleets, had 11 carriers in 1964 (both CVA and ASW), today there are only six (CVA/N). Though four were formerly deployed with the Seventh Fleet, only two are still permanently attached.³⁵

Though a rough state of equilibrium exists today between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in the Far East, the future forecast is far less certain. In his farewell address as Commander-in-Chief for the Pacific (October 31, 1979, Hawaii), Admiral Maurice F. Weisner poignantly observed "that Soviet momentum in conventional military force improvements will put us in second place -- especially here in the Pacific where we are no longer in a position of military superiority and where military parity is threatened."

³⁴ Asian Security 1980, pp. 42-45.

³⁵ Cf. John M. Collins, U.S.-Soviet Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980, p. 348.

Further complicating the overall Pacific environment is the threat posed by North Korea. In 1979, the U.S. intelligence community admitted that its estimates of the North Korean armed forces were too low. North Korean ground forces were reappraised upwards by 25 percent to 600,000 men; the number of divisions by 40 percent to 37; and tanks by over 33 percent to 2,600. North Korea today possesses the world's fifth largest army and the sixth largest submarine force.

In contrast, the South Korean armed forces are seriously outnumbered. Though their ground forces are roughly equivalent, the North Koreans hold a decided 3:1 edge in aircraft, a 2.5:1 edge in tanks, and a 4:1 superiority in ships. This unstable military position is particularly significant given Japan's recognition that her security is intimately tied to that of Korea.

CURRENT ANALYSIS OF THE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

Given the ever-increasing threat posed by the Soviet Union and North Korea to the overall military balance in the Far East, it is important to ask whether current Japanese Self-Defense Force levels are adequate to meet potential aggressors.

The Japanese Self-Defense Force is currently divided into three separate branches: Ground, Maritime and Air. The Force's primary responsibility is to stand ready to repel any armed incursion against the home islands of Japan. Its mission is, therefore, defensive in nature and has been structured accordingly. Current force levels in all branches, however, are inadequate and seriously jeopardize Japan's ability to defend itself against external aggression. Before reviewing the current mission, status and operational capability of each branch of the Self-Defense Force, including new equipment allocations for the coming year, a few words need to be said about the current defense budget and the overall budgetary process.

Current Budget

The budgetary process in Japan, particularly the role of the bureaucracy in formulating fiscal policy, differs dramatically from that found in the United States and hence deserves review.

The Finance Ministry (Okurasho) is the primary bureaucratic organ charged with determining the budget for all ministries and agencies in the Japanese government. Performing more than an advisory function, the Finance Ministry often comes into conflict with the Diet as well as the leadership of the LDP. Unlike U.S. departments, which take a limited role in determining government fiscal policy, the Finance Ministry operates like an autonomous OMB; any major decision must clear the Ministry before its implementation.

In particular, the defense budget has always generated controversy between the Finance Ministry, the Defense Agency and the LDP-controlled Diet. The Ministry prefers to fund domestic programs and has generally taken a dim view of military and defense-related projects and expenditures. With the decline in the growth of the Japanese economy, the reluctance of the Ministry to expend funds for the Self-Defense Forces has risen proportionately. The decision to hold back auto imports over a three-year period (announced on April 29, 1981) will further fuel the Finance Ministry's arguments for fewer defense-related allocations.

The Japanese political custom of decision by consensus requires consultation with the Finance Ministry before implementing any fiscal policies. This decision-making process, coupled with the Finance Ministry's monopoly on economic information necessary in formulating the budget, assures the continued importance of the Ministry in the budgetary process.

In May of last year, Prime Minister Ohira agreed in principle to an increase in Japanese defense spending as a percentage of GNP. Following Ohira's untimely death, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki reaffirmed Japan's commitment to improving national defense through an increase in the defense budget.

Despite warnings by Finance Ministry officials that significant increases in the defense budget would be impossible, the full Cabinet on July 29 approved a scheme exempting the defense budget from the overall ceiling placed on other ministerial budget requests. The defense ceiling was set at a 9.7 percent increase rather than the 7.9 percent for other agencies. Accordingly, the Defense Agency requested a budget of Y2,474 billion, representing 0.92 percent of Japan's GNP.

During subsequent negotiations, the Finance Ministry cut defense appropriations to 6.6 percent. Suzuki, however, was able to achieve a compromise of a 7.6 percent increase, bringing the approved budget to Y2,400 billion or approximately \$11.8 billion. This budgetary increase, after adjusting for inflation, amounts to about a 4 percent increase in real terms -- only a 0.6 percent rise over last year's increase.

Capabilities and Deficiencies of the Self-Defense Forces

(A) Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)

The primary mission of the GSDF is to prevent foreign nations from successfully invading Japan. Given the geographic configuration of Japan, ground forces should be highly mobile, able to be quickly deployed in a variety of terrains and locations.

Accordingly the GSDF emphasizes armor as the primary, mobile striking force. Currently, the GSDF has about 830 tanks on line, most of which are the older Type-61 model. In order to upgrade Japan's aging tank capability, the new budget calls for 72 Type-74

tanks to supplement current strength levels. In addition, the new allocation calls for an additional nine Type-73 armored personnel carriers and 36 203mm and 155mm self-propelled howitzers in order to "beef up" present levels of mobile, support artillery.

The present personnel quota of the GSDF is 180,000 troops. However, current manpower is maintained at only 86 percent of the authorized quota -- with a ready reserve force of 39,000. The buildup plan announced by Prime Minister Suzuki on April 28, 1981 calls for the addition of 25,000 troops to the active ground force, thereby bringing its strength to the authorized level.

The anti-tank capability of the GSDF lags far behind current technology found in other ground forces. Japan has yet to deploy an effective anti-tank missile system and still relies on the 84mm recoilless rifle which has a relatively short kill range and limited destructive capability. The Type-79 anti-tank and anti-ship missile launchers are scheduled for deployment this year, but production will leave the GSDF anti-tank capability below desired levels.

(B) Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)

The MSDF has a two-fold mission: to protect the nation against seaborne invasion and to secure the sea lanes around Japan in the event of war.

The MSDF emphasizes anti-submarine warfare. Consequently, its ability to defend against missile and airborne attack at sea is considered inadequate. In an attempt to upgrade and strengthen Japan's naval capability, the new budget includes authorizations for one 4,500 ton destroyer; two 2,900 ton destroyers; one 2,300 ton submarine-killer submarine; two 440 ton minesweepers; and six HSS-2B anti-submarine warfare helicopters. In addition, the MSDF is currently deploying the P3C and has plans to purchase one more squadron for deployment in late 1982.

In the event of war in the Pacific, Japan would be incapable of mining the strategically important straits which surround Japan and would be unable to "choke-off" the Soviet Navy at Vladivostok. The MSDF currently deploys only one minelayer and has not announced intentions to purchase another, though methods of improving Japan's minelaying capabilities are currently under consideration.

In an attempt to upgrade transport capabilities, construction has begun on two 500 ton transport vessels to support the six ships currently providing maritime, logistic support to the GSDF.

(C) Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)

The ASDF is organized, equipped and deployed to engage in defensive operations only. Denied the right to initiate air strikes against a potential enemy, the ASDF must be able to react

quickly to intercept and destroy airborne invaders with little prior warning.

In order to bolster ground radar capability, the ASDF has decided to purchase two E-2C early warning aircraft in FY 1982 and two more in FY 1983. In addition, Japan's ground radar equipment is being modernized and the current Base Air Defense Ground Environment (BADGE) system in use since 1967 is being upgraded, with studies currently underway to determine a suitable replacement.

Japan's main interceptor-fighter, the F-4EJ, has become somewhat obsolete in view of the more sophisticated aircraft being introduced in and around the area of Japan by other nations. Consequently, in 1978, the F-15 was selected to replace it with the first squadron scheduled for deployment in the latter half of 1982. Additionally, Japan lacks an adequate electronic warfare capability, precision-guided bombs and a sophisticated air defense missile system. The NIKE, operational since 1962, remains Japan's primary surface-to-air missile defense -- though plans for its replacement are currently under consideration.

In order to upgrade the ASDF, the current budget calls for the purchase of two F-1 supersonic ground support fighters; two U.S.-made C-130H Hercules transport planes; four E-2C Hawkeye airborne early warning planes; and two units of short-range SAM system called Tan-SAM.

(D) Other Capabilities and Deficiencies

The system for combined and joint operations and the command and control structure are considered deficient. Effective combined and joint operations are nearly impossible under present circumstances since there is as yet no established mechanism for crisis management, for a wartime leadership structure, for joint operations of three services, and for combined Japan-U.S. operations.

Similarly, readiness is at an extremely low level. A mobilization system has not yet been established. Peacetime reserves of personnel and equipment are considered insufficient, a tendency particularly noted above in the GSDF.

Finally, there is the problem of sustainability in a wartime situation. Present stockpiles of munitions, fuel, food and other equipment are considered low.

Given the growing military imbalance in the Far East occasioned by the growing power of both the Soviet Union and North Korea, and the present state of Japanese defense efforts, one can easily conclude that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces leave much to be desired in both quality and quantity.

A similar conclusion was arrived at by the Comprehensive National Security Study Group, appointed by Prime Minister Ohira,

during the summer of 1980. In their Report on Comprehensive National Security, the Group ridiculed the current capabilities of the Self-Defense Forces, noting that a half of the defense equipment was virtually useless, arms stockpiles were insufficient, and security efforts were, in general, deplorable.

CONCLUSION

In the future, the international environment in the Pacific will be more forbidding, particularly in light of

- (1) the growing military power of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and the introduction of the BACKFIRE bomber and the SS-20 missile;
- (2) the ever-increasing instability on the Korean Peninsula;
- (3) the sagging position of the U.S. in the area, particularly the Seventh Fleet's over-commitment (recent requirements of Fleet activity in the Indian Ocean and continuing responsibility north of Formosa); and
- (4) the existing deficiencies within the Self-Defense Forces.

With these factors in mind, what should be the appropriate response of the Japanese government to adequately and successfully meet the potential military challenges which lie ahead?

In the short term, greater emphasis must be placed on air and maritime force improvements. Particular consideration should be given to the following:

- procuring additional P-3C anti-submarine warfare aircraft (capable of mining waters), SH-3B ASW helicopters and ASW frigates for the maritime forces.
- procuring new destroyers, CG-47 Aegis cruisers and destroyer escorts armed with surface-to-surface and anti-ship missiles, and additional RH-53E minesweeping helicopters.
- strengthening surveillance capabilities on the coast and the Straits.
- upgrading early warning capabilities with a greater number of E-2C early warning aircraft.
- increasing the number of F-15 fighters and procurement of long-range, land-based F-14 fighters armed with Phoenix air-to-air missiles.

- improving the BADGE system.
- converting NIKE units to SAM-X units.

In addition, consideration should be given to

- creating a Central Command HQ;
- stockpiling petroleum, ammunition and other supplies;
- increasing interservice exercises and joint maneuvers with the United States;
- assuming more of the burden of stationing American forces on the home islands.

In the long-term, Japanese defense planners should consider first extending the range of defensive operations, through the acquisition of new guided missile and helicopter-carrying destroyers, modern anti-ship missiles for use against surface combatants, and more destroyers with improved air defense equipment. Long-range submarines (possibly nuclear) might also be introduced. Consideration should also be given to the acquisition of a V/STOL aircraft carrier, similar perhaps to the Soviet Kiev-class carrier. All P-3J aircraft should be replaced with P-3Cs and all F-4Js with either F-15 or even the F-16. Finally, consideration should be given to the establishment of an amphibious/airborne force.

During both the short- and long-term, Japan must seriously re-evaluate much of the philosophy underlying its current defense posture. It is hoped such a re-examination will lead to the discarding of such meaningless taboos as the 1 percent ceiling, canonized during the Miki administration. Similarly, one would hope that the prohibitions against possession of offensive weapons and the sending of Self-Defense Forces abroad in any contingency would be eliminated. Consideration should also be given to the abandonment of the three non-nuclear principles and export controls on defense equipment. In such a re-examination and re-evaluation, Japan should be encouraged to define and develop its own concept of security and act accordingly.

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