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NEW MEASURES NEEDED TO FIGHT ANTI-U.S. SPYING

INTRODUCTION

Devastating security breaches at American diplomatic installations abroad have highlighted once again the unrelenting threat of Soviet espionage. Coupled with the threat itself has been near criminal neglect by top United States diplomatic officials of even the most routine security precautions.

These events abroad, however, should not divert attention from one blunt fact: the major components of Soviet espionage targeted against the U.S. are located in the U.S.--at Soviet and Soviet bloc diplomatic and United Nations Missions, within the United Nations Secretariat, at commercial offices and news bureaus, and among the thousands of Soviet and Soviet bloc visitors who come to the United States each year.

Among the most important covers for Soviet and Soviet bloc espionage is U.N. Headquarters in Manhattan. Examples:

◆◆ On May 20, 1978, two Soviet employees of the U.N. Secretariat, Valdik Enger and Rudolph Chernyayev, and one employee of the Soviet Mission to the U.N., Vladimir Zinyakin, were expelled from the U.S. on charges of trying to buy information about American submarine defenses.

◆◆ On April 21, 1983, two "diplomats" at the Soviet U.N. Mission, Aleksandr Mikheyev and Oleg Konstantinov, along with a Washington-based Soviet "diplomat," were expelled from the U.S. on charges of espionage. All were trying to obtain secret information about U.S. weapons technology.

◆◆ On August 23, 1986, Gennadiy Zakharov, a KGB operative working as a science officer in the U.N. Secretariat, was arrested for purchasing classified documents on robotics, computers, and artificial intelligence from an undercover informant.

◆◆ A 1986 Senate Intelligence Committee Report¹ identified Vladimir Kolesnikov, Special Assistant to U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, as a China expert for the KGB, the Soviet intelligence and security service.

◆◆ Previous Senate reports² identified other U.N. posts as "traditional" KGB jobs. These include the post of External Relations Director of the U.N. Department of Public Information.

The abundant evidence reveals how much Moscow uses the U.N. Secretariat for hard-target espionage (buying or stealing classified government documents), for acquiring sensitive scientific and technical information, and for furthering Soviet disinformation and propaganda themes. These activities, however, are only part of the problem. Other documented cases of Soviet bloc espionage in the U.S. include agents as diverse as a California-based Polish trade official engaged in procuring top-secret information on U.S. nuclear weapons and a West German auto mechanic arrested in Florida for buying U.S. Army documents for sale to East Germany.

It is now clear, moreover, that the Soviets have been just as active at such U.N. specialized agencies as the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna and the United Nations Environment Program in Nairobi. This problem appeared so serious that the CIA investigated it, and, in a still classified report, details the use of such agencies by the Soviets for large-scale scientific and technical espionage.

The Reagan Administration, working with bipartisan majorities in Congress, has begun the critical job of rebuilding U.S. defenses against this multifaceted espionage threat. Major initiatives taken since 1981 include reductions in Soviet personnel at Soviet diplomatic installations, the imposition of travel restrictions on Soviet and Eastern bloc diplomats in the U.S., the creation of an Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) within the State Department to coordinate security programs, and increased funding and training for FBI counterintelligence agents. This combination of legislative and executive action is paying dividends. Says a senior FBI official: "We've hurt them."

They have not, however, been hurt enough. If the U.S. is more effectively to counter espionage inside the U.S., steps are needed. Among them:

1) **Streamlining a number of OFM Regulations**, such as the travel restrictions that currently apply to most Soviet bloc nations;

1. "Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs," Report 99-252 of the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 23.

2. See, for example, "Soviet Presence in the U.N. Secretariat," Report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, S. RPT. 99-52, United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985).

- 2) **Extending the reach** of such OFM regulations as "closed area" restrictions;
- 3) **Increasing pressure for strict enforcement** by the U.N. of the U.N.'s own regulations on Soviet and bloc personnel in the U.N. Secretariat;
- 4) **Tightening surveillance** of non-Soviet bloc targets, especially the People's Republic of China, and non-diplomatic Soviet bloc personnel, such as trade and press representatives; and
- 5) **Expanding the OFM authority** to coordinate U.S. policy toward diplomatic installations.

Though these steps cannot fully insure the U.S. against damage caused by U.S.-and U.N.-based espionage, they will enhance the odds in favor of U.S. counterintelligence.

THE SOVIET BLOC

An October 1986 Report of the Senate Intelligence Committee states: "Among foreign intelligence services, those of the Soviet Union represent by far the most significant intelligence threat in terms of size, ability and intent to act against U.S. interests."³

Soviet espionage in the U.S. (and Canada) is planned and conducted by the First Department of the First Chief Directorate of the KGB, by other operational components of the KGB, and by the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence agency. Their respective responsibilities are described in a report on foreign espionage in the U.S., recently transmitted to Congress by Ronald Reagan. It says: "Within the Soviet services, GRU personnel are targeted primarily against strategic military intelligence while KGB personnel are assigned to one of four operational components or "lines"--Political (PR), Counterintelligence (KR), Scientific and Technical (X), or Illegals Support (N)."⁴

While the tasks of the first three KGB "lines" are clear, the fourth, Line N, comprises what the presidential report identifies as "a small group involved in the operations of illegals, that is, intelligence officers and agents infiltrated into a foreign country under false circumstances for intelligence purposes."⁵ An example of a successful "illegal" operation is the case of Karl Koecher, a U.S. citizen of Czech origin who "emigrated" to the U.S. in the 1960s and worked for the CIA as a translator in the 1970s--before being uncovered as a Czech "illegal" dispatched to the U.S. to penetrate American intelligence agencies.

3. 1986 Select Committee Report, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

4. "A Report on Foreign Espionage in the United States, United States Department of State (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 4.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Dangerous East Germans and Cubans. The Soviets are aided in their espionage activities by the foreign intelligence services of their Warsaw Pact allies and by the Cuban intelligence service, the Direccion General de Inteligencia (General Directorate of Intelligence), generally known as the DGI. The capabilities of these services vary. Particularly dangerous, explains the presidential report, are the East German service (MfS), which has run several successful operations involving "illegals," and the Cuban DGI, whose "usefulness to the KGB...cannot be underrated."⁶

Since the KGB plays a major role in operations of most of these services, the Soviets have been able to develop particular areas of specialization. Example: Romanian spies in the U.S., explains the report, "...tend to concentrate on gathering political and economic information," while the U.S.-based East Germans' "central focus" is on "a broad variety of S&T [scientific and technical] information."⁷

Some Soviet bloc espionage services cooperate with Moscow more closely than others. Observes Jeffrey Richelson, a professor of government at American University: "The relationship between the Soviet intelligence and security services and those of the Warsaw Pact nations and Cuba vary with the particular service, the Bulgarians and the Cubans being the most and the Romanians the least tightly tied."⁸ Despite this uneven cooperation and the inevitable friction between the Soviets and these subordinate services, significant information collected by Soviet bloc intelligence officers almost certainly is shared with Moscow. The Polish intelligence officers, for example, who supervised James Harper, the California-based engineer who provided the Poles with classified documents pertaining to U.S. strategic nuclear forces, received personal letters of commendation from Yuri Andropov, who then was KGB boss.

Spies at U.N. Headquarters

American counterintelligence against U.S.-based Soviet and Soviet bloc espionage is made particularly tough by the fact that these countries use for espionage tasks their nationals in the U.S who are not attached to embassies or diplomatic missions.

By far the largest such permanent concentration of Soviet and Soviet bloc intelligence officers is at the U.N. Secretariat in Manhattan, where 265 Soviets and 33 Soviet bloc nationals are currently employed. The Senate Intelligence Committee confirms that between 30 and 40 percent of these ostensible "international civil servants" are in fact officers of the KGB, GRU, or their Soviet bloc equivalents; all are subject to cooptation and "spot" use by bloc services. As the current Director of Central Intelligence, William Webster, stated in a speech when he was FBI Director:

6. Harry Rositzke, The KGB (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1981), p. 225.

7. 1987 State Department Report, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.

8. Jeffrey Richelson, Sword and Shield: Soviet Intelligence and Security Apparatus (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1986), p. 212.

"...the U.N. is indeed a rat warren of intelligence operatives and needs to be severely constrained."⁹

The value of U.N. Headquarters in New York to the Soviet bloc goes far beyond using its U.N. employees for intelligence collection. Numerous studies indicate that, through a series of bureaucratic maneuvers, with the acquiescence of top U.N. officials, Moscow virtually now controls entire segments of the U.N. bureaucracy.¹⁰ This allows the Kremlin, for example, frequently to include Soviet disinformation and propaganda themes in U.N. publications and activities, giving such themes legitimacy they could never enjoy if datelined Moscow. It is for this reason that the "non-militarization of space" was a major theme of the U.N.'s 1986 International Year of Peace program; this theme is at the core of Moscow's worldwide propaganda effort to derail the Reagan Administration's Strategic Defense Initiative. The U.N.'s International Year of Peace program was run by a Pole.¹¹

Recruiting Third World Citizens. The U.N. community itself is a prime intelligence target for the Soviet bloc. With its thousands of accredited diplomats representing virtually every country, the U.N. offers an ideal setting to identify and recruit Third World citizens, many of whom will return home to assume high positions in their national bureaucracies or governments. Many already have access to sensitive information. Even Western diplomats are targets. Example: Norwegian diplomat Arne Treholt, who served as a high-ranking official of the Norwegian U.N. Mission, was arrested in 1984 and identified as a longtime Soviet agent. U.S. officials confirm that a significant number of non-Soviet bloc U.N. employees are Soviet agents or agents of influence. A top Soviet official boasted to Arkady Shevchenko, a former Soviet citizen who was U.N. Under-Secretary General when he defected to the U.S. in 1978, that the U.N. "is our best watch-tower in the West."¹²

Non-Diplomatic Covers

The Soviets and their bloc allies make espionage use of other permanent non-diplomatic establishments in the U.S. All the Warsaw Pact countries, for example, have trade or commercial offices in the U.S., not only in major cities like New York and San Francisco, but also in Charlotte, North Carolina and Columbus, Ohio, and other regional centers. Most Soviet bloc nations also have established so-called news bureaus in the U.S.; these routinely are used for espionage purposes, as the

9. Remarks by William H. Webster, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the Society of Former Special Agents Annual Convention, Boston Massachusetts, September 29, 1986, p. 8.

10. See, for example, Juliana Geran Pilon, "Moscow's U.N. Outpost," Heritage Foundation Background No. 307, November 22, 1983, and Charles M. Lichenstein, "By Breaking the Rules, Moscow Keeps A Tight Grip on the U.N.," Heritage Foundation Background No. 526, July 23, 1986.

11. For an excellent overview of Soviet disinformation techniques, see Richard H. Shultz and Roy Godson, Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey, 1984).

12. Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), p. 237.

public expulsions of TASS News Agency personnel shows.¹³ As the Soviet and Soviet bloc intelligence officers operating under U.N. cover, intelligence officers nominally employed by TASS or AMTORG (the Soviet trade agency) have the advantage of creating less suspicion in the minds of potential targets than Soviet diplomats would.

Soviet Scientists as Spies. All Soviet bloc intelligence services use visiting delegations in the U.S. as cover for intelligence officers. Soviet bloc security personnel accompany every delegation visiting the U.S. to prevent defection or "unauthorized contact" with U.S. citizens. Members of such delegations also are used for "offensive" purposes. Reports the Senate Intelligence Committee: "In one case cited in KGB training manuals, an intelligence officer spotted a possible recruit while serving as interpreter for a Soviet scientist visiting the laboratory of a private U.S. company. The KGB account states that the scientist was aware of his interpreter's intelligence function and actively assisted him in that role."¹⁴

Effective U.S. counterintelligence is thus extremely difficult, because every national from the Soviet bloc in the U.S. for whatever apparent reason, as well as the thousands of bloc visitors to the U.S., must be considered a potential agent. A cursory examination of the numbers involved (see Appendix), as well as the range of possible intelligence activities, from traditional scientific, military, political, and economic to disinformation and "active measures," make the job seem nearly impossible.

NON-SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HOSTILE TO THE U.S.

While the Soviet and Eastern bloc services represent by far the most serious intelligence threat to the U.S., the activities of other hostile services in the U.S. cannot be ignored. Two threats are of primary importance: the intelligence activities of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the espionage efforts of other hostile countries, including non-Warsaw Pact Communist states and states supporting terrorism.

Countering PRC espionage in the U.S. is difficult. The reasons: 1) good relations and expanding economic and military cooperation between the U.S. and PRC have made Washington reluctant to raise sensitive intelligence issues; 2) the U.S. seems to know very little about PRC intelligence, not even, it appears, how many intelligence services Beijing maintains; and 3) the huge PRC presence in the U.S. give PRC personnel excellent opportunities for espionage.

Chinese Espionage. Explains an FBI official: "The PRC is working on the 50 year plan." Meaning: The Chinese have built their espionage apparatus in the U.S. slowly. This apparatus focuses, according to the Senate report, "primarily on

13. See "Expulsions of Soviet Officials, 1986," Foreign Affairs Note, United States Department of State (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1987), pp. 4-11.

14. 1986 Senate Select Committee Report, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.

[obtaining] advanced technology not approved for release so as to further PRC military and economic modernization in the 1990's and beyond." Though the PRC does not engage in the systematic subversion and disinformation characteristic of the Soviets, continues the report, "...the PRC intelligence threat continues to be significant...and justifies alerting American citizens to the current risks."¹⁵

Within the context of the valuable U.S.-PRC strategic relationship, therefore, Washington must do more to monitor and restrict PRC espionage.

Generally, the activities of the intelligence services of such nations as Vietnam, Libya, and Afghanistan pose only a relatively small long-term threat to U.S. national security. For one thing, their known involvement with terrorism makes the U.S. especially vigilant in monitoring their activities in America. For another, North Korea, Iran, and several other hostile countries are not allowed to have diplomatic relations with the U.S. In addition, they have relatively few diplomats at their U.N. Missions and in the U.N. Secretariat. And most of these countries lack sophisticated foreign intelligence services and do not conduct large-scale traditional intelligence collection operations.

Most of these countries, moreover, spend a large part of their intelligence resources simply monitoring the activities of their U.S.-based emigres.

RECIPROcity CONSIDERATIONS

Washington's policy toward diplomatic installations in the U.S. is based generally on the principle of reciprocity. This means that the U.S. will extend to the U.S.-based diplomats of a particular country the same treatment and conditions that apply to U.S. diplomats in that country. With respect to most countries, full reciprocity is in force. Example: because the USSR places stringent travel restrictions on American diplomats in Moscow, Washington places similar restrictions on Soviet diplomats in the U.S.

In terms of U.S. counterintelligence capabilities, the generally sound policy of reciprocity is flawed. First, it is not feasible to compare the privileges and immunities granted American diplomats in Soviet bloc countries, especially the USSR, with those granted bloc personnel in the U.S. America is an open society committed to freedom of information and movement. The Soviet bloc makes good use of the inherent nature of U.S. society, by collecting huge amounts of information from "open" sources¹⁶ and by playing on instinctive U.S. resistance to the imposition of restrictions on free movement. In the USSR, by contrast, even if there were no restrictions on the movement of U.S. personnel, all such movement would be known and reported to the Kremlin, due to the constant surveillance and

15. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

16. Intelligence professionals and scholars estimate that between 70 and 90 percent of all information gathered by the Soviet intelligence services in the U.S. comes from open, public sources. See, for example, "Remarks by William Webster before the Standing Committee on Law and National Security of the ABA," Federation Bureau of Investigation, Washington, D.C., December 1, 1985, p. 7.

harassment that all foreigners suffer there. The situation, in short, is inherently unequal and asymmetrical.

Flawed Reciprocity. The second major flaw in the policy of reciprocity is that U.N. Headquarters is in New York City; there is no equivalent facility anywhere in the Soviet bloc. This gives the Soviets the ability to place some 450 "diplomats" in the U.S. who otherwise would not be there. U.S. intelligence enjoys no reciprocal opportunity. In fact, while there are major U.N. offices in Rome, Vienna, Geneva, Nairobi, Paris, and other large cities, there are none in any Soviet bloc nation.

A case can be made that reciprocity helps to ensure acceptable status and working conditions for U.S. diplomats in the Soviet bloc countries and also offers the U.S. intelligence collection opportunities abroad. But concerns for U.S. diplomats overseas must not deter Washington from imposing and implementing whatever restrictions on Soviet bloc personnel are necessary to deter espionage in the U.S. This is especially necessary in light of the tremendous damage done to U.S. national security by U.S.-based Soviet spies, and in light of the inherently unreciprocal situation as it affects intelligence collection opportunities.

U.S. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY PROGRAMS

The Congress in 1982 established the Office of Foreign Missions within the State Department. This was one of the most important recent U.S. anti-espionage initiatives. The OFM has statutory authority to "assist agencies of Federal, State, and municipal government with regard to ascertaining and according benefits, privileges, and immunities to which a foreign mission may be entitled."¹⁷ By placing U.N. Missions under OFM authority, Congress and the Reagan Administration openly admitted the problems caused by U.N.-based espionage.

In 1985, the Roth/Hyde Amendment to the Foreign Missions Act expanded OFM's authority by making all restrictions that apply to diplomatic missions of particular countries applicable also to that country's nationals in the U.N. Secretariat. The Amendment's intent was to curtail the espionage activities of U.N. employees, primarily those from the Soviet bloc.

The most important OFM anti-espionage regulations restrict the travel of foreign diplomats and nationals in the U.S. These are now imposed, on the basis of reciprocity, on nationals of 15 countries.¹⁸ The tightest cover all Soviet nationals in the U.S., with the strange exception of certain trade officials. Restricted Soviets who now want to travel beyond a 25-mile radius of their base city must make their arrangements through the OFM Travel Service Bureau. OFM reserves the right to

17. Section 203(c), (1), Title II of the State Department Basic Authorities Act (As Added by the Foreign Missions Act), as cited in *Compilation of Intelligence Laws and Related Laws and Executive Orders of Interest to the National Intelligence Community*, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives (G-45-8820), U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1985.

18. Afghanistan, Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Iran, Libya, Mongolia, North Korea, Poland, USSR, Ukraine, Vietnam.

deny travel permission and insists that travel requests be filed 48 hours in advance, to permit checking with the FBI on the backgrounds of those wishing to travel. Since the Soviets "close" parts of the USSR to Americans, the U.S. reciprocally "closes" certain American cities and areas to Soviet travel.

Violating the Roth/Hyde Law. There are, however, serious inconsistencies in the application of these restrictions. These inconsistencies are particularly significant since the State Department has acknowledged publicly that most Soviet bloc intelligence services use their travel privileges for intelligence activities. In violation of the Roth/Hyde Amendment, for example, Soviet U.N. employees travel to "closed areas" in the U.S. As for Moscow's Soviet bloc allies, the U.S. regulations are less restrictive and coherent than those imposed on the Soviets. Though all Polish, Bulgarian, Czech, and East German personnel in the U.S. (except certain commercial and trade officials) must book travel through OFM, they can travel to "closed areas" and beyond the 25-mile radius of their base. They can do so because Washington insists on honoring what has become an asymmetrical reciprocity.

What is worse, Hungarian and Romanian officials, who cooperate extensively with the KGB, are subject to no restrictions at all. Although the Cubans at the U.N. are under the 25-mile restriction, members of their Interest Section in Washington can travel anywhere they desire in the U.S. These restrictions, distressingly, apply only to travel by commercial carrier; any national of any of Moscow's Warsaw Pact allies in New York or Washington, can get into their cars and drive where they want--to the submarine construction facility at Groton, Connecticut, or to the Navy base at Newport News, Virginia, for example.

Lack of FBI Manpower. Not only does the U.S. apply its restrictions inconsistently, but Soviet bloc personnel probably violate the restrictions. Even if all of the FBI's 9,220 agents were detailed to counterintelligence, the Bureau would still not have the manpower to ensure that the roughly 110,000 nationals of communist countries in the U.S. at any given time do not violate the restrictions.¹⁹ This is despite completion of the FBI's five-year agent expansion program and increased training and expertise in counterintelligence techniques. Even with a one to one ratio, tight surveillance would be impossible; a single FBI agent cannot keep tabs on a potential spy.

Though they now have some means of monitoring hostile intelligence officers, some counterintelligence officials still are skeptical of the efficacy of travel restrictions in curtailing espionage, particularly in light of their inconsistent application. Says one official: "These guys will always find a way to go about their business despite these inconveniences." Yet, combining tighter travel restrictions with strict limits on the numbers of potential hostile agents may deter Soviet bloc espionage more effectively. No actions have done as much to wound the Soviet intelligence apparatus in the U.S. as Ronald Reagan's expulsion last September of 25 Soviets from the Soviet U.N. Mission and October's expulsion of 60 Soviets from their Washington Embassy and San Francisco consulate.

19. Figure cited in Remarks by William H. Webster, footnote 9, above.

In the U.N. expulsion, the entire KGB and GRU leadership was sent back to Russia, along with the ablest professional intelligence officers. In the Washington case, the Soviet technicians manning their technical collection apparatus were expelled along with the leadership cadre. Moscow's offices in New York City and Washington, moreover, now will be subject to mandatory ceilings on the number of Soviets allowed at them--170 in New York (down from 275) and 251 in Washington and San Francisco (down from roughly 320).

Paying a Heavy Price for the U.N. No such actions can be taken with respect to the U.N. Secretariat, where 265 Soviets currently are employed. Although the U.S. does deny visas to known intelligence officers from time to time, the Soviets are entitled to send their citizens to serve at the Secretariat. This is one of the heavy prices that the U.S. pays for hosting the U.N. Moscow, however, is not entitled to use these individuals to control entire components of the U.N., nor does Moscow have any right to house its international civil servants in a compound protected by diplomatic immunity--as it currently does.

The U.S. can and should take steps to eliminate the manifold Soviet abuses of the U.N. The U.S. also can take measures better to protect its own secrets, to ensure that individuals with access to classified information are not security risks, and to alert all such individuals to the dangers of espionage. The most serious damage to U.S. national security has been from those already willingly working with hostile services. At last there are signs that Washington is taking more seriously the existing components of a "good defense." An encouraging example of this is the FBI's Development of Defense Counterintelligence Awareness program, or DECA, which alerts employees of U.S. defense contractors to the dangers of espionage.

Perhaps most important, Washington can try to turn the large hostile presence in the U.S. to American advantage by operations to penetrate the hostile services and known arenas of Soviet activity. The secret defection "in-place" of Arkady Shevchenko three years before it was made public, allowed him to keep his top U.N. job for that period. In that time, the U.S. learned much about Moscow's systematic use of the U.N. as cover for espionage. There is reason to believe that the U.S. has had similar success with other Soviet bloc intelligence officers, particularly during the early 1980s, when there was widespread disaffection in parts of Eastern Europe.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The U.S. probably will never be able to protect itself completely from hostile intelligence services. Washington, however, can take steps to reduce the dangers from U.N.-based espionage and other activities of hostile intelligence services. These steps include:

◆◆ Increased funding for FBI manpower, training, and technical support. FBI agents in the New York Field Office should receive "hardship post" adjustments, particularly housing allowances to offset New York City's towering rents.

◆◆ Authority for the FBI and other intelligence agencies to pursue offensive counterintelligence opportunities within the constraints of U.S. foreign policy concerns. The huge foreign presence in the U.S. presents obvious opportunities for penetrating hostile services. So do the headquarters in the U.S. of international organizations.

◆◆ Placing all Warsaw Pact and Cuban diplomats in the U.S. or at the U.N. under the tight restrictions now applied to Soviet diplomats and officials. This could trigger reciprocal restrictions on U.S. diplomats in Soviet bloc countries. Nonetheless, the burden of proof must be on those officials who would justify the absence of meaningful restrictions by citing the value of intelligence collected in those countries. Given the huge amounts of intelligence collected by bloc spies in the U.S., this is a heavy burden.

◆◆ Limiting the number of hostile country nationals allowed in the U.S., and requiring the Office of Foreign Missions to report to Congress every six months on the numbers of those officials.

◆◆ Granting the OFM primary responsibility for enforcing all travel restrictions applied to foreign nationals. Currently, the State Department's Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs shares with OFM responsibility for the travel of Soviets.

◆◆ Requiring U.S.-based officials of mainland China to use the OFM Travel Service Bureau to book all travel in the U.S. This would allow the FBI to track their movement.

◆◆ Coordinating more closely the work of the numerous federal agencies involved in issuing entry visas for the U.S. Often, the FBI is advised that visiting delegations from Soviet bloc and other hostile nations are coming to the U.S. only days before the visit. This makes monitoring nearly impossible.

◆◆ Insisting that the U.N. end its abuse of "secondment," whereby the Soviets have gained control of key units of the U.N. Secretariat. The U.N. should adopt a rule limiting to 50 percent the number of nationals at the U.N. which a country can have "seconded," with a waiver for small states who use "secondment" legitimately. This would cripple Moscow's ability to rotate intelligence officers in and out of the U.N. Secretariat.

◆◆ Requiring that the top 3,000 professional posts at the U.N. Secretariat be subject to five-year rotation. This would prevent nationals of the same country or group of countries as the current occupant of a given post from replacing the incumbent in that job. This would loosen the Soviets' hold on key positions in the Secretariat. If the U.N. fails to adopt these measures, the U.S. should consider denying entry visas to "replacement" nationals of countries with more than 50 percent of their U.N. personnel on secondment.

◆◆ Prohibiting by law the housing of foreign nationals lacking full diplomatic privileges and immunities in compounds protected by such immunity. Most Soviet bloc countries and China house their nationals from the U.N. Secretariat in their

diplomatic compounds. Though this actually makes surveillance of them a bit easier, it makes a mockery of the separation of diplomats and "international civil servants."

In light of recent, repeated breaches of U.S. security, the Reagan Administration and Congress must cooperate to crack down on U.S.-based hostile intelligence activities. For too long, the Soviet and other hostile intelligence services have been allowed to use the facilities of the U.N. in New York and other diplomatic and commercial installations in the U.S. as cover for large-scale espionage activities. Although the U.S. has at long last recognized the scope of the problem, and taken some important steps to deal with it, more needs to be done to reduce the danger and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence.

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APPENDIX

COUNTRIES	PERMANENT OFFICIAL PRESENCE*	VISITORS**
USSR	1344	5000
Bulgaria	84	1000
Czechoslovakia	144	N/A
East Germany	90	853
Hungary	110	6000
Poland	300	N/A
Romania	72	N/A
Afghanistan	11	N/A
Cuba	127	N/A
Iran	16	N/A
Libya	9	N/A
Nicaragua	43	N/A
North Korea	16	N/A
People's Republic of China	1500	25000
Vietnam	29	N/A

*"Permanent" official presence reflects the total number of officials--diplomats, consular officers, commercial and press personnel of a given country in the U.S. as of December 1986. In some cases, Cuba, for example, the the number also includes working wives. In the case of USSR, the number may also reflect clerical personnel and servants, who have been used for espionage tasks.

**"Visitors" includes full time students, East-West Exchange Participants and tourists, as well as members of official visiting delegations.

Sources: Department of State, Protocol, Diplomatic and Consular Lists, 1987
 List of Employees of Diplomatic Missions
 Senate Report "A Review of United States Counter-Intelligence and Security Programs" 1986
 Unclassified Report on Foreign Espionage in the USA.

Prepared by Lee Avrashov