

A United Nations Assessment Project Study

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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE U.N.

INTRODUCTION

Were Humpty Dumpty, Lewis Carroll's colorful character, to stumble into the halls of the United Nation's General Assembly, he would be flattered by the nearly universal adoption of his famous principle: "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less."

Ignoring logic, rejecting consistency, the U.N. has fashioned its own strange reality--understood only by venturing through the looking glass to a weird wonderland. A majority of about 100 nations, for example, consistently castigate the U.S. for such "crimes" as trading with South Africa (never mind that Zimbabwe does too), or for "aggression" against two Libyan fighters shot down in the Mediterranean after they opened fire on two U.S. jets. Among the countries allowed to "debate" in the Assembly, missing are Taiwan (replaced by the People's Republic of China in 1971) and South Africa. This despite the total lack of political and civil liberties in mainland China, despite the spectacular economic success and relative freedom in Taiwan, and despite the fact that South Africa, one of the U.N.'s founders, legally remains a U.N. member. Though South Africa, in violation of the U.N. Charter, was kicked out of the General Assembly in 1974, several terrorist groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO), not only enjoy the legitimacy of observer status in the General Assembly (a departure from the U.N.'s original practice to extend this honor only to states and groups of states¹), they even receive substantial financial support from the U.N.²

¹ The Representative of the United Kingdom expressed a widely shared sentiment when he said, in 1974: "Only States may be Members of the U.N. Consistently with that position, the status of permanent observers has

In short, what thrives at the U.N. is a Humpty Dumpty-like standard affecting rhetoric and practice. This amounts to a political culture, a mood and atmosphere, an evolved system of practices dictating which behavior is preferred and which taboo, what can be said and what best remains unspoken. It is a political culture dominated by a majority of developing countries, which are seduced or intimidated into extremism by a well-organized, totalitarian minority. The result, as one top-level member of the U.N. Secretariat admits in private, is the production of "nonsense." And many a seasoned Western delegate will agree (as many American journalists know) that the U.N. has been staging a "theatre of the absurd" for quite some time. A longtime U.N. observer, Moses Moskowitz, captures the situation well in his 1980 book, The Roots and Reaches of U.N. Actions and Decisions:

There is a surrealist quality to many events taking place in the U.N. which makes it very difficult to believe that they are happening in the real world.³

On issues of great importance to world peace, member states tend to draw together into grotesque voting blocs that foster, in the words of former Permanent Representative Carl W. A. Schurmann of the Netherlands, "a new kind of diplomacy," namely, "a diplomacy of speech-making and of lobbying."⁴ Schurmann argues that this diplomacy "forces governments to take a stand (if not by making a speech, then, at least, by voting) on a great many questions and conflicts that either do not really concern them or on which they would much have preferred to keep their opinions to themselves." U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the U.N., Kenneth Adelman, agrees: the U.N.'s political culture, he says repeatedly, exacerbates rather than relieves conflict, and fosters double-talk. A member of a Western European Mission to the U.N. observes that one reason so little has been written about the U.N.'s political culture is the fear by many scholars in the West to expose some of the more unpleasant features of that organization.

also hitherto been confined to non-Member States such as Switzerland or the Vatican, and to regional organizations of States, such as the OAU and, most recently, the EEC and the CMEA." A/PV.2296, pp. 22-25. He deplored the fact that the PLO will be able to participate in the proceedings of the General Assembly, with "the right to take part in the proceedings of all U.N. conferences and indeed [the specialized agencies are] virtually instruct[ed] to follow a similar course." All of which seems "to bring into question the nature of the U.N. as it has hitherto been accepted."

² See Thomas Gulick, "How the U.N. Aids Marxist Guerrilla Groups," Heritage Foundation Background #177.

³ Moses Moskowitz, The Roots and Reaches of United Nations Actions and Decisions (Alphen aan den Rijn, the Netherlands: Sitjhoff & Noordhoff, 1980), p. 173.

⁴ "Two Kinds of Diplomacy," address delivered at the 63rd Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Proceedings, 1969, pp. 246-248.

The General Assembly, in fact, seems like a House of Mirrors that distorts reality: some things are exaggerated, others diminished, and still others obscured. Unlike a House of Mirrors, however, the General Assembly's distortions form a pattern--and it is this aspect that makes it a full-fledged culture. U.N. rhetoric and most policies are anti-free enterprise, anti-West, and especially anti-U.S. A member of the West German Mission to the U.N. notes that "the U.S. has to have its resolutions sponsored by another country; hardly anyone wants to be voting in favor of a U.S.-initiated resolution." The U.S. is attacked by name in a General Assembly resolution for so minor an act as extraditing an alien accused of murder;⁵ the Soviet Union, on the other hand, is not mentioned by name, even when it invades Afghanistan. So go the "rules of the game" of U.N. political culture.

Learning the rules is easy for a newcomer at the U.N. If he wishes to be on the winning side, all he must do is:

- 1) Lambast the perennial scapegoats--Namibia and South Africa, the arms race (denounce NATO, but not Moscow), Israel, violations of human rights in Chile (but not in Iran, North Korea, or Ethiopia) at every possible U.N. forum--whether an International Women's Conference, a Conference on the Environment, or a UNESCO meeting.
- 2) Treat the U.S. as a colonial power by demanding the "liberation" of Puerto Rico--never mind that polls show a majority of its population prefers its present political status.
- 3) Talk about "Zionism" and "racism," even "fascism," in the same breath, echoing the resolution passed by the General Assembly in November 1975. Condemn Israeli trade with South Africa. Do not bring up Soviet diamond trade with South Africa;⁶ say that you have not seen the evidence.
- 4) Use the Credentials Committee as a political instrument;⁷ now that Israel has been condemned, on February 15, 1982, as a "non-peaceloving state"--the only U.N. member so named--it could be denied participation in the General Assembly, since the U.N. is reserved, by Charter, only to "peace-loving" states. Do not do the same to "peace-loving" Vietnam, Iraq, Iran, or the USSR.

⁵ Resolution 36/171 passed on December 16, 1981, relating to the case of Ziad Abu Eain.

⁶ See Edward Jay Epstein, The Rise and Fall of Diamonds (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1982).

⁷ Marjorie Ann Browne, Credentials in the U.N. General Assembly: Selected Precedents, CRS, September 30, 1980: "In the last analysis, the actions taken by the membership of the U.N. in the General Assembly on the controversial credentials questions are based primarily on political rather than legal considerations....", p. 21.

5) Tell the Americans, at cocktail parties or in the Delegates' Lounge, that you did not really mean what you said from U.N. podiums and insist that no one really believes such rhetoric. Ignore U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Charles Lichenstein, and some of his colleagues when they tell you that things are changing and the U.S. really does care what is said in public.

6) Demand at every opportunity economic "reparation" from the developed industrial states, even from those who have never had colonies. This "moral" obligation of the "North" to aid the "South" has been consecrated in several U.N. reports, such as "Measures for Development of Underdeveloped Countries" (1951), "The First U.N. Conference and Trade and Development" (1964), and the "U.N. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order" (1974). In fact, this obligation has been institutionalized through such organs as United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), and others. According to a veteran of seventeen General Assembly sessions, Israel's liaison with the Afro-Asian group, Arieh Eilan, things have come to a point where even

Norway, though it has never had any colonies, is nonetheless regarded as an accessory to the "crime" of colonialism and imperialism, while the Soviet Union is portrayed as the defender of oppressed humanity. However irrational this may sound, these assumptions are no longer disputed, not even by the Norwegians, Danes, or Swedes. On the contrary, they seem almost to respond joyfully to the role of penitent sinner.⁸

The new nations learn fast. The U.S., therefore, cannot afford to pretend that the game does not exist. For the game is deadly and subtle with repercussions affecting the entire international environment. This realization prompted U.S. Permanent Representative to the U.N., Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, in a widely publicized speech at a Heritage Foundation conference on June 7, 1982, to chastise the U.S. for being unable to understand, let alone participate in, the U.N.'s political culture. Said Ambassador Kirkpatrick:

[a] consequence of ignoring the political character of the U.N. is that we operate as though there were no difference between our relations with supporters and opponents, with no penalties for opposing our views and values, and no rewards for cooperating....By not really learning the rules, the players, the game, we have often behaved like a bunch of amateurs in the United Nations.

⁸ Arieh Eilan, "[The Soviet Union and] Conference Diplomacy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1981, p. 28.

THE TERMS OF DISCOURSE

The organ of the U.N. that has played the decisive role in shaping the organization's political vocabulary is the so-called Committee of 24, elaborately titled The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Recommendations of the Committee of 24 have usually become first resolutions of the Fourth of the General Assembly's six Committees, and then of the Assembly itself. The U.S. and Britain have long since withdrawn from the Committee because of its virulent rhetoric. By now, the tone of its resolutions is well known. Says former U.N. diplomat, Seymour Finger: "If such resolutions are changed from one year to the next, the change has usually been in the form of adding inflating adjectives or inserting still more unattainable provisions."⁹

The Declaration whose implementation the Committee of 24 is pledged to ensure had been Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev's gift to the U.N. on its 15th anniversary in 1960. It was the first of a series of moves shaping the U.N.'s ideological climate that led to the admission of so-called "National Liberation Movements" (NLMs) as observers at the General Assembly on a par with nation states. The 1960 Declaration stated that self-determination is "a right belonging to all people," hence "all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease." A memorandum circulated by the Soviet Union in 1960 threatened that either the peoples' demands are "recognized by all states, or the oppressed peoples, with the support of their numerous friends throughout the world, will take their destiny in their own hands."¹⁰ A subtle move, from rejection of colonialism to support of its overthrow by force, was in the offing.

Five years later, Resolution 2105(XX) of December 20, 1965, recognizes "the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, and invites all states to provide material and moral assistance to the national liberation movements in colonial territories." This was followed in 1970 by an endorsement of using "all the necessary means at their disposal" to achieve their ends (Resolution 2708(XXV) of December 15). The sum of these resolutions: official encouragement to extremists and terrorists to read the Charter as legitimizing the use of force. And this in an organization founded to preserve world peace.

⁹ Seymour Maxwell Finger, Your Man at the U.N.: People, Politics, and Bureaucracy in Making Foreign Policy (New York and London: New York University Press, 1980), p. 30.

¹⁰ See Request for Inclusion of a New Item in the Agenda of the 15th Session of the General Assembly: Item Proposed by the U.S.S.R., Annex II. For text see A/4502/Corr.1, September 23, 1960, p. 7.

Oscar Schachter, former Director of the General Legal Division of the U.N., finds that "in recent years, at first almost imperceptibly, we have witnessed a countertrend toward the justification and, one might say, the licensing of international violence"¹¹ at the U.N.

The U.N. has been careful, however, to define "wars of liberation." The U.N. blessing is not extended to members of Poland's Solidarity movement, nor to Czechs or Hungarians fighting for their liberation from Moscow's rule, indeed, not even to nonextremist black African groups such as Inkatha, led by Gaftsa Buthelese, head of the Zulu nation, which is the chief black opposition to the South African government. Helping craft this definition is ideology. "Imperialism" at the U.N. is a label routinely attached to the U.S. and the West, but never to the USSR. A speech by Cuba's Permanent Representative to the U.N., Roa Kouri, delivered at a meeting of the Sixth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in January 1980, dealing with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, states that

the United States rulers do their utmost to demand before international public opinion respect for institutions which traditionally have been violated by armed interventions or conspiracies plotted by United States administrations since the turn of the century. The Yankee chorus has been joined by the Pinochets, guilty of the genocide of their peoples....

Indeed, it is "the Government of the United States which advocates intervention in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and is intent on reimposing on the countries of that region the status of pawns of its imperialist policies." Orwellianism runs rampant: the U.S., not the Soviet Union, advocates "imperialism" in Afghanistan.

Though it would be simplistic to call Third World rhetoric unequivocally "Marxist," given its varying nuances and degrees of forcefulness, sociology Professor Peter Berger of the University of Massachusetts observes

it is possible to point to a series of propositions as the common core of Third World ideology [which] has gone hand in hand with various political initiatives, almost all of them within the U.N. system.

He notes that the construction of that ideology is, broadly speaking, leftist--indeed, it depends on elements of Marxist theory.¹²

¹¹ Oscar Schachter, "The Generation Gap in International Law," Proceedings, 1969, p. 232.

¹² Peter Berger, "Speaking to the Third World," Commentary, October 1981, p. 31.

The architects of that ideology are well aware of the mechanics that operate in linguistics: connotations are woven from associations. Thus, words like "imperialism," "colonialism," and "racism" are deliberately used together. Cuba's foreign minister addressing the General Assembly in 1975, condemned Chile's junta as follows:

Latin American fascism is the natural ally of racism and colonialism. It is in fact in their service. It seeks to act as a wedge that will break the necessary solidarity between the peoples of the three continents. The struggle against it, therefore, becomes of primary importance for all the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America.¹³

He then points out that "not a single international conference of note" in the U.N. during the past year had failed to express "its most categorical repudiation of the atrocities committed by the Pinochet junta" including such agencies as the International Labor Organization, UNESCO, and the World Conference of the International Women's Year.

The majority's political rhetoric that condemns colonialism aims too at free enterprise. Resolution A/RES/36/51 passed on December 22, 1981, for example, "condemns the activities of foreign, economic, and other interests in the the colonial territories," and requests the U.N. Centre on Transnational Corporations to prepare a register of profits for the next session of the General Assembly. Never mind that there are almost no colonial territories left. The principle now is established that such a register is a legitimate U.N. undertaking, and the link is established between alleged "colonialism" and free enterprise, in particular, the activities of multinational corporations.¹⁴

¹³ See A/PV.2380, esp. pp. 53-57.

¹⁴ Professor Georgy I. Mirsky of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences made the connection between "colonialism" and "economic injustice" before a UNITAR Conference held in Moscow in June, 1974:

the interests of a lasting peace require the speediest liquidation of the aftermaths of long years of colonialism, of the system of inequitable international economic relations and social and economic injustice that to this day plague the bigger part of mankind.

He then proposed "organizing a Technology Bank that would make it easier for the developing countries to get access to modern scientific-technical achievements," so as "to profoundly transform social relations, to embark on the road to progressive socioeconomic and political development." The U.N. and the Future (Moscow, 1976), p. 142.

The rhetorical offensive in the economic sphere had its first major victory in 1964 at a meeting of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development when 77 countries formed the "Group of 77" (today numbering over 120 nations). Throughout the sixties, the group argued for strong trade concessions, compensatory financing, and other preferential trade and credit measures. On May 1, 1974, the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly formally adopted a resolution that stressed the need to work urgently for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) which "shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and developing countries," in short, establish a scheme for redistributing the output of developed states to developing countries.

Seven months later, on December 12, 1974, the General Assembly adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which sets out the demands of developing countries, questioning the very principles of economic exchange. The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which entered into force on January 3, 1976, continued the Third World offensive. Arguing that they are at a disadvantage under the international economic order established after World War II, the developing countries proclaimed the right to "freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation." They also claim a right to form primary commodity producer cartels as well as the right to be granted generalized preferential, nonreciprocal treatment in all international economic activities. The U.S. has refused to ratify the Covenant.

The arguments underlying the NIEO are infiltrating the Western political climate.¹⁵ Its presuppositions are very much alive in 1982. According to the 1982 Report of the U.N. Director General for Development and International Economic Cooperation, entitled "Towards the NIEO," the existing economic order--"which [is] characterized by inequality, domination, dependence, narrow self-interest and segmentation"--should be changed. The system of free enterprise, that is, should give way to the kind of interdependence dictated by the Third World.

Conferences, resolutions, and reports cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. They mold the international diplomatic culture. Even if the results at times are belated, they are not difficult to trace. Notes Finger:

Some of the most important results of Assembly sessions do not come from resolutions at all but rather from changes in attitudes of key governments that result

¹⁵ William L. Scully, "The Brandt Commission: Deluding the Third World," Heritage Backgrounder #182.

from both formal debates and informal talks during the session. Having represented the U.S. in the Second (Economic) Committee of the General Assembly from 1956 to 1963, and having watched it closely since then, I have been impressed by the way prolonged discussion there can bring about major changes in attitudes on economic issues.¹⁶

He cites the discussion of soft, low-interest loans, in the form of the Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development. Although the Western nations had rejected the concept when first introduced by the less developed countries in the early fifties, the U.S. caved in by 1959 and advocated establishment of the International Development Association as a soft-loan affiliate of the World Bank. Two decades later, the World Bank is recognizing its mistake and is trying to reverse its rather too liberal lending policies.¹⁷

Other examples include the notion of compensatory financing put forth in the 1950s, which in 1975 former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposed through the establishment of a \$10 billion facility in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which would provide preferential credit terms to less developed countries. Nonreciprocal tariff concessions have now been put into practice as well, despite initial Western rejection, as a result, says Finger, of "many years of discussion in the U.N.'s General Assembly and UNCTAD."¹⁸

General Assembly resolutions and speeches alone do not shape the rhetorical atmosphere of the U.N. and the world community. There is another dimension behind the public image, as Ambassador Kirkpatrick discovered when some of the Third World delegates joined Cuba and several other totalitarian countries in signing a vituperative anti-U.S., anti-West "Communiqué"--the product of the September 1981 meeting of the nonaligned countries in Havana.¹⁹ In a letter responding to the Communiqué, she stated what should have been obvious: "In fact, your excellency, I think you no more believe these vicious lies than do I and I do not believe they are an accurate reflection of your government's outlook." The Christian Science Monitor reported on October 16, 1981, that many U.N. diplomats thought this letter a mere "tempest in a teapot [and] many moderate nonaligned diplomats shrugged off her statement as rhetoric. They believe that rhetoric is part of the political game at the U.N."

¹⁶ Finger, op. cit., p. 30.

¹⁷ Far Eastern Economic Review, July 23, 1982.

¹⁸ For a description of the entire Generalized System of Preferences instituted to benefit less developed nations, see William R. Cline, editor, Policy Alternatives for a New International Economic Order: An Economic Analysis, pp. 219-248 and pp. 333-351.

¹⁹ Cited by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan in the Congressional Record, October 22, 1981.

Though rhetoric indeed may be part of the game, it is a very serious game. By ignoring it for so many years, the U.S. sacrificed important ground in the U.N. Only now does the U.S. Mission appreciate the importance of rhetoric in shaping the U.N.'s political culture. For this reason the U.S. should continue responding to rhetorical assaults.

BEYOND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

With the General Assembly as the U.N. focal point, its political culture inevitably spills over into the rest of the U.N. system. South Africa, for example, illustrates the many dimensions of the U.N.'s consistent effort to isolate a member state from all of the U.N.'s activities. As far back as 1963, the U.N.'s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) had decided to suspend South Africa from participation in the work of the Economic Commission for Africa. This had been the first instance of suspension or expulsion of a member state from a permanent subsidiary organ of the U.N. Five years later, at the 1,238th meeting of the Second (Economic) Committee of the General Assembly, Upper Volta moved to suspend South Africa from UNCTAD.²⁰ The resolution was rushed to a vote even before the Committee had an opportunity to consider, at Denmark's urging, the opinion of the Legal Counsel. It was adopted by a vote of 49 to 22, with 23 abstentions.

The Legal Counsel's eventual opinion cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of Upper Volta's resolution, arguing that, while the General Assembly could set up committees of limited membership, it could not establish a committee open to all member nations--such as UNCTAD--and then exclude one or more of them from activity.²¹

Yet the rules at the U.N. are often at the mercy of majority interpretation, as are considerations of what is relevant in a particular forum. Walter Berns, Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who attended a U.N. seminar on human rights, was offered a lesson in the U.N.'s political culture when he objected to a definition of "human rights" that, for example, allowed for doing away with freedom of the press:

Cuba's answer to this is that, unlike 1945, the U.N. now represents the majority of the world's people, so it can say what human rights are--and the U.S. better get used to it. Syria denounces Israel, and we adjourn for lunch. Resuming at 3:40, Czechoslovakia, in the

²⁰ A/C.2/L. 1022. The draft resolution also endorsed UNCTAD's Resolution 26(II) suspending South Africa. For text see Proceedings of UNCTAD, second session, vol. I, annex I, p. 56.

²¹ For text see A/C.2/L. 1030, December 2, 1968.

person of a rather attractive young woman, gives its version of the Soviet line, but gives it in English.²²

Another issue that pervades U.N. activities almost as much as South Africa and the Middle East is the New International Economic Order. The latest move is to bring the NIEO into the space age. In August 1982, the U.N. is holding a "Unispace 82" conference, which promises to be another propaganda circus. It is being staged by the same nations that have already pushed the Moon Treaty, the Law of the Sea Treaty, and other preparations for a new world economic order. Their goal is to gain the benefits of technology developed in the industrialized nations--by international fiat rather than free trade.

The Third World aims to establish a U.N. agency to monitor and govern all space activities. Dr. Jerry Grey, who in January was appointed deputy secretary-general for the conference, observes that "these U.N. conferences are political in nature, not technical." Yet at previous meetings the U.S. has limited itself almost exclusively to technical presentations, which resulted in both the USSR and the Third World scoring political and propaganda victories at, Dr. Grey believes, America's expense.

The U.S. successfully resisted the attacks on free enterprise implicit in the Law of the Sea Treaty by refusing to sign it.²³ But on other occasions, the U.S. has not been so wise. What Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has called "the blindness of American diplomacy" involved ignoring attacks on American and, in general, capitalist achievements. One notable example is a document of the Economic and Social Council entitled "World Social Report," which first appeared in 1963. Over the years, notes Moynihan:

it was becoming a document based on the veritably totalitarian idea that social justice means social stability and that social stability means the absence of social protest. Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union--not much social protest there!--emerges as the very embodiment of the just state, while the U.S. is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protest these injustices have provoked. And Western Europe hardly comes off any better.²⁴

Evidently, the U.N. Secretariat, which produced the document, showed the developing and the Communist countries in a good light, the result of what Moynihan calls a "Finlandization" of

²² "Where the Majority Rules: A U.N. Diary," The American Spectator, vol. 14, no. 11, November 1981, p. 8.

²³ Roger A. Brooks, "The Law of the Sea Treaty: Can the U.S. Afford to Sign?" Heritage Foundation Background #188.

²⁴ "The U.S. in Opposition," Commentary, March 1975, pp. 5-6.

the Secretariat. Interviews with Secretariat officials who wish to remain anonymous do, indeed, indicate that there is near unanimous support for the U.N. as a Third World forum, where developing countries should be treated by the U.S. with tolerance even when there is strident, exaggerated criticism of the U.S. Moynihan comments: "Complacency of this order could only arise from the failure to perceive that a distinctive ideology was at work, and that skill and intelligence were required to deal with it successfully."²⁵

Another example is the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome. Though convened mainly at American initiative, it turned into a plenary forum by the less developed countries for blasting the U.S.--the major source of the world's surplus food supply--as responsible for the current food crisis. Proclaimed India's Food Minister: "It is obvious that the developed nations can be held responsible for [the developing nations'] present plight." Whatever help comes from the developed West, therefore, is not a matter of generosity but of entitlement.

Among the Third World's most effective U.N. instruments are the ad hoc "investigating bodies." Seldom do they investigate anything; their missions are determined from the outset.²⁶ A careful reading of the records shows, for example, that, whenever the U.N. voted to inquire into allegations of misdeeds by Israel and to create fact-finding bodies to examine the facts and verify the conditions, Israel always stood condemned by the very resolution that ordered the inquiry; the issues were almost always prejudged, the allegations set forth as proved facts, and the members of the fact-finding bodies appointed despite their bias. An early example is General Assembly Resolution 2443 (XXIII) of December 19, 1968, which practically dictated the conclusions of the Committee. Indeed, the resolution adopted the following sections from an earlier--May 7, 1968--resolution, which

- (a) Expressed its grave concern at the violation of human rights in Arab territories occupied by Israel.
- (b) Drew the attention of the Government of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from the disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in occupied territories.
- (c) Called upon the Government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population....

²⁵ Ibid., p. 36.

²⁶ As former Human Rights Commission Chairman, Felix Ermacora, has pointed out: "in the present [U.N.] system there is no objective search for or choice of persons having the personal qualities to work in an investigation commission." Cited in Juliana Geron Pilon, "The U.N. and Human Rights: The Double Standard," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder #183, p. 9.

In short, it condemned even before investigating. So biased was the resolution that uncommitted member states refused to serve on the Special Committee. The President of the General Assembly ended up appointing members from Ceylon, Somalia, and Yugoslavia, none of which had diplomatic relations with Israel--indeed, Somalia did not even recognize the right of Israel to independence and sovereignty.

Some U.N. reports are not intended for reading. One example is Section III of a report entitled "Military and Nuclear Collaboration" [with South Africa], which was meant to show that Israel and South Africa collaborate on nuclear weapons. In fact, the report contains no such information whatsoever. There is not one word about nuclear collaboration between Israel and South Africa, strongly intimating that such collaboration cannot be documented because it does not exist. It exists only in the title and in the table of contents of the Committee's report, presumably because the Committee no longer expects anyone to read the report or take it seriously.

Yet this did not stop Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Benin, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Jordan, Laos, Libya, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Syria, Uganda, Tanzania, Vietnam, and Zambia from sponsoring a resolution expressing grave concern over the "persistence of Israel in escalating its collaboration and strengthening its relations with the racist regime of South Africa." The resolution was adopted on January 24, 1979, by a vote of 82 to 18 with 28 abstentions.

Misuse of information is not uncommon in the U.N. system. In May 1981, the U.N. admitted funneling \$432,000 to fifteen foreign newspapers that ran supplements promoting its views on the economic needs of the Third World.²⁷ This is surely but the tip of political efforts by developing countries, with the aid of the Soviet bloc, to use the U.N. to reshape world opinion. As Rita Stollman reported in Business Week on July 20, 1981, the evidence is mounting that the U.N.'s \$300 million-plus economic research programs are being manipulated to promote the New International Economic Order. Tampering with research appears to be pervasive. The director of the Manufacturers Division of the Geneva-based UNCTAD, for example, deleted an entire section of a consultant's 1979 study on structural problems in the slow-growth steel industry because it painted too negative a scenario for

²⁷ The U.N. Department of Public Information paid fifteen top foreign newspapers, including the prestigious left wing Le Monde, to publish propaganda articles advocating economic, social, and political proposals that would favor the Third World. A \$1,250,000 slush fund given by a Japanese multimillionaire for the propaganda operation was taken by the U.N. Department of Public Information in violation of Article 100 of Chapter XV of the U.N. Charter which prohibits the Secretariat from seeking or receiving instructions (or funds) from any outside source.

less developed countries' steel producers. The Future of the World Economy, a major study by a research team led by Nobel laureate, Wassily W. Leontief of New York University, was altered by a high-level Soviet official in the New York-based Economic and Social Affairs Department of the U.N. Secretariat. The study was changed to show much higher potential growth rates and a rosier economic situation than the data originally indicated.

During the Law of the Sea Conference in 1977, a staff report was suppressed that showed that, if private firms were to mine the seabed, then copper-producing countries would not lose as much market share as they were claiming. Elliott L. Richardson, President Carter's special representative to the Conference, shed some light on the reason why the report was spiked: the copper-rich less-developed countries, he said, had complained about the results.

Harvard University economist Hendrik S. Houthakker admits: "Frankly, I don't pay much attention to U.N. research today because I know much of it is propaganda." He contends that in 1975 UNCTAD officials tried to stymie a U.N. study that he was supervising because it contradicted the widely held belief that the prices of manufactured goods imported by poor countries always rise much faster than the prices they get for their exports. Houthakker appealed successfully directly to Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim. But few seem to be as lucky as Houthakker. Economist Ingo Walter of New York University stopped working for UNCTAD in 1980 because "I could no longer recognize my work by the time it was published." Rangaswami Krishnamurti, a former high-ranking UNCTAD official who often supervised Walter's work, acknowledged that many of these changes were made to reflect "the very substantial differences of view and approach among many Third World and Western economists."

By prescribing a specific outcome for the U.N.'s economic studies, the political culture may be flattering the Third World. But it is doing the underdeveloped states no favor. By telling these countries only what they want to hear, the U.N.'s political culture is preventing their receiving the kind of tough advice and bitter medicine that is required for a sound strategy of economic growth.

EVOLUTION OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE

The Cast--A General Profile

The U.N. is inevitably a function of its members, not simply its member states but the cast of characters who represent those states. On occasion, there is disagreement between the Missions in New York and their home governments. This has been true since the U.N.'s inception. In 1963, when the Japanese representative Kakitsuba said that "there is only one real class struggle nowadays--the struggle between the governments and their missions,"

he reportedly "gave everyone a good laugh, precisely because there was a grain of truth in it."²⁸

The tapestry of the U.N.'s political culture is woven mostly behind the scenes, primarily in the Delegates' Lounge--a spacious room on the second floor of the U.N. building. Writes Seymour Finger:

The Delegates' Lounge is full of valuable contacts, especially just before and just after lunch. There, individual brief contacts can frequently be made with four or five delegates in half an hour, faster and more effectively than by any other means. During my years as minister counselor, we made "lounge assignments" to make sure someone was there at all times, and many of us made frequent forays. The lounge is probably the best place to use antennas, but it offers only one of the many opportunities that must be used if the U.S. is to reach out effectively, as it must.²⁹

Certainly the most important part of the General Assembly's work takes place before a resolution is actually brought to a vote, in what is commonly known as "the kitchen": when the delegates are approached in elevators, at dinner parties, even in the men's rooms, to bargain on votes, compromise on wording of a controversial paragraph, or just gossip that brings political dividends. Individual ambitions and vulnerabilities play an important role in this. The Soviet Union, for instance, is very adept at keeping track of the career hopes of various representatives, especially those from the smaller nations.³⁰ For them, a career at the U.N. offers high pay and high living in Manhattan. Moscow uses its control of several U.N. administrative units to influence or delay the promotion of a Third World colleague, depending on that colleague's political usefulness. To ignore this fact, or that the international bureaucracy is as full of intrigue and as much the scene of cutthroat competition as is any national civil service, is simply naive.

The Western Minority

The West usually commands about 20 votes out of the U.N.'s total 157. At the core are the European "10." Yet there are divisions within that group. Though three Scandinavian countries--Norway, Denmark, and Iceland--are NATO members, they generally seem influenced more by neutralist Sweden than by the U.S. Carl Gershman, Advisor at the U.S. Mission to the U.N., expressed his dismay that the European members of the Human Rights Commission

²⁸ Finger, op. cit., p. 36.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Eilan, "[The Soviet Union and] Conference Diplomacy," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1981, pp. 25-26.

in March 1982, would criticize the Soviet Union only if they also condemned El Salvador. Gershman sees this, rightfully, as a glaring, and probably hypocritical, disregard for the differences. As one U.S. participant at the Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva stated, many of his Western European colleagues appeared to lack philosophical commitment and were either cynical about the U.N. or utterly discouraged by it. A member of the West German Mission admitted that the average tenure at his Mission is about three years: "Most people do not want to stay longer because they are frustrated by the fact that the votes appear to be 'locked in' at the U.N."

Another dimension that might explain the behavior of the Europeans at the U.N. was revealed in a discussion recorded in a secret document captured by the Israelis in Lebanon in June 1982. This discussion was between PLO leader Yaser Arafat and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and took place in Moscow on November 13, 1979. Said Arafat:

Our [PLO] activity in Europe is based on Europe's need for Arab oil. Oil has not yet been introduced as a factor in the battle, but there is apprehension of that there. Some of the Arab states help us in this respect.³¹

The Europeans are aware that the major force at the U.N. is the group of so-called "nonaligned" nations, which have embraced the PLO as one of their members.

The Nonaligned

An Asian diplomat, who wishes to remain anonymous for fear of Soviet reprisals against his country, observes that the developing countries usually side with the Soviet Union, even though many realize that Moscow does not always help them. He admits that the June 1982 meeting of the nonaligned in Havana saw some Third World states taking the Soviet Union to task for giving them almost nothing in foreign aid. They also objected to the fact that the USSR contributes to the U.N. Development Program in rubles, a nonconvertible currency good mainly to buy Soviet products. The Soviets were unmoved. Yet the bond between the Communist bloc and the less developed nations is strong even though their interests do not always coincide. They share an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology.

Political scientist Richard E. Bissell of the University of Pennsylvania explains that "most concessions to anti-capitalist unity mean little in operational terms."³² At the 1968 meeting

³¹ Protocol of Talks Between PLO and Soviet Delegations in Moscow, November 13, 1979, Document captured by Israel's army in Lebanon, June 1982.

³² Richard Bissell, "The Fourth World at the U.N.," The World Today, September 1975, p. 377.

of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, for instance, the USSR magnanimously eliminated all tariffs on products from the lesser developed countries; what was not stated was that the effect of tariffs on the state controlled price mechanism in the USSR is nil. The affinity between the Third World and the Soviet Union, however, goes even beyond philosophy and such issues as foreign aid. Writes veteran U.N. observer Arie Eilan:

this fact has wider implications than the mere use of similar political clichés in speeches and resolutions; it has affected the practice of parliamentary democracy in the U.N. and has gradually destroyed all claims of objective adjudication that its [the U.N.'s] Charter so clearly stipulates.³³

The pro-Soviet lobby, apart from clients such as Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Vietnam, consists also of countries whose relationship with the USSR is more tenuous but which, for a variety of reasons, end up adopting a political stance that is more clearly anti-Western than it is pro-Soviet. The hesitations, reservations, and sometimes downright opposition of some of the 92 nonaligned states to the wording of Soviet engineered resolutions, however, are rarely reflected in the final text. The decision-making process known as "democratic centralism" was well demonstrated at the 1979 meeting of the nonaligned in Havana. The text of the conference's official declaration was hammered out in all-day and all-night sessions of the political committee, where the Cubans and their allies succeeded in exhausting their opponents and placating them with marginal concessions. Also during the conference, Cuba kept the roster of speakers a closely guarded secret and gave priority to ideological friends.³⁴

The right to dissent, inherent in the voting system of the U.N., essentially is frowned upon in the nonaligned movement. Some of the resolutions of the nonaligned meetings are then presented as draft resolutions at the General Assembly, since the U.N. is the movement's main stage of operation and almost the only venue where its collective strength is of political consequence.

The result is a remarkably pro-Soviet voting pattern at the U.N. among the nonaligned. The percentage of support for the Soviet Union during the 1981 General Assembly shows overall agreement to be 84.9 percent (compared with 25 percent average agreement with the U.S.). Keeping in mind that the U.S. and the Soviet Union voted together only 17.6 percent of the time (usually on matters involving the U.N. budget or on efforts to revise the

³³ Arie Eilan, "Soviet Hegemonism and the Nonaligned," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1981, p. 98.

³⁴ K. P. Misra, "Burma's Farewell to the Nonaligned Movement," Asian Affairs, vol. XII, Part I, February 1981, p. 56.

U.N. Charter), this is an alarming illustration of the isolation the U.S. faces at the U.N. today.

36TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1981:
VOTING PATTERNS OF NONALIGNED MEMBERS

	Agreement with USSR	Agreement with U.S.
	(in percentages)	
Vietnam	99.6	11.2
Laos	99.5	13.1
Seychelles	98.4	8.6
Afghanistan	97.3	12.2
Cuba	94.4	11.6
Cape Verde	93.7	15.3
South Yemen	91.9	13.4
Mozambique	91.6	11.2
Angola	91.5	16.9
Zimbabwe	91.1	18.1
Sao Tome	90.9	15.7
Botswana	90.8	28.6
Syria	90.0	15.2
Guyana	89.3	21.2
Ethiopia	89.0	17.1
Madagascar	89.0	18.6
Algeria	88.7	13.9
Lebanon	88.7	24.5
Benin	88.6	17.1
Chad	88.5	21.6
Congo	88.1	17.0
Comoros	88.1	28.3
Libya	88.0	14.1
Nicaragua	87.8	19.0
Guinea Bissau	87.8	19.7
Tanzania	87.5	17.1
Grenada	87.5	16.9
Cyprus	87.4	20.9
Bhutan	87.3	24.8
Djibouti	87.0	22.1
Iraq	86.9	18.7
India	86.3	18.8
Iran	86.2	19.0
Malta	86.2	26.0
Yugoslavia	86.1	21.1
Bahrain	86.1	21.2
North Yemen	86.0	20.1
Guinea	85.8	19.8
Ruwanda	85.5	25.4
Equatorial Guinea	85.4	33.3
Burundi	85.3	23.6
Mali	85.2	23.4
Jordan	85.1	21.9
Nepal	84.8	29.4
Kuwait	84.7	20.9

Uganda	84.6	22.4
Qatar	84.6	24.4
Mauritania	84.5	22.2
Surinam	84.4	25.0
Trinidad/Tobago	84.3	26.5
Cameroon	84.3	24.6
Saudi Arabia	84.3	25.6
Emirates	84.2	22.3
Niger	83.9	28.2
Zambia	83.8	26.3
Sierra Leone	83.6	20.7
Sri Lanka	83.6	28.0
Oman	83.3	24.9
Maldives	83.3	28.1
Kenya	83.0	26.0
Swaziland	83.0	31.1
Bangladesh	82.9	28.2
Lesotho	82.4	27.1
Mauritius	82.2	27.5
Ecuador	81.9	27.6
Indonesia	81.7	27.0
St. Lucia	81.6	28.9
Argentina	81.5	30.0
Ivory Coast	81.5	32.2
Sudan	81.4	28.6
Somalia	81.1	31.8
Nigeria	81.0	27.8
Gambia	80.9	24.8
Ghana	80.8	30.8
Egypt	80.8	29.1
Kampuchea	80.8	34.4
Tunisia	80.7	29.2
Pakistan	80.6	26.5
Gabon	80.4	31.4
Malaysia	80.3	32.8
Peru	80.0	31.4
Belize	80.0	30.4
Panama	79.5	27.4
Upper Volta	79.4	29.9
Togo	79.1	30.6
Central Africa	78.3	34.1
Senegal	77.5	35.4
Singapore	77.5	40.1
Zaire	77.0	36.9
Morocco	76.8	36.6
Bolivia	75.7	42.0
Jamaica	74.9	39.7
Liberia	73.7	33.9
Malawi	64.9	47.2

A list not devoid of surprises. In Africa: New Guinea is currently urging stepped-up American private investment, yet it voted with the U.S. 19.9 percent of the time and with Moscow 85.8

percent. Tanzania, a pro-Chinese dictatorship that lies in virtual economic ruin, received over \$37 million in economic assistance from the U.S. in 1981. Yet Tanzania voted with the U.S. only 17.1 percent and with Moscow 87.5 percent. Even militant Algeria received \$7 million in U.S. taxpayer subsidized Eximbank loans in 1981; Eximbank also loaned Angola a total of \$87.8 million during the past three years, in addition to \$10 million in economic grants. Mozambique received \$8.7 million in economic assistance from the U.S. in 1981. Yet Algeria voted with the U.S. 13.9 percent, Angola 16.9 percent, and Mozambique only 11.2 percent. Tunisia, which now wants the U.S. to sell it arms, received in 1981 \$39.8 million in economic aid alone, plus \$15.7 million in military assistance, and \$56.9 million in loans from Eximbank.

In Asia: Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are in most respects closer to the West than they are to the Soviet Union. Singapore's economy, for example, is often held up as an example of the success of free enterprise in the Third World. Pakistan, often considered to be a moderating influence in the nonaligned movement, receives a considerable amount of American aid: \$76.8 million in economic assistance in 1981 alone. Yet Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Pakistan seldom back the U.S. at the U.N. India, of course, is a notoriously anti-American recipient of U.S. largesse.

It is well known that the more moderate members of the nonaligned movement find it difficult to resist the militant Cubans. But some have the courage to stand up and protest. Burma left the movement in 1979 as a result of pressure from the radicals, with the following comment delivered on September 7, 1979:

The principles of the movement are not recognizable any more; they are not merely dim, they are dying....There are those among us who...deliberately exploit the movement to gain their own grand designs. We cannot allow ourselves to be exploited.³⁵

THE PARIAHS

South Africa

The ousting of South Africa from participation in the General Assembly in 1974 did not stop the U.N.'s campaign against that member state. On March 23, 1977, the Permanent Representative of Yugoslavia declared:

³⁵ Misra, op. cit., p. 53.

Racism, apartheid and oppression in Southern Africa represent a violation of fundamental human rights and principles of justice and freedom and constitute a threat to peace and international security.³⁶

Yet when Western states raise questions about violations of fundamental human rights in a Communist country, the government under attack proceeds to cite Article 2 (7) of the U.N. Charter which states that the U.N. is not authorized "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."

The U.N.'s campaign against South Africa represents a clear departure from the its original mandate. The debate that took place in the General Assembly in Autumn of 1976 is indicative of the problem: the ninth resolution in a series of ten on South Africa adopted on November 9, 1976, denounced the Pretoria regime as illegitimate and reaffirmed the status of the NLMs now recognized by the Organization of African Unity--the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan African Congress--as the authentic representatives of the people of South Africa. Indeed, the resolution endorsed the commitment of both these groups to seizure of power by "all possible means," including armed struggle. This is hardly in line with the U.N.'s original categorical opposition to the use of force.

The resolution, moreover, called upon France, the United Kingdom, and the U.S. not to "misuse" their veto power in the Security Council by shielding the government of South Africa. Notwithstanding the over 100 vetoes it cast prior to 1961, the Soviet Union has never been accused of "misusing" its power, for that would have been to violate the U.N.'s "rules of the game."

The U.N.'s anti-South African campaign was furthered during the 1981 session of the General Assembly, when South Africa was abused in 61 of the initial 108 meetings and 45 resolutions were adopted against it: also, 283 Plenary speeches dealt with Namibia and 70 with apartheid. Fifteen subsidiary programs, organs, and funds against the present South African government exist at the U.N., while five days are set aside each year in solidarity with the "struggling people" of South Africa, and no less than three special weeks dedicated to the same purpose. In all, 200 full-time Secretariat officials work almost exclusively against South Africa, a campaign with a total estimated U.N. funding of \$40 million a year.

At a time when Soviet troops were marching through Afghanistan, Vietnamese forces laying waste to much of Kampuchea and Laos, and Iraqi and Iranian ferociously battling each other, were the internal affairs of South Africa really the most urgent item

³⁶ S/PV. 1990, p. 23.

on the U.N. agenda? Yet South Africa nearly monopolized that agenda.

Israel

One of the most significant steps against Israel was taken in the wake of the November 13, 1974, appearance of PLO leader Yasser Arafat at the General Assembly podium. Arafat's reception was enthusiastic. His speech was followed by two resolutions: the first, A/L.741, requested "the Secretary-General to establish contact with the PLO on all matters concerning the question of Palestine"; the second, A/L.742, invited the PLO "to participate as an observer under the auspices of other organs of the U.N." This despite the fact that the PLO refuses to recognize the right to exist of Israel--a member state of the U.N. PLO representative Al-Kaddumi, the final speaker at the debate, stated:

We did not come here to seek reconciliation with the Zionist terrorists and usurpers. We came here to bear witness to the historic difference between us and the Zionists. We regard diplomatic activities as a complement to our activities on the battlefield.³⁷

On November 10, 1975, Zionism was castigated in the General Assembly by Resolution 3379(XXX) without any scholarly consideration of the "Zionism is racism" equation. The various documents cited by the resolution's sponsors by way of "proof" were either irrelevant or simply previous assertions of that equation in various forums dominated by the Third World.³⁸ It is remarkable indeed that Zionism could have come to be equated with a doctrine that nearly annihilated the Jewish people; Orwellianism obviously was being carried to astonishing heights.

Since 1975, the U.N. majority has escalated its attacks on Israel. About 40 resolutions passed by the 36th General Assembly dealt with the Middle East, invariably chastising the state of Israel. No mention is ever made in any U.N. resolution of PLO attacks on Israeli civilians, including women and children. At the same time, the U.S. is constantly attacked for its support of Israel. At the Seventh Emergency Special Session on Palestine resumed in April 1982, after no less than two years, Representative Abdallah S. Ashtal of Democratic Yemen stated that U.S. policy for the Middle East was made in Tel Aviv, not in Washington. He accused U.S. diplomacy in the Middle East of showing utter "disregard and disdain for the international community."³⁹ He then echoed the statement made by Representative Ali Treki of Libya who warned the U.S. not to "sacrifice the world" for the sake of

³⁷ A/PV. 2296, pp. 117-118.

³⁸ See Moskowitz, op. cit., pp. 142-149, for a thorough discussion of the issue.

³⁹ Press release GA/6575, April 26, 1982, p. 3.

Israel, urging the General Assembly to expel "the Zionist entity" from the U.N. Mohammad Zarif of Afghanistan accused the U.S. of encouraging Israeli aggressiveness by modern weaponry. No one expected Mr. Zarif to denounce the government that was waging war against his own countrymen. Instead, the representative of that government, Oleg Troyanovsky, brazenly accused the U.S. of imposing "diktat" on the peoples of the Middle East in order to control their natural resources.

The 1980 meeting of the Seventh Emergency Special Session illustrates one of the latest most effective tactics used by Third World nations to bring into the limelight issues of political significance to them.⁴⁰ This Session, described by a senior U.N. official as a "pre-arranged emergency," was, in fact, decided on in 1979 at the Havana meeting of the nonaligned at PLO insistence. A subsequent U.S. veto on April 30, 1980, of a nonaligned Security Council resolution on Palestinian rights provided a pretext for the resumption of the Session. The meeting, however, was not requested until June--hardly an "emergency." At the conclusion of the meeting, the nonaligned--again led by the PLO--further prevailed in adopting a formula whereby the Seventh Emergency Special Session would not be formally closed and could be reconvened at any time by request of the members. This device provided an open-ended authority which the nonaligned exploited two years later during the April 1982 meeting of the nonaligned countries in Kuwait when they decided to resume the session later that month. Resumption after two years proved to be little more than a continuation of the earlier pre-arranged emergency, and the meeting was again left open-ended, giving the Assembly a pretext to convene at any time on issues of the Middle East.

The propaganda function of the U.N. for the purpose of mobilizing public opinion against Israel, especially in the U.S., was clearly outlined by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Boris N. Ponomarev, in his secret discussion with Yasser Arafat on November 13, 1979:

You raised the subject of consultations on this matter [of the U.N. debate on Palestine]. We always asked you to consult us on this subject. It is very important that we know in advance the steps of the adversaries in the U.N. and will know how to exploit the U.N. stage by

⁴⁰ The "emergency special session" is a procedure whereby the General Assembly can meet on 24-hour notice at the request of nine Council members or a majority of the Assembly after a veto on an important issue or failure by the Council to obtain the necessary majority. Five such sessions were held before 1967 and four since 1980. The procedure, "Uniting for Peace," was initiated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950 following paralysis of the Council from 1946-1950 by multiple Soviet vetoes, and was designed to break deadlocks in the Council over issues involving a threat or breach to peace or act of aggression.

exposing aggressive actions which Israel conducts in South Lebanon. It cannot be condemned inside Israel, but in the U.S. Israel has friends and there is utility in campaigning to expose Israel's actions against elderly people and children, while using all means of propaganda.⁴¹

The Soviet Union is well aware of the uses of propaganda alongside financial and military training for its allies. In exchange, the PLO became the coordinator of the international terrorist network: as Arafat stated in January 1982, the PLO guerrillas have been serving in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Angola.⁴²

Chile

The overthrow of Chile's Marxist President Salvador Allende has become a hot item at the U.N. The ruling Pinochet regime is nearly as popular as South Africa as a U.N. majority punching bag. Chile's trade with South Africa, for instance, is condemned whenever possible, despite the fact that many other nations trade with South Africa as well, including "nonimperialist" USSR and Zimbabwe.

The campaign against Chile started at the Commission on Human Rights in 1974. Since then, it has not abated: the human rights situation in Chile has been a "special item" on the agenda of the Commission--Item 5. A Special Rapporteur, who produces a lengthy document on Chile each year, appears to have become a permanent fixture at the U.N., even though the human rights situation in Chile has definitely improved since 1974. What is worse, this Rapporteur--Abdulah Dieye of Senegal--has overstepped the bounds of his authority: rather than confining himself to fact finding, he offers (unsolicited) advice to member states. For example, when several Western nations tried to remove Chile from its "special item" category, the Rapporteur presumed to advise against it.

The politicization of the Chilean case became evident as early as 1974. It prompted the representative of Costa Rica, for example, to question whether the General Assembly resolution of that year "had been inspired by purely humanitarian objectives or by a genuine concern for human rights in Chile." For his impression was otherwise. In his opinion, "the 1975 debate undoubtedly showed that the treatment of human rights in Chile had been influenced by political publicity aimed at well-defined political goals."⁴³

⁴¹ See footnote 31.

⁴² Wall Street Journal, January 14, 1982. Arafat's claim is supported by documents captured by the Israelis in Lebanon in June 1982.

⁴³ A/C.3/SR.2155, p. 243

The evidence used to castigate Chile is often far from unobjectionable. The Council on Namibia Report for 1981, for example, charges the Chilean government with sending mercenaries to South Africa; yet the only evidence for this charge was produced by a SWAPO representative.

Chile was condemned at the March 1982 meeting of the Human Rights Committee as a "military dictatorship" by countries whose own record is considerably worse. Freedom House, in its 1981 report, ranks Chile as "partly free"--indeed, "as free as Tunisia, freer than Czechoslovakia" or than any other totalitarian country pointing its finger at Chile for holding allegedly undemocratic elections.

It seems that the Chilean question has been turned into a campaign of the international class war of "the people" vs. the "imperialist" forces. The pariah states at the U.N. have become well defined; the East German representative stated clearly that

the competence of the U.N. and the legitimacy of international concern were quite different in such cases as South Africa, Chile, and the territories occupied by Israel, where the gross and systematic violation of human rights created a situation likely to impair friendly relations between nations or endanger peace.⁴⁴

Evidently, Chile is now a permanent member of the pariah group at the U.N.

CONCLUSION

In an attempt to explain the bizarre reality in which the U.S., despite having virtually invented foreign aid, is constantly castigated at the U.N. alongside such pariahs as South Africa, Israel, and Chile, Ambassador Kirkpatrick speculated in a June 7, 1982, speech that "it is due to our lack of skill in practicing international politics in multilateral arenas." For one thing, she believes that "we have not been effective in defining or projecting in international arenas a conception of our national purpose." That should be an unqualified priority. It is essential that the world know what the U.S. stands for. The basic rights of life, liberty, and property, articulated by the English philosopher John Locke in the 17th century, which inspired the Founding Fathers of the U.S., should be defended with no apologies. In addition, the U.S. must start playing international politics with greater skill.

-- The U.S. must recognize that rhetoric is not insignificant. Ambassador Kirkpatrick's letter to the less radical leaders of

⁴⁴ E/AC.7/SR.780, p. 3.

the nonaligned movement, protesting its Orwellian contempt for reality, should provide an example.

-- As a sign of respect for the cost of rhetorical capitulation, the U.S. must resist the "semantic infiltration" to which it has succumbed so often. That term was defined by Dr. Fred Charles Ikle, former director of the Arms Control Agency, as a process whereby we come to adopt the language of our adversaries in describing political reality.⁴⁵ For example, the U.S. should stop referring to terrorist groups such as SWAPO as "national liberation movements."

-- The nations of the Third World should be reminded of the excellent record of free enterprise. Ronald Reagan's message urging Western nations to help poor countries learn how to create their own wealth, rather than merely accept hand-outs from their more successful neighbors, should be articulated ably and compassionately. Many Third World representatives have shown receptivity to these arguments.

-- Any evidence that the U.N. tampers with data and statistics should meet with forceful U.S. response, including cutting off funds to organizations that indulge in such practices.

-- Participation in the General Assembly, as well as other U.N. forums, such as the International Women's Conferences, should be reconsidered very carefully, and severely streamlined. Charles Lichenstein, a member of the U.S. Mission to the U.N., complains that the U.S. has not been sufficiently selective about its participation in the U.N.: "all too often, we have been at the mercy of the majority." Short of pulling out of the General Assembly, the U.S. might decide to participate in only a fraction of its meetings. When it does participate, however, the U.S. should use the forum to express its opinions strongly and clearly.

-- The U.S. Congress should investigate charges of politicization throughout the U.N.

There seems to be no reason why the U.S. should simply capitulate to the political culture of the U.N. and be forced to play by its Orwellian rules of the game. Those rules should be exposed; for the inflammatory rhetoric and the tactics of harassment on the part of the radical leaders of the U.N. majority can only exacerbate, not solve international conflicts.

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Policy Analyst

⁴⁵ Cited in Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "Words and Foreign Policy," Policy Review #6, Fall 1978, p. 69. See also his "Further Thoughts on Words and Foreign Policy," Policy Review #8, Spring 1979, pp. 53-59.