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REFORMING "MILITARY REFORM"

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INTRODUCTION

What is called "military reform" may be the most sensitive and the most important topic on today's defense agenda. Some of the reasons are obvious. There is the inherent importance of defense itself--of national security. There is the vast amount of money involved--and the need to spend vastly more if the U.S. is to regain any of the ground lost during years of unilateral neglect of America's defense. Less obvious is the inherent power of simple ideas; "military reform" suggests the need for fundamental changes in the way defense business is done. As such, the concept ignites enthusiasm, but it is a concept in need of reform itself.

"Military reform" has captured more attention in the past couple of years than any similar set of defense ideas. Newsweek devoted not only a cover story to the subject, but followed with four lead articles that dominated the entire December 20, 1982, issue. Time followed suit on March 7, 1983, with even more extensive coverage. It has been page one news and the subject of feature articles, op-ed pieces, and editorials in almost every leading newspaper in the country.

"Military reform," however, is more than a mere press fancy. West Point has hosted a three-day conference on the subject; and in Washington, members of Congress have formed a joint House/Senate caucus dedicated to it. Meanwhile, there have been a host of books dealing both generally and specifically with the subject.[1]

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1 The most important of these are James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House 1981); Mary Kaldor, The Baroque Arsenal (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981); and Thomas H. Etzold, Defense or Delusion? America's Military in the 1980s (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

"Military reform" may prove one of the most powerful sets of ideas of our time.

Where these ideas will lead is still uncertain. They could be exploited by those who see "reform" as a useful cloak with which to wrap proposals designed to limit the nation's defenses, or they could be used to achieve a genuine revitalization of the way the nation views and provides for its defense. The challenge, therefore, is to assure that "military reform" achieves defense revitalization--giving Americans a more creative, appropriate, effective and efficient way to protect themselves and the nation.

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

Military reform makes strange bedfellows: reformers and philosophers; liberals and conservatives; hawks and doves. In fact, those associated in one manner or another with the movement seem to have little in common except the shared perception that there is something askew in the Defense Department and its subordinate services.

The "old line" of the "military reform" movement is composed of two rather distinct groups: the "reformers" and the "philosophers." The former include Pierre M. Sprey, Steven L. Canby, William S. Lind, and John Boyd. Sprey has focused on various aspects of weapons systems problems. A defense consultant and former Special Assistant in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (1966-1970), he spends a good portion of his time lecturing about the defects in today's weapon systems. Canby, a Washington defense consultant, and Lind, an aide to Senator Gary Hart (D-CO), are more concerned about structure and doctrine--particularly the need for forces capable of a maneuver style of warfare. John Boyd's movable feast, an unpublished, but regularly updated (and as regularly, lengthened) lecture, "Patterns of Conflict," has provided the reformers with an intellectual construct on which to base much of their work.

The "philosophers" include, among others, Edward N. Luttwak, and Jeffrey Record. Luttwak, a defense consultant and writer on strategic issues calls for Washington to "move beyond cost-accounting debates and the fancier bookkeeping of 'systems analysis,' to address the really serious tactical, operational and strategic questions."[2] Record, a consultant on defense affairs to Senator Sam Nunn, also calls for a broader view of reform, arguing that "the proper amount and mix of heavy and light forces cannot be determined in the absence of a clear idea of where the Army

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[2] Edward N. Luttwak, "Effectiveness or Mere Efficiency: Some Reflections," in Jeffrey G. Barlow, ed., Reforming the Military (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1981), p. 3.

intends to fight and whom it intends to fight."[3] They have criticized the present generation of military officers for having lost touch with their profession. The armed services, they argue, have cultivated managerial and technical expertise at the expense of traditional military skill. As a result, the officer corps has become too "civilianized": officers attempt to provide services that society could better provide for itself; officers do not understand the nature of war because they fail to study military history; officers do not develop skills in leadership because they study management techniques instead; and officers never learn what constitutes effectiveness in the field because they are too busy developing technical prowess in the laboratory.

If there is common ground for the "reformers" and "philosophers" it may be related to the last point--a common disdain for the American military's over-reliance on high technology. Indeed, this ground is shared by most who have become affiliated with the movement.

Strange bedfellows in the movement are nowhere more evident than in the Congress. There are hawks for reform--with impeccable credentials in favor of a stronger U.S. defense--who are concerned about spending defense money on the wrong things, that an obsession with technology has led the military astray.

Likewise, there are the doves for reform, advocating simpler, more reliable, and more numerous weapons, expanded and more realistic military training, and a general streamlining of the armed services.[4]

The Congressional Military Reform Caucus formed three years ago by Congressman William Whitehurst (R-VA) and Senator Hart, provides a common forum for these hawks and doves, Democrats and Republicans, liberals and conservatives. It has grown to 75 members, and according to a recent Defense Week article has taken "a conservative tack" which "has wrought changes in its legislative agenda, moving its emphasis away from what first appeared to be an alphabet soup of weapons priorities."[5] At the same time it has acquired a new activism. In August 1983, the caucus promoted the establishment of an independent testing and evaluation office in the Defense Department. In approving the new office, Congress overrode the vigorous objections of the Pentagon's top development

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3 Jeffrey Record, "Heavy and Light Ground Forces in the Context of U.S. Grand Strategy," in Peter W. Chiarelli, ed., The "Military Reform" Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1983), p. 138.

4 At the same time, some hawks and doves have been united in opposition to reform measures--though in a less formal way.

5 Melissa Healy, "Military Reform Caucus Takes a Conservative Tact," Defense Week, September 6, 1983.

and procurement officials.[6] More recently, Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KS) and Representative James Courter (R-NJ), who jointly chair the caucus, sought to rally support for some $372 million in modernization initiatives for the Army and Air National Guard and Reserve.[7]

The military has hardly been at the epicenter of this debate, but neither has it been altogether excluded. Lt. Gen. Jack N. Merritt, a former Army War College commandant who is currently assigned at the Pentagon as Director of the Joint Staff, co-authored an article with Pierre Sprey in 1974 that serves as a useful point from which to date the current "military reform" movement.[8] More recently a number of officers have contributed to the debate, including the Army's Timothy T. Lupfer and Huba Wass De Czege and the Air Force's Franklin D. Margiotta.[9]

LOOKING BACK

For the historian of the early American military, there is a certain sense of deja vu about the "military reform" movement. The issues capturing the attention of the current movement have antecedents as far back as the early years of the republic. In 1807, William Duane, a political pundit and staunch backer of Thomas Jefferson, began to call for the introduction into the army and militia of light infantry and the adoption of a new tactical system (proven by the French) that reduced the emphasis on firepower while it added flexibility to the formations. Duane's efforts presage the present-day work of Steven Canby and William Lind. Duane labored until the conclusion of the War of 1812 to convince the army to adopt his system and ultimately called for congressional military reform. Twice Congress instructed the army to adopt a specific tactical system--in 1812 and again in 1813--and twice the army resisted. Finally, in

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6 See Robert Foelber and Manfred Hamm, "Better Testing to Prevent Shoddy Weapons," Executive Memorandum No. 29 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, July 25, 1983), supporting creation of the new testing office.

7 The seven modernization initiatives were drawn from a National Guard Bureau and report Vista 1999 ostensibly prepared by a group of Guard officers chaired by Maj. Gen. Francis Gerard, chief of staff of New Jersey's Department of Defense, but largely ghosted by old line members of the military reform movement.

8 J. N. Merritt and P. M. Sprey, "Quality, Quantity or Training?" USAF Lighter Weapons Review (Summer 1974), p. 14.

9 Timothy T. Lupfer, "The Challenge of Military Reform," and Huba Wass de Czege, "Toward a New American Approach to Warfare," in Peter W. Chiarelli, ed., The "Military Reform" Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1982), pp. 1-16, 45-76. Franklin D. Margiotta, ed., Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policymakers (Washington, D.C.: The National Defense University Press, 1980).

December 1814, as the result of yet another congressional effort, the army ordered Winfield Scott to adapt the French system to American circumstances. The similarity of issues and methods with today's efforts is remarkable.

The reforms of Emery Upton and Elihu Root are more familiar. Upton, who in the 1870s sought to revitalize the nation's militia ethos and to build a large, modern, citizen-based force, found that there was no interest in such an undertaking. He was bucking the spirit of the age.[10] Root, on the other hand, was more a reflection of his times. His structural reforms of the army at the turn of this century reflected the image of the managerial revolution then in progress.[11]

As the age of the owner-entrepreneur gave way to the age of the hired manager, the army gave up its "commanding general" who "owned" the forces and hired a "chief of staff" who only managed them. Root was a corporate lawyer more familiar with the organizational theories that informed the railroads and oil companies of the era than with the intricacies of the General Staffs which had grown up in Europe. It is no coincidence that the U.S. Army's new general staff more resembled the organization of one of the new giant American corporations than it did the German General Staff on which it supposedly was modeled.

Many of the keener observers of current trends have suggested that America is moving into a new age of entrepreneurial leadership.[12] That implies the necessity of new organizational and leadership models. Recent calls for important reform of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, first by Generals David C. Jones and Edward C. Meyers, and more recently by the Reagan Administration itself, would increase the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and place him formally in the chain of command. This is a reflection of important current managerial trends, not mere tampering.

The work of the modern military reformers began in the mid-1970s with a paper by Sprey and Merritt entitled "Quality, Quantity or Training?" They argued that the United States had gone too far in looking for the "breakthrough in sophistication." "We would take the 'better' [in contrast to the best]," they said, "and more of them and with more training." This is, with some twists, the line that Sprey has been pursuing ever since.

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10 Michael E. Vlahos, "Military Reform in Historical Perspective," Orbis (Summer 1983), pp. 245-253.

11 See Walter Millis, Arms and Men (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1956), particularly chapter III: "The Managerial Revolution."

12 See Peter Drucker, The Effective Executive (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); John Nesbitt, Megatrends (New York: Warner Books, 1982); and Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, In Search of Excellence (New York: Harper and Row, 1982).

The second major component of the reformer's agenda was put forward in 1976 by William Lind in an attack on a new army doctrine of "active defense." This piece circulated widely before the Army, under some pressure, agreed to publish it. In this and subsequent articles Lind developed the argument that the army's new doctrine relied too much on firepower or attrition. Interestingly, he compared the doctrine to the linear formations--with as many weapons as possible engaged--of the eighteenth century. This was the doctrine that the French had abandoned and that Duane had urged the Americans to abandon almost 170 years earlier. Lind's argument matured into a call for an entirely different style of warfare characterized by "maneuver."[13]

The movement gained coherence and a name in 1981 with The Heritage Foundation's publication, Reforming the Military.[14] The essays in this booklet, by Luttwak, Canby, Lind, and Sprey, argued that the way to improve the fighting effectiveness of U.S. general purpose forces was not to spend significantly more money on them, but to restructure the way they were organized, equipped, and employed. Heritage President Edwin J. Feulner, Jr., noted that though the Foundation was not yet prepared to embrace these ideas, they deserved a wider audience and a careful hearing.[15]

THE REFORMERS: TECHNICIANS, TACTICIANS, AND MAGICIANS

As the movement has grown, so have its variants. Currently three groups of "reformers" are readily identifiable. The first are the technicians dealing in either weapons systems or weapons technologies. It is this group that has fostered the "high-tech/low-tech" debate; the big carrier/little carrier debate; and the F-15/F-16 debate. Mary Kaldor, in the 1981 book The Baroque Arsenal, argued that American weapons had become much too sophisticated, that the military has added unnecessary features to weapons in much the same way architects once placed gargoyles on cathedrals. Small gains in performance were made, she argued, at unreasonably high prices, forcing the U.S. into a set of quality vs. quantity decisions. Opting for quality not only places reliance on often unproved technologies, but dictates a smaller number of these higher priced weapons in the bargain. The marginal gains in performance are an inadequate substitute, she argues, for what is given up.[16]

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13 William S. Lind, "Some Doctrinal Questions for the United States Army," Military Review (March 1977), pp. 54-65. William S. Lind, "Military Doctrine, Free Structure, and the Defense Decision-Making Process," Air University Review (May-June 1979), p. 21-27. More recently see William S. Lind, "The Case for Maneuver," in The "Military Reform" Debate: Directions for the Defense Establishment for the Remainder of the Century (West Point, New York: United States Military Academy, 1982).

14 Barlow, op. cit.

15 Ibid., p. iv.

16 Kaldor, op. cit., p. 19-20.

Thomas H. Etzold has made much the same case. "America's advanced technology, once the source of military advantage, is becoming a root of military malaise." The increasing cost of military technology, he points out, means that the services buy fewer weapons. "It is a vicious circle: fewer weapons necessitate greater sophistication, and greater sophistication, because of cost, implies fewer weapons."[17]

An important variant of that argument is made by Sprey, in some ways the "Godfather" of the movement, who posits that the less sophisticated weapons are not only cheaper but actually better. There is, he charges, no "quality versus quantity" quandary--weapons can be both simpler and cheaper. The fact that the services are not moving in this direction strikes him as evidence of a kind of pervasive incompetence in the Department of Defense and in the Services in particular. For Dina Rasor, who founded the Project for Military Procurement (first funded by the National Taxpayers Legal Fund and now by the Fund for Constitutional Government), the root problem is more sinister than mere incompetence. It is a pervasive corruption, nurtured by the procurement system, that explains how the Pentagon buys ineffective weapons. "The procurement bureaucracy," she asserts, "...fosters a false sense of security and blind faith in technologically complex weapons that will not work effectively in combat."[18]

In a second category of reformers are the tacticians who argue that tactical excellence and doctrinal "right thinking" are more important than hardware--the "every man a Rommel" school. William S. Lind suggests that the military must now choose a new form of warfare; it must move toward "maneuver" and away from the traditional firepower/attrition formula derived from Grant's experience in the War Between the States and reconfirmed in two world wars. "The issue facing the Army today," he argues, "is not whether some officers will understand maneuver warfare--a few always have. Rather, it is whether or not maneuver warfare will be adopted as the Army's doctrine and institutionalized--that is to say, whether the Army will be organized, trained, equipped and structured for maneuver warfare." Maneuver warfare, in the sense Lind suggests, is an overall concept or "style" of warfare where the objective of operations is to destroy the enemy's cohesion. "The objective," Lind writes, "is as much the enemy's mind as his body."[19]

The concept that underlies modern ideas of "maneuver" was developed by John Boyd. He argues that all parties go through

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17 Etzold, op. cit., p. 95.

18 Dina Rasor, ed., More Bucks, Less Bang: How the Pentagon Buys Ineffective Weapons (Washington, D.C.: Fund for Constitutional Government, 1983), p. vii.

19 William S. Lind, "The Case for Maneuver," in Chiarelli, op. cit., pp. 86, 87.

repeated cycles of observation-orientation-decision-action. The potentially victorious party is the one who can complete this cycle the fastest. As the faster party repeatedly cycles inside his opponent, the opponent finds he is losing control of the situation. The party with the longer cycle time is always facing a later action than the one he intended to oppose. His actions become increasingly irrelevant. The slower party, having thus lost control, often suffers mental breakdown in the form of panic or passivity, and is defeated before he is destroyed physically.[20]

Steven L. Canby has carried the maneuver theory one step forward in what could be called the "getting more for less through maneuver" school. This new style of warfare suggested to Canby the advantage of moving toward smaller combat units amalgamated into large numbers of lean divisions.[21] Other major powers, argues Canby, obtain more than twice as many divisions (with equal combat power) per soldier as does the United States. Jaeger or light infantry, he maintains, "leads to reduced airlift and overseas basing requirements and a fourfold relative increase in infantry line combat strength because of its inherently smaller 'tail'....Jaeger infantry substitutes technique for size."[22]

The third category of reformers is the magicians--those whose feat is making defense dollars disappear. The magicians, indeed, may not really be military reformers at all. They simply are those who seize the mantle of "military reform" for their own political ambition, or who believe that the exercise of power is either futile or wrong.

The magicians particularly are in evidence on Capitol Hill. Increasing pressures to cut defense spending in response to large deficit projections have led some to marshal reform ideas to justify cutting the Pentagon budget. These defense budget cutters argue that there are wasteful or unnecessary programs--an assertion that may be true but is presented in a way that distorts the "military reform" argument.

Beyond the budget battle, military reform thinking has been used by traditional opponents of a strong defense to attack the acquisition of a number of key weapons systems which the Reagan Administration has described as "vital" replacements for old and increasingly vulnerable conventional and strategic systems. They have sought to exploit the debate engendered by military reformers to undermine confidence in--and therefore support for--U.S. defense efforts at all levels.

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20 John Boyd, "The Patterns of Conflict," an unpublished and oft updated lecture.

21 Steven L. Canby, "The Army" in Barlow, op. cit., p. 32.

22 Steven L. Canby, "Military Reform and the Art of War," International Security Review, Vol. 7 (Fall 1982): 3, p. 259.

THE CHALLENGE

The interests of the United States require that the nation take seriously the troubled criticisms of its defense efforts made by experienced persons committed to national security. The reform movement has identified a number of specific problems to be addressed. So doing will achieve the revitalization sought by all genuine "reformers." The goal of such reform, after all, is to ensure victory on the battlefield--and to make victory so certain that war can be deterred.

The ultimate goal of military revitalization is to provide for the nation's defense in a manner that will credibly insure not only bare survival, but attainment of national objectives and securing of vital interests. In fulfilling its unique responsibility of applying force in the name of the state, the military must cope with constant change, and a military revitalization movement must help identify the options that will create the most effective force.

So far, regretably "military reform" has done little more than identify symptoms of larger problems. This is the difficulty with the hardware agenda that has largely preoccupied it. To be sure, they have tallied an impressive list of troubles: cost overruns; slow development; systems defects; testing deficiencies; unproved technologies; and bureaucratic intransigence--not to mention simple waste, fraud, and corruption. Congressman Newt Gingrich (R-GA) points out that weapons issues provide "the kind of fight [Washington] thrives on." Yet he warns that they are issues "with immediate and short term consequences only."[23]

To be sure the symptoms identified by the "military reform" movement are real; they will not go away simply by pretending that they don't exist. The U.S. cannot afford (in any sense of the word) to purchase weapons systems that make Americans less effective on the battlefield.

In a democracy the resources directed to defense always will be more limited in peacetime than those available to authoritarian regimes. The military must compete with many other demands. Military revitalization should help create a military establishment that will provide, with the resources available, the most effective possible force.

"Military reform" must shape the processes and structure through which resources are turned into winning forces. The focus of the movement must be shifted from specific weapon systems or doctrinal debates to more fundamental problems. If it is true that the services do not procure the most appropriate weapons, or formulate competent doctrine, the processes must be fixed. Below

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23 Newt Gingrich quoted in Defense Week, September 6, 1983, p. 3.

the process level potential gains are limited. For example, to win on a specific weapons issue--i.e., to convince the Defense Department (who place the orders) or the Congress (who appropriate the money) that one weapon is better than another--is to win in the short term. The next weapons decision is likely to be as bad as the one just corrected. To win on a doctrine issue is similarly a short-term victory. Doctrine is as ephemeral as the pamphlets in which it is published.

It is the processes that need to be addressed. Solutions are needed to the problems of process and structure. Solving these yields long-run solutions. Fixing the procurement process will solve a host of weapon system problems. Curing the command and control structure problems at the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the service, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense levels will cure a host of operational ills up and down the line. Repairing the process of doctrine formulation will allow the forces to rationalize the way they fight. Restructuring the process of strategy formulation could move the nation from reaction to pro-action.

THE FOCUS ON PROCESSES

There is a growing sense of frustration among the "reform" elements of the movement. They have made little, if any, progress, argues critic John Mearsheimer. "The reformers' desire to turn back the clock and return to an age when the brilliant individual and simple weaponry were the keys to success in war is a hopeless cause."[24] Except on the rhetorical level, Mearsheimer asserts, their ideas have had little impact. The problems that have surfaced are often real enough; their solutions, however, have been unsellable in the markets that count.

"Military reform" must move beyond the narrow concerns of the movement's "reformers" and onto a tack suggested by the work of "philosophers"--a tack that leads to more fundamental issues.

"Military reform" must move toward the fundamentals of structure and process. Winning on the battle field is the product of both how forces are prepared to fight in war--organizing, equipping and supporting them--and how forces are prepared to think of war--deciding how to fight and preparing those who make these decisions. These are abstract processes, and this is where "military reform" must now move. Washington needs to understand the implications of present processes and to change those that are inappropriate.

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24 John J. Mearsheimer, "The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment," Orbis (Summer 1983), p. 300.

There is evidence of movement in that direction and of a growing sophistication. Representative James Courter recently responded to one critic of the "reform movement" in a way that demonstrates this growth. To the overly simplistic challenge that reformers prefer quantity to quality, he responded that they do not oppose high technology (the quality side), but rather high technology simply for the sake of high technology--pervasive "gold-plating" that adds only delays and costs. His point is that "gold-plating" has insinuated itself into the process. It is the process that needs to be fixed.

Building a force that can win on the battlefield is better approached by shaping the processes that defines that force, than by influencing an occasional weapon choice or doctrinal decision. Future efforts must focus on the processes. For example, they must influence how weapons are chosen and procured, and how doctrinal decisions are made and implemented.

"Military reform" must seek out these fundamental issues in four main areas:

(1) Force Roles and Missions. Forces fight on land, or sea or in the air or space. This first requires consideration of the nature of warfare today and the ways in which force will have utility. That will provide a conceptual framework for subsequent consideration of the nature of land, sea, air, and space warfare today.

(2) Command and control structure and relationships. The House recently passed a bill that reorganizes, in rather modest ways--and generally, in ways requested by the Reagan Administration--the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Some witnesses before the Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee in 1982 and 1983 suggested that JCS reform alone did not go far enough.[25] The Senate has just completed a series of hearings and seems inclined to look beyond the confines of the JCS. The Congress this year approved some modest organizational changes requested by the Administration with the aim to increase the effectiveness of critical defense programs and strengthen efforts to reduce costs. More changes may, however, be necessary. Those interested in "military reform"--and this issue is more vital than the selection of any weapon or doctrine--must work to shape this debate.

(3) The process of defense planning and management. The procurement process, as outlined by the Pentagon's Life Cycle Ma agement Model guides the entire acquisition process--from

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25 "Reorganization Proposals for the Joint Chiefs of Staff," Hearings before the Investigations Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1982).

concept to deployment. If weapon systems cost too much, take too long, are poorly conceived, or inadequately tested then the fault likely lies in this process. Similarly the Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) defines the process by which force structuring proceeds from plan to budget. All of these processes need careful reevaluation.

(4) The relationships between the military and the Congress, press, defense industry, and the public. Here a number of issues are clustered. Increasing congressional micromanagement of defense issues must be examined. A new working relationship between the press and the military needs to be defined. The continued viability of the All Volunteer Force, and defense industry's capability for mobilization also deserve attention.

CONCLUSION

Whither military reform? It must move beyond the problems of individual weapon systems to the fundamental issues of process and structure that define the way U.S. forces are organized, trained, equipped, and how they fight. There is mounting evidence that this kind of "reform" will move ahead. Administration requests for changes to the role of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff demonstrate their awareness that some structural and process changes are imperative. Congressional willingness to address these changes in a bipartisan spirit--to achieve effective national defense--are further evidence of the same conclusion.

Whither military reform? It is important to revitalize the nation's consensus for a strong defense--and to wire it effectively to the political process. The magicians--the false reformers--have consciously sought to erode that consensus, and many military "reformers" have abetted them. That is not to say that the work of the "reformers" has been wrong-minded or trivial--it is to say that it has been ineffective, misdirected and largely futile.

Military reform must now be reformed. It must move in the direction of solutions: real solutions to process problems and thoughtful reform of organizational structures. Structural changes have been proposed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the necessity for broader organizational changes in the Defense Department has been raised. Process changes in weapon procurement, strategy and doctrine formulation, and in force planning are essential. This new direction for military reform will revitalize U.S. defense.

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