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IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, THE STATE DEPARTMENT BETS AGAINST THE REAGAN DOCTRINE

INTRODUCTION

Africa has been the key testing ground in the struggle between the Reagan Doctrine's support for resistance forces fighting Soviet-backed communist regimes and the Brezhnev Doctrine's insistence on the irreversibility of communist gains. But since 1982, even as it has trumpeted the virtues of the Reagan Doctrine, the Reagan Administration has been working actively against it. A high Administration official now confirms that for more than five years, the United States secretly has been providing military assistance to the communist Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) regime in Mozambique in its battle against the Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) freedom fighters.

Just last week, senior U.S. representatives, including Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci in Lisbon and Chief of Command of U.S. Forces in Europe Lt. General Howard Crowl in Maputo, possibly discussed further U.S. military assistance to FRELIMO. Washington also has been reluctant to press Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano to live up to his promises to Ronald Reagan to open negotiations with RENAMO by last January 1. The reason for this violation of the Reagan Doctrine apparently is that the State Department believes, without offering any evidence, that Chissano and his FRELIMO regime can be "weaned away" from Moscow.

Diluting U.S. Position. In Angola, meanwhile, the State Department appears to have allowed the U.S. negotiating position to erode. For years, the U.S. correctly has insisted that no solution was possible for Angola until all of the more than 40,000 Cuban combat forces are withdrawn. Now, according to high-ranking State Department officials, the U.S. is willing to accept an Angolan settlement that allows Cuban forces to remain south of the 13th parallel for one year and north of the parallel for a longer period.

While the State Department has been diluting the U.S. negotiating position in southern Africa, the freedom fighters have been winning battles and demonstrating the Reagan Doctrine's soundness and power. In a pitched series of major battles in

Angola over the last seven months, the democratic resistance forces of Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) three times have defeated the soldiers of the communist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) regime and its Soviet and Cuban patrons. Savimbi's position in Angola is now stronger than ever before.

In Mozambique, RENAMO now controls about 85 percent of the countryside. The FRELIMO regime has retaliated with propaganda attacks to discredit RENAMO and by punishing RENAMO's supporters through Ethiopian-style policies of forced famine and resettlement.

Recognize Reagan Doctrine Victories. Instead of retreating in southern Africa and seeking hollow agreements apparently for agreements' sake, the Reagan Administration should recognize the victories of the Reagan Doctrine. In Angola, Washington should hold firm to its original demand for the full withdrawal of the Cubans before a settlement based on United Nations Resolution 435.¹ Cubans should be forced to leave in less than one year. U.S. assistance to UNITA must continue until the last Cuban has withdrawn and Soviet aid is terminated. Further, the Administration should demand that Angola's MPLA regime negotiate directly with UNITA, just as the U.S. demands direct negotiations between communist regimes in Afghanistan and Nicaragua and their respective resistance movements. Washington should press for the establishment of a coalition government to hold free elections under international supervision.

In Mozambique, the Administration should demand that Chissano keep his promises of negotiating with RENAMO. If FRELIMO refuses, Washington must conclude that FRELIMO has dealt in bad faith. The Administration then could: terminate economic assistance to FRELIMO; end humanitarian assistance; cut off political and diplomatic support; expand political contacts with RENAMO, and press U.S. allies to do the same; and begin an assistance program for RENAMO under the terms of the Reagan Doctrine. Washington should give Chissano a specific date for opening negotiations, beyond which one or more of these actions will be taken. And then the Administration must follow through.

ANGOLA: THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND

The Second Battle of Lomba River

The MPLA launched its 1987 summer offensive in July.² Led by Soviet General Konstantin Shagnovitch, eight brigades of MPLA troops, numbering 18,000

1. U.N. Resolution 435, passed in 1978, calls for a phased South African withdrawal from Namibia and U.N.-supervised elections to be held there. At the end of one year, all South African troops are to have been removed, a new government elected, power transferred, and Namibia granted its independence.

2. For a fuller discussion of the background of the war in Angola, see Fred Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987); William Pascoe, "Angola Tests the Reagan Doctrine," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 470, November 15, 1985; Pascoe, "U.S. Aid Pays Dividends for Angola's Freedom Fighters," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder Update* No. 36, January 29, 1987.

men, with almost 100 tanks, forced their way from Cuito Cuanavale to the outskirts of Mavinga. Capture of Mavinga would have been a devastating blow to Savimbi's UNITA democratic resistance; aside from the psychological impact of losing control of a town a mere 120 miles from UNITA's provisional capital at Jamba, Mavinga's air strip would make any future attacks on Jamba much easier. Having learned the painful lesson of air attacks against UNITA units armed with U.S.-supplied Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, the communist offensive of 1987 used heavy armor, with infantrymen following tanks and armored personnel carriers into battle.

But UNITA's strong intelligence-gathering operation had tipped Savimbi to the MPLA's plans, giving him time to obtain TOW anti-tank weapons from the U.S. Fighting from September through November, some 8,000 UNITA soldiers defeated the superior communist assault force at the Second Battle of the Lomba River--the largest land battle ever fought in sub-Saharan Africa.³ The casualties were high: communist forces lost 2,000 dead and 5,000 wounded, while UNITA lost 150 dead and 600 wounded.⁴

The Taking of Cuito Cuanavale and Cuemba

Savimbi's troops chased the retreating MPLA troops back to Cuito Cuanavale, the MPLA's southern-most base. Its significance to the MPLA mirrors that of Mavinga to UNITA. Cuito Cuanavale has served for the last several years as the MPLA's prime base of operations against UNITA forces. Its air strip allows Cuban pilots to fly Soviet-made MiG-23 jets in missions against the southernmost regions of UNITA territory. The MPLA's control of Cuito Cuanavale also has prevented UNITA from consolidating its hold on all of southern Angola. Its capture would force the MPLA to fall back to its second line of defense, roughly along the Benguela railway.⁵

UNITA Marches In. Beginning in November, UNITA forces surrounded Cuito Cuanavale, encircling five MPLA brigades. Soviet and Cuban officers fled in helicopters to the safety of Menongue, another MPLA stronghold even further to the northwest. From November through January, UNITA besieged Cuito Cuanavale. Then on January 22, the last major MPLA and Cuban troops abandoned the city; only small elements of the communist force remained.⁶ UNITA marched in.

Meanwhile, other UNITA forces were assaulting the town of Cuemba, on the Benguela railway. Cuemba was the last major MPLA garrison town on the

3. For coverage of the battle, see Cloete Breytenbach, "Biggest Battle in Southern African History," *The Johannesburg Star*, October 2, 1987, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Africa (hereinafter referred to as "FBIS-Africa"), October 5, 1987, p. 13. See also Norman Patterson, "Savimbi Predicts 'Epic Battle' Upcoming," *Johannesburg SAPA*, October 3, 1987, reported in FBIS-Africa, October 6, 1987, pp. 4-6.

4. See "Savimbi Holds 12 Nov Jamba News Conference," in FBIS-Africa, November 13, 1987, pp. 4-6.

5. See Peter Younghusband, "UNITA Forces Threaten Key City," *The Washington Times*, November 23, 1987, p. A8.

6. See William Claiborne, "Angolan Guerrillas Say Army, Cubans Withdraw From Strategic Garrison," *The Washington Post*, January 27, 1988, p. A21.

Benguela line still in MPLA hands. Its collapse late last month gives Savimbi total control over the Benguela railway, which traverses Angola from Benguela on the Atlantic coast to Zambia on the east. Coupled with the fall of Cuito Cuanavale, the victory at Cuemba gives Savimbi a much stronger hand to use diplomatically against the MPLA.

MOZAMBIQUE: GROWING RENAMO STRENGTH

For eleven years, RENAMO gradually has intensified its pressure on the communist FRELIMO regime. Last year, in a key strategic decision, RENAMO redeployed its forces from north to south. This brought the insurgency to the gates of Maputo, Mozambique's capital. RENAMO sources indicate that there are an estimated 5,000 soldiers in the southern provinces of Mozambique, with 1,000 concentrated in the Maputo area.⁷ This has been confirmed by a South African journalist who recently visited a RENAMO base camp within sight of Maputo itself.⁸

In response to RENAMO's gains, FRELIMO launched a massive propaganda offensive. FRELIMO denounced RENAMO, for instance, for a series of massacres. The first, and most notorious, of these alleged massacres took place last July 18 at the Mozambican village of Homoine, along the Atlantic coast. RENAMO insurgents were alleged to have slaughtered almost 400 civilians, including children and pregnant women sleeping in their hospital beds.⁹

Alleged Massacre. From the start, however, there were serious problems with FRELIMO's story of the Homoine massacre. For one thing, Western journalists and embassy officials were barred from the site of the alleged massacre until all bodies had been buried. For another, the only reports of the massacre for the first week came from the official Mozambican government news agency. As more evidence came to light, U.S. officials lowered their estimates of the dead from 400 to 100, and even indicated their doubts that RENAMO was responsible.¹⁰

FRELIMO's propaganda war against RENAMO suffered further credibility setbacks from the statements of Kindra Bryan, a U.S. citizen working in Mozambique as a missionary nurse. For three months last year, she was held captive, along with six other Westerners, by RENAMO. After her release in August, she wrote: "At no time were we mistreated by the RENAMO soldiers....[They] were very gentle with us. They never threatened us or shoved us with their guns....The soldiers seemed disciplined and well organized and appeared

7. Conversation with RENAMO representatives, Washington, D.C., February 1988. See also Peter Younghusband, "RENAMO rebels choke off Mozambique capital," *The Washington Times*, January 7, 1988, p. A7.

8. See "RSA Journalist Describes MNR Camp Conditions," London BBC World Service, January 11, 1988, reported in FBIS-Africa, January 12, 1988, pp. 4-5.

9. See William Claiborne, "5-Hour Massacre Leaves a Tableau of Carnage," *The Washington Post*, July 24, 1987.

10. For a fuller discussion, see William Pascoe, "Massacre or Manipulation?" *The Washington Times*, July 30, 1987, p. D3.

to have a good relationship with the villagers, who in turn seemed to recognize them as the government."

Bryan further contradicted FRELIMO's claim that RENAMO has no political platform. She wrote: "From the beginning, the soldiers wanted us to understand their cause. They claimed that the Marxist government, known as FRELIMO, had ruined Mozambique....The soldiers could get themselves all pumped up talking about their cause...."¹¹

The FRELIMO regime faces other difficulties. Along with such diplomatic successes as Chissano's visit to the U.S. and his meeting with Ronald Reagan last October, there have been failures. An effort to establish diplomatic relations with Israel apparently has stalled.¹² The U.S. State Department, apparently believing that the establishment of relations between Israel and Mozambique would head off possible resistance to its Mozambique policy from the Jewish community in the U.S., strongly encouraged the move. But FRELIMO reportedly demanded \$1 million in economic assistance from Israel as the price for establishing relations; when Israel was unable to get the money from the U.S. government, FRELIMO balked.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND SOUTHERN AFRICA

The communist regimes in Angola and Mozambique are on the defensive. Their military and political positions are eroding daily. Yet U.S. State Department officials seem determined to do everything necessary to keep these regimes in power. In Angola and Mozambique, the State Department seems more concerned with guaranteeing the Brezhnev Doctrine than with fulfilling the Reagan Doctrine.

In Angola, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Chester Crocker has allowed the U.S. negotiating position to erode. Prior to Crocker's arrival in Angola at the end of January, a high Administration official declared that the U.S. would be willing to accept an MPLA proposal for a partition of Angola at the 13th parallel. Those Cuban troops south of the 13th parallel would withdraw over a one-year time frame; those north of the 13th parallel would be allowed to remain, for withdrawal at a later agreed-upon date. Meanwhile, South African troops would withdraw from Namibia, and United Nations Resolution 435 would take effect.¹³

11. See Kindra Bryan, "My 3-Month Trek Out of Africa: Our Captors Were Gentle But the Land Was Brutal," *The Washington Post*, August 23, 1987.

12. On the reasoning behind the effort to establish diplomatic relations, see Glenn Frankel, "Israel Weighs Maputo Ties," *The Washington Post*, November 13, 1987, p. A25, and "Chissano on Possible 'Contacts' with Israel," Maputo Domestic Service October 2, 1987, reported in FBIS-Africa, October 5, 1987, p. 15. On the stalled effort, see "PLO Envoy Arrives with Arafat Message," Maputo Domestic Service, January 12, 1988, reported in FBIS-Africa, January 15, 1988, pp. 8-9. During a meeting with the PLO envoy, FRELIMO ideological watchdog Marcelino dos Santos "expressed the solidarity of the FRELIMO party, the government, and the Mozambican people with the just struggle of the Palestinian people for their independence." *Ibid.*

13. The information on the current U.S. negotiating position came from author's conversation with the official, January 22, 1988.

U.S. Reversal. This represents a reversal of the long-held U.S. negotiating position of insisting on a full and complete Cuban troop withdrawal prior to the implementation of U.N. Resolution 435.¹⁴ Dividing Angola at the 13th parallel makes little sense. First, the 13th parallel is roughly 20 minutes jet flying time from UNITA territory; thus, Cuban forces would not be out of action. Second, once South African troops withdrew from Namibia, allowing the Soviet-backed South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) to come to power there, there would be no pro-UNITA force to prevent the Cuban troops in the north of Angola from breaking the agreement and attacking UNITA. Third, the plan risks partitioning Angola permanently, thus abandoning those Angolans north of the 13th parallel to life under MPLA dictatorship.

Finally, and most important, the plan fails to take advantage of the increased strength of the U.S. bargaining position, which has resulted from UNITA's recent victories.

January 1 Deadline. As for Mozambique, Chissano reportedly admitted to Reagan in their October White House meeting that the war against RENAMO was unwinnable. Chissano is believed to have asked Reagan for U.S. assistance in arranging negotiations with RENAMO. Reagan is said to have agreed. January 1, 1988, was set as the deadline for action by FRELIMO; beyond that date, Reagan was to take a lack of movement toward negotiations with RENAMO as evidence of FRELIMO's bad faith.¹⁵ So far FRELIMO has not moved toward negotiations. Yet Administration officials have taken no action against FRELIMO.

More important, a high Administration official has confirmed that as part of its attempt to "wean away" the communist FRELIMO regime from its close ties to the Soviet Union, the U.S. secretly has been providing military assistance to FRELIMO for over five years.¹⁶ The military assistance includes jeeps and trucks, and small arms, including rifles and mortars of Soviet-bloc origin. There are unconfirmed reports that covert U.S. assistance to FRELIMO includes security personnel for Chissano's personal entourage.

Just last week, U.S. Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, a former U.S. Ambassador to Portugal, visited Lisbon. While there, according to RENAMO sources, he met with Mozambican Prime Minister Mario Machungo, who also was visiting Portugal. Simultaneously, Lt. Gen. Howard Crowl, the Chief of Command of U.S. forces in Europe, was in Maputo meeting with Mozambican officials. Administration officials deny that either Carlucci or Crowl discussed giving Mozambique military assistance.

14. This insistence on full Cuban withdrawal was acknowledged by the State Department as recently as June 1987.

15. Author's conversation with another high Administration official, November 4, 1987.

16. Author's conversation with the official, January 6, 1988. His information confirmed other reports from Western intelligence sources.

Giving covert military assistance to FRELIMO could violate the Helms Amendment to the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985. This specifically prohibits funds authorized for fiscal years 1986 and 1987 from being used for military assistance to FRELIMO, unless the President certifies that Mozambique has "implemented a plan...to reduce the number of foreign military personnel to no more than 55."¹⁷ The number of foreign military personnel in Mozambique has remained above 16,000 for the last several years.

FULFILLING THE REAGAN DOCTRINE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

The State Department's Africa Bureau headed by Assistant Secretary Chester Crocker has been balking at taking full advantage of the UNITA and RENAMO successes to fulfill the promise of the Reagan Doctrine to the people of Angola and Mozambique. The State Department position, moreover, even fails to serve U.S. interests.

The Administration should return to the course set by the Reagan Doctrine. Specifically, the Administration should:

Hold firm in Angola. Washington should insist on full and complete withdrawal of all Cuban troops from Angola before pressing South Africa to implement U.N. Resolution 435. Any agreement that leaves Cubans in Angola beyond the date of South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia runs the risk of being broken.

Demand direct MPLA-UNITA negotiations. In Afghanistan and Nicaragua, the Administration insists on direct negotiations between the ruling communist regime and its respective resistance movement. Angola should be no different.

Shorten the Cuban withdrawal schedule. In Afghanistan, the Reagan Administration insists that 115,000 Soviet troops leave within eight months. There is no reason that it should take 40,000 Cuban troops any longer to withdraw from Angola.

Push for a coalition government. With the MPLA and its Cuban patrons clearly weakened, now is the time for Washington to demand that the MPLA invite UNITA into a coalition government and then hold free elections under international supervision.

End military assistance to FRELIMO. Arming Mozambique's pro-Soviet leaders may be violating U.S. law and is not in the interests of the U.S. It makes a mockery of Administration claims to "neutrality" in the conflict.

Demand direct FRELIMO-RENAMO negotiations. Mozambican President Chissano promised Ronald Reagan that FRELIMO would begin meeting with RENAMO by January 1. Nothing has happened. The Administration should inform Chissano that it regards the lack of action as an indication of FRELIMO's bad

17. The International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, section 813 (b)(2)(c).

faith, and that it will take new actions unless direct FRELIMO-RENAMO negotiations begin immediately. These actions could include: termination of economic or humanitarian assistance to FRELIMO; termination of propaganda, diplomatic, and political support; expansion of U.S.-RENAMO relations, and a U.S. effort to press its allies to do the same; and giving RENAMO assistance under the terms of the Reagan Doctrine.

Push for Free Elections in Mozambique. More than most of its predecessors, the Reagan Administration consistently has pushed for the growth of democracy, as represented by free elections, throughout the Third World. Mozambique has not had a truly free election since independence. The Administration should push FRELIMO to hold free elections under international supervision.

CONCLUSION

Nowhere in the Third World is the struggle between the Reagan Doctrine and the Brezhnev Doctrine more intense than in southern Africa. Pro-Western freedom fighters in Angola and Mozambique have tested the Reagan Administration's commitment to aiding democratic resistance forces struggling against Soviet-backed Marxist-Leninist regimes. In both instances, and to varying degrees, some Administration officials have betrayed the Reagan Doctrine by letting the freedom fighters down.

It is now time to keep the Reagan Doctrine's promise for southern Africa. Recent UNITA and RENAMO battlefield successes strengthen the U.S. negotiating position in Angola and Mozambique. The Administration thus should pursue a victory for the Reagan Doctrine in southern Africa. Washington should not be tempted to obtain an agreement--any agreement--before the end of the Administration. Clever diplomacy and the willingness to wait can turn the freedom fighters' battlefield successes into major diplomatic and political victories for Ronald Reagan, and for the proud doctrine which bears his name.

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