

The Heritage Lectures

37

The Second Reagan Administration Europe, East-West Relations, and National Security

Richard V. Allen



The Heritage Foundation is one of the country's leading public policy research institutes. With offices just two blocks from the United States Capitol, The Heritage Foundation's research and studies programs are designed to make the voices of responsible conservatism heard in Washington, D.C., throughout the United States, and in the capitals of the world.

The key to Heritage's research effort is timeliness—providing the policy-making community with up-to-date research on the important issues of the day. Heritage publishes its findings in a variety of formats for the benefit of decision makers, the media, the academic community, businessmen, and the public at large. Over the past five years The Heritage Foundation has published more than 400 books, monographs, and studies, ranging in size from the 1,093-page government blueprint, *Mandate for Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administration*, to more frequent "Critical Issues" monographs and the topical "Backgrounders" and "Issue Bulletins" of a few thousand words. Heritage's other regular publications include *National Security Record*, *Policy Digest*, *Education Update*, and *Policy Review*, a quarterly journal of analysis and opinion.

The Heritage Foundation's 100-member staff—which includes several internationally recognized scholars and former government officials—concentrates on four areas of general study: domestic and economic policy; foreign policy and defense; the United Nations; and Asian studies. With some 1,600 individual scholars and research organizations working with its Resource Bank, The Heritage Foundation is uniquely equipped to provide U.S. policy makers with the intellectual resources needed to guide America into the 21st century.

In addition to the printed word, Heritage regularly brings together national and international opinion leaders and policy makers to discuss issues and ideas in a variety of formal and informal settings. Through a continuing series of seminars, lectures, debates, and briefings, The Heritage Foundation provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and a laboratory for developing these ideas into practical public policy proposals.

The Heritage Foundation was established in 1973 as a nonpartisan, tax-exempt policy research institute dedicated to the principles of free competitive enterprise, limited government, individual liberty, and a strong national defense. Heritage is classified as a Section 501(c)(3) organization under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, and is recognized as a publicly supported organization described in Sections 509(a)(1) and 170(b)(1)(A)(vi) of the Code. Individuals, corporations, companies, associations, and foundations are eligible to support the work of The Heritage Foundation through tax-deductible gifts.

**The Second
Reagan Administration
Europe, East-West Relations,
and National Security**

Richard V. Allen

Presented to the
Fifth International Symposium on Policy and Strategy
of the
Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung
Munich, November 8, 1984

Richard V. Allen is Distinguished Fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Assistant to the President for national security affairs during the first year of the Reagan administration, Mr. Allen writes and lectures on U.S.-Asian policy for Heritage and serves as chairman of Heritage's Asian Studies Center Advisory Council. He is also a senior counselor for foreign policy and national security affairs for the Republican National Committee. Mr. Allen was a member of the President's Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy and a senior staff member of the National Security Council during the Nixon administration.

ISSN 0272-1155

Copyright © 1984 by The Heritage Foundation

The Second Reagan Administration: Europe, East-West Relations, and National Security

Richard V. Allen

My theme concerns the priorities, the problems, and the opportunities for the security policy of a second Reagan Administration. It is not my intention to dwell upon the spectacular results of the elections held in the United States less than forty-eight hours ago, but you will understand that I consider the context and the impact of those elections to be of profound importance to the task you have given me today.

For one who participated so intimately both in the long campaign that led to the first Reagan Administration and its first year, and indirectly in its affairs during the subsequent three years, the renewal of Ronald Reagan's mandate by such a convincing margin is a source of great satisfaction. It is obvious that the electorate in America has spoken in an unmistakable way, that the overwhelming majority of the American people finds itself at ease with the policies of the Reagan Administration, and is satisfied to the extent that it wants four more years of the same kind of policies and leadership.

As we all realize, merely wanting more of the same does not automatically produce it; there are important obstacles in the path of sustaining growth in our economy, momentum in the restoration of our defenses, and confidence in the nation's leadership. So, now that the shouting and the confusion of the electoral season is behind us, we quite naturally begin to wonder what lies ahead.

Perhaps it is best to begin the analysis with a brief look at the situation confronting the Reagan Administration as it took office in January 1981.

The combined effects of an economy that did not work, especially with interest rates higher than 20 percent; inflation growing at an unprecedented rate; a defense establishment that had been demoralized by years of underfunding; a foreign policy characterized by years of indecision; and both respect for, and confidence in, America at an all-time low—all these conditions weighed heavily on the nation that was expected to lead the Free World and to energize the global economy.

I cannot in good faith argue that all of America's problems were caused by Jimmy Carter. Actually, many of these problems had begun in the

Johnson, Nixon, and Ford Administrations, and rather than being corrected during the Carter years, they actually were exacerbated and compounded. But it was very clear that the American people, and many Europeans, Asians, and others as well, wanted significant change.

In the past several years my friends and I have often argued with this Administration's critics about whether the results of the 1980 Presidential election constituted a mandate for Ronald Reagan's programs as represented in the party platform of that year. I think it was, and I believe that the results of Tuesday's elections were clear proof that the mandate for change was embedded in the results. If this is correct, it follows that the mandate has been renewed, and that the course to be charted is one of continuity, for more of the same, for consistency. This is going to make some people unhappy, but then those people were also very unhappy when Ronald Reagan was elected the first time.

Thus, when the Reagan Administration came to office, it confronted a delicate situation: American hostages in Iran had been released, essentially because the Iranian rulers believed that the new Administration would act decisively; but the situation in Afghanistan was unchanged; the revolutionaries in Central America pledged an "irreversible" situation in the region, with special reference to El Salvador; and in Poland the threat of a Soviet invasion to crush the resistance of the Solidarity movement seemed likely.

As with any new Administration, this one required a period of time to settle in and to become familiar with the terrain. Internal disputes within the foreign policy establishment conveyed a sense of disorganization and even confusion, and occasionally sent the wrong signals to our friends abroad.

The Soviet Union reacted sharply to the first initiatives of the Administration, condemning its decision to begin rebuilding our defenses and to reaffirm U.S. commitments abroad. While the Administration placed its highest priority on the domestic economic program and the accompanying tax cuts required to make it work, the defense program was the beneficiary of urgent, but quiet, priority status as well. By late summer the choices were presented to the President and he selected the major programs now in motion. They are well known: the MX missile, the B-1 and so-called "Stealth" bombers, a 600-ship Navy, additional funds for modernization of command and control, and other programs.

Although the Reagan defense increases have been attacked in various quarters, in real terms those increases still are less than those proposed by Jimmy Carter in January 1981, and compared with what the Soviets are doing, the U.S. has not achieved a buildup to meet the needs of the next decade.

President Reagan came to office in 1981 convinced that the Soviet Union must be persuaded to abandon a policy of unrestrained military growth in favor of realistic negotiations to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides. The goal of reducing weapons, rather than just limiting them as SALT and SALT II sought to accomplish, was immediately criticized by the arms control lobby as “unrealistic” and “demanding too much.” After all, these critics argued, we already know that the Soviet Union will not accept on-site inspection, and therefore to insist on such a condition in the face of the historical behavior of the Soviet Union was simply wrong.

If it is not to be reductions, the President argued, then how will our future security be assured by arms agreements? Was this to be a public relations exercise, one in which we would be called upon to make repeated concessions to demonstrate our good will and benign intentions, meanwhile not angering the Russians—and therefore “spoiling” the chances for an agreement—by insisting that any agreement be verifiable?

He flatly rejected the fashionable notion that some agreement is better than no agreement and, as a result, came under fire from every quarter as a stubborn “anticommunist” who would not negotiate. In reality, of course, he had already begun his secret correspondence with Leonid Brezhnev in an effort to determine what the Soviet leadership actually wanted.

The central question in our relationship with the Soviet Union—and therefore the central question with respect to Europe’s relations with the Soviet Union—is the question of preserving peace. Mr. Reagan had stated his views clearly: arms reduction must replace arms control, and while the Russians got used to this new approach of an American leader who did not view arms talks as a domestic political problem (or opportunity), the United States would spare no effort in restoring momentum to its own defense efforts. In other words, the United States would no longer defer the research, development, and deployment of advanced weapons systems solely on the basis of the hope or expectation that, sooner or later, the Soviets would come to their senses and acknowledge that their military buildup goes far beyond their defensive needs.

With significant domestic consensus on the need for increased efforts in the field of defense, the U.S. Administration prepared initiatives on strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons negotiations with the Soviet Union. The 1979 Double Track decision of NATO was reaffirmed, and in late 1981 the President proposed the “Zero Option” to cover the intermediate sector, while developing specific proposals for strategic weapons. As we know, the Soviet Union consistently criticized these

proposals, and by the end of 1983 walked out of the arms talks, declaring that the United States must assume the responsibility for their failure. The Soviets were not without their friends in the United States and even here in Europe. Many argued that the United States had put forth "one-sided," or "unfair" and "unrealistic" proposals. I can recall the response of one United States Senator of the liberal Democrat persuasion. As I briefed him on the "Zero Option," he said, "But isn't that very unfair to the Soviets, to ask that they dismantle weapons they already have in place in exchange for our not deploying cruise and Pershing missiles?"

The result has been, of course, that we have now gone more than four years without any significant progress in arms talks with the Soviets. Do we therefore have a right to expect that things will be different in the future, and that the Reagan Administration will be capable of breaking what seems to be an impasse? At the same time, is it possible that the Soviets will drop their own precondition that the cruise and Pershing missiles must be limited severely, "frozen" at present levels, or dismantled altogether as a precondition for returning to the negotiating table? In this connection, we must be very careful that we do not end up negotiating with ourselves on the matter of concessions to the Soviets merely to get them to agree to talk again.

There has been considerable criticism of the United States position regarding its sincerity at the bargaining table. In prior negotiations, the United States always seemed to find a way to induce the Soviets to stay with the process, to continue discussions, somehow persuading them that an agreement could in fact be reached if only the two sides would persist.

But this time the attitude of the United States was different. There was no fear of domestic political repercussions in the event of a Soviet walkout, because the Administration was prepared to argue that its stand was correct, and that the unreasonableness was solely on the part of the Soviets. The calculated risk for the Soviets was clear; if they would be unable to place the blame on the United States, they, the Soviets, would be perceived as the party being unreasonable.

The persistence of the Allied governments was something the Administration in Washington could appreciate. Although Bonn and London and Rome obviously would prefer to have Washington and Moscow in permanent talks, there was a clear recognition that a firm and convincing Allied stand would be required to avoid polarizing the Western point of view. In the face of continuous press and peace movement criticism, the Allies managed to remain firm, and now are beginning to understand and appreciate the importance of their tough and principled stand.

I should like to underscore the importance of Allied cohesion in the

face of a Soviet walkout, because it demonstrates that the Alliance is alive and well in the face of constant centrifugal forces and separate interests. This cohesion makes possible a united and resolute stand when talks resume, and demonstrates that the Alliance cannot be split by Soviet pressure tactics and threats.

We frequently have disagreements on important matters in our respective relations with the Soviets; the Yamal pipeline stands as a notable example. But on the central issues pertaining to our security and survival, it has been demonstrated that we are able to stand together. NATO will always face such challenges, and it is important testimony to the durability of the Alliance that we have been successful thus far.

There is no question that the peoples of the Western countries want progress on arms talks with the Soviet Union. We all have peace movements, and you have your special problems of the Greens here in Germany. We have all been through the delicate ordeal of debating with the proponents of a nuclear freeze, although their influence has declined in recent months. And we have just completed our election, during which the winning candidate promised to try to get things moving again in the field of disarmament. What will he actually do after January 20, 1985?

To assess what will happen in the next Reagan Administration, we must now engage in a few predictions and try to focus on the priorities.

If we have in fact renewed the mandate to President Reagan, much will depend upon the team he selects to carry it out. In this respect, continuity of policy implies continuity of personnel: the team will remain essentially in place as it is today. I believe that Secretary of State Shultz and Secretary of Defense Weinberger will remain in place. Another key player on the national security team, CIA Director Casey, also will stay for the time being. As the top men will stay, we can expect that their respective teams will remain, and there will be no significant departures from the second and third levels of the national security team.

Unlike the situation in 1981, when the new team required many months to settle in and to begin to develop and implement policy, this time there will be no delay, and the Administration will be ready for business immediately after the Inauguration of the President on January 20th.

Alliance Policy

In my view, there will be no meaningful change in policy toward Europe and the Atlantic Alliance. There is no reason for change, and I therefore expect any new initiatives to be aimed at consolidating the achievements of the past two years.

It is a certainty that Europe will be pressed by Washington to do still more in the field of defense, and to synchronize basic policy approaches to the Soviet Union, especially in the field of trade and credits. As the economic recovery gains momentum and its effects are felt in Europe, there will be an increasing tendency to resume what Europe feels should be "normal" trade relations with Moscow, if for no other reason than to assist in the acceleration of economic growth. Certain sensitive sectoral trade will continue to affect the political cohesion of the Alliance, and I anticipate new efforts by the Reagan Administration to unify our understanding and our policies in this regard. In its present economic condition, the Soviet Union should not be given gifts; we must make our trade count in the strategic calculus, making it serve the policy goals on which we can agree.

Asia: A Rival for Europe?

There can be no mistake about the renewed interest of the United States in Asia, and that the Administration is engaged in a major, long-term effort to formulate a coherent and effective policy toward this region. One does not need to say more about the importance of Asia than to mention that, as a region, Asia constitutes the most important trading partner of the United States, and will likely remain in the position for years to come. The dynamism of Asian economies, especially when contrasted with other parts of the world, signifies that important things are happening there, and that the United States must respond with a coherent approach.

While we never completely lost our interest in Asia, the setback in Vietnam weighed heavily upon the nation; we had suffered an ignominious defeat in a region we thought vital to our interests, but had failed to understand the basic purpose of our presence there. The public and the Congress lost interest, and support for an American involvement disappeared. Under those conditions, withdrawal was the only course of action. For almost ten years we looked elsewhere, avoiding Asia except to pursue our economic interests.

Now the situation is different, but I am afraid that some Europeans suspect the United States of turning away from the continent to embrace Asia instead. I think there is a very real possibility that American attentions could shift even more toward Asia if things in Europe are thought to be going badly, but we have not reached that stage yet.

We have become fascinated with Asia and its impressive growth, and we are beginning to feel the effects of Asian competition. We also are deeply concerned with the overall security situation in Asia, and when we speak

of security policy we cannot just stop after mentioning Europe. But Asia is remote to you in these terms; you do not see it as we do, and you certainly will find this situation increasingly troublesome in the years ahead.

While I realize this is not a burning issue with Europeans, I must nevertheless mention some aspects of our thinking regarding Asia. I have already remarked that Asia is our largest regional trading partner, and we have important and traditional ties with Asian nations. We also have some individual problems: the bilateral trade deficit with Japan could reach \$40 billion this year; our trade deficit with Taiwan alone will reach nearly \$10 billion, and with the Republic of Korea it will be almost \$4 billion. Apart from Canada, Japan is our single most important individual trading partner; but Taiwan is sixth, and Korea seventh.

The People's Republic of China is entering a new relationship with the United States, based on both economic and security considerations. The six Southeast Asian nations known as ASEAN also are extending their relationship with the United States, and we are deeply troubled about the future course of one of them, the Philippines, where we have two vital and irreplaceable military bases that contribute directly to Asian stability.

We watch with growing concern the extension of Soviet military power into Southeast Asia. With its facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, the Soviet Union has gained an important foothold. The Soviet fleet, complete with large numbers of nuclear submarines, prowls the entire Asian coast, complicating our security assignment there. And Japan, with which we have a defense security agreement, will require many years before it can develop the domestic consensus for a strong defense. It is constrained by a traditional reluctance to increase spending beyond one percent of Gross National Product, and faces additional problems generated by the enduring suspicion of several Asian countries, the remnants of the bitter experiences of World War II.

To Europeans who find this unsettling I would respond: do not believe idle threats about turning American attention away from Europe because we are disappointed with your response to our policies, or simply because we find the grass in Asia to be greener and more inviting than among our traditional allies. Nor should you respond to the fashionable arguments that Europe is "tired," or "on the point of exhaustion," offering nothing because of a lingering malaise. Too much has been made of "Euro-fatigue" already, and thinking Americans know better than to conclude that the continent has run out of energy, ideas, and motivation.

But please do understand that we are serious about the pursuit of our interests in Asia, and that it is a region that is absolutely vital to our security—and to yours, although indirectly so.

Central America

No discussion of security policy can ignore the profound importance of the Caribbean, Central and South America to the United States. At the same time, no discussion should overlook the fact that the United States has not had a coherent policy toward the region for many years, and in the case of Central America one could even argue that we have had absolutely no policy since the end of World War II.

Now that has changed. Whereas the Carter Administration actually refused to identify Central America as a vital U.S. interest in the same sense that the Persian Gulf is a vital interest, the Reagan Administration lost no time in rectifying the error. Unfortunately, opinions in the United States (and elsewhere) became rapidly polarized when Alexander Haig declared our problems there to be a classic confrontation between communism and democracy, and the credibility of American efforts was soon put in jeopardy.

Eventually our aims became clear. What was seen by many as a hopeless situation in El Salvador has been turned around, and democracy is on the march in that country. We have to thank the efforts of the moderate and conservative parties of Western Europe, including the CSU and the CDU as well as the European Democratic Union and the International Democratic Union under Alois Mock, for their very important contributions to the support and stabilization of the government of Napoleon Duarte.

We have pursued a policy of opposition to the excesses of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. It is a Marxist-Leninist regime, and it has as an important goal the destabilization of the region. This is unacceptable to the United States, and we have stated our case. The opponents of this policy include, naturally, the Cubans, the Sandinistas, the Soviets and their friends—and Herr Willy Brandt and his colleagues of the Socialist International, whose purpose I frequently have a hard time in distinguishing from that of the senior members of the curious coalition with which Mr. Brandt finds himself aligned.

I foresee, and can recommend, no significant change in U.S. policy toward the Sandinistas, nor do I wish to turn this discussion into one about the region, which we identify as vital to U.S. interests. But please remember that it was the Reagan Administration that instituted the Caribbean Basin Program, and it has been during the four years of the Reagan Administration that the forces of democracy have made such impressive gains in all of Latin America. Finally, it was this Administration that drew the line with respect to the security of the Caribbean

nations, and intervened to preserve the democratic process in Grenada. We do not hear much about it any more, but the nations of the region continue to praise this resolute and determined action by the United States. I have the unhappy memory of the German Foreign Minister expressing his distaste and opposition to what we did in Grenada until a certain Bavarian statesman spoke out forcefully in support of the United States, insisting that it was absurd for Germany to distance itself from the American action in Grenada.

East-West Relations

Having already spoken at length about East-West relations over the course of the past four years, I will offer only a few notions about what one might reasonably expect as the next steps in a new Reagan Administration.

I believe that the time has come for a summit. In fact, I suggested publicly during the past year that a summit should occur, but with one major condition: that it have no agenda at all.

This runs counter to the conventional wisdom on the subject, to be sure. We are told constantly that summits must be carefully prepared, that we must know the outcome before they take place, and indeed, the press communiques should be negotiated before the leaders meet. That was standard procedure for the summity of yesterday, when summits were seen in the context of domestic politics, but it clearly is inadequate for today.

The purpose of a summit of the type I am advocating would be to "break the ice," to reduce pressures and tension. Because it would be a summit without an agenda, and without agreements to sign and without communiques, it could provide the opportunity for a careful examination of the outstanding issues, and would give the leaders on both sides the opportunity to assess the other's character and disposition.

If an agenda were to develop in the talks, it would be limited to what one might talk about in the future and on what level the issues would be discussed. There is no need to go further than this; and there is no guarantee that the occasion would necessarily be a happy one for either side. As long as there is nothing specific to negotiate at such a meeting, it would be difficult for the Soviets to exploit it for their own purposes. To be sure, there would be some minimal posturing on each side and conceivably even a propaganda barrage following, but what harm is there in that?

At the very minimum, such a meeting would erase the charge that President Reagan is unwilling to meet, and remove the suspicion that the

Soviet leader, whoever he may be at the time, is incapable of meeting with the President.

If such a summit could not take place, then there are other options for testing the water.

Exploratory discussions, at an appropriate level, are scheduled for the beginning of next year, and may lead to additional talks on other subjects.

By now, in the wake of the U.S. election, or certainly very soon, the Soviets will have come to the realization that there is no alternative to the Reagan Administration until at least January 1989. Can the Soviet Union afford to stay away from serious negotiations for such a long time, especially in view of the continuing momentum behind the U.S. defense program? Or can the Soviet Union afford complacency in view of the new direction in long-range American policy, especially the program known as "Star Wars" or the Strategic Defense Initiative?

We must remember that pressures are also building in the United States for some new initiative to induce the Soviets to sit down with us and to negotiate seriously. But there is no disposition whatever to revive the sterile and misguided detente policy of the 1970s. Note that I speak of the policy of detente, not of the actual process of relaxing tensions, because there is a profound difference. As an instrument of policy, detente should always be a goal, but what came to be known as the detente policy of the 1970s, complete with its discredited theories of interdependence, convergence and the like, was a colossal failure and left us with only the fancy theories and no results—and therefore less secure than before.

In my view, President Reagan will consult closely with the Allies on every phase of negotiating with the Soviets. He will do this not to make Europe feel good, but to draw upon your combined experience, judgment and wisdom on the subject. He will not seek an agreement at the expense of Europe; he enjoys an advantage of time, and an equally important advantage of being free from political constraints as he seeks to protect our collective long-range security.

Finally, if you ask what criteria will be employed for an arms control agreement, I can respond by saying only that the same criteria that ought to govern any agreement apply also in this case: it must be one that reduces arms, is balanced and equitable and, most of all, one that must be verifiable. Without reliable verifications, there will be no agreement signed by President Reagan.

What Should Europe Expect From The United States?

In this paper I have suggested that the re-election of Ronald Reagan is a good sign for Europe; I believe that this is so, although I urge Europeans

to recognize that unsettling and worrisome pressures for change in the substance and the form of our commitments can be detected.

For example, the Nunn Amendment, the reincarnation of the Mansfield Amendment, has been defeated but the sentiment that motivates it has not disappeared. The arguments as to why it is not good for you or for us need not be repeated here, but I expect that we will be hearing of it again in 1985 and beyond.

There is also a risk that security issues can become linked to trade issues, as has been the case with Japan. This is a very difficult linkage to break once it has been made in the minds of legislators who have narrow constituent interests at heart, and I could easily foresee a legislative vehicle such as the Nunn Amendment gather new strength because of trade considerations.

I must also say a word about the phenomenon of anti-Americanism. Whether it is real or perceived, we are beginning to display a high degree of sensitivity to the extreme forms of opposition to our policies. But the extremist critique does not stop with our policy; it attacks our democracy, our economy, our way of life, our leaders, and even our people. There are important considerations involved here, and I do not believe that the phenomenon is either as deeply rooted or as widespread as press reports suggest.

But you must understand that our media do a disgracefully inadequate job of reporting on and analyzing events in Europe, and particularly in Germany. Our media, with a few exceptions, are not motivated by an anti-German bias; they simply do not care about what goes on here, or they do not consider what happens to be newsworthy. In many cases, there is little understanding of the process of European politics. The situation is lamentable and unforgivable, but it is the objective reality with which you must deal.

Therefore, every expression of opposition to U.S. policy, and especially every demonstration of consequence, is presented on U.S. television as further evidence of "growing anti-Americanism." We never hear the views of an average German or Frenchman about these issues; but we do hear from the likes of Petra Kelly, Oskar Lafontaine, and Egon Bahr.

Something else must be done to demonstrate to Americans that we are not despised and hated by the average European and the average German. Both the public and the private sectors in this country have a never-ending task in reaffirming the importance of the German-American relationship.

If I leave you feeling badly about this matter, allow me to offer the consolation that our friends in North America, the Canadians, also find us

an impossible people. Canada is our most important trading partner, our neighbor, and Ottawa is just one hour by air from Washington, and yet we almost never read an article or see a television program about that country.

The Strategic Defense Initiative

I must say a few words about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), because it is an issue that seems to trouble some Europeans and because of the way it has been presented in this country.

The President announced SDI as a policy in March 1983, and then left it to the press, the critics and the Soviets to explain and attack it. The result was an unfortunate and simplistic description of an extraordinarily important policy declaration. Any new policy, and especially one of this profound importance, must be enunciated clearly, then repeatedly explained, clarified and defended.

In my opinion, the United States lost the initiative in this crucial aspect of public information and understanding, not only in Europe but also in the United States. This is politically unfortunate, but it is not beyond redemption.

The public impression seems to be that the SDI involves the militarization of outer space by deploying nuclear weapons, and other weapons of mass destruction there. Whether from malice or misunderstanding, even Walter Mondale and his running mate, Geraldine Ferraro, attempted to depict it in this way.

Succinctly put, the SDI is a program of non-nuclear space and land-based defense that will employ the full range of modern technology to track and destroy enemy missiles once they have been fired. It is a program that enjoys huge and decisive support among the American people when it is explained in an unbiased and objective manner. The Platform of the Republican Party expresses strong support for the SDI, and the Congress has given its approval for the program to get under way.

But now I come to an important point: I would like to ask that Europeans, and especially German commentators in the Government and outside it do two things:

(a) Please stop calling the SDI by the name "Star Wars," which conveys a very inadequate impression; and

(b) Please stop describing this proposal as destabilizing or dangerous. Apart from being simply wrong, it also sends the wrong signals to your public, to ours, and to the Soviet Union.

The SDI is not a space fantasy, and it is certainly not a program designed to make America an isolated and invulnerable fortress, leaving

Europe to its own defenses to face a superior Soviet military machine. The SDI does represent an alternative defense posture for the United States and its allies, and it is a strategy representing the antithesis of Mutual Assured Destruction, in which security is to be achieved by holding our populations hostage to nuclear attack by the Soviet Union.

It is inconsistent to argue, as many do, that the United States spends too much on defense—especially on offensive weapons systems that many agree will not provide us with true security or stability—and at the same time oppose the SDI, which takes us precisely in the direction of seeking security through better defense. Why should Europeans oppose better defense?

As President Reagan said in his March 1983 speech, “Would not it be better to save lives than to avenge them? Are we not capable of demonstrating our peaceful intentions by applying all our abilities and our ingenuity to achieving a truly lasting stability?”

Finally, it is the obligation of European leaders to become fully briefed on this new strategic proposal, and then explain it to the public. The second Reagan Administration must lead this effort, and do so by engaging in a major information program at home and abroad.

In conclusion, let me express the hope and the expectation that the next four years will bring the United States and Europe into a new positive and mature attitude toward each other. We have to accept unconditionally and joyfully the reality of mutual interdependence, and the bonds of alliance, friendship, and partnership.

This union is indissoluble by mutual choice, strategic necessity, and historical reality. Yet, to keep the union free from the disintegrating effect of familiarity or negativism, we must now begin a series of new initiatives in quite specific areas to enhance our mutual alliance interests, and therefore our individual national interests.

But that is another subject for another time.

37

The Heritage Lectures

As Ronald Reagan is about to begin his second term in the White House, Washington observers ask the question, "What can we expect from the new Administration?" Just as curious are America's allies and adversaries.

Just two days after the Reagan landslide, the President's former National Security Advisor, Richard V. Allen, addressed West German scholars and policy makers in Munich. His remarks, reprinted in this volume, very likely preview the Second Reagan Administration's foreign policy directions.

The re-election of Ronald Reagan, says Allen, is a good sign for Europe. The Administration will now build on the policies it set down during its first term. Europe, however, must do its part. Support from America's European allies is important for several key initiatives. Among them: the Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative and talks with the Soviet Union. Allen advocates an "agenda-less" summit between the superpowers to allow discussions without the pressures of formal, orchestrated meetings.

Over the next four years, Allen hopes, the bonds of interdependence, friendship, and partnership will draw the United States and Europe ever closer together.


The Heritage Foundation

214 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. • Washington, D.C. 20002