

# The Heritage Lectures

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**The State Department**

**vs.**

**Ronald Reagan**

**Four Ambassadors Speak Out**

**Edited by James T. Hackett**

The  
Heritage Foundation



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## Contributors

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**Charles M. Lichenstein** was Alternate United States Representative to the United Nations, with the rank of Ambassador, from 1981 to 1984. He is a Yale University graduate. He served on the research staff of former President Richard Nixon; he has been Executive Director of the Free Society Association; Director of Research for the Republican National Committee; a policy level official during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and from 1975 to 1979, Senior Vice President of the Public Broadcasting Service.

**Curtin Winsor** served as Ambassador to Costa Rica from 1983 to 1985. He is a graduate of Brown University and holds a Ph.D. from American University. Ambassador Winsor also has served as Associate Director of the Alliance for Free Enterprise. He is currently a Washington consultant and is President of the Winsor Pittman Company.

# The State Department

vs.

## Ronald Reagan

**Burton Yale Pines, Vice President of The Heritage Foundation:** I am very pleased to welcome you to The Heritage Foundation and the Louis Lehrman Auditorium.\* I am also obviously pleased with the very impressive turnout and I know that many of you are here today because you share our concern that the State Department seems to be undermining Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. We believe in a simple fundamental fact: that the President is elected by the people to carry out specific policies. And it is a betrayal of the electoral process when these policies are thwarted and undermined by a bureaucracy. This is what has been happening with Ronald Reagan's foreign policy for more than four years. The State Department—key parts of it at any rate—has been undermining and thwarting Ronald Reagan's foreign policy.

How this is being done and why are the topics for discussion this afternoon and in subsequent sessions by these and future panelists who honor The Heritage Foundation with their presence.

Beginning today's program and moderating the discussion will be James Hackett. Jim is the editor of our monthly publication *National Security Record*. Jim was a Foreign Service Officer for fifteen years. He was Deputy Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, then served for eight years with the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and later became Ronald Reagan's Acting Director of that Agency. He then went over to USIA where he was Associate Director. It is a great pleasure for me to introduce today's moderator, who will make the introductory remarks. Mr. Jim Hackett.

**Mr. James Hackett:** Thank you, Burt. Many of you will remember that Ronald Reagan ran for the presidency on a set of principles that he had enunciated over a number of years. Now you can look around the world and see that in many places and in many situations those principles are not being pursued by the Department of State. I would like to list a few examples:

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\*This roundtable discussion took place on July 2, 1985.

- For four years the State Department tried to undercut the establishment of Radio Marti to avoid antagonizing Fidel Castro.
- The State Department supported a Contadora draft treaty, which would have led to acceptance of a communist regime in Nicaragua.
- The State Department has consistently opposed meaningful assistance to the Afghan freedom fighters.
- The State Department supports the communist regime in Mozambique and would give it military and economic aid against noncommunist freedom fighters.
- The State Department cooperates with communist regimes in Angola and Ethiopia, convincing itself that African Marxists are not real communists.
- The State Department opposes most freedom fighters around the world, because its basic policy is to support the status quo, even when the status quo is communist.
- The State Department opposes the sale of defense items to the Republic of China on Taiwan, trying to accommodate Beijing's desire to absorb the Republic of China.
- The State Department plays down the significance of Soviet arms control violations and opposes meaningful compensatory measures.
- The State Department has consistently opposed a reduction in the number of Soviet diplomats in the United States, even though a large percentage are KGB agents.
- The State Department supports a return to détente every day in every way, even though this again would give Moscow a free hand to spread communism around the world.

And this is only a partial list. I submit that these are not the policies the American people voted for, in 1980 or in 1984. The President has overruled the Department of State on some of these issues, but on most he has not.

How has this happened? Part of the answer is that the Administration has failed to understand that people make policy. Indeed, people are policy. If people who fully understand and support the policies and goals of candidate Ronald Reagan were appointed to most of the policy-making positions in foreign affairs, the President's policies would be pursued more effectively. On the other hand, when people who do not positively support the President's policies are placed in policy-making positions, they pursue their own agenda, or more likely, follow the agenda of the career bureaucrats who surround and advise them.

Now, of course, the advice of experienced and conscientious careerists

is essential, but only when added to a basic understanding of and commitment to the policies of the President. If that commitment is lacking, the President's policies will be undermined, intentionally or not, by his own appointees. This has happened in every administration. It makes little difference if an administration is elected to carry on as before. But when a President is elected on promises to change direction, he must appoint supporters dedicated to that goal if it is to be realized. No matter how conscientious, most career officers are obsessed with the perpetuation of the status quo. After all, that is what diplomacy is all about. It is an effort to prevent rocking the boat, to avoid the use of force at all cost, in fact, to avoid doing just about anything except negotiating and accommodating.

Diplomacy certainly has its place and serves useful purposes. But it should be used to implement policy that already has been determined. Diplomats should not be making policy. They may provide useful advice, but the formulation of policy is part of the political process, and the State Department cannot function apart from that process.

While there are some 6,000 professional-level officers in the United States Foreign Service, who properly fill the vast majority of foreign affairs positions in the United States government, there is constant pressure from the State Department to place career officers in the few dozen policy-making jobs that are reserved for presidential appointees. In our system of government, those positions should be filled by supporters of presidential policy, whether career or noncareer.

Some proponents of the appointment of a large percentage of career officers to policy-making positions ignore the implications of such action. Some even have argued that the career service has a special and unique responsibility to provide continuity in foreign policy, regardless of the will of the American electorate. That argument is inconsistent with democracy.

While many people feel in their bones that the State Department has not been pursuing the foreign policy they voted for, exactly how is less clear. We have here today three distinguished former ambassadors who supported the policies of President Reagan while they were in office. We have asked them to share with us their insights. It is our hope that President Reagan will act promptly to take firm control of the foreign policy process for the remainder of his term in office.

Our first speaker, Ambassador David B. Funderburk, holds a Masters Degree from Wake Forest University and a Ph.D. in Slavic Studies from the University of South Carolina. He served as United States Ambassador to Romania from 1981 to 1985, and has just recently returned from Romania to become the Graham A. Barden Professor of Government and

Chairman of the Division of Social Sciences at Campbell University in North Carolina.

**Ambassador David B. Funderburk:** Thank you very much. I would like to thank The Heritage Foundation and especially James Hackett for the initiative in organizing and hosting this roundtable. I also want to note that out in the field as well as back at State there was intense interest in Mr. Hackett's 1984 article and contribution to *Mandate for Leadership II* entitled "Regaining Control of the State Department," which led the State Department's labor union, the Foreign Service Association, to issue immediately a lengthy rebuttal. Mr. Hackett's article offered encouragement to the minority in the Foreign Service who shared his view.

For there is a goodly number at State who would like to courageously put Western principles and values, country and President above mere promotion, rewards, and security—and above stale, superficial diplomatic niceties as a substitute for vigilant defense of our nation's best interests and perceptive support for freedom's survival. I am approaching the topic of discussion from the perspective of one who served in Romania and dealt with the European Affairs Bureau of the State Department.

U.S. policy toward Romania and Eastern Europe is laughed at by really knowledgeable people in Eastern Europe as well as by the Soviets, who know that it plays right into their hands. It is tragically wrong because it does not benefit either the people of Eastern Europe or the best interests of the United States. It is not a pro-freedom policy, but a pro-slavery policy. I am and have been a supporter of President Reagan and his pronounced goals, objectives, and beliefs regarding Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. But the State Department has not effectively implemented the President's stated foreign policy goals, rather it has undermined them at every turn.

So how has the State Department done this? The President has consistently stated in his annual "captive nation" speeches, in the Yalta anniversary statement, and on other occasions that we are solidly behind the aspirations of the freedom-loving people of Eastern Europe to escape from communist slavery and that we will not assist the Marxist-Leninist rulers in oppressing the people through violations of human rights. But our policy as implemented has not realized the desired objectives. The opposite has occurred as the Soviets have strengthened their grip over the people of Eastern Europe.

In explaining how the State Department undermines the President's foreign policy, I would repeat the words of an experienced career Foreign Service diplomat, which should be instructive.



In those areas of the State Department hierarchy that deal with Eastern Europe as well as in other agencies are several influential career officers who apparently hold firmly to views of Romania and Eastern Europe fashionable during the Nixon years, and to a policy toward Romania and Eastern Europe shaped in that period. As these officers have a large hand in choosing and assigning officers to key positions in the region and some hand in selecting their ongoing assignments and their successors, there has been a pronounced tendency to select personnel who share established views and, thus, to perpetuate them.

These views generally persist until a traumatic event or the imposition of a bellwether change in thinking by higher policy levels of government force a rethinking of conventional wisdom. In many cases, these career officer's views of Romania and Eastern Europe were not gained firsthand, but rather from Washington or nearby capitals. Many of these views stem from the halcyon years of U.S.-Romanian relations in the early 1970s. Continuing the quote by this career Foreign Service Officer:

There seems to be a persistent vein of wishful thinking in the way our government regards Romania and how our policy toward it is shaped. Wanting independent Romanian behavior, we tend to focus on appearances of such behavior and not on continuing inevitable cooperation with the Soviets. As independence of behavior of a Soviet puppet is highly desirable, there has been a tendency to look for it and concentrate on it and downplay the aggressiveness of the Soviet-imposed government. Evidence developed in the field that challenges prevailing views is interpreted in the framework of conventional wisdom or is simply ignored. As relatively few people in the U.S. government pay any attention to Eastern Europe and fewer to Romania specifically, those career officers involved on a day-to-day basis with the region and with Romania to a significant degree make our policy regarding them. Presidents understandably concern themselves only on the occasion of visits and noteworthy developments. And then they are dependent upon material and suggestions presented to them by subordinates in the Department of State career bureaucracy. The power of these career officers stems from the fact that they have the field largely to themselves. This group of individuals are men and women who have worked together and for each other as a regional bureau group resembling others in the State Department.

Finally, this career Foreign Service Officer described what happens to those who dare to advocate a Reagan foreign policy or to buck the misconceived policy line of the elite network at State that controls appointments, advancement, promotions, rewards, assignments, and so forth. When several such courageous officers came up for reassignment they were given the following, and I am quoting this from a paper that was presented to me by a career Foreign Service Officer: "no assignment; no

assignment; assignment to a paper shuffling position; assignment to a lesser position; no assignment.”

While the President wants to promote an Eastern Europe policy that benefits the freedom-loving people and not the tyrannical regimes repressing them, helps develop human rights and freedom from Soviet domination, ensures reciprocity for the United States, and protects U.S. interests, the elite network of State, from the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs to the Deputy Assistant Secretaries and the country desk officers, has for the most part carried out a different policy. The network works frantically to denigrate the latest information from the field regarding human rights violations and technology transfers. For example, every piece of sensitive technology that came up for review for sale to Romania, which has an agreement with the Soviet Union to transfer any technology they want, was supported blindly by the State Department. Only the Department of Defense and some in the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest were opposed to such transfers.

Other information from the field that is denigrated, discredited, or ignored by the State Department includes Soviet troop transit in Romania. Soviet troops were photographed and shown to be crossing Romania, but this did not fit the preconceived policy, so it was ignored. Also ignored is the massive extent of Soviet-Romanian military collaboration and Romanian assistance for terrorists, radical Arabs, and Marxist-Leninists around the world. It is a haven for thousands of Libyans, Iranians, PLO members, and other international terrorists.

Romania sends aid to the Sandinistas and to Marxist-Leninist guerrillas in Africa and around the world. But this is never reported by the State Department. Concerning military sales, the little country of Romania was reported by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as being the fifth largest military armaments exporter in the world. When this information was sent to Washington—actually it had come out of Washington in the first place and the Embassy in Bucharest happened to take note of it and report it back to Washington—the State Department scrambled to rationalize this information, saying that it could not possibly be true, because Romania is our friend and almost an ally.

The Foreign Service network is not noted for sympathy for President Reagan, his nontraditional appointments, or conservatives of any stripe. What apparently motivates the players, other than liberal views and a biased certainty that they alone know how to conduct diplomacy, is the desire to succeed in the Foreign Service. Mr. Hackett correctly pointed out in some detail that the troops must do the bidding of the leaders of the “old boy network” to get promotions and rewards at State. The required

elements of fealty are liberal views politically; antipathy toward conservatives and political appointees; pro-internationalism and détenteism; and my favorite, activist clientitis.

Activist clientitis means an all-out effort to favor and bestow largesse on the area or country of specialty as the expected and preferred policy at State. For example, officers try to outdo one another in improving bilateral relations with a given country by dreaming up things to do for that country, such as a gift-a-month. Their preoccupation is with what the United States needs to do for that country; never vice-versa.

In the case of Romania, the desire is to shore up bilateral relations, to reward Romania's so-called independent foreign policy, and to constantly prove the validity of differentiation, which is our policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. The problem is that, as implemented, the policy overlooks essential U.S. interests and is not consistent with President Reagan's stated objectives. The gift-a-month might be a license granted for a high technology shipment, despite evidence of technology transfer to the USSR. It might be an extra quota of suits or sweaters dumped on the U.S. market for hard currency, International Monetary Fund loans, Commodity Credit Corporation credits, the annual renewal of most favored nation status, or high-level visits by United States officials, all of which help prop up the repressive rulers and weaken the possibilities of the people to resist them. Although Romania, for example, has become closer to the Soviets and more repressive internally during the past four years, the State Department sent visitors to congratulate Romania for what it might have done at some point in the past, and was thought by some to continue to be doing.

I just received a communication from a leading Romanian professional, who is concerned about his life if this information were to be connected with his name. He says that, following my departure and the report that came out in the news, high communist party officials pressured him to rebuke me in the name of his country. The reason put forth by the communist party officials was that the State Department disagreed with the views that I expressed. Therefore, it was right for him to do it. He goes on to say that my statements about the lack of independence of Romania's foreign policy and Romania's lack of basic human rights and basic human needs are absolutely true. To give one or two examples, he said, "It is important to have the respect of some of the basic needs of the individual, which are even recognized in a socialist type society. These are: health, running water, hot water, electricity, decent food, and a weekly day for rest. These basic needs are not met any more in my country." And with regard to foreign policy, he said "Everyone should be very aware of the

basic links with the Soviets and not lure themselves into believing that there can be or is independence in foreign policy.”

I could recite a litany of the horrors that occur in Romania to show that it is the most repressive society in Europe, and certainly Eastern Europe, with the possible exception of Albania. This includes the murder of a Roman Catholic priest in Transylvania, the killing and disappearance of various Baptist pastors, the demolition of churches, babies dying in incubators because the electricity was cut off, peasants being shot for stealing grain from a cooperative because they were starving to death. There are no Western publications allowed in the country. A scientific diet was announced, which was a sick joke. Dissidents are jailed, no labor union is allowed, penalties are imposed for not having four children, and there is a typewriter law that requires all typewriters and copying machines to be registered with the state. Last winter there was very little heat and electricity for most people. This led to a large number of deaths, but that was covered up.

In foreign policy, Romania collaborates closely with the Soviets in Warsaw Pact activity, in Third World activity, harboring terrorists and supporting radical Arabs, technology transfer, KGB activities, the U.N. and international fora, communist party activities, energy, trade, economic development, and in communist party ideology, practice, aims, beliefs, control, and expansion. Most of the evidence verifying this that has been presented from various quarters has been ignored by the State Department.

One example of how the State Department undermines the credibility of our president in Eastern Europe occurred during the visit to Bucharest of State Department Counselor Ed Derwinski in May 1984, when we learned from Romanian Ambassador Mircea Malitza that Ambassador Malitza had approached a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and recommended that something be sent to Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu from President Reagan praising the government of Romania and Ambassador Malitza and pleading that Romania attend the Los Angeles Olympics. Words lavish in praise of Romania's policies and hence of Ceausescu—one of the most hated tyrants in the world—were crafted by the State Department network without help from the most experienced experts, who were intentionally left out. At the outset of the meeting, the Romanian officials announced that they were going to the Olympics. Romania planned to go to the Olympics before being asked by us or before being praised by us. The State Department network mishandled the situation and made the U.S. and its President look bad.

It was in fact necessary for Romania to go to the Los Angeles Olympics

in order to maintain its pretense of being independent of Moscow. And both the Soviet and Romanian communists realized that it was in the best interest of both for Romania to go. A Romanian official told me in private that, several months prior to the Olympics, Romania and the Soviet Union had decided this very thing. They decided that it had to be done or Romania could not continue the myth of being independent and receive rewards such as most favored nation treaty status, \$650 million in exports to the United States, and other assets, because Romania is perceived to be different. Thus Romania is rewarded, and this takes the burden off the Soviet Union. In so doing, the U.S. is assisting the Soviet Union to maintain control over its empire. I have not mentioned names deliberately, and there is a lot more detail on this case. But it would seem that United States policy toward Romania was being manipulated by this elitist group at the State Department almost at the initiative of the then Romanian communist ambassador.

I have been very general in all of this, but if it is true that a majority of State Department officials are left of center, it is even more true for the elite network. It does not pay to show sympathy in the State Department with President Reagan, with the core of his political party or his policies. While the networkers often overtly profess to be supportive of the President's objectives, such as the tough stance vis-à-vis the Soviets, on a day-to-day basis they work very hard to undermine even this policy. Any official who is sympathetic with President Reagan's policies and who sends in evidence that goes contrary to a State Department view or policy that has long been in place will be ostracized, isolated, and ignored.

**Mr. Hackett:** Our next speaker is Ambassador Charles Lichenstein. Ambassador Lichenstein is a Yale University graduate. He served on the research staff of former President Richard Nixon; he has been Executive Director of the Free Society Association; Director of Research for the Republican National Committee; a policy level official during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, and from 1975 to 1979, Senior Vice President of the Public Broadcasting Service. From 1981 to 1984 he was Alternate United States Representative to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador, and you may remember that he is the gentleman who said that he would stand on the dock and wave goodbye to the United Nations if it chose to leave the United States.

**Ambassador Charles Lichenstein:** Thank you. The invitation is still open by the way. I have been looking forward to this day for a long time. I became very used to not being among friends, having spent three years at

the United Nations. During those three years I developed a great fondness for Funderburk and Winsor. Whenever we received telegrams signed with those two names at the U.S. mission, we had the feeling that we were being given insights into the real world, and these were rare and cherished occasions. They have both served the President and the United States with distinction.

I am going to make three brief points, which I would be delighted to talk about more if anybody wants to. I think they bear some relationship one to another, and I believe that each relates to the subject of this afternoon's roundtable.

The first point I have subtitled "The System First, The System Last, The System Always, Long Live the System." And the ironic part of point one is, as I will try to explain, that this holds even at the expense of accomplishing productive results that would themselves reflect credit on the system. But insofar as producing such results would throw monkey wrenches into the smooth operation of the system, these potential credits are set aside.

My second point I have subtitled "The Momentum of the System, What Keeps It Going, and How It Works Its Will From Day-to-Day, Day After Day, Year After Year, Without Cease and Despite All Impediments." And for my third and final point I would direct attention to "The Mythology of Politicization." It is perhaps my central point, and I suggest it to you this afternoon as one of the principal answers to the question before us—"How does the State Department system undermine the foreign policy of a President like Ronald Reagan?"

Returning to point one, that the system must, in any case, win, I want to tell you an extended case history by way of illustration of this principle. To provide the necessary context so that you will be able to appreciate the case history, I remind you that the U.S. Mission to the United Nations is a unique operation in many respects, one peculiarly advantageous for the likes of myself to be a member of, because there are many political appointees, unlike any other mission of the United States anywhere in the world. This means that you have a few friends to do business with. There are eight or ten or twelve political appointees—the rest of the staff of roughly 110 are members of the career Foreign Service.

The even more distinctive characteristic of USUN is the kind of business you do. It is not typical; it is not the same as, or even in some cases similar to, the business that is done by most of the State Department most of the time. What is practiced at USUN is multilateral diplomacy, not bilateral diplomacy. What is at issue at USUN is an ongoing calculus of multiple chess games, in which moves in each and all of the various games

may have some predictable and unpredictable impacts on moves on other chess boards, some of which you know about and some of which you do not know about. It is a very difficult, very distinctive specialty—I am not sure that anybody is particularly good at it—certainly I never thought I got to be all that good at it. Sometimes I was testy enough to be able to win a debate, but it was always difficult to judge the productiveness, the success, the contribution that we were making in New York to U.S. foreign policy in general.

My point is that this is a difficult kind of assignment, and there are few people in the State Department establishment who know how to do it. It is not, indeed, a preferred career track. That in itself creates a different level of problem. It does not necessarily attract the best talent within the Foreign Service establishment itself for the excellent reason that, being distinctive, it does not necessarily enhance one's career record or lead to bigger and better assignments. But it is a distinctive specialty, and there is something to be said for gaining experience in it.

So now I go to my case history. One of the problems that Jeane Kirkpatrick and the rest of us who served her in New York had was to try to identify people who were reasonably good at this distinctive specialty. Few had much training in it, as there is not much training in multilateral diplomacy to be had within the traditional State Department establishment. We tried to identify people who looked generally competent. We tried to identify people from the career Foreign Service to work with us who might be expected to enhance the capabilities that we ourselves brought to the task. And then it became a question of working with them, training them, and working back and forth training one another as we acquired experience and skill in the practice of multilateral diplomacy. We thought at the end of the four years that a couple of people she had identified—who had been with us throughout the time I was in New York and who continued on for the fourth year of the Kirkpatrick Ambassadorship—were getting better and better at what they were doing. They were people who were really beginning to understand the requirements of multilateral diplomacy. They unfortunately also had become identified as people who worked closely with Kirkpatrick.

And so we come to a case—he shall remain nameless; I want to protect the innocent—of a skilled Foreign Service Officer who became better and better at the task of multilateral diplomacy. By sheer happenstance, the Assistant Secretary-Designate of International Organizations, which is the State Department bureau that rides herd on multilateral diplomats in New York and elsewhere, is also a member of the Kirkpatrick team. He wanted this highly trained, highly skilled, and by this time highly experi-

enced Foreign Service Officer to be his principal deputy here in Washington. The system decided, however, that he was urgently required in Nigeria. Now he has no particular background in African affairs; he has no particular love or hate or interest in Nigeria. He would bring to Nigeria what a hundred or three hundred other Foreign Service Officers would bring to a relatively unimportant, about a fourth-level assignment in Lagos, Nigeria. He was very much wanted by the Assistant Secretary-Designate. But the system said "Oh no, no, no. You can't have him. We had already designated him." It was very important for him to go to this particular assignment.

Now as I say, the irony of the system imposing itself in a situation of this sort—I really should say interposing itself—is utterly irrational even from the system's own perspective. The system would have benefited greatly by having a truly skilled representative of the system serving, as I think he would have served, with distinction as the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organizations—a job for which he was marvelously qualified. The system said no. The system won.

This is the kind of thing that happens in the system and could be illustrated by case after case. The other aspect of this case that I want to spotlight is the retribution factor, which I think any reasonable person must accept as being at the heart of the explanation for such irrationality. The gentleman involved had achieved, and quite rightly, a reputation for being a loyal, dedicated, and effective assistant to Jeane Kirkpatrick and all those other terrible right-wing ideologues in New York. A further irony is that the gentleman involved is a registered Democrat and has always considered himself rather more of a liberal than a conservative. He thought, however, that he knew his duty. He did it, unfortunately for him, all too well.

I move to my second point. What keeps this system going? Where does it get its motivation? Where does it get its juices? For one thing, the defenders of the system operate on the accurate assumption that political appointees come and go, but they stay on forever. And if they can sit it out for a year here, two years there, four years, or maybe even eight years, it is all right. In the fullness of time the Funderburks, the Winsors, the Lichensteins, and the Kirkpatricks will go to their greater reward, and these folks will still be running the Foreign Service.

They control the systems of rewards and of penalties. They control the supply of both carrots and sticks. They are in charge. They recruit. They recruit people in their own images. They train those people. These chickens even have the advantage of running their own chicken coop by law. By law the Director General of the Foreign Service of the United States must



be a member of the Foreign Service. That seems to me one of the most perverse pieces of legislation for a democratic society that I have ever heard of—a democratic society that presumably governs itself according to the results of free, open, and competitive elections, which are held regularly at four-year intervals.

They never give up. They sometimes put the memorandum, the piece of paper, the policy recommendation aside for the time being, but it comes back—and comes back—and in the end it comes back one time too many, and they win. An immediate and recent example: On April 4, the State Department, to the best of my knowledge without anybody asking them, produced a memorandum. I had seen the previous drafts two years ago, three years ago, and four years ago. In those days it addressed the illegality of the Israeli settlements on the West Bank. This time it addressed the illegality of detaining 765 Shiite militants who had been removed from behind Israeli lines during the withdrawal of Israel's defense forces from southern Lebanon. The State Department identified those Shiite militants as having been illegally detained under the terms of the so-called Fourth Geneva Convention. Reasonable people may differ about the wisdom of this Israeli action, whether it was politic or not, whether it was prudent or not, whether it was required or not. But it was not in contravention of the Geneva Convention. At the time, I remember talking to some of my former colleagues and also to some officials in the Israeli government and we simply said to each other, "This is an unfortunate memorandum, but one hopes it will go away and will not haunt us."

When TWA Flight 847 was seized, it surely did rise and come to haunt us. It has deeply affected the working-out of the unpleasant and unhappy hostage crisis by supplying the Shiites with precisely the kind of justification they could take greatest advantage of, both locally for their own constituencies and equally important before the American public. It gave them an opportunity to make a seemingly perfect equivalence: "After all, we only seized 39 of your people and you got 765 of ours, so let's have a trade and let that be the end of it." I will not underscore that except to say that I think the permanent establishment of our State Department is very expert at this kind of thing. I could give you ten more illustrations, not all as dramatic, but, in my judgment, just as deleterious in their impact on the U.S. national interest as the one I have given you.

Finally, the "mythology of politicization." Even beyond the system's self-serving mechanisms—beyond its permanency or any of the considerations that I have already put out on the table—the system relies upon and perpetuates what I call the "mythology of politicization." The reverse side of the myth, of course, is that foreign policy is nonpartisan and

neutral, and that politics stops at the water's edge. Foreign policy is considered above the usual play of domestic politics in the United States. Thus the President—in this particular case let us call him Ronald Reagan—who attempts to challenge the pervasive, accepted conventional wisdom is automatically accused of injecting ideology into a process that should be free of ideology. This is not only a myth; it is a dangerous and a malicious myth that Ronald Reagan, or Jeane Kirkpatrick, or Funderburk, or Winsor, or Lichenstein is injecting ideology.

What we are actually doing is challenging the ideology to which the whole establishment has become accustomed, which provides the base of the establishment's power and authority. It has always amused me that the two Presidents in recent years who have had the greatest percentage of political ambassadors—I admit that it is only by a couple of percentage points—happen to be named John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter; not Ronald Reagan, not Gerald Ford, not Richard Nixon, or Dwight Eisenhower. Yet I can never remember a great public scandal being raised in the prestige press, or in the academic community, or within the State Department establishment, about the terrible degree to which John F. Kennedy and Jimmy Carter were politicizing the foreign policy process.

In my judgment, the most political ambassador who has ever been appointed to represent the United States at the United Nations—no it is not Jeane Kirkpatrick—it is Andrew Young. Andy Young did not have a single qualification for the job. He had not spent a single day of his life in the practice of diplomacy. He had no academic background in international affairs. There was absolutely no reason to think that Andrew Young would have brought to this job anything other than what Andrew Young is splendidly skilled at—namely, politics. He is a very good politician. I wish he were on my side. I even sometimes wish he were on the side of the United States, but that probably is asking too much. I do not remember any great criticism—any storm of protest—about the appointment of a man like Andrew Young to the job of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. And on political grounds, I would not have made any criticism either. I would have made my criticism only on grounds of competence. But Jeane challenged the prevailing conventional ideology as Andrew Young did not. Jeane Kirkpatrick, therefore, is considered a political ambassador. Andrew Young, at the beginning of his term, was not.

I think that this myth is pervasive because it goes far beyond the subject of today's roundtable. It goes deep into academic politics. It goes deep into the way in which our prestige press operates. It is pervasive throughout our society. But it is extremely important within the narrower framework of today's concerns.

Why is such a situation tolerated? Why does this Administration permit it? Stipulating for the moment that we are not all crazy, that we know what we have been talking about and what I think Curt Winsor will also talk about, why is it tolerated? I almost do not want to raise the question and I almost do not want to know the answer. But I raise it and I leave it with you and maybe we will return to it.

**Mr. Hackett:** Our next speaker is Ambassador Curtin Winsor. A graduate of Brown University with a Ph.D. from American University, he has the interesting perspective of having served as a career Foreign Service Officer, left the Foreign Service for other work, and come back as a noncareer appointee. So he has seen foreign service from all sides. He served as Ambassador to Costa Rica from 1983 to 1985. Prior to that, he was Associate Director of the Alliance for Free Enterprise. He is currently a Washington consultant and is President of the Winsor Pittman Company.

**Ambassador Curtin Winsor:** Thank you very much. For me this is an interesting opportunity to comment on a problem that has dynamics running back into the 1950s. I will not belabor the history of this problem, but rather attempt to raise some questions that will enable us to better discuss its causes and come up with some ideas as to how it can be rectified.

As a private citizen, I have served on a Foreign Service promotion panel for the United States Information Agency, on the transition team for the first Reagan Administration, and finally, as United States Ambassador to Costa Rica. From these experiences, I have gained a sense that there exists in the Foreign Service and the Department of State a profound contradiction—a self-defeating syndrome. The Foreign Service attracts very bright, very capable people. Thousands take the entrance exam every year, and usually fewer than 120 a year are admitted. These young people form an extremely skilled cadre. They come in tested as an elite and are made to feel that they are an elite. But when they go out to serve, they find they must submit to a grinding process, which I believe in many cases takes brilliant young minds and dulls them to the point of conceptual uselessness. This process undercuts the Department of State, this country, and most important of all, the job they have to do to manifest the President's policies in his diplomacy.

There are good Foreign Service Officers who have made it through this grinding process. Many of them are well-known names. But this group is all too few in number. The Foreign Service Officer who makes it to the top as a career diplomat is all too often, cumulatively speaking, a man who

has made it by taking no risks. In this lies the fatal flaw of the Department of State. Within the Department of State, as indeed in other elements of our society today, there is a no-risk attitude. This manifests itself as a universalist morality—a concept that what everybody in the international environment wants is what we should provide. This points us away from national security thinking within the context of the Department of State. This outlook makes a Foreign Service Officer instinctively very, very cautious about coming up with fresh ideas or initiatives that might be seen as threatening the status quo. The status quo is usually accommodated by the State Department system through processes of negotiation, which do not take the direct national security interests of the United States into account and which often prolong situations that are clearly against our national security interests.

The problem is general, but it has specific manifestations. The Department has taken good people, burned many of them out, and it has drummed out those who do not burn. I believe the Foreign Service, which has a history of self-examination, is long overdue for more. A way must be found to enable the individual, who comes in brilliant and capable of conceptualization and adapting to new ideas, to function without threatening the system.

I would like to talk now about some specific examples, Central America in particular, because no place on earth more richly demonstrates the difference that exists between the clear policies of a popularly elected president and a diplomacy that has become opaque and virtually inexplicable to rational people. We have a President who speaks often of the importance of democracy in Central America, of the importance of commitments clearly made by those who formed the communist Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Intervention by the United States and the other countries of the region made that government possible. But that government has contravened all those promises. President Reagan has been very clear in his view that the Nicaraguan government must democratize, cease terrorizing its neighbors, cease introducing subversive doctrines into the region and inflicting them on its neighbors, and cease its spiraling armaments buildup.

How has this clear message of the American President been translated into U.S. diplomacy? The Central Americans had attempted to establish a diplomacy of their own in San Jose in 1982, but the San Jose Accords of 1982 were quickly forgotten when the Mexicans, who have served as patrons of the Sandinistas, formed an alternative, the so-called Contadora Group. The Contadora Group at that time stood basically for buying time for Nicaragua. It was dressed up in nice language; it proposed 21 good

points, but in reality became a process in which a victory for democracy became virtually impossible and remains so.

The Department of State gave little credence to the San Jose Act of the Central American countries, preferring to see the Central American countries put in a docket, in effect, before the Court of World Opinion, where the judges were the Contadora countries, whose democratic credentials are not noticeably better than those of the Central American countries. The Costa Ricans, who are the most profoundly democratic people in Latin America, understandably resent being put in this position, and they resent Contadora—a point that is not widely disseminated by the U.S. Department of State or, indeed, by the news media. Contadora has become an article of faith in U.S. diplomacy and its explanations of what American policy should be worldwide.

The second point is the Manzanillo negotiations. These were secret negotiations that could have had only one substantive outcome: the sellout of America's friends, the Hondurans, and to a lesser extent, the Costa Ricans. These talks were perpetrated to assuage those who felt that ongoing dialogue and accommodation with the communist Sandinista government was indispensable. Is this a reflection of our President's thinking?

The third point, which I think is equally difficult to deal with for a diplomat representing the President's thinking is the fact that the U.S. has offered assistance to the democratic opposition in Nicaragua, organized them in certain places, and then politically pulled the rug out from under them. We have given them too little money; we have given them money that was politically tainted; we have given them trouble in terms of their political antecedents, subjecting them to purity tests that should have been applied to the Sandinistas in the mid-1970s. The result has been absolute confusion over our objectives. This confusion has been sown by the Department of State, not by the President or the White House.

For example, in March 1982, there were discussions between then Secretary of State Alexander Haig and the Mexicans, which raised fears in Central America that the U.S. would endorse the Mexican negotiating formula. This formula would have allowed Nicaragua to escape implementing its OAS commitments for democratization and basically came from key people in the Latin American Bureau of the State Department.

In January 1983, Secretary George Shultz and then Assistant Secretary Tom Enders proposed to work with Mexico for a "two-track" approach to a political solution, which in the end was rejected by the President, after which Mr. Enders departed shortly for a new assignment as Ambassador to Spain. This two-track approach, in effect, would have

provided a basis for accommodation with the communist Sandinista government, which was intent on subverting U.S. friends and blocking the democratization of Central America.

In December 1983, there was a secret visit to Nicaragua by then Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley. And there were subsequent State Department leaks about a feasible political solution, again along the lines of a negotiated settlement with the communist Sandinistas.

In June and July 1984, there was a State Department proposal for a four-step U.S.-Nicaragua bilateral negotiated solution, which had no provisions whatsoever for effective verification of Nicaraguan implementation of its OAS commitments. Again, this was rejected, and the President's original vision of the importance of democratization and the end of the arms race in Central America was reaffirmed.

As recently as October and November 1984, following the October 1984 congressional action to temporarily cut funding to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters, a key Department of State official stated that a new Central American policy excluding the freedom fighters would have to be developed. After the Nicaraguan elections, these officials spoke on background and stated that the election was not a Soviet-style sham and that it was possible to arrive at a negotiated solution with the "pragmatic" Sandinista leader, Daniel Ortega. This would appear to be a clear reflection that the approach of this State Department group is a very strange one and deserves the attention of the American people.

To close my remarks, I would like to raise a key question. If U.S. diplomacy is such that its credibility can be threatened in its own front yard, how can the U.S. claim credibility with its allies in Europe and Asia? If they cannot see the U.S. as willing to clear out the bear-infested garbage from the front yard, how can they count on the U.S. for the issues that are profoundly important to them? The failure of American capacity to develop an effective diplomacy could be fatal in the future.

**Mr. Hackett:** You have heard three different perspectives from three officials who have served in this Administration, from the point of view of European Affairs, the United Nations, and Latin America. We would like to take questions.

**Cathy Klenely, *International Press Service:*** Ambassador Funderburk, you mentioned Richard Burt in your statement not by name but by position. In the last couple of days, leading West German newspapers, including *Die Welt*, have given coverage to the opposition to Burt's nomination as Ambassador to West Germany. A group called the Coalition to

Stop Richard Burt claims that, were he actually to be confirmed by the Senate, given his pedigree, his record, it would do severe damage to U.S.-West German relations and NATO, and more important, would be perceived by Moscow as a signal that the United States no longer considered West German security and membership in the Alliance of paramount importance. Could you comment on that please?

**Ambassador Funderburk:** I would agree with that assessment. As you know, I testified in a Senate hearing last week on this nomination. Richard Burt is not a career Foreign Service Officer. In my experience in Romania, the career Foreign Service Officers, from Lawrence Eagleburger to Mark Palmer to Richard Combs to Roland Kuchel, to Jonathan Rickert to Thomas Lynch, seem to be the ones most anxious to defend the network's elitist view of differentiation, reward, and favoritism toward every East European country. My concern now is who is going to take Richard Burt's place, and it concerns me more than where Richard Burt is going. It is not good for the United States to have someone as U.S. Ambassador to West Germany who does not really understand the danger just next door, because West Germany is a key member of NATO and our major ally in Europe. But at the same time, it is a position of limited influence in policy making. Less damage can be done in Bonn than in Washington as Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. This is not to rationalize this appointment. I am concerned about it and testified to that, but I am more concerned now about who is going to replace Richard Burt in directing all of European affairs, including the Soviet Union and Canada. And that person is Rosanne Ridgway, a career Foreign Service Officer who has the same attitude, that we should reward every country in Eastern Europe with something and try to wean them away from Moscow by giving them aid. And the aid goes to the regimes, not the people.

**Miss Klenely:** This is a followup. There seems to be some thinking among conservatives that getting Richard Burt out of Washington is somehow good. I understand your objections to Ridgway, but if she represents the same policies, what good is it to send him over there?

**Ambassador Funderburk:** It is not good. I am just saying it is the lesser of evils.

**Steve Dujack,** Editor, *Foreign Service Journal*: This question is for Ambassador Lichenstein. Can you tell me what the statistics are that you are referring to that show that Jimmy Carter was one of the highest of

postwar Presidents in the number of political appointees he made as ambassadors, and can you also tell me who compiled the statistics.?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** They were probably compiled by the State Department. I hope you will accept the authority of those data.

**Ambassador Winsor:** They were compiled by the Undersecretary for Management about two years ago at the request of Congress.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** I think that the percentages were something like between 40 and 41 percent over the years of the Kennedy Administration and the same for the Carter years, while in the Reagan, Ford, and Nixon years they were in the 36 to 38 percent range.

**Mr. Dujack:** The Foreign Service Association, which publishes our magazine, keeps such statistics. The State Department and the Foreign Service Association say that Jimmy Carter was the lowest in percentage of political appointees, ranging from 21 to 27 percent; Kennedy was the highest at 40 percent.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** I do not think that is true of Carter, but let us not argue about the figures.

**Mr. Dujack:** Also, there is the quality of the appointees, and certainly our Association would take a position that the Reagan Administration's quality of appointees has been the lowest. Do you have any comment on that?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** That would be your judgment. I have a very different judgment, obviously. I am also biased, having been one of those appointees. I believe that the overall quality of expert skills and training of President Reagan's political appointments in the foreign policy establishment—as ambassadors and officials of the State Department—has been extraordinarily high. I would be delighted to lay them side by side with anybody else's appointments. But you know, we could go around and around on this, and I would not expect that you and I would agree on many of the criteria about which we would be making the judgments.

**Joanne Omang, *The Washington Post*:** Ambassador Winsor, in your time as Ambassador to Costa Rica did you ever advocate any particular remedies for removing garbage from the front yard, and if you did not would you do so now?



**Ambassador Winsor:** Yes, I had indicated, but not publicly, that I felt that the diplomacy of the United States should be directed to work toward reconvening the same OAS meeting that stripped Somoza of his legitimacy in 1979, which meeting is still in fact kept open and which our Department of State has made scant mention of. There should be multi-lateral diplomacy to perhaps restore some credence back to the Rio Pact, which concedes that subversion is aggression. There should be an attempt to challenge the legitimacy of the Sandinista government in a multilateral format and do unto them as was done unto Somoza. Then I would raise a question as to whether the U.S. should maintain a full diplomatic mission, or indeed any diplomatic mission, to a government that has betrayed all confidences and its own people and has perpetrated truly hideous policies from the U.S. point of view. I would then seek democratic outcomes from that type of diplomacy. I never have advocated direct U.S. military action in Central America.

**David Aikman, *Time Magazine*:** I have a question for Ambassador Lichenstein. Would you be good enough to answer your own rhetorical question why the situation you have very graphically described is indeed tolerated in the Department of State?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** The problem is not that it is tolerated in the Department of State, the question is why is it tolerated, period. I will answer my rhetorical question. We have the wrong Secretary of State.

**Les Kinsolving, columnist:** We may have the wrong Secretary of State, Mr. Ambassador, but we have his boss, the President. Why doesn't he do something about it?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** You will have to ask the President that.

**Mr. Kinsolving:** I have tried to do that.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** It may very well be that the President is not fully aware of the nature of the diplomatic process. I was not aware of the nature of the diplomatic process until I became a diplomat myself. It is very difficult indeed to tell what any of the people you are sending out to carry messages to foreign ministries around the world are actually doing and saying. You do not know whether they are conveying the message you are asking to be conveyed, with the nuance, with the understanding, the subtlety, and the sophistication that you hope they are bringing to the

task. It is a virtually uncheckable process. Only results can be checked, and even then, it is difficult to draw one-to-one correlations between cause and consequence.

I say all that only to illustrate the point that this is an extraordinarily difficult process over which to exercise political leadership and to maintain quality and substantive control. I believe that the President must be permitted to have the people he chooses to head his executive departments. I focus only on what I am able to focus on from my own experience, and that is the quality of the work done by Secretary Shultz's Department. I think that Secretary Shultz is an excellent human being. I think he is a patriot. I think he is a thoughtful man. There are a dozen jobs for which I would nominate him. One of them happens not to be Secretary of State.

**Peter Nelson**, International Development Institute: My question concerns U.S. foreign aid policy. The Agency for International Development (AID) claims to be independent of State, and the foreign assistance relationships and mistakes made by AID over the years are much easier to document than are the mistakes made in foreign policy. Would anyone like to discuss the relationship between the White House, AID, and the State Department, who is responsible for what, and who actually sets policy?

**Ambassador Winsor**: Let me attempt to answer that since we have a substantial AID mission in Costa Rica. AID is clearly under the Secretary of State. The development of AID policy is usually a protracted exercise between the Department of State, AID, Congress, and possibly elements within the White House. These things are correlated between perceptions of national security policy, interests—sometimes special interests—and personalities. In the case of Costa Rica, there is a very large assistance program, probably on a per capita basis the second largest in the world, because that country is a democracy and a showcase for democracy in a region that is now deemed to be of extreme importance to the United States. The assistance package was developed in consultation between the Department of State and AID. They kept in mind that Costa Rica's problems are defined not in terms of political fragility—Costa Rican democracy is very strong—but economic fragility. But political systems cannot survive economic collapse. There could be no freedom politically without freedom economically. The two are inseparable. And so it is with AID policy. It is a consultative arrangement that is usually arrived at in a very complex, protracted negotiation. I hope that answers

your question.

**Mr. Nelson:** How much influence does the White House have in making AID policy?

**Ambassador Winsor:** It varies. In the case of a country that is of particular importance to United States policy interests, the White House—through the National Security Council staff mechanism—will provide input. If it is a question of broad regional policy under which a country fits, there will probably be more input from a Department of State-AID negotiation. In some cases, it may be largely AID policy, depending on the level of political interest in a given country.

**Mr. Hackett:** There has been a move on Capitol Hill to make some real changes in the whole concept of foreign assistance. Congressman William S. Broomfield (R-MI) in the House has been supporting the concept of the Senate bill, which places a new emphasis on reduced overall aid levels, and on aid that would go more to the friends of the United States and those countries that cooperate with us and pursue the same goals. But I also understand from sources on the Hill that this effort is not being supported by the Department of State. The Department apparently has a very substantial constituency that likes to give money to countries that have been getting money and wants to keep doing it.

**Karen McKay,** Committee for a Free Afghanistan: The perfidy and duplicity of the State Department is nowhere more evident than on the issue of Afghanistan, wherein the State Department appears to be unalterably opposed to any effective, visible, or traceable American aid to the Afghan people, including humanitarian aid and American doctors. To block the growing support movement, State is now carrying out a war of disinformation even on Capitol Hill, almost working hand in hand with the Soviets to prevent the American people from pressuring their government into aiding the Afghan people before it is too late. I would appreciate a comment from one of you gentlemen, perhaps Ambassador Lichenstein, on this and why they can get away with it when the entire Congress, the media, and the American people are unanimously demanding support for the Afghans? Even *The Washington Post* had an editorial headed "Let's Arm the Afghans," and nobody seems to disagree with that except the State Department.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** I have the same sense that you express and I

certainly had that sense throughout my three years in New York. The desire of the State Department's permanent establishment seemed always to be to wish that the Afghan problem would go away so that they could concentrate on more urgent issues of alliances, of working out essential agreements with the Soviet Union and with other major powers in the world. It is an irritant to the State Department, rather than as I would regard it, an opportunity. It is a pesky nuisance rather than an area in which the United States can and should, in my judgment, support those who are fighting in behalf of freedom. But this gets to the very heart of the issue that we have been addressing this afternoon.

The State Department establishment is not comfortable with foreign policy that is cast in terms of affirmative conceptualization, affirmative goals. To try to seek affirmative goals; to try to enhance the chances for free people to remain free and for those whose freedom is under attack to fight back: this is not the kind of job that, in my experience, many in the State Department establishment felt comfortable with. The State Department diet consists largely of working out relatively narrow agreements on relatively narrow issues one at a time. They do not let one agreement too much affect another agreement, and by all means, do not let broad concepts get in the way of what sounds like a dread disease, activist clientitis, or what is sometimes known more familiarly as "going native." Every professional diplomat wants to be loved, and particularly he wants to be loved by the government to which he is accredited.

The easiest way to do this in the case of the Afghan situation is not to let this affect the U.S. relationships with Pakistan, or the Soviets, or any of the other regional powers. I suppose that we should not even let it affect our relationship with Afghanistan, with which we maintain a formal diplomatic relationship, even though one of our most recent ambassadors to Afghanistan happened to have been murdered in the presence, as I understand it, of the gentleman almost surely the chief of the local KGB establishment and probably on his direct instruction to proceed with the murder. But we do maintain that relationship. I am sure that there is somebody in the State Department who could give this a marvelously moving and lucid explanation.

**Mr. Hackett:** The State Department continues to accord the Afghan puppet government most favored nation status, and we continue to trade with them. At the same time the Afghan resistance is out there fighting a heroic struggle against a bold Soviet invasion. But if we tried to help the resistance more effectively, we would handicap the efforts of the State Department to establish a new *détente* with the Soviet Union and, of

course, we do not want to do that. If the U.S. helped the Afghan resistance, it might make the Soviets madder at Pakistan than they already are, and officials in the State Department worry more about Pakistan's well-being than the Pakistanis do.

**Ambassador Winsor:** I think that the broader pattern also should be considered. If the Afghan freedom fighters were alone, it would be discomforting, but they are not. There are the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. They are subject to the term "contra," for example, a communist-coined term that means counterrevolutionary, which these people certainly are not. There are the resistance fighters to a Marxist regime in Mozambique. There is Angola. Consider the State Department's nonrecognition of any one of the heroic resistance efforts that are going on in Soviet bloc countries. Consider U.S. policies from the point of view of those who would dare to resist the Brezhnev Doctrine. In effect, these policies have been reinforcing the late Mr. Brezhnev. One wonders from the President's speeches if in his own mind he might not be formulating a Reagan Doctrine. Perhaps I am being wildly optimistic to think in these terms, but would it not be possible for the U.S. to say "Come, you who want democracy, and we will give you the arms that you need"—to extend support to those who want democracy in the world and be proud of it? But I fear that the State Department is not on this frequency at all.

**Bill Outlaw, *The Washington Times*:** Ambassador Lichenstein, you indicated earlier, pertaining to the TWA situation, that the State Department had acted on its own in saying that the Israeli detention of the Shiites was a violation of international law. Can you say specifically where that came from and if any one at the White House had indicated any specific disagreement with the State Department saying that?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** I can answer one part of your question. It came initially from the Office of Legal Counsel at the Department of State on April 4. Who else signed off on that particular memorandum I have no way of knowing. I do not have access to classified information. Whether this was noted at the White House, again I do not know. I do know that I discussed this with representatives of our own government. I discussed it with members of Congress, and I discussed it with representatives of foreign governments. There was great amazement expressed that, at a moment (short of the actual incident of hijacking) when clearly this kind of issue was of the highest degree of sensitivity, to the best of my knowledge nobody had specifically asked the State Department for its opinion

about this issue. It also was a moment when the government of Israel had already published its own rationale, which obviously was objected to by the representatives of many Arab governments and certain other governments in the world. At that moment, in other words, there did not seem to be any reason why the State Department had to throw a legal memorandum on the table. By April 10, it was forgotten. By June 10, who remembered it? When TWA 847 was hijacked, it was remembered.

**Robert Corrigan**, retired Foreign Service Officer: Ambassador Lichenstein, I have been reading a lot about Namibia, Southwest Africa, and Angola. My question is what about SWAPO? Are they really bad eggs and are we trying to keep them from taking Namibia over, and what prospect is there that they will not take it over?

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** SWAPO is an organization that, as is amply documented, engages in traditional political activity as a dissident out-group and also operates as a terrorist organization. It engages in the support of terrorist activity within Angola, within Namibia, and in some occasional locations on the territory of the Republic of South Africa itself. It is, of course, an outlawed organization within South Africa and Namibia. It is also a qualified observer mission accredited to the United Nations. This gives it a cast of international legitimacy, which is a matter of very great importance to SWAPO. Its leadership, even though it is barred from participation with any legitimate government in any country of the world, appears at the table of the Security Council of the United Nations and is granted exactly the same privileges as the head of any state or the foreign minister of any state.

My further perception is that there is a chance that the United States, acting as honest broker, could promote an accommodation between the present government of Angola and the government of South Africa, and this could begin to phase the withdrawal of the Cuban troops, which perhaps are the essential prop of the government of Angola. This could be done in such manner as would permit the Republic of South Africa to grant Namibia the independence that it is legally obligated to grant it. Whether this will happen, whether events will permit it, whether the most radical elements of all of the governments, all of the terrorists, all of the political groupings, and the extremists within those groups and governments, will permit such a reasonable outcome is the kind of problem that representatives of the U.S. government are now working very hard to find out. They are working very hard at the same time to create the kind of environment in which such an outcome might be possible.

**Sam Dickens**, American Security Council: Ambassador Winsor, a question related to the development of the inter-American system by the Foreign Service, a very complicated process of the Rio Treaty that dates back to 1947. Countless hours of diplomacy and multilateral discussion went into the development of that system, and subsequently there were meetings over the years in Caracas, San Jose, and elsewhere concerning Cuba and communism in the hemisphere. It is a complicated system, and Foreign Service Officers have participated in its development from the very beginning. My question is, why is that system not brought forward and used to face up to U.S. problems in the hemisphere?

**Ambassador Winsor:** The answer to that is complex. But it suggests one of the themes that has been pointed out by this panel, that the Department of State is reluctant to depart from a status quo posture vis-à-vis de facto governments. Cuba is now regarded as an evil that we know. State's people are reluctant to indulge in possible scenarios that would create something that we do not know. In other words, we are reluctant to really go after Cuba. Following the passage of the Clark Amendment in 1975, which in effect protected Cuba's activities in Africa, the U.S. betrayed those countries of the inter-American system that were then willing to join in an economic effort against Cuba. The U.S. has consistently acted through diplomacy to preserve governments that are not its friends and also those that are sworn enemies. This has undermined the Rio Treaty to such an extent that at this time it has very low credibility among many U.S. friends.

This points to a serious problem, which is at least in part of our own making. The U.S. is very reluctant to give bilateral assurances to countries, because that would wholly discredit the Rio Treaty. Yet it also has seemed very reluctant to accept the agreed language, which is appended to the Rio Treaty, that subversive terrorists sent from one country to another are covered by the treaty and are the equivalent of an invasion. Hopefully, the President will recognize this problem and instruct his diplomats to change their approach.

**Unidentified Guest:** With the resolution of the TWA 847 situation, the press has suggested that perhaps the United States ought to reassess its relationship with the Syrians, and goes on to note that this is a point that Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy had made up to a year and a half ago. This seems to be in direct contravention of the comments of the President, the Secretary of State, and the National Security Advisor to the effect that Syria supports, trains, and sponsors various terrorist orga-

nizations.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** I think that the point you make in conclusion is squarely on target. I could even point to page 1 of this morning's edition of *The Washington Times*, which gives again a point-by-point, paragraph-by-paragraph recital of the depth of Syrian involvement in the organization, support, sustenance, and command of international terrorism operating in many parts of the world. I think there is absolutely no question about Syrian involvement. I think there is absolutely no question about Syrian culpability with regard to the blowup of our embassy in Beirut, of our embassy in Kuwait, of the Marine barracks in Beirut, and, in all likelihood, the recent murders in Beirut, the kidnappings in Beirut, and the hijacking of TWA 847.

We now are in the interesting situation of thanking the criminal for having relented in his crime wave. I think we handed Hafez Assad a no-lose situation. Apparently he does not have to cease and desist from any activity that he may contemplate in the future. Presumably he does not even have to pay any specific price for any of the activity in which he has engaged in the past. It is as if the suggestion is now being made that the slate is wiped clean, and we can establish a friendly and mutually profitable new relationship.

**Ambassador Winsor:** Because Syria is not alone in supporting terrorists, I believe that we have had a propensity to look to the individual terrorists and not to those who created them. I would say Khomeini had as much to do with it, with his terrorist movement, as Syria did. Libya bankrolls them all. Nicaragua trains them, sustains them, and uses them. But we have had a propensity to name and look at individual groups, not at root causes, because again that would rock the boat. It would cause the U.S. to have to deal adversely and perhaps in a very summary way with nation states that are content to be outlaws, given such little law as exists in the international system. That is the question that must be addressed with respect to terrorism, and it has not been addressed by the actions of Mr. Shultz. The recent murders in El Salvador come to mind, where U.S. Marines were the victims. Were the entities that organized those murders and took credit for them pointed to? No. The talk was about the terrorists and the people who pulled the triggers, and I think that raises some profound questions about U.S. institutional attitudes toward terrorism.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** And we must not forget to mention the brooding, benign presence that casts its protection and provides ultimate sanc-



tuary for all of the above, the Soviet Union.

**Ambassador Funderburk:** And the State Department has not given Romania credit for the assistance and support it gives to radical Arab terrorists. I have read sensitive documents verifying that Romania is deeply involved in this. And our Most Favored Nation treatment gift to Romania is supposed to be in part for noninvolvement with terrorist activities.

**Joanne Omang, *The Washington Post*:** I would like to ask Ambassador Winsor, Mr. Funderburk, and Mr. Hackett if they agree with Ambassador Lichenstein's assertion that Shultz should be replaced.

**Mr. Hackett:** Yes.

**Ambassador Winsor:** Yes.

**Ambassador Funderburk:** Yes, absolutely. With regard to the European Bureau, Shultz knows only what the network tells him, and he always supports the careerists at the State Department. I do not think he effectively implements or represents the President's foreign policy.

**Ambassador Lichenstein:** We always say that, and I suppose sometimes we believe it. What perplexes me about the whole business is how this system really does work. I sometimes wish that somebody would make me the Secretary of State for a while so that I could have a day or two insight into how the system works. I know for a fact that Secretary Shultz hears all sorts of things outside the network. He hears them from Secretary Weinberger; he hears them from Bill Casey of CIA; he used to hear them from Jeane Kirkpatrick when she was representing the United States at the United Nations. I do not doubt that he hears them from some of his other friends—Mrs. Shultz for all I know; and maybe analysts of world communism and of the realities of the world in which we exist. What really perplexes me is how a man who is as intelligent and well-intentioned and gives such good speeches as George Shultz can permit and indeed cultivate and perpetuate this kind of situation. It is not clear to me that we can just leave it that he only knows what the network tells him.

**Mr. Hackett:** In discussions I had early in the administration of Secretary Shultz with a senior official very close to the Secretary, it became clear to me that his approach to serving as Secretary was to address "the big issues" and to leave the management of the State Department and foreign

affairs to others. He made quite clear, as a former Secretary of Labor, that he did not want any labor trouble with the Foreign Service bureaucracy and said, in effect, let them have their way, I am going to concentrate on the big issues. That was a misguided approach, which has caused a lot of the problems we are witnessing today.

**Hono Boissenin**, Transylvanian World Federation: Is there nothing I can do about all this as a citizen?

**Ambassador Lichenstein**: There is plenty you can do. You can send cards, letters, and cookies to the President and make it clear to him that you support him enthusiastically, and you wish that he would tell his principal deputies to do his will. You can write your Congressman. You can talk to your Senator. You can jump up and down. You can write letters to the editor of your local newspaper. Even *The Washington Post* occasionally publishes letters from the likes of you and me. There are many things you can do, and I am quite serious about this. It is very important that people like ourselves do what we ought to make it clear that certain situations involving critical policies of essential, vital interest to the United States of America are not being well served, and we want them better served. This kind of activity can have a great deal more effect than some of us suppose.

As a former instant folk hero, I can speak to the way in which thousands of people suddenly get mobilized. I received in three weeks time more than 3,000 letters, and my secretary was very good to me so she screened out the unpleasant ones. But she told me she threw away only eight or ten. I read the rest of them, and they were marvelously supportive. People would honk their horns at me on the street, and New York policemen would practically invite me to double park. This was a great display of public support for something that a deranged diplomat—now a former diplomat—had said in a moment of inspiration. The President needs to be told things like this, as indeed all of the highest officials of our government need to be told things like this. It can be effective and it is something that we should not shy from doing.

**Mr. Hackett**: Thank you all for coming.

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**James T. Hackett:** The subject of today's discussion is backdoor détente at the State Department.\* It concerns U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe, which is a matter of great concern to conservatives and, I hope, to all Americans. The period of détente ended with the blatant Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. It was a period that witnessed a relative decline of American power and the concomitant rise of Soviet power. The economic ties with Moscow and Eastern Europe, which were supposed to contain the Soviet Union and restrain its global ambitions while weaning the countries of Eastern Europe away from the Soviet Empire, did not work as planned. The Soviets did not link their economic interests to their political or military behavior. The economic web failed to contain Moscow, but it did constrain the West, which places a very high priority, indeed, on economic interests. The East European dictators continue to rule their police states with little regard for human rights and precious little independence from Moscow. Yet in the foreign offices of the West, including our own State Department, the instinct for accommodation is powerful, and the desire to return to a policy of détente is a driving force that must be restrained by the President.

The guest we have invited to discuss this issue has impeccable credentials. A graduate of Yale College, he was a classmate and friend of fellow conservative William F. Buckley, Jr. He went on to graduate from Harvard Law School, practiced law, and then became an investment banker. As an international banker, he directed offices of major banks in Paris and London. Appointed United States Ambassador to France in 1981, he served Ronald Reagan for nearly four years as head of America's largest, and one of its most important, embassies. While in France he did things that were considered by some to be surprising, even shocking. He spoke out publicly against communism and in support of his President's policies.

Now back in banking as a senior advisor of Morgan Stanley International in New York City, he is still writing and speaking out on matters of national importance. He has written a book called *A Conservative in Paris*, which is being translated into French and will be released in Paris about January. It will be published in the United States later, sometime next year. Excerpts will be carried by the *Reader's Digest* early next year, including the Ambassador's proposals for a reorganization of the State Department. I mention that so the folks at Foggy Bottom can think about it between now and then.

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\*This panel took place in the Louis Lehrman Auditorium at The Heritage Foundation on August 29, 1985.

It gives me great pleasure to present our distinguished guest, Ambassador Evan Galbraith.

**Ambassador Evan Galbraith:** Thank you, Jim. I recently taped a show for Bill Buckley's "Firing Line" with Larry Eagleburger [who recently retired as Under Secretary of State], and the subject we discussed was the role of the Foreign Service and existing policies today in the State Department. There was a very dramatic moment in that program when Buckley asked Larry, "Galbraith here has alleged that the overwhelming majority of Foreign Service Officers are liberal Democrats. Is that true?" Larry Eagleburger, being an honest man with integrity, sat there and thought. I was reminded of one of those Jack Benny interludes when the man stands there and there is a vacuum on the air for what seems like a half an hour, but it is really 30 seconds. Finally, Eagleburger said "Yes." Then to make it a little more palatable he said, "If you had asked me that question ten years ago, the majority would have been much bigger." I did not find that very comforting, but I was grateful for the revelation. To me that really is the essence of the problem, not only as to how the Department functions, but also in terms of the fundamental policies of this country.

A conservative government taking office has a bigger problem than a liberal Democratic administration. Conservatives have a difficult time finding people who are fundamentally compatible with their views to put in policy-making positions. And I do not see how anybody can expect a president to function adequately in the foreign policy area unless he can place in office people who are compatible with him on these issues. This is not just a Republican/Democratic distinction. I am talking about a fundamental difference in point of view.

The problems in the State Department have been very well aired by The Heritage Foundation and others. I have taken steps to assemble my views and will be publishing a proposal for reform, which would help the institution to be better equipped to serve the President of the United States and the Foreign Service itself. If the reforms I am suggesting and others you have talked about were instigated, I think we would have a better Foreign Service.

Within the organization there is a compelling force to revert to détente as we saw it flower in the 1970s. Why this should be is an interesting question, but the point is that it exists today. We all know the arguments as to why détente is not only illusory but dangerous. But it must be recognized that these arguments have not yet carried the day. During the four years I was in the Paris embassy, I could see that détente was being revived through indirection, hence the phrase "backdoor."

The theory on which détente is being revived in the Department is being put forward as a foreign policy goal of the United States. The theory is that West Germany must reach out to its brothers in East Germany. It is as if there were an ethos in West Germany that required it to form some sort of solidarity with East Germany. And if a political party in Germany attempted to stop it, it would be political suicide. Consequently, so the argument goes, the U.S. must do everything it can to support the efforts of the Christian Democratic Party in its policy to reach out to East Germany. For example, the United States should support the efforts of West Germany to lend money to East Germany, to transfer technology to East Germany, to increase trade with East Germany, and to support the exchanges of people and culture associated with détente.

If the U.S. does not do this, the argument goes, it runs the risk of seeing the Christian Democratic Parties (CDU/CSU) defeated and the government returned to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), which has turned rapidly toward pacifism. And so the U.S. is expected to support the détenteist effort in West Germany, or find West Germany being run by a pacifist-oriented SPD. It is, in effect, blackmail into promoting a policy that looks upon East Germany as a sovereign nation rather than what it really is, a piece of ground occupied by the Red Army. East Germany is used by the Soviet Union as a channel to the West through which it receives money and technology, while East Germany promotes détente for the economic and political benefit of the Soviet Union. It has no other *raison d'être*. There is no justification for East Germany except as a useful tool of the Soviet Union.

Now why does the State Department do this? My own feeling is that it is an effort to revive détente, which had acquired a bad name. It is difficult to advocate overtly a renaissance of détente; the arguments against it are too widely known. There is a sense that this is a good way to establish détente again.

Second, there is a sense that the U.S. must do something—that our foreign policy institution must come forward with a policy that holds out some hope and justifies the State Department as an institution. There is a hope that this relationship could lead to rapport, which would become infectious and create similar relationships with other Eastern bloc countries, and that the Soviet Union would see the economic benefits that flow from dealing with the West.

The U.S. is already encouraging West Germany in its efforts to deal commercially with other elements in the Eastern bloc. People in the State Department claim that it is good policy for the United States to encourage West Germany to promote commercial dealings with Bulgaria. The

Bulgarians are fairly efficacious in certain of their commercial dealings, and this would be a good way to wean Bulgaria away from its communist tendencies. Bulgaria, a country that has supported terrorist activities, mounted an operation to stick a poisoned umbrella in a man in a London street, and been involved in promoting the assassination of the Pope. The U.S. is going to wean Bulgaria away from Moscow? There is a sense that something can be done, which in my view boggles the mind.

It seems to me that the prime thing to do is to make it known to the world that some in the U.S. government oppose this policy. I do not think it is necessary to restate the consequences that came from a similar policy that was followed in the 1970s, when the U.S. not only engaged in an illusory pursuit, but also confused the people in the United States about the nature of the enemy. The Soviet Union, as a totalitarian expansionist force, uses only such words as peace in order to serve its expansionist ends. The doubletalk, the double-think, the "newspeak" are out there for all to see. The Soviets have expressed directly what they have in mind when they tolerate a policy of preventing global conflict, but at the same time promote revolution and expand their power. So it seems that there is need for dialogue on this issue, even though it has been carried on often enough, and you might think that particular vampire would now have a stake in its heart. But it is flying around again and should be finished off.

It is clear to me as a result of my experience that the State Department should be politicized right down into the bureaus by making it clear that the assistant secretaries are the President's men. Something like thirteen of the eighteen or nineteen assistant secretaries and under secretaries are career people. The Secretary tends to believe that he can handle the policy direction of these people in order to have the policies of the President implemented. But I just do not think that any one man, or any two men, can do that. You have to have the President's men right down in the bureaus, because it is in the bureaus that the talking points are formulated and the option papers are put together. That paper work tends to survive up through the system and end up at the National Security Council unless there is a strong-minded, knowledgeable person who can stop some of it.

But if it is true that most Foreign Service Officers are liberals, why should conservatives add to their burden of governing by putting people they ran against in high office where policy is formulated? There are intelligent people around who share conservative beliefs, who can operate on behalf of the President down at the bureau level. That is the only way to have a foreign policy that operates on behalf of the man who is elected by the people, as opposed to a foreign policy that is kind of a historical smorgasbord of bureaucratic resentments, tendencies, and beliefs, which

exist above and beyond what the people of the United States expressed in the last election. Ronald Reagan ran against *détente*. He used the word. Why should he have people running the bureaus who are believers in *détente*?

**Mr. Hackett:** We will now take questions.

**Bruce Fein, The Heritage Foundation:** First, since polls show that the West Germans, among all the NATO allies, have the greatest loyalty toward the United States, what accounts for your great pessimism as to German support for the U.S. cause, insofar as that would suggest a desire to accommodate the Soviet Union rather than East Germany?

Second, with regard to appointments, don't you think the major flaws in the Reagan foreign policy have been caused by presidential appointees and not by Foreign Service Officers being permitted to do what they want?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** On the first question, as you point out, the polls would cause us to believe that the U.S. ought to encourage those forces that are opposed to accommodating the Soviets. I should have brought out that point and I am glad you did. It is not necessary to give in to blackmail. If the U.S. showed the sort of leadership that is required in this circumstance, it would be applauded in Western Europe. We do not have to give in to this policy of reviving *détente* with the Eastern bloc. There is no compelling reason for it, and it is clearly the wrong thing to do. The U.S. should spend more time and effort on public diplomacy, explaining the pitfalls of *détente*.

As to whether or not it is a political failure on the part of the Administration to allow current policies to be pursued, that is a question I have tried to address before—sometimes uncomfortably. Why tolerate something so important being run by those we ran against? I think it is due in large part to an effort by the Administration not to be seen as aggressive and hawkish. I think the President and some of those around him see a certain virtue in appearing to be in the middle of the road. The feeling is that, if the typical organization is in place in the State Department that has been accepted in the past, it would make it easier to go forward in the really important areas when necessary. It is a kind of cover story. I think that is the argument, but I do not buy it. I think it is a mistake. It confuses people and will create a reaction in the country against the Administration's policies. But I do not think it reflects a lack of will at the top.

**David Fand, Wayne State University:** If most Foreign Service Officers are liberals, are we now paying the price for the Great Depression, while 20 years ago you might have seen something entirely different? Second, is this not always going to be true? Don't bright conservatives shy away from government jobs in foreign affairs?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** I do not agree with either of those points. It seems to me that the quality is way up in the Foreign Service. We are talking of a group that comes out of the intellectual community. These people were not formed by the Depression, but as a result of their exposure to academic institutions such as the one I attended [Yale]. It is not just academic brainwashing. I am talking about people who are smart and have some sort of hope. They say that the U.S.—the West—cannot just sit there, they must do something. Their hope is that the Soviet Union will change its spots. They ask why we cannot hold our hand out and cause this evolution to take place. They are weaned on that theory, which you and I would regard as fallacious.

As to the second part of your question, I do not know. What we want is a long period of conservative control of the government. Then we will attract more conservatives. But let us put them in there. There is a dearth of them in the State Department at this point.

**Allen Greenberg, The State Department:** I do not agree with your comment that the orientation in the State Department is liberal Democrat. For example, you might say that Jimmy Carter was a liberal Democrat, but after Afghanistan he slapped economic sanctions on the Soviet Union and the Foreign Service was less than enthusiastic in seeing those sanctions supported by the West European allies, particularly the French. I do not think the orientation here is liberal Democrat. It is perhaps something else, more akin to what Jim Hackett had in his article yesterday in *The Washington Times*, about an orientation toward acceding to the desires, whatever they happen to be, of the country to which the Foreign Service Officers are assigned or have served.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** We saw the education of Jimmy Carter before our eyes. He came in with the naive expectation that his human rights policy would have an impact on the Soviet Union. He saw it fail, and his budget proposals for the Defense Department at the end of his term reflected that. But why should the country have to see a grown man who has been around get an education in the presidency that he should have received thirty or forty years ago? When he walked out of the White House, Jimmy



Carter was not the same man as when he walked in.

**Mr. Greenberg:** Then you are saying that Jimmy Carter was more educable than the Foreign Service?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** You said it.

**Mr. Greenberg:** The other point is this: shortly before the crackdown in Poland, the State Department played a major role in ensuring that the Soviet-European gas pipeline agreement was signed on the dotted line.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** You mean they promoted the creation of the pipeline?

**Mr. Greenberg:** That is right. I can testify to that. It was a major political plus for Helmut Schmidt in the sense that the U.S. did something that Schmidt had been touting for a long time.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** The reasons are the most venal. The purpose was to promote the sale of German pipe and equipment, but the sale was couched in terms of preventing unemployment and a swing to the left. It was basically an effort by the Germans to make money.

**Mr. Greenberg:** But the rationale then was to support Helmut Schmidt and the SPD, and now the rationale of détente is to support Kohl and the CDU/CSU. Does that not suggest more a willingness to give in to whatever political interest is in power in that country, than it does a liberal tendency?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** You have a point there, but I think it is more profound in this particular case.

**Chris Manion, Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff:** All my colleagues on the majority staff think you have done a great job as Ambassador. You should know that Jim Hackett is responsible for a lot of the work that went into what I call a giant leap for mankind. There is now legislation for a truly independent Inspector General at the State Department instead of the former head of the Foreign Service Union, who is the Inspector General there now.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** I like that.

**Mr. Manion:** We do, too. At Rozanne Ridgway's hearings for the post of Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, many people did not think that the recent \$500 million loan to the East German government by Western banks, including American, was sufficiently discussed, and I understand that now there is another \$500 or \$600 million loan in the works. I would like you to address not only the U.S. government's loan policy, but also that of American business.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** The tendency to lend money is comparable to that of wishing to sell goods. The bankers want to do business, particularly in connection with the export of goods. That is the type of banking they like. I am not one to advocate a particularly prominent role for government, but it seems to me this is one area where the government has to act. We cannot rely on the business community or the banking community to engage in self-restraint in doing business with East Germany, Russia, or the bloc. They will do what they can to do business. It is up to the United States and other governments to prevent it. The exports from West Germany to the East are, say, 5 percent of German exports, but they are a very crucial 5 percent. The U.S. would not only sell the rope, it would sell them the rope on credit. That can be stopped by government leverage. There is no other way.

**Fred Singer, George Mason University:** You have identified the key issue—the key problem—which is how to put supporters of the President's policies into the chief policy positions in the State Department. Could you explain why it is difficult for the White House to assert itself with respect to the State Department? Why do they act as if there were a quota system—one for the White House and one for the State Department?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** This has been a case of deferring to the Secretary of State. There was a deferral to [former Secretary] Alexander Haig when he wanted certain people, and he did not feel a need for political appointees. Neither did George Shultz. I think both of them felt supremely confident and thought they could be the political force within the Department. They wanted professionals and experts in certain areas who would advise them, based on years of experience. But it seems to me that it is an estimate of their capabilities which is not supported by the record. I just do not believe that any one man, no matter how vigorous, can give political impulses to people who do not have the antennae to receive them.

**Mike Walker, office of Congressman John R. Kasich [R-OH]:** Congress-

man Kasich has been very interested in the subject of Soviet spying in this country and in our embassy in the Soviet Union. Our office has tried to work with the State Department in improving the situation—reciprocity and other factors—and based on my own superficial impression, they grudgingly admit there is a problem and then come up with a million excuses, many quite imaginative, as to why nothing can be done. What is your view as an insider?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** Any intelligence from the offices in the Eastern bloc is marginal. In my opinion, the whole U.S. official presence should be reduced. It is very difficult to run intelligence gathering operations there. The U.S. gets very little out of it and would do better to reduce it.

**John Shannon, *Los Angeles Times*:** The problem most people have with what you have been saying and with what has been said by some other conservatives recently is that the President has appointed a Secretary of State and, presumably, if he did not like the way the Secretary of State was running the Department, he would change him. How can you expect the White House to go around the Secretary of State and appoint assistant secretaries under him to run the Department?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** There is a tendency for the President to give him a certain amount of rope. The Secretary says, "I would like to have my own assistants around me. I work best this way." And presidents tend to go along with that. But the fact is that the State Department really cannot be controlled by one man. The President should say, "Look, we understand this, but we have a problem and would like to deal with it this way." The tendency for any Cabinet member is to appoint his own assistants. But at State this has to be put in the perspective of what has happened historically as a result of that having been done.

**Mike Rothfeld, U.S. Defense Foundation:** Given that one man cannot change the whole Department, could even appointing all the assistant secretaries the President wanted bring about a change in the Department's attitude, or would structural changes be required as well?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** I feel that the President should put his own qualified appointees in the posts that are important or that he thinks are important. As a practical matter, that amounts to 50 or 60 within State. It might vary widely depending on the facts. It could be that it is crucial for the President to have a representative on a piece of sand down in the Gulf

of Oman. But the point is that he should be the President's man. He should be allowed to operate as such and not be expected to be totally part of the State Department apparatus to the extent that he loses his independent capacity to function on behalf of the President.

A number of things could be done to improve the morale and upward mobility of Foreign Service Officers and to make them better operatives. For example, at the very top of the Foreign Service there should be a foreign policy committee made up solely of Foreign Service Officers with the rank of assistant secretary, maybe three or four of them, presided over by a Chairman with the rank of Under Secretary of the Foreign Service. This would be an entity, which would put forward openly as Foreign Service proposals alternative policies for consideration by the Administration. It would be a highly prestigious committee with standing similar to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in advising the Secretary of Defense on military matters.

**Vincent Brayson, *Annapolis Times*:** Could you comment about the role of the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs and the National Security Council staff? Are they suitably politicized?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** I think that the National Security Council staff very well understands the ideology of the President. The people at the top have become aware that their views are not exactly similar to those that come from the State Department. As time goes on, the group in charge there recognizes the need to implement what Ronald Reagan believes. Things are moving in the right direction.

**Tom Diaz, *The Washington Times*:** Concerning backdoor détente in Eastern Europe, you talked mainly about its manifestation in Germany. Could you suggest other circumstances in other countries of Europe in which you think United States policy, as affected by the State Department, is opening the backdoor to détente?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** Other countries also have the urge to do business—exports and finance—with the bloc. Indeed, many countries such as France feel that Germany's economic growth miracle, as they call it, was in large part the result of this Eastern bloc business, and they want a piece of the action. There is a worldwide effort by most industrial nations to expand commercial relationships. If you are trying to sell something and someone says such sales are good foreign policy from a strategic point of view, because they will cause an evolutionary process in the Soviet

Union that accrues to your benefit, that is music to your ears. It is difficult to deal with this problem if the U.S. acts as if it does not exist and it is in U.S. interest to engage in commercial exchanges with the Soviet Union. We are not very good policemen.

The problem is crucial in Germany. What the Soviets are attempting to do there is promote nuclear intimidation and fear of nuclear weapons, to cause the Germans to reach an accommodation with the Soviet bloc. That is the prime goal of the Soviet Union in Western Europe today—to demilitarize and neutralize Germany. I suspect that if it came down to a deal, to achieve that, they would probably agree to some sort of a unified Germany. They would say Germany is just going to be another Austria, singing in the hills, and would paint a picture about how well Germany is going to live if it gets out of the NATO alliance.

**Charles Baroch, consultant:** How do you explain this phenomenon that you said started in the 1960s? I think we have to look back a little further to 1917, when the first *détente* was initiated by Lenin. Since then, *détente* has been a recurring phenomenon in relations between the West and the Soviet Union.

**Ambassador Galbraith:** I agree with that. I have read your papers, and I think you are absolutely right.

**Mr. Baroch:** Looking back at the record, it is amazing that people in the 1970s had the experience they did with *détente*. Would you agree with that?

**Ambassador Galbraith:** Yes, and much of it is language. The Soviets are able to infiltrate words into our language, and *détente* is a comfortable word. Relaxation of tensions has become a foreign policy goal, but what it really means is ceasing to resist. Peace is an admirable word, but what that means in the Soviet Union is the end of the class struggle—the end of resistance to the Soviet Union. It does go back to Lenin, and some of the quotes that you and others have cited about what he said concerning the gullibility of the West and the need for the Soviets to take advantage of that gullibility should constantly be brought out.

**Mr. Hackett:** Mr. Ambassador, I want to thank you for coming down from New York.

# The Heritage Lectures

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Five former Reagan appointees to senior foreign affairs positions, including four ambassadors, speak out on the failure of the State Department to carry out Ronald Reagan's foreign policy. In the fifth year of the Reagan Administration, charge the five former appointees, the career bureaucrats at State continue to do what apparently comes naturally—work with a 1970s mindset that accomodates Moscow and tries to return to the failed policies of détente.

The reason for this is clear. The five former Reagan officials point to the preference of the State Department leadership for the musty ideas, goals, and strategies of the old Foreign Policy Establishment rather than those articulated effectively by President Reagan. The problem is compounded because Secretary of State George Shultz, who rhetorically strongly supports the Reagan foreign policy agenda, has surrounded himself with career officers and other advisors who do not.

If the Reagan Revolution is to succeed in foreign policy, and if the Reagan Doctrine is to be transformed into reality, the participants in this discussion conclude, then the President must appoint senior staff at the State Department that clearly understands his goals and is committed to achieving them.

