

policy REVIEW

Summer 1985

Number 33

Four Dollars

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A free market is our best protection

It's hardly a secret by now that the oil industry is undergoing a period of dramatic change. Worldwide, crude oil availability exceeds demand, and there's far more than enough refinery capacity to turn crude oil into petroleum products. Competition in all phases of the business is fierce, and profit margins are razor-thin.

Against this background, a protectionist chorus is sounding its siren song. Tariffs or some other trade barriers are needed, the protectionists say, to protect U.S. refiners and marketers of petroleum products. To which we say: Protectionist measures are a "cure" that's worse than the disease.

The big problem with protectionism is that it makes no economic sense, for these reasons:

- The consumer ends up paying for the tariff and for the misallocation of capital and labor that always follows the erection of trade barriers.

- Encouraging, through protectionism, the construction or continued operation of inefficient or unnecessary facilities inevitably makes the nation less competitive in world markets.

- Protectionist measures in any one nation always encourage retaliatory actions in other nations. If America closes a door to foreign products, American exporters will find foreign doors closed to them.

It is particularly ironic that some in the oil industry are looking to government to solve their problems. If a decade of federal controls of various types hadn't preempted the free market, the current industry rationalization would almost certainly have occurred less traumatically over the years.

In the 1960s and '70s, substantial refinery capacity was constructed in expectation of ever-rising demand. In the mid-'70s price controls in the U.S. (that didn't end until 1981) kept consumer prices artificially low, and further stimulated demand. When demand dropped sharply in the 1980s after the price of crude oil had soared, the

industry was left with massive overcapacity.

Are the memories of the public and some segments of the oil industry so short as to invite a new round of government intervention? Surely, they must remember all the arguments that were mustered in the 1960s and '70s against the policy of overriding the free market by government edict. The industry then was pointing out that inefficient refiners were being subsidized first by so-called import rights and later by the entitlements program—so much so that some operators went into the refining business for the purpose of receiving these subsidies. Precisely this misallocation of capital is exacerbating today's problems.

But painful or not, the industry is adjusting to the new market realities. Since 1980, U.S. refinery capacity has been reduced by about 17 percent (19 percent in Europe) even as billions of dollars have been and are being invested to upgrade most of the remaining capacity to yield the products now in demand.

Despite the refinery closings, the U.S. still has ample capacity—about 16 million barrels a day, which is more than total product demand, including imports. Even in the event of an international supply disruption, America has the capacity to refine all its domestic production plus the drawdown from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and still have as much as 3 million barrels a day of capacity in reserve.

Given the reality of an industry making the transition to a changed marketplace—and the fact that product imports pose no real threat to national security in the event of a supply disruption—the arguments of those who favor protectionism hardly seem to make sense.

Trade barriers aren't needed by the petroleum industry. They're bad economics. They drive up the prices paid by the American consumer. And, in the long run, they only worsen the problems they're supposed to solve.

Mobil®

policy REVIEW

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LETTERS

Morton Kaplan, Robert Selle, Hal McKenzie, Cliff Kincaid, Donald Craib, Steve Baldwin, Michael Johns, Jeffrey Sadow, Sir Philip Goodhart, and others.

Defending Moon

Dear Sir:

It was good to read Dinesh D'Souza's candid and objective article on the Reverend Sun Myung Moon ("Moon's Planet," Spring 1985), but certain points need clarification. As we all understand, religious writings are often allegorical. Thus, the suggestion that Reverend Moon advocates a final world war for which the free nations must prepare is misleading.

The *Divine Principle*, which is the basic text of the Unification Church, says, "God does not desire judgment or destruction but salvation." Although I do not accept Reverend Moon's theology, it is his consistent support of the peaceful resolution of disputes and his openness to persuasive dialogue with representatives from Communist countries that permits me to accept the position of international president of the Professors World Peace Academy, which is funded by an organization associated with Reverend Moon. If I thought for a moment that he was looking forward to Armageddon, this would not be possible.

If Mr. D'Souza had had time to speak to as many "Moonies" as I have, he would discover many extremely intelligent, independent

thinkers who disagree on politics, economics, the proper conditions of communal life, and even theology.

Morton A. Kaplan
Professors World Peace Academy
Chicago, IL

Dear Sir:

The article "Moon's Planet" by Dinesh D'Souza is rife with inaccuracies and misrepresentations. The piece, which tried to deal with the politics and theology of the Unification Church, was also an example of exceptionally bad reporting.

Mr. D'Souza's description of the church's theology—with which I, as a 12-year member of the movement, have some familiarity—distorted it sadly. His portrayal was often as simplistic and insensitive as if one were to characterize the doctrine of the Trinity as "3-in-1 motor oil" (which Eldridge Cleaver once did) and leave it at that. His description shocked and hurt any reader who happened to be a Unificationist, just as surely as cavalier treatment of the Trinity hurts a traditional Christian.

For example, Mr. D'Souza writes that "In Mr. Moon's theology, the fall was the result of the angel Lucifer copulating with Eve." If he had bothered to discuss the matter with some church members, he would

have discovered that it was not copulation but the corruption of man's emotional/spiritual ability to love that brought about the fall.

Throughout the article, while attempting to achieve an objective reportorial style, Mr. D'Souza only succeeds in rehashing two decades of foul anti-Moon calumny in America, "balancing" it with reportage that cannot possibly offset the dreadfulness of the allegations. This is not responsible reporting.

For example, the author raises the "brainwashing" issue, as so many others have before him. He also refers to the charge that Reverend Moon has coitus with Unification women to "purify" them of sin. This is known as trial by innuendo, because the charges are so outrageous that one can only sputter ineffectually that freedom of mind and sexual morality are the very foundation of the Unification Church.

The author also attempts to impugn the conservative credentials of the Unification Church on the subjects of individual liberty and patriotism, saying that Reverend Moon advocates socialism and one-worldism. The socialism of the Unification Church, however, is simply that espoused by Jesus, namely, to love one's neighbor as oneself. The policy implications of this "social-

ism” are, of course, fascinating, but to treat them properly would require a volume. Suffice it to say that in Unificationism, the individual and his liberties are sacred because each person is made in the image of God.

Likewise, Mr. D’Souza’s view of the Unificationist stance on patriotism is flawed because he fails to properly stress that church members are urged to love their nations more than either themselves or their families. The “world unity” envisioned by Reverend Moon incorporates the peace-loving, amity-seeking aspects of patriotism, rejecting the pugnacity and arrogance often associated with it.

Robert Selle
Religion Editor
New York City Tribune
New York, NY

Dear Sir:

As a member of the Unification Church, I welcome Dinesh D’Souza’s well-informed and insightful essay. Furthermore, I appreciate his thoughtful effort to articulate features of Unification thought and practice which, despite a number of warrants for solidarity (e.g., anti-Communism), tend to unsettle some conservatives. But I don’t always agree with Mr. D’Souza’s conclusions.

For example, he characterizes Unification theology as Manichean. This is as incorrect as it is oft-repeated. Unification anti-Communism is not based on any vision which pits absolute good against absolute evil in an all-out confrontation. According to my own studies, it involves the judgment that Marxism-Leninism is a most formidable ideological and military threat to human liberty, justice, and peace. To adapt a phrase from Marx, Unificationism seeks not only to understand the imperial world of Communism, but to change that world—not by force, but through an effort to recover and rejuvenate the moral and religious foundations of society.

In reference to Mr. D’Souza’s remarks about Unificationism’s economic ethics, particularly its so-called socialism, a final comment is in order. While Unification social

teachings do suggest an affinity with *Acts 2:44-45* (“And all who believed were together and had all things in common; and they sold their possessions and goods and distributed them to all, as any had need.”), Unificationists are certainly not

cation Church pays “little or no attention to the afterlife.” The *Divine Principle* offers a very detailed, systematic, and comprehensive concept of the afterlife. In that regard we are rather more spiritual than many mainline Christian groups.

Unificationism seeks not only to understand the imperial world of Communism, but to change it—not by force, but through an effort to recover and rejuvenate the moral and religious foundations of society.

Thomas Walsh

timid when it comes to commerce. In fact, Unificationists have a kind of early capitalist bravado about business, risk-taking, and “using their talents.” Within the Unification movement itself, the “penalization effect,” whereby the culturally despised nevertheless excel in commerce, has operated. The general theory of commerce seems reminiscent of Wesley’s injunction to “Work all you can. Save all you can. Give all you can.” Whatever socialism there is applies less to the centralization of the forces of production and distribution than to the brotherhood of all humanity under God. Unificationism is no more socialist than the Mormons or any other groups who share a common sense of life’s purpose and meaning. This is not state socialism.

Thomas Walsh
Doctoral Candidate in Ethics
Vanderbilt Divinity School
Nashville, TN

Dear Sir:

Dinesh D’Souza’s piece on the Unification Church, in which I have been active for 16 years, contained a number of inaccuracies. One of the most serious was his charge that Unification theology parallels the social gospel of liberal Protestantism.

It is simply untrue that the Unifi-

The Church’s stress on establishing the kingdom of heaven on earth stems from an entirely different basis than that of the “social gospel.” The Unificationist concept is founded on God’s first commandments to Adam and Eve in Genesis: “Be fruitful and multiply, fill the earth and subdue it.” Unificationists interpret these commandments to mean individual perfection (be fruitful), perfection of the family and society (multiply), and perfection of the environment (subdue the earth).

The social gospel of liberal Protestantism, on the other hand, interprets Jesus’ admonitions to feed the hungry and his apparent empathy with the poor to condemn capitalism and justify socialism. A little reflection would make it obvious that the Unificationist concept of the kingdom can be seen as supporting free enterprise, contrary to Mr. D’Souza’s implication, because fulfilling the three blessings can best be accomplished in a free society where everyone can become a “lord of creation” in his or her own way.

In practice, the Church today is no more and perhaps less “collectivist” than, say, the Mormons or Hasidic Jews, even in the matter of arranged marriages. Reverend Moon himself stresses individual commitment and initiative and doing God’s will, as embodied in his “home church”

providence, where every member is asked to witness to 360 homes as an individual "messiah" to that area.

But what about the *Divine Principle*, which says that ultimately a "socialistic society centered on God" will come about? Here one must distinguish between the ideal of socialism and the reality of socialist systems in the world today based on atheism or Marxism.

I understand the *Divine Principle* to say that if and when people have God in their hearts, the result of their combined, free, economic and social activities resembles the highest ideals of socialism: class distinctions minimized, poverty eliminated, productivity increased, social alienation and crime abolished, and so on. The fact that this ideal has never been realized in any society labeled "socialist" does not mean the ideal is not good or that it can never be realized.

In short, it is more accurate to say that the Unification Church promotes "free enterprise centered on God," not socialism centered on God. The only difference is that free enterprise would be without the obstructive self-centeredness that has cursed the West thus far.

Finally, it is tragic when conservatives adopt the deprogrammers' myth that we employ "coercion" in "getting and keeping members," as Mr. D'Souza writes. The reality is that people join the Church of their own free will and work for a better world of their own free will—or leave if they don't like it, again of their own free will.

On that point, and on many other points too numerous to mention, I think Unificationists and conservatives agree and can find themselves to be natural allies.

Hal McKenzie
Editorial Page Editor
New York City Tribune
New York, NY

Dear Sir:

In his article, "Moon's Planet," Dinesh D'Souza seems to have left out a few details about his own trips to that planet.

He writes, "My only experience with a Moonie before this article

was with Carol Bechtel, editorial page editor of the *New York City Tribune*, another church-owned newspaper. She wanted to publish some of my writing, and invited me to lunch." Thus, he implies that she wined and dined him in an effort to get his articles in the *Tribune*. Readers might conclude that the sophisticated D'Souza didn't succumb to this effort.

In fact, according to Carol Bechtel, articles by Mr. D'Souza appeared in the *Tribune* even before that lunch. She tells me that a total of ten of his articles appeared in the *Tribune* during 1983 and 1984. As I understand it, Mr. D'Souza didn't refuse payment for the articles.

There is nothing unusual in any of this, of course, except for the fact that Mr. D'Souza didn't disclose the information to the readers of *Policy Review*.

Cliff Kincaid
Associate Editor
Human Events
Washington, D.C.

Dinesh D'Souza replies:

"The Third World War will inevitably take place," the *Divine Principle* says. It does not give a date, but specifies that the conflict will involve the forces of Communism and God-centered ideology. "God desires to induce Satan to submit ideologically," says the *Divine Principle*, but since this is unlikely (Reverend Moon is not naive about Soviet acquiescence), "the heavenly side must . . . defeat the satanic side by force" when it is attacked.

Professor Kaplan falls into the common error of confusing what theologies predict with what they advocate. Unification theology has a strong millenarian strain, but because it sees Armageddon approaching does not mean it is "looking forward to it," as Mr. Kaplan writes.

Robert Selle is oddly emphatic about denying what is unequivocally stated in the *Divine Principle*. The sin of Adam and Eve, he claims, was not copulation but the corruption of man's ability to love. Commenting on the aftermath of the fall, the *Divine Principle* says, "We read that [Adam and Eve] covered the lower,

or sexual, parts of their bodies with fig leaves after they sinned . . . Adam and Eve should have covered their hands or mouths if they had taken the fruit with their hands or had eaten it with their mouths. This is an indication that Adam and Eve's transgression involved their sexual parts."

A little later, "Fallen man belongs to Satan's lineage, not God's. This is the result of Eve's committing the sin of fornication with the angel . . . Since eating something means to make it a part of our flesh and blood, Eve's giving Adam the fruit of good and evil and his eating it mean that Eve caused Adam to fall through the same act of illicit love." It should be clear that the *Divine Principle* is not being allegorical here; indeed it is explaining the real meaning of allegorical passages in the Bible.

The reason I cited anti-Moon literature was because it is so pervasive and has had such a powerful impact in making people suspicious of the Unification Church. Some stereotypes about the church are true, others are not—where the charges are unsubstantiated, as in the case of allegations about Moon's sexual exploits, my article clearly said so. So why mention the charge at all? Because somehow it has made its way even into the respectable literature; for example, in David Bromley and Anson Shupe's *Moonies in America*, we read, "The frequent charge of anti-UM spokesmen has been that Moon was repeatedly in trouble for sexual hijinks, specifically for his alleged ritual of pikarume (cleansing of the blood) in which Moon purportedly performed intercourse with each female initiate." These things have to be raised to be refuted, just as other objections to the church have to be raised to be sustained.

I did not claim that "Moon advocates socialism and one-worldism," only that his theology set up hierarchies that would seem to make socialism preferable to laissez-faire, that several Moonies think of themselves as "God-centered socialists," and that Moon's ideology is internationalist—it seeks to break down barriers of religion and state boundaries and work toward what the *Di-*

vine Principle calls "the ideal world of cosmic ideology."

This is clear in Moon's assertion that salvation is not individual but corporate, in the comments of Moonies such as the Unification Seminary's Sara Witt who calls for a world in which "people wouldn't do things because of a profit motive, but . . . for the good of others and society as a whole," and church pamphlets which identify "a major challenge facing society today is how to share technologically developed wealth with all sectors of society." Paradoxically, Moonies hold these views while being aggressive and successful entrepreneurs themselves (as Thomas Walsh points out), and while their church-owned newspapers support American patriotic sentiments and strong national defense.

Hal McKenzie denies that Unification theology parallels social gospel theology, and then cites evidence which suggests—more strongly than I did—that there is such a parallel. Walter Rauschenbusch's *A Theology for the Social Gospel*, a landmark work published in 1917, envisioned precisely the kinds of earthly perfection that Mr. McKenzie says Unification ideology seeks to establish. My copy of the *Divine Principle* does not offer the "detailed, systematic, and comprehensive concept of the afterlife" that Mr. McKenzie talks about, and who needs heaven when we can have perfection here on earth?

The *New York City Tribune* obtained some of my articles through Public Research Syndicated, which mailed them out to more than 50 newspapers. I turned down an offer to work at the *Washington Times*. I mention this not because I think the Moon papers are disreputable in any way, but because Cliff Kincaid seems so concerned about my record of dealing with Moonies. It is true, as I stated, that my first experience with a Moonie was with Carol Bechtel, who invited me to lunch because she liked my writing, she said.

The point of my article was not that conservatives should avoid writing for the *Washington Times* or attending conferences sponsored by the Unification Church, but that they should understand that some of

the perspectives of the Moonies are based on values that conservatives may not be comfortable with.

Registering Complaints

Dear Sir:

I take offense at the inclusion of draft registration on the list of "America's Worst Regulations," by Doug Bandow in his article, "The Terrible Ten" (Spring 1985). Mr.

sistance movements in Vietnam, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua.

We too often forget that the United States is the number one target of the world's totalitarian forces; and since the United States appears to be the only country with even a remote chance of defending the world against Communist aggression, the perception of strength plays an important role. With draft registration, we would be perceived as

With draft registration, we would be perceived as strong by our enemies, regardless if we are or not in the long run.

Steve Baldwin

Bandow appears to be narrow-minded on issues which deal with our national security, selectively citing a dissenting conclusion in a 1981 administration Task Force study which challenged the evidence that draft registration would save eight weeks during mobilization in time of war.

However, the conclusion of the 1981 Task Force, composed of the nation's top military and civilian manpower experts, was that since our volunteer forces are not large enough to deal with an all-out war, the computerized registering of all eligible men would clearly speed up the draft process. It is far-fetched to assume, as Mr. Bandow does, that the draft could be accelerated eight weeks by "other measures, such as using more sophisticated sorting and processing techniques."

But there is a more compelling reason why draft registration is important to our national security, regardless of the merits of draft registration, and that is perception. The United States needs to be perceived as a nation that has the will to fight.

In our recent history the United States was whipped in Vietnam, intimidated by Iran, did nothing when KAL 007 was shot down, and has refused to assist anti-Communist re-

strong by our enemies, regardless if we are or not in the long run. Draft registration should be looked at as a form of deterrence, just as our missiles, conventional forces, NATO Alliance, etc. are, forcing our enemies to think twice before attacking us or our allies.

What is really disturbing to conservatives is the alliance formed between Marxists and libertarians on this issue. The nation's largest draft registration resistance group, the Committee Against Registration and the Draft (CARD), was founded by a coalition of Communist and libertarian groups. Of course, the Marxists are using the libertarians to achieve their own political goals—destroying U.S. military preparedness—but that does not seem to bother the libertarians.

The heavy involvement of Communist youth groups in the draft registration resistance movement and the thousands of dollars spent by them on legal fees, posters, newsletters, newspapers, bumper stickers, etc., all directed against draft registration, begs the question: if draft registration will not effectively improve America's military preparedness, as the libertarians assert, why then are the Communists working so hard to sabotage it?

As a full-time student organizer, I have found that the vast majority of students are registering out of patriotism, not out of fear of legal prosecution, which is extremely rare. With a compliance rate of 98.7 percent, this is the most successful registration in U.S. history. It has helped bring out a patriotic instinct in our youth and has mentally prepared them to fight for freedom.

While conservatives and libertarians alike share a distaste for any government program which computerizes information on individuals, draft registration is worth the loss of a little privacy in exchange for the creation of a perception that America is willing to fight to defend freedom. The more prepared for war we are, the more likely we will have peace and remain free.

Steve Baldwin
National Program Director
Students for a Better America
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

In his listing of "The Terrible Ten—America's Worst Regulations" (Spring 1985), Doug Bandow includes what he calls the airbag rule. His statements on the airbag contain errors and his position constitutes very bad national policy.

The proposed regulation does not mandate airbags, as Mr. Bandow states. It is a performance standard requiring automobiles to protect front seat occupants against certain types of injuries in 30 miles per hour barrier crashes of frontal and front angle types up to 30 degrees through automatic crash protection. The method of compliance and the conduct of testing and certification are left to the manufacturer. They may choose automatic belts or airbags or any other method that achieves the required performance results.

We at Allstate support seat belts and the use of seat belts—we also support the availability of airbags to all car purchasers because we know that airbags and seat belts together will save twice as many lives and prevent twice as many injuries as seat belts alone. We also know that for those who refuse to use seat belts, airbags provide automatic crash pro-

tection in a major percentage of crash situations.

At Allstate, we have been driving airbag-equipped cars since the 1972 model year—1972 Mercurys, 1973 Chevrolets, 1974 Oldsmobiles and Buicks, 1975 Volvos and 1976 Oldsmobiles and Buicks. Over 600 cars travelling over 30 million miles—without failure to inflate in a crash situation and without an inadvertent inflation. I have been driving airbag-equipped cars since the 1972 model year. We know that airbags are reliable, beneficial, and cost effective.

Unfortunately, only Mercedes is presently selling airbags to the public. Mr. Bandow refers to the fact that Mercedes charges \$875 for the option. Of course, Mercedes cars and parts are generally about four times as expensive as Chevrolet cars and parts—so that brings the cost down to the \$200 to \$250 range. In the record of the recent litigation on the subject, the manufacturers of air bag systems estimated a cost of \$185 in large volume production, including manufacturer's profit and dealer's mark-up.

Another statement repeatedly made by airbag opponents is that the lap belt must be used with the airbag to make it effective and that the airbag is effective only in frontal impacts. First, the airbag will perform in front and front angle (up to 30 degrees) crashes whether or not a lap belt is used. In fact, test criteria require certification of such performance without a lap belt. In addition, field experience and test results indicate the airbag will perform in many front angle crashes beyond 30 degrees. The crashes in which the airbag will inflate constitute about 65 percent of the serious injury crashes. Mr. Bandow erroneously uses the figure of 20 percent.

In side impacts on the passenger side, seat belts protect the driver from being thrown toward the point of impact—but so do airbags. If the crash is on the other side the airbag is of no value and probably neither are belts—in fact belts can increase the likelihood of injury by holding the driver close to the point of impact in the event there is passenger compartment intrusion.

Airbags are not designed to be ef-

fective in rollovers. So it is primarily for protection in rollovers that belt use, in conjunction with the airbag, becomes most important.

Also it is at the higher speeds that airbags far out-perform manual belts. At crash speeds of 30 m.p.h. and above, manual belt systems cannot keep the face from impacting the steering wheel hard enough to bend it. For this reason Mercedes and Ford both support airbag availability as supplemental protection—even for belt users. Our airbag crash tests with live volunteers at 25, 30, and 35 m.p.h. barrier crash speeds have produced no injuries.

If all cars had airbags, we believe over 9,000 lives could be saved annually and several hundred thousand crippling injuries prevented. We have projected that if all cars had airbags so persons in cars struck by our at-fault policyholders were also protected by airbags, that bodily injury liability premiums would be reduced by 30 percent.

After over a decade of the equivalent of regulatory war and interminable delays, it appears that regulation unfortunately is the only way to make airbags and automatic crash protection readily available to the public. Implementation should be one of the greatest public health advances of this century.

Donald F. Craib, Jr.
Chairman of the Board
Allstate
Northbrook, IL

Doug Bandow replies:

Alas, Mr. Baldwin relies on a report he has not seen and writes on an issue he does not fully understand.

Peacetime registration has nothing to do with the size of the All-Volunteer Force. The military plans on re-instituting the draft in the event of, for example, a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe; the question simply is the relative merit of peacetime versus mobilization registrations.

Peacetime registration is of value only if it yields an accurate list of names and addresses of young men. Contrary to Mr. Baldwin's contention, the current registration is not the most successful in history; registration conducted during World

War I and before World War II had equally high compliance rates. Moreover, those lists had substantially fewer errors in them. Roughly a quarter of draft registrants move every year, and the General Accounting Office has found that the government's rolls are growing significantly less accurate.

Further, the report to the President—I spent several months on the inter-agency drafting committee—did not show a savings of up to eight weeks, as was stated by administration spokesmen when the decision to retain registration was announced. That figure was a public relations fraud. The report presented three alternatives to continued peacetime registration. The savings ranged from six weeks with a slow post-mobilization scheme, to two weeks with an accelerated post-mobilization procedure, to zero weeks with a pre-mobilization plan, to be implemented in the event of a looming emergency. Thus, there were plenty of less coercive options to the current program.

Anyway, a couple of weeks saved does not mean much. Since troops must be trained and deployed, the two or so weeks saved is occurring in the fourth month after mobilization. The real military question is whether there are adequate reserves for the initial conflagration. Moreover, if Americans volunteered anywhere near the percentage that they did in World Wars I and II and other conflicts, the training camps could not hold any draftees during the period during which time was being "saved." Even if peacetime registration speeds up a draft, the extra time is useless.

The decision to keep registration came down to the argument that Mr. Baldwin considers to be the strongest—perception. But Mr. Baldwin's contention that registration creates a "perception of strength" is just plain silly. The Soviets certainly know the difference between outdated lists of untrained 18 year-olds and new military weapons or geopolitical advances. I would think Mr. Baldwin could make the same distinction.

As for registration fostering patriotism and preparing young men to fight and die, let's get serious. Real

patriotism and a willingness to give up one's life involve a deep-seated appreciation of a nation, its people, and a set of fundamental shared values. Good feelings caused by signing a piece of paper will quickly dissipate when real hardship threatens.

Registration infringes personal liberty and does not enhance national security, which is why libertarians—who by and large dropped out of CARD when the Marxists staged their coup—are opposed to it. This country must be careful not to trample the very values it is supposedly defending.

As for Mr. Craib, it is true that the passive restraints regulation does not specifically mandate airbags, but to have fully explained the rule would have used up all of my available space on the issue. Suffice it to say that under the rule's provisions, some automakers are going to unwillingly install airbags for unwilling customers.

As for the utility of airbags, there is no doubt that they improve safety. The point is they are not the cheap panacea that their advocates, both in the transportation bureaucracy and insurance industry, have made them out to be. Let Mr. Craib increase his company's premium discount for use of airbags and undertake a major campaign to convince the consuming public of the system's value; if the demand is there, the automakers will offer airbags as an option. But it's time the insurers stopped trying to use government to cut their claim expenses under the guise of protecting an unwilling public.

Abortion and Infanticide

Dear Sir:

A high Justice Department official wondering if infants should live? Nobel laureates declaring infants must meet certain standards before they can be allowed to live? A reviewer stating all human life is not of equal worth? An academic declaring the life of a newborn is forfeit should the parents not be sufficiently wealthy and/or do not wish to care for it?

Where could these beliefs have originated in our society? The next

logical steps stemming from these ideas would be to select all humans on the basis of certain characteristics for life or death. Criteria such as religion, ancestry, and/or political opposition have already been used by Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and China.

Orwell's nightmare surely will have come true should these values ever become accepted in America. You deserve enormous praise for warning the general public that some rather "learned" and influential people are trying to accomplish just this outcome.

Jeffrey Sadow
Columnist
The Vanderbilt Hustler
Nashville, TN

A Continuing Crisis

Dear Sir:

David Brock's article, "The Big Chill" (Spring 1985), presented a realistic view of the modern day barbarism exercised by the far left on our nation's campuses and of the movement which stands to wipe out much of what our Constitution stands for.

Recently, at Northwestern University in Illinois, Adolfo Calero, Commander-in-Chief of the pro-democratic forces in Nicaragua, was harassed and shouted down while attempting to present a speech he was scheduled to make. Calero, who came to Northwestern to speak about one of the most important foreign policy issues of our time, was disrupted by Marxist groups and professors. They threw cans of animal blood at him. They shouted obscenities at him. They threatened him with violence. And finally, after his security could no longer be assured, he was ushered away, unable to make his speech. The mob squads and hatemongers of the far left had won.

As reported in the *Northwestern Review*: "English professor [Barbara] Foley grabbed the microphone and incited the crowd [that had gathered to disrupt Calero's presentation]. 'He has no right to speak tonight and we are not going to let

him,' Foley barked to the mob . . . 'He [Calero] should feel lucky to get out of here alive' and 'we declare the meeting of the fascist out of order.' ”

As Calero was hustled out of the auditorium and into a waiting car, the mob cheered at the mission they had accomplished. A Northwestern history professor, Bonnie Blustein, went to the podium to congratulate the mob's "great victory."

The scenario at Northwestern is not unusual on today's campus scene. The hatemongers of the far left frequently win out over the voices of freedom, free speech, and democracy. They use violence. They use mob rule. They use McCarthyism. They use hate. They use whatever works to silence those with whom they disagree. Somehow, they have taken it upon themselves to decide which ideologies and voices will be afforded the benefit of the First Amendment. Is it any wonder that the totalitarian regimes they eulogize act the same way toward common liberties?

Michael Johns
Editor-in-Chief
The *Miami Tribune*
University of Miami
Coral Gables, FL

Dear Sir:

David Brock's "The Big Chill" paints a most depressing picture, yet in truth the open stifling of conservative speech on America's campuses is more commonplace than Mr. Brock's article shows.

One of the most recent cases of infantile protesters haranguing former ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick was at the University of Washington. Mrs. Kirkpatrick participated in the Distinguished Lecture Series of the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies. Protesters from every imaginable political fringe group gathered prior to the speech to make skeleton masks and plot ways to disrupt the talk. The protest was common knowledge many days before Mrs. Kirkpatrick's visit. Despite inadequate security, over 15 protesters were dragged from the auditorium.

The kicker to this incident is that Mrs. Kirkpatrick's speech was noth-

ing more than a eulogy for Washington's late Senator Henry Jackson. Notwithstanding the non-political tone, few members of the audience could hear her, due to the obnoxious hubbub made by the campus radicals.

It is too bad that the majority of university professors and administrators fail to understand the immense impact that the actions of a small, vocal minority are having concerning the exercise of free speech on our nation's campuses. The acquiescence and lack of disciplinary action by university officials gives the appearance of blessing the protests of these fringe groups.

The everyday occurrences of this sort make even more important the work of the many conservative campus newspapers that are continuing to sprout up around the country. Keeping papers such as these alive could be the only way for reasonable students to maintain a voice at their school.

Joe Friend
Editor
The *Washington Spectator*
University of Washington
Seattle, WA

Counting the Cost

Dear Sir:

I have read with interest the vitriolic exchange of letters between David Roberts and Sydney Schanberg in the winter issue of *Policy Review*.

Of course it is important to note exactly what leading American commentators were writing about the situation before and after the fall of Phnom Penh, but I am more concerned that a certain fuzziness now seems to be creeping into the popular perception of the scale of the Khmer Rouge atrocities.

In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, the number of Cambodians killed by the Khmer Rouge is generally quoted as "up to three million dead." In recent weeks, I have seen the figure of "one to two million Cambodians killed" used as a benchmark in the serious American press.

The fact that six million died in

the Nazi concentration camps during World War II has been established with precision because the Nazis themselves kept meticulous records of their crimes, and concentration camp survivors were willing and able to collect a mass of detailed evidence of the crimes that were perpetrated.

It is similarly important to attempt an objective assessment of the precise number of people who died in Cambodia as a result of the Khmer Rouge atrocities. Tentative suggestions have been made that the American government should undertake this task, but it would be better undertaken by an independent team of historians and research assistants, backed by a charitable foundation.

Although the American government has shown no desire to be directly involved, there would seem to be no reason why the State Department and intelligence agencies should not make their own records of the time freely available, and the reports from the relief agencies could be checked.


It is not too late to locate and interview large numbers of Cambodians who managed to escape from their country. No doubt other governments such as Thailand, France, and the United Kingdom would also be prepared to let responsible research workers see the current assessments made by their own representatives.

The followers of Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann are still grouped along the Thai/Cambodian border. In view of the depth of the hostility between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese government that administers almost all of what is left of Cambodia through their puppet, Heng Samrin, substantial information—not all of which need be worthless—could be provided by one Communist regime about crimes of other Communists.

In a few years' time, the chance to assemble an accurate record of this horrible episode will have passed.

Sir Philip Goodhart
Member of Parliament
House of Commons
London, England

BUREAUCRACY vs. ENVIRONMENT



FORESTLANDS Public and Private

Edited by ROBERT T. DEACON
and M. BRUCE JOHNSON

Foreword by B. DELWORTH GARDNER


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By GARY D. LIBECAP

Foreword by JONATHAN R.T. HUGHES

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THE DEFENSE BUDGET

A Conservative Debate

With the consensus for growth in military spending shattered once again, it is more important than ever to make sure that defense dollars are being spent in the most effective ways. Policy Review asked 19 leading advocates of a strong defense to assess the principal strengths and weaknesses of the American military under President Reagan, and to outline their priorities for future spending. Participants were interviewed separately, and afterwards edited their remarks.

What have been the most important improvements in defense in the last four years?

Zbigniew Brzezinski: The most important improvements in defense over the last six years have involved, first, our revision of strategic doctrine, to provide for greater strategic flexibility and thus for enhanced deterrence; and second, the development of the Rapid Deployment Force, which gives the United States the capacity to respond more flexibly and rapidly in areas where its forces are not permanently deployed. Other improvements include the original decision to proceed with the deployment of 200 MXs in a survivable mode, and the renewal of NATO, including the long-term agreement of 1978, which called for three percent per annum increases in defense spending.

The decision by the Reagan Administration to deploy the B-1 prior to the eventual deployment of the Stealth aircraft; the increase in the number of cruise missiles, in particular ALCMs; the energetic enhancement of the Navy; and the Reagan Administration's efforts to provide greater air and sea lift for the Rapid Deployment Force are all important improvements. Finally, I believe that the President's Strategic Defense Initiative is a constructive contribution, not only to serious dialogue, but to our strategic needs, and to strategic deterrence in the likely conditions closer to the end of the century.

I have put emphasis on the last six years, because, in fact, strategic renewal started six years ago, and gained momentum under President Reagan.

Thomas Moorer: The most important improvements have been in the field of consumables: raising the stockpiles of such things as ammunition, spare parts, and missiles that

permit you to use the systems you have to their full capability. Second, Mr. Reagan's approach in both budgetary matters and military operations has significantly raised the morale of the men in uniform. That can't be measured in dollars but is perhaps the most important aspect of overall military capability.

Representative Jim Courter: On the strategic side, we have undertaken an across-the-board modernization program in each of the three legs of the offensive triad and in the fields of communications, command, and control. Our conventional capability also stands improved due to increased funding for training, weapons and ammunition in the basic readiness accounts. And our entire military capability has been improved by the higher quality of our military personnel.

Senator Malcolm Wallop: Clearly, our military machine is readier than it was. There is more ammunition.

There have been improvements in the ability of trucks to leave motor pools, airplanes to get off the ground, and ships to be at sea instead of in port. The real improvement stops here.

Robert Pfaltzgraff: The most important improvements have been in conventional force structure modernization, readiness, and sustainability. Since 1981, the United States has reversed the decline in the size of the United States Navy and increased substantially the number of ships in high readiness categories. We have also begun to produce

new strategic forces, including the B-1 long-range combat aircraft, the Trident submarine, and the MX, as well as the cruise missile. Although the problems that faced our strategic force posture in 1980 of encroaching obsolescence and increasing vulnerability remain largely unresolved in 1985, we are nevertheless beginning to deploy needed, new strategic capabilities.

Samuel Huntington: There has been a significant improvement in overall defense capabilities. The Reagan Administration has implemented the strategies and policies adopted in theory by the Carter Administration, but never adequately funded or really put into effect.

Our biggest weakness in the mid-1970s was that we had acquired an additional security commitment—to defend the Persian Gulf and Israel—without the capability to defend them. The Carter Administration recognized the problem and began to develop the Rapid Deployment Force, but didn't get very far with it.

Donald Rumsfeld: With respect to general purpose forces, useful improvements include weapon modernization and readiness in the Army and Air Force, the higher quality and improved retention of people in the Army and Marine Corps and the growth of the Navy.

Strategic force improvements include command, control, communications and intelligence, survivability, and progress with the Trident submarine, and the Intermediate Nuclear Force deployments.

Alvin Bernstein: The most important improvement is morale. People in the military no longer feel like an ugly kid

sister. Now people in the military feel important again. The Reagan Administration has really restored a sense of pride and professionalism.

William Van Cleave: There have been some minor improvements relative to the state of our forces four years ago. But they have been overstated by the administration, the Pentagon, and the media; and in the area of the nuclear forces improvements are non-existent. Relative to the Soviet improvements during the same period, I would say we have lost ground.

Representative Jack Kemp: The first major improvement is the restoration of the spirit of Western resolve and the willingness to confront Soviet expansionism for what it is: classic transnational empire building.

I want to stress the important of NATO's deployment of the GLCMs and Pershing IIs. Modernizing our theater nuclear deterrent has been one of the most important foreign policy achievements of the United States under Ronald Reagan.

I also give the President a lot of credit for rebuilding and modernizing the full range of our conventional and strategic forces after the very serious decline in our defense due to the record of real disinvestment during the 1970s. Sustaining that buildup is another thing.

General David Jones: Without question, the most important improvements have been in personnel, both in the quality of new people coming in and in the retention of good people. During Vietnam, the quality of young officers was a weakness. Now it's one of our strengths.

What are the major weaknesses that have not been confronted?

James Hackett: The most serious weakness is in the land-based deterrent. Minuteman missiles sitting in vulnerable silos led to the concept of the window of vulnerability, and that has not been redressed by the decision to deploy 100 MXs in vulnerable silos.

Richard Allen: Civil defense always gets short shrift. We have no measures to protect the population.

I am also astounded by our failure to confront the question of interservice rivalry, and the command structure of the armed forces. Without weakening the individual services, it is important to convey additional power—and responsibility—to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly in the procurement field. For the individual services, the outcome of the struggle over who gets the larger slice of the resource pie too often becomes more important than the national defense itself.

Bernstein: The thing I fear most is the military's incapacity and unwillingness to deal with anything less than conventional conflict. There is something of a consensus in the military, exemplified by Weinberger's Six Points on the Use of Military Power, which says all or nothing. My fear

is that in the next five to ten years, there will be a real mismatch between what the military is going to be called on to do, and what the military perceives itself as being able and is willing to do. This is an invitation for terrorists and guerrillas to attack us, because we're not going to step into the ring unless it is a proper stand up, knock 'em down fight.

Brzezinski: The most significant weakness is on the doctrinal plane. While the Reagan Administration has been successful in providing a broader financial base for defense, it has not crystallized the strategic concept and has not been guided in its procurement decisions by a coherent set of strategic priorities. Even with regard to the SDI, there is a gap between what is being said publicly, and what in fact is both feasible and desirable in the more immediate future.

Wallop: The worst is the growing decline of our strategic forces relative to those of the Soviet Union. This decline is most serious in the field of counterforce missiles and, most important, in the field of anti-missile and anti-aircraft forces. We are where the Soviets can put two counterforce

warheads on every one of our important military targets in Europe, the Far East, and at home. This gap is widening, not diminishing. We have piddled around with regards to both counterforce and strategic defense, while the other side is building both.

Murray Weidenbaum: I'm most seriously concerned about the erosion of public support.

In 1980, the National Opinion Research Center reported that 56 percent of the American public believed that not enough was being spent on defense. By 1984, only 17 percent believed the U.S. was spending too little on defense. This trend is ominous given the long-term nature of the military threat. And unfortunately, the adamant attitude of the secretary of defense toward almost any budget restraint has contributed to the erosion of public support.

Moorer: In long-range procurement, we still have a way to go. Take the MX missile, for instance. Congress has voted on that missile over 20 times and it is still uncertain as to how many missiles we are going to have. The Soviets do not have that kind of problem. The stretch-out of production rates is another problem. If we have a program to produce 100 airplanes Congress might cut it to 60. That immediately increases the unit cost very significantly.

Van Cleave: We have not yet taken our officially established defense policies, doctrines and commitments seriously. Our forces fall far short of officially established requirements, and there is a growing gap between requirements and capabilities. We have not restored the stability of the nuclear balance, or restored our nuclear deterrents. The window of vulnerability, which is so important, has not been closed at all; rather, it has been dangerously extended.

Defense spending under the Reagan Administration has been more myth than reality. It has been grossly inadequate. Actual spending under Reagan in Fiscal Years 1985 and 1986 will be less than projected under Jimmy Carter.

Courter: There are still problems in command. I would argue for a stronger Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There are still gaping weaknesses in the procurement system: we have started moving toward increased competition, but much more can be done, and the Office of Operational Testing that Congress started has been pretty much ignored. It is important to have an objective tester whose reports are directed to the Congress. There is also still a problem with the inter-operability of equipment, as evidenced by the fact that the Army and the Navy brought different radios to the Grenada invasion and could not communicate with each other because their frequencies were not compatible.

Huntington: Not enough emphasis has been put on air transport capabilities and mobility. It is tremendously important that we be able to act quickly and decisively in situations where we have to intervene overseas.

I'm also worried by the way the administration has approached the budget. Don Regan has said that the administration wouldn't want to cut any major programs, but

might sacrifice food and munitions. Well, you don't get very far in a war without food and munitions. In the future, budget items for readiness and for operations and maintenance may well suffer as a result of the commitment to major new weapons systems.

Rumsfeld: A number of weaknesses have been and are being confronted by the administration but not yet solved. Among them I would cite the vulnerability of our strategic and tactical nuclear forces; and the need for significant improvements in the rapid deployment forces, both in capability and organization. Ammunition stocks are still low, especially for the new smart weapons; and tour lengths in all services continue to be too short.

Finally, there is an urgent need for effective options and capabilities to counter state-sponsored terrorism, which has been growing in recent years. This type of warfare needs to be deterred, and, regrettably and unnecessarily, we currently have little or no deterrent capability.

Pfaltzgraff: Despite improvements, the readiness and sustainability of our conventional forces remain a critical problem. We have chronic shortages of ammunition, spare parts, and senior grade enlisted personnel. Such shortfalls present an even more serious problem for our NATO-European allies. In overall firepower, Soviet-Warsaw Pact forces surpass those of NATO. We still confront the specter of Soviet force superiority in most indicators of military power.

Kemp: I am very concerned about the willingness of some in my party to compromise our national security by supporting a defense freeze. Defense modernization, if it is going to be effective and commensurate to the threat, has to be sustained for more than just three or four years. We are just catching up after a decade of neglect. In the current round of budget negotiations, the freeze in defense spending represents a major political threat to the Republican Party, and worse, a threat to our future ability to meet our vital national security requirements.

Another mistake is not closing the window of vulnerability. I give credit to the President for advancing the idea, but the administration has accepted too many restrictions on the modernization of our land-based strategic system. It has been a mistake, I think, not to move to either mobility or a ballistic missile defense system.

Congress needs to reexamine its standards for deciding critical defense issues. Too often, arms control interests have taken on a logic of their own, to the detriment of objective decision-making on defense requirements. For example, votes on the MX were traded for specific arms control commitments from the administration. In general, the defense budget has become a victim of concerns about the deficit, which has generated support for defense cuts without any understanding of their impact on our national security requirements.

Jones: The area of least progress is in getting our act together—maintaining a sustained consensus for defense, better stability in programs, a clearer set of objectives with priorities. Organizational issues continue to plague us.

If you had to cut \$30 billion from the military budget, where would you cut?

Weidenbaum: I would focus on several key weapon systems, notably the MX and B-1. There may be a compelling, highly classified justification for the MX. But the case made in the public record is so transparently silly that I can't see it impressing the Russians or anybody else. The justification for the B-1 strikes me as purely sentimental—the desire to maintain a piloted strategic force.

Courter: I am not in favor of any cuts in the 1985 levels of expenditure, though I have been willing and eager to cut the administration's original requests for defense growth. I have problems with the Bradley fighting vehicle. I have problems with the research in Amraam. I have problems with the division air defense gun (Divad). I don't know whether we need to spend the money on Aquila, that remotely piloted vehicle in the R&D stage now. Also, money could be saved through improved procurement practices, and by making sure that the various pieces of equipment that the services buy are interoperable.

Wallop: I'd cut the ratio of general officers and field-grade officers to enlisted men. That ratio is now four times as great as in World War II. I would cut the office of the Secretary of Defense down to the point where you would not have people trivializing each other with struggles over decisions that none of them end up making anyway. I would cut the pre-positioning of military supplies, especially in Europe, since we do not have and are not acquiring the ability to defend those stocks against unconventional warfare, chemical and biological warfare, much less against strikes by SS-20s. It therefore seems totally unlikely that the Soviets would ever permit our armed troops to meet up with those pre-positioned weapons.

We have some highly sophisticated and highly expensive intelligence systems that tell us highly sophisticated information that we don't need. I would cut them and devote a little of the savings to more conventional intelligence gathering capabilities such as human intelligence—a little money goes a long way in this field. Most of the money saved, however would have to be spent on new intelligence technologies that would surely pay off very handsomely, but that we have not been able to develop because our budget continues to be tied up in systems that the Soviets understand too well, and that give us information we really can't do much with.

Woolsey: I would hold down procurement rates for the major systems, although I realize that this adds to their unit costs, and spend some of that money on sustainability and readiness. In the Army, I would cut back on procurement of heavy equipment for the north German plain—tanks, armored personnel carriers, and the like—and emphasize equipment for light units that would be more readily transportable to other parts of the world.

I would also begin to cut back on the procurement of manned aircraft for missions that can be performed by

cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles. The Pentagon has discovered RPVs in the last two or three years but only as a result of the fantastic Israeli success in the Bekaa valley. And there is still too much reluctance to use them rather than piloted aircraft. I would like to see a deemphasis of battlefield nuclear weapons and an emphasis on doing the same job with modern non-nuclear weapons. I am thinking particularly of the second echelon attack and emerging technologies.

Over the long run I think that we are going to see less emphasis on the surface navy and more on submarines. It is going to be increasingly easy to find things on the surface of the ocean, while for many years it will still be extraordinarily difficult to find them underneath the ocean. The advent of the cruise missile, particularly the conventional-warhead cruise missile, also gives the submarine a whole new dimension in warfare.

Luttwak: I would drastically cut the number of high-level and mid-level officers, reducing correspondingly the administrative operations that those officers head. So as not to reduce combat echelons, the cuts would have to focus on the supporting overhead.

Any additional cuts should fall more heavily on the surface Navy and should not affect the land forces of the Marine Corps or the Army.

Moorer: The best approach would be simply to reduce some of the systems that are scheduled for purchase in the future. I would not cut personnel or items that permit you to use your systems to capacity.

Brzezinski: I would cut from the Navy probably one or two of the aircraft carrier task forces. I would probably reduce the number of heavy Army divisions in Europe and use the savings to enhance air and sealift capability. I would go into strategic defense of a counter first strike fairly rapidly, thereby in the longer run making the likely expenditures on the Midgetman unnecessary.

Allen: I would do my best to take it from the human cost; restoring the military draft would be one of the more equitable ways to achieve significant savings. Ending duplication and overlap among certain weapons systems could also result in significant savings.

Hackett: I would apply cuts in personnel, both civilian and military. I am convinced that substantial savings can be made by more efficient use of personnel resources. Other areas include military pensions and the general problem of gold-plating weapons systems.

An example of gold-plating is the Midgetman missile. The need is for a small, mobile missile that can be produced and made operational in a few years. We need a Nissan or Toyota missile and instead the Air Force seems determined to develop something like a Cadillac.

Where would you add \$30 billion?

Pfaltzgraff: I would put many more resources into research and development for strategic defense. The increasing accuracy of offensive systems will make it more and more necessary to provide for the defense of vital military assets. We need also to improve substantially the sustainability of our military forces. In the last four years, we have done a great deal to enhance the readiness of our conventional capabilities without doing all that is necessary to enable them to fight for protracted periods. I would spend more on stockpiling ammunition and supplies. Deterrence will be strengthened if our forces possess the means to fight in a sustained fashion.

Hackett: The immediate need is to develop and deploy a defense of the land-based missile force. The research program of the strategic defense initiative (SDI) is essential, and the mobile development schedule for the mobile missile should be accelerated. The Soviet SS-25, a comparable mobile missile, is being deployed this year, while our Midgetman is not projected for deployment until 1992.

Allen: I would spend a portion on civil defense measures that protect the population, and I would provide additional funding for spare parts and training hours, for example, flying hours for pilots and steaming time at sea. Most of the rest I would put into advanced military projects, with the hope of achieving some technological breakthroughs that could enhance our defense posture.

Rumsfeld: Areas that could benefit from additional investment include ammunition stocks for the Army and the Air Force, survivability measures for air attack and NATO, hardened basing for the MX missiles, strengthened rapid deployment and counter-terrorism capabilities, and additional submarines.

Weiss: We could do much more in the way of cruise missile deployments, both air-launched and sea-launched. I would move toward deployment of at least a limited ballistic missile defense. Vast improvements can be made to our general purpose forces.

What are the most serious problems over the next five years?

Brzezinski: The doctrinal-strategic problem is a serious one. We have neither a strategic doctrine for the effective intermeshing of our military power with our foreign policy, nor a doctrine for the effective conduct of war.

Second, I think our military leadership, by and large, is composed of managerial bureaucrats and congressional fundraisers dressed in uniforms—not military leaders. There is a desperate need for a shake-up in our military command and for the adoption of an interservice oriented general staff that would induce in the military a shared

Weidenbaum: This would be a great opportunity to make a fundamental change in the military retirement system. Thirty billion dollars could go a long way toward funding, on a secure basis, the pension liabilities for servicemen on the rolls, permitting the development of a more sensible retirement system that takes account of second careers.

Luttwak: I would use the money for training and to expand the land forces. Except in a few areas, such as flight hours for tactical aviation, U.S. forces do not receive intensive training nowadays. In the U.S. Army, basic recruit training for infantry is only 12 weeks, three days. Basic training in for the Israeli infantry is 22 weeks. Basic training for the British infantry is about the same and it is 32 weeks for the Royal Marines. What counts is not only the volume of training but also its realism. Forces that are kept in Europe must be trained in Europe, and money is needed to pay for “maneuver damage.” Now we tend to train many of our forces in the desert, which is easier terrain and provides a poor preparation for combat.

Jones: I would improve what we already have, ensuring that existing programs are adequately funded. I would put some additional effort into mobility—not just airlift and sealift, but an ability to move forces very rapidly. Such a capability enhances deterrence and, if there is a conflict, improves our chances for success.

Courter: I would defend MX by using active defenses. I would spend additional money on mobility—airlift and sealift—which is still inadequate. I would also spend more on spare parts and training, in order to improve readiness, and on increased pre-positioning of supplies and equipment in Europe and other forward areas which we are committed to defend.

Kemp: I would back full funding for SDI research and development, in order to commit to an early deployment of an active defense system. We should allocate more resources for strategic modernization, which I very much favor.

perspective. The existing chain of command is cumbersome, inefficient, and overly bureaucratized. There are too many layers of command, all jealously protected, particularly by the Navy. The Navy sees itself as a separate entity, though fortunately coexisting peacefully with the United States!

Weidenbaum: To develop a strategic approach to military planning that reconciles the force structure with the availability of resources. There has been a generous expansion

of the military budget since 1980. But I worry a great deal about the extensive array of new weapon systems that have been given the go-ahead: The military budget over the next five years likely will be inadequate to finance them. I don't see any careful thinking about how new weapon systems mesh with the resources likely to be available.

Huntington: We have not been doing very well in our conventional military involvements. We've had 40 years of successfully deterring nuclear war, and 40 years of losing, or at least not winning, conventional engagements. The weaknesses on this side should be confronted.

Pfaltzgraff: The large number of political conflicts within and among states, will coincide with the diffusion of weapons technologies on an unprecedented scale. Moreover, the Soviet Union and its client states and other groups will play an active role as the "scavengers of revolution," exploiting deeply rooted cleavages in societies in many parts of the world.

Rumsfeld: Over the next five years, it will likely be the assured continued growth of Soviet nuclear forces and the likely continued growth of state-sponsored terrorism.

A second and very serious problem is the tendency toward micro-management of the foreign policy and national security decision-making process by the U.S. Congress. As a nation we cannot afford to have 100 foreign policies, one for each U.S. Senator who happens to have a mimeograph machine and an airline ticket. We need one for the country. Unless we get the excess hands off the steering wheel, the U.S. truck could end up in the ditch.

Weiss: It is to develop the national will to confront the Soviet threat. Our nation has not yet faced up to the question of what to do when the Soviets break their contractual promises on matters that go to the heart of U.S. national security. If we continue to avoid reality in this fashion we simply will not generate the national will necessary to

prepare for a defense which will deter aggression from starting a war.

Moorer: The most important problem is in the country at large. The public attitude, which is fed into Congress, waxes and wanes over the defense budget. It is very difficult to make a long-range plan.

Another problem is maintaining a balanced procurement program so that you can buy and maintain modern systems, and take the old ones off the bottom. And second, getting enough operational money to permit the pilots and the gunners and the submarine engineers to practice enough to maintain their peak capability and efficiency is very difficult. What we need is stability, a steady program so that sound planning can be carried out.

Kemp: Sustaining our defense buildup is the greatest challenge this administration and this country face. The whole idea that we should subordinate the defense of our country and the modernization of our deterrent to budget considerations is outrageous. It is poor economics and an outrageous setting of priorities.

Other problems are winning support for our strategic defense initiative and dealing with the Soviet Union's gross violations of ABM, SALT I and SALT II.

Courter: In the next five years, I think it will continue to be the cohesion of NATO, which was tested severely over the question of Pershings and cruise missiles. It is going to be tested again with respect to the Europeans' involvement in the strategic defense initiative. This may also be a very long-term problem.

Van Cleave: As much as general purpose forces have suffered, the most serious problem has to be Soviet nuclear superiority and the dangerous instability at the nuclear level. Restoration of the strategic nuclear balance must be the single most important priority.

Under what circumstances should we withdraw troops from Europe?

Bernstein: Probably my number one fear is that we are going to do something like that. We shouldn't. NATO keeps our basic geopolitical stance viable, which is why the destruction of NATO is the prime strategic objective of the Soviet Union.

Since Napoleon, the name of the strategic game has been to prevent the unification of Eurasia under a single hegemonial power.

Wallop: Unless our forces there, together with European forces, are given the weapons and the manpower to fight and defeat a Soviet conventional assault preceded by a missile attack, it just does not seem proper to expose American troops to certain catastrophe. We are presently exposing them to such a catastrophe and, in effect, treating them as hostages. Our European allies are unwilling to join in the kind of multi-faceted reactionary force that is neces-

sary to assure their survival and, more importantly, to prevent the assault in the first place. They are a tempting target now. We should make them a force able to win—and therefore to deter—or they should come home.

Allen: Only if we are convinced that Europe no longer wants them. Having our troops in Europe is crucial to our national security interests, and, of course, to Europe's. If it were possible to reach a verifiable and balanced agreement on mutual force reductions with the Soviet Union, then we could conceivably withdraw troops at Europe's invitation.

Brzezinski: We should not withdraw all troops, but I agree with Senator Nunn and Henry Kissinger that some reductions are justified, both for military reasons, since it would give us other options as a consequence, and because I think it is in our interest to set in motion a process in Europe

whereby there is a gradual reduction eventually in both American and Soviet armed forces. A more autonomous Europe is in our geopolitical interest.

Rumsfeld: If the Soviet Union were to withdraw its forces from Eastern Europe, one might argue that then it might be logical for the United States to consider some reduction in its forces in Western Europe. However, in that Soviet troops are in Eastern Europe in part to impose Soviet control over their satellites, it seems highly unlikely that the Soviets would be reducing their forces in Eastern Europe.

Woolsey: Given the size of the Soviet conventional threat, including their chemical warfare capability, I don't think we should pull troops out of Europe. I can see significant reductions of U.S. manpower only if the West Germans effectively arm their territorial reserve.

Courter: I cannot think of any right now. It is important, however, to make sure that the Europeans know that the United States has other important obligations in Asia, the Middle East, and Central America, and that we have to rely more on the European ground defenses than we have in the past. We also ought to continue urging our European allies to upgrade their conventional capabilities, and making sure that they have enough supplies to last for more than a few days if a war starts.

Huntington: It isn't necessary that we maintain the current level of our forces in Europe, and I see no reason why we shouldn't raise with our European allies the desirability of a modest and gradual reduction of our forces. We should not, however, threaten substantial withdrawals. Rather than shock the Western Europeans into doing more for their own defense, this would lead them to be more susceptible to Soviet influence and more accommodating of Soviet pressure.

Pfaltzgraff: We should deploy troops in Europe as long as ground forces, maritime capabilities, and air power are supplied principally by NATO-European states. The United States has a vital interest in deterring, or preventing, the outbreak of war in Europe because it would be next to impossible for our armed forces to liberate Western Europe if it was seized by the Soviet Union. This is not to assert that the number of American troops must remain at the present level. But it is important to recognize that in the absence of a tangible American defense commitment, the military balance would tilt ominously toward the Soviet Union.

Obviously, if our NATO allies did not wish American forces to remain, we would be obliged to withdraw.

Weiss: I see no circumstance in the foreseeable future in which it would be in the U.S. interest to withdraw our forces.

We aren't keeping troops in Europe simply out of the goodness of our hearts; we are there because we view the defense of Europe as a frontline defense of U.S. interests and U.S. security.



UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos.

Moorer: The number of American troops over there is not significant except in the image context: as long as the American troops are over there, the Soviets know that they cannot attack Western Europe without getting the United States involved in a war. But I think the Europeans should do their share.

Kemp: I do not believe that withdrawing our forces from Europe is a rational response to concerns that the allies should do more in their own defense. We are in Europe not out of altruism, but because the defense of Europe is a forward defense of freedom and our Western values. I agree that the Allies should be spending more on our common defense, but then, so should the United States. And we shouldn't forget that during the 1970s, while our defense expenditures were declining, the budgets of our European partners continued to grow.

Helmut Sonnenfeldt: The security of Europe is an American commitment that requires the military presence of the United States in Europe. There may be circumstances in which I could envisage some rearrangement of forces in Europe, but I can't foresee any circumstances in which the United States could or should or would wisely withdraw the totality of its forces from Europe.

Hackett: Following the collapse of the Soviet empire. It would be imprudent to do so prior to that event.

Do we need a 600-ship navy and all those carrier and battleship forces?

Kemp: Yes. One of the greatest challenges to U.S. defense in the late 1980s is the expansion of Soviet power projection, including the growth of the Soviet navy from the defense oriented navy of the 1960s to a blue water navy in the 1980s. There is not a major choke point in the world where the Soviets do not threaten U.S. communications, commerce, and strategic interests. All the major waterways today are potentially at risk.

Scowcroft: I am skeptical. I am strongly opposed to the development of the so-called maritime strategy, because that is not where the threat is. The critical areas of competition between us and the Soviet Union are around the Eurasian land mass. We don't have the luxury of fighting a war at sea if the problem is on land.

Wallop: Maybe yes and maybe no. The problem with the Navy is the same as with the rest of our force—we have no strategy to guide it. Our big carrier and battleship groups are excellent in mid-ocean. But they seem to be thought of as a near-in strike force against the Soviet Union in the early stages of the war. This is really to invite their destruction. Yes, we need a powerful Navy, if we could devise the strategy to use it. But at this moment, there seems to be none.

Brzezinski: We probably need a 600-ship Navy. But I am not sure they are the right ships. The Navy should not be used for carrying strategic warfare to Soviet home ports and to major Soviet assets located in Soviet territory. The Navy has to sustain our forces in Europe and in the Far East. It has to be able to project American power to Third World areas of vulnerability and conflict. It should be able, if necessary, to bottle up the Soviet fleet at choke points. These purposes would be best served by somewhat less concentration on the large aircraft carriers and greater funding for attack submarines, frigates, and other resources.

Bernstein: With the possible exception of Central America, the Soviets can walk just about anywhere they want to go. But we have to be able to control the sea lanes of communication to reinforce our troops overseas or to project power. Our naval assets are stretched very, very thin for that responsibility. A 600-ship navy with 15 carrier groups is just the bare bones of what we need. Carrier groups are the only way that we can project power in a Third World conflict.

Hackett: The 600-ship Navy is one of the major accomplishments of the Reagan Administration. If we are to remain a great power, a global striking force that can help defend and assist democratic forces around the world is needed. The carrier and battleship task forces are a key part of this ability to project force.

The Navy is particularly important in the long-term struggle against Communist aggression because it can bring

offensive power closer to areas of the Soviet Union than other components of the military.

Jones: There is justification for more than 600 ships, for more divisions in the Army and the Marines, and more wings for the Air Force. It's a matter of determining priorities. I'd like to see more emphasis in the Navy on control of the seas, and a lower priority on taking the battle to the Soviet homeland.


Allen: We need a 600-ship Navy for a very practical reason: because the Soviet Union has decided to become a naval power, contrary to every prediction or expectation that we had. I think we need all the ships we can get and I think we are on the road to getting them.

Moorer: We need every bit of 600 ships. No longer do the British, or the Dutch, or the Belgians, or the Germans or the French have a navy of any size. The best they can do is to contribute to the defense of the approaches to Europe. So the United States is left to cover the Indian Ocean, the Pacific Ocean, and the Atlantic Ocean. We no longer have bases around the world that are available to the United States. The only place that we have freedom of operation is on the high seas; that is why we need the Navy.

Woolsey: With 7 percent to 10 percent real growth in the defense budget, I think we would have been able to support 15 carrier battle groups and four battleships. But with real growth down to three percent or less, there is a danger that important parts of the Navy and the defense establishment will not get adequate funding or manpower if we continue these programs. Carrier battle groups and battleships are useful for contingencies in far-flung corners of the earth, and my preference would be to stay with the 15 battle groups and the four battleships for the long-term. In order to do that, I think that we need higher taxes.

Requirements in the Indian Ocean, particularly in wartime, make it very hard to operate with much less than 15 carriers and still do an adequate job on NATO's flanks and in the Pacific. Perhaps in some future world of different energy technologies, we won't need to worry so much about the Persian Gulf, and then we might not need quite so many aircraft carriers. As for the battleships, at least the first two and possibly the third were reasonable capital investments, because it cost comparatively little to overhaul them and get them ready for sea. The only thing that really concerns me about their cost is the large numbers of people that they require. But with 16-inch guns and cruise missiles, battleships are very effective tools of military power.

Courter: During the past 20 years, our naval capability has declined dramatically vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. We are an island nation, and we have to use the sea to project power. Any type of European war would be resupplied 90 percent by sea, which requires a strong Navy. I don't know



whether 600 is the magic number—we were down under 500, and that was grossly inadequate, especially as the Soviets began to acquire a first-class naval capability.

Carrier battle groups make sense. There is a synergistic effect when you have ships, aircraft, and submarines all protecting each other. I do support the Administration's goal of 15 carrier battle groups.

Luttwak: We need a Navy strong enough to ensure sea control and to protect linkages with Europe, northeast Asia, and the Gulf. The threats to shipping come from submarines and aircraft. The Soviet surface navy is an insignificant threat so long as we retain any kind of base structure overseas. So we need maritime power, but that maritime power does not all have to come from assets painted blue. And as little as possible should come from large surface ships, which are very costly. We definitely do not need all the carrier battle groups now in service, which can protect themselves against attack only by devoting a very large proportion of their total capacity for self-defense.

Today's carriers are not comparable to the aircraft carriers of 30 years ago. Now more than half the aircraft are devoted to their own self-protection, leaving only the attack squadrons to perform positive missions. As the Navy

acquires even more self-defense capabilities, for example, in the Aegis cruisers, the offensive potential of the carrier battle groups is a declining proportion of the overall effort. The carrier battle groups are really like floating self-serving priesthoods dedicated to the preservation of their own complex rituals, but yielding less and less usable combat power. By now the word has gone out that when the United States sends a carrier offshore somewhere, it's because its government does not actually want to act.

Weidenbaum: The increasing vulnerability of carriers continues to worry me—though not enough to say we should eliminate all the carriers. Foregoing expansion of these forces would be a reasonable Defense Department contribution to reducing the budget.

Van Cleave: Yes, but with the budget limited as it is now, I would have to say no to all those carriers. The overriding Navy rationale for them—horizontal escalation against the Soviet Union—is unpersuasive and illogical. It says that we would in fact be willing to escalate local non-nuclear wars, carry offensive action to the Soviet Union, presuming that the Soviets would allow us to do that and still keep the war non-nuclear.

Would you place a high priority on strategic defense?

Brzezinski: We should go ahead with the deployment of a counter first strike strategic defense composed of two

screens, terminal defense and boost phase interception. Such a two layer strategic defense would greatly enhance

strategic stability without in any way threatening the Soviet Union or increasing American first strike capabilities. It would enable us to also junk the Midgetman or at least to limit its deployment to a relatively small number. Without SDI, we would need the Midgetman in prohibitive numbers with probably insurmountable deployment problems.

Huntington: Research and development should have high priority. Decisions about production and deployment would have to await the results of the research. Going ahead with the strategic defense initiative is not necessarily destabilizing. The Soviets are doing what they can to develop their capabilities in strategic defense. So it is also necessary for us to go ahead.

Allen: Yes, absolutely. I would like to see the whole SDI program accelerated. But we need to do a better job of explaining it to the American people and to our European allies. We have to make clear that we are not abandoning deterrence as we work on SDI, and that, contrary to the malicious term "Star Wars," which implies that strategic defense is a pipe dream or comic book stuff, the technology of this defense is at hand and well within our ability to achieve.

Weiss: I applaud SDI research and hope we will push the technology as far as it can go. But I think it is unlikely that we will be able to deploy a perfect defense of cities any time in the foreseeable future. In the meantime, less esoteric and less demanding defenses employing those aspects of advanced SDI research as prove themselves could be extremely valuable in deterring attacks on military hard points—command and communication nodes, missile silos, even airfields.

Weidenbaum: No. We may find the balance of terror between strategic offensive forces uncomfortable, but it has prevented hostilities between the two superpowers. I worry that a new emphasis on strategic defense would be destabilizing, and would fuel the arms race.

Woolsey: Yes, but my definition of strategic defense is pretty broad—a whole range of defensive issues and problems have been neglected in the last 20 years. They include the threat from Soviet submarine-launched cruise and ballistic missiles, fired from just off our coasts, against our command and control facilities; they also include the non-nuclear, chemical, and nuclear threat to NATO airfield and other strategic facilities posed by the Soviet shorter-range missiles. They even include vulnerability to terrorists or special warfare units. All of these issues require attention. Research, across a whole range of technologies, on the very difficult job of cost-effective and survivable defenses against ICBMs and SLBMs in general is also worth doing.

Courter: Yes. It makes no moral or military sense to cling to a strategic doctrine which holds that our nation is safe as long as we remain vulnerable to the threat of Soviet nuclear weapons. This poses obvious risks in the event that deterrence fails or if there is an accidental launch. It also

poses long-term strategic risks even in the absence of a nuclear war, because the Soviets can use their nuclear arsenal, and the West's vulnerability to it, as a protective shield for conventional aggression.

Even an "imperfect" defense can have great short-term benefits. If we deploy defenses around our missile fields and other land-based military assets, we will raise the cost, and undercut the military rationale, of a Soviet pre-emptive first strike. This in itself would enhance stability and Western security even before overall population defenses are developed and deployed.

If all this means that we renegotiate or abrogate the ABM Treaty which the Soviets have violated, so be it.

Luttwak: Yes, I would put a very high priority on strategic defense. The decisive criterion should not be cost-effectiveness against threats, but rather the overall two-sided cost-effectiveness including the results of inducing the Soviet Union to emulate us. The real payoff of an American SDI would be its stimulation of Soviet spending on similar defenses, thereby soaking up rubles that would otherwise go for more dangerous purposes such as offensive land forces and AK-47s for guerrillas in Central America.

Rumsfeld: Absolutely. The Soviet Union has been engaged in research and development in this area over a period of years. The United States must be involved in strategic defense research if for no other reason than to offset the possibility of a Soviet breakout.

Sonnenfeldt: I have always placed a high priority on the effort to determine whether strategic defense is feasible and cost effective. I have never accepted as valid the proposition that the ABM treaty of 1972 represented the immutable acceptance of both superpowers of mutual vulnerability. The Soviets haven't accepted that, as demonstrated by their enormous investments in defensive weaponry, and we shouldn't accept it either.

Kemp: Yes. The one area where the Soviets cannot compete at all with the United States is in technology and the industrial capacity to meet a challenge. SDI would force them to divert huge amounts of resources away from expanding their current offensive posture trying to overcome our defenses, and developing defenses of their own. They already have begun this with their ABM system, their work on lasers, sophisticated air defenses, anti-satellite warfare, and so on, including a research effort on directed energy weapons that greatly exceeds our own. It all points to the need for us to accelerate our research and development.

Bernstein: The strongest argument for strategic defense is that it is the only way to deal with the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Whatever its merits in confronting the Soviet strategic threat, strategic defense should be able to protect us against hostile Third World nations with their own delivery systems. Nuclear strategy assumes that people have some sort of instinct for survival, but suppose Idi Amin had a nuclear weapon, suppose Qaddafi had a delivery system. I place an enormous priority on strategic defense in case that should happen.

Can our forces deal with guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and other forms of sub-conventional conflict?

Luttwak: No. Our forces are structured for carefully planned, large-scale, multi-service operations on the D-day model. Certainly the excessive number of mid-level and senior officers (proportionately about three times as many as we had in 1945) contributes to this predisposition for large-scale operations. But to deal with guerrilla warfare and terrorism, one needs simplicity, and a craftlike attention to detail. This requires a willingness to give responsibility to relatively junior officers in a decentralized pattern of command.

It is hopeless to expect that senior officers now crowding huge, grossly over-staffed, multi-service headquarters will leave the small operations of war to their juniors. They refuse to remain idle, they systematically interfere: for every operation they require a two-way flow of reports up, and orders down. Appropriate for a set-piece offensive in the style of one Western front in World War I, this method is grossly inappropriate for commando operations and small scale war in general. Our overelaborate system can only handle huge and complex operations.

The Special Forces and Special Operations Forces live a precarious existence, and do not receive the priority they deserve except for money, lots of it. Their officers are not regarded as future generals, but rather as deviants destined for early retirement. This precludes recruitment of the quality people that we need.

Wallop: No. Not as presently constituted and not as presently led. And not so long as the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA and the NSC work under the illusion that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. How do you fight enemies if you can't be certain in your own mind whether they are enemies or friends or even if the distinction matters? So long as senior officials act on the assumptions that the world is nothing but varying shades of gray, we don't know what to confront.

Van Cleave: Our problems here have less to do with military capabilities than with self-imposed political handicaps

that restrict the use of those capabilities. Our military forces undoubtedly don't prepare enough for low-intensity conflicts. But they are also disillusioned about whether they would be allowed to use their capabilities once they developed them.

Hackett: Part of the problem is that the people engaged in anti-terrorist activities usually don't have much opportunity for rapid promotion in the military. Anti-terrorism is not the fast track for advancement.

Jones: Not very well. Guerrilla warfare and terrorism are the most likely types of conflict, and they are the areas where we are least prepared. They generally receive low priority within the military. When faced with this kind of warfare, we tend to fight it as if it were conventional war. We made the Vietnam War our war instead of a Vietnamese war.

Scowcroft: We can probably do more than we have to identify sources of supply and organizational structures. But terrorism is very cheap in comparison to the costs of defending against it. Guerrilla warfare is something we learned how to do fairly well a long time ago fighting the American Indians and against the British, but our present military concepts are heavily oriented toward firepower.

Woolsey: Not very well. American society has a broad range of vulnerabilities that no one deals with very well. A lot of the counter-terrorist people look upon terrorism as principally the taking of hostages. Many of the civil defense people are oriented toward full-scale nuclear war and massive relocations.

But there is a troubling middle ground of vulnerabilities, including the possibility of attacks on oil and gas pipelines and electric power grids, or bank transfer networks, on all the sinews that tie us together as a modern society. This is a broad national problem, not just a problem that the Department of Defense can solve.

How serious is the problem of interservice rivalry?

Luttwak: Competition between services is as valuable as competition elsewhere. The real catastrophe is interservice harmony. The services achieve harmony through the committee structure of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They achieve the usual results of committees, namely lowest-common-denominator solutions. Strategy requires sharp choices, not diluted compromises. Compromise works well in everything except strategy—in it one must make sharp decisions. One can win by attacking on the right or on the left; one cannot win by diluting one's effort across the board.

Interservice harmony resulted in the division of Gre-

nada, a small island with only 133 square miles, into two distinct operational sectors, one reserved for the Army and Air Force, the other for the Marines and the Navy. This military atrocity slowed down the entire operation: to avoid fratricide, each separate force had to be very careful as it moved instead of hitting fast and hard. The result was that several thousand elite U.S. forces took several days to defeat perhaps 42 military Cubans and a few hundred others of scant military training. Interservice harmony also produced the Iran rescue attempt with its Marine pilots for Navy helicopters to carry Army troops to rendezvous with Air Force aircraft.

We need national military officers. Let us not call them a general staff. As opposed to the present multi-guild arrangement, we would have a body of national military officers, who would confront national military problems and offer national military solutions. With their staff support the civilian authorities could designate what mix of diverse military force is required. And then instruct the services to provide them—instead of the present chaotic army of forces separately chosen.

Moorer: All the big corporations have rivalry, all the universities have rivalry. What is so wrong about rivalry? People say that the Supreme Courts deliberates, the Congress debates, and the Joint Chiefs bicker. But if you get five officers with 180 years experience between them, it would be silly to expect them to agree on everything. And it would be a grave disservice to the President if that happened.

Bernstein: Sure, interservice rivalry is a serious problem, as Edward Luttwak has shown in analyzing the Grenada operation. But I don't see any need to restructure the Joint Chiefs of Staff into a general staff. I am instinctively reluctant to increase the power of a single military figure. That would not be consistent with our political tradition. Political leadership should make it clear that promotions at the highest level go to team players, and that internecine rivalry of the sort that now goes on in the military will put an end to your professional future.

Allen: Interservice rivalry is a pernicious but endemic factor in our defense establishment. I am not so sure that a general staff in the classic sense of that term is required, but we do need a stronger Chairman. The Chairman should be able to make choices that he is not now permitted to make. He should also be held accountable. Interservice rivalry diffuses accountability in our system.

Van Cleave: I think it's about time to we had a general staff. It would give us more professionalism in planning.

Has Caspar Weinberger been a good secretary of defense?

Bernstein: Yes. He is breathing life back into the military. The only thing I regret is his speech on the use of military power. I wonder if we would ever have used military force in the past if we had had to meet his criteria. His speech also created an unfortunate image for the military, implying that the name of the game is procurement for its own sake.

Van Cleave: The picture for Weinberger is mixed, I believe. There are two or three areas where he has performed splendidly. He has shown courage and determination in attempting to resist cuts in an already inadequate budget. He has been very sound on arms control. And he has spoken candidly and articulately about the Soviet threat, releasing far more detailed and up-to-date information than in the past.

Pfaltzgraf: Proposals to strengthen the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or create a planning staff within his office would build yet another layer of military bureaucracy and aggravate one of the worst problems in the American military establishment today: the overcentralization of tactical decisions. Strategy must come from the highest authority, but tactics for the execution of that strategy are best determined by the circumstances in the field. Unfortunately, tactical decisions have been centralized in Washington in the last two generations, and this has greatly damaged our ability to fight wars.

Kemp: I am not as critical of the current set-up as some in the military reform movement. I am not saying that we are doing it perfectly and I think the failure of the Joint Chiefs to speak out during Vietnam was a stain on the system as well as on them. But a level of competition or rivalry probably is necessary. It is up to the Chairman, as well as the secretary of defense, to remove the deleterious effects.

Huntington: It makes it difficult for us to have an effective command structure. It makes it difficult for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to operate properly. And it makes it almost impossible for the top civilian leadership to get military advice independent of the interests of the services.

The problem is not just interservice rivalry, but also what is done to compensate for interservice rivalry. We get exactly what you would expect from an oligopoly of this sort: interservice collusion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff essentially negotiate agreements among themselves, and according to the testimony of most recent secretaries of defense, their recommendations about strategic planning and weapons procurement aren't very useful. Another serious problem is that each service strongly resists putting its forces under the command of somebody from another service.

Rumsfeld: It exists. It is manageable. And it is not always unhealthy. Management of the Defense Department needs to prevent tensions between the services from being destructive. We don't need a general staff.

On the minus side, he has done a poor job articulating United States strategy, especially in nuclear policy. His Annual Reports have been much weaker in this than Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, and Harold Brown. They fail to mold a comprehensive and consistent strategy, with matching force developments and priorities. And the restrictions and conditions he has put, in his speeches, on the use of American military force would virtually deny timely and effective use of those forces except in extreme cases.

Wallop: He started in 1981 with a clear mandate from the people that a buildup in defense was absolutely necessary for the United States. In 1980, 71 percent of Americans thought we should be spending more on defense. And he, in effect, justified the *New York Times* editorializing that more money doesn't buy more defense. He did this be-

cause he did not choose weapons to accomplish a strategy. He simply took the requests from the services and passed them on to the Congress.

He has taken the excellent idea of strategic defense and has allowed the bureaucracy to turn it into a multi-billion dollar boondoggle guaranteed not to protect a single American until after the year 2000, if then. He has not mastered the Pentagon. It has mastered him. Thus he has managed to turn a critical need for an increase in defense into a critical cry for less. Today only 9 percent of Americans think we should be spending more. The mandate for defense was lost somewhere along the line by a lack of ability to translate what we spent into safety for the American people.

Sonnenfeldt: He has not been the best but he has not been the worst. I think that Weinberger was here to manage a substantial effort to deal with deficiencies in our military posture. He has been quite successful in that respect. His interest has been less in strategic theory. He, like others, has to confront the unfortunate circumstance that in the United States, public support in regard to defense tends to be very cyclical and fluctuating. For a period he had the benefit of strong public support. Not any more. He is fighting a rearguard action now, and I admire him for his tenacity. Perhaps the earlier exuberance contributed to a rather more rapid swing toward the negative than would have happened otherwise.

Scowcroft: In 1980, there was a strong national consensus that we needed to spend more money on defense. That consensus has now vanished. Maybe it would have anyway. But if the force improvement had been structured differently and perhaps undertaken on a less ambitious scale, we might have been better off. But in part thanks to Weinberger, morale in the department is very good.

Luttwak: I think he was the ideal secretary in the first few Reagan years, because the urgent need really was to restore



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the structure, and throwing money at the problem really was the correct solution. Now that the patient has recovered, the time has come for surgery. If Cap Weinberger doesn't undertake deep, fundamental reforms, he will no longer be a good secretary of defense.

Allen: He has been tenacious and prudent at the same time. He is not obsessed with achieving superiority over the Soviet Union, but he does recognize his responsibilities of stewardship in providing us with the defense that we may one day need to activate. I think he has done as well or better than any secretary of defense in the post-war period.

Weidenbaum: He has provided leadership to the Defense Department, presided over the strengthening of the volunteer military force, and enhanced the military's own self-respect.

On the negative side, he has overdone it in convincing the President to make resources available to the Defense Department. His role should not be just to reconcile statistically overlapping claims of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but to choose which service's program best meets a given strategic or tactical need. I don't see that happening.

How well has the volunteer army been working?

Luttwak: It is easy to show with statistics that the volunteer forces are doing just fine. What doesn't show up in the statistics is the atmosphere of an armed force not made up of vibrant youngsters but rather of people who are doing a job. There is still a great deal of enthusiasm and dedication, but the social atmosphere puts an emphasis on doing the job, and getting the pay. There would be nothing wrong with that if the armed forces were a business organization. But, when you have to maintain readiness for combat, it is a very serious problem.

Neither do the statistics show the many adjustments that have to be made in order to lure people, even with high pay, into the armed forces. Training requirements have been relaxed, and there is an overall culture of comfort.

A major strategic weakness of the all-volunteer army is that it does not generate young reservists. With a conscription system, it is very hard to train people in only a year or a year and a half. But the reward of bringing many young people into the military is that you then have trained reservists in the civilian population. We now have rather small active-duty forces, exceedingly well trained and equipped with extremely elaborate equipment which we cannot mass-produce. We have neither mass-produceable equipment nor a mass of reservists. We therefore have neither condition of mass mobilization.

The current structure of the U.S. military—small forces at a high state of readiness—is not sufficient to meet our worldwide commitments. To generate much more military



power at equal cost, we need much larger forces that are not as well trained, with a much greater reserve component.

The argument that conscription would cost more, unless slave wages were paid to the conscripts, is pure demagoguery. Conscripts are not slaves and they serve no master for slave wages. They are young people doing their duty, for their nation. Why should the United States be a country where young people do not have to serve their nation? It is an unnatural state of affairs.

Weiss: Better than I thought it would, but I remain opposed to it. On a philosophical level, I believe that young men and women ought to serve their nation. I support universal conscription—and it could be broader than just for the military—for a limited period. In addition, as a practical matter, half or more of our defense budget goes to expenditures on personnel—salaries, pensions, and benefits. This is an unconscionable amount to devote to personnel. The Soviets devote a tiny fraction of this sum, thereby permitting the purchase of much more hardware.

Brzezinski: We are contributing to hedonism and elite guilt complexes in our society by a system in which essentially the poorer classes are enticed by a combination of economic motives as well as patriotism to defend the privileges of the rich. This prompts the rich to engage in pseudo-intellectual justifications for their evasion of civic responsibility. I favor a national service obligation for every young man and woman at the age of 18 for a period of

a year and a half in which military service will be one option among several, including some very humane, philanthropic, and ecological services.

Wallop: Well, the volunteer army hasn't had to work. It did well in Grenada, which is the only purposeful act that it has been asked to do. From the secretary of defense on down, the ideal in the military is that it won't be committed. The volunteer army has given the American people the sense that their defense and the need for projection of military force can be purchased without a tax paid in blood. And it has taken the middle class completely out of the thought process. But democracy and liberty are not spectator sports.

Sonnenfeldt: It is a very expensive military establishment because it has to compete to some extent with private employment. Our manpower costs are enormous compared to the Soviets and to many other countries. On the other hand, we do have in many respects highly motivated forces and improving professionalism throughout the military services. And we have been spared in recent years major problems of discipline and morale which we might have had to face if we had maintained the draft. Overall, the nonconscript military establishment has worked quite well for us, but at great expense and without the benefits of a wider national commitment to national service.

Woolsey: As we move into the mid-1990s, the armed services will have to attract one out of every three qualified non-college males just to maintain the current force structure. And when you add the increases necessary for a 600-ship navy, you have a serious problem on the horizon. I am also worried by the widening divorce between the middle class and the military. Before long, it will be rare to find many professional people, for example college educators or members of Congress, who have served in the military or had much to do with it. I think that is a mistake. We have an opportunity now, partially as a result of some of the controversy over student loan programs, to institute the idea that government support of an individual's higher education should be given in exchange for service to the country. Perhaps this should not only be done for serving in the military but also for serving in other capacities, the Peace Corps and the like. These types of educational incentives could attract into the military people who are particularly upwardly mobile. And I think that would be a positive thing.

Jones: Very well. The quality of personnel is high. And I would prefer an all-volunteer force if we can recruit quality people. If we can't recruit volunteers who meet high standards, however, then I would be the first to call for restoring selective service. I would rather have a draft than have the problem we had in the 1970s, when the system had to lower standards in order to recruit the numbers required.

Kemp: I think it has worked remarkably well. The morale and quality of the services has never been higher and I give a lot of the credit to Reagan and Weinberger for restoring much of that and Congress too, for its support of pay

increases. It wasn't so long ago that solid conservative members of Congress in both parties were calling for the return of the draft. I haven't heard that very recently and for good reasons.

However, the volunteer army is a costly venture. To attract and retain good people, we have to pay them more. And when 50 percent of our defense budget is related to personnel costs, this is an expensive trade off. While I don't like the idea, defense budget cuts could force consideration of returning to a draft as an immediate and very effective way of saving money.

Weidenbaum: I served as a member of the President's military manpower commission. I came away with the belief that with sufficient incentive—pay, housing, or educational programs—good people can be attracted to and kept in the military. I did make a suggestion that fell on deaf ears—to use the pay system in a differential way, the way we do in commercial markets. If you have a shortage of scientists and engineers, you pay them more. That was offensive to military people. They objected to paying one specialty more than another. "Comparable worth," unfortunately, is alive and well in the Pentagon

Hackett: The volunteer army is a real success story. In 1980, there were a number of people who thought that the volunteer army could not work, that a draft was going to be necessary. But President Reagan has restored an attitude of patriotism in the country, and this has had the beneficial side-effect of increasing the attractiveness of military service.

Allen: It costs too much. I think we ought to pay our people well, and that we should not stint in taking care of their dependents. But we can make massive savings at the

lower end by restoring the draft. I would like to see the reinstatement of the GI bill in its broadest form, combined with the draft. That would solve a number of the cost problems that confront us today and also provide an important incentive to serve in the military

Pfaltzgraf: It has worked well in attracting recruits, especially during periods of unemployment. It has yet to be tested in sustained combat, which remains the ultimate measure of military effectiveness. The question for the late 1980s is whether we can continue to attract people with the requisite skills into the military with declining levels of unemployment and reduced draft-age population.

However, with its tradition against large standing armies in peacetime, our society contains built-in resistance to conscription as a basis for our armed forces. Only with a broadly based conception of a clear and present danger are we likely to mobilize the necessary popular support to sustain a draft, unless perhaps it is developed within some broader alternate form of national service.

Bernstein: The important question is not so much how well has it worked in the past, but what will it look like 10 or 15 years from now. Is a shortage of available manpower going to force us to put women into combat?

Rumsfeld: The testimony of the senior officials at the Pentagon is that the United States has the highest quality personnel ever, the lowest absence without leave rate, and generally good retention. However, there is concern that as the economy strengthens, it could become somewhat more difficult for the services to attract and retain sufficient numbers of volunteers on active duty and in the active reserves. The solution to that would be to make the incentives in the military more competitive.

THE TWO FACES OF GEORGE KENNAN

From Containment to "Understanding"

PAUL HOLLANDER

George Kennan used to be an unapologetic critic of the Soviet Union and an advocate of a firm U.S. response to its expansionism. Now he seeks to understand and accommodate Soviet behavior. What accounts for this remarkable change in one of the most influential voices in American foreign policy since World War II?

In 1947, Mr. Kennan published a pseudonymous article in *Foreign Affairs* that called for a U.S. policy of "long term, patient but firm, and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies . . . by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." The "Mr. X" article became the blueprint for the policy of "containment" that was generally adopted by five presidents, from Truman to Nixon. Mr. Kennan argued that containment should be a global strategy, not one restricted to a few areas, and that it was a means to defeat the Soviet system. Without expanding, the Soviet empire would collapse.


Since his "Mr. X" article, Mr. Kennan has gone on to become one of the nation's most respected diplomats and experts on Soviet affairs. He was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union in 1952, and to Yugoslavia from 1961-1963. He has had an enormous influence on the Soviet studies establishment, and is regarded as the patriarch of Sovietology in the West. No longer are his opinions confined to the pages of scholarly magazines or rarefied meetings of academics; they are amplified in the pages of the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *New Yorker*, *The Atlantic*, and other popular journals. Indeed, the propositions advanced by Mr. Kennan have become, with the passage of time, less and less distinct, more and more part of the conventional wisdom. Paradoxically, Mr. Kennan's current set of views converges with those of other public figures profoundly ignorant of Soviet politics, Russian culture, and the history of U.S.-Soviet relations, and animated by an adversary posture toward their own society. Though himself a critic of American foreign policy, Mr. Kennan is distinguished from these numerous advisors of a conciliatory position toward the Soviet Union by his first-hand knowledge, experience, and insight into Soviet conduct and the mentality of Soviet leaders.

Mr. Kennan is reluctant to admit it, but his understanding of the nature of the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat has changed remarkably over the years. His writings in the 1940s and 1950s reveal an urgent sense of the dangers posed by the Soviets and the need for a firm U.S. response. In 1946, Mr. Kennan wrote that the Russians "have no conception of permanent friendly relations between states"; for them, "all foreigners are potential enemies." The United States was advised, "Don't act chummy with them," "Don't make fatuous gestures of goodwill," and "Don't be afraid of unpleasantness and public airing of differences." In his *Memoirs*, Mr. Kennan recalls a statement he made in 1951, in which he voiced skepticism about arms control because "armaments are a function and not a cause of political tension" and "no limitation of armaments on a multilateral scale can be effected as long as the political problems are not tackled and regulated in some realistic way."

Perhaps the line of argument most continuous with his early thought is Mr. Kennan's claim that the Soviet Union is a chronically insecure regime that seeks to project its power in pursuit of an elusive security. But in the past Mr. Kennan regarded the Soviets' insecurity as a source of aggression and conflict; now he seems to regard it as something to be understood and accommodated.

He argued in a *New Yorker* article last year that the Soviets suffer from a "siege mentality," that their expansionism results from a "state of mind that assumes all forms of authority not under Soviet control to be, or to be likely to be, wicked, hostile, and menacing." Mr. Kennan lapses into a clinical vocabulary as he describes Soviet leaders as possessed of a "congenital sense of insecurity" and a "neurotic fear of penetration"—he frequently characterizes them as frustrated, secretive, defensive, fixated, troubled, and anxious. Quite recently he ascribed to them "dark suspicions of everything and everyone foreign. . . ob-

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Drawing by Bill Bramhall for *Policy Review*.

session with secrecy . . . compulsion to conceal.” (At the same time, in the context of arguing for agreements with the Soviets to diminish the nuclear risk, he presents the same Soviet leaders as sober, conservative, responsible, stable, and cautious.)

While Mr. Kennan is quick to pass moral judgments about American society on subjects ranging from pornography, crime, pollution, Watergate, the CIA, and Vietnam, he recoils from being judgmental about Soviet politics.

Of late he has stressed that these insecurities and neuroses are best alleviated by understanding and tolerance. Mr. Kennan seems to share the therapeutic perspective of scholars such as Jerry Hough, Stanley Hoffman, Theodore von Laue, Marshall Shulman, and Stephen Cohen, who regard insecurity, of an almost pathological kind, as the principal driving force in Soviet politics, foreign and domestic. Correspondingly, Soviet aggression is often perceived as epiphenomenal, inconsequential, and inspired by weakness—not strength. Hostile Soviet statements are treated as harmless rhetoric, the domination of neighboring countries as measures of understandable insecurity, the projection of military power across the globe as muddled adventurism, or perhaps as a peculiar mixture of motives involving traditional Russian geopolitical goals and the tiresome necessity of competing with China in the Third World.

Moral Accommodation

In his pursuit of accommodation, and to reduce the menacing aspects of Soviet policies, Mr. Kennan is eager to de-emphasize the distinctive and often unpleasant attributes of Soviet leaders. In a February 1985 *New Yorker* article, Mr. Kennan noted that “these Soviet Communists with whom we will have to deal are flesh and blood people like us,” an assertion not likely to be doubted. He went on to concede that they were “misguided, if you will, but no more guilty than we are of circumstances into which we all were born—and that they, like us, are simply trying to make the best of it.” What is one to make of such Olympian perspectives, such a resolutely non-judgmental stance? Can’t we apply the same lofty and generous considerations to any political system, or group or individual, thus foreclosing moral judgment over any behavior? Weren’t the Nazis born into circumstances beyond their control?

While Mr. Kennan does not hesitate to pass moral judgments about American society on subjects ranging from pornography, crime, pollution, Watergate, the CIA, and

Vietnam, he recoils from being judgmental about Soviet politics. Following the Polish military takeover in December 1981, Mr. Kennan advised the American government “to reserve judgment in the face of a rapidly moving and unpredictable situation.” He was equally unable to muster indignation when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, viewing the event primarily as a matter that “has created serious international complications.” Generally speaking, Mr. Kennan’s concern with Soviet transgressions has been that they disturb Western public opinion and make rapprochement between the superpowers more difficult.

Over the years, Mr. Kennan has come to believe that the negative image of the Soviet Union is “a monster of our own creation.” He intends to provide a corrective in the form of a more judicious and balanced image. For example, in *Nuclear Delusion*, he views the Soviet attempt to build missile bases in Cuba as “an unwise effort . . . something [either] forced upon Khrushchev by his own colleagues or . . . a last desperate gamble on his part with a view to restoring his authority.” Recent Soviet advances in the Third World are “no more far-reaching or . . . any more successful than those they had put forward in earlier decades.” The Soviet adoption of “a rhetorical and political stance of principled Marxism [was] designed to protect them from charges by the Chinese Communists that they were betraying the cause of Marxism-Leninism.” The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan he described as “bizarre” and “an ill-considered” act of “incredible clumsiness.” Mr. Kennan was eager to give the benefit of the doubt to the Soviets for a probable violation of the ABM treaty; in a Winter 1985 article in *Foreign Affairs*, he argued that the construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar “becomes understandable” when you consider that it “fills an important gap in Soviet warning systems.” What is troubling is Mr. Kennan’s apparent difficulty to deem illegitimate any manifestation of the Soviet determination to cling to or project power. Wherever he looks he finds exculpatory reasons for Soviet expansionism.

When the argument requires it, Mr. Kennan can move very swiftly from the realm of understatement about the Soviet Union to vivid language to caricature the view of those who see the world and the Soviet leaders differently. Thus he talks about “professions of determination to grind the Russians into the dust economically to exploit the resulting misery,” a characterization difficult to match with any U.S. policy. In the view of those who disagree with him, according to Mr. Kennan:

The Soviet leaders appear as a terrible and forbidding group of men: monsters of sorts . . . men who have all internal problems . . . essentially solved and therefore free to spend their time evolving elaborate schemes for some ultimate military showdown—men who are prepared to accept the most tremendous risks, and to place upon their people the most fearful sacrifices, if only in this way their program of destruction or domination of ourselves and our allies can be successfully carried forward.

Mr. Kennan’s own view of Soviet leaders is one of “a group of quite ordinary men, to some extent victims . . . of the ideology on which they have been reared, but shaped

far more importantly by the discipline of the responsibility they and their predecessors have borne as rulers of a great country in the modern technological age." They are seen as

men who share the horror of major war . . . who have no desire to experience another military conflagration and have no intention to launch one—men more seriously concerned to preserve the present limits of their political power and responsibility than to expand those limits—men whose motivation is essentially defensive and whose attention is riveted primarily to the unsolved problems of economic development within their own country . . . men who suffer greatly under the financial burden which the maintenance of the present bloated arsenals imposes on the Soviet economy.

Mr. Kennan seems convinced that the Soviets' choices are drastically limited by historical necessity, of which the Soviet leaders are merely "victims." A most telling expression of this is the way that Mr. Kennan reacts to Soviet persecution of dissidents. "I am far from approving of the treatment these people are receiving," he has written. "I feel almost sorry for a regime whose sense of weakness is so great that it cannot find better ways than this to cope with differences of opinion between itself and a relatively small and helpless band of intellectuals." Here Mr. Kennan seems to narrow the distinction between victimizer and victim. Why should anybody feel "almost sorry" for a regime so intolerant and repressive? By Mr. Kennan's criteria, one is unable to censure South African whites who repress and murder blacks because they feel threatened by the prospect of revolution and loss of power, or the Nazis who were paranoid about the possibility of a Jewish takeover of the world.

Benevolent Determinism

Another thread in Mr. Kennan's thinking is the belief that the Soviet Union, sometime after World War II, shed its menacing and ideologically conditioned peculiarities. From then on, he wrote in *Nuclear Delusion*, "The Soviet Union would behave in the main as a normal great power, the traditional concerns and ambitions of Russian rulers taking precedence over ideological ones." The men in the Kremlin, Mr. Kennan said, were acting "in the tradition of nationalist Russian rulers of earlier periods. Their predominant and decisive concern ran to the protection of their own rule within Russia, and also to the security of the Russian heartland." And Mr. Kennan seeks to refute those who argue that Soviet leaders place political objectives above the welfare of their people. Indeed, he seems hopeful about Soviet intentions to reduce armaments because "the program of social and industrial development on which the Soviet leaders have set their hearts. . . is still far from complete and its completion. . . could not be reconciled with the preparation for any major military undertaking."

Occasionally Mr. Kennan writes about Soviet repressive practices as if they were anthropological curiosities that unreasonably disturb ethnocentric Americans and constitute one of the unnecessary impediments to better relations.

The Soviet authorities will no doubt continue to adhere to internal practices of a repressive nature that will continue to offend large sections of American opinion. They will continue to guard what they consider their right or their duty, to subject the United States to periodic rhetorical denunciation and to give anti-American political factions in Third World countries support . . . None of this will be helpful to the development of the relationship.

In recent writings, Mr. Kennan has increasingly displayed a historical determinism combined with an effort at a sympathetic understanding of Soviet policy. "The Soviet leaders view Western Europe, we may be sure, with a troubled and unhappy eye. Its military association with the U.S. has always been disturbing. Its high living standards provide an uncomfortable comparison." Mr. Kennan finds

What is troubling is Mr. Kennan's apparent difficulty to deem illegitimate any manifestation of the Soviet determination to cling to or project power.

some justification for Soviet imperial ventures in the Near and Middle East. "This is, let us first remember, a region much closer to the Soviet borders than it is to ours. It would be idle to expect the Soviet leaders not to feel their interests seriously affected by whatever happens in that area." Mr. Kennan fully understands Soviet reluctance to ease its grip on East Germany. "East Germany remains, for various reasons, the kingpin of the entire Soviet position in Central Europe. For this reason Moscow is *obliged* to cling to positions, with relation to Berlin, to the Wall, and the division of Germany." In the Third World, "Political necessity *obliges* Moscow to try to keep its hands as a supportive force for left-wing and national liberationist efforts of every sort." Soviet expansionism in Africa is explained by the Chinese challenge. The Soviet Union "has *no choice* but to keep up its involvement." After dismissing the invasion of Afghanistan as "bizarre" and "ill considered," Mr. Kennan discerns a Soviet eagerness to withdraw, just as it is eager to withdraw from other areas under its domination. Yet, "Moscow might *feel itself compelled* to hang on even though it would like. . . to withdraw," Mr. Kennan wrote in the *New Yorker*. (Emphases mine.)

This benevolent determinism provides the basis for the uneven application of moral judgments to the U.S. and Soviet systems. Mr. Kennan seems to say that while both commit reprehensible actions, the United States is to be held accountable for its evils, while the Soviet Union is excused because its actions lie outside its control. Mr. Kennan also argues as though the Soviet Union were a political system that exercised power with utmost reluc-

tance and inefficiency. A look at the map of the world since World War II, and particularly since the end of the Vietnam War, does not sustain this image of Soviet reserve.

Curiously, Mr. Kennan overlooks the perennial link between defensiveness and insecurity on the one hand, and aggressiveness and power-hunger on the other. In the case of generations of Soviet leaders, these two sets of attitudes are inextricably interwoven. Stalin felt threatened by Trotsky, for example, even when Trotsky removed himself to Mexico—we all know how Stalin assuaged this sense of insecurity. And the fact of the matter is that ruling groups or individuals intent on expanding their power at home and abroad will sooner or later be bound to feel more threatened on more occasions than those with more limited aspirations.

Occasionally Mr. Kennan writes about Soviet repressive practices as if they were anthropological curiosities that unreasonably disturb ethnocentric Americans and constitute one of the unnecessary impediments to better relations.

Here is Mr. Kennan's version of the domino theory applied to the Soviet empire. He explains why Moscow cannot bring itself to improve relations with Japan by returning the islands it seized following World War II.

Moscow could no doubt appreciably improve its relations with Japan were it able to yield on this point. But there is apparently fear on the part of the leadership that to do so would be to make itself vulnerable to similar demands for readjustment of borders in Europe, where the Soviet Union also appropriated several areas which other governments do not regard as historically or otherwise natural parts of Russia.

By this logic no aggressor can ever cease to aggress, and no conqueror relinquish any of its conquests. Perhaps the Soviets do feel that to yield to Japan would also mean yielding to Romania and Lithuania and Afghanistan. Perhaps the Soviet leaders also fear that to permit 20 dissenters to gather in Red Square would be to risk mass demonstrations of thousands or hundreds of thousands of people whose popular discontent would sweep the regime from power. But if this is the case, why does Mr. Kennan have so much empathy for the regime? Why should the desire to retain the fruits of conquest be treated as a respectable impulse? By the same token, one may absolve of responsibility any power which ever conquered any land, or any group which ever subjugated others: concessions are always dangerous and may lead to further demands.

The Reasons Why

It is not easy to account for Mr. Kennan's gradual change of heart and mind about the Soviet Union. One obvious explanation is that the Soviet Union today is less barbarous than it was under Stalin. But the essential nature of the Soviet regime has not changed; indeed in some ways Stalinism has been institutionalized. Mr. Kennan himself, while noting changes in the Soviet Union over the years, nevertheless wrote recently, "The traces of Stalinism, while today much faded and partly obliterated, are still not wholly absent from the Soviet scene."

Perhaps a more significant factor is Mr. Kennan's apocalyptic fear of environmental disaster and "the growing darkness of the nuclear shadow." In *The Decline of the West*, Mr. Kennan writes:

We are faced with two conceivable versions of catastrophe. One is a possible . . . catastrophe in case we should militarily clash with the Russians. The other is an absolutely certain ecological and demographic disaster which is going to overtake this planet within the next, I would say, 60-70 years, but the effects of which will probably make themselves very plainly felt before the end of this century . . . compared to the dangers which confront us on the ecological and demographic front, the possibility of Soviet control of Western Europe . . . would strike me as a minor catastrophe.

In *Nuclear Delusion*, Mr. Kennan argues, "We have been putting the emphasis in the wrong places. We talk of saving Western civilization when we talk of a military confrontation with Russia—but saving it for what? In order that 20 or 30 years hence we may run out of oil and minerals and food and invite upon humanity a devastating conflict between the overpopulated and undernourished two-thirds of the world and ourselves?"

Perhaps we can share Mr. Kennan's concern for the earth's limited resources, but it is hard to see why tackling that problem and keeping the Soviet Union from expanding its influence should be mutually exclusive. Mr. Kennan seems to feel either that the ecological-demographic situation is so bad that it warrants turning attention away from all other threats, or he does not view the other threats as so bad after all. Perhaps a key to Mr. Kennan's changed views is his growing conviction that American claims of moral superiority over the Soviet Union are dubious, at best. In 1983, he wrote, "If what we want to achieve is liberalization of the political regime prevailing in the Soviet Union, then it is to example rather than precept that we must look; and we could start by tackling with far greater resolution and courage than we have shown to date, some of the glaring deficiencies in our own society." Earlier, in 1976, Mr. Kennan wondered "what use there is in trying to protect the Western world against fancied external threats when the signs of disintegration within are so striking. Wouldn't we be better advised if we put our main effort into making ourselves worth protecting?" These are baffling arguments if taken at face value—surely Mr. Kennan does not believe that, say, the reduction of air pollution, juvenile delinquency, and other social ills in the United States would motivate the Soviet regime to relax censor-

ship, stop incinerating Afghan villages, and cease confining their dissidents to psychiatric wards.

Mr. Kennan does believe, however, that the flaws and defects of American society disqualify its representatives from dwelling on the evils of the Soviet system. In one memorable passage in *The Decline of the West*, Mr. Kennan writes:

Isn't it grotesque to spend so much of our energy on opposing Russia to save a West which is honeycombed with bewilderment and a profound sense of internal decay? Show me first an America which has successfully coped with the problems of crime, drugs, deteriorating educational standards, urban decay, pornography, and decadence of one sort or another—show me an America that has pulled itself together and is what it ought to be, then I will tell you how we are going to defend ourselves from the Russians. But, as things are, I can see very little merit in organizing ourselves to defend from the Russians the porno shops in central Washington. In fact the Russians are much better in holding pornography at bay than we are.

Mr. Kennan seems to have arrived at this conclusion from an elitist, aristocratic point of view, somewhat similar to the fulminations of Herbert Marcuse against a debased mass society. Unlike most social critics of contemporary America—of the radical, radical-liberal, or quasi-Marxist persuasion—Mr. Kennan is not primarily troubled by inequalities, a phenomenon he probably considers endemic to all societies. His main concern lies with standards: moral, cultural, educational, aesthetic, or environmental. Their decline is at the root of his critique of American society.

These sentiments are also evident in Mr. Kennan's account of a small Danish port he was visiting: "swarming with hippies—motorbikes, girl friends, drugs, pornography, drunkenness, noise—it was all there. I looked at this mob and thought how one company of robust Russian infantry would drive it out of town." These recollections reveal with special force his visceral distaste for the many hedonistic elements of contemporary Western culture and youth culture, and a deep-seated revulsion from disorder, crowds, and cheap escapism. His wishful allusion to a clean-up operation by robust Russian soldiers also suggests that he would favor the heavy-handedness of authoritarian moral purpose and purification over the permissive, dissolute hedonism of the declining West. In his *Memoirs*, Mr. Kennan readily admitted to "a preference for hierarchy and authority over compromise and manipulation" and a "distaste amounting almost to horror for the chaotic disorder of the American political process." By contrast, he has developed a grudging respect for the Soviet exercise of authority to deal with social problems. Soviet leaders, when they recognize the debasement of modern society, "would have the political authority and the economic controls necessary to enable them to take the practical consequences of their insights," Mr. Kennan writes.

What set Mr. Kennan apart from many other critics of American society was his aversion to the rise of the New Left in the 1960s. He found the rhetoric and tactics of the

antiwar activists extremely distasteful, although he shared many of their concerns about U.S. foreign policy. But while opposition to the New Left helped prod many liberals into becoming neoconservatives, Mr. Kennan's disapproval of the radicals further alienated him from the West. He treated the cultural radicalism of the New Left as a symbol for new attitudes that were becoming widespread in the West—loose living, hedonism, and ill-mannered behavior—and he began to ask the question of whether this decadent society was worth preserving, after all.

Left Out

Mr. Kennan admitted to an alienated sensibility as early as 1951, when he wrote of travelling to the heartland of the country and being repulsed by the dirt, desolation, and ugliness of large midwestern cities. He wandered around them in a daze, feeling totally estranged. "Even the language [of children playing in the streets] was unfamiliar to me."

"I can see very little merit in organizing ourselves to defend from the Russians the porno shops in central Washington. In fact, the Russians are much better at holding pornography at bay than we are."

George Kennan

In 1952, Mr. Kennan complained that "our country bristles with imperfections," including racism, graft, slums, juvenile delinquency, decline of community, inflation, mass media culture, deterioration of the soil, and lack of spiritual purpose. These problems seem to introduce a deep pessimism in him, even causing him to doubt "whether America's problems were really soluble at all by operation of the liberal democratic and free enterprise institutions traditional to our country." These worries about the West were compounded by a personal sense of loneliness and failure. In his *Memoirs*, Mr. Kennan recollects, "I returned to Princeton [from Washington] extremely lonely. There was, it seemed to me, no one left in Washington with whom I could discuss matters fully, frankly, and hopefully against the background of a common outlook and understanding." Despite his enormous influence, Mr. Kennan has always felt under-appreciated, and once remarked on a feeling of declining "public usefulness over the course of the years."


A final explanation of Mr. Kennan's current views may lie in his nostalgia for pre-industrial life and values. In his *Memoirs*, we have a striking passage where Mr. Kennan remembers, in his early trips to the Russian countryside, a

sort of rural utopia, presumably free from all the by-products of technology and progress.

I knew, in fact, of no human environment more warmly and agreeably pulsating with activity, contentment, and sociability than a contemporary Russian dacha are on a nice spring morning . . . Everything takes place in a genial intimacy and informality: hammers ring, roosters crow, goats tug at their tethers, barefoot women hoe vigorously . . . small boys play excitedly at the little streams and ponds, family parties sit at crude wooden tables in the gardens under the young fruit trees. The great good earth of Mother Russia . . . seems once more to exude her benevolent and maternal warmth . . . I realize, as I look back on it today, that the magic of this atmosphere was derived not just from the fact that this was Russia but also from the fact that it was a pre-industrial life . . . a life in which people were doing things with their hands, with animals, and with Nature, a life little touched by any form of modernization . . . how much richer and more satisfying was human existence, after all, when there was not too much of the machine.

Mr. Kennan once described himself as in “an impossible situation between two worlds.” His views of both worlds—that of the Soviet Union and the United States—have changed substantially over time. He has not forgotten some of the grim facts he learned about the Soviet Union several decades ago, but those sets of images have come to coexist with a new set of beliefs—often this does not make for a very consistent amalgam. Also, Mr. Kennan has become increasingly critical of American society, and less hopeful about it finding solutions to its various social problems.

He has concluded that Americans should not criticize Soviet behavior or propose ways to improve the Soviet system. “Such a country [as the U.S.] ought to follow a policy of minding its own business. . . we have nothing to teach the world.”

So Mr. Kennan’s views of American and Soviet society and their respective political systems and foreign policies, are inextricably connected and mutually reinforcing. They are not mirror images of each other, as some have suggested. It is more like a seesaw: as Mr. Kennan’s appreciation for American society goes down, his esteem for its adversaries rises. 

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MARTY COME LATELY

The New Republic Discovers Old Truths

DINESH D'SOUZA

What kind of society would South Africa have to be for you to consider your constructive engagement policy to have fully succeeded?" With a slight grin, Michael Kinsley, editor of *The New Republic*, put the question to President Reagan's assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker. Crocker winced. He knew the dilemma: "One man, one vote" in South Africa might lead to a strongly anti-American government. Crocker talked vaguely about the need for "power sharing" between various ethnic groups, but was interrupted by *TNR* Literary Editor Leon Wieseltier, who suddenly came alive from a sleepy spell. "Power sharing?" Wieseltier said. "Democracy would not mean power sharing for the white minority. It would mean relinquishing power." Crocker tried a watery smile. He wasn't interested in ideal worlds in the faraway future, he said; the Reagan policy was improving conditions now, and that was preferable to the mayhem of revolution. Yes, yes, growled Jefferson Morley, the stocky associate editor of *TNR*, but what about the pace of progress? Why should the United States, with its elevated ideals, tolerate the structure of apartheid, even temporarily? What was wrong with a Zimbabwe-style resolution for South Africa?

Questions, one after another, between mouthfuls of stuffed croissant and salad. This was an editorial luncheon at *The New Republic*, at which public officials are often invited to defend their policies. The contrast between the speaker and his interrogators was evident. Crocker was knowledgeable, but unwilling to issue a resounding defense of the U.S. alliance with South Africa. He fingered his spectacles and made plenty of concessions. The editors of *TNR* weren't as well informed as Crocker, but they compensated for data with moral energy, and their questions were sharp and impatient. Wieseltier and former executive editor Morton Kondracke, now visiting from *Newsweek*, where he is Washington bureau chief, were trying to reconcile U.S. strategic goals with its moral duties in its South Africa policy. But the others, especially Kinsley and younger staffers like Morley and staff writer Chuck Lane, were mainly concerned with asserting virtue—we care more about black people 10,000 miles away than you, Crocker; by the way, would you pass the brownies? The session

ended cordially but without any agreement. It did, however, as they like to say at *TNR*, "raise the tough issues."

Almost everybody is feeling good about *TNR* these days, especially the folks at *TNR*. They agree wholeheartedly that "we are the best political magazine in America," as Morley puts it, that "we are a group of strong-headed, smart people," as Wieseltier says, or that "our editorial sessions are the most interesting intellectual events in Washington," as former publisher James Glassman affirms. In its 70th anniversary issue, *TNR* termed itself "irreverent, eclectic, and unorthodox." Charges that the magazine is schizophrenic were "just another way of characterizing the differences that thoughtful men and women will have over very complex issues." If *TNR* readers didn't realize it, they were also informed that "readers today are struck by the humor in *TNR*'s pages."

Apparently this high assessment of *The New Republic* is shared by many conservatives, who are taking it seriously, perhaps for the first time in its history. "Indispensable," *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz says of *TNR*. Columnist George Will calls it "currently the nation's most interesting and most important political journal." On its 70th anniversary, *National Review* termed it "an important cultural barometer" and congratulated it for its "break with the past." President Reagan has spoken favorably about the magazine, and the White House picks up 20 copies each week from *TNR*'s offices in downtown Washington.

There is something odd about all this right wing praise of *TNR*. Terms such as "indispensable," "interesting," and "unpredictable" are usually applied after the conservative reads an article with which he agrees. (Liberal articles in *TNR* are viewed as regrettable lapses, akin to the reforming drunk who falls back on the bottle every once in a while.) It is not clear why ideas long believed by conservatives and articulated in scores of books and articles should be surprising and indispensable when they resurface in *TNR*. Obviously it's not the ideas that interest conservatives so much as the masthead under which they appear. Indeed, several of *TNR*'s articles, such as Robert Leiken's

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“Sins of the Sandinistas” (October 8, 1984) or George Higgins’s “Why Busing Didn’t Work” (February 28, 1983), which were triumphantly circulated on the right, would probably be ho-hum items if they appeared in *National Review* or *The American Spectator*.

What is fascinating is that these articles now appear in *TNR*, which used to be a liberal magazine, in many ways a reliable measure of prevalent progressive thinking. Now *TNR* resists orthodoxies on the left and in the Democratic Party. Much of the praise from conservatives is a way of telling *TNR*, “Welcome to the fold. Congratulations on believing the things we do.” Or, as Jack Kemp put it, “There is no question that *TNR* is moving in the, shall we say, right direction. If you believe we are in the middle of a fundamental realignment, as I do, *The New Republic* reflects much of it.”

TNR editors are happily engaged in an orgy of self-definition. “We are still a liberal magazine which insists on the need to put pressure on liberalism,” says Leon Wieseltier. “Yes, we’ve moved right—what the heck,” remarks Michael Kinsley. “But sometimes the degree of change is exaggerated. If we’re in favor of a Reagan program which transfers money from the rich to the poor, we don’t view that as right wing.” Charles Krauthammer places *TNR* “in the Truman-Kennedy-Scoop Jackson tradition: hardline on foreign policy, liberal on domestic and social issues.” Chuck Lane says, “This place is very anti-ideological.”

Muddled Ideology

On foreign policy, *TNR*’s position is hesitantly anti-Communist. *TNR* editorials have attacked the nuclear freeze as a notion “seized upon by politicians who know perfectly well that it is a silly gimmick.” The magazine frequently criticizes “peace” groups, especially in the churches, which reflexively adopt Moscow’s line in negotiations. *TNR* prides itself on a Tough, Realistic approach to the Soviets; a May 6, 1985 editorial warned that, summit or no summit with Gorbachev, “this nerve-racking world will remain the same.”

But when it comes to the actual exercise of might, *TNR* wavers. The magazine is as anti-isolationist in theory as it is anti-interventionist in practice. *TNR* only endorsed the Grenada invasion after it became clear that it was widely supported here and there, and then with reservations and vague moralizing (“There are times when it is moral for a country to cross into another country. There are times when the rigid respect for sheer sovereignty is a form of indifference to human suffering”: okay, okay, but is this one of those times?).

TNR has been equally zealous about chronicling the misdoings of Marxist and right-wing regimes, but it has not been helpful in suggesting measures to remedy the human rights situation in either case. It is reluctant to use force to overthrow Communist governments like the one in Managua; its numerous laments for the revolution gone sour do not extend to support for funding the contras. *TNR* doesn’t like the United States to ally itself with morally tarnished countries even if they are making conspicuous progress and the alternative would be more brutal governments.

The South African question, for example, is “excruciatingly simple,” *TNR* editorialized. “Indeed there probably has not been an evil so simple since the fall of Berlin.” *TNR* printed several articles proving that the Reagan-backed elections in El Salvador meant nothing—they are “a contest for power that will do little or nothing to help the Salvadoran people,” wrote Christopher Dickey in a March 26, 1984 article; “ballots are not the stuff that impresses the Salvadoran armed forces,” wrote Piero Gleijeses in a June 25, 1984 book review. Now that the Reagan policy has worked, and free elections have brought stability and human rights improvement, *TNR* supports aid to the Duarte government. But of course it is easy to sign up for causes after they have prevailed.

It is not clear why ideas long believed by conservatives and articulated in scores of books and articles should be surprising and indispensable when they resurface in *The New Republic*.

Michael Kinsley freely admits that “foreign policy is not my issue.” What the magazine says about nuclear issues is pretty much up to Wieseltier and Krauthammer, who agree on policy but differ in temperament. Wieseltier, formerly a medieval Jewish history scholar at Harvard’s Society of Fellows, is an ethicist on nuclear issues who has developed a curious attachment to Mutually Assured Destruction as “in a sense” immoral, “in a sense” irrational—but still the best hope for mankind. Moral realism is where it’s at, boys, Wieseltier informed the disarmament camp and the Reagan Administration in “Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace,” the January 10, 1983 cover article in *TNR* which was the longest the magazine has ever published.

Krauthammer, a Harvard M.D. who wrote speeches for Mondale before coming to *TNR*, is less fatalistic than Wieseltier; you don’t get the sense that he is carrying the world on his shoulders and waiting for it to drop so he can say “I told you so.” Krauthammer’s limpid prose and surgical style of reasoning, plus his ability to distinguish and then reconcile moral and strategic purposes, have earned him a column in the *Washington Post*, which needs this badly. “I have no problems with the neoconservative view on foreign affairs,” Krauthammer says. One out of every two of his columns worries that the United States, even under Reagan, is too cautious to use force. Wieseltier is less eager to use either the neoconservative label or the neoconservative stick. “I think the U.S. should do whatever it can to weaken the Soviet Union without hurting itself.” But how this translates into policy is, as is everything at *TNR*, “problematic.” Wieseltier says he “can live

with” new weapons systems although “I’m not as crazy about the MX as Krauthammer.”

On domestic and social issues, *TNR* is willing to discuss the morality and efficacy of certain policies, but almost always comes down on the liberal side. Michael Kinsley supervises the domestic policy writing. He represents the politics of envy. Most of his columns inveigh against corporate executives who draw six figure salaries, bureaucrats who imbibe at the public trough, PACs that lavish dough on rightist causes, cigarette companies, rock stars, and especially those who live well on inherited money (except Marty Peretz). Kinsley’s series of articles “High on the Hog” was the consummation of this genre.

It’s no use accusing *TNR* of schizophrenia—the editors take it as a compliment.

The magazine has supported a number of Reagan’s policies, although it declares itself opposed to “Reaganism,” which is identified as “class warfare,” “a mixture of hope and greed,” and “a return to social Darwinism,” all phrases emanating from Robert Reich’s September 20, 1982 lead article and frequently repeated in *TNR* editorials. *TNR* is not opposed to the idea of free enterprise or profits: it has attacked the Catholic bishops for their ignorance about the market, praised David Stockman for his effort to cut farm subsidies, and impugned “domestic content” and other protectionist measures favored by the Democratic Party. “I believe two contradictory things about capitalism,” says Kinsley. “That it is the most efficient way to create wealth, and that it is often an unfair way to distribute it.” *TNR* supports the Treasury’s tax simplification plan because it eliminates loopholes for the rich, but it rejects the philosophy on which the plan was based: supply-side economics for *TNR* is a “theology,” and as for the recovery, that was caused by old-fashioned Keynesianism.

Rising Above the Shouts

Social issues for *TNR* are Incredibly Complex. Here the magazine clearly sees that it has lost the moral momentum to the New Right. It doesn’t want to admit this, so it frequently emits a squid-like cloud of rhetoric to blur the issues. On questions such as abortion, prayer, and pornography *TNR* is at its most tortuous, eschewing simplistic solutions, announcing that there are no easy answers, the world is not black and white, etc. Jean Bethke Elshtain’s essay, “The New Porn Wars” (June 25, 1984), cited “the ambiguities of our most fundamental principles,” noted that porn raises “deeper dilemmas” than most of us dare face, and concluded that we must “break free from the extremists on both sides.” Peter Berger’s book review on April 30, 1984 offered this insight: “Thoughtful observers of the current (abortion) controversy will have to agree that the issue is indeed heavy with moral significance.”

TNR’s lead editorial on abortion (July 11, 1983) began by defining the “vexing jurisprudential question” over this “difficult” and “morally complex issue.” *TNR* recognized a “desire for obfuscating simplification” in both the pro-life and pro-choice camps. (Presumably to identify the fetus as an infant is to muddy the intellectual waters.) *TNR* concluded that it had “misgivings about the morality of abortion, but we do not want to see them written into law,” which may be a bad precedent for those of us who have misgivings about racism or sexism. One day, perhaps, *TNR* will provide a list of issues which are *not* complex and difficult, not susceptible to simplistic answers from the left and the right. After this feigned moral hand-wringing, however, *TNR* usually endorses the liberal position. The exception to this is the issue of reverse discrimination. *TNR* did print a defense of affirmative action by Harvard president Derek Bok, but it is generally skeptical about racial preference, and ferociously opposed to quotas.

It’s no use accusing *TNR* of schizophrenia—the editors take it as a compliment. “Some people say we are schizophrenic,” owner Martin Peretz told *Time*. “Yet these are times when even the most thoughtful people are ambivalent.” The implication is that thoughtful people are usually not ambivalent, but in these, the gravest of times, even great minds (i.e. Peretz and his cohorts) can’t make up their minds. Actually there is a fairly clear and consistent set of principles which guide *TNR*. “We believe pretty much in the liberal consensus before 1972,” says Leon Wieseltier. “A tough foreign policy and a generous social policy are coherent.” Spencer Klaw, editor of the *Columbia Journalism Review* and a new reader of *TNR*, says, “They seem to be trying to revive the notion of the Cold War liberal who nevertheless is sympathetic to the welfare state.” But there is wide disagreement at *TNR* over application of these principles. A philosophic attachment to the welfare state does not mean that all the programs it generated truly help the poor—thus an extensive discussion in *TNR* of Charles Murray’s *Losing Ground*. Similarly, *TNR* is unsure of how best to resist the Soviet threat; for example, virtually every issue presents a different analysis of the situation in Central America and calls for different policies. Some writers at *TNR* seem to believe Reagan when he says he is in the tradition of the old Democrats; the word is that Leon Wieseltier, Morton Kondracke, Charles Krauthammer, and Fred Barnes voted for the Great Communicator. Peretz, Kinsley, Morley, and economics editor Robert Kuttner didn’t.

Does this mean *TNR* is no longer committed to the Democratic Party? “I’m not,” says Krauthammer, “and I don’t think the magazine has confronted this one. With Scoop Jackson dead and Moynihan quiescent, there is no one in the party to represent *TNR*’s point of view.” *TNR* did endorse Mondale in 1984, but halfheartedly—he was a “calm, stable man” and “in a number of ways actually more experienced than his opponent,” the magazine said—and only after Henry Fairlie’s provocative essay, “Why the Democrats Would Be Better Off Losing in 1984.” James Glassman, former *TNR* publisher now at *U.S. News and World Report*, says the magazine “could easily have endorsed Ronald Reagan for President.” But everyone agrees Marty Peretz is committed to the Demo-



Jeff Dearth, Fred Barnes, Dorothy Wickenden, Leon Wieseltier,
Jeff Morley, Steve Wasserman, and Michael Kinsley.

Photograph by Charles Geer

cratic Party and wants *TNR* to “remain part of the discussion on the left,” as Leon Wieseltier puts it. “If we were Republicans or conservatives, we would not be troubled over the weaknesses of liberalism and the Democratic Party.” (A 1984 post-election editorial identified these weaknesses as “the unhappy social facts” which refuted liberal theories, and “the vast defection of voters” from the Democratic Party—quite a long road ahead for *TNR*, savior of liberalism and the Democrats.) What all this means is that *TNR* is a liberal magazine becoming less liberal, with several fairly conservative writers who voted for Reagan, but a liberal constituency it wants to prod in the direction of an old liberalism, which it believes the Democratic Party, to which it is still fairly committed, has abandoned. Got that?

Stalinist Credentials

TNR's current stance is a radical departure from the principles on which it was founded, former editor Michael Straight has alleged. In fact, *TNR*, like Straight, has had a very checkered history. The magazine was founded in 1914 as “a child of the Enlightenment,” as historian Arthur Schlesinger wrote in his commentary to a published collection of *TNR* articles. It was the “voice of Eastern metropolitan progressivism,” which echoed the sometimes contradictory sentiments of editor Herbert Croly and contributing editors Edmund Wilson and Walter Weyl. Over the years, the magazine would alternate between a breathless utopianism and, when its utopian ideas brought ruin, a supercilious pessimism. Thus *TNR* advised Wilson to stay neutral in World War I, on the grounds that Noble Reason would sort out the European dispute—then it

urged participation. Victory did not bring hope but disenchantment: “the progressive hope began to falter.”

It soared again with the Russian revolution, which *TNR* declared a “magnificent” achievement and attacked Woodrow Wilson for calling the Bolsheviks undemocratic, then drooped as the casualty count of Communism climbed into the millions.

At first, *TNR* was skeptical of FDR's reforms—“palliatives only,” an editorial sighed—but then went into a long romance with the New Deal, and an on-again, off-again flirtation with Stalinism. Virtually all of *TNR*'s famous names (Herbert Croly, Edmund Wilson, Bruce Bliven, Malcolm Cowley, Henry Wallace, Michael Straight) were at one time or another apologists for Stalinism. Wilson wrote a famous 1932 essay calling for liberals to “take Communism away from the Communists”; Cowley argued that Stalinism was an “epithet . . . invented by Stalin's enemies partly as a means of confusing the issue”; and a *TNR* editorial in 1938 expressed satisfaction with Stalin's purge trials because, after all, Stalin's enemies had “fully confessed their guilt on all counts.” This history is important because, far from being an embarrassment to *TNR*, its apologies for Stalinism and Communism have become an impeccable credential. Editors at the magazine talk almost cheerfully about its Stalinist past, because they realize that *TNR*'s present arguments are given credibility by its previous spectacular error. The uglier the grandparents, the more the neighbors admire the features of the child.

Between World War II and 1974, *TNR* was part of, and helped shape, the liberal consensus. While proclaiming itself anti-Communist, it opened its pages to liberals and pro-Communist radicals, but not to anti-Communist con-

servatives. Unlike *The Nation*, another forum for exchange between liberals and radicals, *TNR* finally broke down and repudiated two leftist dogmas. It admitted that Alger Hiss was guilty of espionage upon the publication of Allen Weinstein's book *Perjury*; and accepted the proof of the guilt of the Rosenbergs provided recently by Ronald Radosh and Joyce Milton. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, *TNR* opposed the Vietnam War, and with only slight reservations ventilated the juvenile anti-Americanism of the New Left and the black radicals.

“We believe pretty much in the liberal consensus before 1972. A tough foreign policy and a generous social policy are coherent.”

Leon Wieseltier

To its credit, *TNR* was, from the outset, active in the battle for civil rights; in fact it took up this issue as early as 1931, when Edmund Wilson defended the Scottsboro boys. Unfortunately, *TNR* too easily acquiesced in the 1960s in sly adaptations of the term “racial equality” to mean “racial preference.” *TNR* generally applauded Republican and Democratic policies to increase the burden of the taxpayer and direct it toward the needy, although the definition of “needy” expanded like yeast from the 1950s through the 1970s to include minorities, the handicapped, old people, young people, and women—a mere 80 percent of the population. All this time, *TNR*'s back of the book section featured articles favoring abortion, feminism, homosexual rights, and warnings of ever-resurgent McCarthyism.

TNR was purchased in 1974 from owner Gilbert Harrison for around \$380,000 by Martin Peretz, a social science lecturer at Harvard. Peretz had married into wealth in 1967; his wife Anne Labouisse Farnsworth is an heiress to the Singer sewing machine fortune. Under Peretz, *TNR* began to change editorial gears. The “turning point” for *TNR* was 1974, says Krauthammer; since then the magazine has moved slowly right “as Marty's views have become more conservative.” But so slowly and sure-footedly did *TNR* make the transition from the liberal left to the liberal center that it went virtually unpublicized until a series of attacks on the Democratic Party coincided with *TNR*'s 70th anniversary to alert the major media.

Peretz consolidated his power at *TNR* by firing most of the staffers from the Harrison regime; he then replaced them with a club of amateurish but bright recruits from Harvard. There is literally a “Harvard pipeline” which feeds into *TNR*. Harvard alumni on the staff include Kinsley, a Harvard undergraduate and Law School graduate; former editor Hendrik Hertzberg, now back at Harvard; senior editors Ann Hulbert and Charles Krauthammer; staff writer Chuck Lane; and all three *TNR*

interns: Anthony Blinken, David Bell, and Amy Schwartz. Contributing editors Michael Walzer, Robert Coles, and Robert Reich teach at Harvard. Thus Peretz has established a small empire of Cambridge scholars, most of whom were plucked from obscurity and owe their careers to him.

Peretz runs the magazine with a strong hand, by all indications. A passionate defender of Israel, he has kept virtually all criticism of its policies out of *TNR*. “Marty's consuming passion is Israel,” says Richard Strout, who wrote the magazine's “TRB” column for 40 years. Strout and other *TNR* writers say that Peretz's views on Israel have greatly influenced his perception of U.S. foreign policy; he wants an assertive U.S. foreign policy which will be willing and able to defend Israel's security in a crisis. “How conservative the magazine is each week depends on how much time Marty spends in the office,” says Strout. Krauthammer disputes this: *TNR*'s editorial stance is determined after vigorous debate “until there is compromise or one side wins out,” although he admits that “Marty usually has more than one vote.” James Glassman says Peretz is “deeply involved in every aspect” of the magazine. Chuck Lane says, “Marty is a very active owner. He's very fond of reminding us that he owns the place. He is the source—or at the center—of all the changes that have gone on here.”

In 1983 Peretz hired *TNR*'s former managing editor, Kinsley, who was then editor of *Harper's*, to replace a retiring Richard Strout as “TRB.” A year later Kinsley replaced editor Hendrik Hertzberg, a left-liberal who was becoming increasingly anguished at *TNR*'s hawkish tones. In fact, Hertzberg was reduced to writing angry refutations to articles in his own magazine; after printing Elie Kedourie's skeptical appraisal of Mahatma Gandhi, he lamented the “nasty outbreak of Mahatma-bashing” and termed the article he had printed “false” and “grotesque.” Kinsley himself has had nasty altercations with Peretz; on at least one occasion he resigned from *TNR*, because of an article he commissioned that Peretz refused to print. There is now a general truce at *TNR*, however; Kinsley has a free hand in domestic and social issues, and Peretz orchestrates Middle East and foreign coverage with help from Wieseltier and Krauthammer. (Jeff Morley, resident leftist, is permitted an occasional outburst to prove *TNR*'s openness to dissent from the liberal flank.)

Grows from the Moscow Lobby

Because Peretz is not always at the office, however, and because power is distributed so randomly among the various ideological factions, there is sometimes manipulation and chicanery. For example, Fred Barnes's May 6, 1985 cover story on “Media Realignment” was altered without Barnes's knowledge by Morley to include a vicious attack on neoconservative writer Richard Grenier; according to Grenier, Peretz apologized to him but let the incident pass. Peretz was less reticent, however, when Morley wrote an article implying that Jeane Kirkpatrick condoned the death squads; in his own magazine he called this “pernicious nonsense.”

For the direction in which he has chaperoned *TNR*, Peretz has come under vitriolic attack from the far left. “A

disgraceful and vulgar sheet," says Noam Chomsky about *TNR*. Alexander Cockburn found *TNR*'s Vietnam retrospective "so vile that for 24 hours I thought I had eaten rat poison." Victor Navasky, editor of *The Nation*, says Peretz "can't accept that there are honest intellectual disagreements" between the two magazines and has used cases such as Hiss and the Rosenbergs "to smear the left." (Still Navasky says there are "shared goals" with *TNR* and "I don't regard them as the enemy.") Perhaps the most outspoken critic of *TNR* on the left is Christopher Hitchens, also of *The Nation*, who says that "Israel is the transmission belt for *TNR*'s move from left to right." Supporters of Israel, says Hitchens, "find it very hard to criticize a U.S. arms buildup which makes defense of Israel possible. It used to be natural for people to be liberals and Zionists. Now it is very problematic." On the "crucial issues for liberalism—the freeze, Central America, the invasion of Lebanon, and South Africa policy—*TNR* has been closer to Reagan than, say the *New York Times*," says Hitchens.

Leon Wieseltier ridicules the charge about Zionism. "Absolute nonsense," he says. "Hitchens is guilty of political amnesia—Zionism and liberalism were allied from the outset." Krauthammer remarks that "The left didn't just become anti-Zionist, it also became anti-defense and in some ways anti-American." Zionism is only one of a "constellation of issues" on which *TNR* has veered right, says Krauthammer. Still, it seems clear that Zionism has had some effect in alerting Peretz—antiwar activist, contributor to Jerry Brown and Gary Hart—to the need for a consistent U.S. policy of defending its interests and its allies. "Marty has always had the problem of being a dove on Vietnam and a hawk on Israel," says Stanley Karnow, former associate editor of *TNR* and author of *Vietnam: A History*. "The aftermath of the war greatly affected him. He felt sure that America's humiliation in Vietnam would have an effect on its commitment to Israel."

In some ways, *TNR*'s ideological journey parallels that of *Commentary* in the late 1960s, where resistance to the New Left and support for Israel inspired a rightward move, first in foreign policy and then gradually in domestic and social policy as well. But Kinsley, Krauthammer, and Wieseltier say that *TNR* does not plan to keep moving right, and then take up the ideological offensive like *Commentary*. Norman Podhoretz has reconciled himself with conservatism, says Krauthammer, while "there is a classic 19th century civil libertarian impulse in Marty, Kinsley, and me that will resist a movement to where *Commentary* is now."

TNR is driven mainly by intellectual (and sometimes personal) considerations, but its new editorial posture has certainly been good for business. The magazine has gone from losses of \$850,000 a year to a projected loss of only \$50,000 this year. Its budget has climbed from \$2 million in 1974 to \$3.5 million; subscription rates have doubled with no loss of readers; and advertising sales have risen dramatically. Why are readers and advertisers flocking to a liberal opinion magazine when liberalism seems to be a philosophy on the decline? Because former *TNR* publisher Glassman and present publisher Jeffrey Dearth have worked hard to change the marketing identity of the maga-

zine. It is promoted not as a journal of liberal opinion, but as an indispensable source of reporting and ideas, a kind of highbrow *Time* or *Newsweek* meant for readers of all points of view. "We live in a confused world," says Dearth. "The terms left and right are obsolete. We are not a magazine of ideology but a magazine of ideas." Not only is *TNR* not merely appealing to "converted liberals," Dearth says, but the old liberal label is a liability. "A lot of people would like us, but don't subscribe because they view us as traditionally liberal."

Far from being an embarrassment to *TNR*, its apologies for Stalinism and Communism have become an impeccable credential.

Dearth wants *TNR* to become less predictable and less associated with the Democratic Party. That's good for advertising, he says; "Corporate thinking tends to be fairly conservative" and businessmen may be hesitant to advertise in a magazine identified as liberal. It's also attractive to young urbanites who have enough money to pay \$48 per year and think of themselves as a "new generation" with "new ideas." *TNR* even uses praise from the right to make its product more widely acceptable; George Will's blurb, accompanied by feigned alarm ("Is he trying to ruin us with our faithful readers?"), did very well in a mass promotion campaign, according to Dearth. *TNR* hopes to turn a small profit in the next few years, remarkable for an opinion magazine.

Liberalism Doesn't Pay

TNR is now a conspicuous part of the Washington political scene. There are good reasons for its appeal. Unlike many opinion magazines, *TNR* contains first-hand reporting about events in the capital; when ace reporter Kondracke left, the magazine hired former *Baltimore Sun* writer Fred Barnes "not as a conservative but as a reporter," says Kinsley. *TNR* also has wonderful layout and covers. "Reagan's Chainsaw Massacre" on *TNR*'s cover showed the President felling a mighty oak—the article was about his supposed hostility to the environment. "Who'll Get the Ass in Gear?" appeared alongside a bucking donkey, as inside *TNR*'s editors pondered the Democratic Party's scramble for ideas and a candidate. *TNR*'s titles are heavily reliant on puns, as in the articles on Jesse Jackson, "I Have a Scheme," and on the death squads, "D'Aubuisson of a Bitch." Especially under Kinsley, *TNR* combines more serious and contemplative pieces with short, sassy reports, and articles run the gamut from politics to pop culture.

More substantively, *TNR* deserves its acclaim because it is honestly facing up to some of the contradictions in liberalism. "American liberalism is in crisis," the magazine admitted on December 10, 1984. The editorial conceded that after 50 years of liberal hegemony, "the terms of the

debate are now set by a group of intellectuals called neoconservatives." *TNR* admitted that it did not have a "coherent response" to the "confident ideas" from the right, but assured its readers that it was going to put up a fight. The left sees no signs of this; it regards *TNR* as surrendering to its adversaries. "They are so hard on guys that are progressive that they end up making things easy on guys that are conservative," says Stuart Eizenstat, Jimmy Carter's chief domestic policy advisor. But if some *TNR* articles give credibility to the right, perhaps the magazine considers this a small price to pay for getting itself taken seriously by conservatives—who happen to be in power.

***TNR* deserves its acclaim because it is honestly facing up to some of the contradictions in liberalism.**

For the last several decades, after all, liberalism set the agenda and conservatives had to discard their extreme factions (such as the John Birch Society) and extreme ideas (*a priori* opposition to the welfare state) in order to be part of the policy debate. *TNR* has been intrepid in attacking prominent figures of the liberal establishment such as Lee Iacocca, Felix Rohatyn, and "the millionaires who control the Democratic Party," the subject of a recent lead article. In rejecting these embarrassments of American liberalism, *TNR* may be taking the first steps toward its renewal.

Yet how heavily the Democratic Party should rely on *TNR* for analysis and new ideas is unclear. The often oscillating stances of the magazine provide no reliable guide to policy. *TNR* has skewered many of the party's old ideas—comparable worth, nuclear freeze, domestic content bills—but what are its New Ideas? In an editorial "Bad Ideas and Good" late last year, *TNR* outlined some: Tax Reform (h'm, seem to remember Reagan talking about that since 1979), Make the Japanese Finance their Own Defense (this is new?), and Free Television Time for Political Candidates (this one will really bring the Democratic Party out of crisis—a real campaign issue for 1988). Perhaps *TNR*'s only new idea is that its old ideas aren't very good. Everything else that is viewed as iconoclastic and original about the magazine is a reaction to ideas generated on the right. Supply-side economics, enterprise zones, privatization, deregulation, New Federalism, strategic defense—all these ideas came out of the Reagan Administration. *TNR* has responded to them in a perceptive way, but that only makes it interestingly reactionary; it ain't new stuff.

Another problem with *TNR* is its complete failure to understand the results of the 1980 and 1984 elections and the appeal of Ronald Reagan. This was admitted by *TNR*'s

historian David Seideman during the magazine's anniversary reception: "The magazine's inability to understand the attraction of Reagan to the voters shows the gulf between *TNR* and the public."


TNR has featured many an analysis such as this one on March 26, 1984:

Of course (Reagan) can escape accountability—didn't he spend years slipping from one costume to another? Isn't he trained to move from one scene to another, from one role to another? No wonder he speaks so convincingly, even when the lines have been hastily rewritten—isn't that what an actor is paid to do?

This Hollywood theory is as trite as it is wrong: would Ed Asner have Reagan's appeal if he was in the White House?

TNR accuses Reagan of genial posturing before the public and the media, yet that is what the magazine does. The basic formula is: position yourself in some middle area so you can attack both the left and the right. It is wonderful to see the rhetorical gymnastics of *TNR* writers as they try to prove their recommendations belong to neither camp and would disturb ideologues on both sides. Thus Amy Schwartz, liberal, on May 20, 1985 celebrates a feminist novel by noting that the author has produced "neither exactly a feminist novel or a traditional one, but something entirely fresh." Thus Fred Barnes, conservative, writes routinely about Patrick Buchanan, Faith Whittlesey, Sandra Day O'Connor, and others who generally share his politics as "conservative ideologues." There is even a bit of legerdemain in this approach. Charles Krauthammer wrote a lead article, "The New Isolationism," which seemed to criticize both liberals and conservatives from some enlightened middle position. In fact, it was attacking the Democratic Party and a handful of Republicans (mainly Weinberger) *from the right*—for an unwillingness to project American power abroad.

TNR thinks of itself as thoughtful, rejecting easy answers, taking on tough issues, and facing reality. But the only reason for this high-toned talk is: *TNR* was wrong before. Its main credential is previous error. But because the magazine admits this does not mean it is correct now. What *TNR* fails to realize is that while it was wrong—on Stalinism, on the Great Society, on bilingualism, on the New Left, on just about everything—somebody else was right. The conservatives saw the debris of wasteful social programs and the weakening of national security long before this came to the attention of *TNR*. Despite its avant-garde tone, many of *TNR*'s epiphanies are about 10 years out of date.

Where will the magazine go from here? Come on, with rising visibility and rising revenues, do you have to ask? "The one sure thing about this unpredictable magazine," Martin Peretz says, "is that we will go on being unpredictable." 

LOST GENERATION

Why America's Children Are Strangers In Their Own Land

WILLIAM BENNETT

In his 1984 Jefferson Lecture, Sidney Hook pointed to a paradox. During the past 50 years, he observed, our society has been able to make gigantic strides in the direction of greater freedom and social justice, while totalitarian states—first Nazi Germany and then the Soviet Union—have produced wars, holocaust, economic misery, concentration camps, and gulags. “Yet in spite of that record,” Mr. Hook said, “the paradox is that faith and belief in the principles of liberal democracy have declined in the United States. Unless that faith and that belief can be restored and revived, liberal democracy will perish.”

Admittedly, Mr. Hook did not draw on batteries of research teams to document the eroding allegiance to the norms of a free, self-governing society. By the canons of modern social science, then, his observations might be impugned as being impressionistic. But many of the finest minds of our time share his impressions. In 1980, for example, Raymond Aron spoke of “loss of confidence in the country’s institutions” throughout the United States. And in Great Britain, the distinguished philosopher Karl Popper stated flatly, “Americans are no longer certain that their country and form of government are the best.”

Such views are especially worrisome to those of us professionally involved in education. After all, one of the tasks of a school system—indeed, the primordial task of any school system—is the transmission of social and political values. As Bernard Brown observes, “All schools must transmit a cultural heritage and help legitimize the political system—otherwise the regime in the long run loses effectiveness and is replaced, perhaps after a short anarchic interlude, by another regime that knows better how to secure obedience.”

Are American schools helping to transmit our democratic heritage? Do the norms and values that the schools inculcate make the case for our political system? Although the evidence on this question is fragmentary and often anecdotal, what we know is not encouraging. A recent survey found that many 13- and 17-year-olds do not know what happens to a law after it passes Congress, and the majority fail to realize that a President cannot declare a law unconstitutional. In short, far too many students cannot explain the essentials of American democracy.

Why should we be surprised, when many of our schools no longer make sure their charges know the long procession of events that gave rise to modern democracy? We offer our students the flag but sometimes act toward it as if it were only cloth. We neglect to teach them the ancient texts sewn into its fabric, the ideas and endeavors of cultures whose own emblems in time lent us the designs for our own. Too often our high school graduates know little or nothing of the Magna Carta, the Bible, the Greek polis, the Federalist Papers, or the Lincoln-Douglas debates.

We cannot hope that our students will know why the world got into its present situation—or even what that situation is—if they know so little of the events that came before them. Some two months ago, about 15 American teenagers and 15 Soviet teenagers met near Washington to discuss the threat of nuclear war. The Americans were members of a school’s talented and gifted program. The Russians attend an embassy school, and are the children of Soviet diplomats. Here are some excerpts from a newspaper account:

What do you think of America? asked one [American] pupil. ‘America is a good country,’ replied Dmitry Domakhin, 12, whose father is a diplomat. ‘It’s such a pity that it’s a capitalist country.’ Dmitry grinned as the audience of parents and pupils laughed.

Later, he posed his own question to the American children. ‘In the Soviet Union, when we have lunch at school, the lunch is free,’ he said. ‘I just want to know, how much do you have to pay?’ Ninety to 95 cents per meal was the answer. Dmitry smiled again.

Alexei Palladin 14, whose father is a correspondent for [a] Soviet newspaper, pointed out that the Soviet Union and the United States have been friends before. ‘What do you know about the Second World War?’ Alexei asked the Americans. No answer. He nodded as if that was what he expected. ‘Nobody even knows,’ he said, ‘that we were allies. We were fighting Nazism together.’

WILLIAM BENNETT is secretary of the Department of Education. This is adapted from a lecture he gave at a Shavano Institute conference in May.

When I came across this story, the thought crossed my mind that in exchange for the ability to induce one or two of our talented and gifted youngsters to make some reference, however fleeting, to free elections, free speech, Afghanistan, the Nazi-Soviet Pact, or to the plight of Andrei Sakharov, I'd willingly trade away a couple of Olympic gold medals.

Sharing the Blame

Yet when these students fail to respond with an awareness of historical truths, whose fault is it? Is it theirs? No. Whose children are these? They're ours. Aren't they as bright as their Soviet counterparts? Of course they are. Are they good? Yes. Are they well-intentioned and open-minded? Yes. Are they eager to learn? Yes. They are all these things. But they are also, so it seems, intellectually innocent, and as Kant said, "Innocence is a splendid thing, but it is easily seduced." It is not our students' fault that we have forgotten that intellectual innocence too can be seduced, so that they can only nod their heads in agreement and applaud when confronted with standard Soviet propaganda themes.

It is important for our children to realize the ways in which the past illuminates the present. Our students will not recognize the urgency in Nicaragua if they cannot recognize the history that is threatening to repeat itself. If they have never heard of the Cuban missile crisis, they cannot comprehend the Sandinista head of secret police when he states that "Cuba's friends are Nicaragua's friends, and Cuba's enemies are Nicaragua's enemies." If they know nothing of the Russian Revolution, they cannot comprehend the Sandinista Minister of Defense when he says "Marxism/Leninism is the scientific doctrine that guides our revolution" and "We would like to help all revolutions." If students know nothing of the Monroe Doctrine, what difference will the intrusion of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Central America mean to them?

How have we come to such a pass? Surely one explanation for the fact that democratic values no longer seem to command the assent they once did is that for many years now the teaching of social studies in our schools has been dominated by cultural relativism, the notion that the attempt to draw meaningful distinctions between opposing traditions is a judgment which all virtuous and right-minded people must sternly condemn.

One social studies series for elementary schools, for example, advises the teacher that the material aims to "decrease inclination toward egocentrism, ethnocentrism, and stereotyping." But what this means, it turns out, is more than teaching children that all cultures and traditions are not the same. It means teaching that all cultures and traditions are equally valid, that there are not real criteria for good and bad, right and wrong, noble and base. But if all traditions are equally valid, then there is clearly not much point in transmitting a particular cultural heritage, a distinctive set of social and political values. On the contrary, to the extent that educational philosophy is dominated by the idea of cultural relativism, any attempt to impart a particular tradition is ipso facto illegitimate.

So each generation brings its *tabula rasa* into the world, and many educators, including the cultural relativists, pro-

ceed to teach as if it would be a shame to dirty the slate with any affection or respect for our own tradition. But the world itself is not a *tabula rasa*. Some important things have happened to make us what we are, and we cannot be intelligible to ourselves without remembering these things. We remain alien to ourselves, strangers at home, when we do not know our past.

I am reminded of a passage in C.S. Lewis's *The Screwtape Letters*. The devil Screwtape is tutoring his young nephew and disciple, Wormwood, in the arts of corruption. The trick, he explains, is to keep men from acquiring wisdom, a trick accomplished by cultivating disdain for the past and a devotion to present-mindedness. "Since we cannot deceive the whole human race all the time," Screwtape says, "it is important to cut every generation off from all others; for where learning makes a free commerce between the ages there is always a danger that the characteristic errors of one may be corrected by the characteristic truths of another." I believe that if our children do not even know the inherited principles of a liberal democracy, it is foolish to expect that they should put their faith in those principles.

Correcting the Balance

How then are we to restore the American faith in the principles of liberal democracy? A good way to begin, it seems to me, would be by recognizing the importance and the value of the study of history, and by taking the necessary steps to strengthen history as a subject taught in the schools. As Meg Greenfield of the *Washington Post* writes, "In the reconstruction of American schooling that is going forward I would put properly taught history second on the list of goals to be achieved—right after literacy."

Apart from its intrinsic interest as a record of the past, history is a vitally important study for several reasons. First, history is organized memory, and memory, in turn, is the glue that holds our political community together. Strictly speaking, the United States did not simply develop; rather, the United States was created in order to realize a specific political vision. Today, as in the past, it is the memory of that political vision that defines us as Americans.

Throughout our history, there have indeed been occasions when our actions have fallen tragically short of our vision, and it is important for our students to know about those occasions. Certainly, we Americans are not strangers to sin. But there have also been occasions when we have not fallen short of our ideals, and students ought to know about those as well. Professor Lino Graglia writes, "In the context of inhumanity and misery I read as history, I hold the American achievement high." By studying American history, and yes, celebrating its heroes explicitly for each generation, and noting its achievements as well as its failures, our students are invited to grasp the values of our political tradition.

But if history is a kind of collective memory, it is also a mode of inquiry which aims at determining the truth. As a method of inquiry, history teaches respect for facts and for the proper methods of weighing evidence. It helps us to distinguish superficiality from depth, bias from objectivity, tendentiousness from honesty, stupidity from discernment,

and confusion from lucidity. History provides us with a sense of perspective and with the ability to make critical judgments. As the distinguished historian, Felix Gilbert, has observed, "The past is one way—and not the worst way—of acquiring the right and the criteria to judge the present." And acquiring the criteria to judge the present, it seems to me, is no less vital to the success and well-being of democratic self-government than acquiring a sense of community.

The Danger of Ignorance

But again, in being exposed to the truth about our history, our students, of course, should be exposed to the whole truth. So let it be told. As Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan puts it:

Am I embarrassed to speak for a less than perfect democracy? Not one bit. Find me a better one. Do I suppose there are societies which are free of sin? No I don't. Do I think ours is on balance incomparably the most hopeful set of human relations the world has? Yes I do. Have we done obscene things? Yes we have. How did our people learn about them? They learned about them on television. In the newspapers.

Unfortunately, even the subject of history is in danger of losing its distinct identity, of becoming absorbed in the smorgasbord of this and that known as "social studies." The Council for Basic Education noted in its 1982 report, *Making History Come Alive*:

In most schools today, the subject of history is subsumed by the curricular genus of 'social studies.' Teachers of history belong to social studies departments, they commonly identify themselves as social studies teachers, and they teach other subjects in addition to history. Parents are likely to presume that if their children are taking any social studies courses, they are learning history. They may or they may not be.

The Council for Basic Education report largely confirmed the findings of a 1975 study conducted by the Organization of American Historians. The OAH study noted a significant decline in the teaching of secondary school history throughout the country. It found that in some states "virtually no training in history is demanded" of secondary school history teachers. In one state, history teachers were being encouraged to emphasize concepts that transcend "any given historical situation." In another state, the trend was toward ethnocultural courses; in another, the focus was on problem solving, decision making, and social action. And in another, the OAH representative predicted that history would soon be supplanted by more "relevant" courses such as consumer affairs, ecology, multicultural studies, and so on.

The present decline in the status of history in our schools is very serious. To be ignorant of history is to be, in a very fundamental way, intellectually defenseless, unable to understand the workings either of our own society or of other societies. It is to be condemned to what Walter Lippmann called a state of "chronic childishness." Lippmann continued:

Men must collaborate with their ancestors. Otherwise they must begin, not where their ancestors arrived but where their ancestors began. If they exclude the tradition of the past from the curricula of the schools they make it necessary for each generation to repeat the errors rather than benefit by the successes of its predecessors.

Such a situation is intolerable. In order to change it, I propose an intellectual initiative designed to transmit our social and political values, to generate individual intelligence, and to provide our young people with the perspective they need to function effectively in today's world. At the core of this intellectual initiative—yes, it too is a kind of defense initiative—lies an enhanced appreciation of the role and value of the study of history. Specifically, then, I advocate consideration of the following program:


Even the subject of history is in danger of losing its distinct identity.

First, our schools should treat history as an autonomous discipline, related to, but distinct from, the social studies. This history must be sure to teach the events and the principles that have formed modern states.

Second, local communities should agree (and they can agree) on what constitutes a minimum of historical knowledge which every high school graduate, regardless of whether he or she goes on to college, must master.

Third, just as math and physics must be taught by persons who know their subject, so history must be taught by people who know history. As the Council for Basic Education has pointed out, "The preparation of history teachers should include concentration in history, taught by historians and augmented by significant study in such related fields as literature, the arts, anthropology, and the social sciences."

If taught honestly and truthfully, the study of history will give our students a grasp of their nation, a nation that the study of history and current events will reveal is still, indeed, "the last best hope on earth." Our students should know that. They *must* know that, because nations can be destroyed from without, but they can also be destroyed from within.

Americans are the heirs of a precious historical legacy. Let it never be said of us that we failed as a nation because we neglected to pass on this legacy to our children. Remember that whatever our ancestry of blood, in one sense we all have the same fathers—our Founding Fathers. Let it be said that we told our children the whole story, our long record of glories, failures, aspirations, sins, achievements, and victories. Then let us leave them to determine their own views of it all: America in the totality of its acts. If we can dedicate ourselves to that endeavor, I am confident that our students will discern in the story of their past the truth. They will cherish that truth. And it will help to keep them free. 

ATOMS FOR PEACE

Truman Was Right to Drop the Bomb

ADAM MEYERSON

No American can look back happily on President Harry Truman's decision to drop the atom bomb. At least 120,000 and perhaps as many as 240,000 Japanese civilians perished in the blasts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Tens of thousands more suffered excruciating pain from burns and sores, or died prematurely as the result of exposure to radiation. Most of the victims were women and children. And ever since, Americans have been troubled by the misery we inflicted on a nation that we now have the good fortune of calling our friend.

But this summer, as we approach the 40th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragedies, it is important to remember a simple chronology. Hiroshima was obliterated on August 6, 1945, Nagasaki on August 9. One day after the second bomb, on August 10, the Empire of Japan announced its willingness to abide by the surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration, so long as the institution of the Emperor were preserved. The United States immediately accepted, and by August 15, the most infernal war in modern history was over. In short, the two atom bombs did exactly what President Truman hoped they would. They shocked Japan into surrendering, without the need for a bloody American invasion of the Japanese archipelago. In so doing, they shortened the war by as much as a year. And they saved hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of American and Japanese lives.

Yankee troops were scheduled to land on Kyushu in November 1945, and on the central island of Honshu the following March. There can be no doubt that the battles would have been more destructive than the devastation at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. General Marshall predicted a quarter of a million to a million American casualties, with as many or more Japanese deaths. And the experience of other great battles in 1945 made it clear that civilians would bear the brunt of the violence. A hundred thousand Filipino civilians perished along with 16,000 Japanese occupation troops in the defense of Manila, and the city itself suffered greater destruction than any Allied metropolis except Warsaw. The last-ditch defense of Okinawa took the lives of between 40,000 and 70,000 Okinawan civilians, many committing hara-kiri rather than be conquered by the foreign devils.

Of course, there are some who thought that an invasion was unnecessary, and that a naval blockade would be enough to force a Japanese surrender. This was a widely held view in the U.S. Navy, and it would have been a realistic one if Japan had been governed by men who cared much about the survival of their compatriots. By the summer of 1945, Japan was in little position to fight. Most of its war factories had been demolished in the firebombing raids that left Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe, Yokohama, and Kawasaki in ruins and 13 million Japanese without homes. Replenishments for low fuel and food supplies would have to cross the seas, where they would be at the mercy of American submarines.

The bleakness of Japan's military prospects was fully recognized by a growing "peace party" in Tokyo that included the prime minister, the foreign minister, and Emperor Hirohito. On July 12, 1945, the foreign minister sent a diplomatic cable, read by American codebreakers, saying that "His Majesty is deeply reluctant to have any further blood lost among people on both sides and it is his desire, for the welfare of humanity, to restore peace with all possible speed." It is frequently claimed that peace would have been possible without either an invasion or the bomb, if Truman had paid more attention to such signals.

The trouble with this argument is that the "peace party" did not control Japan's guns, and its views did not prevail in the Supreme Council that made the war decisions. The fanatically suicidal war minister, General Korechika Anami, and the army and navy chiefs of staff, Yoshijuro Umezumi and Admiral Soemi Toyoda, remained opposed to surrender under virtually every circumstance. On June 8, 1945, the cabinet resolved to "prosecute the war to the bitter end." On July 27, it decided to treat the Allied surrender terms of the Potsdam Declaration with "silent contempt." The *Mainichi*, one of Tokyo's leading dailies, called the Allied ultimatum a "laughable matter."

The Emperor, meanwhile, looked on in dismay as he saw his country being destroyed. He had opposed the war from the very beginning, but though he was universally revered by his subjects, he was essentially a figurehead in

ADAM MEYERSON is editor of Policy Review.

the councils of government. So sacred was his throne that none dared ask his opinion during cabinet debates. Instead, his silence was interpreted as assent to decisions that had previously been made without his presence.

All this changed with the shock of atomic annihilation. The Emperor was so mortified by the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and so appalled by the suicidal response of Anami, Umezu, and Toyoda to the bombings—even after the news of Nagasaki, they were still holding out against surrender—that on the evening of August 9, he did what he had never done before. He intervened in a cabinet meeting to declare his opinions. “The time has come when we must bear the unbearable,” he proclaimed, and the next day his government signalled its acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration that it had seemingly rejected only two weeks before.

Was the second bomb dropped too soon after the first to give Japan an opportunity to surrender? Perhaps. The meeting that culminated in the Emperor’s extraordinary intervention began one minute before Fat Man, as the Nagasaki weapon was called, was unloaded. But the fact remains that Japan’s first surrender message came on August 10, not August 7, and even then, it was not clear that Japan’s militarist fanatics would allow Japan to capitulate. In fact, a palace revolt on August 14 and August 15 nearly prevented the broadcast of the Emperor’s surrender proclamation.

Some critics of Truman will reject all the above analysis, and say that he could have avoided the need for any bombing at all if he had been willing to accept something less than unconditional surrender—for instance, a negotiated peace that would have stripped Japan of its imperial possessions but spared it the indignity of capitulation. But it must be remembered that Japan had started the war in the Pacific with its savage invasion of China, its lightning conquest of Southeast Asia, and its surprise attack on Pearl Harbor; and that Japanese troops had committed abominations that rivalled Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in their barbarism. Japanese troops massacred 200,000 Chinese civilians in the Rape of Nanking. They doused the hospital patients of Manila with gasoline and set them aflame. They used live prisoners of war for bayonet practice and vivisection experiments, or else fed them starvation rations. And their bombers mercilessly attacked the civilians of Shanghai and Mandalay long before American B-29s began their firebombing raids on Japan. It was entirely reasonable to insist on the unconditional surrender of the regime that had sponsored these atrocities, and to make sure that no Japanese regime would ever again be tempted into aggression.


In this connection, it was especially important not to repeat the mistakes of Allied policy at the end of World War I, in which the Armistice of 1918 was followed by the outbreak of World War II only 20 years later. The Allies did not decisively defeat the army of the Kaiser in 1918, and they did not bring the war home to the German people. Instead, they negotiated a peace settlement while German troops were still in foreign territory, with the result that the German people, denied true information about the war by the Kaiser’s totalitarian control of the press, did not know that their country had been losing the war. When

combined with the vindictive reparations that the Allies exacted against Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, this policy fanned the resentment of the German people and gave credence to the “stab in the back” theory that gave impetus to Hitler’s rise to power.

The two atom bombs did exactly what Truman hoped they would. They shocked Japan into surrendering, without the need for a bloody American invasion of the Japanese archipelago.

The American policy of 1945 was the reverse of the Allies’ in 1918. It was to win the war against Japan (and Germany) decisively, and then to treat the vanquished with friendship and magnanimity. After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people could have no illusions about which side won the war, and they had been taught a terrible lesson about the consequences of their rulers’ militarism. But the surrender of Japan was followed by the most humane occupation in Asian history. American troops were severely punished if they so much as struck a Japanese. The Japanese economy was quickly rebuilt with American help, and in the Pax Americana of relatively free trade, the Japanese were able to channel their extraordinary energies into conquering markets rather than territories. And thanks in part to many of the reforms that were instituted during the American occupation, Japan today enjoys a thriving democracy, the longest lifespans in the world, and cordial relations with its neighbors.

Indeed, one of the advantages of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings is that, by ending the war when they did, they allowed Japan to be occupied by the United States alone, and not also by the Soviet Union. Stalin, who entered the war against Japan on August 9, 1945, had set his sights on Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan’s four main islands, and it is likely that he would have landed there if the war had been prolonged and the United States forced to invade Japan. How traumatic this would have been for Hokkaido can be judged by the experience of Japanese soldiers who surrendered to the Soviets in Manchuria: 350,000 of them were sent to slave labor in Siberia, while Manchuria’s factories were dismantled and shipped to Russia as war reparations. A Soviet occupation of Hokkaido might also have led to a permanently divided Japan on the model of Germany and Korea.

The decision to drop the atomic bomb, like all military decisions, must be evaluated in the context of the circumstances at the time and the information then available to President Truman. The bomb has, thankfully, never been used again. But compared with the alternatives available to Truman in 1945, America’s “first use” of nuclear weapons was humane and just. 

THE FEMINIST MISTAKE

Sexual Equality and the Decline of the American Military

JEAN YARBROUGH

The United States is the only major country to consider seriously the question of women in combat. Of the 72 nations that register or conscript citizens for military service, only 10 include women and none places them in combat. Although women are still excluded from combat by law in the Navy and the Air Force, and by policy in the Army, the United States has moved closer to placing women in combat than any other country. Not only have women moved into "combat related" tasks, but the distinction between combatants and non-combatants has been blurred by the inclusion of women in "technical" combat positions, such as missile launch officers, which would be prime targets in a war.

It is true that women have fought in combat in the past. Sexual egalitarians point approvingly to the heroism of Soviet women during World War II and, more recently, to the combat role of women in the Israeli army. But in the Soviet Union, women fought out of dire necessity, not ideological conviction, and in all-female units. The case of Israel is even more interesting. Partly for ideological, mostly for military reasons, Israel sent women into combat in 1948. But they were withdrawn in three weeks. Israeli men proved more protective of the women, jeopardizing their own missions to save them. And Israeli commanders found that Arab forces fought with greater determination against female units to avoid the humiliation of being defeated by women; as a result, casualties on both sides were higher. If the Israelis could not change the attitudes of their own soldiers toward women, still less could they raise the consciousness of their enemy.

Far more instructive is the present policy of both these countries. Of an estimated 4.4 million member force, the Soviet Union employs approximately 10,000 women, all in traditional female tasks. There is not one woman general officer in the entire Soviet military. Today, Israeli women are drafted, but not for combat. Although they are given defensive weapons training, their function is to free Israeli men to fight.

In the United States, feminists support women in combat for ideological reasons—they regard it as a measure of equity—while some military professionals see it as a measure of expediency. The debate took hold in the early

1970s, when the proposed Equal Rights Amendment seemed to be prospering. The Supreme Court for the first time invalidated a number of sex-based classifications, and the federal courts then extended the principle to the military. Abandoning the judiciary's traditional deference to Congress on military policy, the federal courts greatly broadened the rights of women in the military in a series of cases in the mid and late 1970s.

Congress entered the picture when it voted to end the draft in 1973, resulting in a decline in the number of qualified men joining the armed forces. To compensate, the Pentagon sought to attract more women; during the 1970s, the number of women in the military increased by more than 350 percent, to 150,000. In 1975, Congress opened the service academies to women, and the Army began to narrow its definition of combat to routine direct combat and to assign women to positions previously classified as combat. Women were assigned to combat "support" units, in which they would certainly be shot at, and were trained in the use of light anti-tank weapons, M-16 rifles, grenade launchers, claymore mines, and M-60 machine guns. Under pressure from the courts, the Defense Department also revised its regulations so that pregnancy was no longer grounds for automatic dismissal.

Registration Roulette

With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976, the pace of change accelerated. Two independent studies recommended recruiting more women for reasons of both economy and quality; one concluded the services could perform their mission with one-third female personnel. Field experiments conducted by the Army Research Institute concluded that difficulties attributable to the presence of women in the field were due chiefly to training and leadership problems that could be solved. In response to a court order, Congress enacted legislation in 1978 permitting women to serve on non-combat ships and combat ships for up to 180 days. Co-ed basic training was also launched. The following year, the Air Force opened pilot and naviga-

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tor positions, and allowed women to become missile launch officers, a position previously classified as combat.

In 1979, in its most controversial move to date, the Pentagon proposed repealing the combat restrictions on women altogether, stressing the military's need for flexibility in meeting their recruitment goals and the desire for equity. According to the Undersecretary of the Air Force, Antonia Handler Chayes, it was a question of "equal opportunity to fight and die for the country."


In the last significant measure of his administration, President Carter called for the registration of 18 year-old men and women. The administration's arguments for registration of women recall the discussion of women warriors in Book V of Plato's *Republic*. Here Socrates, discussing the differences between men and women in combat, facetiously suggests that the differences between the sexes are no greater than between bald and long-haired men. Richard Danzig, a Carter official, when asked in the Senate if the proposal to register women was based on military necessity, replied seriously with a similar analogy: "If you said to me does the military require people with brown eyes to serve, I would have to tell you no, because people with blue eyes could do the job."

In rejecting the proposal, the Senate Armed Services Committee Report called the plan a "smokescreen" that diverted attention from serious manpower shortages in the all volunteer force (AVF). The Report noted that although 95 percent of the job categories were open to women, 42 percent of the total number of jobs were closed to them because of combat restrictions. Since most of the shortages occur in combat positions, registering women would not solve the problem. Indeed, looking ahead to a general mobilization, the Report warned that if the proposal to register women in equal numbers were interpreted to require their induction in equal numbers, it would seriously impair military readiness.

The Report concluded that the proposal to register women was based on equity rather than military necessity, and it rejected the plan for this reason. In passing, the Report also addressed the inherent difficulty of the equity argument. If all women were required to register, but then were not inducted in equal numbers (administration officials testified that the ratio of men to women to be called up was 6:1), or admitted to combat, then the plan would fail to satisfy its own principle of equity. Unlike the administration, Congress believed there was a tension between the requirements of equity and a strong defense. It chose defense; and the Supreme Court upheld the decision not to require draft registration of women.

To many feminists and others who view the military primarily as a social institution, this was a serious blow; the subsequent election of Ronald Reagan seemed to foreshadow major cutbacks in many of the gains women had made in the military in the 1970s.

At first, it did seem likely that the Reagan Administration would change policy concerning women in the military. Immediately after the 1980 election, the Pentagon ordered a "pause" in the recruitment of women to assess their impact on military readiness. It temporarily established a ceiling of 65,000 enlisted women in the Army, and held recruitment levels steady in the other services.



In 1982, the Army, in its policy review, *Women in the Army*, (WITA) recommended 1) the development of a "gender neutral" physical fitness test (MEPSCAT) that would have effectively barred most women from the strenuous military occupational specialties (MOS) to which they were assigned, but were performing inadequately, and 2) the closing of 23 additional MOS to women because of the likelihood of routine direct combat. In the same year, the Pentagon ended co-ed basic training for recruits; male and female officers still train together.

In an odd alliance, feminists joined with free market supporters of the AVF in denouncing these moves, and in the end they prevailed. Despite the administration's opposition to the ERA, it was bound by the imperatives of the AVF to continue to expand opportunities for women in the military, including combat-related MOS. Six months after the WITA recommendations, Secretary of the Army John O. Marsh, Jr. announced that the MEPSCAT tests would be used only as a "guideline" in the classification process, and that female soldiers would not be denied

entry into a particular field because of their physical strength. Army officials stress that "closing a career field to female soldiers is not related to the physical standards of jobs or the physical strength of the applicants"; it is "solely a function of the probability of direct combat involvement." At the same time, the Army re-opened 13 of the 23 MOS closed to women for this reason.

Growing Dependence

The American military has grown increasingly dependent upon women to meet its "manpower" requirements in the volunteer force. Defense Department publications regard the increase in women from 173,445 or 8.5 percent of the active force in January 1981 to over 200,000 or 9.4 percent at the end of fiscal 1984 as a "significant improvement." And as the number of women in the military has grown, they have emerged as a powerful interest group. General Jeane Holm, one of the leading advocates of women's rights in the military, makes it clear that as the number of women increases, the pressure to repeal combat restrictions on women will also grow.

Sooner or later, if the numbers and proportions of women continue to expand, Congress and the services will have to confront the restrictions imposed by the combat laws and policies and will have to decide whether they should be changed and, if so, how.

Pressure for change comes most from the female junior officers whose careers are most directly affected by the combat exclusion policy. In a recent report on field exercises in Honduras, Charles C. Moskos notes that among female officers, "about half believed that women should be allowed to volunteer for combat units . . . the remainder said women should be compelled to go into combat units in the same manner as men . . ." These attitudes are important because between 1983 and 1988, the number of female officers is projected to increase by 28 percent.

Although the present administration publicly accepts the combat exclusion policy, a memo from Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, written in July 1983, suggests that the Pentagon recognizes the tension between the military's growing reliance upon women and a broad interpretation of the combat exclusion policy. "The combat exclusion rule should be interpreted to allow as many as possible career opportunities for women to be kept open," wrote Weinberger. He warns the service secretaries that "no artificial barriers to career opportunities for women will be constructed or tolerated." In keeping with Weinberger's directive, the Defense Department's publication *Going Strong: Women in Defense* (1984) boasts

that women in the Army serve in more than 86 percent of the enlisted career fields, and more than 96 percent of the officer specialties are open to women. These fields include non-traditional specialties such as air traffic control, military intelligence, aviation, equipment maintenance and operation, communications, computer repair, and law enforcement.

In the Navy, nearly 10,000 of the 42,000 enlisted women

serve in non-traditional areas. Today 172 women officers and 3,359 enlisted women serve aboard 32 ships. Ground support and maintenance positions were recently opened up to enlisted women. In June 1984, the Navy assigned the first woman executive officer aboard ship. In another recent change, women officers can now be assigned to "mobile logistics support force ships for temporary duty and deployments." As *Going Strong* explains, "this allows women helicopter pilots and women members of explosive ordnance disposal detachments to deploy with their units."

In the Air Force, the following specialties have been opened to enlisted women since 1981: Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS), KC-10 aerial tanker crew, and 26,000 security police positions. More than 300 women officers serve as pilots and navigators of non-combat aircraft, including the mammoth transport aircraft, the C-5A Galaxy. Just this year, women officers have been made eligible for assignment as launch control officers in the Air Force's most advanced strategic nuclear missile, the Minuteman II. And on April 30, 1985, Air Force Secretary Verne Orr announced that more than 800 new positions were being opened to women, including the "C-23 and EC-130H aircraft, forward air control post, the airborne battlefield command and control center mission, and some munitions sites."

Despite its initial reservations, the Reagan Administration has been forced by its commitment to the AVF to expand opportunities for women in the military. As long as the AVF continues, the pressure to increase the number of women and to open all military specialties, including combat, will continue to grow, and to pose serious problems for combat readiness.

Measuring Morale

Morale is difficult to assess because it defies precise quantification. Nevertheless, a number of problem areas have emerged.

1. *Fraternization.* Military policy traditionally prohibits social relations between officers and enlisted personnel in order to maintain impartiality, discipline, and morale. James Webb, a Naval Academy graduate, in a controversial article in *The Washingtonian*, "Women Can't Fight," cites one cadet's opinion of how fraternization has undermined morale at West Point.

Our squad leaders talk about honor, performance, and accountability. Then before you knew it, they were going after the women plebes, sneaking some of them away on weekends. How can you indoctrinate the women when you're breaking the regulations to date them? And how can you talk about integrity and accountability when you're doing these sorts of things?

2. *Special Treatment.* Even when fraternization rules are observed, both men and women complain of double standards. Men believe that women receive preferential treatment in duty hours, assignments, and sick call. They resent having to assume additional responsibilities because women are pregnant or physically unable to perform strenuous assignments.

But it is not only the morale of men that suffers. In the Honduras exercise, Mr. Moskos, who generally regards the operation as a success, nevertheless notes:

Men and women ran together, which led to one of the few forms of invidious comparisons between the sexes in the encampment. Initially, the women were mixed in with the men, but this typically led to the women as a group falling behind the men. The procedure was then changed to place women in front of men. This resulted in the whole group running at a slower pace than if the men had run alone. Either way, the women felt they were being regarded as failures, firstly by not being able to keep up with the men, or secondly, by holding the men back.

Finally, even when women soldiers share equally in the hardships of the field exercises, they are never really comfortable with the lack of privacy in sleeping and showering arrangements, and this too can affect morale, especially among the women recruits.

3. *Sexual Harassment.* Although sexual harassment is likely to occur wherever men and women share close quarters and work together, it is especially acute in the military, and has increased as the number of women has grown. One reason may be that the insularity of military life intensifies sexual attraction and conflict. Another may be that the military legitimately cultivates aggressive behavior to a greater degree than civil institutions. Researchers have suggested that some men may find it difficult to restrain their hostile impulses toward women, especially if they disapprove of their having invaded this most masculine profession.

Nor is sexual harassment only a problem between the sexes. In the Honduras exercises, enlisted women mentioned approaches from lesbians. As Mr. Moskos notes, "accounts of lesbians would come up spontaneously in most extended interviews with female soldiers," though the women were less alarmed than male soldiers by homosexual overtures.

The military's policies on sexual matters tend to go off in opposite directions. Reformers want the military to stay out of private matters with regard to fraternization, pregnancy, family matters, and sexual conduct in general, but they call on the military to intervene in private matters involving sexual harassment, and to use the authority they are otherwise unwilling to acknowledge to reform offensive attitudes. The authority these reformers would give the military is broad indeed: the female officers interviewed by Mr. Moskos consider sexual harassment to include "sexual definitions of suitable work, the combat exclusion rule, sexist language, etc." Similarly the Defense Department defines sexual harassment in part as "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature," which creates an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment." According to this definition, many of the traditional military techniques for instilling courage and a fighting spirit might be regarded as "sexual harassment."

Traditionally, the service academies have prepared officers for leadership positions, chiefly combat ones. But in evaluating the performance of women at the academies, supporters stress women's academic performance, while

minimizing the effect of changes in the physical training curricula. Although the academies initially tried to hold women to the same physical standards as men, with only minimal changes, the disparity in performance between the men and the women necessitated the development of different standards. As General Holm reports:

Women at West Point carry lighter rifles; pugil stick training, in which cadets practice hand-to-hand combat with padded sticks, pits only women against women; and parts of the obstacle course have been adjusted to accommodate shorter people.

In keeping with this view of the academies as essentially academic institutions, West Point publications now stress equal effort rather than equal performance.

On the other hand, critics insist that the principal task of the academies (which cost the American taxpayer over \$100,000 per graduate) is to prepare men for combat leadership. They deplore the shift from leadership to "management," from physical strength to "general excellence," and blame the admission of women for accelerating these trends. At the Naval Academy, physical punishment and verbal abuse of cadets have been abolished. Although this sounds like a sensible reform, and is consistent with the Defense Department's broad definition of sexual harassment, a plausible case can be made that, however brutal, these earlier practices helped to prepare men for the kind of stress and violence they would encounter in combat. Similarly, the Academy has replaced the longstanding practice of peer evaluations with officer evaluations because the officers feared that male cadets would not rate women as effective leaders. Male cadets complain that the leadership evaluation process has been "sterilized" and that women cadets have been singled out for advancement on the basis of their managerial and academic performance. They object that women have not proven themselves effective leaders in ways that matter.

Yet they also know that they dare not say this publicly. Cadets at West Point are rated on their "attitudes toward equal opportunity," and officers understand that their misgivings about women's performances can adversely affect their careers.

Advocates of expanding opportunities for women in the military concede that most women are physically weaker, but they dismiss the issue of strength. They cite studies like the Gates Commission, which maintained that the percentage of ground combat jobs requiring few technical skills had declined and would continue to do so. Future confrontations will require a higher percentage of soldiers skilled in electronic and other technical fields. Also, the advocates say, women recruits are more intelligent and better able to operate such sophisticated equipment. And finally, most of what the Army does requires teamwork. Men can cooperate with women as well as with men if required by their leaders to do so.

Upon closer analysis, these arguments are unpersuasive. The necessity of avoiding a general nuclear holocaust makes it likely that future wars will be limited and improvisational. The Army believes that victory in such contests will depend upon "initiative, depth, agility, and synchroni-

zation . . . maneuver and surprise . . . leadership, unit cohesion, and effective independent operations." It further assumes that casualties will be high in combat "support" units, in which women now serve. To the extent that the recent Falklands war provides any guidance, victory will depend more on traditional infantry stamina than sophisticated weapons.

Mercenaries for the Privileged

During the Reagan Administration, the overall quality of the armed forces, measured by percentage of the force with high school diplomas and high AFQT scores, has improved dramatically, significantly narrowing the gap between male and female performance. Nevertheless, there are strong indications that this trend may not hold. The end of the recession, the proposed Congressional cap on military spending, and the decline in the 18 to 20 year-old pool, pose severe problems for the quality of the AVF. In testimony before Congress earlier this year, Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence J. Korb predicted that "recruiting will continue to become increasingly difficult." In this case, the gap between qualified women and men may again widen, as it did during the Carter years. The real question remains—not whether women are more qualified than high school dropouts or mental incompetents to engage in combat specialties, but why we as a nation allow poor, disproportionately black, men and women to become mercenaries for middle and upper class white men.

Moreover, although women do pose fewer disciplinary problems, they adversely affect combat readiness in other ways. According to the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, "Ten percent of the women in the Army are pregnant at any given time. Over the course of the year, it is estimated that 17 percent of the Army's female personnel will have been pregnant." This creates problems of lost time, child care, and deployability. Although unmarried mothers with dependent children are not allowed to enlist in either the active or reserve forces, they are allowed to remain if they divorce or become pregnant after their enlistment. A case pending in the federal courts charges that this policy constitutes unfair sex discrimination and denial of equal protection of the laws to unmarried mothers who wish to enlist in the services.

Although it is true that many military tasks require teamwork rather than virtuoso displays of physical strength, it is not so clear that men will cooperate with women as readily as with men, or that they will perform as effectively if they do. In the two Army studies designed to measure the effect of women on combat effectiveness, MAXWAC and Reforger, the conclusions, though favorable, are ambiguous. A special team of observers found no differences in units composed of 35 percent women in the MAXWAC study, but noted informally that the "women generally did not perform the field tasks as well as men."


One notable difference between the Carter and Reagan administrations is that the Defense Department no longer conducts such tests. According to Lieutenant Colonel John Boyer of the Pentagon, "the question of whether women can perform as well as men in combat service support type skills is no longer at issue. It is recognized that women do perform as well as men in these jobs."


Finally, the dispute over quality involves different, frequently unstated, methodological assumptions. On the one side is the technical, or what William J. Gregor of West Point calls the "instrumental" approach to measuring military effectiveness. The instrumental view relies upon supposedly objective quantitative tests—nothing is true until it has been quantitatively measured. But technicians, too, have values—in this case that women can perform effectively in nearly all, if not all areas of the military. And the kind of studies they design tend to give them the answers they want. When the tests do not confirm their values they assume that human nature is malleable, and can be changed through "effective" managerial techniques.

By contrast, the "normative" model recognizes the limits of quantification, and recognizes that ultimately the kinds of questions asked and the methods employed to answer them reflect opposing political philosophies. There is no "value-free" study of women in the military. Certain variables like morale or male bonding are subjective and difficult to measure accurately, but they are nevertheless crucial to any realistic assessment of combat effectiveness. Human nature, which is at once universal and particular, human as well as male and female, is not amenable to unlimited experimentation.

Ignoring the Obvious


But the trend of recent history and court decisions is to ignore these differences in the pursuit of social equity. The demand for equity has widespread appeal because it is simple and reflects the egalitarian principle of American society. But when applied to military affairs, it is wrong and dangerous. The military cannot and should not try to mirror exactly the principles of democratic society. The military is not a "civic instrument" that reflects social progress. Nor is it a social welfare agency. The relationship between the military and civilian spheres is more complicated. Although the military defends the principles of democratic society, it cannot fully embody them. Its end is victory, not equity; its virtue is courage, not justice; its structure is authoritarian, not pluralistic. In short, although the military defends democratic principles and is shaped by the regime of which it is a part, it is not simply a microcosm of the larger society. The requirements of military life clash with the democratic commitment to equality, natural rights, and consent.

This does not mean that the military can or ought to ignore democratic principles altogether. The demands of black soldiers are a case in point. Until after World War II, racial segregation was official military policy. Beginning in 1948, and prior to the great court decisions outlawing discrimination in civil society, the services sought to eliminate racial segregation and discrimination. But the situation of blacks and women is not the same. The arguments for segregating blacks was based on longstanding and irrational white prejudice, whereas the case against women in combat is rooted in recognition of genuine physical and psychological differences that are important in battle, such as strength, aggressiveness, and sexual attraction. To the extent that the prejudice against women is based on an appreciation of these natural and desirable differences, it is valid and should influence military policy. 




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THE REPUBLICAN PORK BARREL

Why It's So Hard To Cut the Budget

DONALD LAMBRO

Near the end of April, just as the 1985 budget debate was about to begin, Senate Majority Leader Robert Dole's patience with his colleagues was already exhausted. "I don't want to hear any more deficit reduction speeches from [those] who stand up and vote against us for the next 10 days," he angrily told reporters. "I'm tired of it. I've heard all the deficit speeches I can tolerate from guys who stand up [and] talk about the deficit [and then] don't want to do anything about it. They want to raise your taxes."

Senator Dole, of course, was talking about senators on both sides of the aisle, but his patience was particularly strained with members of his own party: Republicans who beat their breasts with rage over the deficit before local Chamber of Commerce luncheons, then fight to protect and expand pet programs and bring home the pork barrel projects that will aid their re-election.

Indeed, on the very day that Senator Dole was venting his frustration with those who condemn deficit spending but then vote to fatten the deficit, Maryland's Charles Mathias, a Republican, delivered such a speech on the floor. Declaring that in the fight to reduce "dangerous deficits" all Americans must be willing to "make a sacrifice," Senator Mathias said it was time to "put an end to the growth of our national debt, which has taken on a life of its own as larger and larger interest bills add to the total." But shortly thereafter, he affirmed his opposition to "a number of items in the [budget-cutting] package." One item that he fought to preserve was Amtrak, the government-financed rail passenger business that runs through his state, and permits his constituents to commute between Baltimore and Washington at heavily subsidized fares. Senator Mathias then proceeded to urge that taxes be raised by repealing tax indexing, which protects primarily low to middle income taxpayers from being pushed into higher tax brackets simply because their income keeps abreast of inflation.

But Senator Mathias was doing no more than most of his fellow Republicans in the Senate. Thus, as Senator Dole and Budget Committee Chairman Peter Domenici pleaded for support in late April for the deficit-slashing compromise budget package they had worked out with the White House, some of the staunchest conservative and Republi-

can opponents of deficit spending remained perched on the proverbial fence—still squawking about the deficit but also squawking about budget cuts that hit too close to home.

Political Insecurity

No one has voiced more opposition against deficits than Republican Senator Paula Hawkins of Florida who repeatedly warns that the deficits "threaten to undermine" the economy. But when the Senate Republican compromise budget came forth containing a minimum two percent increase in next year's cost-of-living adjustment for Social Security beneficiaries, Senator Hawkins, joined by fellow GOP Senator Alfonse D'Amato of New York, promptly served notice that they would offer an amendment to maintain the full inflation raise for Social Security. Their amendment was accepted on May 2 by a vote of 65-34, thanks to the support of 19 Republicans, including conservatives Mack Mattingly of Georgia and Richard Lugar and Dan Quayle of Indiana.

Notably, Senator Hawkins is up for re-election in 1986 in a state that boasts one of the largest retired populations in the country. "In Florida," a top staffer sheepishly explains, "it's political suicide to cut Social Security."

That's what GOP Representative C.W. Bill Young of Florida thinks, too. Despite his 100 percent American Conservative Union rating, Representative Young is so outraged over any attempt to restrain the growth of Social Security that he helped to form the Congressional Social Security Caucus to insulate it from any curtailment. "We will be a force to counter those who are trying to reduce Social Security benefits," he said.

Standing right behind Hawkins and Young in insisting that Social Security checks must be given the full inflation increase next year and every year, is conservative Congressman Jack Kemp of New York, a likely contender for the Republican Party's 1988 presidential nomination. "Cutting Social Security [increases] is dumb," he told a group of conservative activists at a Capitol Hill briefing earlier this

DONALD LAMBRO is a nationally syndicated columnist and the author of *Washington: City of Scandals*.

year. Representative Kemp contends that many of the domestic budget cuts then being proposed by President Reagan, such as eliminating revenue sharing and cutting college assistance for the middle class, were politically wrong. In the final count, however, all except four GOP senators (Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, Hawkins, D'Amato, and Mathias) voted for a budget package that included a freeze on Social Security.

Or how about proposals to abolish the government's multi-billion dollar Synfuels Corporation, whose "corporate welfare" subsidies are helping out some of America's biggest and richest energy companies? No, says GOP Congressman Mike Strang of Colorado. Any attempt to abolish Synfuel's "crucial national security program is shortsighted," Representative Strang told the House Fossil and Synthetic Fuels Subcommittee. Why? Because his district is the home of the most extensive, high quality oil shale reserves in the world, and termination of Synfuels would result in the cancellation of two Synfuels-backed projects in Colorado.

Senator James Abdnor of South Dakota, who is given an 80 percent rating by the American Conservative Union, thinks that high deficits are "both reckless and dangerous" and must be cut back. But not if it must be done at the expense of eliminating \$52 million a year in airline subsidies, which would be "a crippling blow to rural areas like South Dakota." If the subsidies are cut, as proposed by the administration, Senator Abdnor fears that airline service to Pierre would be threatened—though nearly half the cities getting the subsidies are within 100 miles of a major airport. "I told David Stockman there was no way South Dakota was going to become the only state capital in the nation without air service," the conservative lawmaker said.

Free Coast Guard services for private, wealthy yacht owners and commercial boat companies cost taxpayers millions of dollars annually. A modest system of user fees would cut \$750 million from the deficit over three years, according to the Grace Commission. Who could be opposed to that? Well, Republican members of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee are.

Among those leading the opposition to the administration's user fee proposal is Representative Don Young of Alaska who staunchly believes that "everybody's going to have to make cutbacks" if the deficit is to be brought under control. "The problem is that none of us in Congress has got any teeth," he told *Policy Review*. "We can go ahead and keep spending or we can leave the country bankrupt." Nothing wrong here, except Don Young doesn't want any of these budget savings made at the expense of Alaska's boat owners.

Sharing the Wealth

A rumble of discontent rippled across the GOP side of the aisle when Ronald Reagan had the temerity to suggest that with a \$225 billion deficit staring Uncle Sam in the face, the government could no longer afford to give away \$4.6 billion in revenue sharing grants to every locality in the country. What? Give up revenue sharing grants to municipalities like Beverly Hills, Grosse Point, and Palm Beach?

Representative Frank Horton of New York, with the support of a half dozen Republicans, including Conservative Opportunity Society members such as Robert Walker of Pennsylvania and Barbara Vucanovich of Nevada, took to the House floor earlier this year to announce their opposition. Representative Horton called the program "a model of efficiency. . . that has widespread support across the country from all levels of government as well as the public." So does cutting the deficit, but Horton and Company never mention that.

Some Republicans beat their breasts with rage over the deficit, then fight to protect and expand pet programs.

While revenue sharing obviously has strong support from Democrats too, the program has maintained almost religious support from Republicans who consider it one of "their" programs, since it was enacted under the Nixon Administration. They have so much reverence for it that many of them want to expand it. Indeed, in 1983 over half the Republicans in the House voted to increase the program from \$4.6 billion to \$5.3 billion. It was only after the administration threatened a veto, and Bob Dole stubbornly held out against the raise in a House-Senate conference, that the figure was kept at its present level.

In many cases, Republicans quietly troop down to the White House not to urge deep cuts in the budget but to protect their favorite programs. In the fall of 1984, when Budget Director David Stockman planned to seek sizeable cuts in the Department of Education's fiscal 1985 budget, he was visited by a GOP delegation of Conservative Opportunity Society conservatives led by Mickey Edwards of Oklahoma, chairman of the American Conservative Union. Representative Edwards, joined by Vin Weber of Minnesota and Newt Gingrich of Georgia among others, insisted on seeing the President "to persuade him that he could not cut one dime out of the education budget," according to a congressional participant at the meeting.

Why did these budget-cutting conservatives oppose cuts in a department that President Reagan had promised in his 1980 campaign to dismantle? It wasn't that they had suddenly become believers in federal aid to education, whose budget, after all, provides less than six percent of the nation's elementary and secondary school expenditures. No, the reason was political cost. Reagan, they complained, had gone out and made "too big an issue" over the need to improve the quality of education. The conservative GOP lawmakers told David Stockman in blunt terms that it was "stupid and foolish" to cut education in the coming year. They warned him that they would actively oppose any cuts in Congress.

"That's why we didn't cut anything out of the education budget in our fiscal 1985 request," a top administration official admitted. "Then Congress added more money to it

and voted an \$18 billion education budget in the 1985 continuing resolution. Our original target was \$8 billion.”

Senator Robert Kasten Jr. of Wisconsin, (ACU rating of 81 percent), thinks the deficits are “a serious danger to our economy.” But that doesn’t inhibit him from fighting to preserve two indefensible examples of corporate welfare: Urban Development Action Grants and Export-Import Bank loans to America’s wealthiest corporations.

UDAGs, which big commercial real estate developers cynically call “the gravy in the deal,” have helped build ritzy hotels for businesses like Hyatt and Sheraton and have provided development subsidies to big corporations such as General Motors. Twenty big municipalities scoop up nearly half of all UDAG dollars.

Similarly, Ex-Im loans benefit only a handful of Fortune 500 corporations under the pretext that they are helping sell U.S. products abroad. Yet economists say they have little effect on our balance of trade. Eliminating both would save \$4 billion over three years. Senator Kasten believes that both are essential programs that must stay.

“Can you name a single exporter who supports your proposal?” he once asked Ex-Im President William S. Draper—but this is hardly an objective measure of whether a small and wealthy special interest group should continue to be subsidized.

Like Senator Kasten, GOP Representative Sherwood Boehlert of New York is wild about UDAGs, boasting in one constituent newsletter how they have “been used in the past to make such projects as Utica’s Sheraton Hotel a reality.” Faced with a variety of competing priorities, isn’t it unlikely that Representative Boehlert’s working class constituents in Utica would vote to give the highly profitable Sheraton Corporation federal assistance in its building projects? Yet such is the lure of corporate welfare on Capital Hill.

Electrifying Rhetoric

Few in the Senate have excoriated the evils of deficit spending and big government more than South Carolina’s Strom Thurmond, who has an 88 percent ACU rating. “It is absolutely essential to the economic well-being of our country that we take immediate, strong, and decisive steps to reduce the federal deficit,” he said in a Senate speech in April. But if you are thinking of cutting the deficit by phasing out the New Deal-era Rural Electrification Administration, Senator Thurmond says forget it. Begun when few farms had electricity (now virtually 99.9 percent of them do), this program continues to provide heavily subsidized loans to hugely successful electric and telephone corporatives. In many cases, their customers are big businesses and middle class suburbanites who benefit from cheap, federally-subsidized rates.

Though the Office of Management and Budget says an REA phase-out would save \$5.1 billion over the next five years, Senator Thurmond insists REA is a “worthwhile, solid, cost-effective program which has been of tremendous benefit to rural America”— so keep those subsidies flowing.

Republicans often troop to the White House not to urge deep cuts in the budget but to protect their favorite programs.

Congresswoman Virginia Smith of Nebraska, the ranking Republican on the House Agriculture Appropriations subcommittee, doesn’t want any money cut from the \$300 million Extension Service, a turn-of-the-century program that has totally outlived its purpose.

An administration official says GOP Representative Bud Shuster of Pennsylvania “goes nuts every time we mention getting rid of the \$200 million a year Economic Development Administration,” a 1960s-style pork barrel program that has done little to alleviate unemployment.

Nuclear and non-nuclear energy research? Senator James McClure of Idaho, the conservative Republican chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, opposes any significant reduction of these programs. “We’re talking about cutting programs that give his committee clout,” said an administration official.

The little rhyme that Louisiana’s wily Senator Russell Long often recites about taxes applies with equal accuracy to the dilemma Republican lawmakers often find themselves in when talking about cutting the budget: “Don’t cut you and don’t cut me. Cut that other fellow behind the tree.”

Of course, pointing at Republican members of Congress who oppose spending reductions doesn’t give a precise picture. Many of them, perhaps most, are prepared to go much further in budget cuts than most of their Democratic counterparts. Nevertheless, one thing is clear: many of the most cuttable and least essential federal programs continue to survive because key Republican lawmakers have resisted their reduction at every turn. And for that reason alone they must shoulder much of the blame for the dangerous fiscal mess in which the federal government now finds itself. ■

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THE GOOD, THE BAD, AND THE UGLY

Who's Who in Nicaragua

ADAM WOLFSON

Arturo Cruz

Arturo Cruz is one of the most prominent leaders of Nicaragua's democratic opposition today. But he has often aided the Sandinistas at crucial moments to give them moral legitimacy in the eyes of the world, and his vacillating attitude toward the Sandinistas has helped them consolidate their power. A banker by profession, Mr. Cruz was born in 1923, and received his B.A. in the United States at Georgetown University. From 1969 through 1979, Somoza's last ten years, Mr. Cruz was on the political sidelines, stationed in Washington as deputy associate treasurer of the Inter-American Development Bank.

In 1977, he lent his name to the Sandinista cause by joining their pluralist front group, "Los Doce," or The Twelve. He thought of the Sandinistas as "heroes that my generation had lacked," and he was quick to join their government when they took power. He believed that the Sandinistas "earned their moral authority during the war of liberation," and he thought it was possible for non-Marxists to work with them.

His first position with the Sandinistas was as head of the Central Bank, where he helped to reassure foreign lenders and to secure Western financial assistance for the new government. He remained with the Sandinistas long after most prominent non-Marxists resigned and left the country in distress over the totalitarian direction of the revolution. In 1980, anti-Somoza activists Alfonso Robelo and Violeta Chamorro resigned from the junta then running Nicaragua. Mr. Cruz happily filled one of their vacancies. A year later he, too, resigned in dismay over the "radicalization" of Sandinista rule, but then "with enthusiasm" agreed to represent Nicaragua as ambassador to the United States. For nine months, he tried to convince the U. S. government and the American press that the Sandinistas were not Marxist ideologues. He resigned in 1981, alarmed by the Sandinista's repressive domestic policies and cozy relations with the socialist bloc countries.

During the 1984 "elections," Mr. Cruz was the presidential candidate for the Coordinadora, an umbrella group of centrist political parties, labor unions, and business groups. Unfortunately, he could never make up his mind whether

these elections were fair and legitimate. At one point, he called himself a Sandinista at heart. But he withdrew from the race when the Sandinistas violated their promise to the Socialist International to allow more newspaper and broadcasting coverage of his campaign. Yet immediately after the elections, Mr. Cruz publicly criticized Ronald Reagan for calling Daniel Ortega's victory a sham. He said President Reagan should give Ortega a "period of grace."

Within two months, Mr. Cruz changed his mind about Daniel Ortega's fidelity to democratic principles. "I don't believe that anybody with a sound mind today has the slightest doubt that the Sandinistas are moving towards complete totalitarianism," he told *Conservative Digest*.

Though Mr. Cruz favors American aid to the contras, arguing that withholding help "would be a serious blow to the rebels," he is a critic of the main contra group, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). He told *Policy Review* that the ideology of the FDN must be improved. "It must be more than a mere military organization; it must be a source of democratic indoctrination."

In dealing with the Sandinista regime, Mr. Cruz prefers to speak softly. He opposes the U.S. trade embargo against Nicaragua, stating that "economic cooperation should be utilized, not suspended." He is a supporter of the peace efforts of the Contadora group.

Adolfo Calero

Adolfo Calero is Commander-in-Chief of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN), the most important contra group. A businessman until 1983, he was general manager of the Managua Coca-Cola bottling plant. He was a leader of the moderate opposition to Somoza. In 1979 he was jailed three times for organizing labor stoppages and strikes against the Somoza regime.

Mr. Calero was born in Managua, and educated in America at Notre Dame and Syracuse Universities. In 1959 he played a minor role in the "Olama y Los Mollejones" insurrection, an effort by young members of the Conservative Party to overthrow the elder Somoza. In the mid-

ADAM WOLFSON is assistant editor of *Policy Review*.

1970s Mr. Calero left the Conservative Party after it was clear that it had reached an accommodation with the younger Somoza. He helped found an alternative, the Authentic Conservative Party and later served as its representative on the Broad Opposition Front (FAO) against Somoza.

Three years after the revolution Mr. Calero went into exile when his house was looted by state security forces and his property was confiscated. He declined an invitation by Eden Pastora to join his contra group, then called ARDE. "I was not a repentant Sandinista, as was Pastora," says Mr. Calero caustically. Instead he joined the FDN, and seven months later he was elected President of Directorate and Commander-in-Chief.

Mr. Calero believes that the war in Nicaragua could easily go either way. "I think the Sandinistas may well crumble this year," he says. But he also fears that without American support the contras will be outgunned by Nicaragua's Soviet and Cuban supplied army. "We are under the threat of a new type of colonialism," he says. "The Monroe Doctrine kept the Europeans out of this hemisphere, and should still be a valid policy of the United States." Moreover he asks, "If we are fighting for democracy against Communism, is it not logical that we get American support?"

In an interview with *Policy Review*, Mr. Calero compared Tip O'Neill to Neville Chamberlain and Ronald Reagan to Winston Churchill. "I do not want books written, *While America Slept*."

Alfonso Robelo

He was a leader of the Sandinistas, and I considered him to be subversive," wrote Anastasio Somoza of Alfonso Robelo, one of his main opponents during the revolution. Today Mr. Robelo is a leading figure in the fight against the Sandinistas, which he views as a continuation of his struggle against Somoza. "Somoza was very stubborn," Mr. Robelo told *Policy Review*. "If the Sandinistas can learn from Somoza's experience, seeing where he is now, they may have second thoughts."

Born in 1939, Mr. Robelo is a prominent Nicaraguan businessman with a large popular following in Nicaragua. His early public career (director of the University of Central America, president of the Nicaraguan Chamber of Commerce, head of the development institute INDE) was not particularly political until he led the national strikes following the assassination of *La Prensa* editor Pedro Joaquín Chamorro in 1978. He then founded the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN), an important group of middle-class social democrats opposed to the further rule of Somoza.

Mr. Robelo was one of the five members of the junta that took power in 1979, but he resigned nine months later. "I was not effective within the junta," he explains, "They were using my presence to advertise their 'pluralism.'" For two years Mr. Robelo opposed the Sandinistas "civilly," but when the state of emergency was declared, he decided to leave Nicaragua. Initially detained by the Sandinistas, pressure from U.S. Congressmen Tom Harkin and Michael Barnes secured his safe release.

Today Mr. Robelo is political coordinator of the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE) which originally included Eden Pastora and is now allied with the FDN. He works closely with Arturo Cruz and Adolfo Calero.

Mr. Robelo is a harsh critic of Sandinista claims to have greatly improved literacy. He points to addition lessons in a Sandinista textbook for first graders. (2 machine guns + 2 machine guns + 2 machine guns = 6 machine guns). Mr. Robelo says that charges of rebel atrocities pale before the "real atrocity" today, which is the Sandinista effort to militarize and indoctrinate Nicaragua's children.

Since joining the contras, Mr. Robelo has survived two assassination attempts. If the contras lose, he warns that Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mexico will be engulfed by war.

Eden Pastora

Eden Pastora, a swashbuckling maverick, was the greatest military hero in the Sandinista fight against Somoza. After the revolution, he broke with his Marxist comrades. But today he devotes as much energy to quarrelling with his fellow contras as fighting against the Sandinistas.

Born into a middle class family, Mr. Pastora was five years old when his father was killed by Somoza's National Guard. He opposed the Somoza regime beginning in the 1950s, first as a member of the Traditional Conservative Party, and then as a guerrilla in the "Olama y Mollejones" incident, in which a group of young conservatives attempted to overthrow Somoza. Though Mr. Pastora flirted with the FSLN in the late 1960s, he quickly tired of the ideological rigidity of Tomas Borge. He was wooed back to the FSLN in 1977, attracted by the ideological openness of the Tercerista tendency of Humberto Ortega. In August 1978, Mr. Pastora won international fame as the "Commander Zero" who captured the National Palace in Managua.

After the revolution, Mr. Pastora served the Sandinistas as Vice Minister of the the Interior and Vice Minister of Defense, but resigned in July 1981 and joined the contras a year later. He founded the Sandino Revolutionary Front (FRS) which merged with opposition leader Alfonso Robelo's Nicaraguan Democratic Movement (MDN) to form the Democratic Revolutionary Alliance (ARDE). By 1983, he was commanding 7,000 men. But he obstinately refused to join forces with the FDN and today commands only 2,000 men.

The FDN would welcome an alliance with Mr. Pastora, but he claims the FDN is Somocista and that he would always be looking over his shoulder. Yet this is not the real stumbling block in an alliance between the FDN and Mr. Pastora, who also has former National Guardsmen fighting with him. A more likely obstacle is Mr. Pastora's egomania. "He is the caudillo type," says Alfonso Robelo. According to Adolfo Calero, the major problem is "Pastora can be the boss over there [by himself], but not over here [with us]."

Today Mr. Pastora operates in southern Nicaragua on the Costa Rican boarder. He is on his own now, since Alfonso Robelo has formed an alliance with the FDN. He can be still heard denouncing those "tropicalized Stalin-



Eden Pastora, Obando y Bravo, Adolfo Calero

Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*.

ists" ruling Managua, but he is no friend of the West. He blamed the CIA for an explosion that nearly killed him last year. Even when he broke with the Sandinistas, he stated that the superpowers were morally equivalent: "The invasion of Vietnam was as imperialist as the invasion of Afghanistan. Just as imperialist are those who support a fascist junta in El Salvador as those who support a totalitarian regime in Poland."

Miguel Obando y Bravo

Anastasio Somoza called him a Communist. Today Miguel Obando y Bravo, the Roman Catholic archbishop of Managua, is the rallying point of domestic resistance to the Sandinistas. This year he was named Nicaragua's first cardinal, and is very close to Pope John Paul II. According to opinion polls, he is the most popular man in Nicaragua, perhaps the most devoutly Catholic nation in the Western Hemisphere.

The son of a peasant, Cardinal Obando has always kept a common touch. He was riding a mule when he received the news that he had been appointed Archbishop of Managua in 1970. Somoza unsuccessfully tried to buy the new archbishop's favor by giving him a Mercedes, but Cardinal Obando raffled it off, donating the money to the poor. Two years later he boycotted the ceremonies allegedly transferring power to a new president but in reality keeping Somoza in charge. Later he wrote a pastoral letter calling for "a completely new order" in Nicaragua.

In 1974, Cardinal Obando mediated between the

Somoza regime and Sandinista guerrillas after a Sandinista commando unit seized the home of a wealthy Nicaraguan during a Christmas party. He performed a similar role in 1978 when the Sandinistas seized the National Palace and held the Nicaraguan Congress hostage to gain the release of Tomas Borge. On both occasions, he negotiated an agreement favorable to the Sandinistas. In 1979, a month before Somoza's departure, Cardinal Obando endorsed the people's right to rebel. After the revolution, he looked favorably upon the Sandinistas and permitted priests to serve in government posts.

But the honeymoon between Cardinal Obando and the Sandinistas abruptly ended in 1980. The cardinal now says that the Sandinista government is "totalitarian" and is an "enemy of the Church." He is most critical of the Sandinista leadership on the issue of "social justice," and providing for the poor. Pointing to the marketplace, he says, "I ask myself . . . what has been better for the people, before or after the revolution? I have to say the people were poor before, but they could buy half a kilo of beans any place."

The Sandinistas have responded to Cardinal Obando's criticism with warnings that the CIA may kill him; today Cardinal Obando cannot travel without a Sandinista tail close behind. Daniel Ortega claims that Cardinal Obando is a leader of "a minority that wants to sell out the country." His brother, Humberto Ortega, charges that Cardinal Obando is being "used by American imperialism." The Sandinista paper *La Semana Comica* has carried racist caricatures of Cardinal Obando, who is of Indian and mulatto ancestry. Though the Sandinistas have not moved

directly against Cardinal Obando, on July 9, 1984, they expelled ten priests from Nicaragua.

Cardinal Obando reportedly has toned down his criticism of the Sandinista regime, in order to gain some leverage. He recently stated that "as Christians . . . we seek peace by civilized means and with dialogue—a mediation among Nicaraguans." The cardinal favors direct negotiations between the Sandinistas and the contras, which the government has rejected. According to an ex-Sandinista now living in the United States, Cardinal Obando is "the man whom the Sandinistas fear the most."

Enrique Bermudez

I agree that Nicaragua was in need of change," Enrique Bermudez, military commander of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN) told *Policy Review*. "But I did not support the Sandinista revolution because I considered it dangerous for the change to be carried out by an armed Marxist-Leninist minority." Today Mr. Bermudez runs the war against the Sandinistas. Though frequently accused of being a "Somocista," Mr. Bermudez never had any direct contact with Anastasio Somoza, and has been cleared of any war crimes by the Sandinistas.

Mr. Bermudez comes from a poor family with no previous ties to Nicaragua's military. He was 16 when he entered the Nicaraguan Military Academy, which he says, "gave me the opportunity to receive a higher education . . . totally free." On a government scholarship he studied military engineering in Brazil, and later attended the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Back in Nicaragua, Mr. Bermudez was a chemistry instructor at the Nicaraguan Military Academy and was a member of the Nicaraguan traffic police. He taught safety and traffic rules to elementary schools and helped organize a female police corps. He rose to the rank of colonel in the National Guard.

From 1975 to 1979, Mr. Bermudez lived in Washington, D.C., as a student at the Inter-American College of Defense, and then as Nicaragua's military attache. Like most Americans, he watched the Sandinista revolution on t.v.

Mr. Bermudez was "very distressed" during the revolution, says a National Security Council official. He knew that the National Guard abused its power, but he did not feel he could oppose Somoza as long as the Sandinistas were leading the revolution. "I accept responsibility for serving in the National Guard," he says. "The only regret I have is that there wasn't enough leadership among the senior officers to prevent the abuses and repression that occurred."

Because of his former ties to the National Guard, Mr. Bermudez is the battering ram used by the FDN's detractors to discredit its legitimacy. A former member of the FDN, Edgar Chamorro, claims Mr. Bermudez would be another Somoza, without Somoza's charisma. "We are not a people of laws; we only respect strongmen with weapons," Mr. Chamorro says.

But the FDN has matured under Mr. Bermudez's stewardship from a tiny group of former National Guardsmen into a 20,000-man army led by a civilian directorate. Such former National Guardsmen as Ricardo Lau ("to know his

name is to know fear," a Nicaraguan saying goes) have been expelled from the FDN. Today, its ranks are swollen with peasants whose lands were expropriated by the Sandinista regime. Adolfo Calero, Commander-in-Chief of the FDN, says that one percent of the FDN are former National Guardsmen; 23 percent are former Sandinistas.

The FDN has recently suffered several setbacks. Congress has refused all military aid to the FDN rebels, and the Sandinista army has become more aggressive, chasing them all the way into their Honduran sanctuaries. Mr. Bermudez believes that accommodation with the Sandinistas is impossible. The Sandinistas' "clear Communist objectives have not permitted any other alternative than armed struggle," he says.

Steadman Fagoth

The Miskito, Sumo, and Ramo Indians were the first group in Nicaragua to suffer at the hands of the Sandinistas. Their tribal lands were expropriated, and half the population has been dislocated. Approximately 25,000 Indians live in Sandinista internment camps, and another 25,000 have fled to Honduras and Costa Rica. So it is hardly surprising that Nicaragua's first anti-Sandinista rebel should be an Indian.

Steadman Fagoth's involvement in "Spaniard affairs," as the Indian peoples refer to Managua politics, began when he was a biology student at the National University. Twice he was arrested for anti-Somoza activities. Even so, his vocal criticism of the Sandinista regime led to his arrest in February 1981, on the charge of being a "Somocista informant." The Sandinistas held him for three months, but released him once he "agreed" to accept a scholarship in East Germany. Instead Mr. Fagoth fled to Honduras.

Virtually alone, Mr. Fagoth formed ties with the "Legion of 15th of September Movement" (a rag-tag bunch of former National Guardsmen) from whom he received military training. In May 1981, with approximately 1,000 other Indians, Mr. Fagoth began military operations against the Sandinistas, later calling his organization Misura. Today Misura has 5,000 men under arms, and is loosely allied with the FDN.

When Misura rebels captured 23 members of the Sandinista Army six months ago, Mr. Fagoth agreed to release them in exchange for 10 Misura rebels held by the Sandinistas. But in a doublecross, 1,200 Sandinista troops laid siege to the Misura camp where the Sandinista prisoners were held. Mr. Fagoth promptly got on Honduran radio and declared that unless the attack on the Misura camp ceased, the Sandinista prisoners "would be shot." The prisoner exchange was completed but Honduras expelled Mr. Fagoth. He now lives in the United States.

Brooklyn Rivera

I fight the Sandinistas because of their racist policies and their determination to exterminate us," says Brooklyn Rivera, leader of Misurasata, one of the two Indian opposition groups. Of all the contra leaders, Mr. Rivera is the only one to negotiate with the Sandinistas; thus despite his tough rhetoric, many doubt his sincerity. According to one

exiled Nicaraguan, Mr. Rivera "is playing the Sandinista side, and would gladly sell out the Indian cause." Others argue that he is an ardent Indian nationalist who would oppose whoever is in power in Managua.

Like other Indian leaders, Mr. Rivera was jailed after the revolution when he refused to cooperate with the Sandinistas. He later sought to reach a compromise with the Sandinistas, but fled to Honduras when Jaime Wheelock and Daniel Ortega insisted that the Indian peoples take part in the revolution. But he refused to join forces with Steadman Fagoth, accusing him "of deviating from the Indian struggle by joining other [contra] groups." Indians have "nothing to do with these other Nicaraguans," Mr. Rivera told *Policy Review*. Mr. Rivera formed his own Indian organization, Misurasata, which has operated out of Costa Rica.

For the past six months Mr. Rivera has engaged in "peace talks" with the Sandinistas, arranged in part by Senator Edward Kennedy. Although a group of Misurasata leaders has denied Mr. Rivera "all authority for any negotiations with the Sandinista Front," Mr. Rivera announced in April a cease-fire between the Sandinistas and Misurasata. Though talks recently broke down, Mr. Rivera appears ready to accept a separate peace with the Sandinistas, the Finlandization of the Atlantic Coast.

Pedro Joaquin Chamorro

The censorship my father experienced was mild, *mild* compared to the situation under the Sandinistas," says Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Barrios, the exiled editor of *La Prensa*, the last surviving independent newspaper in Nicaragua. *La Prensa* has long symbolized Nicaragua's fight for freedom, whether against Somocismo or Sandinismo.

Mr. Chamorro bears the same name as his father, Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, whose 26-year battle against Somoza earned *La Prensa* international fame. When the elder Chamorro was assassinated in 1978, tens of thousands of Nicaraguans rioted and 40,000 attended his funeral. More than any other event, his martyrdom precipitated the fall of Somoza. But today the only public recognition of Chamorro's role in the revolution is an unfinished monument that does not bear his name.

In 1984, Mr. Chamorro fled Nicaragua, fearing for the safety of his family. Reporters for the newspaper have been beaten by the Sandinista Defense Committees.

Beginning in March 1982, the Sandinista regime required *La Prensa* to submit all material before publication to the Office of Communications of the Ministry of the Interior. Anywhere from 65 to 95 percent of the paper is censored, sometimes preventing it from appearing at all. Stories on the war in Afghanistan, the personality of Kim Il Sung, the Cuban presence in Angola, and the famed Nicaraguan boxer-in-exile Alexis Arguello, have all been censored in the name of national security. According to Tomas Borge, *La Prensa* is "a counterrevolutionary weapon."

Today Mr. Chamorro works for *La Nacion* in Costa Rica. A year before leaving, he prophetically observed that for the Sandinistas, "freedom of the press is to have all of the media totally controlled . . . and [then] there will be freedom of the press —like there is in Cuba, like there is in the Soviet Union, like there is in East Germany."

Humberto Ortega

Humberto Ortega, who calls the Soviet army a "vital pillar [in] the fight for world peace," is the most important and powerful man in Nicaragua today. As Minister of Defense, he controls the 60,000 man army that keeps the revolution on course. According to one of his former comrades, Mr. Ortega "is the greatest zealot and the most Stalinistic" of all the Sandinistas. He is known as "Punal," meaning dagger.

The son of an accountant, Mr. Ortega grew up in a traditional middle class setting. He attended private and church schools and taught catechism classes to poor children. However, he became active in the student protest movement, joining the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) at the age of eighteen. In 1969, he murdered a Costa Rican guard in an unsuccessful attempt to gain the release of Carlos Fonseca, one of the founders of the FSLN.

In 1970, Mr. Ortega travelled to Cuba, and developed close ties with Fidel Castro, which later proved indispensable. During the next seven years he divided his time between teaching dialectical materialism to other Sandinistas also in Cuba, and studying at Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow.

In 1977, with Fonseca dead and Tomas Borge in prison, the FSLN seemed a spent force. But Mr. Ortega revived it with the "Tercerista" strategy, which formed a broad front with all anti-Somoza elements including the middle class. The Tercerista line attracted such non-Marxist leaders as Arturo Cruz and Eden Pastora (both now in exile). "Without that very broad policy, we would not have achieved an insurrection," observed Mr. Ortega after the revolution.

The Tercerista strategy successfully hid the Sandinistas' Marxist-Leninist character and prevented the democratic reformists from coopting the revolution. Two years after the revolution, Mr. Ortega, no longer feeling the need to hide his colors, declared, "A Sandinismo without Marxism-Leninism cannot be revolutionary; only with it . . ."

Today Mr. Ortega commands 60,000 soldiers and a 50,000 civilian militia, making Nicaragua the most militarized country in Central America. The army is equipped with 150 Soviet tanks and eight Soviet HIND helicopters. In its war against the contras, the Nicaraguan army recently crossed the border into Honduras where the contras stage their operations. Nicaraguan Army artillery barrages killed one Honduran soldier and injured four. According to Mr. Ortega, "more of these hostile situations will be produced if Honduras does not control the mercenaries."

Tomas Borge

Our working class in general is not spontaneously revolutionary," says Tomas Borge, the only founder of the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) still living. Instead, it "must be led to its role of vanguard of the revolutionary process." Today Mr. Borge has the opportunity to nudge the dialectic along. He is Minister of the Interior and controls the state security force as well as the Cuban-style Sandinista Defense Committees. He is one of the most feared men in Nicaragua.



Miguel d'Escoto, Daniel Ortega, Tomas Borge

Drawing by Alexander Hunter for *Policy Review*.

Born in 1930, the son of a drugstore owner, Mr. Borge was 23 years old when he first read Karl Marx. He entered law school in 1954, but his main interest was the student protest movement. He was jailed in 1956, and three years later sent into exile. He headed for Cuba, where he became acquainted with Fidel Castro, and founded the FSLN in July 1961 with Carlos Fonseca, a high school friend, and Silvio Mayorga.

During the 1960s, Mr. Borge divided his time between Cuba, Peru, and Lebanon, cultivating important contacts on the international terrorist circuit. Along with 150 other Sandinista guerrillas, he received his military training in PLO-run camps in Lebanon. In 1980, at an official banquet honoring the first anniversary of the Sandinista revolution, Mr. Borge, acknowledging his debt, declared, "We say to our brother Arafat that Nicaragua is his land and the PLO cause is the cause of the Sandinista." Shortly thereafter, the PLO was granted full diplomatic status by the government of Nicaragua.

Mr. Borge is a fierce defender of the revolution who does not permit criticism of its aftermath. By his own admission, 6,000 Nicaraguans are in prison for political crimes. According to the opposition, the number of political prisoners is closer to 10,000.

Through the "S-7" Department within Security, Mr. Borge controls the Sandinista Defense Committees which effectively stifle internal opposition to the Sandinistas. The Defense Committees control the distribution of ration coupons for basic foods, and good conduct certificates required for obtaining passports and state jobs.

In a recent *Playboy* interview, Mr. Borge was asked whether Nicaragua is the first domino to fall in Latin America, with El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, and Mexico to follow. "That is one historical prophesy of Ronald Reagan's that is absolutely true," he replied.

Daniel Ortega

Although Daniel Ortega is two years older than his brother Humberto, and joined the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) two years before Humberto did, his influence in Nicaragua is much less. While Humberto controls Nicaragua's military, Daniel as president heads the bureaucracy. His importance lies in his international appeal as Nicaragua's "popularly elected" commandante.

Mr. Ortega joined the FSLN in 1963 after being involved in the student protest movement at Central American University law school. He became a head of the underground movement in Managua and in 1967 participated in the assassination of a sergeant in the National Guard. A month later he was captured and imprisoned for seven years.

While in prison he exchanged poetry with a young woman, Murillo, a "famous poet of the resistance," whom he married upon his release. Though he considers himself an "amateur" he enjoys talking about his hobby. One poem he wrote while in prison was titled, "I Never Saw Managua When Miniskirts Were In Fashion," presumably referring to that outmoded style of dress which he had missed. *Playboy* printed this poem of his:

The sh*t and p*ss,
 hot damn, so many people . . .
 Jail man!
 Don't let nobody talk with this man;
 let 'im sleep on the floor,
 and if he makes a move, belt 'im
 one . . .
 The galleys, Auschwitz, Buchenwald
 Nicaragua.

Mr. Ortega is especially important because of his popularity among America's left wing-jet-setters. Many of his contacts are through his wife, who has cultivated such American stars as rock singer Jackson Browne, director Bert Schneider, and producers Haskell Wexler, David Hanna, Daniel Selznick, and Joan Keller Selznick. Mr. Ortega tells Hollywood parties, "Democracy is literacy, democracy is land reform, democracy is education and public health." He issues periodic warnings of an imminent U.S. invasion that will destroy Nicaragua's "democracy."

Mr. Ortega is dedicated to the cause of Marxist-Leninist revolution. Last fall, while in the United States to drum up support for Nicaragua's "elections," Mr. Ortega ran afoul for condemning "Zionists" and carelessly throwing around the word "genocide." For the present, he will be more careful, according to Donald Casey, of Agendas International, a New York firm which does public relations work for Nicaragua. But once things are more politically stable in Nicaragua, Mr. Casey continued, "Daniel will be more willing to take up Third World causes."

Mr. Ortega became Nicaragua's president last fall in an election boycotted by the major opposition candidates because of restrictions on the freedom of speech and press. At his presidential inaugural, the only foreign head of government to attend was Cuba's Fidel Castro. Mr. Ortega takes frequent junkets abroad. Most recently, after the U.S. Congress suspended aid to the contras, he met with Soviet head Mikhail Gorbachev, then stopped in Poland to confer with Solidarity-buster General Wojciech Jaruzelski. He visited a Nazi concentration camp and later declared that it "is no exaggeration" to say that Ronald Reagan in Nicaragua "is emulating what Hitler did."

Ernesto Cardenal

In America they try to suppress their cultures and their languages. Also they kill them. They hunt them in the plains like deer." The speaker is Ernesto Cardenal, Nicaragua's Minister of Culture, poet, Marxist, Catholic priest, and American-hater extraordinaire.

Mr. Cardenal is from a wealthy family from the city of Granada. He received most of his education outside of Nicaragua, studying at the University of Mexico, and then Columbia University. When he was 31 years old, Mr. Cardenal experienced a religious conversion and briefly studied at a Trappist Monastery in Gethsemani, Kentucky. He became a disciple of Thomas Merton (a believer in non-violence), but in 1957 left Kentucky for Cuernavaca where he studied for the priesthood under Archbishop Sergio Mendez Arceo, the liberation theologian.

Mr. Cardenal returned to Nicaragua in 1965, was ordained, and established a church and commune named

"Nuestra Senora de Solentiname." His intellectual development during this period is recorded in the four volume *The Gospel in Solentiname*, a discussion of Christian theology laced with Marxist-revolutionary rhetoric. In 1970 he spent three months in Cuba, which caused "a great change . . . in my life . . . I had discovered that . . . There can be no effective Eucharist except in a classless society."

Whereas Lenin and Stalin declared war on religion, Mr. Cardenal attempts to fuse Christianity and Marxism. As he explains, "not only can a Christian be a Marxist, but that in order for him to be authentically Christian, he must be a Marxist . . ." In 1985, the Vatican suspended Mr. Cardenal from the priesthood when he refused to leave his government post in accordance with canon law.

"They're screwing us . . ." he writes in this poem:

2 twin skyscrapers taller than the Empire State
 the whole top half lit up
 imperialism looming up in the sky behind the win-
 dowpanes
 Hello we wanted more drought
 Who is that other monster rising up in night?
 The Chase Manhattan Bank screwing half of human-
 ity.

Mr. Cardenal is an unabashed admirer of Cuba. "One place where the tenderness of the Revolution may be seen is in the Psychiatric Hospital of Havana," wrote Mr. Cardenal in his book *In Cuba*. In another passage, he exults in the fact that in Cuba everybody "dresses the way I like to dress . . . And the way Fidel Castro likes to dress. And the way everybody ought to dress everywhere."

Miguel d'Escoto

Miguel d'Escoto, foreign minister of Nicaragua, is a pudgy, bespectacled man who likes to wear tailored safari suits and drive a Mercedes sedan. His estate overlooking Managua is tended by a gardener and a maid, and is guarded by a pair of German attack dogs.

Born in Hollywood, California, Mr. d'Escoto was the godson of the elder Somoza. His father, who called his family "conde," meaning nobility, was one of Anastasio Somoza's top diplomats. The Somoza family financed Mr. d'Escoto's education.

A priest in the Maryknoll order, with a degree in comparative journalism from Columbia University, Mr. d'Escoto worked with inner-city poor in Chile in the 1960s. During this period Mr. d'Escoto was no radical. He was a close friend and advisor to Eduardo Frei, Latin America's first Christian Democratic president, and considered the Marxist Salvador Allende a villain. Peter Grace helped finance Mr. d'Escoto's social work.

But in 1975, Mr. d'Escoto joined the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). He served on the pluralist front group, "Los Doce" (The Twelve), which bestowed respectability upon the revolution. Today, he is virulently anti-American. He accuses President Reagan of the "systematic murder of our people."

The Vatican suspended Mr. d'Escoto from the priesthood when he failed to leave his government post in accordance with the canon law. But the New York-based Mary-

knoll mission supports Mr. d'Escoto, and "hope[s]" that the Vatican's decision "will not aggravate tensions."

Mr. d'Escoto is not a true believer in the Marxist dialectic, according to an American priest who knows him well. Instead he is an opportunist interested in power and wealth. "Mr. d'Escoto is neither priest, nor Marxist," says former Sandinista diplomat Antonio Farach. "He has a personal agenda . . . to live like a millionaire."

Bayardo Arce

Bayardo Arce, one of the nine Sandinista commandantes, is a shadowy figure largely ignored by the Western media. Though sometimes described as a moderate, recent facts indicate that he is an ideological hardliner.

Mr. Arce was 20 when he joined the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN). He participated in the student protest movements, and in 1971 directed the Revolutionary Student Front, the student arm of the FSLN. He worked briefly for *La Prensa*, but was fired for suppressing news stories unfavorable to the FSLN. In the early 1970s he made three visits to Cuba.


Mr. Arce is most closely allied with Tomas Borge, with whom he fought in the Prolonged Popular War (GPP) faction of the FSLN. In the 1970s, he commanded guerrilla bases in the mountainous regions of Nicaragua, emulating the strategy of Mao and Che Guevara.

Today Mr. Arce controls Nicaragua's mass media and supervises the Directorate for International Relations, which manages relations with "fraternal brothers" of the Sandinista revolution.

Nicaragua is host to Colombia's April 19 Movement, the PLO, the Salvadoran guerrillas, the Italian Red Brigades, the German Baader-Meinhof Gang, and the Argentine Montoneros.

Last fall, as director of the Sandinista political commission, Mr. Arce oversaw the elections in Nicaragua. He stated the Sandinista position on democracy in a speech to the Central Committee of the Nicaraguan Socialist Party, a Marxist ally of the Sandinista Front: "the elections are a hindrance [but they] are a tool of the revolution and a way of advancing in the building of socialism . . ."

Mr. Arce went on to say that "We should think now about doing away with all this fiction of pluralism." 🗨



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VOICE OF AMERICA

Ronald Reagan and the American Rhetorical Tradition

STEVEN HAYWARD

Ronald Reagan is often called the "Great Communicator." It is a grand accolade, resonant of Abraham Lincoln, the Great Emancipator. And it is a recognition of Mr. Reagan's special place in history. Like Lincoln, he has been the catalyst for major changes in the sentiments of Americans, and how they regard the national government.

But not because Mr. Reagan communicates brilliantly. In fact, the title "Great Communicator" seems very odd at times. The President is no orator on the model of Winston Churchill or William Jennings Bryan. He fractures his syntax at press conferences. He rambles in interviews. In his final debate with Walter Mondale, he left the American people wandering among the California wildflowers with an unfinished anecdote.

It is true that Mr. Reagan excels in delivering a prepared speech; Harvey Mansfield has remarked that the President is as good a speaker as a man can be without being eloquent. His sincere manner carries enormous persuasive power, which he has used on several occasions to build popular support.

Mr. Reagan is also a master of the impromptu witticism. "There you go again," he told Jimmy Carter in the most casually devastating line of the 1980 campaign. A few months earlier, Mr. Reagan may have assured himself of the Republican nomination with another spontaneous outburst, "I paid for this microphone." In the late 1960s, Mr. Reagan was accosted by antiwar protesters with signs saying "Make love, not war." He remarked that it didn't look like they could do much of either.

But this ostensible skill at "communication" does not adequately explain Mr. Reagan's success and popularity, and the title "Great Communicator" fundamentally misstates his achievement. Americans tend to respond more to

what is said than to how it is said. And it is here that Mr. Reagan's genius lies. He conveys a message of native optimism and hope for the future which is deeply rooted in the American character and in American history.

Mr. Reagan understands, as our media and intellectual elites do not, that the most prominent feature of the American character is forward-looking optimism, an innate confidence in people and the goodness of the American cause. Americans brook no ambiguity or equivocation; they are open, forthright, and idealistic on a grand scale. Only America would conceive of a war effort as being "to make the world safe for democracy"; would extend a Marshall Plan to battered Europe; or would regard the quest for the moon not simply as a technological achievement but as an expression of American aspirations.



Courtesy of the White House.

March of Destiny

In his second inaugural address, Mr. Reagan said, "There are no limits to growth and human progress when men and women are free to follow their dreams." In the State of the Union address shortly after he said, "There are no constraints on the human mind, no walls around the human spirit, no barriers to our progress except those we ourselves erect." This is an expression of faith in individualism, in the American character—it rejects the orthodoxy of the elites of the 1970s who said that the world is terrifyingly complex, there are no easy answers, we have to accept a politics of limits, we have to learn to live with less. Mr. Reagan defined the American character quite differently in a televised address to the Chinese last year.

STEVEN HAYWARD is editor of *Public Research Syndicated*.

Let me tell you something of the American character. You might think that with such a varied nation there couldn't be any one character, but in many fundamental ways there is . . . We're idealists . . . We're a compassionate people . . . We're an optimistic people. Like you, we inherited a vast land of endless skies, tall mountains, rich fields, and open prairies. It made us see the possibilities in everything. It made us hopeful. And we devised an economic system that rewarded individual efforts, that gave us good reason for hope.

Mr. Reagan's image of America as a "city on a hill," a common theme of his 1984 campaign, comes from a sermon by John Winthrop of Plymouth colony who held out the promise of the New World as "a city on a hill, an alabaster city undimmed by human tears." This is not mere imagery. It is a symbol of something very deep and profound; in this case the essence of the American temperament. For Mr. Reagan, the "city on a hill" theme is hardly new. As early as 1964, in his famous speech for Barry Goldwater, he spoke of America's "rendezvous with destiny" in much the same terms as he has recently talked about keeping alight "the torch of freedom," of preserving "the last best hope of mankind." Mr. Reagan has never viewed this as a city for the few—it is a goal for all Americans, a reaffirmation of the American dream, the redemption of a promise and its extension to future generations. "The American sound," Mr. Reagan said in the second inaugural address, "is hopeful, big-hearted, idealistic, daring, decent, and fair." The United States is a nation "still mighty in its youth and powerful in its purpose . . ."

"Sometimes people call me an idealist," Woodrow Wilson once said. "That is why I know I am an American." Mr. Reagan's idealism and his use of American images and symbols echo the great presidents of the past. In Mr. Reagan's words, one hears at times the piety of Washington and Lincoln, the idealism of Jefferson and Wilson, and the courage and optimism of the Roosevelts and Kennedy. Always we find in Mr. Reagan what Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893 called "the distinguishing feature of America—expansion, growth, perennial rebirth, and new opportunity." Yet Turner was a pessimist when he said that; he thought America had run out of frontiers; Manifest Destiny had exhausted itself.

This is a misreading of the American character, as Mr. Reagan has recognized. This country is not bounded by geography or shrinking petroleum resources. In his first inaugural address, Mr. Reagan affirmed that "we have every right to dream heroic dreams." He asked us "to believe in ourselves and to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds, to believe that together with God's help we can and will resolve the problems which now confront us." His last line, wonderfully redolent of the American dream: "And, after all, why shouldn't we believe that? We are Americans."

Mythical Malaise

Mr. Reagan's themes have been notably absent from recent American discourse. In literature and history, in popular music and films, in the general tone of rhetoric coming from pulpit and politician alike, an almost German



UPI/Bettman Newsphotos.

pessimism came to dominate American consciousness. Our self-confidence was shaken by Vietnam, our trust broken by Watergate, and our optimism and hope battered by a sagging economy. The captivity of 52 Americans in Iran seemed to underscore our steady slide. The "American Century" once heralded by Henry Luce now seemed at an end, with the nation entering a twilight era as everyone was abuzz with talk of limits.

The climax of this troubled time came with one of the most extraordinary moments in the history of presidential rhetoric, President Jimmy Carter's famous "malaise" speech in 1979. It was a schizophrenic speech. Mr. Carter began by affirming "the decency and the strength and the wisdom of the American people," and assuring us of the enduring strength of our political liberties, and our economic and military strength. But the heart of the speech was his warning about "a fundamental threat to American democracy . . . It is a crisis of confidence. It is a crisis that strikes at the very heart and soul of our national will. We can see this crisis in the growing doubt about the meaning of our own lives and in the loss of unity and purpose for our nation."

What was unusual about Mr. Carter's speech was not that it perceived the faltering spirit of America. In 1978, Alexander Solzhenitsyn at Harvard warned of America's loss of "civic courage." Previous presidents have tackled this theme; three times in 1971 President Nixon addressed "the dark night of the American spirit." Even John F. Kennedy, the incarnation of confidence and optimism, warned during his 1960 campaign of "the increasing evidence of a lost national purpose and a soft national will."

But it was precisely this sinking of morale that Mr. Carter, like Kennedy, promised to reverse in his presidential campaign. Mr. Carter didn't limit himself to the usual promises of more prosperity for various interests; he made almost metaphysical vows to give us "a government as good as the people" or, as his autobiography put it, "why not the best?" He promised us, in other words, a govern-

ment of extraordinary strength and morality, which would uplift the natural American dynamism and greatness. But in his "malaise" speech Mr. Carter did not see tragedy as the flip side of optimism and progress; he seemed to deny optimism and progress. In essence he told us that his government was no good because the people were no good.

Today, of course, we are in the midst of a sunburst of patriotism and optimism. It is true that this resurgence cannot be attributed solely to Mr. Reagan, yet he has had more to do with it than anyone else. It is impossible to think of this revival having taken place if Mr. Carter had remained president. What Mr. Reagan did was not so much create the optimism as unleash it, give it expression; it had been dormant. Patriotism has always been a leading feature of the American character, as many European observers have discovered. Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835 was struck by the almost "irritable patriotism" of Americans; and Lord Bryce in 1889 noted "the bounding pulse of youth" that marked the American temperament. Perhaps the most significant dimension of what the press is calling "the new patriotism" is the attitude of the young, who have responded overwhelmingly to Mr. Reagan, to the chagrin of their erstwhile liberal shepherds. "Students love him," a 21 year-old was quoted in *Newsweek*. "He made me feel prouder of my country, and that I can make a difference. That's what people want to hear right now."

What Mr. Reagan understands about American domestic policy is that it should be formulated and presented in the context of broader, almost philosophical, American goals. The tax cut of 1981, for instance, was not merely a scheme for improving the take-home pay of individuals, it was a moral imperative springing from Mr. Reagan's understanding that government must not come to dominate the initiatives and actions of individuals. Mr. Reagan declared in his first inaugural address:

If we look to the answer as to why for so many years we achieved so much, prospered as no other people on Earth, it was because here in this great land, we unleashed the energy and individual genius of man to a greater extent than has ever been done before. Freedom and the dignity of the individual have been more available here than in any other place on earth.

This is curious rhetoric coming from the most conservative president in the 20th century. Mr. Reagan's rhetoric is individualist; he believes that excessive government stifles human freedom and chokes progress. In his Goldwater speech he said, "Our Founding Fathers knew that you can't



control the economy without controlling the people," which is reminiscent of that classical liberal, John Stuart Mill, who said: "a state which dwarfs men. . . will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished."

One of Mr. Reagan's favorite sources for quotations is that radical firebrand Tom Paine. "We have it in our power to begin the world over again," Mr. Reagan has often quoted Paine, in terms that surely must be anathema to traditional conservatives. All Mr. Reagan's main themes—optimism, hope, initiative, opportunity, work, and middle-class values—

were once traditional themes of liberals. His rhetoric often reminds us more of Wilson, FDR, Truman, and Kennedy than the parsimonious Republican rhetoric of Taft, Goldwater, and Nixon. Even Mr. Reagan's criticism of the dependence induced by federal programs is echoed by Franklin Roosevelt, who told Congress in 1935, "Continued dependence on relief induces a spiritual and moral disintegration fundamentally destructive to the national fiber. To dole our relief in this way is to administer a narcotic, a subtle destroyer of the human spirit."

Freedom and Universality

Mr. Reagan's foreign policy rhetoric is not motivated either by *Realpolitik* or fuzzy idealism, but by an understanding of universal principles enshrined in the Declaration of Independence and shared by most Americans. While President Carter worried about our "inordinate fear of Communism" and his secretary of state believed that the world's leaders "share similar dreams and aspirations," Mr. Reagan understands that Communism is subversive to the principles of human dignity and freedom held by all civilized men.

To deny the democratic values and that they have any relevance to the developing world today, or to the millions of people who are oppressed by Communist domination, is to reject the universal significance of the basic timeless credo that all men are created equal—that they're endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights. . . . By wedding the timeless truths and values Americans have always cherished to the realities of today's world, we have forged the beginnings of a fundamentally new direction in American foreign policy—a policy based on the unashamed, unapologetic explaining of our own priceless institutions and proof that they work, and describing the social and economic progress they so uniquely foster.

In this Mr. Reagan sounds like Lincoln, who repeatedly

reminded us that the great principle of America “was not the mere matter of separation of the colonies from the motherland; but something in that Declaration giving liberty, not alone to the people of this country, but hope to the world for all future time.”

Mr. Reagan has cited these very words, most recently in his 1985 State of the Union message. On other occasions he has declared: “Especially in this century, America has kept alight the torch of freedom, but not just for ourselves but for millions of others around the world.” “Freedom is not the sole prerogative of a chosen few,”

Mr. Reagan has stressed. “It is the universal right of all God’s children.”

More than any other recent president—including the born-again Baptist Jimmy Carter—Mr. Reagan understands and has repeatedly spoken out about the religious foundations of American order, and the religious dimension of the American character. “Freedom prospers when religion is vibrant and the rule of law under God is acknowledged,” Mr. Reagan proclaimed in his controversial “evil empire” speech in Orlando in 1983.

He expanded on this theme in another controversial speech to a prayer breakfast during the Republican National Convention in Dallas in 1984. “The truth is,” he argued, “politics and morality are inseparable. And as morality’s foundation is religion, religion and politics are necessarily related.” Mr. Reagan concluded:

We establish no religion in this country nor will we ever; we command no worship, we mandate no belief. But we poison our society when we remove its theological underpinnings; we court corruption and we leave it bereft of belief . . .

Without God, we are mired in the material, that flat world that tells us only what the senses perceive; without God, there is a coarsening of the society; without God, democracy will not and cannot long endure. And that, simply, is the heart of my message: if we ever forget that we are “one nation under God,” then we will be a nation gone under.

That Mr. Reagan’s remarks on religion should be so bitterly controversial is indicative of the lack of historical self-understanding of the nature of America by our intellectual and media elites, for Mr. Reagan’s words are taken almost verbatim from Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, and Wilson. “And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure,” Jefferson asked, “when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God? That they are not to be violated but with His wrath?” In his farewell address,



Washington admonished: “Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable support . . . reason and experience forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.” Woodrow Wilson, in words that make Mr. Reagan’s seem mild, declared: “America was born a Christian nation. America was born to exemplify that devotion to the elements of righteousness which are derived from the revelations of Holy Scripture.”

Religion, indeed, lies at the very core of the American character, a fact that is either

forgotten or ignored today, even though it has always been obvious to keen foreign observers of America. Tocqueville wrote that it was not until he visited the churches that he understood the genius of America. G.K. Chesterton described America as a nation “with the soul of a church.”

The act of the American Founding was not merely an act of defiant separatism from the “Old World,” but was the defining act, both in principle and in spirit, for what Lincoln called our “political religion.” The Founding was an act of panoramic idealism and unbounded hopefulness and optimism. It is this idealism and optimism that distinguishes America from Europe; it is the basis for what is known as “American exceptionalism.” “The European,” Luigi Barzini noted, “is pessimistic, prudent, practical, and parsimonious, like an old-fashioned banker,” while America is “alarmingly optimistic, compassionate, incredibly generous . . . It was a spiritual wind that drove Americans irresistibly ahead from the beginning. Few foreigners understand this, even today.” The apocalyptic gloominess and gritty *Realpolitik* that characterize European politics has never affected America; the spirit of Spengler’s *Decline of the West* never applied to America. The European dwells on his past, considering it more glorious than his future. The American sees in his glorious past a prologue to an even more glorious future.

Presidents in the last generation have proceeded in the shadow of FDR, not simply because he changed the course of government—after all his New Deal policies were largely ineffective at the time—but because his infectious optimism restored confidence in the future. Few presidents have had the oratorical resonance of FDR, or now of Mr. Reagan. While it is true that Mr. Reagan’s place in history books will largely depend on the outcome of discrete problems—whether the budget is controlled, whether peace and security are maintained—Mr. Reagan will probably set the standard against which the next generation of presidents will be measured. By his rhetoric, he has caused us to think again of possibilities, of growth and progress, and of confidence in our future. 🏛️

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THE FDA'S BAD MEDICINE

Overregulation Is Dangerous To Your Health

DALE H. GIERINGER

Recently newspapers carried the announcement of an important medical advance: a new sonic-wave device that destroys kidney stones of a type that would otherwise require surgery on 100,000 Americans each year. In a ceremony that has become increasingly common in recent years, the Food and Drug Administration, not the developer, made the announcement. Buried deep inside the newspaper accounts was the fact that the new kidney device had already been used for two and a half years in Germany before the FDA bureaucracy began to evaluate it.

Under present law, no new drug or medical device can be sold until it has been officially approved as "safe and effective" by the FDA. While the purpose of this is to protect consumers' health, it also limits their access to potentially valuable therapies. FDA approval is a complex and time-consuming process, and Americans often have to wait months and years for the approval of innovative treatments that are widely available elsewhere. The FDA even discourages the approval of relatively innocuous treatments such as vitamins, food products, and other innovative drugs and chemicals that may possibly be of value for life extension, memory enhancement, prevention of cancer, treatment of herpes, and other conditions not generally curable through orthodox medicine.

A recent book, *Orphan Drugs*, by Kenneth Anderson, lists over 200 drugs that are presently available in foreign countries but have not been approved in the United States. Unapproved products can be used only in investigative studies that have been cleared by the FDA through a procedure known as IND approval. This requires formal application by the doctor or sponsor on behalf of the patient. Most recently, the FDA approved initial experimentation with a drug known as isoprinosine which may be of some use in treating AIDS, yet isoprinosine was already being sold in 72 foreign countries and many American AIDS victims were going to Mexico to buy the drug.

Although the FDA tries to allow for "compassionate INDs" in emergencies, its decision is not always prompt or reasonable. In a highly publicized case this March, the FDA admonished a Tucson hospital for disobeying its order forbidding an experimental mechanical heart transplant in a last-ditch attempt to save a dying 33-year-old

patient. When the FDA blocked medical use of DMSO, a purported treatment for arthritis and muscular injury which also happened to be legally available as an industrial solvent in hardware stores, many consumers ended up treating themselves with industrial strength DMSO of questionable purity, without any instructions on safe medical use. Some patients have been unable to obtain investigational products, even when suffering from such debilitating conditions as arthritis, multiple sclerosis, and cancer.

Losing the Edge

In recent years, critics have argued that FDA overregulation has produced a U.S. "drug lag" relative to foreign countries. The drug lag problem dates from 1962, when Congress was prompted to strengthen the FDA's powers following the thalidomide disaster. (Thalidomide was never approved by the FDA, but caused several thousand severe birth defects in Europe and elsewhere, where it had been prescribed to pregnant women as a tranquilizer.) The 1962 Amendments extended FDA regulation to drug research, creating the present IND approval system and strengthening requirements for animal studies. In addition, new drugs were required to be proven not only safe but also "effective" in at least two well-controlled clinical studies.

Many of these provisions had little connection with the actual problem of thalidomide. Given that retrospective animal tests of thalidomide showed no evidence of harmful effects in 13 out of 22 studies, it seems likely that it would have been approved even with further testing. At the same time, both aspirin and penicillin have dire effects on laboratory animals, leading many experts to question whether they could gain FDA approval today.

In the wake of the 1962 Amendments, new drug development costs began to soar, rising over tenfold to \$54 million per drug by the mid-1970s. The average time of development increased, while introductions of important new drugs plummeted from 50 to 17 per year. Not all of these costs were entirely due to regulation, but there is no

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doubt that drug development was slowed by FDA paperwork—ranging upwards of 100,000 pages per application—and by bureaucratic delays averaging two years.

The years since 1962 have produced mounting evidence of a “drug lag.” In a comparative study of the United States and Britain, Dr. William Wardell and Dr. Louis Lasagna found that Britain led the United States by as much as several years in the introduction of valuable new drugs during the 1960s and 1970s. In a famous cost-benefit study, the economist Sam Peltzman concluded that the cost to consumers of the 1962 Amendments outweighed benefits by a 4 to 1 margin. By my own estimate, a one-year bureaucratic delay in new drug development could cost as many as 32,000 to 76,000 lives per decade—at least four times the rate of casualties from new drug accidents.

Both aspirin and penicillin have dire effects on laboratory animals, leading many experts to question whether they could gain FDA approval today.

The costs of delay are illustrated by the case of beta-blockers, a class of drugs that has proved valuable in treating hypertension, angina, and prevention of heart attacks. The FDA approved the first beta-blocker in 1968, three years after Britain, but only for a limited number of uses. Finally, in 1981, the FDA announced with much fanfare that a new beta-blocker was being approved for the prevention of second heart attacks, a treatment it claimed might save 6,500 to 10,000 lives per year. However, medical studies had indicated the efficacy of this treatment at least seven years previously, in 1974.

Since 1979, and especially under the Reagan Administration, the FDA has been sensitive to drug-lag criticism and made some efforts at regulatory reform. It has set up a “fast-track” approval process for important new drugs, reducing regulatory delays to as little as eight months. Overall, approval times for important new drugs have been reduced by 40 percent, to an average of 19 months. New regulations issued this year are expected to reduce this by another two months or so. But unless the quicker approval is accompanied by tighter scrutiny, there can be problems. This was illustrated by the recent example of Oralflex, an arthritis drug that received fast-track approval. When Oralflex subsequently had to be withdrawn from the market for poisoning 72 British and American victims, the FDA was politically embarrassed and forced to retract proposed deregulatory reforms.

A fundamental problem in the present approval system is that it requires drugs to be approved as “safe and effective” on too wide a basis. Safety and efficacy vary greatly from individual to individual, depending on personal val-

ues and medical circumstances that are difficult for regulators to foresee. Even thalidomide has turned out to have benefits for victims of a rare condition known as Behcets syndrome; it has accordingly come back to use in Britain, where it is administered to women who are warned of its dangers.

An informed choice policy, where the responsibility of the FDA would be to inform, rather than to restrict consumer choice, is the obvious alternative to the present approval system. Under an informed choice system, the FDA would no longer ban products, but could require warnings to ensure that consumers are suitably informed. Any product the FDA found unsatisfactory could be marked with the prominent legend, “WARNING—NOT FDA APPROVED.” In addition, where risks were especially high, the FDA could require customers to sign written “informed consent” warning statements. Manufacturers would have the right to include any truthful information they wished on the label. Consumers would be better informed than they are under the present system.

Informed choice would help consumers distinguish among products better than the present system, in which all approved drugs are simply designated “safe and effective.” Under informed choice, only drugs of the highest safety would be placed in this category. Beneath these would be a class of more dubious drugs, including “new” drugs that had not yet proved themselves in the market and “old” drugs that had become controversial or obsolete.

The drug lag dilemma would thus be resolved. The market, not the FDA, would decide when new drugs could be sold. Manufacturers would still be liable for accidents under product liability, and might also be sued for fraud or quackery. The FDA’s power to regulate technical issues of adulteration, misbranding, or quality control in manufacture would not be affected.

Informed choice would thus scarcely mean market anarchy. Most physicians and consumers would no doubt avoid drugs that were not FDA recommended, giving manufacturers a strong incentive to seek certification as “proven safe and effective.” Nevertheless, legalization of unapproved drugs would provide a vital safety valve against overregulation. These consumers who wished to try new and experimental treatments could do so without FDA interference, while those who did not could simply avoid drugs not rated “safe and effective.”

Given such advantages, it is unfortunate that informed choice has received little serious attention. Aside from a handful of advocates, such as the consumer health writers Durk Pearson and Sandy Shaw, drug policy critics have routinely dismissed informed choice on grounds of feasibility, but the burden of present evidence strongly suggests that it is the present system that is impractical.


Many members of the medical establishment oppose consumer choice because they believe that patients are incapable of making their own decisions, a peculiar notion in a nation governed by democratic choice. Drug patients, the argument goes, are too sick to make good decisions. But patients are routinely free to choose all sorts of risky, non-drug treatments exempt from FDA regulation, including open-heart operations, cosmetic surgery, and organ transplants.

Perhaps the greatest concern about informed choice in drugs is that it will lead to greater self-medication. This is anathema to many doctors, who since 1939 have enjoyed a legal monopoly on the right to prescribe drugs. From a consumer perspective, mandatory prescriptions seem unjustified. The FDA has produced no scientific evidence to prove a need for prescription restrictions. In many cases, prescription restrictions are clearly burdensome to consumers; for example, asthma patients have complained of the difficulty of obtaining their medication when traveling.

Consumers have a right to the medical treatment of their choice, independent of government.

There are cases where restrictions on consumer choice are justified. Restrictions are needed to prevent overuse of antibiotics, which can cause public health problems by breeding resistant organisms in the environment. And addictive drugs such as pain-killers and tranquilizers pose special problems, since they jeopardize the autonomy fundamental to personal freedom.

Aside from the issue of mandatory prescriptions, the most common criticism of consumer free choice is that it may lead to a proliferation of medically dubious products, like the supposed anti-cancer drug Laetrile. While the FDA claims that such products hurt people by luring them away from legitimate cures, there is little evidence for this. In fact, the FDA's prohibition never stopped use of Laetrile, but rather pushed it onto the black market, replicating the classic evils of Prohibition. Denied the protection of law, customers ended up paying exorbitant prices to unscrupulous operators for drugs of dubious quality.

In the end, the case for informed choice rests on two grounds: first, that it should prove superior to the present system in protecting consumer health; and second, that consumers have a right to the medical treatment of their choice, independent of government. Despite the ingrained prejudices of half a century of medical paternalism, recent trends suggest movement in a new direction. There has been an explosion of sophisticated consumer literature on prescription drugs; medical care and medical research point out the clinical importance of individual self-help. For the first time, arguments for free choice in drugs are beginning to be heard from some consumer health activists. Someday, it may dawn on public opinion that control over health must ultimately rest with consumers, not government agencies. If so, the people may well demand a drug policy based on informed free choice and an end to FDA paternalism. 

WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS

Foreign Scholarships and Foreign Policy

REPRESENTATIVE JIM COURTER

The newspaper of the Palestine Liberation Organization, *Fateh*, recently reprinted a remarkable photograph taken in 1956 at the International Union of Students Congress in Prague. Seated behind a plate marked "Palestine" were Yasser Arafat, identified only by his *nom de guerre* "Abu Ammar"; Zuhair Alami, future head of the Palestine National Fund; and Sala Khalaf, or "Abu Iyad," later to become head of internal security and chief of intelligence in the P.L.O. and, as head of Black September, a director of the 1972 Munich massacre.

Several invitations were extended to the Palestinian students during the Congress. "As a result," wrote *Fateh*, "Dr. Alami left for Moscow while Khalaf left for East Germany. Abu Ammar's sudden illness after the Congress prevented him from visiting Romania."

Today, Arafat and Khalaf are veterans of a dozen trips to Moscow, many more than a dozen to Eastern European capitals, and a hundred other meetings in Beirut, Algiers, Tunis, Damascus, and Havana with Soviet-bloc diplomats, military experts, economists, and intelligence officers. Their Palestine Liberation Organization is avowedly revolutionary and socialist; some components are Marxist-Leninist. The P.L.O. leadership regularly salutes its Soviet "comrades," rarely deviates from the Soviet line on foreign policy matters, and praised the Soviet invasion of Moslem Afghanistan as "disinterested and altruistic." And if, three decades ago, the U.S.S.R. began helping to build the core P.L.O. leadership of today, then today it builds for the next 30 years. Several hundred Palestinians attend Eastern bloc military academies each year. Several thousand others are on academic and vocational scholarships in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Romania.

Palestinians are not the only students to be carefully cultivated by the Soviets and their allies. In 1982, some 83,000 foreign students were receiving full scholarships in academic and technical programs in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, most of them in four to six year terms. This does not include the 7,000 young Afghan boys taken to the U.S.S.R. for training. Another 27,000 foreign pupils are enrolled in elementary, secondary, and post-secondary schools in Cuba at Soviet and Cuban expense. Communist

regimes pay much more attention to this question than does the United States government, which during the same year was sponsoring about 7,500 scholarships for foreigners, a number which has perhaps doubled today.

The United States offered a few hundred academic scholarships in Central America in 1982: the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe offered 7,000. A similar disproportion was evident in Asia. About 37,000 African students were educated in the U.S.S.R. or Eastern Europe in 1982, compared with 3,000 underwritten by the United States.

The Soviet bloc countries do not spend lavishly on anything except military and security capabilities. Disbursements of the foregoing magnitude must represent Soviet foreign policy interests commensurate with the country's "internationalist" purposes. Does the policy work? Presumably, yes. It would be an odd government indeed that encouraged expensive practices for 30 years yet realized no returns.

The achievements are of two kinds. First, scholarship diplomacy engages the sympathies of the next generation of leaders in the developing countries. Some may be inculcated with Marxist-Leninist views. Others, during extended residence, may absorb what has been called "pre-propaganda"; when appropriate intellectual or emotional stimuli are later applied, the audience will be receptive. Second, a number of reliable cadres are recruited who are not so much students as trainees.

The gains of the first sort are harder to assess, but in the long run may be of greater importance. Cadres can be found anywhere, and they are: recruitment is the daily task of intelligence officers. But educators have equal influence, and need less or no direct control. They know that the degrees they give are entrees to the elite in a developing country, and that to educate thousands is to have a direct hand in a country's future. As Fidel Castro said after the Cuban revolution, it was "in the university (that) we began to learn about the *Communist Manifesto*, about the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and this began a process."

JIM COURTER, (R-N.J.), now serving his fourth term in the House, is a co-sponsor of H.R. 1340, "The U.S. Scholarship Program for Developing Countries Act."

Most Soviet bloc scholarship offerings in the Third World are made to the underprivileged. The Party assumes, in accord with Marx, that those with the lowest status in society are the most useful revolutionary material. The poor harbor resentments; they long for change; they wait for opportunities. The Party can speak to all these needs by offering the privileges of training and advancement. This may not buy a man, but neither can it leave him unsympathetic.

One cannot say, for example, what was in Li Ping's heart when he led the Chinese delegation to the Chernenko funeral early this year. But there is something we do know. Thirty-six years before, Li Ping had left his home for six years of training as an engineer in the U.S.S.R. When he returned, he became a specialist in the power industry, and made his name managing Chinese electrical projects built during the years of close Sino-Soviet cooperation. Eventually Ping became a Vice Premier. It was natural that Beijing should choose him to head the funeral delegation, and further the quiet restoration of relations with Moscow underway since 1981; Ping and Gorbachev exchanged warm "comradely" greetings.

The example may have an Egyptian parallel. Hosni Mubarak underwent lengthy training in a Soviet military academy in the years before he rose to become his nation's Vice President. When Anwar Sadat was killed, Mr. Mubarak became President and, for whatever reasons, moved swiftly to restore full relations with the Kremlin.

The second achievement of Soviet bloc international education efforts is cadre building. The greatest opportunity for indoctrination is with the young; that is why the U.S.S.R. has sent 7,000 young Afghan boys for training in the Soviet Union.

Fidel Castro's Isle of Youth (the former Isle of Pines) serves the same purpose. This is home for some 14,000 elementary and secondary school children selected according to "proletarian" standards from the countries where Cuban troops and military advisors are most heavily deployed: Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. The children are separated by nationality, and rarely encounter ordinary Cubans. In addition to the social and natural sciences, there is a premium on political education, in accord with Castro's declared purpose: "creating a Cuban-trained cadre capable of governing Marxist countries and working for political change in non-Marxist countries," according to a U.S. General Accounting Office report of August 1984.

One Soviet model and counterpart for this Cuban enterprise is Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, founded in 1960 in Moscow for men and women under 35 years of age from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. It is both a college and a recruiting ground for hardened cadres and fighters. Listed in the catalogues as "self-governing," Lumumba University is in fact under the direct control of Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Party's Central Committee.

Occasionally students return from Patrice Lumumba disaffected, particularly by Soviet racism. But alumni have played a direct role in the revolutionary process in non-Communist countries. These include the terrorist Mohamed Boudia, who took charge of the Western European

operations of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and his friend Carlos, the notorious son of the founder of the Venezuelan Communist Party. It was at Lumumba that a Mexican named Armando Carrillo worked with KGB agents to select the Mexicans given guerrilla training in North Korea and used in an abortive 1971 coup attempt in Mexico. Here too came Sandinistas, including Doris Maria Tijerino Haslam, a Secretary of Foreign Relations, and Oscar Turcios Chavarria, who died in action in Nicaragua in 1973. Another alumnus is Henry Ruiz, the present Nicaraguan Minister of Planning. Ruiz still travels to Moscow and the Eastern European capitals. Not long ago he proclaimed the East German school system (one of the world's most militarized) to be the perfect model for Nicaraguan education.

Laissez-Faire Academics

American colleges and universities are currently host to some 338,000 foreign men and women doing full time academic or technical work. This is as many as the Soviet and East European countries have educated at government expense over the last 25 years. Nearly all of these students, or their governments, pay for their American education; our government underwrites only about 2.3 percent, and perhaps another 10 percent receive assistance from the host institutions. The only problem is a deeply flattering one: when their course work is over, many students do not want to go home.

They come from Taiwan, Iran, Nigeria, Malaysia, Canada, Korea, India, and in lesser numbers from a few dozen other countries. It is interesting to consider where they do not come from: there are only eight here from Mozambique, 18 from Angola, 70 from Libya, and 140 from Afghanistan. Arrangements for foreign students are usually handled by a large and happily decentralized amalgam of private concerns, which operate with some government funding. The National Association for Foreign Student Affairs, founded with \$1,400 in 1948, today advises over 1,000 academic institutions, businesses, educational organizations, and local citizens' groups that bring foreign students to the United States. Of equal vitality are the Experiment in International Living, with representatives in 60 countries, the Council on International Educational Exchange, and the Institute of International Education. The unparalleled Rotary International enjoys no government sponsorship.

Most of these programs are consciously non-political. So are the government-sponsored scholarship programs. The Agency for International Development (AID), which sponsored 10,000 students from developing countries in 1984, is mandated to undertake "programs of a developmental nature rather than programs of a political and cultural nature." Agriculture, biology, nutritional science, population studies, and the like are the favored courses. The Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961, under which other American governmental efforts at educational public diplomacy are funded, declares: "Far from being a means of gaining national advantage in the traditional game of power politics, international education should try to change the nature of the game, to civilize and humanize it in this nuclear age."

Yet the American officials who write and say such things seem also to believe, as well they might, that "apolitical" programs are not without political effects. A long stay in any foreign country usually results in an emotional affinity, and our educators agree that foreign students particularly relish a chance at higher education in America. "Foreigners like it here. They admire our institutions. They want to stay," according to Robert Hochstein of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. "Some who tended to be anti-American find that their views are modified. They come to see America as a good place. Even governments and leaders abroad who take us apart on everything else still look to us for higher education." Mr. Hochstein concludes: "We win hands down."

Fruits of Knowledge

This is not always the case, of course. Some have come here and been unduly influenced by American friends with undemocratic politics, or professors who praised Mao's Red Guards or Sartre's impossible blend of existentialism and Marxism. Others became attached to freedom, but not to sound ideas about how to bring it about. They went home and helped make revolutions that replaced one despot with another. Or, like Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu, a veteran of many years at Harvard and Berkeley, they reached—or they were led to—the astonishing opinion that the influence the United States wields abroad is politically and morally indistinguishable from that wielded by the Soviet Union.

But for each of these, a dozen others studied, circulated socially, contributed to their schools, and returned home grateful and prepared to serve their countries. For example, Gonzalo J. Facio of Costa Rica took a doctorate in law from New York University and went on to co-found his country's major political party. He has served at the United Nations and the Organization of American States, and is a respected author and a pro-American syndicated columnist. A graduate of M.I.T., Siddhi Savetsike, is now Foreign Minister of Thailand, where the press is free, the political parties democratic, and the foreign policy unofficially pro-American. In the upper echelons of India's educational structure are graduates of Michigan, Harvard, and Berkeley: the current Minister of Education was once overheard telling the Soviet Ambassador to India: "You need a system of higher education like the Americans have." Graduates of the Claremont (CA.) Institute's government-assisted three-week "International Seminars in American Studies" have returned home to their professional work at U.N.E.S.C.O. in Paris, West German college faculties, Turkey's American embassy, newspaper offices in several Australian cities, and the parliaments of Greece and the Netherlands. The daughter of Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone was once an exchange student in Michigan City, Indiana, a fact her father recalled with evident emotion during his visit to the White House.

At least two problems, however, mar successful American efforts to educate foreign youths. First, only the affluent can afford to come; costs are prohibitive to others. Second, we have limited our guests, and ourselves, by being afraid to teach them anything about American political principles.

Momentum for action on the first matter has been gathering on Capitol Hill since 1978. Identical bills in the House and Senate propose establishing a scholarship program to bring young people from developing countries of no wealth but proven ability to American colleges and technical schools. The anticipated advantages are listed in the bills: improving education, increasing mutual understanding, creating lasting links between the United States and developing countries, cultivating future leaders, enhancing trade, forestalling Soviet efforts, and complementing existing American aid programs.

The idea is sound. The program must start slowly: if the 10,000 Central Americans the Kissinger Commission called for in November 1984 arrived next year, they would leave the institutions of higher education in their own nations stripped bare. There is no good reason to try to match the Soviet bloc scholarship for scholarship. But our direction is true: ideology and opportunity in Soviet form have been speaking to the poor and the desperate; they will be heard if there is no other voice.

The second problem with American programs to date is our dread of "indoctrinating" our foreign students. So uneasy are we about selling our political system, or even our avowedly universal political principles, that we have sanitized every scholarship program of any political overtone. The Fulbright-Hays Act requires that all programs be "nonpolitical and balanced, and shall be administered in keeping with the highest standards of academic integrity." The implication is that anything "political" is unbalanced, and probably unscholarly, too.

But "political" does not only mean "partisan." Certainly it is possible to teach foreign students about American politics without being "political." The economic and political records of Third World democracies readily demonstrate that democratic political wisdom has as much to teach the citizens of developing countries as American science and medicine. If we are to bring men and women here to live among us at public expense for four or five years, we should ask them to learn something of the fundamental principles of American political life. The oft-cited goal of "mutual understanding" probably requires it.

Scholarship students at undergraduate institutions should be strongly advised to complete a college course introducing them to the classics of American political thought—the covenants, ideas, speeches, documents. Such a course would be an important supplement to the scientific and agricultural studies so many of the students pursue. And it would be a welcome addition to what one American expert has called the "pretty dismal" fare for foreign students: "international dinners and festivals, 'culture nights,' intercultural communication workshops."

Every kind of foreign aid is open to some objections. But assistance to education is among the safest and best kinds of public diplomacy. Education buoys up the recipient; it engages his intellectual and moral faculties; it teaches skills, and emphasizes self-help. It is real "developmental aid," and will help build American political assets.

Money sent overseas as economic or military aid must indeed be sent. But it risks being wasted by incompetence, or drained away by graft. That which is taught cannot be taken away. Once planted, it will grow on its own. ■

BREAKING NEW GROUND

Public Choice Economists Explain Why Government Doesn't Work

JANE SHAW

This year's budget debate is following a familiar pattern. In public, Congressmen moralize about the deficit, but privately they fend off threats to their favorite interest groups. Federal spending keeps growing, even under the most conservative president in more than half a century.

The process is working exactly as predicted by an iconoclastic group of economists and political scientists who call themselves the "public choice" school of political economy. By examining the incentives of collective decision-making, and by assuming that government officials are rational, self-interested individuals, public choice scholars have shown that without fundamental changes in the rules of politics, government spending will inexorably expand—even for programs that the majority of voters do not favor.

The locus of public choice research is the Center for the Study of Public Choice at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia, and its two most prominent figures are James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, both George Mason professors. Other centers include Washington University (St. Louis), the University of Maryland, the Political Economy Research Center in Bozeman, Montana, and the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy at Indiana University.

But public choice has been resisted by many academics because it attacks the cherished notions of two large and influential groups: economists who think that government can smoothly carry out the public interest simply by adopting the prescriptions of "welfare economics"; and political scientists who believe that pluralistic competition among interest groups leads to the public good.

Challenging Benign Government

Government management of the economy accelerated after World War II partly because influential economists convinced the public that a democratic government could help create a better society by correcting the failures of the marketplace. The unbridled marketplace, Paul Samuelson wrote in the 1958 edition of his famous textbook, produced rapid progress in the 19th century, but at the price of periodic business crises, exhaustion of natural resources, and monopolies. Gradually, as American society developed, people became willing to give up "rugged individual-

ism" and accept more regulation of economic activity to make life more humane. "Where the complex economic conditions of life necessitate social coordination, there can sensible men of goodwill be expected to invoke the authority and creative activity of government."

Economists like Mr. Samuelson minimized the possibility that the government, in trying to make up for the private economy's flaws, would make matters worse. So did prominent political scientists, who believed—as most still do—that a democratic government reflects the will of society, although imperfectly, through competition among interest groups. In 1967, Robert Dahl of Yale University provided a characteristic explanation:

Because one center of power is set against another, power itself will be tamed, civilized, controlled, and limited to decent human purposes, while coercion, the most evil form of power, will be reduced to a minimum.

Because even minorities are provided with opportunities to veto solutions they strongly object to, the consent of all will be won in the long run.

Because constant negotiations among different centers of power are necessary in order to make decisions, citizens and leaders will perfect the precious art of dealing peacefully with their conflicts, and not merely to the benefit of one partisan but to the mutual benefit of all the parties to a conflict.

Public choice questions these benign images of government. It "replaces a romantic and illusory set of notions about the workings of governments by a set of notions that embody more skepticism," says James Buchanan. It argues that in a democracy many government decisions do not reflect the wishes of the citizens and that government has predictable flaws at least as serious as those of the market. "The major contribution of public choice," says James Gwartney, an economist at Florida State University, "is to show that market failure is not a sufficient condition to turn a problem over to the government."

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Public choice theorists look at government decision-makers as rational, self-interested people, just like the rest of us, who view issues from their own perspective and act in the light of their personal incentives. While voters, politicians, and bureaucrats may desire to reflect the “public interest,” that desire is only one incentive among many and it is likely to be outweighed by more powerful ones.

This way of looking at people in government is, of course, the way economists view people in the marketplace. But in the marketplace, people generally carry the full responsibility for their decisions. If they want something, they have to give up something—their labor or property—in return. If they make an unwise purchase, they pay for it. Thus they have a strong incentive to make wise purchases in pursuit of their personal goals.

The days are over, says Mr. Buchanan, when economists could push for more federal intervention “blithely assuming governments would solve problems.”

In the public sector, where decisions are made collectively, people are equally self-interested and rational, say public choice proponents, but the incentives are different. When a congressman pursues the “public interest,” he does so by spending other people’s money. So the congressman has little incentive to make sure that government expenditures are efficient or wise. But when that congressman pursues the goal of re-election, he or she has a strong incentive to act carefully. Thus, a congressman can be expected to work hard at swaying votes and ensuring campaign funds—but not so hard at controlling or monitoring government spending.

The results of this system of incentives, public choice proponents say, is that government tends to grow too large and to be increasingly costly to operate. The interests of the overall populace and future generations are continually rejected in favor of the here and now: narrow special interests, whose campaign help will be useful in the next election. Many public choice analysts conclude that, where possible, decisions should instead be left to the private sector.

A central tenet of public choice theory is the rational apathy of the voter. Voting takes time, wrote public choice scholar Anthony Downs in *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957), “time to register, to discover what parties are running, to deliberate, to go to the polls, and to mark the ballot.” And the reward is elusive. While the outcome of an election may be tremendously important for a nation or city, an individual’s vote will rarely be decisive. And the voter will have virtually no impact on the resolution of the multitude of issues that the winner will tackle once elected. Thus, for many people, said Mr. Downs, the costs of informed voting “may outweigh the returns,” so that

“rational abstention becomes possible even for citizens who want a popular party to win . . .”

While social consciousness or concern for the “public interest” may get some people to the polls, it is rarely going to provide enough incentive to spur the voters to be well informed, except on a few highly publicized issues. The voter gains more personally from deciding which car to buy than which congressional candidate to vote for. It is hardly surprising that more than half of the U.S. citizens of voting age cannot even name their congressman—the voter has little incentive to find out. Rational ignorance explains the power of political advertising, which, although costly, supplies information to voters without charge. It is also the most important reason why special interests take over. Most voters simply do not have the time to keep informed about seemingly minor legislative decisions, in which small groups may have a vital interest. The result is that legislators’ records are frequently unrepresentative of their constituents’ views on all but those few issues where voters have a strong concern.

In addition, survival in the political arena generally depends on cooperating with special interest groups. These groups supply vital campaign funds in return for access to the politician’s ear. A politician who is willing to “rent his ear” will ultimately outcompete those who will not. Richard Stroup, an economist at Montana State University, points out a corollary: predictability—that is, a steady commitment to a policy or a principle—is often punished by defeat. The predictable politician is unlikely to be wooed or supported by lobbyists looking to sway votes. That is why politicians are fence-sitters on most of the issues they face—the myriad issues that a politician’s constituents know little about.

Inefficient Bureaucracies

Public choice explains some chronic criticisms of bureaucracy as well. Like people in the private sector, bureaucrats usually believe in the importance of their mission (or they wouldn’t be there) and they naturally want to increase their office’s impact and prestige. But in the private sector, such professional pride and narrow focus are checked. The manager of a chemical company’s polypropylene division would build more production facilities if he could, but if polypropylene is not very profitable, the chief executive, responsible for the bottom line, will force him to take a back seat.

In the public sector, checks such as the profit line are missing. Funds come through Congress. Since congressmen are spending other people’s money, they have no direct incentive to cut back on spending, except to the extent that spending on one bureau cuts into the funds available for another. That trade-off used to be more of a check than it is today, when there were greater restraints on the ability to raise money. But once inflation began boosting tax revenues automatically, and after deficit spending gained acceptance, even this constraint weakened.

William C. Mitchell, a political scientist at the University of Oregon and author of an early textbook on public choice, explains that since congressmen use the agencies of the executive branch to win votes, they select their committee assignments so they can defend and promote pro-

grams that will help them get re-elected. They then log-roll to get other congressmen to support these programs. By trading votes—a rural congressman supports housing subsidies in return for support of the farm program—both the Department of Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Agriculture get the money they want, or at least a good chunk of it. The result is bigger government. William A. Niskanen argued in his 1971 book, *Bureaucracy and Representative Government*, that bureaus tend to be twice as large as they would be if they were performing a similar function in the private sector.

Other factors reduce the ability of bureaucrats to carry out the public interest. Bureaucrats are not “bad people,” but they have little incentive to operate efficiently, since there is no reliable measure of efficiency. Instead, there is an incentive simply to appear efficient, since that will please voters. James Gwartney and Richard L. Stroup, authors of a public choice economics textbook, point out that a “well-publicized campaign to save a few dollars by eliminating limousine service for high government officials can produce greater political benefits than a complex government reorganization plan that would save taxpayers millions of dollars.”

Bureaucrats do have an incentive to satisfy the people they regulate or deal with, as Nobel laureate George Stigler showed some years ago with his famous theory of the “capture” of regulatory agencies by the regulated groups. Although civil servants are more effectively restrained than Congress in getting payoffs from special interests, their close association with those who benefit from the agency’s decisions—be they trucking companies or environmentalist groups—tends to thwart their willingness to serve the broader interests of the public.

Most students of politics would agree with these observations. Findings of political science are “not inconsistent with public choice,” says Mr. Mitchell. But the dominant “interest-group pluralism” school still sees the public interest as taking shape through the pulling and tugging among special interests. In contrast, public choice sees special interest groups not as competitors against one another as much as joint raiders of a common pool—the U.S. Treasury—and as potential abusers of government’s coercive powers. Special interests compete against the public, which is largely unaware of what is happening.

Public choice is not the first model of the rational, self-interested politician. Machiavelli urged his prince to be both lion and fox, to intimidate and deceive, if he wished to stay in power. H.L. Mencken saw politics as a branch of grand larceny.

The government consists of a gang of men exactly like you and me. They have, taking one with another, no special talent for the business of government, they have only a talent for getting and holding office. Their principal device to that end is to search out groups who pant and pine for something they can’t get and to promise to give it to them. Nine times out of ten that promise is worth nothing. The tenth time it is made good by looting A to satisfy B. In other words, government is a broker in pillage and every election is sort of an advance auction sale of stolen goods.

Public choice economics is neither manipulative like Machiavelli nor cynical like Mencken. It is, however, skeptical and for the most part pessimistic. Its proponents argue that government failure—inefficient, costly, and misdirected government—is inevitable unless the governmental process is restrained by procedural rules that prevent narrow groups from plundering the system. The Constitution provides such rules, but their effectiveness has diminished over time.

Public choice is the only social science discipline to explain why government so often fails to do what high-minded thinkers want it to do.

Recent public choice work, especially Mancur Olson’s book, *The Rise and Decline of Nations*, contends that the governmental process deteriorates because special interests become increasingly entrenched and effective. Mr. Olson argues that the economies of Germany and Japan prospered after World War II because the war destroyed the power of special interests.

For James Buchanan, the increased power of special interests stems largely from the adoption of Keynesianism, which unhinged the moral restraints that for more than a century had kept government spending within bounds, except in wartime. Once economists decided that the federal deficit could be used to manage the economy, effective control over Treasury raids was lifted. Other public choice-oriented economists, such as Terry Anderson and P. J. Hill, argue that key Supreme Court decisions starting in the 19th century made possible the triumph of special interests. These decisions reduced constitutional restraints on government power, such as limits on the use of eminent domain.

Public Choice Prescriptions

To correct major government problems such as the deficit, public choice theorists look for rule changes that will put more constraints on politicians’ ability to cater to special interests. They recommend new constitutional rules that everyone agrees on initially to guide the political process. For example, Mr. Buchanan recommends requiring Congress to identify a specific source of revenue for any legislation that establishes a new spending program. He also favors tax indexing to provide some restraint on government spending, and he supports a constitutional amendment requiring a balanced budget.

Another technique to restrain congressional spending is the line-item veto, which would enable the President to cut back specific expenditures that congressmen write in for special interests. Mr. Buchanan considers the line-item veto “questionable.” By giving one individual more discretion, the veto could spur even more political maneuvering

by congressmen. With or without the veto, a strong president can help restrain special interests since he is elected by the people as a whole and is not accountable to any one region. President Reagan's veto of the farm credit bill last March is an example of such restraint.

When a congressman pursues the "public interest," he does so by spending other people's money.

The public choice model also argues for changing the incentives of bureaucrats. Gordon Tullock and William Niskanen have proposed stimulating competition among bureaus by allowing several to supply the same service. This, they contend, would improve efficiency. Some public choice proponents recommend more user fees, and allowing those fees to return to the operating agency rather than to the Treasury. This would provide an incentive to attract paying customers. John Baden of the Political Economy Research Center has taken competition a step further and suggested creation of a "predatory bureau" whose operating income would depend on the extent to which it can reduce the budgets of other bureaus.

Public choice adherents favor leaving as many governmental duties as possible in the hands of (or turning them over to) local governments. The existence of many governments allows the testing of many alternatives and provides a semblance of competition. People can point to successful alternatives or even "vote with their feet" when the government taxes them too much or is inefficient. Such "voting" is slow to take effect, but it does provide a check on efficiency that national decision-making doesn't have. Another way to weaken the force of special interests is to put more issues on the ballot through referenda. Economists James Gwartney and Jonathan Silberman have found that issues decided in state legislatures often favor special interests, but when the issue is presented to the entire voting populace, a special interest is more likely to lose. They cite an example of a plan in Ohio to exempt homeowners over 65 from property tax. This exemption was adopted by the legislature, but when it was presented in a referendum, the voters rejected it.

Such reforms tend to be limited in their impact, and no one in public choice is confident that any reform can resolve major national problems such as the deficit. "These are really 'best guesses,'" says Mr. Buchanan. He points to the Budget Reform Act of 1974 that tried to force Congress to reconcile individual appropriations with overall spending. The experience of a decade suggests that it didn't have much effect in reducing expenditures, and possibly made things worse. Indeed, the only time it really worked, says Mr. Buchanan, was in 1981 when a strong president, flush with a surprising election victory, bundled budget cuts into a single package and forced a vote. But public choice proponents do think that the situation could be bad enough, with the raids on the Treasury so visible, that

Congress could act, possibly passing a balanced budget amendment. Such a desperation move occurred in the 1930s when the tragedy of the Smoot-Hawley tariff led Congress to hand over the power of negotiating tariff reductions to the President. In the post-war period, this authority led to significant reductions in trade barriers.

Not everyone who applies public choice to the world of government is as conservative or as constitutionally oriented as the "Virginia school." Mancur Olson, for example, retains his faith in a strong government. Anthony Downs says that while public choice illustrates the flaws of government, he still thinks that government has an important role in redistributing income. In 1960, he wrote an article entitled, "Why the Government Budget Is Too Small in a Democracy."

Some schools of public choice—and the kind that have fared best in political circles—are highly mathematical. Rochester University, Carnegie-Mellon, and the California Institute of Technology have become centers of this brand of public choice. They concentrate on formal mathematical models of voting strategies or apply game theory to understand how political conflicts are resolved through bargaining, coalitions, and threats. These academic sectors, while robust, do not have a great deal of impact on public policy.

And much of public choice research, even among the Virginia school, is analytical rather than directly policy-oriented. Leafing through issues of the journal *Public Choice*, which Gordon Tullock edits, one finds articles on a mind-boggling array of subjects. One article analyzes political terrorism, another compares the performance of school board members who have children with those who don't, and a third tries to determine if changes in the size of the deficit are related to the presidential electoral cycle (the authors decided they are). The emphasis is often on understanding what happens, not on recommending policy.

Nevertheless, public choice is gradually changing the way that people, especially academics who deal with policy, think and talk about government. The days are over, says Mr. Buchanan, when economists could push for more federal intervention "blithely assuming governments would solve problems." Indeed, while most economists still consider public choice a narrow wing of the profession, they have shown their respect for Mr. Buchanan. They elected him president of the Southern Economic Association in 1963 and president of the Western Economic Association in 1983. Colleagues say that he has been seriously considered for a Nobel prize.

In the 1980s, it is becoming obvious to nearly everybody that well-intentioned government programs from the War on Poverty to the farm program often end up bilking taxpayers to serve special interests. But until recently, neither economics nor political science had a useful explanation. Economists were still teaching from Paul Samuelson's textbook and political scientists were concentrating on empirical studies of competitive interest groups. Public choice is the only social science discipline to explain why government so often fails to do what high-minded thinkers want it to do. As those failures become more visible, chances are that public choice will become more visible, too.

TEXAS

The Republican Roundup

WILLIAM MURCHISON

The state of Texas, birthplace of Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, political linchpin of the Sunbelt, is becoming a two party state. This turn of events was dramatized by President Reagan's gigantic margin of victory over Walter Mondale there in 1984, by a massive turnover of local elective offices to the Republicans, and by conversions to the GOP by conservative Democrats Phil Gramm and now Kent Hance.

Hance's switch to the Republican Party was celebrated by party officials because it confirms—and accelerates—a trend of non-liberal Democrats leaving the party. Hance, who lost the Democratic nomination for the Senate to left-liberal Lloyd Doggett, is persuaded that there is no more room for conservative Democrats like himself in the party, a realization that is coming to scores of Texas Democrats who share Hance's views on issues. The Texas Democratic Party, which once accommodated both liberals and conservatives, now runs the risk of losing many of its members, and certainly the conservative label, to the GOP.

Until recently, the Democratic Party had a lock on politics in Texas. For the first six decades of the century, no Republican won statewide office in Texas. There was no Republican in the Texas legislature from 1931-61. When at last, in 1961, John Tower was elected to the U.S. Senate, just one other Texas Republican sat in Congress—Representative Bruce Alger of Dallas. In 1978, Texans elected the first Republican governor since Reconstruction: Bill Clements, a Dallas oil well magnate. Throughout the 1970s, Republican state legislators and judges were few and far between.

The elections of 1982 made things even worse for the GOP. Bill Clements was defeated for reelection by Mark White, a liberal opportunist, and a whole slate of qualified Republicans seeking statewide office were clobbered. The recession that year, attributed to President Reagan's policies, no doubt played a part in this.

Today, for numerous reasons, Texas Republicans rub their hands together with satisfaction:

- Texas Republicans boast one U.S. senator; 10 of 27 congressmen; 58 of 181 legislators; a multitude of local officials; and almost complete political control of the Dallas County courthouse.

- Ronald Reagan garnered 3.1 million Texas votes against 1.9 million for Walter Mondale: a 64-36 percent split. (By contrast, four years earlier, Reagan beat Jimmy Carter in Texas 2.5 million votes to 1.8 million. In 1976, Mr. Carter won the state by 129,000 votes over President Ford.)

- Of 254 Texas counties, the Republican ticket carried 238—including Plano County, birthplace and home of the late Lyndon B. Johnson.

- President Reagan's support across the state was astonishingly even. The six urban counties gave him 57-67 percent of their votes; the 19 middle-sized and the 229 rural counties 65 percent each.

- The mandate for Congressman Phil Gramm, in his quest for retiring Republican Senator John Tower's seat, was similarly broad and deep. In the urban counties, Congressman Gramm polled 57 percent of the vote, in the middle-sized ones 60 percent, in the rural counties, 59 percent.

- Texas Republican pollster Lance Tarrance forecast, incredibly enough, that 36 percent of registered voters would go straight Republican, while only 23 percent would grasp the Democratic lever. He was right.

A little caution is in order. To say that Texas is becoming a two-party state is plainly not the same as saying it has become one already. The 1984 elections notwithstanding, most Texas officeholders, including nearly all the top ones, remain Democrats.

On the other hand, the Texas landslide of 1984 didn't just happen. It helped, of course, that by then the state's economy was once more on the boom. Unemployment at election time was 5.4 percent, down several points from 1982. It also helped that a popular president and a vice president from Texas headed the Republican ticket. By contrast, the Democratic Party candidates were perceived as Northeastern liberals. But what probably counted most in Texas was a change of perception: in 1984 the Republican Party was viewed as the conservative party.

It could not have managed this by itself. The Democrats helped enormously. Between 1972 and 1984 they demonstrated an unerring ability to stake out positions not shared by the majority of Texas voters.

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The old Texas Democratic Party was as conservative as a pocket watch. It was dedicated to rugged individualism, local control, and traditional values. So while Texas registered Democrats might vote for Republican Presidential candidates, they almost always pulled the lever for local candidates from their own party. This remained true until the conservative Democrats in high places began to lose interest and standing in the party, and either left or converted to the Republican fold. This alerted rank-and-file Democrats in Texas, who in any case were not happy with the policies of the national Democratic Party: appeasement, redistribution of income, and hyper-solicitousness toward homosexuals and feminists.

In 1984, the opportunity for Texas Republicans was plain. All they had to do besides get out the vote was get out the conservative message. Which they did.

Phil Gramm was the conservative point man. No candidate could have been better equipped for the job. Balding, with more than a trace of Georgia drawl, and a self-deprecating sense of humor, he had the common touch. He also had the uncommon distinction among politicians of thoroughly understanding economics and public policy. (Before entering Congress, he was an economics professor at Texas A&M University.)

In 1983, Congressman Gramm had quit the Democratic Party rather than knuckle under to Tip O'Neill. On changing parties, Gramm resigned his seat in Congress, ran as a Republican in a special election, and won a thumping endorsement from a rural district that had never before sent a Republican to Congress. In 1984, Congressman Gramm waded around his new party label.

"I ran as a Republican," he said recently. "I said, 'I'm a Republican. Here are the reasons why — and you are one, too. And the time is here to admit it.'" Had he failed to convince, Texans only had to look at the record of his Democratic opponent, state Senator Lloyd Doggett, which was uniformly liberal.

It was the way of the old Democratic Party to anoint in the primaries a conservative—who then went on to defeat his Republican opponent in November. The Democrats had such a conservative at their disposal in 1981, Congressman Kent Hance of Lubbock. By 1,400 votes in the runoff primary, the Democrats spurned his suit.

Doggett, who represented chic and liberal Austin, spoke as senatorial candidate for all the important elements of today's Democratic Party—minorities, feminists, peace movements, labor leaders, homosexuals. The group for whom he failed chiefly to speak was the ordinary Texan: not particularly rich, not particularly poor, concerned for the revival of lost values like work and patriotism.

Congressman Gramm, in speech after speech, embraced the values of the working man, as exemplified by a printer in his congressional district, one Dickie Flatt. On the campaign trail, Dickie Flatt became almost as famous as Lloyd Doggett. Gramm portrayed the voters' choice as Texas values versus the philosophy of the new Democratic Party. His was a campaign of issues—the need for budget cuts, strong national defense, and traditional conservative areas that Republicans commonly conceded to Democrats. Some 50,000 volunteers worked the entire state on behalf of Reagan and Gramm together.

In Texas, as elsewhere, Democrats had pinned their hopes on an upsurge in voter registration. Republicans responded by signing up 1.2 million new voters—one million more than their original goal. The number of financial contributors to the party tripled to 70,000. Not even Hispanic voters, on whom the Democrats had set their sights, helped the Democratic ticket in the end. Texas Republicans have long regarded Hispanics—hard-working, church and family oriented—as a natural Republican voter. John Tower, for instance, was popular with Mexican-Americans. Ultimately, Reagan and Gramm carried a number of heavily Hispanic counties in South Texas.

Numerous Texans made up their minds to eschew the whole Democratic ticket. And so Republican straight-ticket voting made its debut on Texas. In Dallas County, led by an exceptionally able county chairman, Fred Meyer, Republicans swept all but one contested race, including judgeships. They fared nearly as well in Harris County (Houston).

The Future is Now


What of the future? "We've got a great opportunity," says Meyer. Once a defensive, introverted, even apologetic kind of party, Texas Republicans have become bold and assertive. Led by Phil Gramm and state party chairman George Strake, they have been on an evangelical kick, carrying the gospel to conservative Democrats, urging them to switch their party allegiance.

All this missionary work has not been without effect. Three Dallas Democratic judges converted at a highly publicized press conference. The spirit has likewise come upon various local officials, including the sheriff of Nueces County (Corpus Christi) and the district attorney of Williamson County. "I continue to be encouraged," says Gramm, "that the fastest-growing group in the state is called Former Democrats."

By far the greatest coup is Kent Hance himself. In early May, he called it quits as the Texas Democratic Party's only well-known conservative, saying that "my personal philosophies will no longer be in conflict with my party's." Ronald Reagan sent a telegram: "From one former Democrat to another, welcome to the team. We did not leave the Democratic Party over the years, it simply left us."

Mr. Strake says the Hance conversion "moves political realignment ahead by at least two election cycles." One reason is that Hance's example will probably inspire other conservative Democrats to convert. Another reason is the likelihood that Hance will run for governor against Governor White, who is regarded as vulnerable. "He reads the same tea leaves I do," says Meyer. "He couldn't wait to get down to Honduras. White will move absolutely as far right as he can get." In the Republican Party, Hance's likeliest competition is highly regarded Congressman Tom Loeffler of Hunt, in west Texas.

The Republican Party's quest for converts makes tactical as well as public relations sense. Right now, there isn't a big enough field of well-known, well-respected Republican candidates. This makes harder the job of capturing medium-visibility offices like lieutenant governor, attorney general, and agriculture commissioner, not to mention seats in the legislature.

With noted ex-Democrats running on the GOP ticket, things might be different. Small wonder evangelism gets so much priority from Republican leaders like Gramm and Meyer. Small wonder, too, that Texas Democratic leaders are morose. They fear their power is ebbing away. 

CALIFORNIA

A Senator Named After A Curve?

TOM HAZLETT

Art Laffer has “risen to the top of my profession,” as a university economist, “been fabulously successful—beyond my wildest imagination—as a businessman,” his A.B. Laffer and Associates pulling down some \$2.7 million in annual billings, and, as is commonly understood, he sits at the right hand of President Reagan for policy matters economic (hence, the \$2.7 million in annual billings). So what do you give the policy expert who has everything? A United States Senate seat, of course.

Mr. Laffer is likely to run for Alan Cranston’s Senate seat in California in 1986. If elected, Laffer will certainly rank as the U.S. Senate’s most “curvaceous” member, as the Laffer Curve has gained folklore status in a matter of a very few semesters. According to legend, the curve was first posited on a Washington, D.C. cocktail napkin to Wall Street Journal writer Jude Wanniski and an unnamed staffer in the Ford White House in 1974. The graph shows a simple relationship: tax receipts as a function of tax rates. As rates rise, so do government revenues—up to some point. After a high (and unspecified) tax rate, people will work and invest so much less, that government’s take—while a bigger *share* of GNP—shrinks in absolute terms. The practical upshot is that we may have reached the point, by the late 1970s, where government could actually increase its income by cutting tax rates. This powerful argument served as the intellectual motivation for the dramatic 25 percent cut in personal income taxes during Ronald Reagan’s first term.

In a field crowded with Republicans anxious to make the final heat against, presumably, Alan Cranston (the incumbent senator may face the formidable San Francisco mayor, Diane Feinstein, in a tough primary), Art Laffer sticks out like a pointy-headed intellectual—which he’s not (most intellectuals wouldn’t have the faintest idea of what to do with a cocktail napkin, for instance). L.A. police chief turned state senator Ed Davis is currently the smart money choice for the nod, against congresspeople Bobbi Fiedler, Dan Lungren, and William Dannemeyer, state senators William Campbell and Ken Maddy. (No one has dared to yet declare, due to fear of “equal time”—or loss of franking). There is also some rumbling about the



intentions of Peter Ueberroth or Charlton Heston descending from Mt. Olympus or Mt. Sinai respectively, to slay the entire field in a bold stroke. But for now it’s a dog fight.

An economist in the Senate? It has been done, true. Texas rookie Phil Gramm quit the Texas A&M economics department, joining the Club of 100 last fall, following by some years the well-known symbol-cruncher Paul Douglas of Illinois, the only U.S. Senator in history to have a production function named after him (the vaunted Cobb-Dougllass model: you remember it, surely . . . c’mon—it’s the one where the exponents sum to unity, indicating linear homogeneity? Oh, that production function. Right.) But why would a 44-year old guy, plump and happy with six kids, a new 25-year-old wife, a Southern California estate boasting exotic wildlife (with, yes four, macaw birds) and more strains of cacti than the Gobi Desert would want to mix it up with the low-lives of politics?

It’s not an academic seminar out there, Art. “I know that, but I think people would rather have someone who knows the process from the outside and has been successful on his own,” he grins. Besides, Laffer’s image as a policy expert out of official ranks gives him a little added credibility, he believes. “I’m saying the very same things today I said and wrote 10, 15 years ago. When a person’s been running for office since they were 22, you don’t really know what they believe.”

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Knowing what Laffer believes is relatively easy to discern: talk to him for five minutes and you receive only a slightly abridged version of the *World According to Art*. The scholar (Yale undergrad, Stanford MBA and Ph.D., tenure at the University of Chicago at age 28) buzzes with theories on pretty much every aspect of the real or metaphysical—from a foolproof scheme to shed pounds (submerge yourself in cold water for 12-20 hours a day, thereby letting your biological thermostat blow off hundreds of calories, just to keep you revved up to 98.6°F), to why visiting reporters with somewhat sympathetic views should contribute \$1,000 to his campaign fund. Laffer strikes as an intellectual dynamo as he buzz-saws his way through doubting Thomases—and mercilessly slays the non-believers with imaginative policies, economic jargon, and an almost spiritual devotion to the merits of boyish enthusiasm.

The idea that excites the excitable Laffer the most, of course, is the ideology of tax cut-ism. “Reaganomics has been enormously successful, I think—don’t you?” he rhetorically asks with a staccato verbal energy most Southern Californians would likely associate not with macro-theory but with cocaine abuse. “And I think Reaganomics is perceived that way. Tax cuts are working, they’re working nationwide, and statewide,” and he reels off an impressive list of states, including California, Massachusetts, and Delaware, that have signed on for the tax revolt.

Deficits? On some occasions Laffer will apologize for under-estimating the deficits—but believes that a robust economy and a fat deficit is a whole lot better than no robust economy at all. More likely, though he’ll be quick to zero in on non-defense spending as the butler in the federal deficit whodunit. Laffer claims that January 1985 budget figures reveal, when juxtaposed with January 1983 projections, a \$16 billion increase in revenues, and a \$25 billion decline in defense outlays. The deficit scaled the \$200 billion summit on the back of increased social spending, he maintains.

On the other hand, supply-siders, including Laffer, have been criticized by many free market proponents as having

been notoriously soft on budget cuts. As Murray Weidenbaum recently wrote: “I still recall the many budget-cutting meetings in the White House that the supply-siders dismissed as needless in view of the torrent of revenue they expected from the tax cuts.” Indeed, upon entering the national spotlight in 1978, Laffer’s proposed medicine of lower taxes and higher spending led the press, not illogically, to dub him “the G.O.P.’s Dr. Feelgood.” Now, however, Laffer claims genuine concern over the rate of social spending, perhaps an indication that an economic expansion is the time when welfare programs can—or should—be cut.

So what could the ebullient economist add to public policy by trading tenure for a slot as one of Bob Dole’s minions? Laffer believes that the supply-side agenda is but partially fulfilled. “We still have to move to a flatter rate.” His goal now is to steamroll rates down to 11.5 percent personal, 11.5 percent corporate (claiming 23 percent GNP in total, so as to balance the federal budget even without a “Laffer” effect), all while maintaining full deductibility of interest and charitable donations, introducing tax-deductibility of rent payments, lowering the capital gains tax rate to 0.0 percent, and (over an initial phase-in period) allowing firms to entirely expense their capital in one year (which would simplify the depreciation schedules a bit). Of course, now that even Senator Cranston has endorsed Bradley-Gephardt, the idea of squeezing rates is no longer Boston Tea Party stuff.

As a proud father, Laffer clucks, “We’ve shown that the tax cut program works. Now it is time to let everyone share in the good times.” Hence, Laffer is an outspoken champion of enterprise zone legislation, and has even told the *Los Angeles Times* he favors a federal prize for high achievers in the Scholastic Aptitude Test: \$15,000 to achievers in the top 5 percent—tax-free, need you ask?

“Now is not the time to attack people,” warns Laffer, referring to the supply-side program. “With an open heart and a clear vision, we want to bring the fruits of economic opportunity to all layers of society.” But to do that takes

THE WORLD ACCORDING TO ART

Strategic Defense

An integral part of America’s defense capabilities. I support it.

The MX Missile

I’m for it. I view it as an important part of America’s arsenal for peace. It will help us negotiate arms reduction from a position of strength, not weakness.

Prayer in Public Schools

Prayer in the public schools did not hurt us in the first 200 years of our country and I see no reason why schools that elect to have non-denominational prayer should not be allowed to do so.

Nicaragua

I have met with Daniel Ortega and from the encounter I am convinced that the commandante and the Sandinistas have broken their promise of freedom and democracy to the people of Nicaragua. As a result, I fully support the contras in their fight to reclaim the promises of the Nicaraguan revolution.

Abortion

I oppose federally funded abortion.

Balanced Budget Amendment

Unfortunately, Congress’s lack of ability to carry out its responsibility to control spending forces me to be a supporter of the amendment.

more than Republican votes, argues Laffer—it takes expertise. “Details are devastatingly important,” he admonishes. “In 1984 we got a 2,000 page tax bill. You need someone who can understand that enormously complex policy.”

Why not just set aside a few more dates for congressional testimony? “Senators negotiate; advisors don’t,” he points out. Laffer charges that his expertise could have made a difference in the 1981 tax cut bill; the cuts were phased in over a three-year period rather than plugged in immediately. He believes that the President knew nothing of the negotiated compromise until it was a *fait accompli*—and neither did citizen Laffer. Being an insider could change that.

“Understanding how the system works, that’s my specialty,” says the unshy professor. “I was George Shultz’s chief economist at OMB for 2 years, I’ve been responsible for analyzing the Soviet defense budget—that technical stuff is important.” And, just to illustrate, he asks “When you’re writing the next Bretton Woods agreement, who’d you rather have there—moi, or Alan Cranston?”

The kind of bilingual academic intensity Laffer boasts would be of greatest help, he believes, in constraining Defense Department bloat. “Defense can be cut—but it depends on what you cut. I could give you tons of cuts that would lead to disaster. Tons of others wouldn’t matter. If you let me take Peter Grace in there we would do a good job. But if you took Les Aspin and Alan Cranston, you’d cut the guts and the muscle.” (Cranston has received recognition for favoring the made-in-California B-1 bomber. But he focused his embarrassing 1984 jog for the Democratic nomination almost exclusively on the nuclear freeze issue, which has prompted some to wonder just what Mr. Cranston advocates building the B-1 to deliver.)

Laffer’s nose for the punch line is well trained these days; he enjoys telling audiences that the “British pound is so weak they’ve started calling it the ounce.” And of Senator Bill Bradley, the former N.Y. Knickerbocker front-court man, “It’s disgusting how tall he is.” (The roundish Professor Laffer checks in at 5-foot 7-inches, 175 pounds, evidently spending too much of his time in hot water.) And for all his straight-in-the-eye believability, he can be slippery. While he told a 1981 crowd he favored “the freedom to smoke pot if we want,” he now prefers to soft-pedal


(no, not peddle) the drug issue. His ardent support of the draft in a 1980 interview where he argued that taxing the young would displace few economic resources, has now given way to the Reagan party line opposing conscription. Moreover, Laffer’s outspoken support of a gold standard (in 1982 he was vigorously pushing a quick conversion to a gold standard as salvation for the recession) has dissipated to “support for a stable currency—I’m not tied to gold.”

Laffer’s academic fortunes have apparently suffered somewhat by his interests in the body politic; he has lost his USC position over administrative differences on his furious scheduling of outside interests, and is now ensconced at the lesser-known Pepperdine University. Whatever his campaign schedule, Laffer will not want to forget his Pepperdine scholars; the *Los Angeles Times* now runs quarter-page ads featuring his “curvaceous” offer: “Be One of Only 20 Students to Study for an Executive MBA with Professor Arthur Laffer.” The economist’s handsome mug is prominently placed, looking its professorial best. (Perhaps the Federal Elections Commission will be moved to investigate Mr. Laffer’s grading policy as the campaign progresses.)

But Laffer has all the idealism—and political consultants (Bill Roberts’ Dolphin Group is handling the balloon drops and such)—to make a serious run at senior spinster Cranston. “I’ve made more money than I’d ever dreamt I’d make,” says the economist cum consultant, “but do you believe that I went into academia—and was writing all those papers in 1969, 1971, 1976—to make money?”

In a subtle repudiation of his curve, Laffer claims that “I’ve not spent my life trying to get a high income, or to run for the Senate in 1986.” What makes him run is simpler, if more profound. “It’s to pursue that dream,” he says with uncharacteristic calm. “When you’re lying on your death bed, you don’t want to say that you made \$10 more than someone else. You’d like to say that you were responsible for helping to alleviate poverty in the black ghetto.”

Why is Laffer hoping to trade his faculty chair for a campaign platform—and the chalk of scholarship for the mud of politics? “It’s just like why I had six kids,” he responds.


Gee, Art, and we always thought you did it for the tax break. 

“**...One of the people it's been most useful to and used by is me.**”

Ronald Reagan

on *Mandate for Leadership I*

The election is over but not the revolution




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BOOK REVIEWS



Vietnam Revisited

No More Vietnams, by Richard Nixon (New York: Arbor House, \$14.95).

Reviewed by Jeffrey T. Bergner

Virtually all Americans, regardless of their other views, would agree with the sentiment expressed in the title of Richard Nixon's book: that we should not as a nation be required to endure the futile sacrifice of another Vietnam War.

But former President Richard Nixon is convinced that many Americans have drawn the wrong lessons from our involvement in Indochina, and that these lessons jeopardize the successful conduct of American foreign policy. His history of the Vietnam War from the end of World War II through 1975 is an effort to de-mythologize this episode of American history.

Mr. Nixon was not responsible for the massive American involvement in Vietnam; he inherited it when he assumed office in January, 1969. Although he is somewhat critical of the way in which his predecessors fought the war, Mr. Nixon argues that the fault was not with their motives. The United States intervened in Vietnam for essentially moral reasons: to protect the non-Communist South from the Communist North.

But Mr. Nixon believes that the

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United States made a series of important miscalculations and mistakes. The United States tried to confine the war to Vietnam, when in reality the military theater was all of Indochina. The United States should have trained the South Vietnamese to take a larger role in their own defense so that the United States would have to deploy fewer of its own troops.

lesson of *No More Vietnams* is that the victory in Vietnam "was thrown away in a spasm of congressional irresponsibility." He blames Congress for permitting neither adequate military assistance to the South nor any threat of resumed American bombing of the North. This failure, combined with the ruthlessness of the North, led to the collapse of South Vietnam and all Indochina in 1975.

For Mr. Nixon, the real lesson of *No More Vietnams* is that the victory in Vietnam "was thrown away in a spasm of congressional irresponsibility."

Mr. Nixon maintains that it was both correct and necessary to reverse these policies when he took office. His account focuses on his own strategies of Vietnamization, pacification, diplomatic isolation, peace negotiations, and gradual withdrawal of American forces. He argues that by the time of the Paris Peace Agreement of January 27, 1973, the United States and South Vietnam had "won the war in Vietnam." He contends that South Vietnam could have protected its independence, so long as the United States continued to provide adequate military assistance and so long as the United States credibly threatened to retaliate against North Vietnam if it broke the terms of the peace agreement.

That, of course, is not what happened. And for Mr. Nixon, the real

What are we to make of this account? In its assessment of the North, in its evaluation of American motives, and in its judgment of the consequences for Indochina, it is essentially correct. Few today would debate what was so hotly contested during the war: the moral superiority of the American side, and the destructive consequences for Indochina of American withdrawal of support for South Vietnam.

Still, the claim that the war had been won in January 1973 must strike even a sympathetic reader as highly implausible. Even Mr. Nixon admits the 1973 accords were flawed in at least two major ways. First, the commission to review violations was ineffective and had no meaningful enforcement capability. And second, 290,000 North Vietnamese troops were permitted to re-

main in the territory of the South. This was hardly a recipe for success.

Congress might well have cut off all U.S. participation in Vietnam in 1973 if the President had not achieved a withdrawal; but the same President who knew this must also have suspected that Congress would reduce support for the South as well even if—or perhaps especially because—U.S. troops were no longer involved. To assert that the 1973 accords were the best of many poor alternatives, rather than a step toward victory, would have been more accurate. President Thieu, in his reluctance to agree to the accords, seemed to understand this quite well.

The dominant theme of the book is one of tragedy, wherein the many actors are fated to play their roles out to an unhappy conclusion. What more, after all, could have been achieved with a recalcitrant Congress, an unfriendly press, a dedicated enemy, and an unimaginative bureaucracy? Each played its assigned role, and human ingenuity could not have been sufficient to overcome this context. One gains the sense that the President was fated, despite his best efforts, to lose.

What are the conclusions that Mr. Nixon draws? First, the departure of the United States and the subsequent fall of South Vietnam produced unspeakable misery for millions of people in Indochina. The destruction of the South, the genocide in Cambodia, the collapse of Laos, and the brutality of piracy and death for high seas refugees from Indochina are a chapter of modern history that cannot be told without pain.


Second, the war in Vietnam has had a direct and lasting set of consequences for American foreign policy in the last decade. The “five year geopolitical sabbatical” that Mr. Nixon describes in the mid-1970s has lasted beyond those years right up to the present time. To be sure, President Reagan has taken a far more geopolitical view of the world than did President Carter. But the nation still operates under a series of legislative restrictions and political assumptions inherited from the Vietnam and post-Vietnam years. It is in-

structive to note, for example, that regarding Angola—the first of the post-Vietnam conquests—the Clark Amendment prohibiting assistance to the opposition remains in effect, nearly a decade later.

Finally, Mr. Nixon argues that the wisest course is to avoid through pre-emption the problems that we encountered in Vietnam. In a final chapter, artfully and ambiguously titled “Third World War,” Mr. Nixon argues for a policy to attack the root economic causes of instability. He suggests that the United States support a “peaceful revolution” to satisfy the demands for change in Third World nations.

This is a compelling idea in theory. In practice, however, it amounts to little more than providing substantial new foreign assistance to many nations. In fairness, Mr. Nixon points to—but does not develop—the idea of a new, concerted public/private effort to achieve economic development in the Third World. Unless, however, this is predicated upon a fundamentally new version of foreign assistance, it seems doubtful that this will achieve its hoped-for results. In the past decade, foreign economic assistance has not succeeded in preventing numerous Soviet challenges. And advocates of military assistance have been unable to persuade the American people that our aid is an alternative, rather than a pathway, to future American military involvement.

At the same time that Mr. Nixon expresses concerns about the need for stability, he argues for change and growth. Can one have it both ways? Instability, he says, “is the Soviet Union’s most powerful ally in the Third World War.” But fear of instability and commitment to dynamic change do not necessarily fit well together. Perhaps what is required is a serious re-thinking of the relationship between political and economic change. Clearly, economic growth cannot occur in a context of poor political choice, including Marxist policies. Yet it is also clear that an increasingly powerful economic middle class cannot and should not be expected to refrain from exercising political power as well.

The United States has a strong, dynamic revolutionary heritage. As the Soviet Union has become an imperial power, with its own status quo to protect, perhaps there is an opportunity to accentuate this element of our national character. This will require not only a review of the past, but sound, creative, and persistent thinking about how to support both democratic evolution and democratic revolution in the future. 

Converging Neighbors

Distant Neighbors, by Alan Riding
(New York: Knopf, \$18.95).

Reviewed by Velma Montoya.

In asking us to regard Mexico as a “distant neighbor,” Alan Riding, former Mexico correspondent for the *New York Times*, aligns himself with those Mexican intellectual and political leaders who are anti-American, strongly nationalistic, and firm adherents of a politically centralized and economically interventionist state. Having appropriated to themselves the symbols of the Mexican Revolution, they accuse those who want to move towards a U.S.-type political system of being counter-revolutionary, un-Mexican, and a source of Mexico’s current political precariousness.

The maintenance of political stability in Mexico, argues Mr. Riding, hinges upon how its leadership responds to its expanded, and what he terms, “Westernized” middle class. He sees danger in the “Westernized” responses that have occurred and argues that if Mexico continues to reform in ways that make it less representative of “real Mexicans,” it will intensify “the contradictions within the country” and “risk a backlash from the past.”

But Mr. Riding’s own evidence in-

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icates that such distinctions are not easy to make. Though Mexico remains profoundly different from the United States, Mexican society has been becoming more like that of the United States. *Converging Neighbors* appears a more appropriate title than *Distant Neighbors*.

In popular culture, for example, Mr. Riding reports that Mexico, like the United States, has experienced a revolution in mass communications, becoming a nation of television watchers. As in the United States, TV is now the principal influence on the cultural, political, and economic attitudes of the Mexican population. In addition, Mexican and U.S. viewers watch many of the same U.S.-produced popular entertainment programs: the favorite TV personalities of young Mexican boys are Superman, Spiderman, and Batman, and of young girls, Wonderwoman. Football and baseball enjoy more Mexican airtime than soccer.

Problems of Technocracy

One politically important example of convergence is the emergence of the Mexican middle class. Virtually non-existent in the early 20th century, it has grown to roughly one-fifth of the population today. Like recent trends in the United States, this group—Mr. Riding calls them Mexico's "Americanized minority"—recently has been moving politically rightward. It seeks to liberalize Mexico's politically and economically centralized government, in part, says Mr. Riding, via its own opposition party, Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN). In northern Mexico, the PAN recently won an unprecedented string of municipal elections against the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional. The PRI has never lost a presidential election since its creation in the wake of the 1910 Revolution, controls all state governorships, and regularly wins an overwhelming majority of the other electoral positions on the national, state, and local levels. The PRI's authoritarianism, which has provided Mexico with a record for political stability with civilian rule unmatched in Latin Amer-

ica, is tempered by its "enormous capacity to negotiate" with its challengers, co-opting them in the process. Mr. Riding is justifiably concerned that this political sensitivity has been lessening with the recent tendency of Mexican presidents to surround themselves with politically inexperienced, often U.S.-educated, young technocrats, best personified by Mexico's current president, Miguel De la Madrid, who has a masters' degree in public administration from Harvard. Mr. Riding implicitly criticizes the De la Madrid administration for trying to make the system more decentralized and democratic on the American model. He suggests that the leaders return the system to its "peculiarly Mexican" centralized and authoritarian ways, selecting policies favoring Mexico's rural and urban poor who are unconcerned with "the trappings of Western democracy."

But it is in the economic sphere that Mexican-American convergence is most clear—and most important. The roots of Mexico's current political and economic difficulties lie in the late 1970s, when in response to rising energy prices, Mexico, like other Third World countries and many private corporations, borrowed heavily to invest in energy-oriented production equipment, machinery, and related infrastructure. This appeared profitable at the time, but Mexico's dependence on the U.S. market for its exports left it particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in the American economy. Then, in 1981 and the first half of 1982, the U.S. Federal Reserve imposed an excessively restrictive monetary policy, provoking a deep U.S. recession. As a consequence, oil prices tumbled, and Mexico found itself stuck with a lot of now-useless machinery and a massive external debt. Today it totals about \$100 billion and is growing.


President De la Madrid readily accepted the International Monetary Fund's approach to helping Mexico repay her foreign debt, making Mexico a case study of Fund solutions. IMF policies encourage debt-laden

governments to reduce inflation by restricting the domestic money supply, and to narrow budget deficits by lowering imports and domestic subsidies and raising exports and domestic taxes.

Under this prescription, Mexico's inflation has been slowed, as has its budget deficit, but at the expense of growth. According to Mr. Riding, Mexico's deficit was reduced by steadily raising the prices of many government-provided goods and services, including such necessities as corn tortillas, electricity, telephones, and water; by postponing all major investments; and by raising some taxes. Indeed, the De la Madrid administration has won accolades from abroad for deflating the economy and reducing spending without widespread political unrest.

However, while Mexico has succeeded in making its annual interest payments of \$12-\$16 billion, such continued yearly capital outflows through the rest of the decade will retard domestic economic growth. Mexico's "rescue" will require prolonged, severe sacrifice by its people, including its increasingly vocal middle class and its poor majority, who live close to the margin and who already have endured stiff price increases in basic commodities.

Mr. Riding's criticism is misdirected. Mexico's emerging middle class is not the source of Mexico's distress, but rather its most articulate reminder. Mexico's current problems stem from the decisions of its politically insulated, technocratic leadership that blames the populism of the past for the state of the country and favors "a more scientific approach." Strong on orthodox theory and unfettered by the checks and balances of experienced politicians, these leaders chose to sacrifice industrial production and purchasing power for an improvement in the country's financial indicators.

De la Madrid should have considered alternatives to the recessionary policies of the IMF so as to maintain domestic economic growth. Economic stagnation is clearly the main cause of Mexico's current difficulties. 

DEPARTMENT OF DISINFORMATION

COPING WITH AFGHANISTAN

On December 27, 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, overthrowing the Communist but somewhat-independent-of-Moscow government of Hafizullah Amin and installing the puppet regime of Babrak Karmal. Since then, the country's population has fallen from 14 million to 9 million as the Soviets have waged a devastating scorched-earth battle against the heroic resistance of the Afghan people. As described by Helsinki Watch in 1984:

just about every conceivable human rights violation is occurring in Afghanistan, and on an enormous scale . . . The crimes of indiscriminate warfare are combined with the worst excesses of unbridled, state-sanctioned violence against the civilians. The ruthless savagery in the countryside is matched by the subjection of a terrorized urban population to arbitrary arrest, torture, imprisonment, and execution.

1. Withdrawal Symptoms

Armand Hammer, the American businessman who has had six decades of dealing with the Russians, says the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, told him the Soviet Union planned to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan, but did not specify when . . .

He said he has been a friend of Mr. Dobrynin for 15 years. The Ambassador 'has never lied to me,' Mr. Hammer added.

New York Times
February 1, 1980

In [George] Kennan's view the United States should not seek to increase the Soviet difficulty there through aid to rebel forces, but rather to explore the hints that the Soviets may seek a way out.

Washington Post
February 28, 1980

The Soviet Union wants very much to negotiate its way out of Afghanistan.

Ned Temko
Christian Science Monitor
December 22, 1982

The Western press has for the most part been denied access to Afghanistan, and so it can probably be excused for not giving this horrifying subject the coverage it deserves. Less defensibly, the press has been the conduit for disinformation that has had the effect of making the Soviet invasion more palatable and of discouraging aid to the Afghan resistance. This disinformation has taken five principal forms: the idea that the Soviets were on the verge of withdrawing their forces from Afghanistan, if only the West would cease supplying the resistance; the idea that Afghanistan was the Soviet Union's "Vietnam," a mistake that would do more harm than good to the Soviet leadership; the idea that the invasion was defensive; the idea the Karmal is a more benign ruler than Amin; and the idea that the Afghan resistance leaders are Islamic fanatics whose real interest is to establish an Iran-style theocracy and suppress women.

There are indications tonight that the Soviet Union may be looking for a way to disentangle itself from Afghanistan.

Dan Rather
"CBS Evening News"
January 25, 1983

As the diplomatic, military, and economic costs of its involvement have grown, Moscow has searched for a face-saving way out.

Selig S. Harrison
USA Today
December 27, 1983

NEARING A PULLOUT FROM AFGHANISTAN

The United Nations mediation effort on Afghanistan has now reached a make-or-break stage. Although the emerging agreement is hardly ideal, it may well offer the best hope for getting Soviet forces out and advancing American interests in Southwest Asia . . .

The issue before Washington is no longer whether a settlement is possible but whether the type of settlement envisioned would be acceptable. America, the Soviet

Union, and China would have to endorse the agreement before it could be implemented.

Selig S. Harrison
Foreign Policy
Summer 1983

2. Apocalypse Now II

Twenty million Afghans might be able to make life as uncomfortable for 100,000 Soviet soldiers as a similar number of Vietnamese did for half a million U.S. soldiers.

It is extremely difficult for a superpower to accept inability to master a much smaller country. The U.S. used up two Presidents in the attempt to pacify Vietnam.

If the men in the Kremlin read history wisely, they will profit from that U.S. experience and get out of Afghanistan before the price goes higher.

Joseph C. Harsch
Christian Science Monitor
February 8, 1980

3. Blame America First

... seen from the inside (of the Kremlin), the Soviet motivation seems more like militant defensiveness, caused by historic Russian fear of encirclement by hostile forces ...

A senior Western diplomat here noted that in a recent meeting, Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko seemed almost obsessed by a threat to Soviet security from the United States and China.

Craig R. Whitney
New York Times
February 16, 1980

The reason, I think, lay in its (the Soviet Union's) miscalculation of American behavior toward Iran ...

If American forces moved into Iran, the result could be the establishment of U.S. bases on the Soviet border, with a hostile China stretching along most of the remaining Soviet frontier in Asia, and only a turbulent Afghanistan in between.

To understand the Kremlin's obsession with this prospect, one need not look far into Soviet history, one need only recall Washington's own anxieties over a foreign presence in nearby Cuba ...

The answer comes back to the Soviet obsession with a foreign power's presence along its borders. In Soviet reckoning, the Russian troops poised in Afghanistan ensured that any American move in Iran would trigger these troops to take over Iran's north, adjoining the USSR ... and would bring about a partition of Iran a la Korea or Germany. It was a gamble based on the presumption that America would act.

Leo Gruliov
Christian Science Monitor
February 25, 1980

4. Karmal Knowledge

AFGHANS SAY SLAIN PRESIDENT CONSPIRED WITH REBEL LEADER AND C.I.A.

The Afghan Government convened a news conference here today to explain its repeated charges that the late

President Hafizullah Amin was a spy for the United States Central Intelligence Agency.

Interior Minister Sayed Mohammed Gulabzoi told reporters that President Amin had attempted to end the country's guerrilla war by conspiring with a Moslem rebel leader and the C.I.A.

Reuters, reprinted in
New York Times
January 22, 1980

Amin was a vain, ruthless man who alienated the populace ... The Russian bear swallowed Afghanistan in one gulp. The villainous Amin, who had ruled by the gun, died by the gun. To replace him, the Soviets installed Karmal.

Jack Anderson
Washington Post
January 13, 1980

'We will take the human approach, the democratic approach,' Karmal said, 'not like Amin, who wanted to crush everyone who disagreed with him. Our party will guide and lead, but we will not interfere.'

... the main reason Soviet leaders disliked Amin was that he was a free-wheeling nationalist ... who insisted on using brutal tactics that fueled anti-Soviet resistance.

Selig S. Harrison
Washington Post
May 13, 1984

[Karmal] has always had a grudging acceptance among educated Afghans as an intelligent 'moderate' Communist who has fought consistently against repressive policies.

Several non-Communists told me with conviction that life is better than it was under Amin and that they would rather have a man like Karmal, dedicated to modernizing the country, than some of the Islamic fundamentalist leaders based in Pakistan, whom they identify with a rigidly theocratic approach to social and economic issues.

Selig S. Harrison
Washington Post
May 13, 1984

5. Sunni Side

With the Islamic world in a sort of religious revival, the last thing the Soviets wanted was a fundamentalist Moslem government in Kabul. That might well have meant trouble among the 50 million Soviet Moslems ... So the Soviets brought in their tanks and helicopters.

Tom Wicker
New York Times
January 4, 1980

The actual reason for the Moslem opposition is not religion. Instead, the insurgents oppose land reforms, literacy campaigns, the establishment of rural health clinics, and the abolition of medieval restraints on women's rights—all of which whittle away at the power of the landlords and the religious aristocracy.

Naseem Jamali
The Guardian
May 16, 1979

[The Afghan guerrillas] proclaim themselves Islamic warriors. The largest of the guerrilla alliances is Islamic fundamentalist. Its closest model is Khomeini's Islamic Republic.

Charles Krauthammer
Washington Post
April 5, 1985

The Afghan government insists it wants to distribute land, spread literacy, and liberate women from the confines of Islam.

The rebels want to overthrow the Communists and turn Afghanistan into a fundamentalist Islamic nation.

Washington Times
June 22, 1983

... as in Iran the clergy has also opposed the emancipation of women. While the new government has tried to involve rural women in its literacy campaign, and has decreed reforms in marriage practices, this has provoked clerical opposition ...

Fred Halliday
New York Times
May 18, 1979

The Soviet Union is aware, they (United States intelligence sources) say, that about 70 percent of the Afghan rebels are fundamentalist Moslems and if the rebels were to triumph, the religious fervor could spread to the Moslems in Soviet Central Asia.

Other Iranian Moslem leaders [than Khomeini] ... have condemned the Communist Afghan government's war against Moslem insurgents, who want to set up an Islamic republic similar to Iran's.

William Branigin
Washington Post
January 9, 1980

Land reform attempts undermined their village chiefs. Portraits of Lenin threatened their religious leaders. But it was the Kabul revolutionary government's granting of new rights to women that pushed orthodox Moslem men into picking up their guns ...

'The moment the women were invited to the meeting, the fighting started,' said Zamari (a former middle school headmaster and refugee leader).

James P. Sterba
New York Times
February 9, 1980

Veil of Tears

The preposterousness of many of these assertions has been clearly revealed by the passage of time. It has been five and a half years since the Soviet invasion, and yet contrary to Armand Hammer and Selig Harrison, over 110,000 Soviet troops are still in the country. Contrary to the predictions of the "Vietnam" analogy, no Soviet government has fallen over the conduct of the Afghanistan war as Lyndon Johnson fell over Indochina. There have been no antiwar demonstrations at the University of Lenin-grad. The argument that the invasion was defensive collapsed when the Soviets quickly placed offensive weaponry on Afghan airfields. And the idea that Babrak Karmal is somehow less brutal than his predecessor would be disputed by the five million refugees who have fled Afghanistan since he was installed in office.

It is a bit more difficult to counter the claim that the resistance leaders are Moslem theocrats. Some of them are. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is leader of the Hezb-e-Islami Party, based in Peshawar, Pakistan, which is the political organ of about 10,000 guerrillas fighting in Afghanistan.

He is generously financed and supplied by Libya's Qaddafi, Iran's Khomeini, and Yasser Arafat. And his desire for an Islamic government like Iran's is frequently cited in the Western press.

But Gulbuddin is only one of many resistance leaders. It is estimated that 150,000 to 200,000 Afghans are fighting the regime of Babrak Karmal full time. And other commanders of the resistance, among them Ahmed Shah Massoud, Sayed Jaglan, Wali Khan, Abdul Haq, Amin Wardak, Qari Baba Taj Mohammed, Sayed Mokhtar, and Said Azim, have all kept their distance from Khomeini. Many of these chieftains are devout Moslems who pray five times a day and who might want the enactment of Islamic laws like those in Pakistan. But in Sunni Afghanistan, there is no tradition of giving secular authority to religious leaders. Says Abdul Wakil, director of Refugee/Mujahedeen Relief for the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan, "as badly as my people hate the Russians, they hate Iran's fanaticism."

Naresh Krishnamoorti


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A STAR IS BORN

Strategic Defense Has Unconditional Support

A Policy Review/Sindlinger Poll

After two decades of political disharmony, Americans are reaching a new consensus on some of the most important defense issues facing the United States since the birth of the bomb. Americans overwhelmingly support President Reagan's proposed Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), also known as "Star Wars." Eighty-five percent favor developing a missile defense "even if it cannot protect everyone," and 69 percent even if it means "withdrawing from our existing arms control agreements" with the Soviets. Nearly three-quarters of Americans believe that a Star Wars system would "make the U.S. more secure."

As a solution to the current Soviet advantage in land-based missiles, more Americans favor developing the President's Strategic Defense system to a U.S. missile buildup or to a U.S./Soviet nuclear freeze.

These are the results of the *Policy Review/Sindlinger Poll* conducted between May 7 and May 27. Sindlinger & Company, Inc. of Media/Wallingford, PA surveyed 2,318 Americans in proportion to the population of the 48 contiguous states. Ninety-five percent of the original sample was interviewed.

The opinion poll also revealed that a very large number of Americans are not aware of a number of critical strategic advantages enjoyed by the Soviets. For example, 43 percent do not realize that the United States cannot protect itself from a Soviet nuclear attack, and two-thirds do not realize that Moscow is ahead of the United States in developing a Star Wars system.

The poll found that Americans strongly disapprove of current U.S. nuclear strategy, which relies on the threat of massive retaliation to deter a Soviet nuclear attack, while leaving the U.S. defenseless against a Soviet nuclear attack. Sixty-one percent believe that the current U.S. nuclear

strategy is "dangerous and does not sufficiently defend" the United States and 74 percent believe it "needs to be changed." If a missile defense can be made to work, 77 percent favor developing and deploying it over continued reliance on our current nuclear strategy.

In findings significant for the U.S.-Soviet arms talks and the status of the 1979 SALT II treaty, 90 percent favor continued arms talks with Moscow. Yet 68 percent of Americans believe that the Soviet Union "cannot be trusted" most of the time. In the event of Soviet cheating on arms control treaties, 92 percent believe the Reagan Administration should publicize the Soviet violations and 62 percent would favor an increase in U.S. defense preparations. Some 85 percent of Americans would not consider it a foreign policy failure were no agreement reached at the Geneva talks. As for SALT II, which expires at the end of this year, 51 percent oppose U.S. compliance beyond that date; only 43 percent favor U.S. compliance.

Americans appear to support the arms control process, as long as it does not weaken U.S. security. For example, 69 percent believe the United States should build the President's Strategic Defense system even if it involved "withdrawing from our existing arms control agreements" with the Soviet Union.

The poll found that American females are consistently more hawkish than their male counterparts. For example, when the Soviet Union violates its arms control treaties, only eight percent of American men would favor discontinuing further arms control talks, compared to 26 percent of American women. Similarly, while 96 percent of American men agree that the United States should engage in arms control talks with the Soviets, only 85 percent of American women do.

Part I. Arms Control

- 1) How do you rate your trust in the Soviet Union to live up to arms control agreements with the United States?
- | | |
|--|------|
| The Soviet Union is very trustworthy most of the time | 2.5 |
| The Soviet Union is trustworthy about half of the time | 26.0 |
| The Soviet Union cannot be trusted most of the time | 68.0 |
| No opinion | 3.5 |


- 2) Do you agree that the United States should currently be engaged in arms control talks with the Soviet Union?

Agree	90.1
Disagree	7.1
No opinion	2.8

- 3) In the future, if the Soviet Union violates arms control treaties it has signed with the United States, do you believe we should . . .


Trusting Moscow

How do you rate your trust in the Soviet Union to live up to arms control agreements with the United States?




Abiding By Salt II

Do you recommend that the United States continue to abide by the terms of the unratified 1979 SALT II treaty that expires later this year?




Geneva Negotiations

If no arms control agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at the ongoing Geneva arms control talks would you consider this a failure in our foreign policy?




Opposing MAD

Do you think that the current U.S. strategy of threatening the Soviet Union with massive retaliation to defend the United States needs to be changed?




U.S. Security

Would the development of "Star Wars" make the United States more secure or less secure?



Star Wars vs. Arms Control

Would you favor U.S. development and eventual deployment of a "Star Wars" defense system even if it meant that the U.S. would have to renegotiate or withdraw from our existing arms control agreement with the Soviet Union?



Graphs for Policy Review by Karen Portik.

A. immediately withdraw from the treaty?	
Yes	37.5
No	54.0
No opinion	8.4
B. increase our defense preparation?	
Yes	61.5
No	29.2
No opinion	9.3
C. publicize the Soviet violations?	
Yes	92.3
No	4.1
No opinion	3.6
D. discontinue further arms control talks with the Soviets?	
Yes	17.6
No	79.6
No opinion	2.9
E. continue to abide by the treaty?	
Yes	64.1
No	30.5
No opinion	5.4

4) Although the United States never ratified the 1979 Salt II arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, our nation has abided by the terms of the treaty for the past five years. This treaty expires later this year, and it is

known that the Soviet Union has violated the treaty in five key areas. Do you recommend that the United States should continue to abide by the terms of the treaty?

Yes	42.9
No	51.0
No opinion	6.1

5) If no arms control agreement can be reached between the United States and the Soviet Union at the ongoing Geneva arms control talks, would you consider this a failure in our foreign policy?

Yes	10.2
No	55.9
No opinion	4.5
Other (Soviets Union's fault)	29.3

Part II: "Star Wars"

1) Can the United States protect itself now from incoming nuclear missiles?

Yes	8.9
No	57.1
Not sure	17.6
Hope so	16.4

2) Current U.S. policy is to deter a Soviet nuclear attack by threatening massive retaliation against the Soviet Union, while at the same time leaving the United States defenseless against a Soviet nuclear attack. This strategy is often referred to as MAD (which stands for Mutual Assured Destruction), or as the "balance of terror." Which one of the following statements do you feel most comfortable with?

- A. The current strategy does not need to be changed.
 - No need to change 11.7
 - Needs to be changed 74.4
 - No opinion 13.9
- B. The current strategy is dangerous and does not sufficiently defend the United States.
 - Yes 61.2
 - No 29.8
 - No opinion 9.0

3) If "Star Wars" can be made to work, and there is a choice between the current mutual assured destruction ("balance of terror") strategy or the new plan of "Star Wars," which would be your number one choice?

- A. Keep the current strategy?
 - Yes 10.2
 - No 80.0
 - No opinion 9.8
- B. Or develop and deploy "Star Wars?"
 - Yes 77.0
 - No 10.0
 - No opinion 13.0

4) Under what conditions would you support the President's Strategic Defense proposal?

- A. If it could destroy almost all incoming missiles?
 - Yes 84.4
 - No 10.7
 - Not sure 4.9
- B. If it could destroy at least half of incoming missiles?
 - Yes 71.9
 - No 19.4
 - Not sure 8.7
- C. If it defends only U.S. retaliatory missiles?
 - Yes 61.5
 - No 26.8
 - Not sure 11.7

5) Would the development of "Star Wars" (the President's Strategic Defense strategy) make the United States more secure or less secure?

More secure 73.1

- Less secure 8.7
- No difference 9.7
- Not sure 8.6

6) Currently the civilian population of the United States has no complete defense against any enemy nuclear attack. Even if a perfect defense cannot be developed, would you favor and support developing a system which protects most of our population, even if it cannot protect everyone?

- Yes 84.7
- No 2.4
- Not sure 12.9

7) According to the best information available, the Soviet Union now has 1,398 land-based missiles which could reach the United States. On the other hand, we have 1,030 land-based missiles which could reach the Soviet Union. Which of these conditions would make you more secure?

- A. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to freeze their nuclear arsenals at present levels?
 - Yes 47.5
 - No 49.7
 - No opinion 2.7
- B. The U.S. built the President's strategic defense system?
 - Yes 64.8
 - No 16.3
 - No opinion 18.9
- C. The U.S. built more missiles to equal the Soviet Union?
 - Yes 36.4
 - No 24.5
 - No opinion 39.1

8) Some people say that in the development of any strategic defense system that could destroy incoming missiles, the Soviet Union is far ahead of the United States, while other people are saying that the United States is far ahead of the Soviet Union. What do you think?

- Soviet Union ahead 33.6
- Soviet Union behind 26.3
- Both the same 17.0
- Not sure 23.1

9) Would you favor development and an eventual deployment of a "Star Wars" defense system for the United States, even if it meant that the U.S. would have to renegotiate or withdraw from our existing arms control agreements with the Soviet Union?

- Yes 69.1
- No 6.7
- No opinion 24.2

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Dinesh D'Souza

