


# The Heritage Lectures

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**A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION**



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# SALT II

## Rest in Peace

### A ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

Colin Gray  
James Hackett  
Seymour Weiss  
William Van Cleave

The Louis Lehrman Auditorium  
The Heritage Foundation  
March 22 1985

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**Dr. William R. Van Cleave** is professor of international relations and director of the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at the University of Southern California. He is also a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution and an adjunct scholar of The Heritage Foundation. Dr. Van Cleave was a member of the first U.S. delegation to the SALT talks and is the co-author of two recent books on strategic defense.

**Ambassador Seymour Weiss** is President of the SY Corporation, a defense consulting firm. Ambassador Weiss served with the Department of State as Director of the Office of Politico-Military Affairs and as Ambassador to the Bahamas. He has authored articles on strategic issues and serves as a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

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# Introduction: SALT II, R.I.P.

President Jimmy Carter journeyed to Vienna in June 1979, where he and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or SALT II as it is commonly known. This culminated nearly seven years of U.S. negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. A major debate on the merits of SALT II followed. At its center were extensive Senate hearings. There a large number of prominent Americans of varying political persuasions warned that the treaty's conceptual flaws would give a considerable advantage to the Soviets. Among those testifying against SALT II were such prominent public figures as Henry Kissinger, Paul Nitze, Gen. Edward Rowny, Adm. Elmo Zumwalt, and Eugene Rostow.

As the debate progressed and the accord's weaknesses were uncovered, it became apparent that SALT II could not win the necessary Senate approval. After Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, even Carter acknowledged that Moscow was scarcely fit as a treaty partner and asked the Senate to defer consideration of the agreement. The Senate never again was asked to ratify SALT II. Thus, it never acquired the force of law and was not binding. Despite this, SALT II has been treated as if it were a ratified treaty. Carter and Brezhnev stated that they would take no action to undercut the agreement as long as the other side did the same. This has remained official U.S. policy ever since.

Ronald Reagan in his 1980 primary and general election efforts campaigned against SALT II. He denounced it as a "fatally flawed" treaty. Shortly after his election in November 1980, however, it became clear that his fledgling Administration was divided on whether to continue honoring the unratified agreement. Navy Secretary John Lehman branded SALT II a dead letter. The State Department, on the other hand, under Secretary of State Alexander Haig, announced that the U.S. would continue the "no undercut" policy. Haig said it was not wise to replace something (SALT II) with nothing. Later he found an additional rationale: that continued U.S. compliance with SALT II would help create a favorable atmosphere for the START nuclear arms reduction talks. START began in Geneva in May 1982 and ended in December 1983, when the Soviet delegates refused to return to the table. Their reason was that the U.S. would not stop deploying its Pershing II ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in Europe's NATO countries. Clearly, therefore, the

fact that the U.S. voluntarily was obeying the unratified SALT II had no effect on the Soviet attitude in the START talks.

In the meantime, Washington gradually became aware of a growing pattern of Soviet SALT II violations. Since January 1984, Reagan has issued three reports detailing extensive Soviet violations of arms control agreements, including SALT II. Because the U.S. was obeying SALT II, American development, testing, and deployment of improved weapons were seriously constrained. This has been giving Moscow an important advantage in its drive for strategic superiority.

How much the U.S. is prepared to continue allowing SALT II to benefit Moscow is something that the Reagan Administration must soon decide. In September 1985, America's newest strategic submarine, the new Trident *USS Alaska*, is to begin sea trials. Once it is at sea, the U.S. will exceed the ceiling on multiple-warhead ballistic missiles imposed by SALT II. To remain under this ceiling, the U.S. will have to destroy a useful and viable part of its existing nuclear deterrent, even though overall Soviet offensive nuclear power is far greater. In 1986, SALT II similarly will limit the U.S. deployment of air-launched cruise missiles and in 1987 it will prevent the testing of America's new mobile missile, the Midgetman, even though Moscow is already deploying its own mobile ICBM, the SS-25, in violation of SALT II. That is, unless the U.S. recognizes what the Soviets have understood all along—that an unratified treaty binds no one.

Even had SALT II been ratified, moreover, the agreement would expire at the end of 1985. The issue this raises is whether the U.S. will continue complying with an unratified agreement after its termination date. Moscow already has given its answer; it is ignoring SALT II in many critical areas. Only the U.S. is being constrained by the accord in its military modernization program. Still, there are those outside and even inside the Reagan Administration who recommend that the U.S. continue to abide by SALT II, although it is unratified, beyond its scheduled expiration date.

To discuss whether the Reagan Administration should voluntarily obey or bury SALT II, The Heritage Foundation invited four distinguished experts on national security and arms control to participate in a Roundtable on March 28, 1985. Their consensus is that SALT II, at its scheduled expiration, should Rest In Peace. The Heritage Foundation is pleased to present the transcript of their discussion in the hope that it will contribute to the dialogue on this important policy issue.

Burton Yale Pines  
Vice President  
The Heritage Foundation

**James Hackett:** I welcome you to this Heritage Foundation Roundtable. I would like to start with a little background. The SALT II discussions began in November 1972 and lasted nearly seven years, concluding with the SALT II agreement signed by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev at Vienna in June 1979. An intense debate followed in the United States Senate with such authorities as Henry Kissinger and Paul Nitze expressing concerns about the deficiencies and unequal nature of the agreement. It became clear that a two-thirds vote of the Senate would not be forthcoming and, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, President Carter stopped seeking Senate approval for SALT II. However, both Carter and Brezhnev issued statements that they would not undercut the SALT II agreement if the other side would not undercut it.

After President Reagan was elected on a platform that opposed SALT II as an unequal treaty, he was advised by then-Secretary of State Alexander Haig to continue the no undercut policy on the grounds that he should not replace something, SALT II, with nothing. In 1982, then-Secretary of State Haig argued that continuing the no undercut policy could create a favorable atmosphere for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks, that were then about to begin. However, after eighteen months of START, the Soviets walked out of those negotiations. U.S. compliance with SALT II had not favorably affected the negotiations.

Now, six years after the Senate failed to approve SALT II, we are still unilaterally complying with all provisions of that unratified agreement. We are in a new round of negotiations with Moscow, and again the President is saying that he will take no action that might undercut the talks. Whether that means continuing to comply with SALT II after it expires this December, we don't know. The President has indicated he will make a decision on that issue in the next few months.

Meanwhile, Moscow has violated provisions of the SALT II agreement and the Soviet Union continues to exceed the SALT II overall ceiling of 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. I mention the overall ceiling because this important limitation was one of the main goals of SALT II. If the Soviet Union complied with this provision of the agreement, it would result in a considerable reduction of their offensive strategic nuclear power. But they have not done so, and they are maintaining at least several hundred more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than the agreement permits. Their rationale is that SALT II is not binding because it has never been ratified, and that is perfectly true. Therefore, SALT II is

not binding on the United States either. Yet the Administration continues to comply meticulously with all provisions of the agreement.

SALT II is due to expire in December 1985. In September it will begin constraining the U.S. military modernization program, when the seventh Trident submarine, the *U.S.S. Alaska*, begins sea trials. At that time, the United States will exceed one of the sub-ceilings of the agreement by fourteen ballistic missiles. To continue complying, the United States will have to take one Poseidon submarine or fourteen Minuteman III missiles out of service in order to stay within that particular sub-ceiling of the agreement.

Now is that in the national interest? Would it be more in the national interest to stop complying with this agreement before it interferes with the Administration's defense modernization program? Is there any reason the United States should unilaterally comply with SALT II after the agreement expires, as some groups have suggested? These are the issues and to address them I'm pleased to introduce Ambassador Seymour Weiss, the former Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs at the State Department.

**Seymour Weiss:** Thank you, Jim. I would like initially to cast my comments in a broader frame of reference than solely that related to SALT II violations, as important as they are, for the obvious reason that violations themselves have gone well beyond SALT II and their implications are not limited to the SALT II agreement. In any event, the purpose of my initial remarks is to suggest a frame of reference within which some of the detailed examination I suspect we'll get into in our discussions over the next couple of hours can be weighed.

Returning therefore to the first principles, the initial question which it seems not inappropriate to address is, why do we enter into an arms control agreement in the first place? Presumably, we all accept that an agreement ought not to be an end in and of itself. I doubt that many would support an agreement for agreement's sake. The supporters of past arms control agreements have made the not implausible argument that we enter into these agreements because they presumably are in the national security interest of the United States. And if one has had any governmental experience with the negotiation of these agreements, as I have, one knows that it's a laborious process lasting months or years, with every issue, every phrase, subjected to excruciating examination. It is a reasonable presumption, therefore, that at least those people in the government who are involved in the process feel when they have completed their efforts that they have an agreement that has advanced U.S. national



security interests. Now, if this is true, then it would seem in point of logic that if that agreement is then violated in its particulars, U.S. security must by definition in some measure be jeopardized.

I should say at once that there are a series of counterarguments to this assertion. The first which is frequently heard is that any particular violation is really not strategically significant. But as already indicated, if it's really not strategically significant, why did our negotiators spend years negotiating it in the first place? Aside from that, if no single individual violation is deemed to be strategically significant, then the obvious question is, what about a pattern of numerous violations extending over a number of agreements? Is this also to be considered irrelevant?

In fact, one frequently finds it very difficult to pin down the advocates of arms control agreements (who are often in the forefront of those denying a concern over violations) as to what they really do mean by "strategically significant." It would not be an exaggeration to state that some American advocates of arms control seem unable to describe any violations or combination of violations as being "strategically significant."

The second rejoinder, which is related to the point just made, is the overkill argument. That is to say, each side has more than enough nuclear weapons and, therefore, Soviet violations are not particularly troubling. If this is so, however, why was it so essential to have an agreement in the first place? The response is that if we did not have the agreement, we'd have an unconstrained arms race. This assertion suggests another first principle that warrants examination.

Is it really true that absent arms control agreements limiting nuclear weapons an unconstrained arms race would result? To many who have analyzed this issue, it appears to be utter nonsense. Since SALT II, under a militarily constrained environment, the Soviets have increased the number of their warheads by some 75 percent; this hardly supports the notion that arms control effectively constrains. But the converse is also true, that is to say, even without arms control limits, both sides really do operate under constraints all the time. Budgetary, technological, lack of scientific expertise, production capacity, critical raw materials—there are a whole range of constraints which operate both on the Soviet Union and on the U.S. that exist with or without an arms control agreement. As this relates to the issue of violations, however, the danger is having still another constraint introduced, namely a negotiated agreement that one side honors and the other does not. This is the situation today. It is my contention that the Soviets are not honoring their agreements and we in fact are.

On more than one occasion I have observed a reluctance on the part of

United States government officials charged with our national security to think about, to plan or to propose programs of research, not to mention of deployments, for fear that they may be in violation of the spirit if not the letter of an arms control agreement.

There is another and even broader sense in which the violation of agreements is troubling. It follows the line of thought that the word of a nation, but especially a superpower, is probably its most valued commodity. When the United States, for example, offers a commitment to an ally, it is imperative that it be believed, that it be given credibility. Perhaps even more significantly, when dealing with an adversary, it is similarly true that it must be understood that in a confrontation, a nation's word or its threat must be believed, that is, the adversary must believe that words will be backed by deeds.

When I was in the State Department, although I was sometimes a lonesome hawk, I used to argue, "Don't threaten, don't bluff, unless you're serious about following through." As this particular principle relates to arms control violations, my concern is that the United States now accuses the Soviet Union of not one, or two, minor transgressions, but of very widescale arms control violations. Keep in mind, these are violations that affect solemn contractual relations with regard to the ABM Treaty, SALT II, and other agreements. The ABM agreement is one which the United States has put through its constitutional process. A treaty once ratified becomes, after all, a part of the highest law of the land. What is likely to happen if the U.S. fails to take significant action with regard to proclaimed violations of such an agreement? It debases the value of our nation's word to ignore Soviet violations, and the implications go well beyond arms control. We have had crisis confrontations with the Soviets in the past. My own prediction is that, unhappily, we will have such confrontations again in the future. One would like to feel that if we have such confrontations, and we feel it is essential and in our national interest to say to the Soviets, "You may go so far and no further," that they will credit such a warning. If we have previously talked tough about arms control violations, but failed to follow through with some definitive action, they may begin to discount our national will to act in other contexts such as crisis confrontations. Consider the implications.

There are two possibilities. Either the U.S. will back down from the confrontation, with vast adverse consequences, or we won't back down, the Soviets will have miscalculated, and again the consequences need hardly be spelled out.

So what can or ought to be done about violations? This is the most difficult problem that those officials who have the heavy weight of

government responsibility must deal with. Too often, however, it appears that they are seeking a comfortable and easy way out. I don't think there is any. The only alternatives open are tough.

I mention one that has gained some recent currency, which has been advanced by Congressman Kemp (as well as others). It is the notion that arms control agreements should in a sense be self-enforcing, that is, there will be sanctions built into the agreement which will be automatically invoked if there are violations. I would like to keep an open mind on this proposal, but I have to tell you I'm skeptical. The reason is that I don't think the problem is one of legalities. It's not a question of making better agreements or writing things into law. In fact, my own feeling is that if we had such so-called self-enforcing agreements written into our law, it might well have the perverse effect of inducing the U.S. to rationalize away violations to avoid having to do something about them.

I don't think it's a matter of legalities, I think it's a matter of national will. Whether or not we have an explicit sanction written into an agreement, if we have the national will, there are things we could do about violations. What are those things?

Someone has said that arms control has been the foreign policy valium of our time. My own view is that violations should be viewed for what they are—a very serious threat to U.S. national security, both individually on their own merit and collectively in terms of what they imply for the continuing adversarial relationship between ourselves and the Soviets. I, therefore, conclude that rather than citing violations and then using it as an occasion for equivocation, U.S. policy ought to be to seize upon such violations as an opportunity to mobilize the national will.

It seems doubtful that the U.S. will gain satisfaction from the Soviets in response to the list of violations with which we have charged them. For example, they are not going to tear down their radar at Krasnoyarsk (although I think it's not a bad idea to press them to do so). If they do not rectify such violations, we ought to face up to the fact that arms control has been not productive but counter-productive and cancel the agreements. We ought to place the blame precisely where it belongs, on the Soviets, citing the violations and the cause. Having done so, it ought to provide U.S. leadership an opportunity to go before the Congress and seek the kind and level of military budget which the nation over the past decade has not been willing to support. Note, by the way, such budgetary responses should not be limited to some tit-for-tat notion; we ought not necessarily build a U.S. version of Krasnoyarsk, but rather respond across the board with such conventional and nuclear programs which can be justified on their merits as necessary to meet U.S. security needs given

Soviet capabilities.

Would the American people respond to such leadership? I don't know. But how do you tell until you have made the attempt? I tend to think that they would rise to the occasion. But over the last decade and a half we have chosen a different path. We still say today, for example, that we will honor agreements even though the Soviets are by our own assertions in non-compliance. Under such circumstances it's understandable why there is confusion in the body politic as well as within the Congress. How are massive increases in the defense budget to be justified given all the other pressures on the resources available to us, if at the same time U.S. leadership appears to be adopting the inherently inconsistent positions that (a) arms control is an important contributor to U.S. security and (b) we're not going to concern ourselves with violations of these agreements.

In this context to argue for new agreements, and to assert that the next agreement will be verifiable, is both confusing and perhaps counterproductive. Current agreements are in significant measure verifiable. We are verifying that the Soviets are non-complying. The issue is, what does the U.S. do about non-compliance? I have suggested a course of action which clearly has drawbacks, but which nevertheless seems appropriate in the circumstances.

**Mr. Hackett:** Thank you, Sy. Our next speaker is Dr. William Van Cleave, Director of the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at the University of Southern California.

**William Van Cleave:** Now that Sy has made the best possible case for the agreements, let me address the reasons we should not be abiding by them. Actually, Jim and Sy have already touched upon the major reasons, particularly those having to do with the fundamentally different Soviet objectives, which have been and are incompatible with U.S. arms control goals, and with Soviet violation or circumvention of existing agreements. I would not disagree with anything that's already been said.

It is really staggering that the President of the United States has now said, first of all, that the Soviets are, as Sy has pointed out, in rather massive violation of existing arms control agreements, and, second, that they are also in the process of building a base for a ballistic missile defense of their national territory; and there is scarcely any attention given to this by the media, or by well-known arms control enthusiasts, or on the Hill, or, for that matter, by the Administration. Indeed, the Administration persists in emphasizing the putative importance of arms control agreements—however ineffective—and of the arms control process—however

failed.

The specific subject of our discussion is continued observance of SALT II, but I would like to include the SALT I ABM Treaty in my remarks because I believe the question applies also to that treaty. My position is that we should no longer abide by either agreement on the basis not only of Soviet violations of their key provisions, but also because they bestow no benefits on the United States—they are not effectively restraining the Soviets, for sure—and they are detrimentally restraining the United States.

There are, then, three general reasons why U.S. observance of the agreements should be discontinued.

First, they are demonstrably ineffective in restraining Soviet programs or in accomplishing the original objectives of arms control. These, as Sy pointed out, are the reasons we presumably went into arms control. Second, however, they do restrict the United States from accomplishing those very objectives that were supposed to have been accomplished by arms control. I find it perverse, as well as irrational, that we would abide by arms agreements that were supposed to accomplish certain objectives but clearly did not, and then let those failed arms agreements retard our ability to pursue those same objectives.

Finally, of course, is the non-compliance issue. It seems to me that Soviet non-compliance is intolerable and Soviet non-compliance coupled with U.S. compliance is ridiculous.

Concerning effectiveness of the agreements, no one can argue seriously today that the SALT agreements have effectively restrained Soviet strategic programs, or enhanced stability of any sort. It is clear that since the initial days of SALT and right through SALT I and SALT II to this very time, the Soviet Union has been developing, testing and deploying precisely the military capabilities that were to have been precluded by strategic arms limitations agreements and by a stable regime of mutual deterrence.

It should be clear that these Soviet arms programs, as well as the Soviet approach to arms control, have been absolutely and thoroughly contradictory to American arms control objectives. It should also be clear that the Soviet Union has effectively used arms control for unilateral advantage not only in terms of restraining the U.S., but in masking the purposes of some of their own. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Warfare Agreements are good examples.

As to the latter, in hindsight it seems certain that when the Soviets approached the United States in 1969 with suggestions of mutual restraint and dismantlement of chemical and biological capabilities, it

was precisely the time they had actually planned to expand their own capabilities, and they have since done so.

The ABM Treaty was signed by the Soviets to arrest the U.S. ABM program and to disguise the deliberate development of multi-faceted Soviet ABM capabilities, the deployment of which I believe we are now witnessing. There were three major purposes of the ABM agreement, if you recall. The first was to prevent not only deployment of a national territorial defense but also the preparation of a base for such deployment. The second was to prevent SAM upgrade to ABM capability. The third was to prevent mobile ABM systems and components. Now, as the President's February 1 report on Soviet violations points out, the ABM Treaty has been ineffective because the Soviets have been doing all three of those things in contravention of the agreement.

The Soviets have a deployed ballistic missile defense capability, in the Moscow ABM, in SAM defenses, in civil defense and in leadership protection. The U.S. has none. The Soviets have a short-term program to modernize and upgrade those capabilities. Lacking such capabilities, the U.S. obviously has no comparable program. The Soviets have an extensive R&D program for advanced ABM technologies. The U.S. has only about half a program, aimed at research more than at arms. The ABM Treaty has, thus, been ineffective, except in restraining the U.S. side.

Now, the ABM Treaty is standing in the way of progress in the Strategic Defense Response—SDR—to the Soviet strategic defense initiative. I do not believe it likely that the U.S. government will be able to design an SDR development program that makes sense or much progress while constrained by that treaty. In our system it is impossible to do as the Soviets do, that is, pretend to abide by a treaty while simply ignoring most of its provisions. It will even be difficult, perhaps impossible, to “lawyer” the treaty by playing on and stretching its ambiguities and apparent loopholes, simply because all of those people so ready to excuse, rationalize, and define as permissible such Soviet activities will be clamorous in attacking similar U.S. activities as breaking the treaty. So, it seems to me that if the Administration is serious about the SDR, it better do something courageous about the ABM Treaty. That would also be a worthy demonstration that it takes Soviet violation and circumvention of the treaty most seriously.

Turning to SALT II, the question is, why did the Administration agree not to undercut SALT II in exchange for a pledge from the Soviets not to do so as well? And why does it now abide by it while the Soviets are plainly undercutting it? There are abundant reasons not to accept SALT II, all of which were laid down very carefully in the SALT II debate of 1979. I

don't need to go over them. Suffice it to say that they were persuasive enough that SALT II could not have been approved by the Senate of the United States. The arguments at the time for continuing to observe SALT II in addition to the silly argument that we shouldn't replace something for nothing, despite the fact that something was fatally flawed, were essentially as follows.

First, it would not constrain the U.S. or prevent us from doing anything we wish or need to do, but it would at least marginally restrain the Soviet Union. I remember cited as examples of those useful restraints on the Soviet Union were the ceilings, the aggregate ceilings, which would force the Soviets to dismantle weapons systems. That has not occurred. The Soviets have not only not come down to the ceiling of 2,250, or even 2,400, but are above the number of systems, and MIRVed systems, they had when SALT II was signed. The limitation of only one new type of ICBM was also cited as a major restraint, and that has not occurred either. The prohibition of telemetry encryption clearly hasn't been a restraint, nor other provisions as well. So that argument for the U.S. abiding by SALT II goes out the window.

The second reason given at the time was that a repudiation of SALT II would make the Soviets repudiate SALT I and particularly the ABM Treaty. As I've just explained, they have in fact done that. The Soviets have already voided that treaty. The third argument was that observance of SALT II would improve the probability of success in START. Now that has clearly been no success. In fact, agreeing to abide by SALT II strengthened the basic Soviet position in START and weakened the U.S. case for moving to very different types of limitations. And finally, observance would add to the arms control image of the Administration. Maybe it did a little bit but that certainly is not a reason that should stand by itself. At best, it's supplementary to the first three, none of which proved valid.

But now in addition to being ineffective, it is also placing important restraints on the United States that stand in the way of our achieving the realization of the vital strategic interests which presumably were to have been promoted by arms control, but weren't.

The ABM Treaty, as I have argued, certainly stands in the way of designing any realistic development program for the SDR. The ABM Treaty also embodies the false strategic principle that ABM systems are inherently "destabilizing"—that they are wrong and should be banned. That principle forms a potent psychological barrier to progress, which will continue to be potent as long as the treaty exists as it is. And that principle and that barrier extend to other forms of defense against enemy weapons

as well, thereby restraining us even beyond the specific terms of the treaty. This is an illustration of something Sy referred to, which is the subtle but nonetheless effective way these arms control agreements have indirectly constrained U.S. arms programs and planning, even surpassing the terms of the agreements. They also affect arms control positions and proposals for new agreements as well.

In general, I would argue that the SALT approach itself always has been biased against improvement of the major problem that arms control was supposed to tackle, which is the improvement of strategic stability by enhancing the survivability of our land-based deterrent forces. First of all, SALT has put no real restraint on Soviet threats to those forces. Second, it has prevented an active defense of those forces. Third, it has prevented or at least strongly discouraged the proliferation of launchers, missiles, and aim points. Fourth, it certainly discourages concealment, and even mobility. It is strange that in every way imaginable the overall approach has been counterproductive to the very objectives that were to have been furthered by the agreements. Finally, there are other specific ways that SALT II, as well as the ABM Treaty, is now limiting us.

Jim referred to the SALT II ceilings that have caused us to deactivate close to 300 systems, although the Soviets have not met those ceilings. And now we are preparing to spend twenty million dollars to dismantle several Poseidon submarines, presumably the most survivable element of our force, in order to meet the ceilings that demonstrably the Soviets themselves are not observing. That is to take place when the seventh Trident goes to sea this year. We have failed to deploy 100 extra Minuteman III's that we could have deployed. We are dismantling Titan silos that could have been useful for a number of different purposes.

The SALT II agreement constrains us from modifications we might eventually want to make in the MX, and it certainly limits the number of warheads we can put on it. It constrains the number of cruise missiles and cruise missile carriers that we can have. It stands in the way of the small ICBM program because of limitations on numbers. It will continue to discourage the proliferation of ICBM shelters and aim points. So it is constraining on the U.S., and harmful, while worthless in restraining the threat. The final question of the 1979 SALT II debate—Is the agreement harmful or merely worthless?—has been answered.

Finally, on the issue of violations, I find it remarkable that the President of the United States seems to be treating the Soviet violations so lightly. How can the public and our allies take his charges of Soviet violations seriously if he does not behave as if they are serious? Mere words do not suffice. This failure of the United States to respond strongly



and vigorously can only promote continued expansion of the pattern of Soviet non-compliance, and continued complaisance about it. Senator Jackson had some good advice on the subject in a letter he wrote President Carter at the start of his administration. He said, "It is essential to understand that even a perfect capability to verify compliance means little if we lack the will to redress the results of a violation, or if as is often the case, the costs of taking corrective action are thought to be so high that we are deterred from doing so. In that event, our only recourse may be acquiescence with all that implies for confidence in agreements in our security interests and in our national resolve."

That clearly is what is taking place at this time.

Many argue that we should overlook violations, or clear circumventions if not strictly technical violations, if they are not of important strategic significance. Those same people generally define strategic significance only in terms of what the United States plans to do and not what the Soviets actually do. But if these violations individually are not of strategic significance, we still face an ominous question: Why are the Soviets doing it? If these acts gain little strategically, and if the Soviets still engage in them, undoubtedly knowing we will see and regard them as violations, then why? I might suggest that if you ponder that question, you might find some alarming possible answers, ranging from deliberate arrogance to U.S. and international opinion, to demonstration of U.S. impotence, to diversion of attention from more serious covert activities.

But I think it's incorrect to say that the violations are not strategically significant in any respect. Generally, the argument places individual examples in the context of everything else the Soviets are doing, and in the full sweep of that, almost anything might be made to look relatively insignificant. But the transgressions of the CBW agreements already are militarily significant and also carry very great potential strategic significance. The ABM Treaty violations are strategically significant. The conferring of appreciable ABM capabilities on SAM missiles not only expands ABM capability, but allows SAMs to defend themselves and thereby increases the complexity of American targeting problems and requirements. The telemetry encryption certainly must mask militarily significant missile developments. The testing above 150 kilotons allows production of new weapons. Extending the range of the Backfire bombers adds to their particular strategic capability. The ICBM activities—the second new type and the SS-16s—promise to give the Soviets a more mobile, less locatable strategic reserve force, which must be of concern. So I think that the argument that these activities have scant military significance doesn't stand up.

An argument frequently heard against emphasizing the importance of Soviet activities in non-compliance with, or circumvention of, arms agreements is that the U.S. should react to them if they are important, but we have no effective and feasible responses. What that really suggests, and what it really boils down to, is that, as Senator Jackson said, we lack the will and political courage. Or the President believes that the political costs would be too high. Of course, such predictable views in democratic societies are what encourage Soviet arrogance in the first place.

But there are several options available to the U.S. to demonstrate the importance of Soviet actions and the seriousness with which we regard them. We could militarily match or compensate; we could accelerate or expand existing programs; we could move the SDR rapidly to a systems program, including near term deployment of a defense for Minuteman and Peacekeeper; we could test over 150 KT, as the Soviets have been doing; we could deploy 100 stored Minuteman IIIs, accelerate the small ICBM, and continue B-1 production. We could at least—perhaps a Congressional Joint Resolution signed into public law by the President would be the best vehicle—declare ourselves not bound, and U.S. programs not constrained, by agreements with which the President has formally declared the USSR to be in non-compliance.

But even if we had no effective response, or none the Administration found acceptable, I believe that strong emphasis on these violations, on Soviet circumvention of arms agreements that the public has been led to believe to be important to us, must contribute to a more realistic public attitude about arms control with the Soviets, about Soviet behavior, and about the requirements of national security. That can only be helpful.

Finally, if we were to use an arms control rationale, which I am not, to make a case for rejecting these two agreements, one might use something like the following logic. If arms control agreements generally reflect the reality of the current balance and trends, and if we are able to get satisfactory agreements only when the balance and the trends are satisfactory, and if old agreements are restraining our ability to improve that situation, then they are, in fact, standing in the way of new and more satisfactory agreements.

**Mr. Hackett:** Thank you, Bill. Our next speaker is Dr. Colin Gray, President of the National Institute for Public Policy.

**Colin Gray:** It is more than a little ironic to pose the question “Do We Need SALT II?” in 1985, since one might think—on the basis of the historical record—that the U.S. political system decided back in 1979-

1980 that the answer was “no.” Personally speaking, I have always agreed with President Reagan’s judgment that SALT II was “fatally flawed.” Back in 1979 there were grounds for argument over whether the terms of SALT II would actually be harmful to U.S. security, but there were no grounds worth mentioning for disputing the judgment that SALT II could not be helpful to U.S. security.

Any country that “needs” an arms control agreement is unlikely to secure one at a price it would be willing to pay. This is not to say that arms control agreements, in principle, cannot contribute to U.S. security—only that we have yet to see a SALT agreement that fell into that category, and above all, that if we truly “need” arms control help then there has to be something very wrong indeed with our defense program.

Not to mince matters, an arms control agreement that Bill Van Cleave or I would support would be a reward, indeed a just reward, for unilateral American effort, not a document in lieu of such effort. The cumulative change in the strategic balance to our disadvantage that has occurred since the SALT process began in 1969 has, unsurprisingly, been reflected in treaties that functioned so as to compound the military problem. Quite aside from the important issue of American errors in the details of negotiations, it was unlikely that SALTs I and II could be of value to U.S. security, given the depth, breadth and steadiness of the Soviet strategic modernization program (and the absence of those qualities on the U.S. side), and the Soviet disdain for the plain meaning of legal undertakings.

Even if SALTs I and II had truly been “equal agreements,” a pattern of unequal compliance continued over a decade and more eventually is likely to amount to military advantage.

The military arguments in defense of SALT II are even more puerile today than they were in 1979. By way of a precursor strike, let me note that the Soviet Union will not be deterred by the presence of a treaty, and particularly a treaty of uncertain legal authority, from taking unilateral program actions that it judges to be essential to its national interest. In other words, the idea is absurd that it is only the existence of SALT II (or the ABM Treaty, for another case not selected totally at random) which is holding back a floodtide of new Soviet missile procurement. The Soviet Union has never permitted treaty terms to place fatal inhibitions on military developments judged to be useful. This has been the story of SALT I, SALT II thus far, and of the ABM Treaty. I see no reason to believe that the Soviet Union in the future will treat SALT II with any greater respect than it has in the past. In this instance, given the record of the past fifteen years, the burden of proof has to rest with anyone seeking to claim that the continuation of SALT II will impose constraints on

Soviet program behavior that would be useful to U.S. security.

Now, back to the military arguments about SALT II. I will itemize some relevant points.

- 1) The various quantitative limits of SALT II do not comprise constraints of any military worth. The military problems of the Soviet Union, today at least, do not pertain to missing quantities of weapons or aggregate firepower.
- 2) Should the SALT II framework be retained, and should the Soviet Union discern a major threat in an emerging U.S. SDI, to which a "brute force" numerical reply is the most expedient, then they can be relied upon not to be "fenced in" by the treaty.
- 3) SALT II places no constraints on air defense and ASW, and places no useful constraints on the ability to develop counterforce capability against missiles in silos and facilities. (These three points are facts, by the way, not opinions.)

Looking to the future, what is the military case for continuing to uphold the tattered banner of SALT II? Could SALT II hinder Soviet ability to achieve its offensive and defensive military goals? Consider the targeting problems the Soviets will be facing from now to the end of the century:

- 1) *Possibly* digging out superhardened ICBMs. SALT II is irrelevant to this problem.
- 2) Barrage attacks on mobile missiles. SALT II is sufficiently permissive that the Soviet Union is unlikely to face any relevant throw-weight constraint indirectly via SALT II limits.
- 3) Denying the U.S. the ability to confirm the fact of a nuclear attack, or to launch forces on the basis of such confirmation. To deny launch after attack *capability* is a problem in disruption. Again, SALT II is not relevant.
- 4) Denying U.S. B-1Bs the ability to effect a safe escape from runways. Yet again, there is nothing in SALT II that constrains the Soviet Union from seeking tactically plausible solutions to this difficulty.

It might be argued that the numerical limits on forces and on payload fractionation in SALT II would inhibit the Soviet Union from buying an arguable quantitative solution to a weaponizing SDI. My answer to that point is the following: if the Soviet Union believes it needs to double or triple its warhead count in order to defeat U.S. defenses then it will do so, SALT II or no SALT II. However, for the better part of the next decade the Soviets are going to be as uncertain about the fact, let alone the critically important details, of SDI weaponization as are we. The Soviets

are hardly likely to rush into maximum fractionation, given that such a program might run headlong into a modestly effective U.S. boost or post-boost defensive threat. Such a program would not meet Soviet targeting needs even if it made sense for assurance of penetration of defenses, and the Soviets are beginning to be a little uneasy about the theoretical U.S. hard-target kill threat for the 1990s.

If U.S. SDI architecture is militarily so fragile that its purposes could be defeated with high confidence simply by an augmented, and substantially technically unchanged (that is to say, not custom redesigned), missile force, then we should not buy that kind of a weaponized SDI. An important problem for the Soviets, if they try to calculate the value of an absence of SALT II constraints for their ability to out-compete with the SDI, is the fact that the range of possible SDI architectures is so broad that custom designing an offensive missile force to penetrate is going to be next to impossible for many years to come.

Deliberately, I have chosen to say little thus far about compliance questions. I may be old fashioned, but I do not think that the U.S., *de facto*, should condone Soviet non-compliance with treaty terms. The argument for hanging tough on compliance issues is both military and political. Asymmetries in compliance make a mockery of arms control debate about the even handedness, or otherwise, of treaty terms. "Equal treaties unequally applied" translates into unequal treaties. Furthermore, asymmetries in compliance make a mockery of the U.S. political fascination with the issue of verification. In fact, we have verified Soviet non-compliance with SALT II. On July 24, 1979, then-Secretary of Defense Harold Brown told the Senate Armed Services Committee:

We have already told them and they have agreed that, if telemetry relevant to matters limited by SALT is denied, whether by encryption or by any other means, that would be a violation of the treaty. (*SALT II Treaty Hearings*, Part I, p. 138.)

No prizes will be given for guessing what Soviet practice has been in this area of recent years. Also, Secretary Brown and other Carter Administration officials, in their explanation of the ICBM modernization provision of SALT II, plainly did not have anything resembling the SS-X-25 in mind—in addition to the SS-24. In short, the Soviets would seem to have done what they wanted to do, notwithstanding American expressed concerns and protests.

Militarily, it is undesirable that an arms control treaty should not constrain that which it is supposed to constrain (ICBM modernization, in this case). Politically, it is highly undesirable that liberal and conservative U.S. governments should be shown by events to be "paper eagles" on the

issue of cheating. Whether or not a particular example of treaty non-compliance, or even bad faith, individually is judged to be militarily significant, I, for one, do not want the tough new Soviet leadership to be encouraged to interpret seemingly solemn American statements simply as bluster. International order requires, among many other things, that the Soviet Union hold American policy determination in suitable respect. By fumbling the compliance question we invite a degree of disrespect that is potentially dangerous for peace. In this regard I would recommend that our government design and implement a sanctions policy for treaty non-compliance.

The political health of the unratified SALT II Treaty is an unusually live issue today not only because the treaty “expires”—if a treaty can expire without having first truly had life, that is—at the end of 1985, or even because we face some near-term weapon-retirement choices, but even more because of actual or perceived “linkage” with the renewed Geneva process. What kind of a signal would Washington send were it to announce the definitive political demise of SALT II? In liberal eyes the question virtually answers itself. How can an Administration that claims to be serious about arms control *choose* to abandon an existing framework of mutual restraint . . . and so on.

The United States should foreclose on the SALT II story, citing:

- 1) the necessity for a new beginning and the need to symbolize the placing of useful distance between past sins committed in the abused name of arms control and new policies;
- 2) the military irrelevance, at best, of SALT II to the real military problems of stability; and
- 3) the thoroughly unacceptable past and present Soviet record on treaty compliance.

Such foreclosure on a story of failure would be a most useful complement to the positive arms control and disarmament policy with which the new U.S. negotiating team is equipped in the new enterprise in Geneva.

**Mr. Hackett:** Thank you, Colin. I used part of my time for the introduction, so I will make just a few points now. First is that continued U.S. compliance with SALT II will seriously limit U.S. efforts to provide for the national defense. SALT II interferes with the badly needed modernization of U.S. forces. For example:

- 1) SALT II will prevent the flight testing and deployment of the Midgetman small mobile missile, one of America’s best hopes for

reducing the serious vulnerability of our land-based nuclear deterrent.

- 2) SALT II will seriously limit the most effective U.S. strategic weapon, the relatively invulnerable ballistic-missile submarine, beginning this year.
- 3) SALT II will prevent the full deployment on the B-52 force of one of our most effective new weapons—the air-launched cruise missile, or ALCM, beginning next year.
- 4) That same SALT II ceiling will prevent the use of ALCMs on the new B-1 bomber unless ALCMs are removed from a comparable number of B-52s. It will also limit deployment of the new Advanced Cruise Missile with stealth technology, which is now under development.

These represent serious constraints on the U.S. military modernization program. Meanwhile, Moscow complies only selectively with provisions of SALT II. While staying within some of the sub-ceilings of that agreement, Moscow has failed to comply with the overall SALT ceiling on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and has nearly doubled its number of strategic nuclear warheads, just since the signing of SALT II in 1979.

Some proponents of the agreement contend that without SALT II there would be a massive Soviet increase in missiles and warheads. But we have seen a massive increase with SALT. There is no evidence that SALT II prevents the Soviet Union from developing and deploying any weapons they want to develop and deploy. When there is a direct conflict with a signed agreement—for example, Soviet testing and deployment of the mobile SS-25, a second new ICBM that is prohibited by SALT II—Moscow just ignores the agreement. SALT very effectively limits U.S. weapons; it does not limit Soviet weapons.

My second point concerns the claim that the end of SALT will lead to a massive Soviet buildup of nuclear missiles and warheads. But the Soviets already have more and bigger nuclear weapons than they need. Why would they increase further their nuclear forces? Their economy is stagnant; their standard of living is far below what the leadership would prefer. They are fighting a hot war in Afghanistan, supporting a hot war in Cambodia, maintaining huge conventional and theater forces facing Europe and China, trying to maintain control in Eastern Europe, trying to maintain control of their internal empire, developing strategic defenses, and supporting communist governments and revolutionary movements around the world. And they are trying to do all this on a stagnant economy, with a GNP that is, at most, half that of the U.S.

Regardless of the alarms of the SALT II advocates, Moscow can't afford another huge buildup of nuclear offensive forces. If they start such a buildup, something else would have to suffer. Perhaps it will be their ability to pacify Afghanistan, to support Vietnam's war in Cambodia, to supply Cuba and Nicaragua, or to maintain control in Eastern Europe. But something would suffer; they can't do it all. In any case, U.S. policy should not be based on hypothetical assumptions of what Moscow might do. The record suggests that they will do what the Politburo considers to be in their own best interest.

My final comment concerns interim restraints. The disagreement between the State and Defense Departments over the issue of interim restraints is no secret. State has favored restraints on weapons as a way of showing good faith in negotiations; while Defense, which considers such restraints potentially damaging to national security, has opposed them.

Last year, the President decided that the U.S. would not agree to interim restraints to get Moscow back to the bargaining table. He subsequently decided that there would be no interim restraints on testing components of the strategic defense initiative during the course of negotiations. Yet continued unilateral U.S. compliance with SALT II for the purpose of creating a "good atmosphere" for the talks is itself an interim restraint. This tactic did not work with the START negotiations and now, as SALT compliance begins to have an adverse impact on U.S. defense modernization, it is contrary to the national security interest of the United States to continue that form of interim restraint.

The United States should end compliance with SALT II no later than December 1985, when the agreement expires. It would be rather ridiculous for us to continue unilaterally complying with an unratified agreement that was never approved by the United States Senate and which has expired anyway.

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**Chris Williams, Office of Rep. Lagomarsino:** We've heard a lot of discussions about employing a limited point defense, or silo defenses, in this country. Do you think that a limited point defense is in the national interest at this time, given the fact that it may have only limited military capabilities?

**Dr. Van Cleave:** Yes.

**Amb. Weiss:** I will say yes also, and especially if it was a transitional step



toward the larger SDI objectives. It seems to me that a major problem we've had with the MX missile is its basing, that is, its vulnerability in fixed silos. Obviously, a partial solution to the problem of the relative vulnerability of the MX missile in fixed silos is to put a point defense around the fixed silos. I'm convinced that such a point defense can be deployed within the limits of the ABM treaty. Now, some have argued that it would be too restricted by the ABM treaty, but I would say that we ought to do the best we can to defend the MX. And if the entire issue were candidly explained, it might be easier to get the MX funds from the Congress.

**Dr. Van Cleave:** I agree that if we go ahead and have what amounts to a Titan replacement program of 42 to 50 MX missiles, at least we ought to defend them. It never made good sense simply to put MX in very vulnerable silos, whatever the Scowcroft Commission said. Let me give you another more general reason I think we should do it. If we don't start early to cut metal, so to speak, the SDI is always going to be treated by the bureaucracy as a long-range studies program. If it is to survive and make progress it should emphasize a near-term deployment of an operational system with limited but readily feasible purpose.

**Dr. Gray:** I was going to make the same point—that I think we suffer because the SDI does not have an agreed military mission, which as Bill said makes it look like an endless R&D program. It is important to have us committed to a particular form of deployment, so we can begin to cut metal to tell the world that this really is a deployment program and we are truly serious about it. I think it is politically of enormous importance. I'm afraid that we may have crested the political wave and the SDI may recede as the years proceed. The sooner we have an agreement on at least one military mission of SDI, the better.

**Amb. Weiss:** I think the issue of why we might want to have a ballistic missile defense system has become somewhat obscured, in part because of SDI. An argument can be made that even partial defenses contribute to uncertainty on the part of a potential attacker. In so far as that is the case, I would argue that it contributes in the first instance to deterrence and that obviously if deterrence fails it gives you a military response of some degree of effectiveness. Unfortunately, what's happened with regard to SDI, although people are still trying to sort out what it is we ought to do, is that if we begin to direct our attention to shorter term goals, we are likely to divert ourselves from the longer term objective of SDI being a broad,

nationwide close-to-perfect defense. Given my own great reservations about the achievement of that goal, I would be prepared to have some diversion of resources, but nevertheless I see the argument.

There is a second argument, which disturbs me much more, and that is the arms control argument. Yesterday or the day before there was a piece in the paper which announced that we were going to cancel or push back certain important tests even under SDI out of fear that they might be inconsistent with our ABM treaty. This strikes me as absolutely absurd. In fact, part of the reason the shorter term goals of SDI have not yet gotten the focus they ought to in our public debate is because of the concern that this will turn off support of SDI on the grounds that it is inconsistent with arms control.

**Dr. Roger Barnet, SRI International:** In a forum at the Brookings Institution yesterday, from the dais came the comment that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been among the most consistent supporters of the arms control process in this country. Do you share that perception, and does it matter?

**Dr. Van Cleave:** I think the observation is, unfortunately, essentially correct. And certainly it has to matter, it seems to me. The Joint Chiefs became embroiled in and committed to arms control mythology during the Carter Administration, when they—the Commandant of the Marine Corps is an exception, thankfully—were enlisted to support SALT II. They now have a corporate legacy. Now, the Joint Chiefs have taken a position that as long as nothing interferes with the five-year defense plan, then almost anything is all right and that includes any kind of arms control. This is a very short-sighted view. I have nothing kind to say about it.

**Mr. Hackett:** Whatever happened to Curt LeMay?

**Amb. Weiss:** Let me preface my comment by saying, not entirely facetiously, that some of my best friends either are or have been members of the JCS. But I have to tell you that I do not think that members of the JCS, with very few exceptions, have been personally well equipped by way of experience in the complexities of arms control, nor have they been effectively staffed, at least over the last fifteen years that I've been familiar with their undertakings. As a result, I have to say that the kinds of conclusions that they have reached have not, at least in my own judgment, always been based on the wisest and most analytical counsel. I

think that it's a very serious problem.

**Dr. Gray:** It's often been observed that there has been a rather large and obvious lack of strategic rationale behind our bargaining positions in SALT, START and INF. And when one questions our negotiating team about what they want to achieve, how they define success, how they define failure and why, you get a rather blank look. If you ask a strategic question about the details of a negotiating position, what sort of compromise or what haggling over numbers might be acceptable and why, what sort of military judgments apply, you tend to get a shrug of the shoulders as if you've asked an indecent question. I think it's been a general truth these past fifteen years and longer that military criteria have been notably absent from the arms control policy making process. So it's hardly surprising that at the end of a lengthy negotiation period, where you try and make sense of the outcome—why something was agreed upon or something else was not—you find that in fact there really hasn't been very serious military discussion of our strategic needs for this posture or that.

**Mr. Hackett:** While not an expert on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I'd like to comment that I have noticed a phenomenon over the last fifteen or twenty years, and that is the development of a permanent arms control bureaucracy. Having once been a part of the bureaucracy myself, I don't want to be too critical. But there is an arms control bureaucracy out there in the State Department, in the Politico-Military Bureau, and in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am told there is a similar bureaucracy on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. With a permanent bureaucracy sitting there which is committed to achieving arms control agreements by whatever means, it's very difficult for a presidential appointee who comes in from some other part of the country, or a General in from an overseas assignment, to avoid falling into the clutches of these people. I think it's one of the major reasons we have this institutional emphasis on arms control throughout the government, even at the JCS.

**Leon Sloss, Leon Sloss Associates:** You know, the arguments made are extremely persuasive to me and I suspect for most of this audience, but we are talking to ourselves. The obvious conclusion you've reached from the four presentations is that you want the Administration to propose tomorrow that we no longer observe the SALT II treaty, and then abrogate the ABM treaty. That would probably require, in the case of the ABM treaty, some congressional action. I wonder what the panel thinks would be the reaction of Congress and the general public to such a proposal made

tomorrow morning, and if the man on the street would not support it, would they like to speculate why?

**Dr. Van Cleave:** The major reason is that there has been a real lack of education and leadership at the highest level on the reality of arms control. The President promotes confusion, not realism, when at the same time he announces these violations, he continues to overemphasize the importance of the arms control process, of on-going negotiations, and of existing agreements, including SALT. Politicians and the media are committed to the idea and ideal of arms control, and they confuse ideal with reality. At least from them, and naturally from academia, there would be an enormous outcry, an enormous amount of opposition. Polls show the general public to be less naive, but unless the public is prepared it might follow such outcries. But it seems to me there are reasonable steps that one could take that would be damage-limiting and would lead in the direction of support for such a presidential, or preferably, congressional act.

For example, there isn't any reason why national security programs of the United States should be impeded in order to comply with provisions of agreements with which the Soviet Union is in non-compliance. And it seems to me that this is such a sensible principle that one might get it easily across to the public. The public majority knows that the Soviets cheat and are not to be relied upon, and surely they would not have us engage in unilateral arms control observing contracts that the Soviets violate. Poll after poll shows that the public at large is very skeptical about agreements, and very skeptical about Soviet compliance with them. As we saw in SALT II, after a year or two of debate contributed to the public education, the public was able to tell the difference between an arms control ideal and a specific bad agreement. I don't see why that can't be built upon. What's lacking here seems to be national leadership and determination of our elected officials more than anything else.

**Amb. Weiss:** The issue in my mind is not whether it should be done tomorrow but whether it should have been done in 1980 when the Administration first came into office. After all, we had a confluence of circumstances, a President who had derided the arms control process, who alluded to the window of vulnerability, and who insisted on the need for a very large defense budget. That confluence of issues would have provided the political basis, though not with unanimity, to develop the national will that is needed to do what is necessary in our own interest. It is barely conceivable, not having done it then, that we may now have a new

opportunity related to the subject of our panel—the issue of non-compliance. If we describe it for what it is—a very serious challenge to our national security—I can conceive of the political case being made anew. Those who would insist that we do not abandon the presumed virtues of arms control agreements would be put very much on the defensive to demonstrate why it is in our interest.

**Dr. Gray:** What I hope we will do now would have been obvious back in '81. SALT II has been dignified by the President's statements on the subject—that we will continue to abide by the terms of the treaty. Also, the words that have been said publicly about the ABM treaty as we go to Geneva again have the effect of strengthening the treaty, *pro tem* at least. We are dignifying that treaty and ensuring problems for ourselves down the road. It is easy to exaggerate the problems the White House would have in calling an end to SALT II observance this year, given the termination date of the agreement and the Soviet compliance record the Administration has advertised. Nonetheless, there's a problem explaining why our policy now should change. If it was in our interest not to undercut it in previous years, what is different about it now? Obviously, one can cite the lack of Soviet compliance and the forced retirement of weapons systems we're now facing.

**Mr. Hackett:** Leon, I'm struck by the fact that we have in office probably the greatest communicator since Franklin Roosevelt or Winston Churchill. The President of the United States has immense persuasive powers and he has used those powers to get the things that he thinks the country really needs. He's been immensely effective in getting congressional support and in getting public support. And when he goes on television and tells the American people the facts and rallies them behind him, he's been very, very effective. I don't see any reason why he could not go on television, having issued three reports of arms control violations over the past fourteen months, and tell the American people that in view of these violations and the circumstances that exist in our strategic posture, we can no longer comply with this agreement.

**Mr. Sloss:** I have to say that it reminds me a little of a scene from the *Pirates of Penzance*, which Colin may remember, about the constabulary who are about to go off and do battle with the pirates. They keep saying "and off we go, and off we go" but they never go. There are some underlying reasons we need to think about as to why an Administration which is as strong on defense as any we've had in a number of years still

has been reluctant to face up to this one. It hasn't been a lack of communicating; it communicated the violations. But it hasn't been willing to face up to the next steps.

**Mr. Hackett:** It's my hope, of course, that the President will not continue complying with SALT II after December when it expires. It seems to me that the expiration date is the logical time to stop complying with an unratified agreement, if any time is logical. The ABM treaty, which is really not the subject of this discussion, is a permanent agreement, although we review it every five years. The ABM agreement ought to be the second order of business for our negotiators at Geneva. The first order of business should be to seek Soviet compliance with existing agreements, including the ABM treaty. The second order of business should be to talk with the Soviets about amending that agreement so that we can proceed with the Strategic Defense Initiative. SALT II takes that issue on in a straightforward manner, because as you point out, that agreement must come to an end so we can proceed with the small mobile missile, which is our counterpart to the Soviet's small missile, the SS-25, which is being deployed this year. By contrast, our small missile, the Midgetman, is projected for deployment in 1992, if all goes well. But we have to get out of SALT II if we're going to do it.

**M. Dean Millot, Leon Sloss Associates:** This is really a follow-up to Leon's question. What I'm concerned about is the practical impact of abrogating the agreement. I'd like you to comment on it. Do you really mean to suggest seriously that we can appreciably increase our defense programs?

**Mr. Hackett:** Well, I don't know. The MX, of course, is a very controversial weapons system. The Trident has been funded and the Trident D-5 missile is being developed, and there are weapons systems that we have not had a lot of difficulty with in the Congress. The B-1 bomber is now being funded. The opposition has stopped complaining about it. So we have the B-1 coming along, the Trident submarine and the new D-5 missile, and there is a lot of support on the Hill for the small missile, which is mobile and relatively invulnerable. So I think if an effort is made in these areas, where there is congressional support, we should be able to do better than we have done on the MX.

**Dr. Van Cleave:** I must leave to catch a plane, but as I do, let me say that we can increase our defense effort from an economics standpoint, and as

the Committee on the Present Danger has said over and over we *must* do so if we are not to retreat strategically and face terrible insecurity. What events must take place to get that across politically, I don't know, but the thought is not encouraging.

**Amb. Weiss:** I have a response to that. My own feeling is that we have created a kind of Catch-22 for ourselves. We have, in effect, committed ourselves to rationalize away appropriate military responses to the threats we face because of a false expectation that arms control arrangements will meet our security needs. If you ask individuals, even those who are not conservative, whether they think we are in an adversarial relationship with the Soviets, I think most would say yes. If you asked them if it was a serious challenge, I think they would say yes. But we've ignored the logical consequences of the aforementioned assessments.

Keep in mind when this whole arms control process started about 1969 we had an enormous lead in the strategic field. Since then that lead has been eroded. It is already certainly a complicated series of reasons that explain why the lead has been eroded, but my own feeling is that arms control is one of the causal factors. So long as we, as a nation, imply that somehow or other arms control is going to solve the problem for us, we will never get the American public or the Congress to face up to the tough decisions, including budgetary requirements, that are necessary. Can I guarantee that if we did away with arms control we would get the public and congressional support required? No, of course, I can't. But as I argued in my opening comments, I think we are long overdue for making that attempt.

The real question is, how do you change the national security consensus? Is it necessary first to abrogate the treaty, or can you perhaps take other steps? Perhaps it is preferable to let matters take their course, for example, by letting the Soviets walk out on us again if they refused to compromise and reach agreements which are manifestly in the U.S. national interest. Then you could say, "Look, we've tried." Perhaps that's a better way to generate public understanding and support for tough policies.

**Dr. Gray:** I think we would not yet be in Geneva save for the political reasons of the Administration. Our leverage is nowhere near what it should be. SDI is in an early stage. The strong critics of SDI claim this is exactly the time we should be negotiating SDI, because the Soviets don't yet know how ineffective it's going to be. A problem with Jim's comments on expanding funding for offensive forces that do not provoke great

controversy, as has happened in the last couple of years particularly with regard to the B-1 program, is that, assuming SDI is the success that most of us would like it to be, I think there's going to be very considerable resistance to expanding funding for strategic offensive forces in the years to come. This is not a serious problem yet, but the level of rhetoric against the evils of nuclear weapons, retaliatory deterrence, and offensive dominance needed in order to justify the heavy expenditures that SDI weaponization is going to require in the 1990s is not exactly going to feed the kind of political environment that is going to be conducive to maintaining large, state-of-the-art offensive forces.

**Dr. David Mann:** It seems to me that the arguments made by Ambassador Weiss, that arms control agreement seriously undermine our ability to build up our defenses, is very persuasive. But then the question is, why do we have these agreements? Where does the desire for arms control agreements come from? Is it possible that the forces in America that think of our defense effort as a big welfare program for the military-industrial complex are more effective in selling their case than those who are trying to educate the American people on the need for a defense program?

**Amb. Weiss:** It's possible that's one of the problems. Why is it that we have this apparent urge for arms control? Let me offer one thought based on insights developed when I was involved with the process. There were a number of people, good decent people, who held a particular strategic view which related to nuclear weapons. It was a rather simplistic view of what we have come to call Mutually Assured Destruction. According to this theory, each side needed only limited amounts of nuclear weapons to deter its opponent, because all that was necessary was to threaten to rain nuclear weapons on a limited number of cities of the opponent. If you held that point of view, then there were a number of things that suggested themselves as suitable for arms control.

For example, you didn't want to have a ballistic missile defense system. Ambassador Gerard C. Smith and a number of other people argue in favor of the ABM treaty, in effect because they want mutual vulnerability. But there are serious deficiencies in such an approach. For one, the Soviets never shared that perspective at all. As evidence of this fact they have deployed massive defenses: thirteen thousand SAM interceptors, several thousand aircraft interceptors, a large civil defense program, a ballistic missile defense, an extensive radar network. So there has been a conceptual mismatch between the MAD theorists and what the Soviets are in fact doing. But this is only one of many conceptual mismatches.



Regrettably, in my view, there are avid arms controllers who totally misperceive (a) what is in the U.S. national interest and (b) how the Soviets perceive their own interest. These people have been a very important force in moving the nation toward imprudent reliance on conceptually faulty arms control approaches.

**Dr. Gray:** You will probably find, for example, folks at the Brookings Institution who will very comfortably claim that the thesis that arms control on balance has had a net negative effect on American and Western security is qualitatively and quantitatively challengeable. The folks who are critical of that thesis will say, "Look at the critical weapons programs of the past twenty years." The Safeguard ABM program, whatever you may have thought about it strategically, was helped enormously in the Congress by the fact of on-going negotiations. Look at the Trident program; look at cruise missile programs; look at the MX. There are people who sincerely believe that on balance the political cover of arms control, to use that cynical expression, has enabled America to be strategically better off than she would have been in the absence of arms control.

**Bruce McDonald, Office of Senator Bumpers:** In 1981, General Rogers said the biggest mistake the United States made was not ratifying SALT II. Just the other day the Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command said his personal recommendation would be that we should continue to abide by the SALT II Treaty. General Dougherty, former Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Air Command, now President of the Air Force Association, has also expressed his support for legislation calling for continued adherence. And there were news articles recently that suggested the Joint Chiefs of Staff today are quietly working to provide continuation of the present policy. My question is where are these distinguished military people going wrong in your view? Why are they mistaken?

**Dr. Gray:** Assuming what you say is right, and I have no reason to dispute it, I have some difficulty recognizing General Bennie Davis's views as you just summarized them. The military judgments that are reflected in the activity you point to, I believe to be unsound. I've yet to see or hear anything from the Joint Staff that would cause me seriously to question the validity of the kind of arguments you've heard here today. That is with reference to what we discussed on the panel this afternoon, with regard to some of the military issues; how SALT II in the past has affected our

security, and whether it might in the future be of value to our military security. We looked at what SALT does in terms of its threat to different elements of our forces. Jim Hackett talked about force modernization options and how SALT is going to hurt that. In other words, I think the people you mention are wrong; that is what it comes down to.

**Amb. Weiss:** I suggested earlier my own view of some of the limitations I think have been inherent in the process, but to answer your question more directly, consider the reaction to the process when as a nation we were considering SALT II. The purported merits, including the merits from a military point of view, were presented to the Senate of the United States. The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously rejected the notion that SALT II was in our national interest. I'm prepared to accept that judgment as representing a considered evaluation of the military utility of SALT II at that time. I see absolutely no basis for suggesting that it has any greater utility now.

**Mr. Hackett:** Active duty military officers must support administration policy, and current policy is to comply with SALT II. If any of the officers you mentioned have specific arguments as to why SALT II is militarily useful, I would like to hear them.

**Stuart Goldman, Congressional Research Service:** Of those who would argue on behalf of the military for SALT II, one of the arguments which is more commonly advanced is that it does add constraints to certain Soviet military developments which might be objectionable. And I wondered for those of us who have less technical expertise than Dr. Gray, if you could elaborate on the point that you made—why the SALT II constraints on greater fractionation of the Soviet missile force would not facilitate barrage attack of a large mobile Midgetman force?

**Dr. Gray:** In terms of counterforce effectiveness, the key question is available throwweight and not the extent of fractionation. It almost doesn't matter the degree to which the Soviets fractionate. You could use that throwweight in several different ways. It doesn't matter how you cut it in terms of the kind of area coverage, the kind of overpressures, that you're likely to achieve. If the Soviets have "X" amount of throw weight and they're facing a very well defined military problem with mobile deployment in the mid-1990s, whether or not they move to fractionate really doesn't matter very much in terms of their counterforce effectiveness against a mobile force. Against the vital military installations we now

have, I do not believe they have a warhead deficiency. They have a reliability problem, not a deficiency of firepower; they're not short of numbers of warheads. Fractionating payload, without an increase in firepower, is not the way to launch a successful barrage attack on mobile missiles because as you fractionate you reduce the effectiveness of your warheads.

**Mr. Millot:** Thus far, the allies have been noticeably absent from this discussion. I'm wondering if you could address yourselves to the problems of our relationship with our allies, if we were to foreclose, as Colin put it, on the SALT agreements. And in particular, how we might manage their inevitable negative attitudes on the subject.

**Amb. Weiss:** Good question. It's perfectly obvious that there would be problems. I view it myself as simply a part of the larger matrix of developing Western will that I was arguing in favor of. There are no guarantees that you could do it. It is perfectly clear to me, however, that if there are those in our own society who are unwilling to face up to the realities of the threat and who tend to use arms control as valium, our allies may well be in the vanguard of that approach. It's simply something that has to be handled frontally. If we don't have a good enough case to persuade our own body politic and our own Congress, there isn't a chance that we're going to be able to persuade our allies.

It's worth keeping in mind that security arrangements of the sort we have—alliances—are intended to serve the national interest. If they manifestly do not do so, then they ought to be called into question. Now as you know, I have been a staunch supporter of our alliance structure. I think the alliances do serve the U.S. national interest. But if we find there is such a broad divergence between what our own populace is prepared to support, and believes to be necessary, and what our allies will support, then the time will have come for a basic rethinking of the value of the alliance relationship.

**Mr. Hackett:** I would just say that if we are the leaders of the Western Alliance, we ought to lead. And we start by making a decision and convincing our allies, as the President would have to convince the American people. He is, as I say, a very effective communicator.

**Mr. Millot:** But that's kind of a motherhood response. I think both of the responses are motherhood responses. We make statements to the effect that we are going to withdraw from treaties, but how do we do it?

**Dr. Gray:** That's where you're wrong, we don't need to withdraw from this treaty. What we'd be doing on SALT II is saying that its term is expiring. It's up in December 1985. Circumstances, including our understanding of the strategic problems, have changed considerably since the negotiation of SALT II. Look what's happening in Geneva. We have a radically new, comprehensive approach to arms control. We are going to let this very old fashioned agreement expire on the date specified. That is against the backdrop of the very visible U.S. endeavor to do it right in arms control in the future. So we would not be abrogating an agreement. We would not be pulling out of SALT II. We would be letting it lapse when there is provision for it to lapse.

**Amb. Weiss:** Let me try once more from a different perspective. Consider the following: I think that a case can be made that one of the effects of arms control over the past fifteen or twenty years has been to contribute to a reduction in our military capacity relative to that of the Soviet Union. To the extent that is true, it has had an erosive effect upon the alliance. Our allies no longer can have the same degree of confidence in the military commitments we have made. Having gotten ourselves in that box, it is sometimes argued that we dare not do anything to try to get ourselves out, that to do so will be divisive in the alliance and dangerous *vis-à-vis* the Soviets. If this is true, we have generated a self-perpetuating disadvantage that we will have to live with forever. My own view, incidentally, is that the greatest immediate threat is not a war starting with a bolt out of the blue. I doubt the Soviets will wake up tomorrow morning and decide its a delightful day to start a war. Rather, I expect that they will exert their political influence, backed by their impressive military capability. If we do not, therefore, face up eventually to the need to break out of the box, the alliance is bound to be eroded over time.

**Peter Samuel, Murdoch Newspaper Group:** This is a technical question I've never been able to get clearly answered from the Pentagon on security grounds. It is about the effects of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty limit of 150 kilotons on the testing of nuclear weapons. My understanding from reading unofficial publications is that the Mark 21 on the MX and the new warhead on the Trident II are well over 150 kilotons and, therefore, those warheads can't be tested. It would seem to a layman that such a system would not be a very credible or reliable one in the absence of testing. Richard Perle told me in an interview last week that the Soviets have been regularly violating the 150 kiloton limit and they have derived significant military advantages through that, but even he didn't comment

on the first point. Could you say something about that and its importance?

**Dr. Gray:** To certify a yield, the yield that you want, you do not necessarily have to test at that yield. Now there are limits. That statement has to be qualified. In other words, you cannot conduct a 5 kiloton test of a new weapon design or a significant improvement of an old weapon design and expect to derive reliable information as to how that device would function at 500 kilotons. There are limits, but there is considerable flexibility in terms of your ability to scale predictions of yields to the actual test that you conduct.

**Mr. Hackett:** Last year, The Heritage Foundation issued a paper on the TTBT entitled "A Flawed Test Ban Treaty." It came out in March 1984, and is certainly still valid. It indicated that there have been at least fourteen violations of that agreement by the Soviet Union, that is, explosions over the 150 KT limit. And it goes into that in some detail.

**Mr. Jean Desazars De Montgailhard, Counselor of the Embassy of France:** I want to put two types of questions. The first is: Would you consider that the ABM Treaty and the SALT II treaty deserve the same treatment? And the second is: I've heard three arguments concerning SALT II. The first is that it prevents the desirable U.S. defense modernization. Second, it does not represent a barrier against Soviet military buildup. And third, that whatever barriers it presents, the Soviets will necessarily cheat. Those three arguments are not on the same level, and also could be contradictory. There's no point in assessing the type of barrier a treaty brings if in any way you consider the other side will cheat. Then you are simply skeptical about arms control in general. So what type of arguments would you recommend in order to convince the allies?

**Amb. Weiss:** I get the feeling that your first question, relating to the ABM issue, may reflect what I've observed, not only from my French friends but from other European friends—a real aversion to tampering with the ABM treaty. This aversion masks a variety of premises, not least of which, in the case of France, is that somehow U.S. ballistic missile defense efforts are going to invalidate the utility of the French nuclear force. Now I can understand that argument, but I think it's misplaced. Unless it is the concern of our allies who have national nuclear forces that their ability to attack the United States will be impaired, and I presume it is not, their concern ought to be with penetrating Soviet defenses. But on this score, I will guarantee that whatever the Soviets deem to be in their best interest

by way of developing defensive capabilities, they are going to do, whatever the United States decides to do or not to do by way of developing its own ballistic missile defenses. The evidence to date is rather conclusive in that regard.

One of my own criticisms of the Administration's presentation has been that they haven't sufficiently emphasized what the Soviets are doing in strategic defense, although if you read some of Secretary Weinberger's speeches, you will find this point emphasized. I really do wish that some of our friends, like France, would focus on the right part of that problem. There may be other reasons why we shouldn't abrogate the ABM treaty or why we shouldn't proceed with SDI, but it is not, I would respectfully suggest, because our action will somehow imperil the nuclear forces of our allies.

**Dr. Gray:** In a sense, we've been addressing this question all afternoon. I mean, legally and politically the ABM Treaty and the unratified SALT II agreement are in very considerably different categories and have different degrees of legitimacy and dignity. I think SALT II, for the reasons that you've summarized so competently, can be explained without any undue negative political fallout. After all, this was a treaty which effectively was rejected; it was decided not to submit the treaty to a full vote by the United States Senate many years ago. We do have a replacement process, indeed more than a replacement process, to try and do "arms control" right this time. Whatever doubts Sy and I have, nonetheless, the Administration does have ambitions with regard to the umbrella talks that have begun at Geneva.

It shouldn't be too difficult to explain a transfer from an old regime that we rejected anyway, that has not worked, and which has been flouted in a very insulting fashion by the Soviets (the arguments they've provided privately and publicly have been insulting to us). But against the very positive backdrop of the new arms control story, which is heavily intertwined with what technology-driven arms control may allow us to do, SALT II is considerably different in its dignity from that which pertains to the ABM treaty.

I certainly would agree with Sy that I found, particularly in London, that among the many reasons why the proposition "Thou shalt not tamper with the ABM treaty" has considerable political weight, is that it does pose considerable political problems for a British government that is trying to persuade its House of Commons to purchase a weapon system that the country really can't afford. Similarly, the anti-nuclear rhetoric

that accompanies and in part justifies the SDI is not helpful to a Europe that is in the process of deploying GLCM and Pershing II missiles.

On arms control in general, it seems to me that certain European governments should not be impervious to the kind of arguments that we've been putting forth this afternoon, arguments that really do not deal with general arms control philosophy. No one here has addressed the nature of the Soviet state and the character of its political system, or has focused upon the big questions about why arms control is unlikely to succeed. By and large, we've addressed the nitty-gritty of how SALT II has not been a success. We have tried to go to the military arguments, looking at particular elements in the triad. So it's not a case of ideology versus ideology or political rhetoric. But I think we have a solid case in saying that SALT II did not try to do very important things. Moreover, the things that it did try to do, it didn't do very well. As for allowing this unratified agreement to lapse decently at a time certain, against the backdrop of a new and more promising arms control venture, I think that case really is overwhelming.

**Manfred Hamm, The Heritage Foundation:** You have used the term that arms control is the valium of the nuclear age. But it seems to me that valium is a prescription drug. We have been both the doctor as well as the patient and in that sense we have been behaving more like a drug addict. We first administered it to ourselves to make reality appear better and more manageable, and then we started to live by the drug and now we're trying to wean ourselves away from it, realizing that it is killing us in terms of security. The question is whether we have enough stamina for the cold turkey that usually comes with withdrawal. We will not only experience cold turkey in regard to the political cost, but also in terms of the instability in our security relations to which the French gentleman has referred.

Are we really going to do anything in the strategic nuclear field that we could not do under the existing agreement? When I look at Congress, the fate of the MX, public opinion polls, the nuclear freeze campaign, which died down but then refocused on SDI, I don't see that we will be doing anything militarily without SALT II that we cannot do under existing agreements. So I think you are completely right that it is a question of political will, but I think we also should recognize that this society evidently cannot muster the political will to correct a situation which it has brought upon itself through the arms control process.

**Dr. Gray:** I thought that the way you put your introductory comment, you

and I were entirely as one. If we have a disagreement, it is where you end up. I'm just somewhat less dogmatic about the certainty with regard to the future. I don't know what the national political will will tolerate. It is historically not unusual for Western democracies to be very reluctant to face up to challenges of the sort we're living with today. It's true of the 1930s. Historically it's easy to demonstrate. Would we be prepared to take additional measures? I'm inclined to think that we would. I wouldn't give any guarantees, but I would say that if we are not willing to make the attempt to face up, we are simply moving slowly down a path of appeasement and accommodation to Soviet will.

**Mr. Hackett:** Thank you all for coming.







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# The Heritage Lectures

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President Jimmy Carter journeyed to Vienna in June 1979, where he and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, or SALT II. When Carter returned home with the treaty, he encountered a major debate which uncovered the treaty's serious conceptual flaws. After Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, Carter asked the Senate to defer consideration of the agreement. Brezhnev and Carter, however, agreed that they would take no action to undercut the treaty as long as the other side did the same.

While the U.S. has been complying scrupulously with the unratified treaty ever since, the USSR has violated it unashamedly. And while American development, testing and deployment of improved weapons have been seriously constrained, Moscow has forged far ahead in its drive for strategic superiority.

Had SALT II been ratified, the agreement would expire at the end of this year. The issue, then, discussed by the four experts at this Heritage Roundtable discussion, is whether the U.S. will continue complying with an unratified agreement even after its termination date. Moscow already has given its answer; it is ignoring SALT II in many critical areas. Only the U.S. is being constrained by the accord in its military modernization program. Despite calls by some outside—and even inside—the Reagan Administration for continuing to abide by the accord, the U.S. answer seems clear. SALT II, Rest in Peace.

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