

policy REVIEW

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Four Dollars

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“to take himself, and us, out of our Western assumptions for a moment,” “to throw off the blinders of American ideology and see the reality of war as it affected the lives of Cambodians,” and “to perceive and convey other people’s vision.” Schanberg, wrote Lewis, was not blinded by the “self-centered cultural outlook,” the “cultural arrogance,” that rendered Ford and Kissinger unable to appreciate the possibility that “the revolutionaries and their peasant army see the return to the countryside as the only way to start on their vision of a new society.”

In an article for the August 23, 1975 issue of *Saturday Review*, Schanberg declared for an even-handed, ambivalent and non-judgmental attitude toward the new social vision:

I am not among those who have been able to make swift moral judgments of the new rulers of Cambodia—either by calling them cruel and barbaric for emptying the cities right down to hospital patients and ordering the people on a long march into the countryside, in which thousands were certain to perish; or by hailing them as brilliant revolutionaries for casting off the shackles of the old, exploitive consumer society and forging a new agrarian system in the rice paddies, in which the peasant will finally profit from his labor.

He expressed the belief that “the Cambodian movement is unlikely to be monolithic, and we have still to see what influence, if any, the moderate and nationalist voices will have on the Khmer Communist movement.” To encourage the putative moderates within the Angka Loeu, Schanberg proposed a program of U.S. economic assistance:

The Khmer Rouge have said that they will accept aid from foreign states if it is without strings. On both humanitarian and pragmatic grounds, reconstruction aid would seem a policy worth considering. Not only would

it help the Cambodian people at a time of great need, but also it would serve Washington’s more practical interest in retaining influence in Asia.

One hopes that the leadership in Washington will eventually acquire the farsightedness to discern there are other ways of looking at Cambodia besides ideological and geopolitical ones—ways that would put people, not just governments, into the foreign policy equation.

and William Shawcross himself. And perhaps Stanley Karnow’s credentials as a pundit of the Indochina War would be somewhat tainted if it were generally recalled that he prophesied in the *New Republic* that the imminent fall of Phnom Penh would prove to be “the salvation of the Cambodians.”

David Roberts, Jr.
Houston, Texas

[Mr. Roberts is a member of
Social Democrats USA].

For some time after the fall of Phnom Penh, Schanberg minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding.

David Roberts, Jr.

To this day Schanberg admires his own work in Cambodia, and insists that he was right in charging that the Cambodians who fled to Phnom Penh were running from American bombing rather than from Khmer Rouge terror, even though the population of the city continued to swell after the bombing cut-off of August 15, 1973.

During the last weeks of the Lon Nol government, Sydney Schanberg predicated his dispatches on the assumption that most Cambodians would be better off under Communist rule. For some time after the fall of Phnom Penh, he minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding. No one who could recall the example of Walter Duranty had any right to be surprised that Schanberg nevertheless won a Pulitzer Prize, but who would have expected to find the committee’s choice seconded in the pages of *Policy Review*?

Of course Schanberg is not the only non-Marxist-Leninist writer whose tracks need covering vis-à-vis Cambodia. My research has yielded incriminating quotations from, inter alia, Anthony Lewis, Tom Wicker, Richard Dudman,

Sidney Schanberg replies:

Ideologues of the extreme right and left fueled the Indochina war, anointing their chosen sides with sainthood and branding the other side with evil and immorality. Mr. Roberts, on the right, continues this sad and destructive practice.

Nowhere in his long letter of distortions and fabrications does he express compassion for the Cambodian people as individuals; he is concerned only with proving his ideological point, with proving that his side possesses absolute truth and that the other side was responsible for the fall of Cambodia.

Roberts doesn’t let facts or accuracy get in his way. In the tradition of ideologues, he culls a few sentences from a large body of work and announces triumphantly that he has discovered sin. A simple perusal of my extensive reporting from and about Cambodia would quickly demonstrate the falsity and maliciousness and defamatory nature of his contentions that my articles “performed . . . services . . . for the Khmer Rouge” and that I “minimized the crimes of the new regime and wrote of the Khmer Rouge with sympathy and understanding.”

some real dangers in the economic reforms instituted in 1979. The Duarte government is working to correct many of these, and we are assisting through our A.I.D. program.

The economic reforms need to be put into perspective. The reforms were a last-ditch effort by Salvadorans to save their society and prevent a takeover from the extreme left. Taking advantage of the popular unrest that had reached a crescendo of violence and anarchy in 1979, the left was orchestrating mass popular movements aimed at taking over the government. The Romero government fell under the pressure and a group of reform-minded military, joined by a few like-minded civilians, took over and decided that if they and the country were to survive, it was necessary to open to popular participation the political, economic, and social life of the society. The first and most radical junta did not last long, but the commitment to reforms as a political and social necessity continued. The results were the three basic reforms: land, banking, and export marketing. Those reforms prevented a Marxist-Leninist takeover of El Salvador. This is not to say, however, that they have been implemented perfectly or do not need modification.

Miss Rosett gives less weight to the substantial accomplishment of the Salvadorans and our economic assistance than I would. A major goal has been accomplished: an economy, and more importantly, its infrastructure, which in 1980 were spiraling toward disintegration under continual attack from guerrillas and facing certain collapse, were stabilized. The decline has been reversed; and this year, we hope there will be positive growth for the first time in four years. Last year, the downward spiral was halted. Given the conditions here in El Salvador, this is no mean feat, and is a tribute to the courage, perseverance, and industriousness of the Salvadorans.

I agree with Miss Rosett's concern over the uncertainty of the status of property rights. The government is working actively to get the

titles of the land reform farms issued. Unfortunately, it is hampered by the lack of funds for compensation (existing U.S. legislation prevents us from assisting) and by an antiquated land registry system dating back to Spanish colonial days. We are encouraging the government to meet their compensation obligations and we are working with the government on the land registry. Unfortunately, there are also forces in the society that are reluctant to relinquish state direction of the cooperatives.

We have had no involvement with INCAFE (the national coffee company), and are not as conversant with its operations as with land reform institutions. However, the basic problem with coffee production is the low international commodity prices in recent years and uncertainty due to the land reform. The latter is being addressed.

Last December, a new constitution was passed which provides an absolute guarantee of the right to own private property. It also set a maximum ownership limit of 245 hectares per person. This effectively settled Phase II of the reform, affecting principally coffee lands, which had been announced but not implemented and which had been an open and debilitating issue for four years.

We have not had any involvement with the banking reform. However, the credit rationing mentioned by Miss Rosett derives from the sudden drop in the country's income due to low prices for its major commodities while simultaneously fighting a war and trying to repair and operate the basic economic and social services needed to keep its economy operating. Under such circumstances, credit would be scarce in any banking system. The need to finance the land reform has also added to the credit shortage.

We are in full agreement with Miss Rosett's comments on the two-tiered exchange rate. El Salvador must unify the exchange rate as soon as conditions permit, and President Duarte's policy of "deslizamiento" (literally "sliding") is committed in the same direction.

In an ideal world, the reforms would not have been necessary, but they are not leading inevitably to a "command" economy. Forces do exist in the Salvadoran society, however, which tend strongly in that direction, partially in response to the previous exclusive domination of the economy by a narrow political and economic elite prior to 1979. We agree that both these forces should be resisted if the economy is to recover and develop over the longer term. We believe that the government is resisting these forces satisfactorily so far.

I hope that these comments will serve to place Miss Rosett's article in perspective; my staff and I found it both provocative and stimulating.

Thomas R. Pickering
U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador
San Salvador

Dear Sir:

Claudia Rosett's article "Economic Paralysis in El Salvador: What the Guerrillas Don't Destroy, Central Planning Does," is on target in its points about the destruction of property by the guerrillas, the nationalization of banks and industries, and the failure of the land reform program. But the article hardly goes far enough.

As long as we have 535 Secretaries of State in Congress we will be prevented from permitting any American funding to be used for compensation of land owners under the existing land reform program. Hence, the worthless mortgages, bonds, and the lack of titles to the so-called new owners of the land will inevitably be continued.

Political pressure by American trade unions will prevent the lowering of tariff barriers to manufactured goods from El Salvador. The traditional production of coffee, bananas, and sugar will not be the answer. These products are already glutted on Western markets. If our liberal and social-minded political philosophers demand further development of cooperatives and redistribution of the land, these products will not be produced and marketed efficiently. Therefore, El

President Duarte has already shown himself to be a man of immense personal courage and devotion to democratic ideals. If he can add to these essential qualities a full measure of economic realism, he may go down in history as the second liberator of his country.

Dr. John R. Silber
President
Boston University

Extending the Mandate

Dear Sir:

Adam Meyerson makes a compelling argument: American conservatives "cannot make a full claim to national leadership" until they can bridge the "wide river" that separates their movement from black Americans (Fall, 1984). I hope other conservatives agree. It is clear that many blacks are looking for alternatives to liberal Democratic thinking.

But Meyerson's essay shows what a long way conservatives have to go in crafting a successful appeal to blacks. Take, for example, the three "Ps" that crop up in the article: personalities, pronouncements, and policies.

Personalities. The essay is sprinkled with names. Some are dropped gratuitously, and some are misappropriated. But some of the names appear to reflect Meyerson's judgments about the kinds of people who best represent the conservative movement. If I were to construct a list of conservatives—black or white—who are respected in the black community, very few of the names that Meyerson uses would be on it.

Pronouncements. Meyerson reminds us that President Reagan's "evil empire" speech also contained a denunciation of racism. One observation: to blacks, the "evilest empire" of all is South Africa. Conservatives have waxed eloquent about the sufferings of Soviet dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov, but I have not heard them agonize aloud about Steven Biko, Nelson Mandela, and thou-

sands of others who have been imprisoned without trial, tortured, or murdered for protesting a regime that is at least as repressive as the Soviet Union, and far more racist. Blacks see this as evidence of hypocrisy on the issue of human rights, especially since some of the conservatives Meyerson mentions are viewed as apologists for South Africa.

Marshall has made the point in numerous opinions.

According to a Gallup survey commissioned by the Joint Center for Political Studies, nearly three-quarters of blacks have concluded that Ronald Reagan is prejudiced. That may not be surprising. What is surprising is that nearly one-third of whites agree with blacks on this point. A president who is widely

The harsh reality is that recent economic and social policies have been harmful to blacks.

Edwin Dorn

Policies. Having written that conservatives must do more than "make speeches" to win black support, Meyerson proceeds to describe "deeds" that amount to little more than tokenism and speechifying. The harsh reality is that recent economic and social policies have been harmful to blacks. Fully one-third of black workers were unemployed at some time during 1982, and black unemployment today is higher than it was in 1980. Poverty rates have grown, as has the gap between black and white incomes. In short, few blacks have seen evidence that the "conservative opportunity society" holds promise for them. Not all of the recent deterioration in black economic well-being can be blamed on Reagan Administration policies, but much of it can be. What infuriates blacks is conservatives' efforts to pretend that black Americans actually are better off under these policies.

The conservative movement has failed to attract middle-class blacks largely because blacks tend to see civil rights as a litmus test issue, just as American Jews tend to see support for Israel as a litmus test issue. To blacks, civil rights is not simply a matter of narrow procedural niceties; it also includes addressing the persisting effects of discrimination. Contrary to what Meyerson implies, Martin Luther King, Jr. and Roy Wilkins understood that, and Supreme Court Justice Thurgood

viewed as prejudiced is not likely to be taken seriously when he talks favorably about civil rights, especially when his policies are perceived as having narrowed the meaning of the term.

To blacks, the call from the far shore has not really been about building bridges, but about taking a blind leap into the cold, swift currents and swimming for dear life. If conservatives are going to appeal successfully for wider black support, they must do some serious thinking about the kinds of people who exemplify their movement, about the consistency of their pronouncements, and about the effects of their deeds. They also must learn much more about the black America that lies on the opposite shore.

Edwin Dorn
Deputy Director, Joint Center for Political Studies
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Reading Adam Meyerson's, "Conservatives and Blacks" in the fall issue of *Policy Review* was like a man dying of thirst, in the desert, discovering water. This is a case of an authentic conservative discussing blacks without hate, hostility, or glee at their reverses.

There have always been true, basic conservative values in the black community. Blacks have had as their idols the captains of indus-

compared to our neighbors in Massachusetts and Connecticut, or of most other heavily industrialized states.

Third, the voters were not rejecting industrial policy as an idea, or as a possible solution to Rhode Island's economic problems. According to a Providence College post-referendum survey, a majority of Rhode Islanders believe that the state's economy is worse than that of other states, and three-quarters believe that the state government must play an active role in addressing the state's economic problems.

All of this is not to say that supporters of the Greenhouse Compact made no mistakes. We probably developed a program that tried to do too much too quickly. But I am convinced from my discussions with local and national businessmen and economic analysts that the Compact's major programs were sound and necessary. Many of these programs are being implemented or contemplated in other states. In fact, the *Wall Street Journal* noted in October that "Development Aid from States Is a Growing Factor for Firms." The article stressed the development of small businesses in many states. Part of the article focused on Massachusetts, citing the state's significant investment in over two dozen young companies.

Kevin Phillips, a leading conservative Republican Party strategist, has recently authored a book entitled *Staying on Top: The Business Case for a National Industrial Strategy*. Phillips argues that conservatives should abandon a rigid adherence to *laissez-faire* economics, and accept an openly pro-business, activist role for government in reviving America's industrial base.

Despite the defeat of this proposal, the groundwork established by this ambitious project and the cooperative spirit it established between business and labor still remains. Future governors will be able to build upon this solid foundation to the benefit of all Rhode Islanders.

J. Joseph Garrahy
Governor of Rhode Island

Allan Feldman replies:

Those of us who opposed the Greenhouse Compact industrial policy plan argued that it would result in higher taxes in Rhode Island. Most voters seemed to agree with this assessment, in spite of the Greenhouse proponents' claims, repeated by Governor Garrahy, that the Compact's break-even point would have been reached if only one-third of its programs succeeded. Why the voter skepticism? Careful analysis by economists at Brown University indicated that the hypothesized state revenue gains attributable to Greenhouse programs were vastly exaggerated, and that program costs were greatly underestimated.

Most agree that there is a role for government in state economic development.

Allan Feldman

But the voter skepticism was mainly a result of recent taxing experiences. During the eight years of the Garrahy administration, total state taxes rose 84 percent. State personal income tax collections rose an astonishing 174 percent. Between 1977 and 1982 our overall state and local tax burden moved up from 18th to 10th worst in the nation. In short, during Governor Garrahy's tenure, state and local tax collectors have reached deeper and deeper into voters' pockets. The voters were therefore sensitive to implausible claims that a \$250 million Greenhouse program would cost them nothing.

Governor Garrahy compares Rhode Island with neighboring Connecticut and Massachusetts. He would connect Massachusetts' economic success to recent and relatively minor programs like its state venture capital operation. In my opinion, Massachusetts' recent growth is connected to Proposition 2½ and former Governor King's tax and expenditure limitation efforts. A big plus for Connecticut is its lack of an individual income tax. New Hampshire is very similar to Rhode Island in terms of popula-

tion, labor force history, proximity to Boston, and so on, but it has taken the low public expenditure, low tax route. Its economic growth has far surpassed Rhode Island's.

In spite of its overwhelming defeat at the polls, Governor Garrahy remains convinced that industrial policy is the wave of the future, that government ought to take an activist role in targeting industries and firms for development. In my view, politicians and government officials would do no better at "picking the winners" than private capital markets. In fact, they would do worse: they would respond to pressures from special interest groups, PACs, lobbyists, and unions. They would not respond to the ultimate

economic arbiter, the consumer, nor would they respond to the taxpayers bankrolling their efforts. This view is shared by professional economists from left to right, and it's also shared by the Rhode Island electorate.

Most agree that there is a role for government in state economic development. It should provide schools, quality roads, and police and fire protection, as well as reasonable, evenhanded labor law. And it should avoid discouraging private economic activity through burdensome taxation. But the Greenhouse Compact industrial policy plan would have furthered none of those ends; rather it would have expanded government intervention in the private sector. Let government first put its own house in order.

Building Heroes

Dear Sir:

Michael Warner's article, "Democracy's Hall of Fame," reinforces a critical point (Fall, 1984). The qualities of the leaders he stud-

red" to civil liberties. That this policy is not enforced can be verified by considering the status of William Kunstler. He is a member of the Union's National Advisory Council. He is also the person who said in 1979 that "I do not believe in public attacks on socialist countries where violations of human rights may occur." It was Nat Henroff who printed the Kunstler quote in the *Village Voice*!

The Vigilantes state that their research did not turn up one initiative of the ACLU's that advanced U.S. interests and hindered Communist expansion. The record shows, however, that throughout the 1940s and 1950s the ACLU was consistently supportive of U.S. initiatives and critical of Communism. Indeed it conspired with the FBI by turning over evidence of suspected Communists. But ever since Vietnam, the ACLU has resorted to its position of the 1920s and 1930s. It is decidedly against most U.S. foreign policy initiatives and silent on the matter of Communist expansion.

Finally, I think the real reason the ACLU has so often strayed from its civil libertarian agenda has less to do with the declining number of civil liberties violations (a claim I would not make) than with the radicalization of the organization itself. The politically driven ACLU cannot restrain itself from seeing every injustice as a civil liberties issue. From the very beginning, the ACLU has inclined toward non-civil liberties concerns. Its *sine qua non* has always been social reform. On that score, the ACLU can claim consistency.

William A. Donohue
Chair, Social Sciences
La Roche College
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Dear Sir:

Richard and Susan Vigilante are to be commended for their excellent article exposing the inconsistencies and intolerance of the ACLU. Without question, no organization has done more to deny Americans freedom of religious speech and thought than the ACLU. And no case better illus-

trates the religious intolerance of the ACLU than their effort to deny graduates of Liberty Baptist College the right to teach in Virginia public schools simply because the teachers of these students may ascribe to the Genesis account of creationism. According to the ACLU, this would constitute an impermissible state advancement of religion.

But what is the logical outcome of such an absurd position? Is it not to deny public employment to certain people holding creationist views? And why does the ACLU fear creationist views? The ACLU's secular agenda is threatened every time a government official develops a public policy based on God-given rights. For there is no God-given right for a mother to kill her unborn child or for a pornographer to exploit infants and children or for a homosexual to solicit acts of sodomy. A public official who believes in God-given rights is the natural enemy of the ACLU social agenda.

The ACLU is nothing more than a self-appointed guardian and distributor of dubious, self-defined human rights—an organization that wants to use the courts to push its version of social change onto society. In my opinion, their efforts to purge religious convictions from the public conscience is not motivated by some high ideal to uphold the U.S. Constitution but, rather, to prevent speech that upholds the credibility and sanctity of religiously inspired values.

Ronald S. Godwin, Ph.D.
Executive Vice President
Moral Majority

The Wrong Medicine

Dear Sir:

In "The Best Health Care for Everyone: Medicine in the Conservative Opportunity Society" (Policy Review, Summer 1984), the Honorable Newt Gingrich presents several interesting arguments for modifying and improving health care delivery in the United States. Unfortunately, the paper opens with several serious misstatements.

He says that cholera, smallpox, yellow fever, typhus, typhoid, and bubonic plague have been *eradicated*. Only smallpox fits the bill. Worse, he claims that "... the parasites that caused these dread diseases" have been *destroyed*. The facts are that improved sanitation, personal hygiene, vaccines, and antibiotics—in that order—are responsible for the relative freedom from these diseases enjoyed by people living in the industrialized nations of Western Europe, North America, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. With the exception of smallpox (eradicated) and bubonic plague (now a disease occurring sporadically in the western United States, parts of South America, and Southeast Asia), all the other diseases mentioned still exist in endemic and recurrently epidemic form, and remain serious problems for much of the world's population.

Perhaps of even more importance (because of the dramatic picture of an iron-lung on the second page of this article) is the erroneous statement that polio has been eradicated. Nothing could be further from the truth. As a result of immunizations, only approximately 10 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis are reported in the United States every year. The picture is similar in Western Europe and in the other industrialized nations. That the virus is not eradicated even in these countries is attested to by occasional micro-epidemics among non-immunized persons both in the United States and in Western Europe. Much more importantly, poliomyelitis claims scores of thousands of victims every year in the developing countries—an important part of the rationale for the World Health Organization's Expanded Program on Immunization, and for Dr. Jonas Salk's continuing efforts to bring the benefits of immunization to those parts of the world.

Harold J. Simon, M.D., Ph.D.
Professor of Community
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BEYOND CONTAINMENT?

The Future of U.S.-Soviet Relations

What is the nature of our conflict with the Soviet Union? What are our ultimate objectives in this conflict? In dealing with the Soviet Union, what have been the greatest successes of American foreign policy over the past 40 years? What have been the greatest mistakes?

Do cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union benefit the United States? What kind of economic policy should we have toward the Soviet Union? Under what circumstances should the United States commit troops to Central America and the Caribbean? For what purposes should we arm anti-Communist guerrillas?

What kind of relations should we have with China? To what extent should we exploit vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union at home and in Eastern Europe? Have arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union benefited the United States? What is the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union in the next 10 years?

Policy Review asked these questions of 21 leading foreign policy thinkers—liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans—who share a vigorous opposition to Communist totalitarianism and Soviet imperialism. The participants were interviewed separately, and they edited their remarks. Their answers shatter the stereotypes of anti-Communism, and illuminate the foreign policy choices that Ronald Reagan will have to confront in his second term.

What is the nature of our conflict with the Soviet Union?

Donald Rumsfeld: Our differences are rooted in a fundamental conflict of values. We believe in the primacy of the individual and that the state is to be measured by how well it serves the individual. The Soviet leadership believes in the primacy of the state and that the individual is to be measured by how well he or she serves the state. We believe in individual freedom for ourselves and we recommend it for others. The Soviet leadership does not. We value our independence and we respect the self-determination of others. The Soviet Union does not.

Second, the Soviet Union represents the gravest threat to our values and our security, and, as a result of its sustained military investment, is a greater threat today than ever before. We have fundamentally different political systems, different economic systems, and the Soviet Union has the military power to put our system and our values at risk. Since World War II, they have engaged in a relentless expansion of their influence that has changed the equilibrium in the world.

The conflict is likely to continue because of Soviet actions to subjugate others, whether in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, or their denial of freedom to their own people. The threat they pose is global, because of the reach and power of weapons, because of the interconnected nature of world economies, and because human beings are willing to resist efforts to deprive them of basic liberties in whatever part of the world they live.

Lawrence Eagleburger: It is in essence a conflict over the survival of our system. It is an ideological conflict between our view of humanity and theirs, a conflict over the role of the individual human being in society, the individual's obligations to society and vice versa, and things such as freedom of speech. In its realpolitik dimension, it is a conflict between two countries with fundamentally different historical perspectives. For hundreds of years, the Russians have looked at the outside world with distrust, fright, insecurity, and uncertainty. Paranoia is not a bad term for describing the Soviets. I would suggest that paranoids are dangerous people.

Jeane Kirkpatrick: It is a variety of great power conflict. There is an ideological dimension, but it is not primarily a contest of ideas. There are other Communist states, for example Yugoslavia, China, and Albania, with which we have important disagreements about the nature of the good society, about what works, about what is important, but with which the United States is not in conflict. We are in conflict with the Soviet Union because it is an expansionist power, with imperialistic aspirations and imperialist habits. It has frequently used violence to achieve its purposes.

Richard Perle: It has a number of dimensions. The one with which I and others in the Defense Department are most immediately concerned is the military dimension. The Soviets are building military power in all its aspects at an unrelenting rate, and in so doing, imposing a stag-

gering sacrifice on their own population. The Soviet leadership believes that there is an inescapable relationship between military and political power and therefore it desires military predominance wherever it can be obtained.

The ideological aspect of the relationship has been a disaster for the Soviet Union. Virtually no one in the world believes in the superiority of Soviet ideology. On the contrary, the current trend in the world is the rejection of Soviet totalitarianism. The economic dimension, too, has been disastrous to the Soviets, whose own economy performs poorly.

Midge Decter: The Soviet Union is a revolutionary force, and whether or not Soviet leaders believe in their revolutionary ideology is beside the point. They are prisoners of that ideology, and they are inevitably bound to conduct an ideological struggle against Western liberal democratic institutions. Their expansionism is not just a desire for warm-water ports. To maintain their power, the Soviets must create throughout the world a series of subservient satellite governments. Communism must grow or die. Wherever it is instituted, the Communist system is economically unviable and politically unpopular. It therefore will be destroyed if it stands still.

Richard Pipes: It is not an ordinary international conflict in the sense that it arose out of territorial or commercial disputes. It is essentially an outgrowth of the Communist system which drives the ruling class of the Soviet Union to create international tension as a means of legitimizing and maintaining its power.

Zbigniew Brzezinski: The Soviet Union sees itself still as an aspirant to world preponderance whereas the United States has been the preponderant world power. That inherently creates conflict. More concretely, the contest has been and still is largely over control of Eurasia. The Soviet aspiration, almost explicitly articulated in the wartime meetings with the Allies, was that after World War II the Soviet Union would be the preponderant power on the Eurasian continent, American would disengage, Western Europe would be fragmented, and the Far East would be powerless. The last 35 years have seen consistent Soviet efforts to push the United States out to the extremities, both eastern and western, of the Eurasian continent, and concurrent American efforts to contain Soviet efforts to that end.

Robert Pfaltzgraff: Geostrategically, it is a confrontation between the world's leading maritime power, the United States, and the world's largest land power, the Soviet Union. For the Soviet Union the key to world hegemony lies in control of that long arc that extends from northwestern Europe to northeast Asia, and comprises Europe, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. From the standpoint of American security, we have been unprepared to permit the domination of those

What are our ultimate objectives in our conflict with the Soviet Union?

Rostow: To achieve a balance of power, and persuade them to accept the rules indispensable to a stable balance of power system. Every other hegemonial, ambitious, predatory power in history has given up the idea of conquest sooner or later. They all reach their limits. Of course we should prefer to stop the Soviets through persuasion rather than through war. I am not too gloomy about the possibility of inducing such a change in Soviet policy. If we can convince them that their ambitions can never be realized the Soviets will recognize that the Germans and the Japanese are pursuing a much more sensible course.

Richard Allen: In the first place, the dissolution of the Soviet external empire (the countries illegally occupied or influenced by the Soviet Union), and the subsequent withdrawal of Soviet military forces to the boundaries of the Soviet Union. It should also be our long-range objective to frustrate the permanence of the Soviet system and to alter its world outlook. These goals may not be readily achievable, but they ought to be very much in our minds.

Samuel Huntington: The original ideal of containment was that it would lead to a mellowing in the Soviet Union. To a certain extent it has: the Soviet Union of Mr. Chernenko is clearly different from Stalin's. But it is a mistake to think that we can bring about major change in the Soviet political system and society. We certainly should make an issue of human rights, but we shouldn't delude ourselves about how much we can do. In particular cases we can make it too expensive for the Soviet Union to pursue some courses of action, but we clearly can't compel or induce the Soviet Union to become a liberal democratic system.

Van Cleave: To secure, perpetuate, and advance our institutions and values, and to safeguard our security so that freedom and free enterprise can continue to prosper.

Our principal objective is to contain and neutralize the Soviet threat. But while we are basically a defensive power, a defensive containment strategy need not be totally passive and reactive. We must actively compete as well as contain. We must take the initiative at times. I would reject the notion of a Brezhnev Doctrine, particularly as it applies to the more recent expansion of Soviet power and seek to reverse Soviet advances, and exploit problems in the Soviet empire.

Perle: First and foremost, we need to maintain the collective strength of the Western democracies so as to limit Soviet encroachment. Second, we need to give support—political, ideological, economic, and military—to those countries that have come under pressure from the Soviet Union or its surrogates, and are struggling to maintain their territorial integrity and trying to develop political institutions free from Soviet totalitarian rule. Third, we should be ready at all times where there is a mutuality of interest with the Soviets to explore ways to cooperate.


But we mustn't make the mistake of finding mutuality where none exists, out of an inordinate desire to cooperate for the sake of cooperation.

Kirkpatrick: Our hope would be for a Soviet Union willing to live at peace with the rest of the world, without resorting to violence and subversion and without pursuing expansionist policies. It would also be for a democratic government in the Soviet Union that would respect the human and civil rights of all its citizens. Our operational policy goal is more the former than the latter. We do not actively seek to intervene in Soviet affairs, nor do I think it is practical to do so, except by way of information, which is a useful instrument.

Eagleburger: Our goal must be to find ways to live on the same planet with the Soviet Union, to avoid war in a constantly changing set of circumstances, without sacrificing the independence of the West or our fundamental views of humanity. I am not saying peace at any price. When we talk that way, as we do on occasion, we dangerously mislead the Soviets and we hand them the initiative. The Soviets must have no doubt that there are principles we will fight for under any circumstances.

Our longer-term objectives are to reduce and eventually eliminate the Soviet stranglehold over Eastern Europe, and to change the nature of the Soviet system. But we need to recognize that these goals are inherently in tension with our objective of avoiding war. They therefore have to be managed with nuance, sophistication, and a great deal of patience. Hal Sonnenfeldt and his famous Sonnenfeldt Doctrine have been pilloried for years. But all Hal was trying to say was that in dealing with Eastern Europe, the United States needs to understand that the Soviets consider current conditions there as fundamental to their own security, and that if conditions in Eastern Europe change, we run the real risk of World War III, if we are not careful. I cannot believe that it is anyone's national interest to force a change in the Soviet situation in Eastern Europe overnight. The dangers of war are too great.

Pfaltzgraff: Since the Second World War, the objective of successive administrations has been the containment of Soviet power. The Truman Doctrine, applied first in Greece and Turkey, the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Middle East, the Nixon Doctrine of building additional centers of power around the world as a counterpoise to Soviet expansionism, and the Carter Doctrine following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, were all based on containment. What distinguishes the Reagan Administration has been its willingness to go beyond simple containment in order to attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in the Soviet Union. In my view this is an important but usually neglected dimension of American foreign policy. I believe that an American strategy must be based first and foremost on the prevention of Soviet expansion, but that to achieve success, American strategy has to focus upon Soviet



Van Cleave: In the 1947–1950 period, the United States conceptualized and adapted into policy the principle of containment, and recognized the need to shore up our allies and to maintain substantial peacetime forces, even to deploy some of them abroad. These commitments represented profound changes in American foreign policy. Without them, we would have faced a far more dangerous world.

The achievements of the 1950s under Eisenhower and Dulles have generally been underrated. During this period, the United States and the West were generally successful in containment, and our decisions to use military power were careful and resolute. We tried to use military power decisively and early enough so that our military confrontation was limited and successful.

Huntington: The greatest accomplishment was in preventing Western Europe from going Communist in the 40s and 50s. This involved the diplomatic planning of the Atlantic alliance, the Marshall Plan, and the assistance we gave to non-Communist groups in Western Europe such as free labor unions. It seems almost bizarre now, but Italy, France, and Germany could easily have gone Communist during the 10 years or so years after World War II.

Containment, with a few exceptions, has been successful. Another success of sorts is that over time, we have been able to maintain the military balance with the Soviet

Union. We have done this in fits and starts, of course; in the 70s defense went down too far, but now we are redressing the problem. Many people thought this would be impossible for a democratic country to do.

Pipes: I think we have been remarkably unsuccessful in dealing with the Soviet Union. We have engaged in didactic diplomacy. We are nice to the Soviet Union when it “behaves” and we try to punish it when it turns aggressive. But we have never gotten to the root of the problem of why Communist regimes are aggressive.

Kristol: We really haven’t had many successes. The Soviets have had some notable failures, but I don’t think we can regard them as successes on our part. We have been lucky in the case of Yugoslavia, and we have been lucky in the case of China, where the Soviet leadership made ex-allies out of allies. Some people see the existence of NATO and the fact that the Soviet Union has not taken over Western Europe as an accomplishment. I don’t regard such negative facts as accomplishments. If you start thinking that way, you are playing defensive football and you end up on the one-yard line.

A success would be for a country governed by a Marxist-Leninist regime to undergo a political transformation. We have had no such success in the post-war period. Nor have we and our allies gained, in physical conflict, territory that the Soviet Union and its allies had possessed.

What would you have done differently over the last 40 years?

Bartley: I would have mined the harbors of North Vietnam in 1965 instead of 1973 or, alternatively, I would have pulled out of Vietnam before the Diem coup in 1963. The problem in Vietnam was that we got involved in something that need not have been a major commitment. But once we committed ourselves—and the critical point was when we sanctioned the Diem coup—we pulled our punches. Either we should have pulled out, or, if we were going to go in, we should have gone in with both feet.

The whole period of arms control negotiations has given us very serious problems, by facilitating the Soviet movement toward strategic parity and maybe in some sense strategic advantage. I think that we probably should have built an ABM system in the early 1970s instead of negotiating it away. Our technology wasn't very good at that time, but it would have been better by now, and we wouldn't have the Minuteman vulnerability problem, where we're trying to put square pegs into round holes to keep a land-based deterrent.

Even more fundamental, I would never have toyed with the idea of mutual assured destruction (MAD) as strategic doctrine. I think the notion that the purpose of our strategic weapons is to blow up women and children and to attack cities is at the heart of our moral ambivalence about nuclear weapons and about defense in general. I'm not sure that MAD has ever really been our policy, but many of our policy makers have acted as if it were. This was a very important psychological mistake.

Kristol: We should have done many things differently, beginning with the Yalta agreement. We made a great mistake in the last months of World War II by not going to Berlin and Prague and getting there before the Russians. It was a tragic error. The Truman Administration did not wish to offend the Soviets by seeming to be worried about their occupying areas in Eastern Europe. We should have been worried and we should have taken preemptive action.

In 1956, we should not have forced the British, French, and Israelis to withdraw from the Suez Canal. We should have accepted their occupation and then insisted that the Canal be operated by the United Nations. If that had happened, we would not have had the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. And if there had been no 1967 War, there would not have been any Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Suez was a stupid error on our part based on the notion that the Western European nations were in some sense "colonialists" and that it was our mission to support the ex-colonial nations whenever they were in conflict with Western Europe. We thought that would gain us their good will and their cooperation in international affairs. That was an illusion.

We have also passed up many opportunities for more assertive actions vis-à-vis Eastern Europe. I don't mean military action, which is not feasible. But we could have taken all sorts of symbolic action that would have made it clear to the people of Eastern Europe and the rulers of the

Soviet Union that we do not recognize the legitimacy of Marxist-Leninist rule in Eastern Europe. This would have rendered the Soviet regime a lot more insecure than it is. I have often wondered why we have not recognized the Ukraine and Byelorussia as independent states. The Soviet Union insists that they have separate seats in the Assembly of the United Nations, so why do we not recognize them as independent states and request that they enter into diplomatic relations with us?

We should never have permitted the imposition of a Marxist-Leninist regime on the people of Cuba. We should have made it clear to Castro from the beginning that he could have any kind of economic or social system he wished so long as he had no ties with the Soviet Union, but that we would regard the establishment of such ties as a hostile action to which we would respond with military force.

Brzezinski: This question requires you to go all the way back to Yalta and Potsdam. I certainly would have waged World War II more explicitly for the political purpose of creating a more congenial world environment after victory over the Axis powers.

I certainly would have reacted differently to the several signs of major internal Soviet weakness. We had the Berlin uprising of '53, the Hungarian uprising of '56, and even the more recent manifestations of unrest in Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1953, there was a remarkable opportunity to ask the Soviets to reconsider their commitment to the division of Germany and Europe. The Soviets were weak and fearful. They themselves were searching for some new formula for Central Europe. We still had, for all intents and purposes, a monopoly on nuclear weapons. That was perhaps the moment to seek some arrangement for the neutralization of Central Europe along the lines of what subsequently was applied on a much more limited basis to Austria.

In very recent history, I certainly would not have been as inclined as some of my friends were to take a rather tolerant view of Soviet proxy expansion in the Third World. Not only did this encourage the Soviets to do what they subsequently did in Afghanistan, it also aborted the chances of stabilizing American-Soviet arms competition through a mutually beneficial strategic arms agreement. I have said on more than one occasion that SALT II lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.

Kirkpatrick: Certainly the Allied policy at the end of World War II was seriously flawed. Soviet intentions with respect to Eastern Europe appear quite clear in retrospect, and were apparently clear to Churchill at the time. But we simply accepted the Soviets' good intentions. I don't believe that the Yalta agreement is responsible for Soviet domination of Poland today. It's the Soviet Army that's responsible for that. But the Yalta agreement was quite appalling in its lack of prudent verification and enforcement measures.

Enormous mistakes were made in and around the



afraid to take advantage of it. We were afraid for our own economic health to help Solidarity by calling in loans and declaring Poland in default.

Pipes: The whole *détente* policy was ill-conceived and based on a shallow understanding of the problem. We adopted the notion that we could influence Soviet behavior by essentially commercial devices. I am gratified that now even Kissinger admits that our policy of economic concessions did not gain us the desired political results. You simply cannot attenuate Soviet aggressiveness by bribery.

Moreover, I would not have gone into Vietnam, though once there, we should have fought to victory. We made a major effort in a marginal region, and our failure there practically paralyzed us for 10 years. To some extent, it still does so. I think we should never engage Soviet proxy forces with our own forces in any massive way. This is a situation which precludes victory on our part.

Allen: We should not have accepted the subjugation of all of Eastern Europe in 1945–48. The decision to supply Berlin by air rather than over land might have been a fundamental error. While it was certainly a heroic act, it could have been done in another, more direct way to teach the Soviet Union it could not subvert agreements. Our decision to pull the rug out from under the Kuomintang, which forced the Nationalists into an impossible coalition with the Chinese Communist party, was another fundamental mistake. So was the decision not to implement any aspect of a policy of liberation as opposed

to containment during the Eisenhower years, especially at the time of the Polish and Hungarian revolutions in 1956. The decision of Suez, however upright and moral it may have seemed at the time, was a mistake. Allowing the Bay of Pigs invasion to occur without providing proper support, and accepting Soviet assurances at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, guaranteed that we would pay on the installment plan for our failure to act decisively in an area that was clearly within our own vital sphere of interest. Certainly, decisions about Vietnam were also defective—in particular, the decision to continue the war after the advent of the Nixon Administration; we ended up with a situation less desirable than we would have been able to achieve in early 1969 if we had simply withdrawn our forces from Vietnam. The failure of the United States to develop, articulate, and implement a long-range policy toward Central and Latin America has resulted in the exceptionally dangerous situation that exists there today.

The most impressive and devastating mistake has been to permit the destruction by the Congress of the basis for bipartisan foreign and national security policy. This process, which began in earnest during the Johnson Administration and the Vietnam War, has continued to this day, with enormous cost to the national interest. Finally, the overwhelming desire for arms control agreements played an important role in guaranteeing that the United States would be in a precarious military position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the 80s and into the 90s. The balance has been shifted decisively against us in a strategic field as well as the tactical and the conventional fields. Especially

What kind of economic policy should we have toward the Soviet Union?

Tucker: I don't believe that anything we can do economically will have a critical effect on Soviet high policy. It never has had in the past, and despite the pretensions of détente of the 1970s, there is little indication that it would do so now.

I think we are past the point where anything should be denied the Soviets. We have had an argument over grain and I think there is a national consensus not to restrict sales. We have given up attempting to influence our allies to deny the Soviet Union either hard currency or, more importantly, high technology transfers. It is unrealistic to try to change this. The events of the past three years have demonstrated quite conclusively that our allies are going to go their own way, just as we go ours in the matter of grain.

Kirkpatrick: It makes no sense for the West to subsidize the Soviet Union with favorable credit terms, money, or technology. When we do it, we free their resources for military development. And we pay twice: first, for the cost of the subsidy, and second, for the cost of the weapons that we have to develop to keep pace with their military buildup. I don't think we should do anything to take the strain off the Soviet people under conditions of the chronic failure of Soviet agriculture. Restricting grain, however, doesn't make much difference, because it is fungible and readily available. But there aren't many commodities like that. As long as they are paying the full market price, and in cash, that is not subsidization.

It is extremely important to remember that given a choice between political goals and economic goals, the Soviets always choose political goals. They always choose power over goods. We choose goods over power. One of the scary things about the last few years is that the Soviets may have finally understood that we aren't power seekers like they are.

Pipes: Economic policy is very important, for two reasons. One is the Soviet dependence on economic assistance from the West. From the 1920s on, the USSR has relied enormously on Western technology. Antony Sutton did a study showing that Western technology was incorporated in 95 percent of all Soviet industrial establishments constructed in the 1930s. The second reason is that, under normal conditions, economic policy is the only field where we are able to exert pressure. Since you do not want to resort to military means for fear of getting into a war, and since there are severe limits on what you can do politically, economic countermeasures remain the only effective instruments at our disposal. Their use can be very painful to the other side.

I think we should make the military alliance intimately connected with an economic alliance. We should tell Europe and Japan that we may find it difficult to stand ready to come to their rescue if they continue to ship the Soviets high technology and give them subsidized credits. It makes no sense to let our allies build up Soviet might, which we then have to match.

Perle: Normal trade in consumer goods with the Soviets seems perfectly acceptable and consistent with Western interests. Trade in high technology, and the development of relationships of dependence on resources, seem to me dangerous and unwise.

Kampelman: When we provide economic assistance to the Soviet Union, we make it more possible for its rulers to maintain their strength and their internal control. The difficulty is that the Soviets understand this as well, and believe that they can survive without our help. They may not be willing to pay a price for our economic assistance. This remains to be seen.

It is essential, for the foreseeable future, to keep sensitive technology from the Soviets. This is extremely difficult, but the effort is worth undertaking. If we cannot prevent the transfer of technology, delay is helpful.

On the other hand, we should let the Soviets know that we are prepared to move toward a more normal trading relationship, down the road, if we can be persuaded of their peaceful intentions, and if they begin living up to their international obligations. This carrot should be present in their calculation. But we have got to be careful in this area. Much of the American and Western business community is so eager for trade that the Soviet authorities don't believe they have to pay a price to reach their commercial objectives.

Decter: I don't think we should make a distinction between economic policy and political policy. Economic policy should be subservient to the political and security needs of the nation, as painful as that might be to certain sectors of our society. I think the business community has been behaving badly, and, from its own long-term point of view, stupidly, in relation to the Soviet Union. While I am for a free market, the security interests of the nation cannot be sacrificed to short-term business interests.

I am opposed to all trade, to all aid to the Soviet bloc. The most important thing we can do now is stop helping the Soviets keep their regimes stable. We must not supply them with grain. Whatever lightens the economic burden of the Soviet Union frees the Soviet regime by that much for its military buildup.

Rostow: One of the most distressing things is to watch otherwise sensible people, frustrated and wanting to do something short of military confrontation, think they can hurt the Soviet Union with economic sanctions. Economic sanctions have never worked. They didn't work against Napoleon. They didn't work against Hitler. They didn't work against the Kaiser. They didn't even work against Rhodesia. Economic sanctions are a fraud and a delusion. People are always looking for a sanitary way to avoid war. There is none. Of course we should restrict trade in highly sensitive, advanced technology, but we must recognize that the Russian people are extremely able and well trained at a high level of science—the Hungarians, Czechs, and the Poles as well.

the Soviet Union is sufficiently integrated into the world economic system, it would face a very complex problem in trying to extricate itself. But I do not believe that economic leverage will be sufficient to make the leopard change its spots. He may snarl a little less. There is no question that the Soviets would like access to our high technology, and there is no question in my mind that we ought to prevent most of that. We have succeeded in getting our allies to take the issue more seriously than in the past. But far more than we realize, we have also suggested to the rest of the world that United States industry is not a reliable supplier. The long term consequences of that to our international competitiveness have yet to be seen. I am not against the concept of controlling

the transfer of technology, but it needs to be done with coherence and restraint. Otherwise, I am afraid that we will have harmed American industry more than we will have harmed the Soviet Union.

Lichenstein: Cabbages and wheat are just as strategic as computers and weapons systems. Everything we know of the Soviet economy suggests that grain production imposes a greater stress on their system than arms production. If I ran the Central Intelligence Agency, I would constantly seek analyses of the input required for each unit of output in different sectors of the Soviet economy, and if I were President I would use that as a guide for negotiations with the Soviets.

Under what circumstances, and for what purposes, should the U.S. commit troops to Central America and the Caribbean?

Kirkpatrick: There are not many. I think the Grenada operation was a legitimate and successful use of U.S. power. We had a specific and limited objective in conjunction with other countries in the region, and we operated with a favorable balance of forces. Of course, we have to honor our treaty obligations, and we also have to defend ourselves.

My big quarrel with doctrines such as the Hart Doctrine is less about the commitment of combat troops than about the other uses of U.S. power. I believe there are many situations where it would be feasible and desirable to use U.S. power short of sending U.S. combat troops. These involve such things as economic assistance or trade policy or military aid, including arms sales. There is a great deal we can do to help other countries help themselves.

Kristol: We need a new version of the Monroe Doctrine for Latin America. Any country in that area could have any kind of economic or political or social system it wishes, including a Marxist-Leninist regime. But we would insist that no country in the hemisphere have military ties with the Soviet Union or act as Soviet allies against the United States. Under this new Monroe Doctrine, we would not try to dominate these countries, but we would set minimum requirements if they wish to live free from interference. We can live with a Marxist-Leninist regime in our hemisphere just as the Soviets can live with Finland. But we have the right to demand of Nicaragua what the Soviet Union demands of Finland in its foreign affairs and in its attitude toward the Soviet Union.

If Nicaragua insists on supporting the rebels of El Salvador and exporting revolution throughout Central America, I think it would be extremely foolish for the United States to exclude the possibility of using military force. Military force would be warranted if we concluded that we could not stabilize the situation in Central America without a reorientation of the foreign policy of the Nicaraguan government.

Eagleburger: If Nicaragua were to conduct major military operations outside its borders, either singly or jointly with the Cubans, we would have a treaty obligation, under the Rio Treaty, to commit troops. If the political will in the United States existed, I can imagine circumstances short of a direct major military intervention by Nicaragua that would require the use of U.S. troops. I doubt that that will exist. But should Nicaragua and Cuba succeed in Central America, the long-term consequences for the United States would be terribly dangerous and would go a long way to transforming our nation into a truly isolationist, xenophobic society. We would become so consumed by problems to our south that we would tell the rest of the world to go hang while we dealt with our problems. Therefore, investing in Central America now prevents a tremendous and costly investment later on. This is a worst-case scenario, but it is a worst case we cannot afford.

Van Cleave: I would send far greater naval forces today to prevent the flow of arms from Cuba to Central America. We should station forces in the region—including a permanent naval task force—both to let all parties know the seriousness with which we view the conflict there, and to prepare for the contingency of using our troops in combat if necessary. We should be prepared to use ground forces if we cannot otherwise contain the Cuban-Nicaraguan objective of revolution without frontiers; that is, if a Cuban-Nicaraguan supported revolution threatens to spread throughout Central America. Short of direct combat, there are many measures we can take in the region. If we were freer to engage in covert action today, and to give military assistance to the contras in Nicaragua, we would reduce the probability that we would have to send our own troops. By denying these options, Congress is increasing the probability that we will have to use troops.

Ulam: We should be able to react to any overt military intervention by Communist forces in Latin America. But

United States believes it can achieve decisive results in a short time, to rid a country of a clear and present danger to its political stability. We cannot commit troops to a protracted military stalemate in the Caribbean or Central America. This calls for a clear definition of the political and military objectives. It means taking steps to prevent the inflow of forces, equipment as well as manpower, from the Soviet Union, Cuba, or other Soviet surrogates.

Bartley: That would depend on the battlefield situation. If there is no other way to stop the further establishment of Communist-dominated societies in Central America, we should not rule out sending troops to stop it. If Nicaragua launched an overt attack on its neighbors, we should not rule out sending U.S. troops to respond. In that circumstance, the objective of the campaign ought to be to change the government of Nicaragua.

For what purposes should we arm anti-Communist guerrillas?

Van Cleave: For the purpose of overthrowing Marxist-Leninist governments and giving the people the opportunity for self-determination. In Nicaragua, this is a feasible objective. In Afghanistan it is not; there we simply ought to aid people whose objective is to make the Soviets suffer for the brutal occupation of their country.

Rostow: Only when justified under international law. As I say over and over again, I believe that the rules of international law with respect to the international use of force have been terribly weakened in recent years, and unless the Soviet Union gives up its policy of aggression, we will be forced to do likewise. We don't want to do that. Our deepest national security interest is in restoring the state system and its rules against aggression. I don't think we are yet at a point where we have to abandon them.

Luttwak: Not to arm anti-Communist guerrillas means that we are not willing to help those who are opposing our enemy. The Soviet Union never hesitates to arm any group or band that wants to harm us. Unilateral forbearance weakens us.

The Nicaraguan contras are people who share our goals. The Afghans do not all share our goals. Many are Muslim fanatics, but they are fighting our enemy and we must have the seriousness and courage to help those who are being a great deal more courageous than we are in opposing the might of the Soviet armed forces. We have been very clever in inventing excuses not to help guerrillas fighting Communism, whether the Afghans or Savimbi in Angola. My favorite is that the Pakistanis won't let us send more than a certain amount of arms to the Afghan rebels because they are worried about Soviet retaliation.

If we were serious about helping the Afghan rebels, we wouldn't be shipping arms through Pakistan at all. We would deliver arms the way that we delivered them to the French resistance. By air. Direct.

Kirkpatrick: I think it's reasonable to help the Afghans, the Kampucheans, and the Nicaraguans. It is feasible but not legal to help UNITA in Angola. These are all large indigenous forces in situations where Communist governments have not fully consolidated power. In the case of Afghanistan and Kampuchea, there is also an external invasion. In all of those cases, there are large external sources of supply.

Rumsfeld: There are a variety of ways to help people who have interests that are compatible with ours. We can help them by using our own force, we can provide weapons, we can provide financial, economic, or political assistance. Clearly when people are opposing Soviet aggression, there are times when it is in our interest to use some or all of these arrows in our quiver. Obviously, our first choice is to use the more modest ones.

There is no doubt in my mind that it is in our interest to help the Afghan resistance. It is not in our interest that the Soviet regime be successful in expanding its influence, but we are without significant options in that part of the world. Clearly no deterrent dissuaded the Soviets from invading Afghanistan. They looked at us, they looked at the Western European nations, and it was a five minute decision, with the first four for coffee. There was no major debate in Western Europe or the United States as to whether U.S. or allied forces should be used. Our remaining options involved political influence, which we tried to use, economic influence, which to a minor extent has been used, and finally providing modest assistance to others who are resisting that invasion.

Allen: I am strongly in favor of arming anti-Communist guerrillas and I am in full support of a policy designed to arm the contras in Nicaragua, the Afghans in Pakistan who make forays into Afghanistan, and other key locations. I don't think that this is a principle that should be universally applied, but I do believe that there are selected cases in which there is a moral imperative that we assist these beleaguered people who have a chance to punish the Soviet Union and its surrogates, occupying forces who don't belong in such places.

Decter: Under circumstances where our arming them would have some chance of success. Certainly Nicaragua, certainly Afghanistan. These are people who even without our help would make great trouble for the Soviets. They have volunteered to do so. We should give them any possible assistance that is prudent. It would, of course, be unwise to do anything that would endanger the security of Pakistan. I do not have enough information to know whether arming, say, the Afghan mujaheddin would do so.

Lichenstein: I would be quite calculating on this. I would not be romantic, and I wouldn't do it everywhere. If we calculate that, over the long term, a Marxist-

porting the Afghan freedom fighters.

I believe that we were right in assisting Nicaraguan rebels, if for no other reason than that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the government of Nicaragua is under attack internally, it is less likely to be aggressive externally. But, before giving aid in this kind

of situation, it is important to ask whether our own domestic situation will enable us to sustain our support. It is hideously immoral to lead people to put their lives on the line on an assumption that the United States will not only help them get started but will help them thereafter, and then walk away from them leaving them exposed.

What kind of relations should we have with Communist countries such as China?

Pipes: Our relations with any country, right or left, ought to be based on one fundamental question: is this country aggressive? Is it seeking to impose its system on other nations by force? If it is not, we can have good relations with it, no matter what its ideology or our attitude toward its system of government. Since the death of Mao, China has turned inwards and ceased being aggressive, and so we are friendly toward China, just as we are toward Yugoslavia. We may deplore their Communist regimes, but these countries are not trying to export their systems and therefore they do not represent a threat to our national security.

Allen: We should have good relations with China. I would urge caution in the sale of certain kinds of military technology and weapons systems to China and I would urge others not to be carried away by the notion that China has somehow become a strategic ally to the United States when in fact it has not.

At the same time, the United States cannot afford to budge from full implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act. The United States should continue to view any alterations of the status of Taiwan by force as a threat to peace in the region, as the law states, and the United States should take great pains to ensure that Taiwan is provided the defense that it needs to keep the military balance in the region. Any aspect of the relationship that supports the expansion of peaceful trade and peaceful relations throughout Asia is in our national interest.

Brzezinski: As good as is feasible and practicable. I was deeply engaged in normalizing that relationship and in shaping at least the initial stages of what might be called tacit strategic partnership. I believe the Reagan Administration after an initial period of fumbling has resumed these efforts, and the American-Chinese relationship is becoming more comprehensive. That is good from the strategic as well as economic point of view.

Van Cleave: Very, very careful. We don't want China adventurous and hostile in the area. We see that China has substantial differences with the Soviet Union, and we want to see the continuation of those differences.

In terms of strategic or political benefit, there is little we can expect from China or from close ties with China. China is a totalitarian Communist state whose values are antithetical to our own. In most areas of foreign policy, China's positions have been opposed to ours. We must


watch the evolution of events, to see how Peking reacts to the Vietnamization of Southeast Asia, to Taiwan, and to the ASEAN countries. We may have careful, not hostile relations with a totalitarian government, depending on its external behavior and its relations with the Soviets. I find it curious that so many Americans object to our relations with Chile, El Salvador, or South Africa, while having a romantic view of our relations with China.

Ulam: When China becomes a first-class industrial and military power—fortunately I will not be around then—we may have just as much trouble from the Chinese as we do currently from the Soviets. But, for the next 10 to 20 years, good relations with China are a practical necessity, a way of balancing Soviet behavior throughout the world.

Kristol: It depends on what kind of relations China wishes to have with us. If China is more frightened of the Soviet Union than it is concerned about the ideological antagonism between its system and ours, then we should have reasonably friendly relations with China. But, it is important for the American government to make it clear that it doesn't like the Chinese system, and that our friendly relations are entirely a matter of expediency. The Chinese certainly make that clear to their own people. We should be equally clear to ourselves.

Laqueur: We can have normal, better than normal, relations with China. Unlike Russia, China has not been an expansive country throughout its history. The Chinese are far more modest in their security interests than the Soviets, and for the next 20 to 30 years will be preoccupied with internal reform.

Decter: Our relations with China should be very, very cautious. China for the moment is strategically useful to us. But we should neither exaggerate its strategic usefulness nor should we lose sight of the fact that Communism is real and poses a threat to us. It ought to be possible to maximize our interests with such powers without going overboard. The problem with us is that we can never seem to engage in mutually useful arrangements with a country without investing it with enormous virtue. During the first rapprochement with China, we had to be subjected to endless accounts by visitors to that country about how absolutely wonderful it was. All this while horrors were going on.



opinion has not launched a massive, sustained attack on Soviet policies toward emigration. The notion that people cannot emigrate from a country is a unique innovation of the 20th century. It is a barbarous innovation. We should be constantly exposing the Soviet Union to ridicule and contempt for refusing to permit its citizens to emigrate. This is a human rights issue, in some ways it is the most fundamental human rights issue. And it is an issue that the Soviet Union would find extremely difficult to cope with. There are other issues on which we can be a lot more assertive than we have been. We should never have signed the Helsinki Agreement unless it included religious toleration within the Soviet Union.

Luttwak: The Soviets are much less vulnerable in Eastern Europe than they seem and I don't think we can do much to make them more vulnerable. For a variety of reasons, the people of Eastern Europe are not in fact willing to make the Soviet Union pay a price for dominating that zone. Secondly, the regimes of Eastern Europe have managed, with different levels of success, to reach accommodations with both their people and the Soviet Union. The notion that the Soviets would feel insecure having to fight a war with client-state allies whose peoples undoubtedly detest the Soviet Union is wrong.

So neither in war or in peace are the vulnerabilities that great. Certainly, we should have a very differentiated policy. We should mark a whole series of subtle gradations in how we treat each country in Eastern Europe, according to two criteria: 1) how dependent they are on the Soviet Union 2) what they are doing militarily. We should favor those governments that contribute the least in defense to the Warsaw Pact. We should be mindful also of the kind of relations a government has with its own people: a softer government has less freedom of action to do harmful things to us. Eastern Europe, of course,

should not be in the Soviet sphere of influence, but it is. But we have proven to the world that we have no intention of doing anything about it—by not lifting a finger to help the Hungarians in 1956. We didn't have to send in the American army. But we could have let a few truckloads of bazookas go through.

As for helping Soviet dissidents, we should always emphasize our recognition and admiration for their individual courage. We should be much more effective than we are in helping the ones who come over to us to restore shattered lives. The Soviet emigré arrives in America and is left on his own. He is treated as if he moved from France of his own volition. Obviously, we should try to sustain the dissidents however we can. We can't send the army but we can send other things, like books and money—private gifts, I mean.

Laqueur: Our options here are limited. Ideally, we should make the most of tensions with the Soviet Union. But we have to remember that however much they may dislike Soviet tutelage, the Eastern European nations frequently dislike each other more.

We should wish them well, and let them know we commiserate with them. But anything too demonstrative will probably only backfire. The Soviet Union regards Eastern Europe as its back garden, and American freedom of maneuver is very limited.

Tucker: We developed economic ties during the 1970s that exacerbated Soviet vulnerabilities, and continue to do so today. I view them with complete favor. Inevitably, these economic ties to Eastern Europe wind up being more than just economic ties. Beyond this, I am increasingly skeptical. We face the old problem of how far we can go without bringing about Soviet military intervention and this I do not wish to do.

Have arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union benefited the United States?

Pipes: I think not. I think on the whole they have been a failure. The number of warheads on both sides has kept growing. The Russians are violating existing agreements in numerous ways. Also, the terms of the agreements allowed them, perfectly legally, to build up a vast force of sub-strategic or marginally strategic weapons, such as the SS-20s, which do not fall under the SALT limits. Arms control resembles our economic concessions. It was devised primarily to get the Russians involved in relations with us in the hope of modifying their behavior. But it has not worked that way. They simply continue to build weapons. Arms control could be useful but only if the Russians were persuaded that superiority was unattainable.

Eagleburger: I would say yes, on two levels. First, this democracy of ours demands that its political leadership engage in the exercise. No administration can afford to seem unwilling to negotiate arms control. Second, and more fundamental, arms control negotiations and arms control agreements, for all their warts, have provided a degree of stability in relationships with our allies and with the Soviet Union. A totally unconstrained nuclear arms race with the Soviets in the last decade and a half would have generated an awful lot of pressures that to some degree we have ameliorated.

SALT I, in my judgment, was an historic accomplishment. That does not mean it is forever enshrined in stone. I have great sympathy for the President's "star wars" approach. He is trying to say that the whole issue of arms control has to be looked at in a different way, and that it is an insanity to pile one offensive nuclear system on top of another.

Van Cleave: I don't think anyone can seriously argue that they have. Not a single one of the objectives that the United States posited for arms control has been advanced. Every single one has been diminished. Our strategic forces are more vulnerable, not more survivable. The military balance is less stable, not more stable. Instead of parity, we have a balance that has worsened in the Soviets' favor and contributed to more adventurous Soviet behavior. Moreover, arms control has had a depressant effect not only on our military programs but also on our ability to deal with the Soviets. It has thoroughly muddled our thinking.

Rostow: Not so far. Some arms control exercises are purely political theater performed with the utmost cynicism. I find this repulsive, I guess, because I dislike that kind of deception. The theory that taking small steps to reach agreements with the Russians, inch by inch, is the way to build momentum for peace is thoroughly foolish and totally discredited. And it is an insult to the serious people who direct the Soviet Union. It is a condescension to them, as if they were feeble-minded children.

They are not at all childish or feeble-minded.

Nuclear arms negotiations are serious or can be serious. They can be dangerous if they lock us into a position where we will be unable to do what we have to do to sustain our security. On the other hand, they can be useful adjuncts to a foreign policy of containment and collective security if they are compatible with true détente.

Bartley: On net, they've been deleterious. The kind we've had so far have restrained U.S. programs in very important ways, primarily through self-restraint. Take, for example, cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads. This is a very promising weapon. But we haven't been pressing its development, because a mixture of nuclear and conventional warheads on cruise missiles makes arms control impossible. For the sake of arms control, we've developed the nuclear ones, but haven't pressed the conventional ones. It's insane.

If we had an ABM now, the strategic balance would be much more stable and people would feel better, even if they knew that no defense was perfect.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have negotiated very loose controls and if these get in the way of their programs they cheat.

Maybe we could do better in arms control negotiations, but it's hard to conceive how we could have these kinds of treaties with people who are going to cheat.

Huntington: Yes, by and large. I don't think they have harmed us. We made a mistake in the SALT II negotiations by not getting a handle on the Soviet heavy missiles. We have made some other mistakes. But I don't buy the argument that arms control negotiations necessarily lead us to let our guard down. We have enough countervailing forces in American society to make sure that doesn't happen. To gain support for SALT II in Congress, the Carter Administration had to commit itself to some very significant arms programs. That is the way our system works.

Luttwak: Arms control in theory should always help the United States. Our best suits are economic competition and the appeal of our society and culture, while the Soviet Union has very little except its military power. Military power is not our strongest card, but our weakest, so if both countries reduce arms, other things being equal, we should be ahead.

But actually arms control has gone down a perverted, counterproductive track from the beginning. Our comparative advantage is in nuclear weapons, because of their high technology. The Soviets' comparative advantage is in conventional forces. But only nuclear arms have been controlled.

Kristol: Arms control negotiations have only benefited the Soviet Union. We always end up negotiating with

Are the Soviets paranoid?

Pipes: No. They are aggressively inclined.

Luttwak: Well, all empires appear paranoid. The Romans were paranoid, if you like. They conquered central Italy to make Rome secure, Gaul to make northern Italy secure; eventually they had to go all the way to Britain just to have security for downtown Rome. That is not paranoia, that is the mechanism of empire.

Kampelman: Yes. Kissinger said that even paranoids have enemies. Totalitarians are insecure. Whenever a small group of people governs large masses without the legitimacy or stability that comes from consent, they are afraid. They fear their neighbors, they fear strangers, they fear one another. I know a 73-year-old scientist who lives in Moscow who couldn't get permission to emigrate. They even fear him and other helpless people like him.

Rumsfeld: Any clique that is in power only by force, not by consent or popular approval does, in fact, have to be fearful of its own people and of the nations it is attempting to control and subjugate. But if by paranoid, one means that the Soviets are frightened of an attack by the United States, Germany, Western Europe, or NATO, that I think, has been overemphasized. The Soviet leadership is not naive. They are exceedingly well read in the Western press and reasonably sophisticated about the operations of the U.S. Congress and our relations with allies. I do not think that the Soviet leadership gets up in the morning fearing a NATO attack across Eastern Europe into the Soviet Union.

Laqueur: There is a paranoid streak, but they put it to good use. They have strong nerves. At the same time, there is an element of distrust that was most pronounced in Stalin, a tendency to see intrigues where there are none. But they deliberately exaggerate their paranoia for political reasons.

What is the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union in the next 10 years?

Allen: Quite small in my view, thanks to the Reagan Administration's regeneration of American forces after more than a decade of failure to develop and deploy new weapon systems.

Kirkpatrick: I believe not very great. I don't agree that it's more likely today than at times such as the Berlin blockade, the Cuban missile crisis, or the Korean and Vietnam wars.

One of the ways we make it less likely is by being strong and clear and firm. Vacillating only confuses the Soviets as well as ourselves. We also should seek quite deliberately to find islands of common activity and common interest with the Soviets. I am not talking about

Bartley: The Soviets have a very peculiar national character, which no doubt has deep historical roots, back to the fact that they never experienced the Renaissance and Reformation, which we in Western culture take for granted. If you read Russian history, you have to be impressed by the persistence of highly authoritarian governments with a tendency to bully, and the persistence of a strain of almost crazy saints, like the current dissidents. I don't know whether I'd call that paranoid. I do think we assume they are more like us than they really are.

Perle: There is an element of irrational fear in their perceptions of the People's Republic of China and to a lesser degree of the United States. There are some analysts who believe the Soviets to be paranoid and somehow take comfort in that fact. I don't find it at all comforting if true. Paranoids are dangerous. The Soviet leadership knows very well that it rules by fear, force, and indoctrination. All governments whose rule is based on those factors have a tendency to be fearful.

Pfaltzgraff: Since the time of Peter the Great, Russia on average has been acquiring territory the size of Holland every seven years. I would say that the victims of Russian expansionism have the right to paranoia.

Brzezinski: Any imperial structure that rests primarily on force tends to develop a paranoid outlook. Do not forget that the Russian empire is the only empire in which the oppressed peoples very explicitly feel themselves culturally superior to their oppressors. In the past, every other major empire created the impression that the imperial center was culturally superior to the areas that it controlled, in addition to being politically and economically predominant. That enhanced its power. By contrast, the oppressors in the Soviet empire have an acute inferiority-superiority complex, which certainly enhances their paranoia.

summitry, but quiet and lower-level talks. I don't believe we can settle problems with the Soviets by grand negotiation. But it is important to find limited areas of agreement, as many fail-safe devices as possible, and to have open lines of communication at all times.

Ulam: Luckily, I would say the likelihood is very small. I don't see a war coming except through a series of accidental escalations, or by us giving the Soviets the impression that they could launch a conventional military venture in Western Europe without any fear of retribution. I think they are just as afraid of a nuclear war as we are, even though at times they pretend that they are not really afraid of it.

ues and without precipitating a major war? The first step is to do much more than we have been doing in building up our military power. In my view, what the Reagan Administration has done is inadequate. We have to reduce Soviet opportunities by being willing to act decisively and early. We need a strategy that tells the Soviets ahead of time what we mean to do if they act aggressively. Our current strategy of uncertainty is a recipe for Soviet miscalculation.

Rostow: Not very great. The Soviets are pressing hard, and pursuing an aggressive diplomacy. But two things will restrain them. One is that they don't trust their own people. The lesson of 1956, when Russian soldiers joined the Hungarian revolution in the streets of Budapest, has not been forgotten in Moscow, or in Eastern Europe.

The second thing of course, is uncertainty about whether a Soviet regime could survive a nuclear war.

Huntington: I would say the danger is slim. The danger of war arises in two circumstances. One is a situation where we in effect invite the Soviets to be aggressive, as we did in 1950 when we said that we were not going to defend South Korea, and then we felt that we had to react vigorously. One most significant action reducing the risk of war in the past five years or so was President Carter's announcement that we were prepared to use military force to resist external force coming into the Persian Gulf area. Without the Carter Doctrine, the Soviets could have well been more inclined to get involved in the Gulf and at some time we would have had to react.

The other danger would be for the Soviets to feel cornered, to feel that the prospects of peace are so unpalatable that they are willing to suffer the risks of war. In 1941 after the oil embargo, the Japanese concluded that the continuation of peace with the United States meant national suicide. They went to war because they felt threatened by peace. There is a potential danger we could push the Soviets into a situation where they could conceivably make a similar calculation.


Tucker: I think the likelihood is very low, because it is difficult to imagine getting into a conventional war with the Soviet Union that wouldn't immediately raise the

spectre of nuclear conflict. And I think the superpowers will go to almost unimaginable lengths to avoid that possibility. I cannot imagine either the United States or the Soviet Union contemplating the use of nuclear weapons, save in circumstances where they were persuaded that the other side was preparing to use nuclear weapons and therefore it would be better to strike first.


Perle: I can only see one situation that would present the likelihood of a major war with the Soviet Union, and that is if we should be so foolish as to diminish our own defense effort, permitting an imbalance to develop. If we maintain our strength, there will be no war.

Eagleburger: If it happens, it will be by accident or misjudgment. In a popular book, the third world war begins in Yugoslavia after the Soviets misjudge the willingness of the West to reply. That is why what we say and do is so important: it gives the Soviets perceptions of how we would react. Over the next years, I think there will be a lot of brushfire wars, which always contain the seeds of confrontation. But a major war, I think, is unlikely.

Pfaltzgraff: The Soviet Union is unlikely to resort to war for the achievement of its objectives, except where it enjoys overwhelming military strength. Since World War II, the Soviet Union has directly used military power only in East Germany in 1953 against defenseless people, in Hungary in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968 with overwhelming odds in its favor, and finally in 1979 in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Soviet writings posit very clearly that military power is to be used in wars only when the correlation of forces, military and nonmilitary, lies clearly in favor of the Soviet Union. I believe that the Soviet Union would enlist the use of military power against the United States only if it believed it could win decisively in a surprise engagement. In short, the prospect for the Soviet use of military power lies exclusively in a situation in which the United States was perceived clearly to be far weaker than the Soviet Union.

Brzezinski: Very low. And if I am wrong, neither you nor the readers of this interview will be around to hold that against me. 





Drawing by Alexander Hunter for Policy Review.

Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union has organized a vigorous research and development of ABM technology. The Soviets currently deploy new ABM missiles and radars at their ABM site encircling Moscow. Reportedly, they have constructed facilities for mass production of ABM components that would enable them to field a nationwide ABM system quickly. Much of what the Soviets do to improve their ABM defense violates the provisions of the ABM Treaty of 1972. For example, the Soviets have tested surface-to-air missiles in an ABM mode; they have tested rapid reload launchers, developed mobile radars and ABM interceptors, and deployed extensive battle management radars for nationwide ABM defense. All are prohibited by the 1972 ABM Treaty.

These developments in Soviet ABM capability make the June 1982 Soviet nuclear war exercise an especially ominous threat. The military exercise began with a simulated attack on United States early warning satellites in conjunction with multiple firings of ICBMs (to simulate a Soviet first strike against an United States nuclear forces). The Soviets then test-fired their ABM weapons against targets (simulating Soviet defense against an American second strike), and launched two SLBMs, (simulating a Soviet third strike).

In short, the United States faces an aggressive adversary that has rejected the idea of a mutual strategic balance based on secure second strike forces. Moreover, the Soviets *do* plan their nuclear strategy with offensive intent. But the United States does not—and should not. Thus, the necessity of effective American self-defense.

III. Strategic Self-Defense, and the Goals of Arms Control

How can United States leaders ensure national security when our adversary is determined to gain nuclear superiority? In the short term, the United States can improve the survivability of our strategic deterrent forces, in particular our ICBMs and the strategic command and control systems. The present vulnerability of these two elements of defense is the most serious potential failing of our strategic forces, and seriously undermines deterrence.

In the next five years over \$18 billion will be spent to provide reliable command and control over American nuclear forces in wartime conditions; more should be invested if necessary. The United States must also protect its vulnerable ICBM deterrent force, and we must upgrade the yield and accuracy of its ICBM and SLBM warheads so as to match the Soviet capability to destroy hardened military targets. As the Scowcroft Commission and military strategists in both parties have recognized, deterrence now consists in the ability to reply in kind across the full range of Soviet attacks.

These minimal measures are necessary but not sufficient. Only advanced strategic defense systems can solve the ultimate problems of nuclear security.

Certainly no strategic defense system can be perfect; leakage may be inevitable. But even a less than perfect defense would change—and change radically in the di-

rection of peace—the present strategic equations. A defense system 90 to 95 percent effective against massive attack would be closer to 100 percent effective against accidents, acts of terror, or limited attacks. This protection alone would represent an enormous improvement upon our present vulnerability. Indeed, such a strategic defense would largely banish the fears of a nuclear war occasioned by other than a deliberate all-out attack. By comparison, an effective nuclear freeze would merely leave the Soviets, Americans, and others still in possession of all the weapons of mutual destruction.

The emergence of a new balance, based on strategic defense, would signal the greatest practical triumph to date of arms control.

To be sure, there would remain the dread contingency of a massive attack. Some utopian critics assume that in this case there is little to be said on behalf of an imperfect system. But a 90 to 95 percent effective defense would dramatically reduce American casualties and leave open prospects of national survival and recovery. This is still a horrible outcome to contemplate, yet it is morally and practically superior to the consequences of no defense at all. Pessimists also neglect the altered calculations an aggressor must make before striking. In the changed strategic environment of self-defense systems, a pre-emptive aggressor will not be able to hold back a substantial part of his forces when striking. In order to reach his goal the aggressor will have to let go with all that he has, since in any event at least 90 percent of his forces will be wasted with the attack. But if he lets go with *all* that he has, he will then be utterly disarmed, completely vulnerable against an adversary that still possesses immense means of retaliation.

The emergence of a new balance, based on strategic defense, would signal the greatest practical triumph to date of arms control. If both sides possessed defensive systems that were 90 to 95 percent effective, then 90 to 95 percent of offensive strategic arms would be useless. No current arms control proposals—even the most optimistic—envisage such a dramatic reduction of offensive weapons. Moreover, the beauty of this particular form of arms control is that it does not depend upon bilateral agreement and unattainable trust. It cannot be upset by dishonest measures taken by one side. Strategic self-defense is the ideal form of arms control. Indeed, strategic defense is the practical equivalent, and much more, of a nuclear freeze.


Critics insist that American deployment of strategic defenses will intensify the arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union, thereby heightening tensions

“**...One of the people it’s been most useful to and used by is me.**”

Ronald Reagan

on *Mandate for Leadership I*

The election is over but not the revolution




The conservative revolution continues. The Heritage Foundation again leads the way.

Four years ago Heritage published **Mandate for Leadership**, the best-selling book acclaimed by UPI as “. . . a blueprint for grabbing the government by its frayed New Deal lapels and shaking out 48 years of liberal policies.” Indeed, within one year the Reagan Administration implemented over 62% of the recommendations.

More than 250 individuals contributed to **Mandate II**, which is available in 578-page softcover from The Heritage Foundation, Dept. PR31, 214 Massachusetts Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, for \$14.95 prepaid.



The Heritage Foundation



Map by Karen Portik for *Policy Review*


behavior.” Will’s pungent anti-Communism has earned him the privilege of being viciously attacked in *The Nation*, *The Progressive*, and the Soviet press.

Though he keeps his personal distance from many social-issue conservatives, Will articulates their deepest concerns with power and passion. He is particularly appalled at the casual brutality with which people advocate abortion and euthanasia. When the Supreme Court refused to hear California’s appeal on behalf of Philip Beckler, a 13-year-old Down’s syndrome child suffering from complications resulting from a common heart defect, Will informed his readers that “Phillip will die prematurely, probably slowly and painfully, perhaps suddenly, drowning in his blood from bleeding into his lungs.” He was dying because he was retarded, Will noted, “just when society is beginning to acknowledge an obligation to nurture the significant fulfillment of even the limited potentialities of retarded citizens.” After remarking that “the idea that the value of human life varies with intelligence is at war with our civilization’s core belief in the intrinsic and equal value of lives,” Will added a footnote about “the Down’s syndrome child I know best, who watches ‘Happy Days’ and cheers for the Baltimore Orioles”—his own son, Jonathan Will.

Editorial editors who feature Will’s columns say one of his great strengths is his range of interests. In addition to politics, he writes columns about the Chicago Cubs, hamburger chains, the space shuttle, and video games. David Broder, the political reporter, wrote that Will’s most memorable columns describe his response “when he confronts popular culture—or rather, when popular culture confronts George Will.” In a recent column about ice cream Will wrote, “Unfortunately my favorite delight bears the unutterable name of ‘Hot Fudge Nutty Buddy,’ an example of the plague of cuteness in commerce. There are some things a gentleman simply will not do, and one is announce in public a desire for ‘Nutty Buddy.’ So I usually settle for a plain vanilla cone.” Brooding about the insidious effect of popular music on his daughter, Will declared that if this taste persisted long, “She will be sent to school at a thick-walled convent on a high mountain overlooking an inaccessible valley in a remote region of Portugal.”

While conservatives acknowledge Will’s depth and range, they have become increasingly suspicious of his motives. “He chooses his positions very carefully,” comments columnist Joseph Sobran. Sobran and others have publicly impugned Will for maneuvering and positioning himself so that he can be applauded by the liberal establishment. In a review of Will’s recent book in *National Review*, Sobran called it “a toothless, coffee-table Toryism, nicely calculated for liberal consumption.”

This antipathy stems mainly from Will’s ideological commitment to a paternalistic welfare state. This runs counter to the notion of limited government which is at the heart of modern American conservatism. In an assessment of Will’s writing in *Commentary*, James Neuchterlein noted the irony that while praising government programs “Will overlooks the moral effects of welfare on its recipients. The evidence is strong that for a critical minority welfare erodes those qualities of self-respect and



George Will

self-reliance that Will extols.”

Undoubtedly most irksome to conservatives are Will’s repeated calls for higher taxes and his condescending treatment of other conservatives. As William Murchison, associate editor of the *Dallas Morning News* puts it, “Will makes quite a living attacking conservatives.” I visited Will to ask him about this recently. He received me in his study, where he usually works. Appropriately, there was a framed portrait of Cardinal Newman across from his desk. Will wore a plaid button-down shirt and looked well scrubbed.

He talked first about his background. He was a frustrated football player in high school, he said, after which he attended Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut, where he headed “Students for Kennedy” in 1960. Then he went to Magdalen College, Oxford, to study politics, philosophy, and economics. While a student at Oxford, he flirted briefly with libertarian thinking, and paid a visit to the Berlin Wall, which fortified his anti-Communist beliefs. He then enrolled in Princeton’s Ph.D. program in political science, and wrote his thesis in 1968 on “tolerance”—he was against it. Then Will taught briefly at Michigan State University and the University of Toronto, before going to work for Republican Senator Gordon Allott of Colorado. In 1972 he was made Washington editor of *National Review*, where he outraged

water and the wiles of the fish.

"Most columnists are parasites," Tyrrell told me. "They live off the evening news and the *New York Times*. They get their opinions from cocktail parties." Tyrrell said he could not take seriously certain elite passions, such as homosexuality and feminism. "These people are ignorant of nature," he insisted. "Who can take them seriously?"


Tyrrell's new book, *The Liberal Crack-up*, carries endorsements from William Safire, William F. Buckley, Jr., Jeane Kirkpatrick, Leo Rosten, Henry Kissinger, and Malcolm Muggeridge. Tom Wolfe calls him "the funniest political essayist to come along in years." And Jack Paar says "Emmett Tyrrell is the wittiest, wickedest writer on the right around. He makes Gore Vidal on the left read like Lawrence Welk."

But Tyrrell's columns have lately been losing some of their splendid invective. One reason is that his editors at the *Washington Post* are constantly urging him to tone down a bit. Another is, ironically, the triumph of the Reagan Administration. Tyrrell cannot really bring himself to attack the man he routinely refers to as "our suave boy Ron." How could he blame "our suave boy Ron" for anything, even tax hikes or the Beirut massacre, especially given the alternative set of buffoons? Even Tyrrell acknowledges that he is best when he is in "an attack mode," as he puts it. He seems a little bewildered about being part of the majority after spending his whole life spearing the conventional wisdom. Sometimes Tyrrell renews his attacks on liberal totems, but it's no longer so sacrilegious to describe Tip O'Neill as a "dyspeptic orb."

Safire's Gems

I was not able to interview William Safire for this article. Even his secretary wouldn't talk to me over the phone. Now I can understand why Safire was so upset in a recent column that Vice President Bush would not return his phone calls.

Well, perhaps he was afraid I would tape the conversation. Or mention religion. Taping and prayer are two of Safire's greatest bugbears. He was recently apoplectic over Charles Wick's taping of private phone calls, and ludicrously suggested that the people Wick taped were "left with the feeling of the aborigine who fears that a picture taken of him steals his soul." Safire's tapilepsy dates back to Watergate, when after stoutly defending Nixon's innocence, Safire discovered to his chagrin that somebody in the Administration was taping *him*. After Watergate, Safire has been stricken with an ethics mania



R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr.

which is behind his prosecution of such scandals as "Koreagate," "Billygate," and "Ethicsgate."

A self-described libertarian hawk, Safire is wary of the intertwining of religion and politics. Recently he wrote a series of columns on the "Christian Republican Party," which accused "Reverend Reagan" of committing "constitutional sin" by declaring that politics and morality are inseparable. Ironically Safire's own columns about politics have a strong moralistic tone, and he is always discovering ethical inadequacy in some public official or other. It is typical of Safire to express deep concerns about the people privately taped by Charles Wick—and then print lengthy transcripts of those conversations in his columns.

But these are Safire's eccentricities, and do not do justice to his polished style and brilliant arguments in favor of reduced government and anti-Communist foreign policy. "I am a hawk," Safire says proudly. "I believe the Cold War has been going on for years." In one of his retrospective analyses of the Vietnam War, Safire noted that "The first thing that went wrong in Vietnam was we decided that there was no way to win without starting World War III." When the Cambodian holocaust erupted, Safire punctured the hushed silence at the *New York Times*. "Passive humanitarianism is not an adequate response to genocide," he opened one column

mainstream where his views are only part of a larger conservative echo. The man needs time to get over this.

Sobran Thoughts

I have known Joseph Sobran for years. A wittier man never graced a bar stool since the days of Samuel Johnson. Tom Bethell, contributing editor of *Harper's* and a close friend of Sobran, calls him "a contemporary Chesterton." Sobran's keen sense of paradox is evident from this October 1984 column commenting on Geraldine Ferraro's charges that Reagan was a bad Christian:

If Reagan led a life of conspicuous religious fervor, without blemish, there might be some plausibility in the idea that he was bent on enforcing conformity. But his personal style, with its mix of conventional piety and relaxed practice, is reassuring, even endearing. It makes him like most Americans. He respects certain norms, even when he doesn't live up to them. He would rather appear to be a sinner, than abolish the idea of sin.

This passage also applies to its author. Sobran, the songster of family and traditional values, has been married twice.

I found him in one of the restaurants near the *National Review* office. He was drinking some exotic brand of beer. We talked about his early years on the plains of Ypsilanti, Michigan, where

he attended public schools and later Eastern Michigan University. His parents were Democrats and lapsed Catholics, "which is pretty much the same thing," Sobran said. He took Catholicism seriously after 1960, when an idealistic Catholic was elected to the White House. "Kennedy showed me that there was a certain romance about Catholicism which I thought it had lost," he says.

Sobran was hired to write for *National Review* as a result of a series of lengthy letters he sent Bill Buckley. He arrived in New York in 1971, was promoted to senior editor of the magazine in 1977, and began his syndicated

column in 1979. Now he appears in 70 papers including the *Detroit Free Press*, the *Dallas Times-Herald*, and the *St. Louis Globe-Democrat*.

"I like to supply people with rebuttals to familiar arguments," Sobran told me. "Much of liberalism consists of making people ashamed of their soundest instincts." We laughed about Sobran's recent fracas with New York Governor Mario Cuomo and Mayor Edward Koch. In Sobran's column on Governor Cuomo's keynote address at the Democratic Convention he observed that "Cuomo looked and talked like one of the characters


gunned down at the end of 'The Godfather.'" This provoked Mayor Koch to suggest that Sobran was the Louis Farrakhan of the right. "I actually thought Cuomo had a kind of rough glamor," Sobran grinned.

I asked him whether he believed that religion was central to the conservative philosophy. "Liberals believe in heaven on earth," he said. "Some conservatives don't believe in heaven at all. Religion is not essential to conservatism, but it is essential to me."

Recently Sobran has become interested in what he calls "the practical coincidence of interests between liberals and the Soviet Union." He does not suggest a conspiracy, but rather a "symbiosis" between the left and Communism. Liberals respond to the "mating call" of utopian rhetoric even if it brings bloody consequences, Sobran told me. He quoted Jean Francois-Revel, "They judge fascism by its record, but Communism by its promise."

William P. Cheshire, editorial page editor of the *Washington Times*, which prints Sobran regularly, says of him, "Most columnists are obsessed with day to day news. Sobran can view events with a certain detachment. He abstracts principles from commonplace events." These strengths are also his limitations. Critics charge that "six out of every five Sobran columns are about abortion." Bethell noted that Sobran does not stay well informed on a wide range of issues.

The unifying theme in Sobran's writing, however, is not abortion or the family, but socialism. "The socialist



Joe Sobran

“Being a family man is important to me,” Raspberry told me. “For example, schools interest me in a way they would not if I were single.” He said, “I take liberal or conservative positions when they make sense to me. My basic approach is to take questions one at a time. Sometimes Newt Gingrich makes sense and sometimes Benjamin Hooks makes sense.”

I asked him why he continued to support welfare programs when he acknowledged their deleterious effects on their recipients. “I don’t know any thoughtful person who doesn’t think two contradictory things. First, that welfare programs don’t work, and second, that we ought to have them.” Raspberry said, “Government programs can work as a source of emergency help, but they can’t graduate people out of poverty. We’re uncomfortable with that because we don’t see the function of welfare as making people comfortable.”


He expressed ambivalence about affirmative action and busing. “Racial mixing by itself does nothing to improve the education of black kids. It is very damaging to have white and black schools side by side. It’s insulting to black kids. But it’s equally insulting to imply that there is something intrinsically wrong with a school because there are too many blacks in it, and so blacks have to be bused away, and whites bused in to improve the school.”

Raspberry at one time seemed to be attracted to conservative black scholars Thomas Sowell and Walter Williams, but he has since pulled away. He now says, “These are interesting men who have stopped being so interesting because they have stopped trying to persuade blacks of the rightness of their views.” The arguments of Sowell and Williams “hold together, but ignore real-life problems,” Raspberry said. For example, “They are absolutely correct that rent control reduces the total amount of housing for blacks. They are also right that the market will eventually take care of imbalances. But the immediate effect of removing rent control would be to destroy large numbers of families.”



William Raspberry

William Raspberry, a short man with greying hair and a bracelet, is honestly trying to think through the contradictions of liberalism. He will never be a Republican, because of the party’s failure to work for civil rights in the 1950s and 1960s. But even if he doesn’t quite see it, he is a liberal at the exit gate of liberalism. ■



The origin of species?

Some creationists dispute that the record necessarily argues any such thing. For one thing, they disagree that the strata should be read as a time sequence. They offer an alternative explanation for the appearance of different fossils in different layers of the earth. First, they suggest that the strata result from a huge flood, perhaps the Noachian flood. As the waters rose, the creationists say, the various creatures settled out at different levels depending on their differing hydrodynamic qualities (with the denser or less mobile ones falling) or on their differing intelligence (with the smarter ones swimming to the top, the better to survive the rising flood). Thus, the strata reveal not that different organisms lived at different times, but that some organisms lived at the bottom of the ocean and others at the top.

Evolutionist Stephen Jay Gould of Harvard University spells out the insufficiency of this argument: there are organisms appearing in different strata that do not, he reports, differ either hydrodynamically or in intelligence. For example, different kinds of clams appear in each stratum, forming a changing "column" of clams all the way up. Each species of clam is hydrodynamically and mentally identical to every other, yet each appears in one specific part of the column and nowhere else. Change in clams over time is simply the most plausible explanation for their stratification, Mr. Gould concludes.

Creationists also find grist for their mill in the sudden

appearance of many complex forms of life in the Cambrian period, 500 to 600 million years ago. Duane T. Gish, a creationist and biochemist, who has done post-doctoral work with Nobel Prize winners at Cornell University and the University of California, Berkeley, writes:

The oldest rocks in which indisputable fossils are found are those of the Cambrian period. In these sedimentary deposits are found billions and billions of fossils of highly complex forms of life. . . . What do we find in rocks older than the Cambrians? Not a single, indisputable multicellular fossil has ever been found in pre-Cambrian rocks.

Again, evolutionists like Mr. Gould simply dispute this claim. Before the Cambrian period, Mr. Gould explains, organisms reproduced asexually. Asexual reproduction works with a relatively narrow gene pool, and so affords but little opportunity for evolutionary change. Sexual reproduction apparently began in the Cambrian period, which was consequently the occasion for a great flowering of new life forms. Mr. Gould points out that even though the pre-Cambrian period was relatively simple, about thirty years ago it was discovered that life in fact did exist in that era, and that since this discovery, an extensive record of both single-cellular and multi-cellular pre-Cambrian life forms, from every continent of the earth, has been assembled.

will improve a species' chances of surviving and reproducing—which will make it more “fit”—and which will not. You have to wait and see how every constellation of traits works out in actuality. This raises the question whether “the fit” are really only definable as “those who survive,” making natural selection the theory of “the survival of those who survive”—a tautological and unusable idea.

The problem with natural selection is that every imaginable circumstance confirms it, including circumstances that contradict each other. Natural selection is utterly unsusceptible of disproof—making it, by logical extension, never really provable either. If a species changes before our very eyes, the theory lets us assume the new kind is more fit than the old, and we can say “the fit are surviving.” Similarly, if the species does not evolve, we can assume this means it is perfectly fit as it is, and we can still say “the fit are surviving.” You can imagine no pattern of species change or non-change that would enable you to say “the less fit are surviving; the theory is disproven.” As nothing can be true under any circumstances and still mean something, this makes natural selection an empty assertion.

It is because of this weakness in the natural selection idea that disputes like the one between the gradualists and the punctualists are irresolvable. A passage in an essay by Mr. Stanley illustrates the chimerical quality of the punk eke debate. The traditional Darwinians, Mr. Stanley writes, claim that if a species is stable, that is only because it is either very well specialized or very broadly adapted, and not in need of change. It is not because the normal condition for a species is stability. Mr. Stanley responds, “There is no factual support for either of these allegations.” He illustrates with some species that seem to make his case. What he cannot do, though, is disprove what the traditionalists are saying. Because all evolutionary statements are irrefutably logical, there can be “no factual support” for any one of them over any other.

The impossibility of pinning down natural selection perhaps explains a remark made at a recent seminar on evolution that was held at the Resident Associates program of the Smithsonian Institution. After a minute or two of persistent questioning on an evolutionary fine point, Joel Cracraft, associate professor of anatomy at

the University of Illinois, exclaimed: “Look! There are probably 50 people in this room who call themselves evolutionists, and if you asked each one of them what evolution is, you’d probably get 50 different answers.”

It would probably overstate the case to say—as some do—that natural selection is a pure tautology. We can’t know which traits are fittest until we see what survives, but there might still be such a thing as objective fitness, even before nature does the weeding out.


But the tautological quality of natural selection does deny evolutionists any predictive powers. Dr. Leon Kass of the University of Chicago explains that the problem

with natural selection is not so much that there is no truth to it, but that it “forces us into the retrospective. It is virtually impossible,” he says, “to discuss the fitness of an organism prospectively.” Natural selection, says Dr. Kass, is “sometimes a name for our ignorance.”

Evolution is the best explanation for the origin of species, yet it leaves unanswered many questions. For instance, though evolution tells us that life arose from a certain combination of elements under certain conditions, it leaves us to wonder why these circumstances produce consciousness and others do not. It is hardly surprising that a theory that raises mysteries as great as this one continues to be embattled.

If improperly pursued, though, the study of evolution can be more seriously deficient even than this. Evolution is perhaps the most essential of all inquiries, for in seeking to discover where we are from, it also seeks to tell us, in one way, what we are. Yet though it may tell us what we are, it has no obvious lesson about what we are for. It is arguably dangerous for any discipline to expose a subject so fundamental as the origins of life without at all addressing—while even appearing, sometimes, to dismiss—this larger and more pressing question.

Just because evolutionists haven’t done enough with this problem doesn’t mean they cannot. That the positive moral lessons of the development of species are subtle and have been too little discussed does not mean they are not present and important. If we hope ever to make peace with evolution, the discipline, such as it is, must now turn its efforts in this direction. It is time to consider not only our origins, but also what our progress from them has meant.



“VERY WELL THEN, HANDS UP ALL THOSE WHO PROPOSE TO BECOME BIRDS.”

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persuade Congress to abolish VISTA; but he has succeeded in reorienting a considerably smaller VISTA, and ACTION as a whole, away from left-wing politics.

Today ACTION focuses on voluntarism and self-help. A drug prevention program helps to enlist corporate leaders and money in supporting local parents' drug awareness efforts. In the Vietnam Veterans Leadership Program, veterans who have successfully re-established themselves in civilian life volunteer to help other veterans with problems stemming from their war experience. Mr. Pauken has not had the impact on the public debate in his field that Messrs. Bennett and Miller have had in theirs; but that is not due to any shortage of efforts on his part to articulate a theme of "voluntarism" as an alternative to liberal, dependency-creating social welfare policies. Rather, his lonely voice has been drowned out by others within the Administration determined to prove that the Reagan Administration is even more "generous" than its predecessors.

Governing Strategically

To the degree they have governed successfully, Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken all emphasize, it is because they have tried to govern strategically. This means first of all having certain fundamental objectives; as Mr. Pauken puts it, "You've got to have a strategy, and that means an agenda." This may seem too obvious to be worth saying; but few Reagan appointees have had a vision of what their agency should be doing, or have thought seriously about how to get there. Far more common is the simple desire to cut back on certain activities or the limited ambition to "manage" one's agency or department well.


All three of our political appointees distinguish their approach from either of these more common alternatives. Governing strategically is different from "good management," for example, because setting as one's goal "good management" means making no serious change in the direction of the agency. Furthermore, the attempt to "manage" non-controversially usually fails even on its own terms. According to John Agresto, Mr. Bennett's deputy, "It's those who try to make the least waves who get into the most trouble." They end up reacting to developments shaped by others, and fighting on others' terrain, at someone else's chosen time and place. And

they end up being judged by criteria set by others.

The political appointee who tries to govern strategically, by contrast, not only has a substantive agenda; he articulates it clearly and publicly. Mr. Bennett offers this "first law" for political appointees: "Before someone else tells the world what you're doing, what you're about, get the bull by the horns and tell everyone—loudly and clearly and repeatedly—what it is you intend to do, and why you're doing it. You need, first and foremost, to articulate a vision of what the agency should be." This is because in politics, unlike football, there is no referee who makes sure you have a turn on offense. "If you don't

act as if you had the ball, if you don't put yourself on the offensive, setting the terms of debate around your agency, then you're on the defensive, and that's no place to be."

One implication of this perspective is that the political executive ought not to be afraid of publicity—or controversy. Mr. Bennett does not mind being called "the outspoken chairman" of the NEH; Mr. Miller does not hesitate to say, "I don't make any bones about it—there's been a change of emphasis and philosophy at the Federal Trade Commission"; and Mr. Pauken does not worry when it is said that he "has made his share of enemies" while transforming ACTION. All three regard publicity, and controversy, more as a tool than as a threat—



Bennett's Basics

but only because they have attended to framing the terms of debate in which the controversy will be reported. This, in turn, requires that the appointee have what Mr. Miller calls an "intellectual framework" that governs his actions within his agency but that also provides a basis for explaining and defending them. As Mr. Miller puts it, "Loyalty and good instincts are not enough. Without an intellectual framework either you get captured and don't get much done—or you get in a lot of trouble."

It is this framework that seems to distinguish Mr. Miller from, say, Anne Burford, President Reagan's first administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. As one sympathetic Administration official explains, "She knew she was supposed to change things, to be more pro-business, but she didn't have ideas of her own. So she would ask the bureaucracy for options and then choose the most pro-business one that was given her. She wasn't able to redefine the agenda; and in the end the



Thomas Pauken (left) with Vietnam veteran.

antitrust and consumer protection laws against the learned professions and city governments. His opposition, he says, was very important in winning a hearing for himself, and building support within the Commission.

Mr. Pauken inherited a group of career employees who were more ideological, and less professional, than either of the others. He therefore had to bring more political appointees into key line positions, using "Schedule B"—a civil service shortcut for hiring people with special skills—to bring in loyalists, and had to do more in the way of transferring and even firing civil servants in order to establish control over the agency. As if this were not enough, Mr. Pauken also had to fight hard with the White House to resist ACTION's being used as a "dumping ground" for loyal Reaganites, regardless of background or qualifications. Yet in the end, by sticking to his guns Mr. Pauken was able to hire a remarkable crew of associates, many of whom had little or no government experience and little in the way of political connections, almost all of whom have since moved onward and upward in the Reagan Administration. By spending his first few months establishing internal control, rather than setting out on speaking tours as suggested by the career staff, he was also able to find out which career employees were willing to work with him, and which could not. Once most of the career civil servants saw, Pauken says, that he was not simply there to trash the agency, most came around, and "a good working relationship" now exists.

Indeed, as one of Mr. Pauken's former deputies points out, it may well be that activists like Messrs. Bennett, Miller, and Pauken get more cooperation from the civil service than would a "good manager." Civil servants are paid to manage, and they resent the claim by business-

men that they are going to come in and, for the first time, impose sound management practices. As long as the political appointee gives civil servants a chance to participate in implementing his program, most of them will be reasonably hospitable to the efforts of the political appointee to change the agenda of the agency. After all, even civil servants will admit, that is what we have political appointees for.

Candor, Cleverness, and Congress

Getting control of the agency requires what Mr. Bennett calls the "will to administer"—the willingness to pay attention to detail, to personnel, to all of the boring chores that translate broad policies into real programs. But even a combination of the broad vision and the will to administer would be insufficient if Congress made the successful governance of an executive agency impossible. Mr. Pauken's efforts to kill VISTA, Mr. Bennett's attempt to cut the budget further and to shift more funds from media programs to educational ones, and Mr. Miller's proposal to change the FTC's enabling legislation have all been thwarted by Congress. But all have nonetheless been successful in generally reshaping their agencies in accord with their new agendas. How?

Here again all three emphasize the importance of being able and willing to make a case and defend it, both in general terms and in its concrete implications. Most Congressmen are not spoiling for a fight with an articulate and confident defender of a particular vision of an agency. Of course that vision must fall within the legislative mandate, but most legislative mandates are sufficiently broad that executive officials have room to maneuver. Thus when Mr. Miller decided that Congress could not be persuaded to narrow the FTC's authority to police

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
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
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Drawing by Bill Bramhall for Policy Review.

membership in, the United Nations." Her belief in the importance of the world body is reflected by her personal commitment. The average tenure of U.S. permanent representatives to the U.N. has been 18 months; Mrs. Kirkpatrick has stayed four years.

"At the U.N. the United States could be isolated and humiliated at will . . . we smiled and other nations kicked us in the teeth."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick believes that our isolation at the U.N. "is above all a political failure, a failure to defend our democratic values, and a failure to defend ourselves." She recalls that when she first arrived at the U.N. in 1981, "The United States could be isolated and humiliated at will . . . we smiled and other nations kicked us in the teeth." Mrs. Kirkpatrick has reversed this trend by making it clear that the United States takes the U.N. seriously. For example, each summer before the General Assembly went into session, she and her team at the U.N. let every nation know what issues and votes the United States considered crucial to its interests.

Nor has she been afraid to defend the United States or its interests against attack. She described a speech by the Foreign Minister from Ethiopia as "an extreme example of what is known as the Orwellian inversion of the truth." She declared that what the government of Nicaragua really wants is not democracy but "the right of repression of its own people with impunity and with immunity from any consequences thereof." And she noted of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that "The effort to subjugate the Afghan people and to impose upon them a form of alien and totalitarian rule has been marked by a degree of violence against the population that is exceeded in the recent past only by the terrible tragedy in Cambodia."

Mrs. Kirkpatrick also encouraged the U.S. Congress to require the State Department to provide annual reviews of voting patterns at the U.N. Congress is now aware, for example, that over 60 nations receiving U.S. aid (including Egypt, India, Greece, Spain, and Pakistan) voted to condemn the U.S. rescue mission in Grenada.

Her impact in the U.N. has been significant, but whether it will last beyond her tenure is uncertain. Since her arrival, the effort to expel Israel from the U.N. has lost steam, Cuba's decade-long effort to list Puerto Rico as a colony of the U.S. has decisively failed, and in the past year the Soviet Union has been forced to use its veto in the Security Council as often as the United States. "We are not a power," concludes Mrs. Kirkpatrick, "but now we get taken into account." Most important, Mrs. Kirkpatrick has shown that the United States can succeed in the U.N., if we are willing to defend ourselves and our values.

Democrat for Life?

Mrs. Kirkpatrick finds herself at odds with the "San Francisco Democrats" on foreign and domestic policy issues. A fierce anti-Communist, she finds the isolationist and accommodationist policies of today's liberals unacceptable. As she declared at the Republican National Convention this summer:


When the San Francisco Democrats treat foreign affairs as an afterthought, as they did, they behaved less like a dove or a hawk than like an ostrich—convinced it could shut out the world by hiding its head in the sand.

Her philosophic differences with the Democrats on domestic issues are also profound. She generally opposes the use of government power to effect social change. In an article, "Why We Don't Become Republicans," published in *Commonsense*, she contrasts her traditional liberalism with the philosophy of the "new liberals."

Traditional liberals see it (government power), as an unwarranted use of regulatory power which progressively narrows the scope of individual freedom, undermines the society's most basic values, and intrudes government's heavy hand into many subjects remote from its appropriate concern—from school busing to boys' choirs; from hiring and firing to football.

Looking back at Reagan's domestic record over the past four years, Mrs. Kirkpatrick says she is completely comfortable with it. On abortion, she says, "I do not think that abortion is the worst evil imaginable, but the opposite of that is also true; I do not believe that abortion should be publicly advanced or casually available; abortion is always tragic." On ERA, Mrs. Kirkpatrick believes it is a means to an end of which she approves, but not the only, and certainly not the best means available. And on the issue of raising taxes she takes the "death and taxes" view that they are a necessary evil.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick does harbor some lingering doubts about Republicans. She is primarily concerned that Republicans have no vision of the public good. She believes that "The burden of libertarianism that has been associated with the Republican Party is not articulated in a way that expresses even a minimal concern for the whole." On the other hand, the past four years have undoubtedly diminished some of her doubts. She mentions Ronald Reagan, George Will, and Irving Kristol as persons who have made great progress in expressing a broader vision of the public good.

Mrs. Kirkpatrick, if she returns to private life, will write a book on her often raucous experiences at the U.N., and then return to teaching at Georgetown University. Political observers agree, however, that Mrs. Kirkpatrick is no flash in the pan and will continue to play a prominent role in Republican politics. In a recent television interview, Congressman Jack Kemp was asked how he would feel about having Mrs. Kirkpatrick as *his* running mate in 1988. "I would be honored," he replied, "to serve on *her* ticket." 



"I'll say this for Adelman; he has a good strong head on his shoulders!"

Although the real battles of confirmation hearings are conducted over policy or ideology, senators generally prefer to attack on points of character. The reason is obvious: vetoing an apparently unsuitable person looks better than refusing a duly elected Chief Executive the right to choose his government. Senate staffers used Leslie Lenkowsky's hearings, for instance, to criticize policy and management changes at the USIA. The spotlight, however, was focused on charges that Mr. Lenkowsky was not telling the full truth about a procedural matter. When Kenneth Adelman was picked for the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a massive forum on Reagan's nuclear policy. But much of the time was taken up with such matters as whether Mr. Adelman had flouted Zaire's export rules to acquire his collection of African art.

Hidden Hazards


Can a nominee predict if he'll stir up a controversy? "What you look for is not the number of people against you, but their intensity and passion," suggested Larry Smith, who became a connoisseur of confirmation hearings during 14 years as an administrative aide to Senators Gary Hart and John Stennis. (He is now a fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government.) Ernest Lefever, archfoe of the reigning human rights dogma, was bound to cause a tempest. Rights activists testified against him at the hearings, including Argentine torture victim Jacobo Timerman, who showed up waving a copy of his book *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*. A newspaper bulletin captured the charged atmosphere: "Rights Victim is Potent Presence As Senators Assess Reagan Choice."

The Lefever nomination points up another rule: a potential dismantler of an agency simply will not receive the approbation of the U.S. Senate. In an article published in *Policy Review* in 1978, "The Trivialization of Human Rights," Mr. Lefever urged Americans to "recognize the political and moral limits of promoting particular reforms in other societies." At his confirmation hearings, Mr. Lefever admitted he had "goofed" when he earlier urged Congress to abolish human rights statutes. But his opponents were relentless. Although ideology was the issue, he was attacked with a touchy question about contributions from the Nestlé Company to the Ethics and Public Policy Center, Mr. Lefever's Washington think-tank.

A delay in the hearings is a signal to the sharks that there's a scent of blood on a nominee. "Once you start having your knees knocked together," says Kenneth Adelman, "you are giving everybody who's against you all kinds of incentives." An originally friendly senator can be peeled off, as Charles Percy reportedly was during Mr. Lenkowsky's ordeal.

A nominee can't do that much to push his cause during a hearing, but one thing he can and must do is to display his political allies as prominently as possible. "When it was just me and [W. Scott] Thompson testifying on the first day," Mr. Lenkowsky ruefully recalled, "I didn't have a single friendly senator in the room." (Mr. Thompson is the former USIA official who alleged that Mr. Lenkowsky had lied to the Senate about his role in drawing up a speakers' blacklist. Mr. Lenkowsky strongly denies the charge.) Mr. Adelman says that one fervent champion is better than 10 lukewarm senators; his prospects brightened considerably after Rudy Boschwitz, originally hostile, rallied to his banner.

BUREAUCRACY vs. ENVIRONMENT



POLITICS, PRICES, AND PETROLEUM
The Political Economy of Energy
 By DAVID GLASNER
 Foreword by PAUL W. MacAVOY

What role did price controls and the entitlements program play in the energy crisis of the 1970s? What consequences would follow total decontrol of natural gas? How do oil imports impact inflation, unemployment, and the balance of payments?


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 Foreword by WILLIAM A. NISKANEN

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The lesson of the *AFSCME v. State of Washington* decision was not lost on cost-conscious legislators and governors in other states. The most effective argument to defeat comparable worth bills became, "If you commission a study, you are buying a lawsuit." This threat helped to defeat a bill for a \$400,000 study of wage equity in the Illinois Legislature. Missouri legislators defeated a bill that would have required the state to make a three-year job evaluation and then equalize salaries for "comparable" jobs.

In some states, a comparable worth bill was already on the governor's desk before the lesson of the Washington State case was fully understood. Iowa Governor Terry Branstad used his line-item veto to mitigate the impact of the bill by keeping the authority to handle all complaints in the executive branch; and California Governor George Deukmejian vetoed a \$76 million allocation for comparable worth adjustments to equalize salaries of women and men. Later he vetoed a bill to establish a commission to make a study on pay equity. Those who successfully urged this veto pointed out that, since public salaries have a big impact on private salaries, comparable worth would give California an uncompetitive business climate.

Illinois Nurses Its Wounds

The truth of the perception that "if the legislature commissions a study, it is buying a lawsuit" is indicated by the Illinois experience. First, the Illinois Legislature was sweet-talked into giving an extra \$10,000 to the feminist dominated Commission on the Status of Women for the purpose of a token study on job discrimination among state employees. The study was controlled by comparable worth advocates, carried out under their terms, with personnel of their choosing. Predictably, the study reported that nurses were paid less than men in jobs to which the evaluators had assigned the same number of points.

A few days after the study was completed, the Illinois Nurses Association filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. As soon as the prescribed waiting period expired, the case moved into the courts; the State of Illinois is now defending itself against this action. Dozens of cases are now pending with the EEOC all over the country, ready to move into court when the waiting period expires.

In Congress, a comparable worth bill for Federal employees breezed through the House by a large majority, but was defeated in the Senate in October 1984. The chief argument which derailed the comparable worth express train was the adverse effect it would have on blue-collar workers. Comparable worth sponsor Mary Rose Oaker (D-OH), whose district is blue-collar Cleveland, became very defensive on this point and amended her bill to stipulate that no wages could be reduced in order to achieve comparable worth.

That begs the question, as the Senate realized. Comparable worth rests on the theory that women have been channeled into certain occupations (e.g., clerical and nursing), and then paid less than men in jobs which allegedly have comparable worth. The men's jobs with which the women's jobs are compared are always blue-collar jobs, e.g., trucking, firefighting, police work, carpentry, and building maintenance.

Comparable Statistics Prove Pay Equity

If "equity" requires an equalizing of wages for, say, stenographers and truck drivers, and the company product must be sold for \$X, or the Federal or state budget must be held at \$X to avoid raising taxes, then inevitably the truck driver will have to forgo his raise so that the stenographer can be given comparable pay. The Office of Personnel Management pointed out that this would be the result if comparable worth legislation forced the integration of white-collar and blue-collar pay scales. Faced with the uncertainties



UPI/Bettmann Archive

Comparable Worthniks want to lower her pay.

SALE OF THE CENTURY

Britain's Privatization Bonanza

MADSEN PIRIE

In 1979, Britain had the largest public sector of any advanced country in the world. By 1995, predicts Norman Tebbit, Minister for Trade and Industry, it will have the smallest.

It was possible, in the Britain of 1979, to go through one's life scarcely encountering the private sector of the economy at all. Much of the industry and most of the utilities and services were dominated by the state's near monopoly of supply. Routine requirements such as public transport, health, electricity and gas supplies, mail delivery, and telephones were all effective national monopolies. State industries ranged from aircraft manufacture and shipbuilding to automobile assembly and North Sea oil; the state also ran a curious range of activities from hotels to English Channel ferryboat services.

The scale of the Thatcher achievement is such that in every single one of those areas, and in many more besides, the state has been pushed back. In all of them there are now private alternatives. Some have been converted into private companies, others opened up to competition. And the pace of change is accelerating.

No nation has retreated so dramatically from government control of the economy since William Pitt began to unravel the cumbersome trappings of the 18th century British state. Under the influence of Adam Smith, among others, successive British governments led a 50-year retreat from state control, culminating in the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1845. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is leading a comparable retreat today.

Mrs. Thatcher's election manifesto of 1979 was not about privatization. Instead, she stressed holding down spending, cutting wasteful and unnecessary programs, and reducing the burden of government. A few months in office showed her that this would not be easy, and that transferring government programs into the private sector was a reasonable alternative.

There has been no single strategy for achieving this. Companies such as Amersham (a radionics company), Cable and Wireless (a telecommunications equipment firm), and British Aerospace were sold off one at a time. Some of the more difficult state enterprises, which had become heavily overmanned and lossmaking, like British

Airways, were placed under a management regime designed to prepare them for privatization at a later date. Others, such as the National Freight Corporation, were sold to their employees. Some were sold privately to interested buyers, some openly on the stock exchange. Some, like Hoverspeed, were even given away. As the government gathered experience, the list grew until the sales were a regular weekly story, and it became apparent that every state operation was a candidate for sale.

Private Blessings

Privatization has not been limited to industry. By enacting into law a "right-to-buy," the government gave tenants the opportunity to buy their publicly-owned housing. To counter the attraction of subsidized rents, purchasers were offered huge discounts, ranging from a third to a half off the market value. 600,000 applications were being processed by the 1983 election, fully 10 percent of the total, and many more applications are still being processed. An added bonus for the government was the propensity of the new owners to express their status by changing their voting habits. As recipients of rent subsidy they had overwhelmingly voted for the Labor Party; as home-owners they found the Conservative Party philosophy more to their taste.

A similar mix of caution and imagination heralded the spread of private medicine as an alternative to the National Health Service. By allowing certain classes of medical insurance premiums to be tax-deductible, the government made private medicine cheaper. The result has been that more and more people have chosen to go private, among them almost 700,000 labor unionists. Some of the pressure has been taken off the NHS, and the government has the option of extending the incentives whenever it chooses. The same technique was used to foster alternative pension plans. Through generous tax concessions, the government encouraged people to opt out of the state earnings-related pension system. Over half the work force has done so.

MADSEN PIRIE is President of the Adam Smith Institute in London.


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50,000 Americans gave their lives in Vietnam, but without helicopters the casualty figures would have been much higher.

Yet helicopters are not perfect for every mission. Just ask Jimmy Carter. His already bleak chances for reelection crashed and burned in the Iranian desert on April 24, 1980. The idea was to fly 8 CH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters off the aircraft carrier *Nimitz*; land them, undetected, in the middle of Iran at a staging area called "Desert

One"; refuel them from waiting U.S. transport aircraft sent in from Egypt; then fly into Teheran and rescue the American diplomats held hostage by the fanatical followers of Ayatollah Khomeini. It didn't work. One CH-53 developed problems and had to return to the *Nimitz*. Another went down in the desert. Of the six helicopters that reached Desert One, one was grounded by hydraulic problems, and another collided with a transport plane and burned. Eight Americans died. The mission was aborted.

The CH-53 is America's most powerful helicopter. It can lift 16 tons at sea level, refuel in midair, and carry 35 combat-loaded troops and a crew of three. But it's still a helicopter, subject to the same limitations that separate rotorcraft from winged aircraft: slower speed (a maximum of 200 miles per hour), shorter range, and increased maintenance requirements. For the Iran mission, the CH-53s would have had to fly more than seven times their normal range, placing an enormous stress on both man and machine. The fact that the mission failed is no discredit to the CH-53 or helicopters in general. The machines are not designed for such applications. Military planners involved should have known better. They didn't.

Ready for Action

One of the best ways to test American weapons under battlefield conditions is to give them to Israel. Helicopters are no exception. During the 1982 Lebanon conflict, Israeli defense forces flew light American attack helicop-

ters against Soviet tanks piloted by Syria and the PLO. Using the Defender, a Hughes civilian model modestly modified and equipped with the TOW (tube-launched, optically-sighted, wire-guided) anti-tank missile, Israel littered the Beirut-Damascus highway with the burned-out hulks of Soviet T-62 tanks. Observers report that the PLO's T-34 Soviet-made tanks were actually lifted into the air after

being nailed with TOW.

American military helicopters again proved their worth during the October 1983 liberation of Grenada. Some 107 helicopters participated in the mission. Under heavy fire from Cuban "construction workers," only four helicopters were lost. Grenada provided the first combat test for the Army's new Blackhawk helicopter, the successor to the Bell UH-1 series models that flew in Vietnam. Based on the Grenada experience, the Blackhawk would have reduced Huey losses by 85 percent.

Helicopters also perform a variety of vital missions at sea: search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface ship targeting, and minesweeping. The Navy has put helicopters on frigates, cruisers, destroyers, and battleships in addition to aircraft carriers and amphibious ships. Ship-based helicopters, equipped with a variety of sensing devices, can fly up to 100 miles off ship, remain on station, and return. While on station, it can also dump a weapon, usually a torpedo, on the enemy ship. Data relayed from the helicopter enables Navy vessels to accurately target enemy craft out of shipboard sensor range and stay out of the range of hostile ships as well.

Heli-Copying


As to the Soviets' helicopter technology, they make theirs the old fashioned way: they steal it.

In 1969, the U.S. Army cancelled its Cheyenne anti-tank helicopter program. The Cheyenne flew over 250 miles per hour and had a host of other advances including terrain-following radar, day and night sensors, all-

reliable AIM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missile. Previously the exclusive purview of jet fighter aircraft, the Sidewinder can knock out a HIND, an MiG Soviet jet fighter, or anything else that flies in the way. In 1981, for example, a pair of Sidewinders launched from U.S. Navy F-14 fighters made short work of two of Libya's MiGs.


The Best is Yet to Come

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army, with over 7,000 helicopters in current inventory, has begun accepting delivery of what it hopes will be as many as 1,200 Hughes AH-64 Apache "tank-buster" gunships, part of a \$7.3 billion program. The Apache's two-man crew can unleash a variety of surprises including a 30 millimeter chain-gun, 2.75 inch rockets, TOW and Hellfire anti-tank missiles, and a new lightweight air-to-air missile still in development. Apache also incorporates two new, high-tech systems; Target Acquisition and Designation System and the Pilot's Night Vision System (TADS/PNVS). With TADS, the gunner uses any of three viewing channels—optical, television, or forward-looking infrared (FLIR), to search for, detect, and identify potential targets. PNVS provides the pilot with thermal images which aid him to fly at night at very low altitudes. The system would be particularly important in a European conflict, where anti-tank helicopters would have to fly fast and low, dipping over, below, and alongside vegetation and other cover to avoid detection. The Army calls this "Nap-of-the-Earth" flying. The technique demands enormous pilot concentration during the day, and without a system such as PNVS, it would be



suicidal at night or during poor weather.

All this may seem rather advanced, but pales in comparison with what the military has in mind for future rotorcraft. One concept will be deployed by the early 1990s. It's called JVX and it has the "rotorheads" inside the Pentagon salivating. A prototype, the XV-15, has been flying for over a decade. JVX lands and takes off like a helicopter, but flies like an airplane. Two large turbine engines, one mounted on the end of each wing, swivel to provide hover and vertical lift capabilities and lock down like airplane engines to provide speed and range unheard of in an ordinary helicopter. The model currently on the boards will carry up to 24 troops and a crew of two, and carry advanced weapons similar to those mounted on anti-tank helicopters. Range will be quadrupled over present medium-lift helicopters. Speed will also jump to more than 340 miles per hour.

As future helicopters go increasingly high-tech, they will adopt many characteristics of today's advanced jet fighter planes. Technology will enable the next generation of rotorcraft to perform more missions under more conditions with greater speed than ever before. The helicopter will continue in its role as the American military's most versatile machine. 

in the democratic world. The fear and hysteria generated by open discussion of nuclear war is shrewdly exploited by the Soviets, who emphasize and reemphasize the same themes: that nuclear war would lead to the extinction of life on this planet, that the Soviet Union abhors the very thought of nuclear conflict, but, conversely, that actions which pose a threat to Soviet interests also threaten world peace. The rich dividends reaped by this kind of psychological blackmail can be seen in the reactions of world leaders to President Reagan's pointed attacks on the Soviet system, specifically in the notion that moral considerations must be set aside when dealing with the Soviet Union because of the absolute necessity of maintaining good relations with the Kremlin. The result of this kind of accommodation is, of course, quite dangerous because it encourages the Soviets to believe that they can commit any act of aggression short of nuclear war without provoking the direct opposition of the West. In similar fashion, the Soviets have won acceptance both of the Brezhnev doctrine and a double standard in the treatment of guerrilla movements: they call for political accommodation with "liberation" forces which threaten non-Communist countries and oppose indigenous forces which threaten Marxist regimes.

For Mr. Pipes, nothing could be further from the truth than the charge, much stressed in Soviet propaganda, that anti-Sovietism exists only because of pressures exerted by private interests in the capitalist world. The list of those who can be depended on to endorse, at least implicitly, Soviet criticism of American foreign policy includes businessmen who have been denied trade opportunities for security reasons, opposition politicians who take malicious glee in our foreign policy setbacks, and those who believe that defense spending deprives the poor of social programs. According to Mr. Pipes, it is "difficult to think of a group in the West which has a vested interest in bad relations with the Soviet Union." Ideological conviction, not self-interest, is the driving force behind our ability to deter Soviet expansion and stem the spread of Communism.

Bolshevik Blues

This conclusion would ordinarily lead one to suspect that Mr. Pipes views the future with deep pessimism. This is not the case. Despite the many advantages it enjoys in its struggle with the democratic world, the Soviet Union is itself beset by a daunting array of political and economic problems with which its rigidly centralized system is ill equipped to cope. Mr. Pipes avoids the mistake of predicting the USSR economy's imminent collapse; he believes that the country can muddle through without significant change. The Kremlin, however, cannot forever maintain itself as an imperial power burdened as it is with an economy which provides a standard of living for the Soviet people roughly comparable with many Third World countries. Reform is essential, but unlikely, since the process of economic change would inevitably pose a threat to the *nomenklatura*, the party elites who rule the country. Thus various experiments designed to provide incentives for workers and managers and inject a measure of economic decentralization have been repeatedly

sabotaged by a bureaucracy protective of its power and privileges.


A further drain on the economy is the increasingly high cost of maintaining an empire. Instead of being enriched at the expense of its colonies, the Soviet Union is emburdened by a transfer of resources to the subject nations. The USSR's weak economy has also inhibited the Kremlin in its effort to gain influence in the Third World; indeed, Mr. Pipes asserts that the Soviets have had to concede defeat in their attempt to establish a global empire.

Survival Strategy

Mr. Pipes' prescriptions for American policy flow directly from his analysis of Soviet society and his reading of the strengths and weaknesses of the democracies. In the Third World, the United States should borrow a note from Soviet practice and employ proxy forces to check Soviet expansionist efforts. He counsels against the direct use of American troops in the belief that a protracted war would only reignite the latent isolationism of the American people.

He recommends that we exploit our economic preeminence wherever possible. This means, above all else, refusing to sell the Soviets the technologies which enhance their military capability. A policy of economic denial, he says, makes economic as well as strategic sense, since improvements in Soviet military capability made possible by our technology will ultimately compel us to spend more on defense. Technology transfer has an additional, insidious, effect: it enables the Soviets to postpone the implementation of economic reform, a development which will necessitate a transfer of resources from the military to the civilian sector. Finally, Mr. Pipes favors the use of economic sanctions as a means of punishing Soviet aggression. Here he dismisses the argument that the measures imposed by President Carter did not bring about Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, observing that our demonstrated willingness to impose sanctions may well have been a crucial factor in the Soviet decision not to invade Poland.

Mr. Pipes also cautions against the perception of arms control as a principal instrument of peace. Arms accords, he observes, do not pave the way for broader political settlements. Rather the political agreements must come before arms control. Peace, in the fullest sense, will be achieved only when the Soviets exhibit a willingness to conform to internationally accepted norms of behavior; until that time, arms agreements will produce only modest consequences.

Survival Is Not Enough is one of the most clearly written books on U.S.-Soviet affairs in some time. Mr. Pipes reveals himself as a man with a profound attachment to the democratic West, to its political and economic institutions, and to its democratic values. He is, nonetheless, a demanding critic of those in the West, principally among our European allies, who believe that the achievements of democratic civilization can be maintained without sacrifice. The democratic world will prevail, he believes, if we neither cower before the bear, nor feed it. 

The collapse of education was almost as destructive. Before the mid-1960s, inner-city public schools were relatively well disciplined. Since then, most of them have become zoos, where teachers who try to establish classroom order are physically threatened, absenteeism is rampant, and virtually no one does any homework. It is hardly surprising that test scores have plummeted, and that even those who finish high school—in New York City, 78 percent of black teenagers drop out—are poor readers, writers, and reckoners. They are ill equipped for any but the most menial jobs.

The third and probably most important change was what Mr. Murray calls “the withdrawal of status reinforcements for upward mobility.” As late as a generation ago, there was enormous pride and self-respect among America’s working poor. Life may have been tough, and they may have had to scrounge to make ends meet, but holding a job, no matter how lowly, and supporting a family through one’s own efforts, conferred high status on poor people in their own communities. As a result, poor people were rewarded socially in the short term for all those goody-goody virtues—hard work, honesty, study—that pay off economically only over the long term, perhaps only in their children’s or grandchildren’s generation.

This changed radically in the 1960s. Suddenly welfare lost its stigma, and the working poor were socially disenfranchised. In many poor communities, studying hard or taking a minimum-wage job made you a laughingstock, not a hero. Mr. Murray cites the horrifying story of a Newark high school that presents its Honor Society awards at an evening event with only the honorees attending: they would be jeered off the stage if the ceremony were held in regular school assembly. The message was reinforced by the fashionable drumbeat of media pundits, left-wing community activists, and social workers. If “the system” of capitalism and racism was to blame for poverty, then it was pointless to improve your lot through your own efforts. Meanwhile, almost every new government program was for people who failed. There was no attention or help for those who were succeeding with difficulty. Clearly failure was more attractive.

Conservative Failures

Conservatives can take little comfort from Mr. Murray’s indictment of social policy. The policies and values he blames for thwarting upward mobility are mostly liberal and radical. But conservatives have not improved conditions for the poor when they have been in power.

On the contrary, progress against poverty stopped when Richard Nixon replaced Lyndon Johnson as president. This was not entirely Mr. Nixon’s fault: he faced a radicalized Democratic majority in Congress. But Mr. Nixon happily presided over the expansion of a welfare state whose suppositions he did not question. Blacks unfairly saw Mr. Nixon as a racist trying to keep them down. He wasn’t trying, but he did succeed. It is hardly surprising that blacks, already embittered by Barry Goldwater’s opposition to civil rights laws, have ever since been hostile to the Republican party.

As for Ronald Reagan, it is hardly a credit to his social policy that during his first term, the number of people living in poverty rose more slowly than under Jimmy Carter. The president’s great political achievement is that he has restored a sense of pride and faith in the future among a majority of Americans. But he has failed to do so among many poor people, especially poor blacks. He has cut budgets (modestly), but he has not provided a vision of opportunity for everyone.

What would such a vision consist of? To judge from Mr. Murray’s analysis, it should not include one popular conservative idea: means testing that would limit major benefits such as Social Security or Medicare to people below a certain income level. This has the disastrous and counterproductive effect of making it more attractive to be poor. Instead, if budgets have to be cut, entire programs should be eliminated. It would be preferable to have fewer programs open to all people. This was the philosophy of the New Deal, which did not produce disincentives the way the Great Society did. Middle-class welfare is better than lower-class welfare, because it encourages people to be middle-class.

In education and crime, the vision of an opportunity society is rather straightforward. That crime has fallen over the last three years is the best news for poor people since the 1960s. Dramatically cutting it further should be one of the top two or three priorities of every politician and social leader who wants the war on poverty to get back on track. In education, the Reagan Administration has already made important contributions with its excellence and school discipline initiatives. Schools are slowly beginning to get better and safer, though they have a long way to go. The big challenges are what to do about the enormous number of dropouts, as well as the millions of adult illiterates, many of them recent high school graduates, who cannot participate in a modern economy.

No war on poverty will succeed unless status is restored to poor people with lowly jobs, unless it once again becomes a source of pride for poor people to make short-term sacrifices for long-term gains. Most immigrants today have this spirit, as did earlier generations. But what government can do here is unclear, for status is determined more by community values than by public policy. At the least, there should be frequent public recognition and praise of those who are struggling to make it in the system.

The toughest question is what to do about welfare itself, or, more precisely, how to provide decent help to the truly needy without encouraging others to put themselves in a position where they, too, are truly needy. Clearly many people on welfare genuinely cannot support themselves and their children. These people need help, temporary or permanent, with the basic necessities of life, and it would be cruel and draconian to cut them off. It is equally clear that many on welfare would have made different choices about their lives if welfare had been less attractive, and that we have done them no service by encouraging them to trap themselves in dependency. As a “thought experiment,” but only as that, Mr. Murray suggests that we do away with all Federal social spending for working-age people, except for unemploy-

but for the rest of the free world. In fact, the audience is never given any reason to believe these young Americans know what such principles mean, or even that they exist.

Their motives are far more basic, as is revealed in the movie's pivotal scene. One of the band, the son of Calumet's mayor, who is a collaborator, turns traitor and leads enemy commandoes to the Wolverines' hiding place. The group survives, the traitor is uncovered. It turns out that he had betrayed his comrades in order to save his father. Jed, the leader of the group, decides the traitor must be executed.

The others are shocked. If the Wolverines kill their former friend, one boy pleads, "What's the difference between them [the Communists] and us?"

"We live here!" Jed screams back. The boy is executed, and once it is done, the group is reunited and they fight on.

"We live here!" Their reasons for fighting never get more articulate than that. Though that response may be primitive, it cannot be easily dismissed. With brutal moral clarity it banishes a thousand excuses for cowardice.

The simplicity of the Wolverines' claim may be one of the prime reasons for *Red Dawn's* popularity. The younger siblings of the Vietnam generation, among whom the movie was particularly popular—and who are among Ronald Reagan's biggest fans—learned very well that when patriotism gets complicated it can be made treacherous. One minute you're explaining the ideals that make America superior to the Soviet Union, the next thing you know some wise guy is using those ideals to explain that the most patriotic course is to burn your draft card, and the really brave ones were those who had the courage to flee to Canada. After a decade and a half of such trickery, the heartfelt simplicity of "We live here!" holds tremendous appeal.

American Nightmare

That same instinct for the simple essence of a conflict is the key to *I, Martha Adams* as well, in which the only American who is "man enough" (the heroine's phrase) to stand up to the Communist aggressors is a woman. Both plot and motivations are more political in *I, Martha Adams* than in *Red Dawn*. In many ways, it is a conservative's dream novel. Here the United Nations really *is* a nest of spies—the new Soviet America is run from the U.N. Communist revolutionaries in Central America really *are* Soviet plants. The nuclear freeze really *does* lead the world into slavery. And the book is a virtual love letter to President Reagan. In one scene, for example, the Israeli intelligence agent who helps Martha find *Magnanimity* explains how the weapon got its name:

It was the choice of your [late] President. . . . He talked of the terrible power of the weapon. It could be used to blackmail the whole world, by a dictator. And he decided to call the project Magnanimity, because the US would build the power, but never use it. It would be held for no other purpose than to let freedom live.

As in *Red Dawn*, the reader is treated to a detailed depiction of the mechanics of a Communist takeover.

Telephone systems are torn out and reinstalled; the Soviets take particular care to secure the Rockies, with their potential as a guerrilla base (rumors circulate that Afghanistan was merely practice for the Rockies); concentration camps are set up in Central Park. The conquered Americans in this novel suffer from a paralyzing inability to face the reality of Communist intentions. Even as internal passports are issued and food supplies are severely restricted; even as people are torn from their homes and "relocated"; even as thousands are jailed, tortured, or summarily executed, the vast majority of Americans cling to the absurd hope that maybe things won't get any worse. Self-delusion and sophistry lead many of Martha's acquaintances to make a smooth transition from loyal American to Communist collaborator. Army recruits blindly follow orders to round up teenagers and to evict people from their homes. Even the last surviving loyal American military men are willing to compromise, to accept something less than the total withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Simple Strength

Only Martha Adams, a not particularly gifted, not particularly brave wife and mother from Connecticut, is unwilling to compromise. Unlike the Wolverines, her stubbornness is grounded in an articulate principle, but one of the keys to her strength is that her principle is simple enough to ward off both Soviet threats *and* Soviet promises: anything short of victory and the restoration of democracy is slavery, even if that slavery is temporarily sugarcoated or "not as bad as it could be." As Ronald Reagan's critics would say, she has a simplistic world view. And she wins.

Still, the question remains, why were these themes so popular this summer? I think it was not coincidental that this was the first summer since the American invasion of Grenada. Our post-Vietnam moral logjam was bound to end sometime soon. But Grenada seemed to really blow things open, partly because Ronald Reagan, the Great Simplifier, has that same ability to keep the unavoidable moral essence of a situation in view that empowers the heroes of *Red Dawn* and *I, Martha Adams*.

Seize the Moment

When the President decided to invade Grenada, the prevaricators and sophists in the press and Congress sang their usual song: the invasion was a mistake; we should have talked to them first; we should have imposed economic sanctions; or, in the words of our first female vice-presidential candidate, guided them towards pluralism. But it was already too late for that. By moving from repression to outright terror, by implicitly threatening to use the American medical students as pawns with which to manipulate the United States, the Grenadian bosses crossed the line between acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Reagan recognized the moment, and did not deliberate further. He acted. Most Americans, and young Americans particularly, could see that line just as clearly. They not only supported President Reagan's decision, they cheered him. He had made things simple—and right—and that always feels good. ■

observers, and pundits who make it sound as if "we are living in a desperate moment." Conservatives speak of declining moral values; liberals of a worsening quality of life. And, Wattenberg laments, "Almost everyone seems to agree that for a dozen or so years the economy was in shambles."

This conventional wisdom, he says, is "wrong, and more than that, dangerous." Instead, Wattenberg contends that "we live in a nation that in most respects—excuse the expression—never had it so good."

The Good News is the Bad News is Wrong generally bears out that conclusion. Indeed, the facts clearly show that, overall, Americans have been getting better off in nearly all aspects of their lives.

For example, most measures of health are improving. Not only has life expectancy at birth jumped 11 years over the last four decades because of falling infant and child death rates, but adult life expectancy has increased more than six years during the same period. In fact, the latter grew faster during the 1970s than at any other time in American history.

**"Doomsday could arrive," but only
"if we invite our own destruction by
restricting the ability of the market-
place to function."**

The rate of cancer, perhaps man's most feared disease, is falling. There is a popular perception of a "cancer epidemic," but that, Wattenberg says, is actually due to an "epidemic of life." Quite simply, people are living longer—the incidence of cancer increases with age—and more people are surviving after treatment.

New and highly effective drugs, with few side effects, are being developed to combat a host of ailments. The environment is becoming both safer and cleaner. Americans are also better off economically: real per capita income has jumped 28 percent since 1972, and the rate of poverty has dropped nearly in half over the last two decades.

Social Improvement

Dramatic social progress continues to be made. Women compose an increasingly large share of the labor force, and blacks are also making major gains: more blacks than ever live in the suburbs, attend college, enter managerial and professional jobs, earn high incomes, and attain political office. Moreover, median school years completed by all Americans is higher; home ownership is up, even among the young. Overall crime rates are down.

In these and other areas Wattenberg has performed a powerful service by quantifying trends that many people until now have only vaguely sensed. Life is improving, and improving dramatically, for most of us.

The Bad News

However, at times Wattenberg fails to show that his good news is really good. For example, he occasionally makes implicit moral judgments even as he disclaims any intent to make moral judgments. "Leaving aside, for the moment, the morality of abortions," he says, "a woman who has the ability to terminate a pregnancy has more 'independence' than one who does not." True enough, but whether this sort of independence proves or disproves the thesis of the book depends on the moral appropriateness of aborting 1.55 million potential human beings in 1980. Later, Wattenberg discerns "a healthy and moral society" by virtue of Americans' support for increased military spending and intervention abroad. Yet nowhere does he show that it is good news for Americans to spend \$129 billion to subsidize Europe's defense, or \$39 billion to protect the Japanese and South Koreans. Doing so may reflect a generous spirit on America's part, but it does not necessarily represent good judgment or common sense.

The Good News

At other times, Wattenberg fails to show that the bad news is really bad. Take voter participation, for example, which Wattenberg finds has actually increased in congressional elections and is not as low in presidential contests as commonly thought. Since both parties were conducting major registration drives in 1984, Wattenberg concludes that "If there ever was a problem, it's probably over."

But was there ever a problem? Perhaps the real bad news is that more people, not better informed people, now are going to the polls. In that case, Wattenberg's optimistic body count at the voting booth should make us less, not more, pleased.

Why are most of us only vaguely aware of all the good news that Wattenberg sends our way? He ascribes it to the "bad news bias" of the media. The problem, he thinks, is not so much that reporters "don't get their stories right"; it is that "they too often miss the right stories." The media, Wattenberg contends, focus on negative events instead of positive processes. (Wattenberg is himself a syndicated columnist.) Thus, viewers see an urban riot, not millions of young blacks going to college. And so on.

In recent years Americans have been inundated with frightening forecasts of doom merchants and professional pessimists alike. Smithson and Maurice ably show that projections of natural holocausts, whether involving oil, timber, or water, are a dime a dozen, and never come true as long as people are allowed to adjust and innovate in a free marketplace. Wattenberg expertly disperses the depressing fog that has settled over the American political debate, that this country faces, if not doomsday, a slow and inevitable decline.

Our future is not guaranteed, of course, and none of the authors are pollyannas. But there are few clearer tributes to the practical, if not moral, virtues of a free society, than the long-term progress consistently achieved and the predicted crises constantly avoided. The message bears repeating. ■

Department of Disinformation

Yellow Herring

On October 30, 1984, PBS's "Nova" series explored "The Mystery of Yellow Rain," the deadly showers that have afflicted the Hmong tribespeople of Laos, causing excruciating pain on contact—violent itching, vomiting, and hemorrhaging—followed by rapid death. The poison in these showers, which are usually yellow, but sometimes red or orange, has been identified as a trichothecene mycotoxin derived from fusaria molds. The fact that this toxin did not appear to occur naturally in Southeast Asia gave credence to Reagan Administration charges that the Soviet Union and its Laotian ally was using yellow rain as a weapon, in violation of the 1972 Convention banning biological and toxin weapons.

"Nova" concluded, however, "that toxin producing strains of fusarium may occur naturally in the (Indochinese) environment." It cited the hypothesis of Harvard biochemist Matthew Meselson that yellow rain was no more than bee feces (which, after all, is yellow). As if this proved his point, Mr. Meselson held a press conference to announce that bees showered him with yellow droppings when he was recently in Thailand near the Laotian border.

But this fable of the bees is merely a diversionary tactic, to distract public attention from the horrifying consequences of the Administration's charges about Soviet treaty violations. Mr. Meselson did not spit up blood or experience any agony after the bees befouled him. Neither he nor any other scientist has presented any evidence that bee feces in Southeast Asia is contaminated with trichothecenes. On the

contrary, Huguette Cohen, a research scientist with Canada's Department of Agriculture, has conducted experiments that have failed to produce trichothecenes from Southeast Asian fusaria added to bee-pollen.

The Administration's charges are substantiated by a report citing hundreds of interviews with Hmong refugees and the doctors treating them. These interviews show clearly that yellow rain attacks occurred during flights by planes, often crop dusters. Until anyone can produce evidence that trichothecenes occur naturally in the region, the only "mystery" about yellow rain is how Matthew Meselson can be taken seriously.

Rich Fisher

Hissteria at The Nation

The sixty-five pages (of typewritten copies of State Department documents) which surfaced in 1948 . . . were the only corroboratory evidence ever produced for Chambers's story that he and Hiss had spied together for the Soviet Union during the 1930s. And Chambers was the government's only witness against Hiss in his trial for perjury . . . The courts have consistently accepted the government's argument that forgery by typewriter is a fantasy, and Hiss . . . has never been able to get a hearing on this issue.

—William Reuben

The Nation

November 10, 1984

The Nation has crusaded on Hiss's behalf for three decades now, but it seems to have forgotten everything and learned nothing. A few corrections are in order.

At Alger Hiss's second trial in

1949, Hede Massing, a former underground member of the Communist Party in the 1930s, corroborated Whittaker Chambers's accusation that Hiss had been a member of the Communist Party. Two others, a Russian code clerk and a defector from the American Communist Party, had also earlier named Hiss to the FBI as an active underground Communist during the 1930s. Finally, an American couple, Noel and Herta Field, separately told Czech and Hungarian security officers in 1949 that Hiss had acted as a Soviet agent in the State Department in the 1930s.

The allegation of forgery by typewriter is equally spurious. In the last 35 years, eight different courts have found the forgery theory to be without foundation, the last time in 1983 when the Supreme Court denied Hiss's final appeal. For his first appeal in 1952, Hiss hired a team of experts to build a typewriter to match the one used to type the incriminating documents. After a year of effort, they still failed to produce an exact match. Certainly Chambers, never accused of mechanical genius, did not do what the experts could not. Nor does the forgery by typewriter theory account for the handwritten notes and rolls of microfilm which Chambers also handed over. Even Hiss's lawyers dismissed the forgery theory—they were surprised when he brought it up at his sentencing, as the authenticity of the documents had never before been questioned.

Reuben's subsequent accusation of FBI forgery is also ridiculous. His only basis for the claim is that the FBI had the technical knowledge to produce such a forgery: they *could* have done it, so therefore they did. But in the 40,000 pages of FBI files relating to the Hiss case, there is no evidence of FBI involvement with Chambers prior to Hiss's indictment, though the documents could

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