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THE BATTLE FOR DEMOCRACY IN NICARAGUA

INTRODUCTION

Much has been said and written about the Sandinista government and its efforts to change the economic and political system of Nicaragua. Little has been noted of the many disillusioned men and women who fought alongside the Sandinistas to overthrow Anastasio Somoza, because they believed that they were building a new democratic order. Using methods all too familiar, the militarily powerful Sandinista party has imposed on Nicaraguans a worse tyranny of violence and repression. This has driven many one-time allies of the Sandinistas into opposition once again--this time against the government run by the Marxist-Leninist FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front). This opposition includes the freedom fighters or the "Contras," the Catholic Church, the one nongovernment newspaper, La Prensa, the private sector, and the Indians, who are calling for a democratic system and freedom from oppression.

Nicaraguans' freedom of speech, assembly, and private property have almost ceased to exist. Yet some nonsupporters of the Sandinistas, who have not overlooked or rationalized Sandinista repression, portray the democratic opposition in Sandinista terms as "Somocistas" or "the right-wing opposition," when in fact the representatives of this opposition are primarily liberal democrats who for years opposed the Somoza regime.¹

¹ An example of a common perception of the militant opposition is Carlos Fuentes' statement to The Washington Post on June 12, 1983, that Nicaragua is being "invaded by counterrevolutionary bands led by former commanders of Somoza's National Guard who are out to overthrow the Revolutionary Guard and reinstate the old tyranny."

The elections announced by the Sandinistas and scheduled for November 4, 1984, have brought about a greater cohesion to this diverse but democratic opposition, who have questioned the fairness and legality of an election under a government that controls the media, the army, 60 percent of the economy, and the councils recently created to supervise the electoral process.² Many fear that, through such a mock election, the Sandinistas will obtain the international legitimacy they need to pursue their foreign and domestic policies without the formidable pressure of the U.S. and neighboring democratic states. The opposition knows that, if this happens, there will be less likelihood of restoring to Nicaragua the original liberal democratic goals of the revolution.

EXPLOITING THE MODERATE DEMOCRATS

In 1978, the Sandinista forces (FSLN) began to ally with various anti-Somoza groups, while carefully retaining tight control of the military wing of the insurrection. They presented themselves as champions of a democratic program that included free elections, a pluralistic society, and a mixed economy.³

² The Nicaraguan Political Parties Law of September 1983 prescribes the legal status of the political parties. It also creates electoral councils that govern the electoral process and the legal rights of the parties. Representation on these boards is, however, weighted heavily in favor of the Sandinistas. The Council of State, one of the bodies created, consists of 11 members from the nongovernment parties and 40 from the Sandinista party FSLN. Another important governing body, the National Assembly of Political Parties, is also dominated by the Sandinistas.

³ Formal written commitments were made by the FSLN on June 23, 1979, to the Organization of American States' 17th Meeting of Consultation, to pluralism, human rights, respect for private property, and other democratic guarantees. In addition, exiled leaders such as Arturo Cruz have stated that, although it was no secret that the hard core of the FSLN was Marxist-Leninist, the non-Marxists were comforted not only by the "pluralistic spirit" but also by the assurances made that certain democratic elements be part of the revolutionary system which followed. These were: the creation of nonpolitical armed forces; democratic elections to be held at a reasonable time after victory; the promotion of pluralism and the preservation of legitimate private property; and national self-determination. Arturo J. Cruz, "Nicaragua's Imperiled Revolution," Foreign Affairs, Summer 1983, pp. 1031-1047.

The deliberate deception of the Sandinistas is further confirmed by an October 5, 1979, report issued by the Sandinistas in which the FSLN stated: the Government of National Reconstruction composed of moderates as well as FSLN was "an alliance of convenience organized by the Sandinistas to thwart Yankee intervention (and) it was not necessary to negotiate with the bourgeoisie, just to give some representation to people with a patriotic reputation."

This garnered international legitimacy for the revolution as well as considerable amounts of financial and military assistance from Western democracies. Further, the formation of this front made it nearly impossible for the U.S. and other governments to continue support to Somoza. In 1979, he was forced to turn over the government to the Sandinista-led coalition. Its legality was recognized by the Organization of American States, after it received a letter from the Sandinista government that promised free elections and democratic procedures.

By 1981, the Sandinistas had emerged as the dominant power. The democratic members of the Government of National Reconstruction that was formed in 1979 were methodically being eased out of any meaningful role in the government. Meanwhile, the Sandinista government was aligning itself with Cuba's Fidel Castro and the Soviet Communist Party. Increasing numbers of Eastern-bloc personnel were given managerial roles in the reconstruction of Nicaragua.

The final blow came when the Sandinistas imposed the Economic and Social Emergency Law in September 1981, which in effect gave them total power to make laws, imprison people without due process, confiscate property, censor the press, and restrict the right of assembly.⁴ Moderates like Arturo Cruz, Violeta Chamorro, and Edgar Macias resigned their government posts in protest and went into exile. From there they are continuing to struggle for the democratic goals of the revolution.

THE MILITARY OPPOSITION

The armed opposition to the Sandinistas operates on two fronts: The Nicaraguan Democratic Forces (FDN) are based in the north near the Honduran border, and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) is in the south near the Costa Rican border. Indians from the Sumo, Rama, and Misquito tribes, belong to one of two organizations. One, under Steadman Fagoth, is called the Misura. It is independent of ARDE and FDN although it cooperates with the FDN. The other, Misurasata, under Brooklyn Rivera, is within ARDE.

Under the leadership of Alfonso Robelo and Eden Pastora, ARDE has about 4,000 armed soldiers and claims to have considerable support from the local populace and army militia. ARDE has been having difficulty collecting supplies and medicine for its forces, although they have been receiving foreign assistance from Western European and Latin American countries as well as the U.S.⁵

⁴ The Sandinistas have attempted to use U.S. support for the Contras as a justification for the promulgation of the Emergency Decree despite the fact that the September 1981 Emergency Decree preceded by several months the November 1981 decision by President Reagan to support the Contras.

⁵ Assistance received by ARDE has not come directly from the governments of these countries, at least not publicly, but from organizations which are nominally autonomous but which receive government assistance. ARDE also receives undisclosed amounts of aid from the CIA.

Because he was a hero of the anti-Somoza revolution and cannot be accused by the Sandinistas of being "Somocista," Eden Pastora ensures ARDE's political legitimacy in Nicaragua and abroad. His early split (1980) with the Sandinistas was politically embarrassing to them. Subsequently, he and his followers have been excluded from the amnesty decree included in the peace proposals announced by the Sandinista government last December. Together with the FDN leaders, they have been refused participation in the upcoming 1985 presidential elections.

Another important leader, ARDE's Alfonso Robelo is also widely respected in Nicaragua. He was the founder and leader of the political opposition front, the Movimiento Democrático Nicaraguense (MDN), against Somoza. After the overthrow of Somoza, he became a member of the Sandinista government. In 1981, he left his position in the junta and joined Pastora. For the most part, the ideological and political objectives of Robelo's MDN have been adopted by ARDE. Although often described as a social democratic party, MDN refused an offer to join the Socialist International, preferring a nationalist autonomy.⁶

The FDN has a force of approximately 10,000 armed combatants and receives much publicized aid from the U.S. government. Large, powerful, and militarily effective, the FDN is seen by some as politically weakened by the presence of ex-National Guardsmen in its military command structure. Although not created as such, the National Guard came to be perceived as Somoza's special army and was unpopular among most Nicaraguans because of its heavy-handed treatment of Somoza's opponents and its support of his repressive policies. However, they represent barely 2 percent of the FDN and they have no political role.

Rank-and-file FDN are mainly peasants, small landowners, and shopkeepers, who became disaffected with the government after the Sandinistas seized their property or confiscated most of their crops. Others have joined because of religious persecution.

The election of Adolpho Calero Portacarrero as FDN Chairman and Commander-in-Chief has done much to offset the political liability from the inclusion of ex-Guardsmen in its ranks. Calero was a highly respected political leader in Nicaragua and for many years an outspoken critic of Somoza, who jailed him twice. In 1982, Calero left Nicaragua for Tegucigalpa, Honduras, from where he now directs his forces.

The FDN's political ideology and objectives reflect Calero's philosophy. And as one of the leaders of the Conservative party

⁶ Certain notable participants in the Socialist International, such as Mario Soares of Portugal, have long been critical of Sandinista government policies.

in Nicaragua, he has given FDN a more conservative democratic platform than that shaped by his counterpart in ARDE, Alfonso Robelo. Although much has been made of their differences, there are many areas of agreement. It would seem that the two forces could unite, particularly now that the FDN seems to have removed the ex-National Guardsmen from its military command. Both Calero and Robelo hold strong democratic views, and neither represents an extreme. The democratic opposition in Nicaragua, though diverse, has never been characterized by the kind of polarization that afflicts other countries in Central America.

THE INDIAN FORCES

Although the Misura and Misurasata forces fighting the Sandinista armies in the north and south of Nicaragua consider themselves part of the nationalist struggle and often cooperate with the FDN and ARDE, their major aim is to return to their ancestral lands from which they were driven by the Sandinistas.

Brooklyn Rivera, leader of the Misurasata coalition of Indian forces, has joined the ARDE alliance. Last summer he publicly condemned the systematic discrimination by the Sandinista regime against the Misquito, Sumo and Rama Indians, who are now kept in detention camps. He said: "During more than four years of totalitarian government by the Sandinista in Nicaragua, the Indian people and other low income sectors of the population have suffered the tragedy of this police state. As a result, they have been subjected to systematic extermination."⁷

Because of international concern with its Indian policies, the Sandinista regime offered amnesty to Indian rebels last December. So far, there has been only minimal response to this offer and other promises for resettlement and improvement of the conditions of the camps, which have been consistently revealed as desperate.⁸

Professor Bernard Nietschmann of the University of California at Berkeley, who has studied the Sumo, Rama, and Misquito tribes since 1968 and recently visited detention camps, has protested the conditions in the camps. In a letter to The Times of London he wrote:

The Indians are not mercenaries nor have they been duped into resisting. The significant point is what they are fighting for, not what they are fighting with. They are fighting for an indigenous cause, Indian

⁷ FBIS, December 15, 1983, p. 14.

⁸ Separate interviews with Bishop Salvador Schlaefter and Jim Steiglitz, an American ex-medic who is still working among the Misquito camps, The National Catholic Register, January 5, 1984.

lands, Indian autonomy, Indian self-determination. To liberate their lands and villages, to bring the people home from the refugee and relocation camps, they would take arms from any source. Would their struggle be more politically acceptable to some if they obtained arms from China, Libya, Israel, or Angola's UNITA force?

As the influx of thousands of Indian refugees into Honduras indicates, the Sandinistas have not been successful in gaining the cooperation of these people, despite their repeated assertions to the contrary.

INTERNAL POLITICAL OPPOSITION

An important political organization inside Nicaragua is the Democratic Coordinating Board. Under the leadership of Eduardo Rivas Gasteozoro, internationally recognized for his human rights campaign against Somoza,⁹ the Coordinating Board is composed of several political parties, businessmen, and union representatives. Its function is to negotiate on behalf of its members for the right to continue their work and to participate in the elections November 4, 1984.

Like many other groups and individuals in Nicaragua, the Democratic Coordinating Board hopes that, by staying and fighting within the system created by the Sandinistas, they will make democratic gains. But this hope is fading. The elections will be under Sandinista control; the February 22 electoral law does not guarantee free and equal participation. Emergency laws now in place effectively prohibit political rallies, access to the media, and criticism of the "Revolutionary Government." Significantly, the Sandinista regime has refused to review or lift these emergency laws that potentially could be used to negate the more liberal electoral law. For this reason, the reaction to the promise of elections in 1985 is pessimistic. Speaking for the Democratic Coordinating Board, Rivas Leiva stated: "We can only view the so-called (political) opening with skepticism if press

⁹ Eduardo Rivas Gasteozoro was one of the leaders of the Nicaraguan Permanent Commission for Human Rights, which was instrumental in bringing world attention to the human rights violations in Nicaragua under Somoza. The Commission is banned inside Nicaragua and has been moved to San Jose, Costa Rica, where it is under the direction of Nicaraguan exile Jose Estaban Gonzales. The Commission, which no longer receives the world attention it once enjoyed, has repeatedly asserted that the human rights situation under the Sandinistas is much worse than under Somoza. See Richard Araujo, "The Sandinista War on Human Rights," Heritage Foundation Background No. 277, July 19, 1983.

ensorship is not lifted, and if we are not allowed to participate in the collective communications media."¹⁰

The Private Sector

Important as a political opposition group is COSEP, the Nicaraguan Higher Council of the Private Sector. COSEP represents those Nicaraguan businesses that have not been fully nationalized. Like other opposition groups and organizations, COSEP is allowed to exist, but is denied access to the media, and attacked in the government newspapers, television and radio stations. Many of its members have been physically assaulted by mobs, and in numerous cases, imprisoned without being charged.¹¹ Although the government recently invited the representatives to participate in a dialogue, COSEP's demands and criticisms were barred from distribution, and the efforts of the one independent newspaper, La Prensa, to print the demands were stopped by the government.

COSEP, nevertheless, has responded to the promise of elections with specific proposals, which have been endorsed by the Democratic Coordinating Board and the Conservative Party. They closely resemble the proposals put forth by FDN, ARDE, and Misura. Calling for "authentic elections," COSEP proposes a separation of party and state; elimination of politics from education and other cultural activities controlled by the state; suspension of the September 1981 and March 1982 Emergency Laws; full freedom of expression and information; respect for freedom of worship; free independent labor unions; autonomy of the judicial branch; national dialogue among all the political parties and movements including the rebel groups; and supervision of the elections by either the Contadora or the Organization of American States.

COSEP's newly elected president, Enrique Bolanos, has requested permission from the Sandinistas to sponsor programs daily on the radio and weekly on television to discuss political and economic topics. Skeptical that his request will be granted, Bolanos observes: "There was a time when we thought we could make the Sandinistas come fairly close to their original programs. But now they have made very clear that they are Marxist-Leninists who are moving towards creating a totalitarian state."

Asked by an American reporter why he stayed in Nicaragua, Bolanos responded, "We have the moral credibility to speak out

¹⁰ FBIS, January 11, 1984, p.18.

¹¹ Several union and business leaders who are members of COSEP were imprisoned for criticizing the economic policies of the Sandinistas immediately following the institution of the September 1981 Emergency Economic and Social Law which, among other things, prohibited any criticism of the government's economic policies.

because we have remained here...We are setting an example for many people who might otherwise give up hope."¹²

The Catholic Church

Just as the Catholic Church in Nicaragua under the leadership of Archbishop Obando y Bravo opposed the repression of the Somoza dictatorship, it now opposes the repression under the Sandinistas. As a result, it has become a major target of Sandinista propaganda and government sponsored mob attacks.¹³ In the last three months, 22 churches have been attacked by gangs, who set tires afire outside the churches and threatened those trying to enter to pray. The Bishop himself has been harassed and attacked on his way to services.

The new Archbishop Pablo Antonio Vega Mantilla was expected to be less political. Yet he has stated that the Catholic Church "...[is] not a political opposition, we are believers in any regime based on Christian values. In Nicaragua today people feel an excessive control and are unable to realize their full potential." He added, "much of the creative dynamism of the revolution has been lost, it has been replaced by scheme imposed from the outside."

The Sandinistas appreciate the church's powerful influence. They have tried to undermine this power by creating a "People's Church." But this "is more fiction than reality," Arturo Cruz, an ex-member of the junta, writes in Foreign Affairs.¹⁴

The Catholic Church is prohibited from receiving funds or contributions from abroad. The Archbishop's Sunday Mass no longer is televised. The People's Church, on the other hand, is heavily funded from abroad, particularly by Protestant and Catholic churches in the United States, and has its own television and radio stations.¹⁵

Most recently, the Catholic Church has protested the Sandinista's efforts to take over the nongovernment Catholic schools. The Episcopal Conference of Bishops, which governs the Catholic Church in Nicaragua, is backing fully the La Salle Order of Teachers' refusal to replace the traditional curriculum with

¹² The New York Times, December 18, 1983.

¹³ The Wall Street Journal, December 9, 1983.

¹⁴ Foreign Affairs, Summer 1983. See also, "The Subversion of the Church in Nicaragua: an Interview with Miguel Bolanos Hunter," The Institute For Religion and Democracy, December 1983.

¹⁵ Centro Valdivieso and CEPAD are the organizations through which considerable funds pass to the Sandinistas for the "People's Church." In 1981, for example, the World Council of Churches contributed \$176,000 to Valdivieso.

Marxist-Leninist teachings.¹⁶ La Prensa, which tried to report the story on January 27, was closed down by the government. Archbishop Pablo Antonio Vega, President of the Nicaraguan Episcopal Conference, has stated that "at this time in Nicaragua there is not a state of law, or basis for liberty and democracy."¹⁷ Like the other groups in the opposition, the Episcopal Conference has demanded of the government fulfillment of its original promise of nonalignment, popular sovereignty, suggesting that "the people be the subject not the object of the revolution."

The Press

La Prensa, the only remaining nongovernment newspaper, is censored daily. In fact, the Sandinistas have set up a special office exclusively to censor La Prensa, according to editor Violeta Chamorro, who was a member of the Junta until 1981. The Sandinistas cannot shut the paper down completely. It would cost too much politically not only because La Prensa still symbolizes, after many years of struggle against Somoza, the fight against tyranny to Nicaraguans and much of the world, but also because the Sandinistas would no longer be able to credibly assert that freedom of the press exists in Nicaragua. La Prensa is internationally known for its opposition to Somoza, and the assassination of its editor Edgar Chamorro, Violeta's husband, was the turning point of world opinion against Somoza.

The Sandinistas do not limit their press control to censorship. Most of the attacks, according to the editors, occur outside the editorial offices. Distributors are often attacked by government mobs, some have been jailed by the government, their families threatened, and their houses painted with derogatory slogans.¹⁸ La Prensa's editorial council has taken an active political stand before the Sandinista Government. It recently demanded fulfillment of points 4 and 5 of the Contadora Group's proposals, which call for the establishment of pluralistic democratic regimes in Central America.

In recent weeks, the Sandinistas claim to have eased the censorship of La Prensa. Yet the paper has been closed down twice more since it attempted to print the statements of the Episcopal Conference of Bishops.

¹⁶ The following statement was issued by the Episcopal Conference: "We oppose any form of monopoly over education because it is contrary to the natural rights of men, to progress and knowledge of men's culture and heritage, to peaceful coexistence of citizens and the plurality of beliefs that prevails in many other societies." Diario Las Americas, January 28, 1984, p. 6.

¹⁷ Wall Street Journal, December 9, 1983.

¹⁸ Furthermore, the Sandinistas are proposing a new law which will grant the government permanent control over the media in Nicaragua. Diario Las Americas, March 3, 1984, p. 6.

Labor Unions

Nearly extinct, the remaining nongovernment labor unions are struggling to stay alive with the help of the Nicaraguan Higher Council of Private Enterprise and the Democratic Coordinating Board. These free unions, the Workers Central (CTN) and the Confederation for Labor Unification (CUS), both of which opposed the Somoza government, have suffered from an unrelenting government campaign of repression. Their members have been assaulted by mobs, arrested and beaten, and their families are threatened. The leaders have been forbidden to hold meetings, collect dues, bargain without government intervention, hold seminars, organize, or leave the country without explicit permission from the Council of Ministers.¹⁹

Although the members of the various opposition groups inside Nicaragua have not publicly endorsed the armed opposition of the FDN and the ARDE, they have not condemned it. Many of their spokesmen concede that, with the focus of the Sandinistas constantly diverted to the external opposition, the internal opposition has more room for maneuvering. Many feel that, without external pressure, the Sandinista government never would have been compelled to issue its peace proposals last December, which promised more freedom and political and economic opportunities to the opposition groups and other members of Nicaraguan society as well as announced elections. In addition, the various opposition groups have unanimously asserted the right of the leaders or representatives of FDN and ARDE to participate in the upcoming elections.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY

The ruling Sandinista directorate was never elected. It came to power only by its alliance with the truly democratic and popular opposition to Somoza. It has maintained its power only through force. By aligning itself with the Soviet bloc, where free elections never are held and power is maintained through terror, the Sandinista regime has made clear the undemocratic path it has chosen. And were it not for the large and growing presence of Soviet and Cuban personnel and armaments in Nicaragua, the armed opposition of the Contras would not need U.S. assistance.

The U.S. government should continue supporting the armed opposition. Through this pressure and through diplomatic channels,

¹⁹ The Washington Post, letter to the editor from Robert W. Searby, Deputy Under Secretary of Labor for International Affairs, January 1984. The AFL-CIO and the American Institute for Free Labor Development have taken similar positions with regard to labor union freedom and other human rights violations. See, for example, the February 1984 Memorandum from AIFLD executive director William C. Doherty on Nicaragua.

the U.S. can support the democratic demands of the internal opposition as well. The U.S. government can aid in the democratic opening of Nicaragua by publishing opposition demands at the United Nations and the Organization of American States as a counterpoint to Nicaraguan demands on the U.S.

Costa Rica, which has no army, is especially vulnerable to Sandinista and Mexican pressure to cease supporting the Contras who receive supplies and find refuge inside Costa Rican borders. Costa Rica's insecurity should not be exacerbated by a wavering U.S. policy. U.S. support for the democratic Contra forces should be continued as part of a firm U.S. stance. So should financial aid, and military aid when requested, to Nicaragua's increasingly apprehensive neighbors. Without U.S. strength behind them, the choice will be narrowed to those forces inside their respective governments that offer "peace" only through accommodation.

Finally, the OAS and the world should be reminded of the Sandinistas' promises to the OAS in July of 1979 that have never been fulfilled and as a result are now the basis of the opposition's demands. As the Sandinistas were able through those democratic commitments to receive the recognition of their legitimacy as a government, then this legitimacy, at the very least, should be called into question by the representatives at the OAS and other international organizations.

CONCLUSION

Although politically diverse, the several elements of the Nicaraguan democratic opposition share the principal objective of achieving the democratic goals of the revolution of 1979 that overthrew Anastasio Somoza.

The Sandinista government's charge that the opposition represents the old Somoza regime is unfounded. The small minority of ex-National Guardsmen active within the FDN are not politically important and are not part of the leadership. There are, in fact, former members of the Somoza government now in the Sandinista regime and many former National Guardsmen in the Sandinista security forces. Most important, substantial progress has been made toward an alliance between the Nicaraguan Democratic Forces and the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance.

In 1979, international support of the anti-Somoza revolution was made possible through the presence of the democratic opposition within the Sandinista movement. The Sandinistas rode to power on their backs. Now this same opposition, divided into political and military camps, is fighting the takeover of their country by totalitarian forces. The struggle is not between Somocistas and the people; it is between democracy and communist totalitarianism. By supporting the opposition forces, the United States is squarely on the side of democracy.

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APPENDIX I

Prominent Sandinista Defectors

<u>Name</u>	<u>Then</u>	<u>Date of Departure</u>	<u>Now</u>
Alfonso Robelo	Member of the original Sandinista junta. Leader of the Somoza opposition party Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN).	July 1981	ARDE leader
Arturo Cruz	Director of the Sandinista Central Bank, member of the junta, Ambassador to the U.S.	December 1981	Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.
Eden Pastora	Sandinista military commander and hero, Deputy Minister of Defense.	July 1981	ARDE leader
Alfredo Cesar	Director of Sandinista Central Bank, was an FSLN militant.	May 1980	In exile
Jose Francisco Cardenal	Vice-President of Sandinista Council of State.	July 1982	FDN
Edgar Macias	Leader of the Anti-Somoza Popular Social Christian Party, Sandinista Deputy Labor Minister.	August 1981	ARDE representative in Washington, D.C.
Haroldo Montealegre	Minister and Director of the International Reconstruction Fund, and was a member of the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN).	August 1981	Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, D.C.

<u>Name</u>	<u>Then</u>	<u>Date of Departure</u>	<u>Now</u>
Francisco Fiallos	Sandinista Ambassador to U.S., was an FSLN militant.	December 1982	In hiding
Violeta Chamorro	Member of the original Sandinista junta, Chairman of the Board of <u>La Prensa</u> , wife of assassinated Pedro Joaquin Chamorro.	December 1981	Editor of <u>La Prensa</u>
Adolfo Calero	Anti-Somoza activist, member of the Conservative Party. Supported the Sandinistas initially.	1982	FDN, Chairman and Commander-in-Chief
Alvaro Taboada	Sandinista Ambassador to Ecuador, member of Anti-Somoza Popular Social Christian Party.		In exile
Carlos Coronel	FSLN militant, Minister of Fishing.	October 1981	ARDE
Noel Rivas Gasteozoro	Board of Directors for Sandinista Nicaraguan Development Foundation, was on Board of Directors of the Nicaragua Chamber of Commerce and a member of MDN.	December 1979	Exile in Miami
Cesar Amador	Minister of Health.	1980	
Bernadino Larios	First Minister of Defense, former National Guard.		Jailed in Nicaragua
Sebastian Gonzales	FSLN ex-militant, Vice Minister of Agriculture.	October 1981	Founder of M3 anti-Sandinista group in Costa Rica, was part of ARDE

<u>Name</u>	<u>Then</u>	<u>Date of Departure</u>	<u>Now</u>
Lionel Bovela	Sandinista Director General of Customs.	January 1981	Costa Rica
Angel Navarro	Vice Minister of Agriculture.	October 1981	Houston, Texas
Jose Antonio Baltodano	Director of Sandinista Coffee Corporation, was a member of MDN.	mid-1980	New York
Miguel Bolanos Hunter	FSLN militant, officer of Counter Intelligence (F-2) of the Sandinista State Security.	May 7, 1983	In exile

APPENDIX II
Excerpts from Written Statements of the Opposition

Summary of main points:

DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONARY ALLIANCE

- To promote understanding among the anti-totalitarian forces;
- To unify efforts to accelerate the overthrow of totalitarianism in Nicaragua;
- To guarantee the establishment of a democratic system of justice, freedom, and social progress, and self-determination through elections.

THE NICARAGUAN DEMOCRATIC FORCES

- To invigorate civic resistance and armed insurrection against the Sandinistas in defense of the essential values of Nicaraguan Nationalism and Christian culture.
- To promote respect for life, liberty and human dignity.
- Respect for family rights and their primary role in society, particularly the rights of parents to choose the education of their children.
- Freedom of religion.
- The right to pursue happiness, the right of private property.
- Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, abolishment of all forms of censorship and state control over the media to guarantee the establishment of authentic democratic system, representative and pluralistic, based on the will of the people as expressed through direct, free and periodic elections.
- Freedom of social, political, labor and professional organizations, and autonomous universities.
- Separation of party and state, party and army, party and national police.

MISURA (MISQUITO, SUMO, RAMA) NICARAGUAN INDIAN ORGANIZATION

- Misura supports the Democratic Movement so that the rightful restoration of the political, social and economic system in the Atlantic Coast can be realized.

- Misura seeks a pluralistic Republic through which the social transformation of Nicaragua can be achieved with a meaningful respect for Human Rights.
- The Sandinista regime has violated systematically human rights in Nicaragua applying its policies of racism, apartheid and neo-colonialism against the ethnic groups of the Atlantic Coast...which constitutes a crime of GENOCIDE.
- The people of Nicaragua cannot act in self-determination under the Sandinistas.
- The Sandinistas must dismantle the internal security apparatus of the Sandinista regime, the Security Forces of the State, the Sandinista police, the Sandinista Army, rationing cards, the Sandinista Defense Committees, the centralization of internal commerce, the international forces, many of which have been given a nationalist disguise.
- It is imperative that the process of change in Nicaragua which was betrayed by the Sandinista Liberation Front (FSLN) in July 1979, be put back in the hands of the Nicaraguan people in order to establish a government which truly represents the different sectors of Nicaraguan society.
- The promises made to the Organization of American States in the resolution at the 17th meeting of Consultation of Ministers in July of 1979 must be fulfilled.

THE NICARAGUAN HIGHER COUNCIL OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE

(Statements made regarding the proposed elections in Nicaragua scheduled for November 4, 1984.)

- State-Party separation...A general restructuring of the state and para-state apparatus to put an end to the identifying of state and para-state organizations with the political party in power (the FSLN) and its ideology. This means transforming state organizations (such as the Sandinista Peoples Army, the Sandinista Police, the Sandinista Air Force, Sandinista Television Network) which now have a political nature.
- Repeal laws that violate human rights...as pointed out in studies prepared by the Nicaraguan Permanent Committee for the Defense of Human Rights since October 1982.
- Suspension of the State of Emergency and the institution of the full exercise of freedom of expression and information.

- Promulgation of an amnesty law pertaining to political crimes.
- Respect for freedom of worship and the exercise of the churches' ethical and religious principles.
- Labor union freedom...repeal of the laws that restrict full exercise of labor union freedom.

(Signed by Democratic Unions, Central Organization of Nicaraguan Workers (CTN), Confederation for Trade Union Unity (CUS); the democratic political parties, Democratic Conservative Party, Social Christian Party, Authentic Popular Social Christian Party; COSEP, Nicaraguan Chamber of Industries, Nicaraguan Chamber of Construction, National Confederation of Professional Associations, Confederation of Chambers of Commerce of Nicaragua, Nicaraguan Institute of Development, Agricultural and Livestock Producers Union of Nicaragua.)