

October 27, 1983

MISSILES IN EUROPE: THE CASE FOR DEPLOYMENT

INTRODUCTION

Barring a last-minute agreement at the negotiating table in Geneva, NATO governments will initiate their intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization program this December, as they agreed to four years ago. Fierce opposition by some Europeans to INF deployment of the first batch of missiles in three NATO countries will be a critical test of the Alliance's political resolve and cohesion.¹ Yet there is no reason to postpone the initial deployment.

To the contrary. There are compelling political and military reasons why deployment must proceed as scheduled. Only the arms control process will determine whether the full complement of 108 Pershing IIs and 462 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) will eventually be stationed in Western Europe. The new negotiating proposal outlined by President Reagan in his address to the United Nations on September 26, 1983, offers a good platform for further negotiations and displays a high degree of flexibility on the part of the Alliance.²

¹ The political symbolism of the need to implement the deployment decision was underscored by West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl's statement: "If we break our word, we would plant the seeds for the destruction of NATO." The Daily Telegraph, September 19, 1983, p. 5.

² In his address to the United Nations, President Reagan modified the U.S. negotiating position. He dropped U.S. insistence on an equal number of U.S. and Soviet missiles in Europe and indicated that the U.S. might deploy the difference elsewhere. He also noted that the U.S. is prepared to accept fewer than the maximum number of Pershing II missiles. The New York Times, September 27, 1983, p. A16.

Deferring INF deployment would engender serious discord among the allies and likely unravel the carefully balanced deployment scheme. It would embolden the opposition forces in many NATO countries to intensify their pressures for unilateral Western concessions that would weaken further NATO's deterrence to the growing Soviet European theater nuclear threat. To postpone deployment at this juncture, moreover, would cast doubts on NATO's ability to sustain politically indispensable military force posture decisions. It would also reward Soviet intransigence at the negotiations in Geneva, indicate Western susceptibility to Soviet propaganda, and confer upon Moscow a de facto veto over NATO's military planning. This would eliminate whatever incentives the Soviets may have to reach arms control agreements, whether on INFs or strategic forces.

The case for INF deployment, in fact, is even more compelling today than it was when NATO adopted its "two-track approach" of modernizing its INFs while simultaneously seeking an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.³ Using the same criteria that NATO applied in 1979, the number of missiles that NATO should be deploying ought to be much higher than it is. Soviet SS-20s have tripled since 1979, while Moscow has not dismantled older SS-5s and SS-4s at the pace of SS-20 deployment. In addition, the Soviets have enhanced their shorter-range nuclear capabilities by deploying a new family of missiles and advanced technology nuclear-capable aircraft. The Soviets also have increased their conventional capabilities--numerically and qualitatively. The combined effect of this Soviet military buildup has been to so erode NATO's deterrence posture that it is about to lose credibility.⁴ The NATO deployment of new missiles is not to increase the West's threat to the Soviet Union. Rather it is to offset--and only partially--an increasing new threat from the Soviets. NATO's INF, at most, is a slow minimal reaction to a buildup that Moscow launched a half-dozen years ago.

THEATER NUCLEAR BALANCE ESSENTIAL TO NATO DOCTRINE

NATO's dual-track decision of 1979 culminated two years of NATO studies of the implications for nuclear doctrine and force posture of changes in the international strategic environment.⁵

³ For a detailed discussion of the evolution of NATO's deployment decision, see The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, December 31, 1980, pp. 15-36.

⁴ Lawrence Freedman, "Nato Myths," Foreign Policy (Winter 1981-82), pp. 48-69 and Francois de Rose, "Updating Deterrence in Europe: Inflexible Response?" Survival, March/April 1982, pp. 12-23.

⁵ Uwe Nerlich, "Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: Is NATO Running out of Options?" The Washington Quarterly, Winter 1980, pp. 100-124. The evolution of NATO's nuclear strategy to cope with the nuclear dilemmas of the alliance is discussed well in David N. Schwartz, NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1983).

These studies were initiated in response to growing European fears that strategic arms control agreements, such as SALT, and the Soviet buildup of theater nuclear forces would place European security interests seriously at risk. In part, the studies also were intended to defuse West European suspicions that the U.S. would sacrifice allied security interests for the sake of reaching a strategic agreement with the Soviet Union, or that the U.S. might not stand by Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt first drew attention to the impact of strategic nuclear parity as codified in SALT I when he told the North Atlantic Council on May 10, 1977, that "the SALT process may lead to a paralyzation of the Soviet and American central strategic forces."⁶ Six months later he voiced concern that "SALT magnifies the significance of the disparities between East and West in nuclear tactical and conventional weapons."⁷ These disparities were growing because of Soviet deployment of the TU-26 Backfire bomber and of the SS-20 missile, beginning in 1974 and 1977, respectively. Europeans were also alarmed by the Carter Administration's willingness to exempt the Backfire from SALT II while concurring to restrictions on the deployment of cruise missiles, a weapons system that Europeans hoped would offer a low-cost opportunity to rectify the growing theater nuclear imbalance on the European continent.⁸

Europeans clearly felt that the continued credibility of "extended deterrence" based on the American pledge to the nuclear defense of Western Europe was being undercut severely by strategic nuclear parity and the progressive development of a separate theater nuclear deterrence relationship in Europe. These factors spurred new concerns as the credibility of NATO's doctrine of "flexible response" was seen at stake.⁹

The U.S. and the West Europeans have never seen eye-to-eye on the role of nuclear weapons. Conscious of their geographic location on the faultline in any East-West military conflict, the West Europeans have sought consistently to commit the U.S. to a strategy of absolute deterrence based on early recourse to strategic nuclear weapons. Therefore, they have steadfastly refused to think beyond deterrence or to contemplate the operational use of theater nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Nor have they accepted such concepts as nuclear warfighting that have been increasingly stressed by U.S. strategists and found expression in

⁶ Chancellor Schmidt's speech was reprinted in Survival, July/ August 1977, pp. 177-178.

⁷ Reprinted in Survival, January/February 1978, pp. 2-11.

⁸ Richard Burt, "The Cruise Missile and Arms Control," Survival, January/February 1976, pp. 10-17.

⁹ Andrew Pierre, "Long-Range-Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe: The Primacy of Politics," in Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro, eds., Nuclear Weapons in Europe (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1983), pp. 39-48.

the Presidential Directive 59, issued in July 1980 by the Carter Administration.¹⁰

By contrast, U.S. officials more and more have sought military options designed to postpone as long as possible conflict escalation to the strategic nuclear level. Thus they have consistently stressed the need for military capabilities to deter war at all possible lower levels of engagement through what is called assured escalation dominance. This refers to NATO's ability to bring about an early termination of a military conflict on favorable terms by deliberately raising the level of conflict and then prevailing at that higher level.

When NATO adopted "flexible response" as its new doctrine in 1967, the allies struck an uneasy compromise between these two fundamentally contradictory approaches to nuclear deterrence. The doctrine was kept deliberately ambiguous with respect to the precise military requirements and operational concepts to be employed when escalating a conflict. In this respect, the doctrine accommodated the divergent interests of both sides to the extent they could be reconciled. Essentially, therefore, "flexible response" was a political compromise couched in military terms. It stated deterrence of aggression as its cardinal objective but, beyond this general observation, was so vague as to defy operational application.¹¹

The Europeans seemingly acknowledged the logical validity of U.S. insistence that a credible deterrent depended on the ability to meet aggression at any level of violence through a range of options across the entire spectrum of warfighting. With respect to their own contribution to NATO's deterrent, the Europeans accepted the need for stronger conventional forces to raise the nuclear threshold as well as to improve their battlefield capabilities. They thus concurred with the basic U.S. premise that to dominate the escalatory process, NATO must possess a panoply of nuclear systems short of strategic weapons, even though the actual use remained largely undefined.¹²

In practice, however, the West Europeans have never fully subscribed to "flexible response." Rather, they have pursued a

¹⁰ For a discussion of the evolution of the directive, see Colin S. Gray, "Presidential Directive 59: Flawed But Useful," Parameters, March 1981, pp. 29-37. Its implications for nuclear targeting are discussed in a historical context in Desmond Ball, "Targeting for Strategic Deterrence," Adelphi Papers, No. 185, 1982.

¹¹ Christopher Makins, "TNF Modernization and 'Countervailing Strategy'," Survival, July/August 1981, pp. 157-164.

¹² This ambiguity regarding the operational use of nuclear weapons is criticized by many strategists as one of the principal weaknesses of NATO's theater nuclear posture. See, for instance, Jeffrey Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The Real Issues, Special Report, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc., Boston, November 1981.

strategy of "conventional sufficiency," meaning they have sought to prolong their own inability to withstand Soviet conventional aggression without early recourse to nuclear escalation. This expressed their intentions of maintaining the near automaticity of escalation by the U.S. to the strategic nuclear level at which the U.S. and USSR attack each other directly with nuclear weapons, despite the changes of NATO's declaratory policy. In this sense, the Europeans continue to pursue a slightly modified version of "massive retaliation."¹³

THE CRITICS OF DEPLOYMENT

Due to the complex interpenetration of the political and military elements, NATO's INF decision has drawn criticism from groups spanning the entire ideological spectrum. The most destructive and politically potent criticism comes from those who challenge not only NATO's military strategy and continued reliance on nuclear deterrence but also seem to embrace a pacifism that prompts them to reject alliance with the U.S. and involvement in the systemic conflict between East and West. Though found also in the U.S., these critics are mainly in the European antinuclear movement. Composed of polyglot groups of largely leftist political orientation and varying intellectual backgrounds, this movement has dominated the antideployment campaign in Western Europe and now threatens to drive some NATO governments into advocating arms control agreements that critically erode NATO's force posture.¹⁴

The critics of deployment mount six main arguments:

- 1) The SS-20 Poses No New Threat to NATO.

It is contended that NATO has lived with the threat of Soviet long-range theater nuclear forces for a quarter century and that replacement of obsolete missiles by the Soviet Union does not increase this threat.¹⁵ This argument ignores the

¹³ The Modernization of NATO's Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

¹⁴ For a country-by-country analysis of the status of and pressures in the domestic debate, see Second Interim Report on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, prepared by the North Atlantic Assembly's Special Committee on Nuclear Weapons in Europe, A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, January 1983, pp. 34-58.

¹⁵ For this argument see, for instance, "Heading Off Disaster: The Need to Combine the INF and START Negotiations," The Defense Monitor, Vol. 12(6), 1983, p. 3, and Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Soviet SS-20 Decision," Survival, May/June 1983, pp. 110-119. Garthoff contends that there is "no evidence to support the idea that the Soviet leaders saw a political 'option' flowing from their SS-20 military deployment decision...and that there existed a compelling military technical rationale for the SS-20 deployment," pp. 113 and 114.

significant differences in the capabilities of the vintage SS-4s and SS-5s and those of the SS-20s. While the older missiles were able to strike time-urgent targets, their ability to do so was severely constricted by preparing their liquid-fueled rocket engines. This process not only takes hours to complete but forces termination of the missiles' readiness status after a few hours to avoid explosion of the liquid propellant. Furthermore, the SS-4s and SS-5s are stored in fixed silos, and thus are more vulnerable to NATO attack than the mobile SS-20. The older missiles carry large, one-megaton (MT) warheads with relatively inaccurate guidance systems and, therefore, are typical counter-city weapons unsuited for selected targeting of in-theater military assets.

By contrast, the SS-20 is a solid-fuel missile, ready for firing within minutes, and carries three smaller warheads of 150-kilotons (KT) each. Both Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) carry only one warhead of lesser yield. The highly accurate reentry vehicle (RV) guidance system of the SS-20s is capable of delivering the low-yield warheads within 300 meters of the target. Finally, the reload capacity of the SS-20 launcher has suggested to military planners that this weapon, unlike its precursors, is designed for a sustained military campaign. Thus, to argue that the SS-20 does not increase both Soviet capabilities and risks to NATO is to ignore the operational logic of technological advancements.

Deployment of the SS-20 is even more destabilizing by virtue of the ongoing modernization of shorter-range theater nuclear weapons for battlefield use. For instance, the Soviets are systematically replacing older model SCUDs and FROGs as well as SCALEBOARD with more advanced SS-23s, SS-21s, and SS-22s and are upgrading the quality of their frontline dual-capable aircraft. They also have announced they would retaliate against NATO's INF deployment by stationing their new SS-24 missile in East Germany. The synergistic gains from these across-the-board improvements of Soviet theater nuclear forces and their implications for NATO are undeniable.

(2) INF Deployment Provokes the Soviets by Posing a New Threat.

This conveniently overlooks the fact that it is Moscow which has provoked the looming crisis by deploying the SS-20s. The Soviets apparently intend to separate the West Europeans from the U.S. by establishing a Eurostrategic theater and opening Western Europe to nuclear blackmail. Whereas Moscow's theater nuclear modernization program poses a new threat to NATO, the alliance's measured response will not significantly increase the physical damage it can inflict on the Soviet Union. All targets on a potential list for INF destinations currently can be covered by the submarine-launched missiles (SLBMs) deployed on U.S. Poseidon submarines assigned to the Supreme Allied Command in Europe (SACEUR) and, to a lesser extent, by the 164 F-111 fighter bombers stationed in Britain under U.S. command. Instead of imposing a

new military threat, INF deployment will only ensure that the Soviet Union cannot wage a nuclear attack on Western Europe and maintain its homeland as a sanctuary, short of strategic nuclear escalation by the United States.¹⁶ Therefore, deployment of INF will shift the escalatory burden onto Soviet shoulders. It is for this reason that the Soviets have mobilized all their propaganda resources to prevent the implementation of NATO's deployment decision.¹⁷

3) INF Deployment Is Destabilizing.

This argument is based on two interrelated assumptions. First, that the vulnerability of INFs and the threat they pose to the Soviet Union will invite Soviet preemptive nuclear strikes before they can be used by NATO. Second, that the Pershing IIs are first-strike weapons that would create a hair-thin nuclear trigger during East-West confrontations. Of course, NATO INFs could be attacked by Soviet missiles if NATO has insufficient warning time to disperse INFs to reduce their vulnerability. But the Soviets are prepared in any event, according to their doctrine of "combined arms warfare," to use nuclear weapons whenever necessary to attain their military objectives. Thus, INF stationing by itself would not precipitate a Soviet first use of nuclear weapons. Conversely, after INF dispersal by NATO, the Soviets could no longer count on their ability to destroy in a preemptive strike a large enough number of these systems to make the costs of NATO retaliation either predictable or tolerable. This uncertainty strengthens deterrence of a Soviet preemptive strike.¹⁸

To ascribe "first-strike" qualities to the Pershing II is at best to use a wrong term, at worst to deliberately confuse the public. Its short flight time and the accuracy of its warhead enables the P-II to strike hardened priority targets (an ability the Soviets have against virtually all European targets with their SS-20s). But to use its hard-target capability as proof that it is a "first-strike" weapon endowing NATO with a "first-

¹⁶ James A. Thomson, "Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Planning for NATO's Nuclear Deterrent in the 1980s and 1990s," Survival, May/June 1983, pp. 98-109, p. 100.

¹⁷ After failing to keep NATO from taking the INF decision in 1979, the Soviets have carefully manipulated the Western public and have lent material support to various anti-nuclear groups in Western Europe. For a review of the Soviet strategy, see Jeffrey Barlow, "Moscow and the Peace Offensive," Heritage Background No. 184, May 14, 1982.

¹⁸ A number of strategists point up the danger of preemption in the context of criticizing the INF deployment mode as too vulnerable. See, for instance, Jeffrey Record, "Theater Nuclear Weapons: Begging the Soviet Union to Pre-empt," Survival, September/October 1977, pp. 208-211, for a general critique of NATO's theater nuclear posture and Jeffrey Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Program: The Real Issues, op. cit., for a detailed critique of the INF deployment plan.

strike" potential is misleading. The term "first-strike" capability is restricted in its use to the ability to exercise a disarming first strike against an enemy. To avoid such a destabilizing strategic development has been the longstanding objective of the U.S. in the SALT and START negotiations. And the 108 Pershing IIs that are being deployed are hardly sufficient to target the Soviet Union for a disarming first strike, for even Moscow is beyond their range.¹⁹

4) Impact of Strategic Parity is Denied.

Critics of NATO's INF deployment reject as unfounded the claim that the loss of U.S. strategic superiority has affected the viability of the doctrine of "flexible response." They maintain that the awesome spectre of an all-out nuclear war inherent in the very uncertainty instilled by the existence of the strategic arsenals of both superpowers is a sufficient deterrent against Soviet aggression. Implicitly they contend that, because nuclear war is uncontrollable, nuclear weapons for sub-strategic nuclear warfare are undesirable, if not counterproductive. Thus, their denial of the impact of strategic parity on NATO's deterrent posture is based on the notion of maximum deterrence through minimal capabilities below the strategic nuclear level.²⁰

By contrast, the doctrine of "flexible response" has critically depended, at least implicitly, on U.S. strategic superiority for its credibility. Its second pillar has been the availability of a range of military options through which to terminate a conflict before it escalated to the strategic nuclear level. In its efforts to fend off European concerns about the implications of SALT for NATO doctrine and European security interests, the Carter Administration for a long time denied that the strategic nuclear force balance codified in SALT had any bearing on the credibility of the U.S. commitment to Europe or its ability to implement it. But it ultimately acknowledged the validity of Chancellor Schmidt's contention that the effect of strategic parity had been magnified by changes in the theater nuclear balance in Europe that placed "flexible response" at risk.

The opponents of INF deployment thus fundamentally reject "flexible response" as a viable strategy. Thereby, they erode the delicately crafted political compromise between U.S. and European security interests, and they question whether the Atlantic security relationship serves European needs. At the same time,

¹⁹ Wolfgang Schreiber, Der Nato Doppelbeschluss (Sankt Augustin: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1983), p. 7.

²⁰ This perspective clearly underlies the argument presented in Karsten D. Voight, "Das Risiko eines begrenzten Nuclearkrieges in Europa, Zur Diskussion über die westliche Militärdoktrin und den NATO-Doppelbeschluss vom Dezember 1979," Europa-Archiv, Folge 6, 1982, pp. 151-160.

paradoxically, they base European security on a total commitment by the United States to initiate all-out nuclear war on their behalf, in spite of the doubts they harbor about U.S. reliability to fulfill this pledge. Being ardent critics of nuclear war and weapons on moral grounds, they also base their security on the morally unsustainable threat of mutual annihilation.²¹

If NATO is to safeguard the viability of its strategic doctrine, it will have to counter the ramifications of the U.S. loss of strategic nuclear superiority and the concurrent buildup of Soviet theater nuclear weapons. INF deployment as configured will strengthen NATO's deterrent posture but, by itself, will not meet all of NATO's needs.

5) INF Deployment Reinforces Decoupling.

This proposition is based on the assumption that the U.S. commitment to the defense of Europe even with strategic nuclear weapons has not been affected by the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and that the U.S. nuclear umbrella of "extended deterrence" remains intact. Simultaneously, however, proponents of this viewpoint charge the U.S. with trying to extricate itself from its strategic nuclear commitment of "extended deterrence" by emplacing weapons systems in Europe that will allow it to fight a nuclear war confined to the European continent. There are a number of logical contradictions in this position. First, if nothing has changed, why should the U.S. seek to extricate itself from its nuclear commitment to Europe? Second, if nuclear war is indeed uncontrollable, how can the U.S. conceivably succeed in limiting nuclear war to Europe? Third, if the Soviet Union adhered to its declared posture that any attack on its territory from Western Europe with nuclear weapons controlled by the U.S. will be considered a U.S. attack resulting in retaliation against the continental U.S., how could the U.S. evade strategic nuclear escalation?²²

6) Present Weapons Systems are Adequate.

Many opponents of INF deployment contend that no new weapon systems need to be deployed because the present inventory of European-based nuclear weapons is fully adequate, if not already excessive. Their principal arguments are: first, the U.S.

²¹ The moral dimensions of nuclear deterrence have recently attracted a great deal of attention in the Christian churches. For a brief review of the status of the debate, see Phyllis Zagano, ed., "The Nuclear Arms Debate," Bookforum, Vol. 6(3), 1983, and the author's contribution to the forum section of Orbis, Fall 1983 (forthcoming).

²² Christian Coker and Heinz Schulte, "Strategiekritik und Pazifismus, Zwei Haupttendenzen in den westeuropäischen Friedensbewegungen," Europa Archiv, Folge 14, 1983, pp. 413-420. Their discussion emphasizes the linkage between the debate on NATO strategy and the resurgence of neutralism and pacifism.

controlled F-111 bombers, U.S. Poseidon submarines assigned to SACEUR, and dual-capable aircraft stationed in Europe constitute an adequate deterrent and are capable of performing the long-range missions for which INF are designed; second, British and French nuclear forces currently undergoing modernization should be considered part of NATO's deterrent but are deliberately omitted in the comparisons of NATO-Warsaw Pact capabilities; third, NATO maintains short- and medium-range nuclear weapons numbering over 6,000 in Western Europe, which should suffice to deter Soviet aggression.²³

Contrary to these assertions, however, NATO's theater nuclear posture suffers from a mismatch of available but hardly useful systems and those needed to uphold the strategy of "flexible response." The F-111 medium-range bombers stationed in the United Kingdom are not only aging but can no longer confidently penetrate Eastern European and Soviet airspace because of enormous improvements in Warsaw Pact air-defense capabilities. Unless equipped with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) that would give these aircraft a stand-off capacity, these F-111s will progressively lose their operational utility. The same applies to nuclear-capable fighter bombers and the British Vulcan bombers of early 1960s vintage. Furthermore, all dual-capable aircraft currently earmarked for nuclear missions are therefore unavailable for air superiority and ground support tasks. This amounts to a significant drain on NATO's already thinly stretched conventional air assets. To increase reliance on aircraft for nuclear missions would exacerbate this already precarious situation. Most significantly, NATO's medium- and long-range theater nuclear forces are qualitatively inferior to the modern, missile-based Soviet nuclear forces. Aging bombers and sea-launched ballistic missiles cannot be compared on a one-on-one basis to land-based nuclear missiles because of their inferior survival rate, speed, accuracy, and state of readiness.

It is undeniable that the French and British nuclear forces contribute to NATO's nuclear deterrent, but these weapons are under the national control of these NATO countries and, for purposes of definition, must be considered strategic systems. They are designed as weapons of last resort to deter an attack on the homelands of their owners. Furthermore, to include these systems under the overall NATO ceiling in an arms control agreement along the lines suggested by the Soviet Union would freeze the U.S. out of its central role in the European theater nuclear balance and result in its separation from the central strategic balance. Finally, this would violate the principle of equality between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and, when applied to the

²³ Richard H. Ullman, "Out of the Euromissile Mire," Foreign Policy, Spring 1983, pp. 39-52. The European opposition to INF deployment has embraced these contentions which are also shared by the U.S. nuclear freeze campaign and the arms control community.

asymmetrical alliance commitments of both superpowers, would result in unequal security for NATO.²⁴

Insofar as short-range theater nuclear weapons are concerned, this is the only weapons category in which NATO still holds an edge over the Soviet Union, though it is shrinking. Recognizing the limited utility of these weapons, their age, and the excessiveness of the existing stockpile, NATO has already withdrawn 1,000 of these tactical nuclear warheads and another 2,000 to 3,000 are slated for retirement beginning this fall. Most critically, however, despite the remaining size of the stockpile, these weapons are useless as substitutes for NATO INFs because of their limited range. Thus, to compare the relative theater nuclear capabilities of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in purely quantitative terms without regard to their qualitative differences is highly misleading and does not support the case against INF deployment.

At the other end of this spectrum are those who deride NATO's deployment decision on numerous counts. First, they charge, as claimed by Alexander Haig, that the small number of new warheads is a "political expedient and tokenism" because it does little to correct the growing theater imbalance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. With respect to GLCMs, they consider them of small military value because they are not being deployed in numbers necessary to overwhelm enemy defenses. Second, these critics assail the weapons mix and its deployment configuration as inflexible and highly vulnerable. They also contend that NATO has failed to evolve an operational doctrine for the eventual use of these systems.²⁵ In fact, they consider the deployment decision an expression of NATO's unwillingness to reassess its theater nuclear strategy so as to resolve the inherent inconsistencies of "flexible response" and to align declaratory doctrine with military capabilities. The arms control position is also depicted as unrealistic, because NATO possesses little bargaining leverage by offering deployment limits on weapons that are not fully operational. Moreover, they express the fear that NATO may lock itself

²⁴ Charles Gellner, British and French Nuclear Forces in the INF Negotiations, Congressional Research Service, Issue Brief No. IB 83117, July 25, 1983. Gellner provides an excellent exposition of the arguments for and against the inclusion of the British and French nuclear forces in the INF agreement. The principles of equality and equal security were agreed upon in SALT I, even though they are operationally contradictory. It should also be noted that the USSR did not insist on the inclusion of French and British forces until late in 1981.

²⁵ Jeffery Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Program: The Real Issues, op. cit., offers the best exposition of this line of criticism of the INF decision.

into a position of permanent theater nuclear inferiority through a too narrowly focused arms control approach.²⁶

POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DEPLOYMENT

Paralleling the strategy debate permeating arguments against INF deployment is a much broader debate, mainly among West European youth, on the desirability of Europe's continued security relationship with the United States.²⁷ In many respects, this controversy exemplifies the fragmentation of the postwar consensus on foreign and security policy, the essential underpinning of the Atlantic alliance.²⁸ A growing number of Europeans perceive the security interests of their countries as differing from those of the United States. In fact, some even believe that the direction, methods, and even motives of U.S. foreign policy jeopardize a wide range of their countries' interests.

These feelings manifest themselves in resurging pacifism, neutralist sentiments, and anti-Americanism in a number of European countries, where they had been submerged in the past. At present, this opposition is expressed by rejection of the deployment of INFs, but the trend among the European postwar generation portends more profound and far-reaching future changes in U.S.-European relations unless a new consensus restores allied unity. Among the arguments against missile deployment are:

²⁶ NATO decided in 1979 to seek first negotiations on the SS-20 and deliberately excluded the Backfire bomber, shorter-range theater nuclear weapons, and nuclear-capable aircraft. This approach was intended to simplify the negotiations. However, it was shortsighted in that it failed to anticipate the upgrading of Soviet short- and medium-range nuclear weapons inasmuch as SALT I had neglected the impact of the SS-20 deployment on NATO's deterrence posture. Thus, unless accompanied by collateral limitations on SS-21s, SS-22s, SS-23s, and SS-24s as well as other components of the theater nuclear arsenal, limitations on the SS-20s will tend to magnify the importance of these weapons systems for the theater nuclear balance in Europe.

Through SS-20 deployment, the Soviets also exploited the gray zone between strategic and theater nuclear weapons: first, the SS-20 is a two-stage SS-16 and the third stage can be added within hours, thus converting it to a strategic missile. Second, by substituting a light single warhead for the three reentry vehicles, its range can be enhanced significantly. Finally, its range is roughly 3,000 miles and, when stationed in the Kamchatka Peninsula, it is capable of striking Alaska.

²⁷ See Christian Coker and Heinz Schulte, "Strategiekritik und Pazifismus," op. cit., and Benjamin F. Schemmer, "A Growing Anti-Alliance Attitude Threatens Free World Defense," Armed Forces Journal International, February 1982, pp. 66-77.

²⁸ Klaas G. de Vries, "Security Policy and Arms Control: A European Perspective," in Marsha McGraw Olive and Jeffrey D. Porro, Nuclear Weapons in Europe, op. cit., pp. 51-64, pp. 51-53.

CONCLUSION

Over the past several years, NATO governments courageously have withstood wave after wave of Soviet disinformation and intimidation. They have stood firm on INF deployment, should there be no arms control agreement, despite the domestic political costs associated with their steadfastness. Most recently, the Soviets have stepped up their intimidation of Western Europe by threatening to deploy, for the first time, nuclear weapons in East Germany and elsewhere outside USSR borders. The Western press has headlined this as a new threat and an escalation of the nuclear arms race, even though the Soviets did this some time ago. General Nikolai Chervov, a member of the Soviet military leadership, confirmed this again in a recent interview. He also warned that, by forward-positioning its missile force, the Soviet Union would threaten the U.S. with the same short warning time it would have following INF deployment.

Contrary to the impression of the qualitatively new threat to U.S. security that General Chervov wanted to create, the Soviets have had this capability in the form of sea-based missiles for a long time. And placing intermediate-range missiles in Cuba or Nicaragua would be such a daring and provocative act as to risk a serious confrontation with the U.S.

Even though the arms control negotiations have not yielded concrete results, NATO must not be tempted to compromise its legitimate security interests at the negotiating table in the vain belief that any arms control agreement is better than none. Nor will such an agreement silence those who adduce some of military and political reasons for delaying or canceling INF deployment.

Since NATO's decision in 1979 to deploy the INF (unless there is an arms accord), it has become clear that the Soviet Union is intent on increasing its advantage in intermediate-range nuclear forces. Contrary to Moscow's earlier pledges that it would observe a moratorium on SS-20 deployment during the negotiations at Geneva, the Soviets have continued deployment within striking distance of NATO targets. By contrast, NATO has yet to deploy a single missile and, even once the full contingent of its INFs will have been deployed in the late 1980s, its theater nuclear posture will require further improvements because imbalances will persist.

If NATO is to reach an agreement with the Soviets, it must not waver from the deployment schedule. Only through determination will it convince Moscow that it is in Soviet interests to reach an agreement at Geneva.

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