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A U.S. POLICY FOR THE U.N. CONFERENCE ON WOMEN

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievements of the U.N. Decade for Women (1976-1985) convenes this July in Nairobi, Kenya. An important preliminary meeting is set for next month in Vienna, Austria. Early indications are that the July Nairobi gathering is likely to emulate its two predecessors--Mexico City 1975, which launched the Decade, and the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference in Copenhagen--in all but ignoring the genuine concerns of women and focusing instead on a typical U.N. agenda of political issues such as "the elimination of Zionism" and providing assistance "to Palestinian women, in consultation and cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people."

Yet Washington still may be able to prod the Conference to focus on its legitimate agenda. The U.S., for example, should draw an unequivocal line against politicization and threaten to withdraw from the proceedings should the legitimate agenda be ignored. Washington too should mobilize a broad-based coalition of like-minded countries in support of a serious, businesslike approach to real and urgent problems. The Reagan Administration has discovered, to its pleasant surprise, that other nations welcome U.S. leadership on U.N. matters. Since the U.S. withdrew from UNESCO at the end of last year, for instance, at least a half-dozen other major countries have said they too are considering withdrawal.

U.N.-sponsored international conferences have been held in recent years on such diverse issues as arms control and population, as well as the problems of women. They are supposed to be non-political, with four main purposes: to highlight and publicize broad areas of concern that the U.N. member states perceive as worldwide in their reach; to bring together experts in the relevant

field to exchange ideas, information, and experience; to amass a common, reliable data base; and to formulate a program of action.

But if past experience is any guide, if divisive political issues are injected into the debate and the final resolutions of the 1985 Women's Conference, its stated purposes are almost surely not to be achieved. In such circumstances, the Conference becomes in effect a mini-U.N. General Assembly--a forum for strident political rhetoric with virtually no practical impact on the problems at hand. Worse, these quite genuine and urgent problems are held hostage to the agenda of venomous attack leveled by extremists (with strong sideline support by the Soviet Union) against Israel, South Africa, the U.S., and the West generally, and the free enterprise system. All this could take place in Nairobi under the U.N. rubric and a cloak of concern for discrimination against women.

Two main questions must be raised as a consequence: Do such exercises have any value at all? And should the U.S. participate, lending as it does legitimacy and credibility, along with its dollars?

In the aftermath of the 1975 and 1980 conferences on women, the U.S. Congress enacted P.L. 98-164, sponsored by Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-KA). This law directs that "the President shall use every available means to ensure that the 1985 conference commemorating the conclusion of the U.N. Decade for Women is not dominated by unrelated political issues which would jeopardize U.S. participation in and support for the conference." The law provides further that "the President shall report to the Congress prior to the conference concerning U.S. preparations for and participation in the conference."

The President is expected to report in April 1985, after the U.N. General Assembly considers the report of the third Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meeting held the preceding month.

Nancy Clark Reynolds, U.S. Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, addressing the U.N. General Assembly Third Committee on November 2, 1984, stressed the U.S. concern about politicization. She said: "fundamental to our opposition...[is] the undue intrusion of extraneous political issues, which are dealt with in other U.N. bodies, into women's conferences or indeed into any other meetings called for specific purposes." She echoed the warning implicit in an August 1980 Washington Post editorial that the outcome of the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference "...should deepen misgivings about the value of these forums." These misgivings remain. In its report to Congress, the Reagan Administration must sketch the actions that it is considering should the Nairobi conference preparations repeat the dismaying experience of the 1975 and 1980 sessions.

THE U.N. DECADE FOR WOMEN

The stated goal of the U.N. Decade for Women is to examine ways to eliminate discrimination against women and promote their equality, and to do so in an atmosphere free from the divisive political warfare that often characterizes the U.N. General Assembly. The Decade's World Conferences were to be forums for the exchange of ideas and experience that would help realize the Decade's objectives.

In December 1972, the U.N. General Assembly proclaimed 1975 as International Women's Year and its main event the Mexico City World Conference to be held that summer. That Conference proclaimed the start of the U.N. Decade for Women and adopted by consensus a "World Plan of Action" for 1975 to 1980. This Action Plan, supported by the U.S., called on governments and individuals to take specific steps to improve the status of women in education, employment, public affairs, the family, and the media, and thus to advance the Decade's goals of equality, development, and peace.

In addition, the Conference approved a "Draft Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women," which originated in the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, the preparatory body for the Decade's World Conferences. The General Assembly adopted the Convention in 1979. It since has been ratified by enough countries to make it legally binding, but not yet by the U.S. Senate.

The Mexico City delegates went on to adopt a "Declaration on the Equality of Women and Their Contribution to Development and Peace." Here the U.S. drew the line and voted no. For the first time in the annals of the Women's Decade, women's issues were saddled with extraneous and unacceptable political statements. Resolution 32 of the Declaration of Mexico, for example, equated Zionism with racism. It stated: "International cooperation and peace require the achievement of national liberation and independence, the elimination of colonialism, and neo-colonialism, foreign occupation, Zionism, apartheid, racial discrimination in all its forms as well as the recognition of the dignity of peoples and their rights to self determination." What this had to do with discrimination against women was and remains unclear.

The Declaration also singled out "Palestinian and Arab women" for special attention, appealing to women around the world "to proclaim their solidarity with... Palestinian women" and to give "moral and material support in their struggle against zionism [sic]."

THE 1980 COPENHAGEN CONFERENCE

Five years later, in July 1980, the Mid-Decade Conference met in Copenhagen, where 57 countries signed the Mexico City

Convention. In spite of the thrust of that document, with its anti-Western and anti-Israel tone, the U.S. decided to go along. After reviewing the record of women's "progress" during the five preceding years, the Mid-Decade Conference overwhelmingly adopted a "Programme for Action" for the Decade's second half. Again, politicization intervened. This time U.S. opposition to the action program was backed by Australia, Canada, and Israel.

At Copenhagen, the large Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) delegation, along with a sizable group of non-accredited PLO sympathizers, successfully pressed for incorporation of explicit political statements into the only official Conference document, the Programme for Action. In Mexico City, by contrast, the political statements at least had been relegated to a supplementary document which could be disowned.

The most troubling parts of the 1980 action program were:

- Reaffirmation of the Mexico City Declaration equating Zionism and racism.¹
- Implicit endorsement of the 1979 Conference of the Non-Aligned and Developing Countries on the Role of Women in Development, held in Baghdad, which explicitly repudiated the Camp David Accords, the foundation of U.S. policy on resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²
- A call for the "elimination of Zionism" (in the same sentence as "racism" and "apartheid"), in effect demanding the destruction of a U.N. member state, Israel.³
- A request for all international organizations, governments, and "other groups" to provide assistance to Palestinian women "in consultation and cooperation" with the PLO, "the representative of the Palestinian people," even though the delegates knew that the PLO is officially committed to the eradication of Israel.⁴
- Implicit encouragement of revolution by force against a U.N. member by urging "the complete eradication of Apartheid in South Africa and Namibia through the assumption of power by the people." It also "commended" the efforts of the Marxist South West African People's Organizational (SWAPO), African National Congress (ANC), and Pan African Congress--all of which conduct or support terrorism.⁵

¹ Report of the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace. Copenhagen, 14 to 30 July 1980, p. 4.

² Ibid., p. 6.

³ Ibid., pp. 5 and 49.

⁴ Ibid., pp. 50, 151, and 162.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 95 and 107-108.

□ Endorsement of the so-called New International Economic Order (NIEO), which calls for the wholesale transfer of technology and wealth from the developed nations of the West to the Third World "as a matter of social justice."⁶

□ Condemnation of the human rights records of Chile⁷ and El Salvador⁸ while specially praising that of Nicaragua⁹ and recommending financial assistance for the Sandinistas. It also commended the efforts of the Polisario guerrillas fighting Moroccan administration in the Western Sahara.¹⁰

There was little relation of these controversial issues to the presumed focus of the U.N. Women's Decade. Injecting them into the agenda merely erected obstacles to the Decade's professed goals. Complained Sarah C. Weddington, a former aide to President Jimmy Carter and the co-chairman of the U.S. delegation in Copenhagen: "...the reason we came here was denied us by a very few nations. The conference was called to focus on the needs of women. What we have seen here has been a deliberate attempt to subvert the real purpose of the conference and, unfortunately, it has succeeded."¹¹

In the official U.S. report on the conference, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Donald McHenry and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie concurred with Weddington's judgment, stating that "ironically, it was the nations who believe themselves most committed to women's rights and equality of opportunity who were forced to vote no or abstain on political grounds. And it was those governments who are not known internationally for their stands in favor of human, civil, or women's rights who 'politicized' the conference and voted overwhelmingly for the Program of Action..."¹² Politicization, the report went on to note, is "more than discussing political issues in a political context. It is invidious, unconscionable, particularly in the case of the feminist movement, when the structures of power that suppress women use and exploit the women's cause to assure that these structures do not change."¹³

Declared the delegation of Iceland: "first in Mexico City and again in Copenhagen, a United Nations conference on women had been misused for political reasons."¹⁴ The Canadian delegation expressed "...strong disapproval of the mockery and farce which

⁶ Ibid., p. 111.

⁷ Ibid., p. 81.

⁸ Ibid., p. 82.

⁹ Ibid., p. 97.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 96.

¹¹ New York Times, August 1, 1980.

¹² Report of the United States Delegation to the World Conference of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equity, Development and Peace. July 14-30, 1980, Copenhagen, Denmark, p. 90.

¹³ Ibid., p. 111.

¹⁴ Report of the World Conference, op. cit., p. 203.

the conference had made of serious proposals to end women's inequality."

Politicization notwithstanding, in December 1980, the U.N. General Assembly accepted the recommendation of the Copenhagen Conference to hold a World Conference to close the Decade. This will be the Nairobi Conference, scheduled for July 15-26.

Preparations for Nairobi have been under way for more than three years. They will be completed when (and if) the General Assembly ratifies the results of the third and final Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) meeting, to be held next month, when the rules of procedure and the Conference agenda will be decided.

There are mixed signals as to the character and quality of the Nairobi Conference. A great deal will depend, of course, on the state of international politics in mid-1985. For its part, the U.S. delegation ought to be alert to and prepared for all contingencies. Moreover, it appears that the Kenyan government is ready to play an active role to try to keep the Conference nonpolitical.

CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT AND AGENDA

The Secretary-General of the Conference secretariat is Laticia Shahani of the Philippines, who so far has been competent and unbiased. On the other hand, her deputy, Chafika Sellami-Meslem of Algeria, is apparently a militant pro-Palestinian.

The secretariat is the key to any conference's productive output. Secretariat personnel determine the schedule, access to and review of documents, internal conference communications, and overall management and support. Just prior to the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference, for example, the U.N. press office held a two-day briefing, "Encounter for Journalists." It focused principally on the alleged status of Palestinian women, women as refugees, and similar contentious topics. According to the official U.S. report, the briefers all tended to be pro-PLO, anti-Israel, and anti-U.S. When journalists questioned the overt bias of the presentations, "they were informed that the selection of speakers was determined by the Conference secretariat's office."¹⁵

Another cause for concern is that the key post of parliamentarian for the Conference is to be held by an apparently radical Syrian who served in the same position at last summer's highly politicized World Population Conference in Mexico City. The parliamentarian advises on critical procedural questions and thus can exert decisive influence, particularly if the presiding officer is not well versed in U.N. procedures. Complained the

¹⁵ Report of the U.S. Delegation, op. cit., p. 105.

president of the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference after that gathering concluded: "The last plenary meeting of the Conference [was] an 'absurd theatre' where a simple majority could turn black into white and white into black."¹⁶

The proposed agenda for the Nairobi Conference also poses problems, although it appears less overtly political than the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference. While it contains no specific references to Palestinian women or apartheid, two items could permit political debate. Item 7 is the "critical review and appraisal of progress achieved...on the basis of appropriate documentation from the Mexico City and Copenhagen international conferences." This in effect will force the conference to focus on the questionable resolutions of its two predecessors. The second troublesome item, Item 8, "Forward-Looking Strategies," advocates establishment of the New International Economic Order and is written broadly enough to allow discussion of just about any issue, thus offering carte blanche for the extremists.

To make matters worse, the General Assembly specified that, under Item 7, "particular attention be paid to the problems of women in territories under racist rule and foreign occupation."¹⁷ This is a green light for the PLO and SWAPO to insist on discussion of their views of South Africa, Namibia, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and the Gaza Strip. In addition, TASS recently reported that the Soviet Union intends to press in Nairobi for a resolution equating Zionism and racism.

These agenda problems will make the parliamentarian's role all the more vital when deciding what issues and resolutions may be raised, and whether any particular proposal is germane.

CONFERENCE DOCUMENTATION

Documentation is another key to the character and quality of a U.N. conference. It forms the "paper" foundation for the proceedings: it focuses the debate and provides a common data base. Decisions about documentation reveal attitudes within the U.N. high command, because all documents must be reviewed by the Conference secretariat and approved by the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, acting as the preparatory body for the Conference.

¹⁶ Berlinske Tidende, August 5, 1980.

¹⁷ In September 1983 the General Assembly approved the official report (A/CONF./114/41, September 16, 1983) of the Special Conference on Palestine, which maintained, among other things, the "Review of the Situation of Palestinian Women in Israeli Occupied Territories, in view of their Special conditions and urged the 1985 Nairobi Conference Prepcom to put this on the agenda of the Conference."

In laying the groundwork for the 1980 Mid-Decade Conference, for example, several documents turned out to be critically important. Two submitted by the Economic Commission for Western Asia (one of several regional organizations operating with the blessings of the U.N. though not as formal U.N. entities) injected into the Conference documentation the language equating Zionism and racism and according special "representative" status to the PLO.¹⁸ Meanwhile, a document submitted by the office of the Conference Secretary-General stressed the role of women in the "liberation" of South Africa and Namibia.¹⁹

Two basic documents requiring updating by the Secretariat contain potential timebombs: they address the situation of Palestinian women and children in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank and are based largely on publications whose objectivity and accuracy cannot be trusted.²⁰

THE NGO FORUM IN NAIROBI

Increasingly important roles are played within the U.N. system by the hundreds of private groups known as Non-Governmental Organizations--or NGOs. In the aggregate, the NGOs are dominated by their most extremist and anti-American members. These NGOs will be in Nairobi in sizable numbers. What can be expected of them was hinted last summer at a Havana meeting of NGOs affiliated with the Economic Commission for Latin America, as a regional preparatory body for the Nairobi Conference. It enacted a formal resolution which stated: "Reagan's inauguration day...ought to be declared an international day of mourning."

An NGO gathering, called Forum 1985, is scheduled to convene in Nairobi before the World Conference. It poses another potential conflict for the Nairobi Conference. NGO forums typically have a more radical leftist bias than do U.N. gatherings. They attract huge crowds; the NGO delegates engage in intensive lobbying of the conference and its delegates; and often make headlines. Unless the Kenyan authorities take appropriate steps--with strong support from the U.S., other Western states, and Third World "moderates"--Forum 1985 promises to be true to NGO form. The Soviet bloc, for example, is preparing to focus on the World Conference's subtheme, "peace," and use it to push its unilateral disarmament campaign. Many Soviet front organizations, such as the World Peace Council, have NGO status.

The "Convenor" of Forum 1985, moreover, is Dame Nita Barrow of Barbados, who also chaired the Havana meeting that adopted the anti-Reagan resolution. She is reported to be selecting the

¹⁸ A/CONF./94/4 and A/CONF.21 and Corr.1.

¹⁹ A/CONF.94/5-7.

²⁰ E/CN.6/1984/102 E/CN.6/1984/10.

NGOs to attend the preparatory meetings leading to Nairobi, with careful attention to their ideological credentials. Because such selectivity violates U.N. rules of procedure, the U.S. and other Western states must take steps to ensure a balanced selection of NGOs.

SERVING U.S. INTERESTS

The predominant U.S. interest in the U.N. Decade for Women is to advance the role and status of women in societies around the world. The U.S. has no hidden agendas for Nairobi. And the record regarding the role of women in the U.S., though imperfect, is exemplary.

Genuine U.S. commitment to improve the status of women should impel Washington to withhold support and legitimacy from U.N. activities that make genuine social concerns hostage to such political agendas as the destruction of Israel or attacks on the West and the free enterprise system. Consistent with Ronald Reagan's warnings and the Kassebaum amendment, the U.S. should exert its influence to shape an effective, businesslike conference that sticks strictly to an agenda dealing with women's issues. The only other option is withdrawal if Nairobi begins turning into a carbon copy of Mexico City in 1975 and Copenhagen in 1980.

This will not be easy; time is short. As with any U.N. conference, the ranks of committed democratic delegations will be thin; support from Third World moderates thus will be essential. What is encouraging is that the host Kenyans appear to be dedicated to a productive outcome of the conference. Washington strongly should back Kenya's efforts to achieve this.

Within the U.S. delegation, much preliminary work needs to be done. Solid position papers and draft statements, for example, must be prepared and negotiation of coalitions with sympathetic delegations from other countries must begin at once.

CONCLUSION

While the Reagan Administration must begin devising its strategy for July's conference in Nairobi, it also must be ready to take strong stands at next month's Prepcom meeting in Vienna. There the U.S. should push for:

□ Adoption of a consensus rule. This would give the U.S. (or any other delegation) veto power over politically motivated resolutions or sections of resolutions. Such a rule worked rather well at the U.N.'s Second Special Session on Disarmament in 1982.

□ Secret balloting on procedural issues. U.N. experience suggests that a secret ballot often derails last-minute radical

efforts to skew the agenda. This procedure worked well at the Universal Postal Union Conference in Hamburg, June 1984, when an Arab motion to expel Israel was defeated handily .

- Clearing basic documentation with the secretariat. This would interpose the Conference secretariat between the regional preparatory meetings and the third Prepcom and Nairobi Conference. It could help screen out the most divisive resolutions by providing reasonably balanced and professional backup documentation.
- Clearing draft resolutions through a balanced special committee well in advance of the Nairobi Conference. This could help avoid last minute surprises. It works reasonably well at International Labor Organization meetings and at the U.N. General Assembly itself, where the General Committee (with sizable Western representation) must clear all except "emergency" draft resolutions.

In addition, Ronald Reagan should state clearly that the U.S. will not participate in Nairobi if the Conference becomes unacceptably politicized.

U.S. preparation for the Conference, moreover, should not be construed as a commitment to participate. The relevant bureaus of the State Department should complete organizing a Conference "secretariat" of their own comprising a team of experts in procedure and substance to serve as preparatory and support staff for the U.S. delegation.

The delegation itself should include members well versed in U.N. processes and multilateral diplomacy. The delegates should be briefed extensively in Conference procedure and in those issues that will be paramount in Nairobi.

Washington now should begin consulting with those foreign delegations likely to share U.S. concerns at Nairobi to agree on Conference tactics. Priority should be given to drafting basic coalition position papers on key issues to avoid divisive actions at Nairobi.

Washington should oppose permitting the NGO Forum 1985 to overlap with the Nairobi conference. This would limit the impact on the Conference of the NGO Forum's predictable extremism, while not impeding the Forum's main functions of collecting and disseminating information.

The U.S. should support Kenya's apparent determination to keep the Conference non-political. There should be, for example, tight controls on entry visas into Kenya to exclude the most radical of prospective delegates and observers (such as those from the PLO), and hotel space allocation should be used to keep potentially troublesome delegations as small as possible. The U.S. should help prepare those Kenyans who will be serving in top Conference posts.

There are other steps the U.S. can take to influence the outcome of the 1985 Nairobi Conference. It could 1) offer to reimburse the Kenyan government for the costs of the NGO Forum 1985; 2) threaten to withhold its 25 percent share of the regular Conference budget; and 3) offer to make up the anticipated shortfall of some \$500,000 in the special trust fund for the Nairobi Conference.

There should be no U.S. hesitation about using its financial leverage, nor any apologies about monitoring the use of funds provided by U.S. taxpayers to assure an effective, productive outcome for the Conference. Involved directly are matters affecting the U.S. national interest and America's genuine desire to advance and improve the role and status of women worldwide.

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