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SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND THE NEWS

PREFACE

In the murky world of disinformation and news manipulation, truth often outstrips the most bizarre fiction. Thus, while reading the proceedings of last year's joint Heritage-CAMERA* conference on Soviet Disinformation and the News (held in Washington on May 16, 1984), it may be necessary to remind oneself that the papers are all, unfortunately, true. The byzantine structure of double and triple agents, agents of influence, front organizations and subtle molding of public opinion known as Soviet Active Measures, has existed for many years, and is more widespread than ever in today's world. What is even more disturbing that the persistence and scope of the operation is the realization that Active Measures, considered so integral to the success of the Communist revolution that they were put into place as soon as Lenin seized power, owe their many successes to the willing gullibility of the West.

Indeed, the conference makes clear how great is the need for the West to take these activities seriously, and to classify them as a major weapon in the Soviets' arsenal. The events of the past year and the revelations of extensive Soviet espionage activities in the U.S. and elsewhere in the West make the contributions to this conference all the more relevant.

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SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES -- THE PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND

by Juliana Geran Pilon

In Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Cancer Ward, two characters-- Shulubin and Kostoglotov--discuss the fate of the Russian people under the Soviet regime. When Shulubin cynically accuses them all of being traitors--traitors to truth, to morality, to their own history--Kostoglotov objects that "To write every single one off as a traitor is much too rash. A storm breaks trees, it only bends grass. Does this mean that the grass has betrayed the trees? Everyone has his own life. As you said yourself, the law of the nation is to survive."¹

Accordingly, one explanation of Soviet behavior in foreign policy would have it that national self-preservation is seen as sufficient justification for both the extraordinary military buildup of the Soviet Union and its efforts in political warfare which include so-called "active measures," or aktivnyye meropriatia. These measure include influencing the policies of another government, undermining confidence in its leaders and institutions, disrupting relations between nations, and attempting to deceive Western public opinion through forged documents, or simply by disseminating theories that distort reality in a manner beneficial to the interests of the Soviet state.²

Indulging in such activities may well be justified in part by sheer instinct of self-preservation, but since that the Soviet Union is confronting enemies it must defeat lest it be defeated in turn. Such a theory, however, ignores the role of Marxist-Leninist ideology as a justificatory instrument of enormous significance and persuasive power. This ideology, rooted in Marx and Engels, then modified by Lenin and given fuller expression in contemporary Soviet philosophy, provides the philosophical underpinnings for a vigorous campaign to affect public perceptions in the West aptly called "disinformation."

The ethical or moral context of Marxism is by no means unambiguous, Marx having indulged in frequent contradictions. His concept of morality appears to reject any absolutist notions but his writing are thoroughly moralistic. On the one hand, he appears to hold that progress is inevitable, while on the other hand he seems to urge that enlightened men (like himself) should lead the proletariat to revolutionary victory. There is never, however, a clear idea whether man's actions are "free" or whether they are "determined." Engels continued this ambiguity, which was inherited by Lenin, with the result that ethics is subordinated or even conflated with science in Soviet philosophy: the distinction between value and fact is blurred. "Objectivity" is a term

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applied not only to knowledge but also to action. Objectively correct behavior becomes that which is in conformity with the laws of progress in nature. And since according to Marx, a scientific analysis of history indicates that communism is inevitable, action which enhances the progress of history to bring about communism is, by implication, ipso facto correct.

In fact, Marx appears to urge that positive action be taken to bring about progress. As he put it in his early work The German Ideology, the task of the communist or "the practical materialist" is to be the "revolutionizing [of] the existing world, of practically attacking and changing existing things."³ Since the goal is to change "objective reality," there seems to be no reason to shy away from actions that may properly be called "active measures" or disinformation. It is this kind of passage in Marx that may well have inspired Lenin in his theory that the actions of individuals should speed up (or "lessen the birth pangs of") the course of history.⁴ Richard T. DeGeorge, professor of philosophy at the University of Kansas, saw Lenin's contribution to Marxist ethics as filling out the concept "that what helps the revolution...and the building of communism is moral, that what hinders it, immoral-- a formula which in fact forms the basis of the new Soviet Moral Code of the Builder of Communism."⁵ The fact that this concept was certainly consistent with Marxist philosophy even if not fully spelled out in Marx, makes it possible to speak of a Marxist-Leninist ideology.⁶

This ideology goes well beyond a simplistic Machiavellian utilitarianism. For the argument is more elaborate, its premises rather more difficult to dismiss. It proceeds as follows: Communism is an end in itself to which history aspires, and which attains man's ultimate freedom. Communism, however, while an inevitable end of history, must nevertheless be built by individuals conscious of that end. These individuals must take positive action, justified because Communism is an objectively positive state of affairs. Here is how one Soviet moral philosopher, A. F. Shishkin, describes it in his book, Foundations of Marxist Ethics:

The movement toward Communism, the struggle for Communism, is the objective measure of evaluation of human actions, that is, the necessary general basis which does not depend on the consciousness of this or that person. It permits one to clearly distinguish true morality from false.⁷

This elaborate philosophical justification, of course, is probably not within the grasp of all or even most Soviets who are currently engaged in "active measures" throughout the world. Neither is the PLO trainee in Soviet bloc camps objected to the minutiae of Lenin's Philosophical Notebooks. For many of them, the remarks of Solzhenitsyn's character Kostoglotov probably do apply: an instinct of national self-interest. For some of them, it is a sense that Communism is worth defending. And for others, the motivations may be petty or even a result of sheer hatred.

It would be myopic, however, to neglect the theoretical superstructure that accompanies Soviet action. For what we have here in the final analysis is a quasi-theological defense of any action leading to what is considered to be "objectively" real progress. That utopian end, moreover, involves the subordination of individual interests to those of society. Soviet philosophers N. N. Kulakova and G. K. Gummickij, in an article entitled "On the Problem of the Criterion of Moral Progress," wrote that "the very character of morality consists in the subordination of the individual to the interests of the collective in the preservation of the community by means of such a subordination."⁸ In fact, they go on to claim that "guaranteeing the interests of society by means of the subordination of individual interests to social, is the basic law of moral conduct."

If the strength of such language derives from its theological tone and intent, however, so does its weakness. For surely it suggests its own answer. Far from having to engage in carbon-copy tactics, far from having to adopt a similar policy of active measures to combat the Soviet efforts, the West has a simpler choice. When confronted with falsehood, for example, repudiate it as such. And when tempted to glorify so-called "national liberation movements," consider the tactic of the players, their actual goals and historic record, and their role in the Soviet active measures program.

Ultimately the West too is operating with a philosophical premise no less than does the Soviet system. That premise involves a denial of the dictum that the individual is completely subordinate to the collective--a denial that man is expendable in the interest of so-called "society." Human rights, after all, have no meaning aside from the right of individual people with their particular goals and their particular modes of worship. Herein lies the strength of the West.

But, again, there lies its weakness. For the belief that others operate with similar concepts may well handicap Western newsmen and opinion makers in the so-called "war of ideas." That war is fought with very unequal instruments. Hence, this conference--meant rather to instruct and enlighten than to inspire panic or to invite censorship and hysteria. Having lived under the other system, which I have called "the other side of night,"⁹ I know that the odds are with us and the principle of freedom. But let us not underestimate the tactics of the opposition, for it too operates with a theology, and is well-equipped to implement its goals. And ours is a fragile flower to grow, these being especially difficult times--or as the Russian poet Pushkin called them, "vile times."

In fact, the poem by Pushkin that had prompted the discussion of Solzhenitsyn's characters in Cancer Ward to reflect upon the proposition that the Russian people under the Soviet regime are all traitors went as follows:

In our vile times
 ...Man was, whatever his element,
 Either tyrant or traitor or prisoner.

They note, upon reflection, that Pushkin "had no room in his line for 'fool,' even though he knew that there are fools in this world." The meaning of that conversation is not opaque: it conveys a sense of urgency in a time of great danger and potential holocaust. In such circumstances, there is no room for fools and no excuse for traitors. The hope is that man will know the way to avoid becoming prisoner to tyrants who would stamp out his very spirit. It is not a vain hope, but neither is it self-evident. May it prevail.

NOTES

- 1 Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Cancer Ward (New York: Bantam Books, 1972), p. 435.
- 2 Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godsen, Dezinformatsia (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984), p. 2. For an excellent series of reports describing active measures and defining the concept, see "Soviet Active Measures," Hearings before the Pemanent Select Committee on Intellience, House of Representatives, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, July 13, 14, 1982, especially the CIA stdy "Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures," p. 50ff.
- 3 David McLellan, ed., Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 174.
- 4 James O'Rourke, in The Problems of Freedom in Marxist Thought (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1974), p. 76, argues that Lein departed from Marx on this issue.
- 5 Richard T. DeGeorge, Soviet Ethics and Morality (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1969), p. 2.
- 6 Leszek Kolakowski, in his fine three-volume Main Currents of Marxism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978) argues that "it cannot be said that Marxism was 'falsified' [by the Soviets] in any sense." In particular, he argues that Lenin's conception of the Communist party's privileged moral position was not only consistent with Marx but was generally accepted among socialists at the time.
- 7 Osnovy marksistko etiki (Moscow: Izd. instituta mezduranodnyx otnosenij, 1961), p. 185. For a fine, comprehensive study of Soviet ethics, see Philip T. Grier, Marxist Ethical Theory in the Soviet Union (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978).
- 8 "K probleme kriterija npravstvennogo progressa" in Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1965, p. 38.
- 9 Julian Geran Pilon, Notes from the Other Side of Night (South Bend, Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, 1979).

SOVIET DISINFORMATION: AN OVERVIEW

by Dr. John Lenczowski

There has been a great deal of misunderstanding in public affairs discussions these days about the nature of disinformation. Much of this misunderstanding lies in the common perception that disinformation is just another one of those little kinds of dirty tricks that the Soviets do. It is one of those naughty things where they will pull a little forgery or tell a little lie or do some other similar sort of thing. In fact, disinformation is something intrinsically related to Soviet global strategy. I would like to begin with a few distinctions.

There are basically three types of disinformation: political disinformation, military disinformation, and economic disinformation. Some of it has a strategic nature and some of it is tactical. The misconception to which I referred is that many people feel disinformation is something exclusively tactical rather than having a broader strategic component. It is this distinction which I would like to clarify today.

The tactical type of disinformation which we often think is "real" disinformation, is analogous to such things as "Maskirovka," i.e., the camouflage and concealment, for example, of military installations--putting a dummy airplane on the runway in hopes that one of our satellites might photograph it--to give the impression that the Soviets have a larger air force than they actually do. Similarly, tactical disinformation often employs economic statistics designed to confuse people in the West about the capacity of the Soviet economy and therefore how much of it is devoted to military expenditures.

The key distinction here is that tactical deception has more to do with Soviet capabilities whereas Soviet strategic deception involves mostly the question of Soviet intentions. Strategic deception is concerned principally with trying to confuse adversaries about fundamental intentions and ambitions of Soviet global strategy. It is here that the Soviets work very hard on playing on existing tendencies of thought within the scholarly and media communities in the West. Specifically, they like to take advantage of our tendencies to engage in mirror image perceptions--i.e., where we tend to look upon the Soviets as just like us; where we tend to think that they share the similar concepts of peace, of freedom, of common decency, of fair play, of national interest, and so on. Soviet disinformation also attempts to take advantage of our tendencies to engage in wishful thinking. For some reason our culture is reluctant to face certain kinds of very ugly realities. We saw the evidence that

the Jews were being persecuted and sent to the gas chambers in Nazi Germany. This evidence was dangling in front of our noses for a couple of years and yet nobody really wanted to believe that it was happening. We did not want to pay attention to it. It was something that was perhaps just too ugly to look at. The same thing occurred during the Cambodian genocide. The same thing occurred in Europe during the latter part of the 1930s when the Europeans refused to acknowledge the existence of the Nazi military buildup.

The Soviets take advantage of these tendencies of thought and psychological inclinations by playing on a number of themes which encourage us to believe that they are not so much of a threat to us as they are in fact. Some of these themes are military in character--it is in this particular sphere that the Soviets like to take advantage of mirror image perceptions. Specifically, the Soviets like to portray the United States as a military threat. After all, if nuclear missiles were pointed at you, wouldn't you have reasonable cause to be afraid? Why certainly. Therefore, because we have such missiles pointed at the Soviets, they similarly must have legitimate cause to believe that the very presence of these missiles is prima facie evidence of an abiding American intention to threaten the Soviet Union militarily. Conveniently omitted here, of course, is whether our arsenal exists for offensive or defensive purposes.

The Soviets also like to talk about American Pershings and their six-minute travel time to Moscow. In fact, a Pershing missile does not even reach Moscow and certainly does not do it in six minutes. The travel time to Moscow, of course, is an example of tactical disinformation rather than strategic disinformation. But the broader strategic deception here is that the United States and the West are indeed some kind of a military threat to the Soviet union.

But we are not a military threat to the Soviet Union. We never have been, and we have spent 40 years proving to them quite unambiguously that we neither pose any military or geopolitical threat to them nor do we harbor any political constituency that would support any offensive geopolitical or military action against them. When we had military superiority and nuclear monopoly, we did not use it to blackmail the Soviet Union. Similarly, in certain cases such as the Hungarians' attempt in 1956 to liberate themselves from Soviet domination, we refrained from taking any action to help those people because we wanted to let the Soviets know quite unambiguously that we were not willing to risk a confrontation. It was this consistent policy that precluded any consideration of crossing the scrimmage line in Korea and Vietnam.

In attempting to show how the U.S. is a military threat to the USSR, the Soviets' discussions of military doctrine encourage us to believe that they support the whole idea of deterrence. They also like to promote the idea that they have a self-interest

in stopping the arms race. Are the Soviets interested in arms control? The growing evidence of their record of non-compliance with arms control agreements compels us to question whether indeed they have a self-interest in limiting their own arms acquisitions and in complying with arms accords. The purpose, of course, of these various forms of politico-military deception is to convince the West: 1) that the Soviets are justified in conducting a buildup that grossly exceeds any legitimate requirements for defense of the Soviet state; 2) that they are only interested in a peaceful, stable status quo in the world; 3) that increasing the domestic standard of living is a higher Soviet priority than advancing communism throughout the world; and 4) that, therefore, unilateral gestures by the West to reduce the acquisition of arms will mitigate Soviet fears, reduce tensions, and open the real possibility of genuine Soviet reciprocation.

This kind of politico-military deception begins to point to the central purpose of strategic deception: confusing the West about the broader political question of Soviet intentions. Here is where we must focus on what I consider to be the number-one Soviet disinformation theme, the idea that the Soviet Union is not really Communist anymore.

Why do the Soviets want to convince us that they are not really Communist anymore? The reason is that they would like us to believe that their objectives in the world are not unlimited. Are the Soviets a revolutionary, totalitarian power with unlimited objectives in the world, or are they just a 19th century, traditional imperial, Tsarist, Russian great power with objectives that are not necessarily unlimited? Playing upon our tendencies toward wishful thinking, they would like us to console ourselves with the fact that they are simply the latter, a traditional great power. If they are Communist, it necessarily means that their objectives are unlimited, and that, therefore, the political transformation of the United States into a Communist society is one of those objectives. If, alternatively, they were just a traditional great power, it would mean that they might be content to stop their expansion having sated their appetite with what they believe to be their fair share of the spoils and having achieved a satisfactory balance of power that ensures their security. In other words, if we can be convinced that the Soviets are simply a traditional great power, a spheres of influence policy and a peaceful international status quo would be possible with them. This is what they would like us to believe.

They do this in a number of ways. The principal way is to encourage the mirror image perception that politics within the Soviet Union is a process of competition between polarized factions just as in the U.S. Specifically, they would like us to believe that there are such categories within the Soviet polity as hawks and doves, hardliners and softliners, Stalinists and moderates, leftists and rightists, ideologues and pragmatists, proponents and opponents of detente. If we can be convinced that such categories exist, then we will be prepared to believe that

the Stalinist, hardliner, anti-detente faction must be the Communist faction. These must be the older generation of people who somehow survived under Stalin and whose ways of thinking are ossified in a more old-fashioned Bolshevism. If all this is so, then, by implication, the "moderate," "pragmatic," "dovish," "proponents of detente" must not really be Communist anymore. And this necessarily must mean that these are people who have crossed the critical threshold where their objectives in the world are no longer unlimited, and therefore some kind of permanent, peaceful, modus vivendi can be reached with them. These must be people who now can accept the international political status quo in the interests of peace. And surely, it is better to reach an agreement with the accommodating doves, thereby supporting their position, than to risk the dreadful possibility that the hawks might come to power.

Another way that the Soviets encourage the idea that they may not be Communists any more and encourage mirror image perceptions is their technique of focusing our attention on the individual within the Soviet system. Whenever there is a succession, there are a whole series of news stories about who the new boss is. Who is Andropov? Oh, does he drink Scotch? Does he have Western paintings on his wall or modern art? Oh, he talks to dissidents and he likes to listen to Glenn Miller music. Perhaps as The Washington Post reported to us from Moscow he may in fact be a liberal. What kind of man is Chernenko? Where was he born and who was his father and what was life like in the Novoselovo rayon, and so on and so forth? The whole implication contained in such stories is that the individual somehow matters within the Soviet system, that his tastes, his character, his political predilections, the intensity of his views and all of these kinds of things can have a decisive impact on the fundamental strategic global intentions of the Soviet Union. Now I am not saying that individuals make no difference within the Soviet system. The question is whether the difference is tactical or whether it is strategic. Does the accession to power of a new individual mean that somehow Soviet intentions can change and the Soviets can cease to be Communist? Emphatically, this is not the case. It cannot be the case because of the indispensable role that ideology plays within the Soviet political system.

Yet another way of playing on our tendency to engage in mirror image perceptions is by encouraging us to believe that the Soviets do not believe in their ideology anymore. After all, we are not an ideological society. And so, therefore, how can they really be ideological? Hasn't their invocation of ideology become just a meaningless ritual? So, in our most prominent newspapers, we read dispatches from Moscow explaining that the ideology is dead and that nobody believes in it anymore. In our society, of course, for an ideology to be politically operational, you have to believe in it. In the Soviet Union, however, this is simply not the case. There, you have to behave like a Communist whether or not you believe in the ideology because of the necessary role that it plays in the system. The Soviets must cling to

their ideology for two basic reasons. First, it is the only means by which they can claim legitimacy, which they must do to mitigate any political domestic challenge to their rule. And second, it sets the standard by which conformity and deviationism are measured. Thus, it is the key element of the internal security system of the state. If one engages in any strategic deviation, much less in tactical deviations of any significant order, one can be easily identified as a threat to the regime and be removed from power by the collective leadership. Khrushchev's removal demonstrates that even the most senior leadership is not immune from such sanction.

These disinformation themes on the fundamental intentions of the Soviet state are bolstered by certain kinds of structural deceptions built into the Soviet system. For example, there is a constitution in the Soviet Union. The implication of its existence is that this is a society that runs like ours, according to the rule of law. There are elections in the Soviet Union. There is a Supreme Soviet, a parliament with whose members American congressmen engage in parliamentary exchanges. Needless to say, the very existence of the bogus Soviet Parliament encourages us to believe that Soviet parliamentarians represent real constituencies. There used to be something like 77,000 Russian Orthodox churches. Now there are something like 7,000 of them, many of which are controlled or coopted by the regime and the KGB. Ask Stan Levchenko who he thinks have been some of the most significant KGB agents of influence and he will identify several of the most prominent hierarchs of the Russian Orthodox Church. So, whenever the Billy Grahams of the world show up in Moscow to pursue their ministry, the Soviets trot out a couple of these prelates who have been given good seminary training during their KGB sabbaticals and it all looks as though there is freedom of religion within the Soviet Union. They are just like us after all!

They have "trade unions" and yet of all institutions in the United States which might engage in exchanges with the Soviet Union, the labor movement, the AFL-CIO, is practically the only one to take this whole question of structural deception seriously. They recognize that a "trade unionist" coming from the Soviet Union is not in fact a trade unionist, but a Soviet agent of influence disguised as a trade unionist who has come to this country for other political purposes.

All of these types of structural elements of the Soviet system are part of the broader strategy of deception crafted to encourage us to believe that the Soviet Union is not Communist, and to accept ersatz Soviet reality as the genuine reality. While primarily designed to further the purposes of strategic deception, they also assist the process of legitimizing the regime both domestically and internationally as well as the process of encouraging conformity.

There is one other set of themes that is very much a part of this effort to deceive the West about the fundamental intentions

of the Soviet system. These are themes that are designed to show that somehow the USSR has changed.

The Soviets know that ever since the Bolshevik revolution the West has debated the fundamental nature of this system: whether it is a Communist system, a "Stalinist" system, whether it is reformable, whether revolution is possible, or whether any real change in the human rights situation is possible. As far back as the time of Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP), the Soviets realized how shifts in their own policy, including domestic policy, can be exploited for purposes of strategic deception and disinformation. When, of necessity, Lenin had to abandon the failed policies of War Communism and adopt the market reforms of the NEP, he witnessed Western reactions that at first surprised him. Many Western businessmen, politicians, and newspapermen thought that somehow the Soviet Union had come to its senses, that all of a sudden it was becoming more pragmatic and realistic, that it was rejecting some of this ideological idiocy that had wreaked much havoc on the Soviet economy. Many of these Westerners deemed it worthwhile to encourage these changes. So, we brought the Soviets the managerial expertise, the financing, the technology, even turnkey plants to help rebuild their economy and bring it into the Western community of nations. Lenin soon recognized the enormous value of this kind of policy change for purposes of strategic deception, and he milked it for all it was worth. Stalin did the same thing when he decided to permit a rebirth of nationalism and a minor revival of religion--all to harness the nationalistic fervor to the Soviet war effort. At the same time, however, he encouraged the West to believe that certain elements of normal civil society once again were blooming within the Soviet political system and that perhaps it was really liberalizing and changing for the better. Khrushchev did the same thing again in his de-Stalinization program. Whether in fact it was conceived as a strategic deception or not, it nevertheless was used subsequently for those purposes. I might add that Brezhnev's detente strategy was designed to accomplish the identical purposes.

Of course, this strategy is not restricted to the Soviets. The Chinese, as well as other Communist regimes, have been very adept at this. The "let a hundred flowers bloom" campaign fits into this particular pattern. So does Democracy Wall. Remember how the Chinese were "liberalizing" and letting everybody express themselves on Democracy Wall? Remember all those gushing dispatches from Beijing that appeared in America's newspapers? But what has happened not to the fabled wall and to the poor wretches whose scribblings graced its facade?

There is a final set of factors that must be included here: certain elements of Soviet global strategy are conducted in ways that contribute to the central deception. Since that deception is designed to convince us that the Soviets no longer entertain messianic communist ambitions, the strategy for achieving those ambitions is constructed in forms that are designed to convince Americans that the United States is not under attack.

An indirect approach in the Soviet global offensive is a principal means of achieving this deception. The Soviets have consistently made an effort to avoid a decisive encounter with their "main enemy," the United States. Instead, they concentrate on a strategy of attrition, nibbling at the edges of the Free World by exploiting regional instability and conflict. The use of proxies and front organizations is another means of indirect attack. So long as Cubans or East Germans are doing the dirty work, the Soviets can create doubt among sizable Western constituencies over whether it is they or the forces of international communism who are pulling the strings.

The effort to convince the United States that it is neither under low-intensity attack nor the ultimate target of the international communist offensive also assumes a much more direct approach. Funding and manipulation of Western peace movements, and the never-ending cascade of "peace" propaganda serve this purpose explicitly. The promotion of East-West trade does the same by highlighting the possibility of building peaceful and stable relations on the basis of an alleged mutuality of interests. Even the very act of sitting at a negotiating table serves the purpose of encouraging the belief that a peaceful political compromise is possible between the Soviet Union and democracy.

The bottom line here is that Soviet disinformation serves two basic functions in the Soviet conduct of strategic deception. On the one hand, its dissemination through various channels may constitute an act of deception by itself. Or on the other hand, disinformation themes are placed in the service of other acts of strategic deception. Thus, when the principal method of deception takes the form of an act such as the dispatch of proxies, the massive Soviet and international communist disinformation and propaganda apparatus will serve as an integral support mechanism of the deceptive dimensions of that act. Unless we begin to understand the critical relationship between disinformation and strategic deception, we will continue to view it as a desultory series of relatively harmless lies to which we will become increasingly desensitized. Only when we grasp how disinformation is part of an overall strategic plan will we begin to recognize it for what it is: a form of low-intensity aggression against the forces of freedom in the world today.

SOVIET "ACTIVE MEASURES": THE OPERATIONAL TRADITION

By John J. Dziak

Increased Western scrutiny of Soviet "active measures" suggests that these are new weapons in the Kremlin's political arsenal. They are not. While Moscow spared no effort to stop U.S. production and NATO deployment of the neutron bomb and Pershing II and cruise missiles, or to meddle in Western elections, this Russian behavior traces back beyond the Bolshevik Revolution.

"Active measures" (aktivnyye meropriyatiya) are rooted in tradition. The Russian language and Soviet operational practice provide a rich and highly developed vocabulary dating back to the Tsars and up through the almost seven decades of the Soviet party-state. Today we think of "active measures" as the umbrella term for this idiom connoting the full range of Soviet covert action designed to manipulate foreign developments to benefit Soviet global intentions. Such instruments range from direction of mass organizations, military operations, press placements, propaganda, disinformation, and deception.

"Active measures" include:

- o Provocation (provokatsiya)
- o Penetration (proniknovenniye)
- o Fabrication (fabrikatsiya)
- o Diversion (diverziya)
- o Agent of influence (agent vliyaniye)
- o Disinformation (dezinformatsiya)
- o Combination (kombinatsiya)

While the first six terms evoke recognizable images, the last refers to the Soviet fixation with complex operational initiatives analogous to intricate chess moves. Combination (kombinatsiya) is an insider's term for relating, linking, or combining operational undertakings in different times and places to enhance overall results.

From the earliest months of the Bolshevik regime we can witness this operational vocabulary in action.

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THE "LOCKHART PLOT"

Recall the "Lockhart Plot" of August 1918 in which the British diplomatic agent R.H. Bruce Lockhart is claimed to have been central (along with Sidney Reilly) in a plot to overthrow the Bolshevik government.¹ In actuality there were two plots, that of Feliks Dzerzhinskiy, which very ably entrapped Lockhart, and the audacious one of Reilly, which the CHEKA handily smashed.² The two were quite effectively meshed together in a matrix of kombinatsiya, provocation, penetration, fabrication, inter alia. Lockhart and Reilly, in retrospect, played at conspiracy and were apparently the unwitting tools of Dzerzhinskiy who called the events of August 1918 into existence and terminated them when his objectives were reached.³

THE "TRUST" LEGEND, 1921-1927⁴

The "Trust" (Trest) may be viewed as the premier and prototypical strategic deception operation in the Soviet repertoire. It involved the creation of a notional opposition organization within the USSR by State Security (successively named CHEKA-GPU-OGPU) and was targeted against the anti-Soviet emigration in the West and Western intelligence services. It also comprised counterintelligence operations against opponents within the USSR who were induced into surfacing themselves through "Trust" provocations.

Planning began in the spring of 1921 and the operation was orchestrated by State Security until the fall of 1927. In addition to disinformation and provocation, the "Trust" simultaneously employed the other techniques mentioned earlier: penetration, diversion, fabrication, agents of influence, and combination.

The official title given by State Security to this bogus opposition was the "Monarchist Association of Central Russia" (MOTsR); its cover title was the "Moscow Municipal Credit Association," hence the "Trust," operating under New Economic Policy (NEP) dispensation. The direction of the "Trust" was provided by the highest echelons of State Security.

Through the "Trust" the Soviets were able to identify, expose, and neutralize opponents within the USSR. It became possible, through "Trust" channels, for the secret police to prevent the establishment of a genuine anti-Communist underground in the USSR. It was through "Trust" channels that Boris Savinkov, the prominent anti-Soviet revolutionary, and Sidney Reilly, connected with British intelligence, were lured back into the USSR and eliminated.⁵ Another well-known emigre, V.V. Shulgin, undertook a lengthy "underground" trip (September 1925-April 1926) through European Russia, handled all the time by "Trust" (OGPU) operatives. His manuscript account of the trip, Three Capitals, was read and approved by the "Trust" leadership and published in Berlin in 1927, the year that the "Trust" was folded by the OGPU. Its disinforming message focused on how Communism was fading in

Russia, how the Soviet leadership were really nationalists/ monarchists of a new stripe, and why any direct action by the West, military or otherwise, would be undesirable.

The "Trust" legend still may serve as a paradigm for Soviet "active measures" purposes. Three substantially different versions of the case, traceable to the Soviets, appeared in 1928, 1945, and 1965, none of which present the truth. And a recrudescence of a "Trust" type provocation occurred as late as 1968 against the NTS (Narodnyi Trudovoi Soyuz or People's Labor Alliance).

THE TUKHACHEVSKIY AFFAIR, 1937

In 1937, as part of purges known as the "Great Terror," Stalin savaged the officer corps of the Red Army following the "discovery" of a massive "conspiracy" involving senior Soviet officers in league with the German high command. To this day knowledgeable insiders and observers contend that there indeed had been stillborn moves against Stalin by certain senior officers, such as Marshal Mikhail Tukhachevskiy, to put a stop to Stalin's terror.⁶ However, Stalin did not publish a shred of proof to support his charges of treason. What is known is that documents were fabricated by Hitler's SD (Reinhard Heydrich) purporting to show treasonous collusion between Tukhachevskiy and the German military. They were passed by the unwitting President Benes of Czechoslovakia to an apparently fully witting Stalin and his NKVD henchman Yezhov. Thus, in a rather unique "fabrication-disinformation-combination" operation, two allegedly enemy, totalitarian powers collaborated in the smashing of one of those power's senior military leadership along with roughly half of its officer corps.

THE "WiN" OPERATION 1947-1952

In an operation reminiscent of the "Trust" case, both the Soviets and the Communist Polish security service (the UB) succeeded in penetrating and controlling the "WiN" (Freedom and Independence) organization, an underground successor to the Home Army of World War II. The plans for the movement were betrayed virtually from its creation. From 1947 until 1952, when the Soviets decided to wrap it up, both Britain and the U.S. worked with the organization. When the Soviets and Poles broke the story with a broadcast in early January 1953, the effect on the exile Polish government in London and on the Western services was similar to the reaction generated by the "Trust" exposure in 1927. The major difference between the "Trust" and "WiN" cases was that the former was notional from its inception whereas the "WiN" began as a bona fide opposition movement.

A WATERSHED YEAR--1959: THE REORIENTATION OF STATE SECURITY⁷

Up through the immediate post-Stalin period, operations such as those above were conducted by State Security or the Comintern (among others) with a changing composition of oversight at the

political level, such as Stalin's "secret chancellery" or Stalin himself. The organizational trace varied with the changing fortunes of Stalin's minions and the institutional shake-ups characteristic of Stalin's reign. There were, to be sure, "active measures"--but the institutional stability undergirding present actions was somewhat lacking.

"Stability" came with a vengeance with the consolidation of Khrushchev's grip on the Party leadership in the late 1950s. First, General Serov was dropped as KGB Chief in December 1958 and replaced by the Party apparatchik Alexander Shelepin. The head of the Leningrad KGB, Mironov became chief of the Central Committee's powerful Administrative Organs Department. Shelepin, with Khrushchev's full concurrence, created Department "D" within the KGB's First Chief Directorate, and assigned it to Colonel Agayants, a man of no small reputation for his successful "active measures" work in the KGB's Paris residency several years earlier. Growing in importance at the same time was the Central Committee's International Department under the veteran Comintern executive, Boris Ponomarev. Thus, in a few swift moves a stable institutional network was emplaced which exists to this day with a few modifications.

Under Khrushchev's overall direction Shelepin guided State Security in a conscious return to the traditions of Dzerzhinskiy and his OGPU. Under Stalin, the KGB had degenerated to the repressive instrument of a one-man cult. Under Dzerzhinskiy and Lenin the OGPU was the true action arm of the Party, implementing policy in truly subtle and effective ways, a la the "Trust." Shelepin directed that the KGB's new role should focus on positive, creative political activity under the proper direction of the Party leadership.⁸ Disinformation and other forms of "active measures" were to occupy critical roles in this redirection under the guidance of Agayants Department "D," Ponomarev's International Department, and Mironov's Administrative Organs Department.

To properly execute the new focus, Shelepin called a major conference in May 1959 of senior KGB officers, the Ministers of Defense and Internal Affairs, and senior Central Committee members--in all over 2,000 attendees.⁹

The contemporary period of "active measures" was thus ushered in. By the time Agayants, the head of Department "D" died in 1968, he was a KGB General. By 1970, his creation had been elevated to a Service (Sluzhba), known today as "Service A." Andropov and his successors had built on the solid foundation refurbished by Shelepin but actually constructed by Dzerzhinskiy and Lenin.

The operational tradition of strategic political deception continues.

NOTES

- 1 R.H. Bruce Lockhart, British Agent (New York and London: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1933); Sidney Reilly and Mrs. Reilly, Britain's Master Spy: The Adventures of Sidney Reilly (New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1933); Michael Kettle, Sidney Reilly: The True Story (London: Corgi Books, 1983), Chapter 3.
- 2 Richard K. Debo, "Lockhart Plot or Dzerzhinskii Plot?" Journal of Modern History, September 1971, pp. 413-439.
- 3 Ibid., p. 439.
- 4 Material on the Trust is drawn from: Geoffrey Baily, The Conspirators (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), pp. 1-86; S. Voytsekhovskiy, Trest: Vospominaniya i dokumentiy (Canada: Zarya Publishers, 1974); Natlie Grant, Dezinformatsiya, unpublished manuscript, 1974.
- 5 Savinkov in spring/summer 1924; Reilly in August/September, 1925.
- 6 Bailey, op. cit., pp. 133-224; Committee of the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, The Legacy of Alexander Orlov (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 119-121, 141-150.
- 7 See John Barron, KGB (New York: Readers Digest Press, 1954); and Ladislav Bittmann, The Deception Game (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Research Corporation, 1972).
- 8 Anatoliy Golitsyn, New Lies for Old (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1984), p. 48.
- 9 Ibid., pp. 48-49; Pravda, May 18, 1959; V. Minyailo, "The Conference of the State Security Organs," Bulletin: Institute for the Study of the USSR, September 1959, pp. 21-23.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES: AN OVERVIEW

By Roy Godson

The Soviets take active measures very seriously. The United States government, in the last years of the Carter Administration, began to release information about Soviet active measures. The Reagan Administration has continued its release.

The Soviet apparatus includes three major components:

1) The International Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The International Department, located in Moscow, influences Soviet policies emanating from Moscow and controls most of the Western Communist parties. While not all Communist parties are as responsive as Moscow might wish, almost all the approximately 100 Communist parties outside of the USSR are basically controlled by the International Department. They receive orders and funds, either directly or indirectly, from the International Department. The Department also controls the international fronts: the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the International Union of Students, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, and others. There are fourteen major Soviet front organizations throughout the world. The International Department also coordinates various "research" institutes: the Institute for the Study of the USA and the Institute for the World Economy among them. The organizations' leaders are either actual Central Committee members or at comparable levels of the Communist Party.

2) The International Information Department of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Now headed by Leonid Zamyatin, a former Soviet "journalist," the International Department works in close cooperation with the International Information Department; controls TASS, Novosti, Pravda, Isvestia, and Soviet radio and TV directed toward the West.

3) Service A of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB. Service A replaced Department D. Service A of the First Directorate also coordinates and supports the activities of the International Department and the International Information Department.

ACTIVITY IN THE WEST

Approximately 14,000 Soviet bloc officials live in Western Europe legally. Coordinated by the apparatus in Moscow, about half of the officials in Western Europe and approximately another 2,200 in the United States engage in active measures.

Approximately 30 to 40 percent of Soviet bloc presence in the Western world involves KGB or other intelligence service activity. Of that 40 percent, approximately a third are members of what the Soviets call the line P.R., the political line inside the Service A and inside the First Chief Directorate. In Western Europe there are approximately 6,000 Soviet bloc intelligence officers and approximately 3,000 are line P.R. In the United States, with approximately 2,200 Soviet bloc legal presence, 40 percent, or approximately 840, are intelligence officers. Accordingly, approximately 400 or so are line P.R. or their equivalent in the bloc services. In brief, there are 400 people in the U.S. and several thousand in Western Europe whose full-time job it is either to collect political intelligence or to influence Western politics. They are trained for this purpose and they in turn are in contact with a number of Westerners.

Sometimes this contact is quite overt. Soviets actually meet with journalists and politicians. They visit Capitol Hill and other places and seek to promote Soviet policies in various ways. However, sometimes this connection is much less overt. And it would vary from semi-clandestinity to full clandestine relationships, running agents in the media or politics.

Each of the line P.R. officers runs one to five agents of influence in the media or politics or what the Soviets refer to as "trusted contacts." These may not be full-time recruited agents who are paid but people whom the Soviets regard as trustworthy, with whom they work very closely. Sometimes they will not be recruited agents or trusted contacts but rather people whom the Soviets believe would be susceptible to their influence.

One former KGB officer suggested that in some of the Third World countries and in Western Europe personnel are formally recruited and given instructions to perform assigned tasks, including getting stories into the newspaper, pushing the party line to influential persons to influence policy shifts.

In the United States it is fairly easy to get what the Soviets want into the press without recruiting journalists or politicians to do the work. The Soviet monopoly on information flow out of Moscow allows them to plant stories easily. Western journalists have almost no way of checking the story. Even the Moscow telephone book is not a publicly available document. While a Western journalist in Washington, Paris, or London can call up almost anyone--for all sorts of sources are available in the West--in Moscow there are next to none. The Western journalist has to rely on Soviet officials. The Soviets expertly exploit these circumstances. Almost always, meetings between important Westerners and Soviet journalists, or between Soviet diplomats or intelligence officers in the Western capitals and the target journalists, are carefully coordinated. Arrangements are made to pass on specific information to the target. The Soviets do not have to recruit formally in order to get their message across.

This enormous propaganda apparatus is well financed. The U.S. government estimates that the Soviets spend approximately \$3 to \$4 billion a year on this activity. Some Soviet specialists estimate that the USSR has 15,000 people working in its active measures apparatus worldwide. Countering these Soviet resources, without damaging our free society, has been an historical dilemma.

SOVIET SUPPORT FOR INSURGENT MOVEMENTS

By Richard H. Shultz

Support of insurgent movements is a key component in Soviet active measures. These include the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Sandinistas, and the insurgents in El Salvador.

In our recent book on Dezinformatzia,¹ Roy Godson and I described active measures as a wide range of overt and covert techniques for influencing events, in particular, the behavior of foreign governments. These measures entail political instruments, including overt and covert propaganda, the use of international fronts, agents of influence, and disinformation techniques, as well as such paramilitary techniques as support for insurgent movements and terrorists.

Active measures employed by Moscow to assist select insurgency movements include official propaganda, activities of international front organizations, political actions within international organizations (including the U.N. General Assembly and special committees within the U.N., as well as the nonaligned movement).

On the paramilitary side, major techniques include arms for insurgents, advisory support, and sometimes the introduction of surrogate forces.

On the political side, the objective of active measures is to legitimize and promote internationally the objectives of insurgency movements the Soviets support. The Soviets seek to present them as the sole legitimate force representing the people in the conflict area. Moscow also strives to delegitimize the incumbent government by presenting it as repressive and immoral, and by linking it to the United States. Ultimately, the United States is the target in all such Soviet political actions. The Soviets, in addition to their own assets, have developed a rather sophisticated surrogate network. These surrogates are involved both in political and paramilitary active measures. Cuba, East Germany, and other bloc countries, the PLO, Nicaragua, South Yemen, and Libya appear to provide the most important surrogate forces.

The Soviet regime, since its inception, has claimed a unique relationship with "national liberation" movements and has promoted

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¹ Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (New York: Pergamon & Brassey, 1984).

these movements actively. Khrushchev recognized Third World opportunities. Brezhnev accelerated support for insurgency, significantly expanding its form and focus. The Soviets, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, concentrated on "the inner crescent"-- those Third World areas contiguous to the Soviet Union itself. In the mid-1970s, this expanded out into the outer crescent of southern Africa, the southern part of the Arabian peninsula and Latin America.

Recall, for instance, when SWAPO became a more important policy issue to the Soviets in the mid-1970s. As propaganda escalated, so did international front activities. The fronts utilized a variety of tactics to promote SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people. In addition, as Soviet overt propaganda escalated, their own and surrogate political actions within the U.N. expanded significantly. Consequently, overt propaganda in effect signals the initiation of other active measures instruments in support of an insurgent movement. These political techniques are activated and integrated with Soviet propaganda. Overt propaganda also sets the thematic pattern for the other instruments to follow. While there is not always a perfect congruence, nonetheless, the themes promoted by the fronts are almost identical with those found in Soviet propaganda. The main difference is that front commentary is less sophisticated and much more vitriolic in tone. Still, one finds a strong relationship. Soviet overt propaganda in support of an insurgency will also reflect what Moscow terms *kombinatsiya*. They combine and integrate multiple themes. In the case of SWAPO, six major themes and multiple subthemes were and continue to be aimed at a number of audiences.

An interesting development found in each of these insurgencies is how often and how frequently the United States is tied in directly, whether it was Vietnam or Southern Africa or the Middle East. In light of the fact that the United States is considered enemy number one or the main adversary by Moscow, the U.S. is integrated into almost all major Soviet propaganda efforts.

As was noted above, overt propaganda themes do not stand alone in support of insurgency. They are promoted and enhanced through major Soviet front groups. Their methods are essentially twofold: they initiate their own propaganda campaigns, and they employ international conference diplomacy. The latter is a very interesting form of political action. I have found that the fronts use this technique in three different ways. They use their own international or regional meetings as a forum for promoting an insurgent movement. They also hold many international and regional conferences in which the insurgency movement will be promoted and the regime, the incumbents, will be criticized. Finally, they work with other national organizations when they can. This is especially true of international conferences co-sponsored with the United Nations. For instance, the World Peace Council (WPC) and African-Asian People's Solidary Organization (AAPSO) have worked with the U.N. Committee of 24, to promote

first the MPLA, and then SWAPO and other insurgency movements in southern Africa and in the Middle East.

I have found in my research that front political action in the international area will vary depending on the insurgency and the situation, and it is interesting to see the flexibility. In the case of Vietnam, the major Soviet front action was conducted by the World Peace Council and other fronts in Europe. This was the ongoing Stockholm conference on Vietnam which ran for about six years. In the case of SWAPO there are two major fronts, the World Peace Council and the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, combining their activities with the Organization of African Unity and with different U.N. committees to promote SWAPO. In Central America tactics are more decentralized and a number of fronts are involved. They are not as active as the World Peace Council or the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization has been in connection with SWAPO, but a larger number of them is involved in carrying out the campaign. The importance of front efforts to link themselves to various international organizations should not be underestimated. This enhances the legitimacy and credibility of front activities. The international appearance of working with a world body establishes a legitimacy that should not be overlooked. It is one of a number of Soviet active measures utilized to promote certain insurgency movements, including the PLO, MPLA, SWAPO, the Sandinistas and the guerrillas in El Salvador.

It is interesting how flexible Soviet tactics can be at the U.N. For instance, in the case of the insurgency movements in Central America, the U.N. has not proved as useful as in the cases of SWAPO and the PLO. In the Central American case, it is interesting to see the use of the Cuban surrogate in the non-aligned movement (NAM) to direct NAM more and more to focus on Central American insurgency movements and on U.S. "imperialism" in the region. Prior to these efforts, NAM was focused mainly on Africa and the Middle East. The Grenada documents suggest that Cuba and the Soviets also were focused on Socialist International (SI) and were conducting active measures against SI.

The activation of these political instruments do not occur in a vacuum, the Soviets coordinate them with paramilitary support, including arms transfers which are done sometimes rather overtly, sometimes covertly through surrogates or, in the case of southern Africa, through the front-line states. The transfer of arms is only part of paramilitary active measures. Additional factors include training and advising of insurgent movements which can take a number of forms. Training takes place in the Soviet Union as well as in a surrogate state. Finally, Soviet and surrogate advisers will train insurgents in areas contiguous to the state where the conflict is taking place. For example, in the Middle East this is carried out in Libya and South Yemen, while in southern Africa it takes place in some of the front-line states. In Central America, Nicaragua and Cuba are both involved in training. And, of course, sometimes the Soviets will send surrogate forces into the conflict itself. The Cubans played this role in Angola.

A coordinated Soviet strategy which employs political and military instruments to support insurgency. Surrogates also play an important role. There has been a significant growth in the implementation of this policy since the early 1970s and I expect over the next decade that this pattern will continue. If one spends a little time in front of a map, one must conclude that the Soviets have had real successes since the early 1970s. Of course, these serve a number of important Soviet policy objectives, including the establishment of pro-Soviet regimes in strategically important regions in the Third World. They secure Soviet geostrategic access to important areas and allows them to establish bases. They also seek to limit U.S. influence in the developing world and finally deny the U.S. and its allies access to resources that are essential to our economic well being.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES DIRECTED TOWARD WESTERN MEDIA

By Stanislav Levchenko

Methods used by the Soviet overt and covert propaganda machine to penetrate foreign mass media and to influence it are more or less the same as other elements of active measures.

However, the role of the International Department (ID), Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) in actions against the foreign media is extremely important. That department, as well as the International Information Department of the Central Committee, work out the main ideas and plans of manipulation of foreign media. After such ideas or guidelines are approved by the Soviet leadership, huge segments of the Soviet "white" and "grey" (i.e., more covert) propaganda machine go into motion. The Novosti Press Agency (with about 8,000 people), Telegraph Agency TASS (foreign news department employs up to 3,000), and Moscow Radio in foreign languages (3,000 workers) start pouring carefully doctored information on Soviet and other countries' foreign and domestic policy to the main world media organs. Novosti Press Agency representatives abroad (half of them are actually KGB or GRU intelligence officers) establish contacts with foreign journalists, editors, publishing houses' representatives. Through some of these outlets the Soviets place articles, primarily on political issues, written from the Soviet point of view. In many cases, Novosti pays foreign media organs to get such articles published. "Cooperative" contacts sooner or later are approached by the KGB officers under Novosti cover and some of these individuals end up in the KGB agents' network.

Novosti, on a regular basis, invites individual journalists, or groups of media workers from almost every country of the world, to visit the Soviet Union "for consultations," for "rest," or "medical treatment." A major effort is made to corrupt such "guests" by lavish receptions, expensive presents, free air tickets, and other gifts. The KGB "works" on such journalists both during their visits to the Soviet Union and in their home countries. Naturally, some of them are recruited, too.

TASS and Moscow Radio use exactly the same techniques as Novosti.

Every article, news cable, or radio commentary produced by propagandists in Novosti, TASS, or Moscow Radio must be approved by the senior officials of International Department before they are sent abroad. Most of the major political commentaries are actually written by the senior officers of ID or the International

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Information Department (IID). Novosti publishes hundreds of thousands of copies of all kinds of "white books," brochures, and pamphlets in virtually every language of the world. The Soviet leaders are readily approving multimillion dollar budgets for the Soviet propaganda organs; the results are worth it.

Let me give you a relatively recent example of how effectively the Soviet propaganda machine can influence the foreign media in overt ways.

As is known, many dozens of foreign journalists, including American, are assigned to Moscow. A few of them have some knowledge of the Russian language and expertise in the Soviet Union's problems. However, the majority of the journalists have no knowledge of the language. Naturally, they have to hire interpreters, translators, and secretaries among the Soviet citizens. All such workers are coopted by the KGB and are trying to plant disinformation into foreign media through foreign correspondents.

The foreign journalists in Moscow have good reason to be in a state of continuous frustration: they are virtually blocked from potential sources of information. It is not uncommon that the foreign editors of their newspapers, magazines, radio and TV stations call their Moscow offices demanding meaningful stories.

So, foreign correspondents sooner or later start to experience "informational hunger." When the Soviet secret police comes to the conclusion that foreign journalists have reached a state of despair, the KGB and the ID "provide" them a "source." It can be any Soviet official, like the Director of the Institute of USA and Canada, Dr. Georgi Arbatov, a senior official of any organ of the Soviet government, academician, or Soviet journalist. Many of them, once in a while, give interviews to foreign media on the record. However, when the ID and KGB need it, they conduct "confidential," "private" conversations with foreign correspondents under the condition that the "source" will not be named. However, the majority of them do not have the skills to see through the scheme and on some occasions unwittingly make their Soviet hosts happy by putting on paper information cooked up by the Soviet overt and covert propaganda wizards.

When the late Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov came to power, quite a few major newspapers in Europe and the U.S. published a sensational profile on the new leader. Andropov, who had been the Chairman of the KGB for 15 years, was painted as the most educated member of the Politburo, an intelligent closet liberal, who had an affection for American liquor and jazz music.

The rule of paradox worked. Such a description was so wild, that it jumped on the pages of respected international papers.

The ID and KGB ran this successful operation for obvious reasons: it was the first time ever in Soviet history that the Chief of the KGB took the No. 1 position in the Kremlin. It was

necessary for the Soviets to convince the world that Andropov would not be worse, but an even better leader than his predecessors. If Andropov were in reasonable health, he would have made some official visits to the free world countries. The Soviets wanted to avoid possible demonstrations against human rights violations in the Soviet Union during such visits. And the Soviets also wanted to give the leaders of the free world countries a message: Andropov is more skillful in foreign policy matters than his predecessors in the Kremlin because throughout his 15 years in the KGB, he was acquainting himself with the secret information the KGB had extracted from their foreign agents.

Another example of typical Soviet penetration of foreign mass-media: By the late 1970s, four out of five major newspapers in Japan had been penetrated by the KGB's Tokyo residency. KGB agents in the Japanese media were not low-level journalists. All of them were well-known commentators, editors, and foreign correspondents. In 1975, through a member of the editorial board of the main conservative newspaper, the KGB planted a forged "Last Will and Political Testament" of the late prime minister of the People's Republic of China (PRC), Zhou Enlai. For a few weeks it became a major item in some of the Far Eastern countries: never before had the last will of the former communist country leader been published abroad. Interestingly enough, a review of this "document" had been published by the Soviet media as a "sensation." The ultimate purpose of this quite sophisticated operation was to cause caution among foreign politicians with the situation in the leadership of the PRC (the "will" said that the situation was not stable).

The KGB agent who had published the "will" in his paper had been recruited in the mid-1960s as a young journalist. By 1983, he became a managing editor of his paper. And only in the spring of 1983, after his relations with the KGB had been publicly exposed, did he retire. He cooperated with the Soviets quite actively for more than 15 years. And his services went beyond publishing the "will." In the late 1970s, he provided the KGB with the secret draft positions of the Japanese prime minister prior to negotiations with U.S. President Carter. He managed (naturally, in the Soviet interest) to dramatically enhance anti-PRC positions in his paper. He was involved in secret negotiations with the KGB and arranged for the paper's owners to interview Brezhnev prior to the U.S.-Japan talks.

The KGB conducts the same type of operations in most free world countries.

The only way to counter KGB press manipulation is to enhance journalistic awareness of active measures. Journalists should be more cautious toward direct or indirect Soviet approaches. Only then will readers have a better understanding of the silent but fierce psychological warfare Soviet leaders have conducted against the free world for almost 70 years.

SOVIET DISINFORMATION DIRECTED AGAINST THE U.S.: SOME PITFALLS

By Stanislav Levchenko

The recent Soviet active measures campaign against the West reached unprecedented levels during the 1984 U.S. presidential election. Designed to discredit President Reagan, the operation was authorized directly by the Soviet Politburo.

Soviet domestic propaganda started a series of personal attacks against President Reagan in 1983, branding him a "war-monger" and a "fascist." The campaign escalated. Each Soviet publication used embarrassing epithets against Reagan many times on the same page of a single issue. Every step by the Reagan Administration was described in negative terms.

The Soviet propaganda bosses knew that the world media would not neglect such an unprecedented campaign by Soviet mass publications. The Soviets, as a first stage of the operation, meant to influence President Reagan's opponents in the U.S. and abroad. The Kremlin tried to convince foreign politicians, media workers, and academics that the current U.S. President should not be reelected because he had become an obstacle to solving a variety of important international issues.

To some extent this first stage of the Soviet campaign was successful. Western media published some commentaries filled with criticism of Reagan's policy. Some political figures in the West expressed concern with the animosity between Reagan and the Kremlin. Some journalists and politicians criticized Reagan's rhetoric, without mentioning the wild Soviet verbal attacks against him. A number of Western Kremlinologists made public their observations that the Soviet leaders do not accept the White House policy as a whole and probably will make irreversible changes in their own policy. Respected specialists who came to such a conclusion forgot to mention that it is not the first time the Kremlin has staged such a violent propaganda war. Each time Soviet leaders hope their adversaries will capitulate and eventually accept some of the Soviet proposals, which the Soviets cannot push through otherwise. Historically, when the free world's response is consistent, clear and justifiably tough, the Kremlin will start looking for compromises.

The second stage of the campaign to influence the U.S. election began shortly before the 1984 Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles. Soviet propaganda specialists used the wildest fantasies to build up almost paranoid accusations against the organizers of the games, charging that Soviet and Soviet bloc athletes would not feel secure in Los Angeles. It was just the lining, however, for the main idea: the Soviet delegation would not come to the U.S. under the Reagan Administration. Reagan's policy made Soviet participation in such a major international event as the Olympic Games impossible.

Unfortunately, some segments of the international media called the Soviet refusal to go to Los Angeles "a boycott." That is exactly what the Kremlin wanted. From a tactical point of view, the Soviet leaders did not want to use this word--otherwise they would have put themselves in a difficult position with the International Olympic Committee. Moreover, they did not have enough reasons to reciprocate the American boycott in 1980--that action had been taken by the Carter Administration.

This campaign did not bring the Kremlin any serious success. Senior Soviet analysts in the Party Central Committee and the KGB made wrong assessments about American public opinion. Such assessments are routinely made before the Politburo issues its directives. Soviet specialists failed to predict the evident resurgence of American patriotism.

While relations between the U.S. and Soviet Union may stabilize in the long run, it will come only when Soviet leaders are presented with America's policies couched in clear, tough, fair diplomatic language. Consistency is the main tactic governing any policy toward the Soviets. By contrast, political zigzags and unreasonable softness are interpreted in the Kremlin as weakness and the position of the Soviet leaders in such cases becomes harder than ever.

WESTERN JOURNALISTS' SUSCEPTIBILITY TO DISINFORMATION

By Ralph K. Bennett

Thomas Jefferson said that, "were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers without government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter." I am inclined to agree with Jefferson. I am also inclined to agree with Jefferson when he said "the man who never looks into a newspaper is better informed than he who reads them, in-as-much-as he who knows nothing is nearer the truth than he whose mind is filled with falsehoods and errors." The evidence that the Soviets have--in various ways and to various degrees--infiltrated or influenced our political and intellectual communities is so overwhelming and so well documented that it needs little comment.

It would be strange indeed to suppose for a moment that such penetration has not occurred in the area of the press both here and abroad--particularly here because it is such a great target and because there is nowhere in the world a press that has greater access to important critical information than the American press.

However, I would also say, as a working journalist, that the actual need for long-term permanent deep agents in the media may not be as critical as in other areas. The press and particularly those various apparatuses that feed information to the press--think tanks, foundations, various and sundry sources of information--they are all a playground for manipulation by the Soviets. The press has a ready ring in its nose for influence in many forms from leaked documents, and "inside sources," to "authoritative" reports, and influential authorities only too willing to share their particular view on subjects of a complexity far beyond the knowledge of this or that particular journalist.

As one who has made his career in journalism and is very proud of it, I nonetheless bear no illusions about what may be called the "dirty little secret" of journalism: although it has many adroit and demanding practitioners, it is not necessarily a highly demanding line of work. Entry into journalism's ranks may require some challenging and even romantic rites of passage, but they are ones which bear no resemblance in rigor to the preparation of, say, a lawyer or a doctor. In short, it is easy to be a successful journalist without demonstrating a great deal of mental discipline, mastery of a body of knowledge, or a deep understanding of the way the world works.

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We sometimes do get too high an opinion of ourselves. And we cherish especially high opinions of ourselves, I think, here in Washington. We wrap ourselves in the toga of press freedom, draw ourselves to our full height, and think that we as journalists, somehow are proof against dishonesty, or the purposeful machinations of others, even against simple human ignorance--our own and others. And this is simply not the case. The record is so clear. The opinion polls reflect the public's mistrust of journalists and we have little cause for this high opinion of ourselves.

Again and again, we are reminded of our vulnerability. Of the many cases, I will mention just a couple of items, which I think illustrate how we often do not operate in a disciplined manner. A relatively innocuous example that illustrates the principle: about three and a half years ago, there appeared an article in the Washington Post. I can still remember sitting up straight at my desk when I read its headline: "Equity of Animal Rights Affirmed in U.N. Declaration." What followed said, and I quote, "Man's feathered and four-legged friends have won a universal declaration of rights of animals adopted Sunday at a ceremonial meeting of UNESCO, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. The animal charter opens with the words 'all animals are born with the equal claim on life and the same rights to existence'"--the same rights, I assume, as human beings. Well, UNESCO did not issue a declaration of animal rights. As zany as UNESCO is, it still has managed to keep some thin line of demarcation between human beings and animals.

But the point is, this was a story that was misreported in the beginning, got into the papers, was given credence, and was completely wrong. What happened was that a reporter who probably did not speak French, saw a group of the burlap skirt and carrot juice crowd in front of the UNESCO headquarters demonstrating about animal rights. They did have a declaration which they had drawn up themselves and which they solemnly read there in front of the UNESCO building. Two and two was put together and it came up three and this story was sent out from Paris. The next day of course, even UNESCO, which I would think knows no embarrassment, did deny that it had issued such an affirmation on the behalf of our hooved and feathered friends.

Yet the point can be taken on a number of levels. First, a journalist goofed. But as I reflected upon this, I thought that if I were an editor at the Post, I might well have printed that story for the simple reason that this is the kind of thing that I would expect UNESCO to do. And, I might not have questioned the dispatch as closely as I should have. And, it is important for us if we are going to try to at least bring a modicum of professionalism to journalism to be questioning, to check everything out. And, sometimes we don't, particularly when it seems to fit our preconceived notion of the way the world works or ought to work. In this case, it may have been a harmless thing but in other cases it might not be so harmless.

I will give you another case where something more pernicious happened. On March 6, 1981 the New York Times published an article headlined, "Spreading Brushfire to the South," about U.S. policy in Central America and El Salvador. It was based on a paper from "high government officials" who were dissenting from Reagan policy. The entire thing was a forgery. The paper was distributed widely by CISPES, the U.S. Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador. This was a prime piece of disinformation. There was at least a nod of embarrassment: a one-paragraph, crow-eating session the following week. That's it.

We can get something that looks so authentic, and then we're eager to go into print with it and we do so. The press is red meat for people spreading disinformation.

Consider Georgi Arbatov, the head of the Institute for the Study of the U.S. in Moscow. This man is a propagandist. Yet he is constantly treated in the American media as a kind of authentic "independent" spokesman for the Soviet Union, someone who is an expert on American and North American affairs.

There is something called the "have you been there?" syndrome. If you have at least been to the country and set foot on its soil you can come back saying "well, I've been there. So listen to me." That is wrong. We know that it is possible to fly down to some Central American country, spend a day at the bar of the hotel, and get on the plane and come back. You may have been there, but you may know little. Also there are some people who go there and spend years there and don't do much better because they never change their preconceived notions about that place.

I remember being in Nicaragua and watching a television program. It would appear on the Sandinista television on Friday nights and supposedly consist of the commandantes on a stage in an auditorium and the people of Nicaragua asking questions, raising protests, and talking about whatever was on their minds. Freedom at work in Managua.

It was staged. I called my translator from Mexico to watch this and we were just laughing at some of the staged questions. When I returned to the United States, however, I saw a story in the New York Times by a person who had been there for many years, who spoke fluent Spanish, who knows the way the world works in Central America, and yet there was not an intimation in the paragraph about this TV show that it might be phoney. It just said in effect, "Well, this is freedom at work. There is a television program every Friday night. The people get to speak their piece to the Commandantes." This was dishonest. This person could not have failed to see how staged this program was.

From my experiences in Cuba and in Central America as a journalist, I am often struck by the fact that leftists almost assume that American journalist are already in their camp. When

I was in Nicaragua a couple of years ago, I remember vividly that I had an interview with a certain high official in the foreign ministry. I went in and we began the interview and it became apparent to me immediately that this person thought that, since I was an American journalist, all that was going to be needed was a little tour of some happy workers in the fields, maybe a little discourse on Sandinism, a quick look at the wonders of fine literacy program, and everything would be fine. And I could be sent back to the United States with a sunburn, a box of cigars, a hammock, and be ready to extoll the virtues of this new experiment in living in Nicaragua.

But my questions were not the kind that she wanted to hear. She became very disturbed when I asked her about the political prisoners that I knew were in the Zona Franca and in the Chipota and in Tipitapa prison. I had the names, and I had a list. And when I asked her about the missing persons that the real--and in very difficult straits--human rights organization in Nicaragua had put together, about people who had just simply disappeared in the country, she did not want to talk about this. She was very disturbed and her attitude changed. And, although I had already been credentialed in Washington, the Sandinista government said I had to go through another process. I would have to show up at the Casa de Gobierno the next day and if I really wanted to talk to any more high government officials I would have to have my pictures taken again and have to go through a process of recredentiaing. I just didn't fit the mold that they had expected when I came down there. This was disturbing. It said something about the way they look, generally, at an American journalist coming into Nicaragua.

We are susceptible to disinformation and subterfuge, indeed highly so. We journalists are no different than other people, and in some ways some things that may seem virtues of journalism may be vices from the perspective of penetration by the Soviets. We have a way of compartmentalizing information. We have a way of wanting to believe some things, but not believe others. We will accept information up to a certain level and then reject everything beyond that. It is a very strange kind of blind-sightedness that we journalists often have.

We sometimes will look critically at one part of something but then our criticality begins to taper off because it might contradict what we believe. If we are supposed to be professionals, then we should develop a better judgment about the sources and quality of information which comes into our hands. We must be much more critical of the kinds of warning signals that are daily being given off in the informational war between the East and West. We should be making value judgments on the material that suddenly is put into our hands when the MX issue is up: suddenly someone has a lot of detailed information they want us to see and it's going to "clear up" our understanding of this. We should be careful in evaluating something, for instance, that is written by a Soviet emigre. Sometimes, we tend to want to

accept everything that comes out of the emigre community. That's a potential channel of disinformation. We are just simply, very often, not being as attentive as we should be.

In many cases, perhaps because of our upbringing or our education, many journalists are not prone to be, because they simply do not believe that the world works the way it does. That the struggle that is taking place in the world is, in fact, a great struggle and it is, to use the Soviet phrase, an objective reality.

DISINFORMATION AND THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME SOVIET THEMES

By Kenneth Jacobson

In my work, I come into contact with many people in the media and I hear from them about the problems they have in covering the news. And I surely do not dismiss out of hand the seriousness of these difficulties. They repeatedly raise certain points. One of the key points is that they very often do not have access to certain places and, inevitably, some stories are not covered. A classic example of this problem took place in the spring of 1982, where within a period of a month, 20,000 or so civilians were killed in the city of Hama, Syria, by the Syrian government, and on the West Bank several Arabs unfortunately were killed in demonstrations by Israeli soldiers. Night after night on the prime-time television news, the top story was about the demonstrations on the West Bank--a legitimate story, indeed, but there was no coverage whatsoever of the incredible devastation that was taking place in Hama.

When questions were raised and one can ask similar questions about the lack of coverage of Soviet activities in Afghanistan, the answer is "We can't get our cameras in there. We can't tell you the story. We're not allowed to be there. We would love to do it but we can't cover the story."

Here we have a fundamental problem. Democratic countries are open to journalists and criticized, whereas in non-democratic authoritarian, totalitarian societies, we do not have access. We know rationally what is going on in Afghanistan. I do not think, however, that we Americans understand in a personal sense what is happening there the way we did, or thought we did, in Vietnam or in Lebanon. We do not understand it, we do not get a fair picture because, as media representatives say, the cameras are not there. But is this a sufficient response? Since the media have such great power, do they not have the responsibility, the obligation to find ways to go beyond these difficulties, to solve the dilemma of non-access that indeed does exist? The unwillingness to think seriously about ways to solve this kind of dilemma is symptomatic of the superficiality that is inappropriate to the problem.

Other examples abound. During the war in Lebanon, NBC made a big thing about Israeli censorship, even to the point where they blacked out the screen and indicated that Israeli censors were at work. Of course, there was some Israeli censorship during the war. But, this is a joke when one compares it to the total censorship that was emerging from the Arab side, except where

Yassir Arafat was willing to show journalists around Beirut to selected spots--places destroyed by Israeli arms, but not to places where the PLO had set up military emplacements in residential buildings.

As a democracy, we think of Israel in a higher way. We expect more from Israel. And one does not dismiss this out of hand either. It is similar in many ways to what the media do with regard to the United States. We criticize our own government in a way that we do not criticize others, because we expect more from ourselves. We do not expect our government to be the Soviet Union. We do not expect our government to act like authoritarian countries and therefore when it does not live up to our standards, we have a responsibility to speak out. Yes, that is true, but (and this is a very large "but") it must be placed in perspective for the viewer so that it is clear what the comparison really is.

In Lebanon, a horrible civil war raged for years before Israel ever came in. The media turned to the situation in a way it had never done before only when Israel entered the equation. And that raises questions about whether the public truly understood what had been going on in Lebanon for all those years prior to 1982. Was it truly explained in the process, in a way that people could understand? The message should have been: "Look, we're not really being super-critical of Israel. We understand Israel has security problems, but we have to examine the situation and present what led it into Lebanon, but we have to cover the present story of destruction. In doing so, however, we have to give much weight to what was going on in Lebanon before the horrors that were going on there, the intervention of Syria, for years, before Israel became a major factor."

In the absence of these explanations, one begins to question what is really going on. But because there is so much power, because there is so much responsibility on the one hand, and because there is no real attempt to overcome these dilemmas, in order for the American public can get a fair view of what is going on one has to go beyond accepting these mitigating circumstances, to begin to examine the situation on other levels. This conference is being held to discuss the question of Soviet disinformation. I'm not here to make any proposal about Soviet infiltration of the media. I do not pretend to know enough about it. And I am not here either to question, necessarily, the motives of journalists. But the word "susceptibility" does come out to mind and I think one thing is very clear: The Soviet Union has been propounding certain notions about the Middle East for a very long time. One can go back 15 or 20 years and find themes that appear in the Soviet Union as well, repeated over and over again.

What is particularly disturbing, and it came out most emphatically during the war in Lebanon, here and in Europe, is that many of those themes that we often took as only representative of the

lunatic fringe in this country began to seep into the reporting concerning Israel with regard to Lebanon and to other issues. I am talking most specifically, and most horribly, about the analogy of Israel to the Nazis, the attempt somehow to portray what Israel was doing in protecting itself against the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as somehow similar to what the Nazis did to the Jews in Europe.

Israel's relations with South Africa is another issue discovered by the Soviet Union. In the 1950s and 1960s, Israel had excellent and very special relations with many Black African countries through its development program. The 1970s, however, brought Arab oil pressure on Black Africa that resulted in Africa's break with Israel. Isolated, Israel did step up its relationship with South Africa. Unfortunately, the U.N. and some in the media sometimes give the impression that the major relationship that South Africa has in the world today is with Israel; this when 0.05 percent of South African trade is with Israel, 99.5 percent is with those other nations, including those usually engaged in criticism of Israel.

The connecting links between these longstanding Soviet themes on the Middle East and growing acceptance of them by the West are two-fold. The Soviet Union today is the center of anti-Semitism in the world. Explicit anti-Semitic jargon and commentary is not uncommon in the Soviet press. In the world-at-large, anti-Semitism is not acceptable. However, the second component, anti-Zionism, is. The Soviets offer a combination of traditional anti-Semitism and the Israel issue as ways to further weaken the West.

If Western media have played into Soviet hands in their Middle East coverage one cannot attribute this exclusively to infiltration by the Soviet Union.

The West starts from an inherent tendency toward self-criticism. We want to maintain a democratic society that does not sink to the level of Soviet-like societies, and we are right to do so.

The Sabra-Shatilla massacre is a case-in-point. Although the killing was done by Lebanese Christians, the Israelis set up a Commission of Inquiry and found indirect Israeli responsibility. Israel emerged stronger from this self-examination process.

Yet if coverage of Israel reveals its every problem, but ignores developments in Syria, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan, we cannot be informed well about the Middle East. Israel's problems are real. But so are problems in the authoritarian, non-democratic, very often, pro-Soviet, anti-Western societies of the region. The public does not get comparable information about these nations. Something must be done to redress this problem. The West's susceptibility to Soviet themes must be undercut. A linkage must be established: a Soviet propaganda attack on Israel is an attack on a Western democracy. By standing up for democracy we are indeed standing up for ourselves.

We must work to make media figures more self-critical. It is not a question of impugning motives but encouraging journalists to examine their role, responsibility, and power. If we can persuade more journalists to look seriously at Soviet disinformation, while presenting democratic nations honestly and within real-world perspectives, then the public will move closer toward a balanced understanding of the problems of the Middle East.

SOVIET DISINFORMATION AND MEDIA REPORTING ON CENTRAL AMERICA

By Joachim Maitre

The Boston Globe (which is not to be confused with Pravda) on May 15, 1984, ran an editorial on the MX missile: "Because of its huge size and its enormous power and accuracy, the MX is a destabilizing weapon ideally designed for use in a first strike.... Too big to be concealed, the MX cannot be saved for a retaliatory second strike. The Pentagon would have to use it first or else lose it to a preemptive enemy attack. The MX thus undermines deterrence by its very existence. The fact that the Soviet Union has a comparable missile does not matter."

This could have been lifted straight, line by line, word for word, from Pravda. It is the official Soviet propaganda line. In a similar vein, The New York Times carried an advertisement attacking NATO's "flexible response" option and in particular advocating "No First Use" of nuclear weapons. The ad claims that "The security of all nations would be enhanced if the U.S. and its allies were to adopt a military strategy that did not rely on nuclear arms to counter a non-nuclear attack." The claim is a blatant untruth, but we do not have to go far to see results of Soviet active measures that actually could have been considered unthinkable only three years ago.

On Central America, the Boston Globe (May 15, 1984) again echoes the Soviet line: "The cynicism and deceit that characterize the Central American policies of the Reagan Administration are evident anew in the Administration's efforts to draw Costa Rica into the vortex of regional war.... What Reagan seeks is not peaceful coexistence between the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua and its neighbors, but an outright war...."

Nonsense like this can be found day after day in Neues Deutschland, in Pravda and in the American "prestige press," The New York Times and The Washington Post. El Salvador has been a favorite topic. Consider Mr. Adam Hochschild (New York Times, December 22, 1983):

"By the most conservative account...more than 30,000 unarmed non-combatant civilians have been killed in four years of civil war in El Salvador, the vast majority of them by Salvadoran Government troops and security men. The regime that Washington is propping up in El Salvador is riddled with corruption that staggers the imagination."

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John B. Oakes, (New York Times, January 28, 1984): "In El Salvador, where army controlled murder of civilians has actually been rising, averaging more than 120 per week at the end of last year...."

Tom Buckley in his new book Violent Neighbors, El Salvador, Central America and the United States: "The Salvadoran police are busier committing homicides than solving them."

Boston Globe (editorial, March 24, 1984): "At the heart, El Salvador's tragedy is that the civilian government itself is only a veneer pasted on the real source of power, the military and security forces."

George McGovern, on revolution in Central America: "Our own country was born in revolution. Why do we have so much trouble coming to terms with revolutions in Central America?"

Finally, McGovern on the rebellion in El Salvador and on the rebels: "I think they are going to win. Why shouldn't they? They have a better case than we had against the British 200 years ago. I hope the revolution in El Salvador will succeed."

It is not accidental that most of the attacks on the government in El Salvador concentrate around the army. It is a basic rule of Leninism that propaganda has to attack the armed forces. A rule not only of Leninism, but also of revolutionary theoreticians on this continent. The Kissinger Commission quoted a Brazilian revolutionary (the quote was taken up nowhere). Let me quote Carlos Marighella in Minimanual of the Cuban Guerrilla published in 1971: Guerillas must transform "the political situation in the country into a military situation in which the militarists appear more and more to be the ones responsible for terror and violence, while the problems and lives of the people become truly catastrophic."

That is indeed the picture you draw from reading the American press on a day-to-day basis. It is a picture you will draw from watching ABC, CBS, PBS, NBC, and so on. Why is this done? Again I do not claim that any of the journalists producing these reports is a member of any communist party. Here are selected items from Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala: In December, on the 21st of December, the Nicaraguan government issued a report stating that an American bishop had been murdered by Contra forces in northern Nicaragua, while trying to lead his flock of two hundred Miskito Indians towards the south, to safety in the south of Nicaragua. Two days later the bishop appeared with a thousand Miskito Indians in Honduras, having miraculously escaped. A week later Nicaragua tried again. The winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Perez Esquivel from Argentina, had visited Nicaragua and had gone on from there to Honduras. Upon arriving in Argentina, he gave a press conference, in which he said that "Honduran security forces had just massacred three hundred Miskito Indians who had tried to come into Nicaragua, escaping "Fascist suppression" in Honduras.

Upon questioning by American diplomats in Argentina Esquivel stated his source: the Foreign Minister of Nicaragua, Miguel d'Escoto. In reality, six Miskito Indians had been killed by Sandinista forces, while trying to escape to Honduras. A leading functionary of the German Social Democratic Party, Henning Scherf, who also happens to be a Minister in the State of Bremen, publicized the piece of disinformation from Esquivel in the German weekly Der Spiegel. I wrote to Scherf twice, asking for clarification. He did not answer. He doesn't have to answer because his story will stick. The lie will continue to live.

As Anthony Lewis wrote in the New York Times in 1983 on Guatemala: "I was told time and again of Guatemalan government soldiers in uniform arriving at a village, rounding up men and women and shooting them. But they apparently don't waste bullets on children. They pick them up by the feet and smash their heads against the wall. Or, they tie ropes around their necks, pull them until they are strangled. We heard of children being thrown in the air and bayoneted." This particular "report" was cross-checked. There was a counter-statement published in the Wall Street Journal: "Various reports tell of children being bayoneted by the Guatemalan army. As I saw for myself, the army does not carry bayonets, nor are their weapons of the type to which a bayonet can be fitted."

The report from which I just quoted is an official United Nations report and was not corrected. The High Commissioner for Refugees had issued this particular report. Anthony Lewis has never been to Guatemala.

Last year, a helicopter carrying two Senators (Chiles of Florida and Johnson of Louisiana) was taking ground fire while flying in the western sector of Honduras. A newspaper, unknown to all of you here, The Press Republican from Plattsburgh, New York, relying upon a UPI wire, wrote that the helicopter had been in Salvadoran air space, in violation of El Salvador's borders. How did The Press Republican in Plattsburgh, New York know that? "Leftist guerrilla Radio Venceremos monitored in El Salvador, charged the helicopters had crossed the border into Morazan province at 4:15 p.m. and were fired on by rebel anti-aircraft units." A very precise description of the location follows.

Radio Venceremos is a chief source for most journalists staying at the Camino Real Hotel in El Salvador. The purpose of this radio station is to deceive. Their efforts are good. The results are better. Whenever there is a battle in El Salvador, and there are less and less now, you will normally see in The Boston Globe, New York Times, Los Angeles Times two accounts. One by the government, one by radio Venceremos. This is considered "balanced reporting." Trouble is, Radio Venceremos has one prime purpose: to deceive.

I will finish on an American reporter's friendly note that visits to the rebels are always happy and sociable occasions. Steven Kinzer, the New York Times' man in Managua, slipped into the southern Salvadoran city of Jucuaran while it was under rebel control for a few days. He described the mood. The rebels "enforce their own simple legal code and dictate wages that planters must pay to laborers, but they have made few other visible efforts to alter traditional patterns of life. The Mayor of Juacaran, a Christian Democrat, has been allowed to retain his office and many of his functions." Even friendlier words from The Boston Globe. Julia Preston has been in rebel territory. She reported from Perquin, El Salvador. "It was well after midnight when they marched through town. their combat boots shuffling over the cobblestones. The moon was still high enough over the hills to light the taut faces of more than two-hundred Salvadoran guerrillas and the M-16 rifles sticking up over their shoulders." Then, of course it is explained that all those rifles had been taken from Salvadoran government troops. Julia Preston has no expertise in weaponry. She wouldn't know an American M-16 assault rifle from a Soviet AK-47.

SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES V. THE FREE PRESS

By Sir James Goldsmith

Freedom of the press is fundamental to protect the citizen against the power of the State. It is a prerequisite to liberty. Unconditionally, we must fight for it.

But how should we react when allies of a totalitarian system try to use the freedom of our press as a protective screen behind which they can conspire to destroy freedom itself? Is the remedy to inhibit freedom of expression? No. The contrary is the case. The remedy is more investigation, more information and more publication of the truth. And for each of us in our own way to draw attention to the facts.

There are lessons to be learned from the conflict between Carthage and Rome. The Carthaginians were a great Semitic people. Their greatest general, Hannibal, led his troops to victory in battles against Rome. But the Carthaginians were a mercantile civilization. They were traders and merchants and they interpreted the motives of the Romans according to mercantile logic. Rome was different. Rome's purpose was military conquest and imperial expansion. This, the Carthaginians were never able to understand and so ultimately Carthage was destroyed.

Today in the West we are like Carthage and Moscow is like Rome. We seem incapable of understanding Moscow's way of thinking. We are mercantile and want to conduct our affairs in peace. We try to set our policies on the premise that the Soviets want to do the same. Every time the Soviets embark on a new "peace" offensive, too many of us are pitifully eager to forget that this is no more than a modulation of Soviet tactics, not a change in their fundamental strategy.

Yet this should not be difficult to perceive. The 1977 Brezhnev Doctrine states officially that it is Soviet Russia's duty to spread the Communist system worldwide without exception. The Brezhnev Doctrine holds that once Communism is established in a country, it becomes irreversible. The USSR would use military means to intervene in any country where Communist rule is threatened. On the other hand, Communist rule must be established in non-Communist countries. To achieve this, the Soviet Union would support "wars of national liberation" by harnessing genuine local revolutionary forces and guiding them to Marxist-Leninism. The Brezhnev Doctrine means that the movement can only go one way.

Nonetheless, many of us still want to believe that the problems that separate us are problems that can be resolved by

negotiation and mutual goodwill. But unfortunately we must realize that we cannot find lasting peace through negotiation because what the Soviets really want we cannot negotiate. We cannot cede to them the right to progressive imperial conquest. We cannot negotiate away our freedom. We must face the fact that the antagonism between our two civilizations is not superficial but fundamental, and that we are condemned to this state of affairs for the long term. There is no easy solution, no quick fix. The only way to peace is by doing whatever is necessary for both sides to realize that war cannot be won.

As a result of the West's defensive power, the Soviets recognize that their most effective current strategy is not armed conflict but instead to weaken us from within.

If they can make us lose our confidence, confuse our sense of purpose, weaken our resolve to defend ourselves, then they can win without armed conflict.

That has been their strategy in Europe. Their plan is clear:

- o Obtain overwhelming military, including nuclear, superiority so as to be able to exercise political blackmail;
- o Attempt to separate the U.S. and Europe and thereby encourage the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe. This would eliminate automatic U.S. involvement in a European war and isolate Europe;
- o Achieve substantial political power in each European country either through local Communist parties, or by infiltrating local socialist parties;
- o Penetrate and if possible dominate the key centers of power and more particular the trade unions, the media, the Civil Service.

If this can be accomplished, Europe would fall like a rotten fruit.

Their methods have been equally clear. Politically they have established Communist parties in each country. In Italy, France, Greece, and Portugal they have grown to a substantial size, gaining between 12 percent and 30 percent of the vote. But whenever candidates, standing under the Communist party label, are unable to succeed at the ballot box, they switch labels and adopt the camouflage of socialism. They penetrate local socialist parties.

Recently in Great Britain, the Cabinet papers for Clement Attlee's period in office as Prime Minister were declassified. They show that Attlee, a moderate Socialist leader, understood and stated clearly, as early as 1950, that as a result of the

lack of electoral support, the Communist Party of the U.K. had changed its strategy from trying to obtain parliamentary representation to infiltrating the Socialist Party and other centers of power.

At the same time the Soviets, through skillful and coordinated use of their political allies and agents of influence, have worked to mold public opinion. Their major propaganda thrusts have been to encourage: unilateral disarmament; neutralism; increased trade with the Soviet bloc; and anti-Americanism.

Anti-Americanism has a double benefit for the Soviets. Its impact in Europe is obvious. But also it encourages isolationism in America. If anti-American demonstrations are orchestrated every time a high profile American official visits Europe, and if the U.S. media give suitable prominence to the demonstrations, then resentment and isolationism are encouraged among Americans. Of course, there will always be some anti-Americanism and some xenophobia, just as there is always some temptation to seek peace by unilateral disarmament. The object of Soviet measures is to use these naturally occurring sentiments and to distort them, exaggerate them and manipulate them so as to serve Soviet purposes. One of their principal tools is propaganda. So they need the media.

Andrei Sakharov, the Nobel Prize winner, smuggled out of Russia what he called his testament to the West. In it he described agents of influence working in the West for Soviet agencies. He wrote "these include some political figures, businessmen and a great many writers and journalists, government advisers and heads of press and T.V."

Also we have the testimony of a number of defectors who have held key positions in Soviet bloc intelligence. Men like Ladislav Bittman who was Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department (Department Eight) of the Czech Intelligence Service. He spent eight years abroad directing and recruiting spies under the control of the KGB. And Stanislav Levchenko who worked as a journalist on the New Times but, in fact, was an important member of the KGB assigned to Tokyo with responsibilities for penetrating the Japanese media. There are many others.

Each one of these men has testified to the importance of recruiting journalists as their agents. Let me quote some extracts from Bittman's testimony. Bittman stated that he

...focused on political figures and journalists. The primary responsibility of these journalists was to publish articles and stories, but their pieces did not emphasize support for Soviet policy. Rather, the major focus concentrated on undermining the United States and NATO, and on creating rifts between West Germany and France or between the United States and its allies.

I provided guidelines for the agents to follow. These consisted of a two or three page outline of objectives and themes to be covered....

A relatively high percentage of secret agents are journalists. A journalist operating in Great Britain, West Germany or the United States is a great asset to Communist Intelligence. He can be investigative, professionally curious, it is his job to get important and even highly sensitive information.

There are many journalists who are agents. There are important newspapers around the world penetrated by Communist intelligence services. There are one or two journalists working for a particular paper and who are agents and who receive from time to time instructions to publish this story or that story....

Levchenko has stated:

In my own case, the most important influence agents I directed were journalists.

A KGB officer generally focuses on recruiting two kinds of journalists. One is the specialist in a particular subject area who possesses both sensitive information and connections with key individuals.... The second type of desired journalist is the individual with a wide following, or one associated with a newspaper with a wide distribution.

In general you provide guidelines, themes and objectives. You make suggestions and discuss how the agent might implement and accomplish the objective.

These intelligence officials backed up their statements by supplying the names of those whom they had employed as agents of influence. Recently, there have been further defectors from Soviet Intelligence who were closely connected with the Soviet propaganda apparatus. They have confirmed the testimony of Bittman and Levchenko and have provided substantial further information.

Sometimes an apparently independent newspaper publishes with regularity articles which must cast doubt on the publication's claimed independence. Such a newspaper is Ethnos, Greece's largest daily tabloid.

Here are some examples of its reportings:

- o On Poland: Solidarity is a union working for the CIA and the Vatican which receives funds from the Mafia. The Pope's historical visit to Poland from 16th June to 23rd June 1983 was not reported.

- o Afghanistan: Afghanistan's resistants are described as a group of bandits whose crimes are similar to those of the Nazis. According to Ethnos there is no Afghan problem. It was artificially created to serve U.S. strategy.
- o The Berlin Wall: Ethnos describes this as the wall of peace which was built to prevent a planned Western attack against East Germany.
- o Soviet Russia: is described as the world's leading peace loving country.
- o The United States: According to Ethnos, Reagan, with the FBI, have muzzled the American people; political liberty in the United States has never been under greater threat; the country is plunging into totalitarianism.
- o The Korean Airlines Jumbo Jet: According to Ethnos, the incident was a deliberate provocation by the CIA to spy on Soviet Russia.
- o Grenada: Ethnos announced that 2,000 people were killed during the first day of the invasion.

A young Greek journalist, Paul Anastasi, carried out an investigation into Ethnos. He published a book in which he alleged that he had uncovered links between the publishers of Ethnos and two important Soviet agents, Boris Pankin, a senior KGB officer, and Vassili Sitnikov, a leading Soviet agent of disinformation operating in Europe. The publishers of Ethnos have sued Paul Anastasi for criminal libel. He has been convicted to a prison sentence which is subject to appeal before the Greek courts. Mr. Anastasi has countersued Ethnos. Let us hope that the Western press will watch these cases with interest and concern.

The Soviets also employ a wide variety of front groups as part of their disinformation apparatus. Each of these organizations plays on genuine matters of concern in our society: peace; trade unions; education of the young; freedom of the press; freedom of worship; women's rights. In the Third World, the Soviets harness genuine revolutionary sentiments so as to guide "wars of national liberation" to Marxist-Leninism. So in the West, they try to harness genuine issues to use them to promote the interests of Marxist-Leninism.

There are a multitude of major Communist front organizations, such as the International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL), the International Radio and Television Organization (ORIT), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) and the International Federation of Resistance Fighters (IFRF).

Each of these organizations has sponsored suborganizations at the international, national and local level and publishes magazines and bulletins. Each of these organizations can be shown to be a Communist front with links to Moscow.

As is normal with the Soviet structure, these organizations are supplemented by another layer of front organizations, which pose as independent western charities and institutes.

An example of a Soviet propaganda campaign was the campaign against the neutron warhead. It was part of the Soviet general campaign at preventing NATO from modernizing its Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (INF). The campaign was led by the World Peace Council who declared the 6th to 13th August 1977, as an international "week of action." It then became a coordinated effort of the whole propaganda apparatus including the use of "agitprop." The sequence of events was:

- 1) Peace councils in various East European states held protest meetings.
- 2) In Istanbul, a peace committee demonstrated in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- 3) In Accra, a group delivered a protest letter to the U.S. embassy.
- 4) In Stuttgart, Frankfurt and Dusseldorf, front groups organized demonstrations in front of the U.S. Consulate General.
- 5) Similar agitation was carried out by front groups in Lima and Tanzania, as well as a Peruvian protest to the United Nations.
- 6) Other major international fronts such as the World Federation of Trade Unions participated in the international week of action.

Also there were the series of Communist-planned conferences in Europe. The target of this effort was the United Nations "Special Session on Disarmament" (SSOD) in New York. Three conferences were organized to provide psychological momentum to the SSOD. The World Peace Council, through one of its sub-fronts, the International Liaison Forum of Peace Forces, organized a symposium in Vienna on "Nuclear Energy and the Arms Race" (in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations body). A larger meeting was staged in Geneva under the group calling itself the "Special Non-Government Organizations Committee for Disarmament." In fact the real organizer was the World Peace Council, aided by the Swiss peace movement. Then there was the "International Forum on the Neutron Bomb" held in Amsterdam. Sympathizers from all over Europe were brought in the meeting, which culminated in a demonstration by 40,000 people. There were many other meetings organized by the World Peace Council used for the same purpose, including one in Mexico City and another in Athens.

All this activity was picked up in the Western media. NATO Secretary-General Luns described this press comment as all consisting of "half truths, untruths and ignorance."

On 8th April 1978 it was announced the President Carter had decided to delay the production and deployment of the neutron warhead.

The chief of the International Department of the Hungarian Communist Party, Janos Bercz, wrote that the "political campaign against the neutron bomb was one of the most significant and successful since World War II."

Another type of propaganda campaign is the type which attempts to discredit an individual.

A good example was the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss. Strauss was a young, up-and-coming Minister in Adenauer's government. In 1956, aged 41, he was promoted to Minister of Defense. As such he made a major speech in the Bundestag calling for the deployment on German soil of U.S. controlled nuclear weapons so as to counterbalance the growing Soviet threat. The disarming and neutering of Europe had already become a primary Soviet strategy. So Strauss became a prime target.

The campaign, which was intensive and long lasting, followed the traditional lines:

- 1) Photos, subsequently proven to be fabrications, depicting Strauss in sexually compromising situations, were published in the East European Communist press and distributed to West Germany.
- 2) Efforts were made to smear Strauss by linking him to a murder trial, the Praun affair. Praun was a dentist charged with a double murder. A journalist ran a story associating Strauss with the case. Strauss took legal action and won the case.
- 3) Efforts were made to impugn Strauss's honesty. In 1962 he was accused by a leftist publication of recommending to the U.S., for a major development project on U.S. bases in Germany, an apartment designer named Lothar Schoss, who was connected to the company Finanzbau A.G. (Fibag). It was suggested that Strauss was to share in the Fibag profits. Judicial and Parliamentary investigations followed and both cleared Strauss of misusing influence. Strauss also won a libel action before the Nuremberg courts.
- 4) It was also suggested that Strauss secretly negotiated to buy for \$375,000 cash the Casa Roccavispa villa in Switzerland. The real estate agent testified in court that he had been surprised to read the entirely false story but he welcomed the publicity.
- 5) Efforts were made to link Strauss with the Lockheed bribery scandal. Compromising documents were circulated and these were subsequently shown to be forgeries.

Strauss was forced to sue for libel on many occasions and won case after case. Ultimately, the Fallex affair, Germany's equivalent of the Pentagon Papers, was Strauss's undoing. Top secret military information was passed to a major German weekly by a Defense Ministry employee. This included details of the NATO evaluation of the military exercise known as Fallex-62. The article which followed was specific and published such information as: Hamburg would not be defended; the timetable for plans to move NATO aircraft to bases that were not normally used; troop transport timetables; and plans for mining Bavarian forests to free U.S. troops there for combat.

Adenauer called the publication of the article an "abyss of treason." Police raided the publication's offices on orders of the Federal Prosecutor. The editor was arrested.

But it was Strauss who was punished. He was accused of overreacting against the press. He subsequently resigned from the Adenauer government. Afterward it was written that "almost everyone concedes that one of the most brilliant postwar political careers in West Germany is in ruins" and that some particularly hostile journalists had "expended time, effort, and money, risking jail and credibility with unsubstantiated charges to prevent Strauss from becoming Chancellor and had won."

General Sejna, the high ranking Czech intelligence defector, testified that the campaign to discredit Franz Josef Strauss was orchestrated by the KGB. The overwhelming majority of the journalists who get caught up in such a campaign do not understand the origins or purpose of the campaign. Those responsible for the publications that are used as platforms usually do not realize that they are being used.

The campaigns often begin as a result of a clear policy decision taken by the Soviet propaganda apparatus. The apparatus brings into play all its assets, both overt and covert. You will find that most of the major themes are developed in a coordinated way in that part of the media which is directly controlled by Communist organizations throughout the world, as well as by the Front organizations and the covert network.

As explained by the defectors such as Levchenko, Bittman and others, the covert activities are initiated by general instructions being given to KGB agents of influence. They start by publishing articles reflecting these instructions. The work of the inner core of agents and front organizations then influences a far larger group of sympathetic left leaning journalists. Those are the people described by Lenin as "useful idiots." They do not realize that they are an extension to the Soviet propaganda apparatus and would indignantly and sincerely reject any such suggestion. Then comes the outer layer consisting of those who follow fashion and seek easy praise.

Responsible journalists are also disinformed by these campaigns. When a journalist works on an article, he refers to the press cuttings file which covers the subject. Once the press cuttings files have been polluted by propaganda, the false information will be repeated and gather further credibility. Responsible journalists inevitably become victims of disinformation.

The media faces a major challenge. But it can defend itself from these campaigns without restricting freedom of expression. With more information, more disclosure, wider publication of the facts, more and better journalism the public will be better equipped to distinguish between news and active measures that distort the news. The media is central to the solution.

It should take certain steps to compensate for the problem.

1) Disclosure of Interests

Those who work in the media should be asked to disclose their interests. Obviously, the idea of invasion of privacy is odious to us all. But are journalists less influential than public servants or businessmen? A recent example gives rise to differences of opinion among reasonable men. Alexander Cockburn is a political journalist who writes, inter alia, for The Village Voice and for The Wall Street Journal. He often comments on world affairs. It was discovered that he had received a grant from the Institute for Palestine Studies. I have no knowledge of this Institute nor of Mr. Cockburn's relationship with it, so I can pass no judgment. But obviously there must be room for different opinions as to whether or not this payment was professionally appropriate. That is proven by the fact that the editors of The Village Voice and of The Wall Street Journal, both of whom were taken by surprise, reacted differently. The Village Voice severed its relationship with Mr. Cockburn whereas The Wall Street Journal maintained it. That is a genuine difference in the assessment of the facts. But how do editors make these judgments if they do not have the facts to assess?

2) The Role of Owner/Publishers and Editors

Owner/publishers and editors have a responsibility for whatever is published in their journal. It is their responsibility to set the standards. Among those standards, they need to consider a requirement to disclose, when desirable, the sources and bias of the material that is published. This concerns both op-ed pages and news pages.

Regularly I see pieces published on the op-ed pages of journals of reference written by authors who are sponsored by the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington. Sometimes that connection remains undisclosed. Sometimes the name of the Institute is published but without explanation. The name of the Institute on its own means little to the average reader. Yet all of us who study these matters know that the Institute for Policy

Studies is a powerful leftist propaganda organization in contact with the Communist bloc. We in Europe know it through its European associate, the Transnational Institute. Of course, there can be no objection to the publication of articles sponsored by them. But the editor should inform his readers as to the sources and bias of the opinions he is publishing.

Editors can have similar problems on their news pages. The London Sunday Times published an article by Mr. Martin Kettle analyzing the recent coal miners strike. This strike is a direct political challenge to the government. The leader of the National Union of Mine Workers is Mr. Arthur Scargill, a Marxist. His Vice President is Mr. Mick McGahey, a leading member of the Executive Committee of the Communist Party in Great Britain (CPGB). Mr. Kettle is a regular contributor to the publication, Marxism Today. This is published by the Communist Party of Great Britain and describes itself as the "theoretical and discussion journal of the Communist Party." Further on in the same issue of The Sunday Times, there was a long article on America and Nicaragua. It was co-authored by Mr. Mark Hosenball. Mr. Hosenball has been closely connected for many years with Mr. Philip Agee, the CIA defector who cooperated with the Communist bloc. The British government, under Prime Minister James Callaghan, took steps to expel from Britain both Mr. Agee and Mr. Hosenball on grounds of national security.

None of this would matter if the articles had been published in a journal well known for publishing the work of far left authors. But The Sunday Times is a great national institution. Most of its readers would expect the articles they read in The Sunday Times to be objective journalism written by objective journalists. Unfortunately over the past decade, The Sunday Times recruited a number of people from a different culture to that of the paper's heritage.

3) The Role of Schools of Journalism

Part of the curriculum for training journalists should be a course on propaganda and Active Measures. It should teach how to identify them and how to defend against them. Of course, this should not be restricted to Soviet or far left propaganda.

4) The Role of Journalists

In a free country the best remedy is wide publication of the facts. Journalists should investigate and publish. But they face a problem. There is a tradition of forbidden areas. Dog must not eat dog. Not only is it unpopular to expose a colleague or journal but it is also difficult to find papers who would publish your material. Investigation should not be concentrated on the unpopular. It takes no courage to be fashionable.

Courage resides in saying the truth that does not please. It can make you a pariah in the eyes of your peers. Yet that precisely is the duty of a free press and the only justification for its existence.