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HOW THE U.S. CAN HELP KENYA

INTRODUCTION

While United States policy toward Africa long has been marked by false starts and missteps, a few countries became monuments to sound policy — theirs and Washington's. Kenya had been one of them. Instead of embracing state socialism following independence in 1963, as did much of Africa, Kenya's leaders opted for the free market. Instead of immediately establishing a one-party dictatorship and cracking down on all political opposition, Kenyan authorities allowed a wide variety of political freedom.

This made Kenya a relative bastion of economic and political freedom in a continent not noted for either. And by choosing political and economic freedom over state socialism, Kenya clearly demonstrated its desire for continued good relations with the West. The result: a long and close relationship with the U.S., providing Washington with an ally in the geostrategically vital Horn of Africa and Kenya with large amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance. When the U.S., for example, desperately sought friendly ports for its naval vessels near the Persian Gulf in the late 1970s, Kenya offered Mombasa. The twin pillars of Kenyan policy, alliance with the West and adherence to political and economic freedom, had served Kenya well.

Threats from Qadhafi. Today there are some problems on the horizon. The Kenyan economy, already sluggish, will be hard-pressed to grow enough to provide jobs for the 300,000 Kenyans who enter the work force every year. Kenya's population growth rate, 4.1 percent, is the highest in the world. The deadly disease AIDS has hit Kenya, threatening to deter Western tourism, one of the mainstays of the Kenyan economy.

On the political front, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, who took office in 1978, also faces internal and external political threats. Libyan strongman Muammar Qadhafi, working with his ally, Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni, has attempted to destabilize Kenya over the last three years. Reportedly, 3,000 Libyan military advisers are training Museveni's ever-expanding army, believed to be growing at the rate of 10,000 per month. Last December, to pressure Kenya, these forces were brought to the border with heavy armaments. Libya and Uganda also have aided *Mwakenya*, an internal opposition movement established in Kenya in the early 1980s.

Ensuring Kenyan Stability. Kenyan political stability also is threatened by self-styled human rights experts. Opponents such as Representative Howard Wolpe, the Michigan Democrat who chairs the House Foreign Affairs Committee Subcommittee on Africa, and the international human-rights watchdog group Amnesty International, have attacked Kenya. In a July 1987 report, Amnesty International accused Kenya of using torture against political opponents. Meanwhile, Wolpe has attempted to tie continued U.S. assistance to Moi's government — $45 million last year — to an improvement in its human rights record.

To attempt to bludgeon Kenya would be a serious mistake for the U.S. Instead, Washington must recognize the threat posed to Kenya from its assorted problems, and should work closely with the Kenyan government to fashion solutions. For instance, Kenya should be commended for its efforts to privatize government agencies and encouraged to expand this privatization effort. Washington should press Kenya to keep such democratic practices as secret ballots. Given the continued tension in the Persian Gulf, and Kenya's important role in allowing the U.S. to operate in the region, the U.S. must provide enough military and economic assistance to fend off the threats to Kenya's stability.

THE U.S. AND KENYA

American interest in Kenya originally was limited almost solely to tourism. After Kenya's independence in 1963, however, U.S. investment was attracted to Kenya by the young country's relatively free market approach to economic policy and active wooing of direct foreign investment. By 1985, total U.S. investment in Kenya was $350 million, primarily in commerce, light manufacturing, and the tourist industry. In the mid-1980s, Kenya averaged some 35,000 American tourists per year.[1]

Access to Mombasa. U.S. military assistance did not begin until 1976, when the Ford Administration supplied Kenya with its first squadron of F-5E *Tiger II* aircraft.[2] As two of Kenya's bordering nations, Somalia and Ethiopia, began to acquire sophisticated weapons systems from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, Kenya's leaders began to feel a need for a stronger defense capability, and requested increased assistance from Washington. By 1980, the Carter Administration had allocated $26 million in military assistance to Kenya — half of the total budget for U.S. military assistance to sub-Saharan Africa that year.[3]

Apparently in return for the increased U.S. assistance, Kenya signed an agreement in 1980 giving the U.S. access to facilities at Mombasa, Kenya's second largest city and its principal port. U.S. warships using Mombasa patrol the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, ensuring the continued flow of oil to the Western democracies. Besides the U.S. Navy,

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1 See "Background Notes: Kenya," U.S. Department of State, April 1985, p. 7. Overall, Kenya received 450,000 tourists in 1985, and 650,000 in 1986.

2 For an amusing account of how Kenyan Foreign Minister Munyua Waiyaki obtained the agreement from Washington, see Sanford J. Ungar, *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985), pp. 201-202.

3 *Ibid.*

elements of the U.S. Central Command, once known as the Rapid Deployment Force, are believed to have access to air facilities in Mombasa, Nanyuki, and Embakasi.

Since 1981, U.S. economic assistance to Kenya has averaged $64 million annually, for a total of $385 million. But aid levels have declined recently. Economic aid fell to $46.5 million in 1986 and then to $35 million last year. U.S. military assistance over the same period has averaged $21 million annually, for a total of $127 million. Last year military aid to Kenya dropped to $10.5 million. Projected figures for 1988 indicate an increase to $40 million in economic assistance, but a further drop to only $5 million in military aid.

KENYA'S ECONOMIC STABILITY

Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya's first prime minister, made a key decision soon after independence: rather than adopt a state socialist economic policy relying on the confiscation of private property, large scale nationalization, and the centralized development schemes practiced in other newly independent states, Kenya would rely on the free market.

Kenyatta stressed *Harambee*, or "self-help," as the national slogan, and urged individuals and communities to do just that. Instead of spending heavily on defense, as his neighbors did, Kenyatta invested in agriculture. Instead of nationalizing all Western-owned businesses and driving out foreign capital, he left businesses in Western hands and welcomed new foreign investment. Instead of scaring whites back to Europe, he made it clear that Kenya needed their managerial and technical expertise.

Better Off Today. The result was two decades of solid and steady economic growth. By contrast, the socialist experiments in bordering countries, such as Tanzania and Ethiopia, failed miserably. Kenyans today are better off than they were under colonialism, while Tanzanians and most other black Africans are worse off.

From 1960 to 1982, Kenya averaged 2.8 percent growth in real per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Real GDP grew 4.9 percent in 1985 and 5.7 percent in 1986. In Tanzania, by contrast, real growth rates have been negative since independence.

The key to this remarkable economic growth was Kenya's investment in agriculture. Private property, communalized in other African nations after independence, actually was expanded in Kenya. The five key material inputs to agriculture — land, seeds, fertilizer, chemicals, and farm equipment — were all available in Kenya from the private sector, which provided Kenyan farmers with reliably available, cheaper, and up-to-date supplies. Farmers in Tanzania, by contrast, had to obtain such inputs from government-controlled monopolies.[4]

As important as the material inputs, of course, is the incentive system. While Kenya created an incentive system to spur individual hard work, Tanzania's socialism specifically

4 See Karl Zinsmeister, "East African Experiment: Kenyan Prosperity and Tanzanian Decline," in *The Journal of Economic Growth*, vol. 2, no. 2, second quarter 1987, pp. 28-39.

denied incentives to individuals. The result: though only 17 percent of Kenya's land is arable, the country is one of the few in Africa to be self-sufficient in food production.

Capital Flight. There are problems, however, on the horizon for Kenya's economy. Much of the recent boom has been tied to a temporary increase in world prices for coffee, Kenya's principal export. Coffee export revenues, $490 million in 1986, are believed to have dropped to $300 million in 1987.[5] Tourism, which would have been expected to pick up the slack, was hurt by cancellations at coastal hotels following a British government decision early in 1987 not to allow its troops liberty in Mombasa, due to a fear of AIDS.[6]

Part of the economic problem stems from a sizeable capital flight away from Kenya. The International Monetary Fund estimates that $1.28 billion is held by Kenyans in non-bank external accounts, while some estimates go as high as $2.76 billion.[7] As more Kenyan assets are placed in overseas accounts, less capital is available to be used for investment, debt service, and trade. Worse, the capital flight indicates there is a perception of future political or economic instability in Kenya.

Considerable attention has been paid to slowing Kenya's population growth. A growing population in itself is not necessarily a problem. A dynamic economic environment turns people from liabilities into assets. Each year, 300,000 new educated workers enter Kenya's job market. But even in booming 1986, only 20,000 new jobs were created in the formal sector of the economy. If nothing is done to remedy this, within ten years there could be almost 3 million unemployed educated Kenyans — a potential breeding ground for revolution. Clearly, the Kenyan government must take steps to increase job growth.

Fearing Competition. Manufacturing industry appears to offer one hope for substantial expansion of the Kenyan economy. Dropping import barriers could spur heightened business activity, a more competitive export sector, and the creation of new jobs. But Kenya's manufacturing establishment opposes dropping these barriers, apparently for fear of competition. Government bureaucracy and its inability to approve import licenses promptly also slow economic growth.

Privatization of public assets, services, and parastatals offers another hope for economic growth. Currently, almost half of the work force of Kenya is employed in the public sector, only 21 percent in industry and commerce, and just 13 percent in services.[8] Shifting work forces from the public to the private sector would increase competition and, hence, encourage economic growth. Further, a large part of Kenya's foreign borrowing is used to

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5 See Andrew Buckoke, "Clouds Gather for Kenyan Economy," the *Financial Times*, November 10, 1987.

6 For a fuller discussion, see Radiala Onim, "AIDS Furor," in *New African* magazine, March 1987, p. 25.

7 See Buckoke. Asian Kenyans, who make up less than one-half of one percent of the total population, account for 70 percent of the urban retail trade, and wield influence over the Kenyan economy largely out of proportion to their size in the population. It is largely these Asian Kenyans who are keeping their cash reserves in overseas accounts, because of their doubts about the continued economic and political stability of Kenya.

8 See "Background Notes: Kenya," U.S. Department of State, April 1985, p. 1.

pay the debts of parastatals; privatizing them would take them off public accounts and reduce the need for government borrowing.

Too much of the Kenyan money market, meanwhile, is controlled by official government authorities: 80 percent, by one estimate, is controlled by state-controlled monopolies, cooperatives, and local authorities.[9] The remaining 20 percent is controlled by foreign and Asian Kenyan companies, leaving other Kenyans with little control over capital. This government control over the money market must be broken if Kenya is to enjoy the kind of economic growth necessary to provide new jobs for its ever-expanding population.

KENYA'S POLITICAL STABILITY

Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi, who became president following Jomo Kenyatta's death in 1978, inherited a nation with a strong economy, a vibrant and growing middle class, and a generally pro-Western outlook in foreign affairs. But he also inherited a country without a clearly defined system of political succession. The political history of Kenya for the last decade largely has been a reflection of Moi's attempts to consolidate his power. In the process, he has thwarted one coup attempt, juggled constituencies, and balanced key aides to maintain a political equilibrium and prevent the establishment of a power base independent of his control.

Press and Political Freedoms. Though Kenya is not a purely Western-style democracy — it formally became a one-party state in 1982 — it enjoys greater press and political freedoms than almost any other African nation. Debate over policy alternatives traditionally has been open and fierce, and there is always a multiplicity of candidates for parliament. In the 1979 elections, for example, more than 740 candidates ran for 158 seats; 72 incumbents, including seven cabinet ministers and fifteen deputy ministers, were defeated. In the 1983 elections, 991 candidates ran for the 158 seats, with approximately 40 percent of the incumbents suffering defeat, including five cabinet ministers and twelve deputy ministers.

The most serious threat to Kenyan political stability was the August 1982 coup attempt by elements of the Kenyan air force. The coup followed a long summer of discontent in Kenya, characterized by student protests and a crackdown on anti-government dissent that culminated in the passage of a constitutional amendment (after a mere two-hour parliamentary debate) making Kenya officially a one-party state.[10]

***Mau Mau* and Oathing.** After Moi crushed the coup attempt, the remaining opposition forces established a secret organization called *Mwakenya*, an acronym for the Union of

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9 See "Kenya's Money Market," *Africa Confidential*, June 24, 1987, p. 6, and "Kenya: Watch the Money Flow," *Africa Confidential*, October 7, 1987, p. 3.

10 For a fuller discussion of the antecedents of the coup attempt, see Ungar, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-168.

Kenyan Patriots. The group apparently is a coalition of disaffected urban intellectuals and rural farmers. Not much is known about the organization, except that it engages in the same sort of "oathing" practices employed by those who ran the *Mau Mau* rebellion of the 1950s,[11] and that it successfully has organized anti-government demonstrations and sabotaged electrical installations.[12] There also appears to be evidence linking *Mwakenya* to Libyan strongman Muammar Qadhafi. According to Western intelligence sources, Qadhafi has supplied arms and training in Uganda to some *Mwakenya* members.[13]

In cracking down on *Mwakenya*, Moi may have gone too far. Over 100 persons have been arrested in the past two years and charged with sedition; over 70 have been convicted. In addition, government critics with no apparent links to the organization have been arrested and charged with sedition.[14] Further, Moi has revised the Kenyan electoral system, abolishing the secret ballot in party primary elections. Voters now must stand publicly in line in front of a picture of the candidate whom they support. Last month's parliamentary primary election results indicate clearly the chilling effect this will have on Kenyan politics: turnout was estimated at only 14 percent in Nairobi, the capital, and only 22 percent in Mombasa, Kenya's second largest city.[15]

Cancelling Meetings. The crackdown on *Mwakenya* has opened up Kenya to allegations of human rights abuse. The international human rights group Amnesty International charged in its July 1987 report that since March 1986 "hundreds" of Kenyan citizens had been arrested, and that many of those arrested on "political grounds" had been tortured.[16] The report repeated allegations made by U.S. Representative Wolpe, in his January 1987 visit to Kenya, when he called a press conference to denounce the Moi government for abruptly cancelling meetings he had scheduled with opposition leaders. Armed with the Amnesty International report, Wolpe was able to include language in the foreign aid bill that for the first time would condition U.S. security assistance to Kenya on an improvement in Kenya's human rights record.[17] Another human rights watch group, Freedom House, changed its rating of Kenya from "partly free" to "not free" as a result of Moi's crackdown.[18]

KENYA'S EXTERNAL THREATS

Kenya is located on the east coast of Africa, astride the Indian Ocean, midway between the Gulf of Aden and the Mozambique Channel. At 583,000 square miles, it is slightly

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11 "Oathing" refers to the practice of swearing loyalty oaths to the movement, and is taken very seriously as a sign of intent in Kenya. The Moi government has used "oathing" as clear evidence of a suspect's treason against the state.

12 For a fuller discussion, see "Facing *Mwakenya*," in *Africa Confidential*, vol. 28, no. 1, January 7, 1987, pp. 4-5.

13 Author's conversation with sources, January 28 and February 12, 1988.

14 See, for example, "Country Report: Kenya," no. 2, 1987, by The Economist Intelligence Unit, p. 4.

15 In previous primary elections, with a secret ballot, voter turnout has approached 90 percent. See Blaine Harden, "Turnout Low as Kenya Revises Vote Method," *The Washington Post*, February 25, 1988, p. A34.

16 See Claire Robertson, "Rights Group Links Kenya with Torture," *The Washington Post*, July 22, 1987, p. A15.

17 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did not agree, and the authorization bill was not passed by the Congress.

18 See Raymond D. Gastil, "The Comparative Survey of Freedom," in *Freedom at Issue*, January-February 1988, pp. 19-33.

smaller than Texas. Kenya is bordered on the east by Somalia; on the north by Ethiopia; on the northwest by the Sudan; on the west by Uganda; and on the south by Tanzania.

Kenya's relations with its neighbors demonstrate that ideological affinity often is overruled by simple balance of power politics. During the Ogaden War of 1977-1978 between Soviet-backed Ethiopia and U.S.-backed Somalia, for instance, Kenya sided with Ethiopia. This is because Ethiopia had never before threatened Kenya, but Somalia had made clear its desire to incorporate segments of Kenya into a "Greater Somalia." Both Ethiopia and Somalia are heavily armed, with huge armies; either could inflict serious damage on Kenya in the event of hostilities.

Closed Border. Relations with Uganda and Tanzania, Kenya's former partners as colonies of British East Africa, are complex. After independence, the three attempted to give a political structure to the economic union they had inherited from the British. They formed the East Africa Community, which lasted only from 1967-1977, when it collapsed because of disputes over such issues as the division of tourist revenues and other trade issues. For six years the border between Kenya and Tanzania was closed and all communications links between the two nations were ruptured. Following an intense negotiating effort, full commercial relations were reestablished in 1983. Since then, relations have been generally cordial.

Relations with Uganda were not so easily repaired. In fact, they had been on a downturn since 1971, when the crazed Idi Amin took power in a coup against Ugandan leader Milton Obote. During the eight years of Amin's brutal rule, Kenyan-Ugandan relations soured dramatically. Even after Amin's overthrow by the Tanzanian army in 1979, Kenyan-Ugandan relations did not heal fully: several years of governmental chaos and guerrilla war in Uganda made that impossible.

Working to Destabilize Kenya. Since the 1986 accession to power in Uganda of Yoweri Museveni, after a five-year guerrilla struggle in which he was backed by Qadhafi, relations between the two nations have become even more strained. Apparently in return for Qadhafi's support during his insurgency, Museveni has allowed Qadhafi to use the Ugandan capital of Kampala as Libya's East and Central Africa headquarters. There currently are an estimated 3,000 Libyan soldiers in Uganda, training Museveni's ever-expanding armed forces.[19] Qadhafi and Museveni appear to be working in concert to destabilize Kenya.

The Libyan-Ugandan move against Kenya is taking two forms: 1) internal espionage and political agitation, and 2) external military pressure. Qadhafi and Museveni seek information on the activities of Kenya's opposition leaders, and secretly have trained

19 Museveni publicly has announced his intention to create a 1-million strong militia. Currently, Ugandan authorities forcibly are recruiting 9,900 men per month for training — 300 per month from each of the country's 33 districts. Author's conversation with Western intelligence sources, January 12, 1988.

anti-government forces in Uganda. Last November Moi arrested several students at the University of Nairobi, charging them with espionage and agitation on behalf of Libya. He expelled from Kenya the Libyan charge d'affaires and top Libyan diplomats, charging them with "gross interference in the internal affairs of Kenya."[20]

While Kenyan political leaders were concentrating on the Libyan espionage case, in mid-December 1987 Ugandan forces crossed the Kenyan border at Busia and shot several Kenyan citizens. Ugandan troops also shelled Kenyan border towns. Kenya rushed reinforcements to the border and demanded that the Ugandans pull back to their country and stop the shelling. Ugandan leader Museveni retaliated by rushing 2,000 troops to the border, reportedly supported with Libyan military advisers and sophisticated anti-aircraft guns and missiles. Moi expelled the Ugandan ambassador and ordered the Libyan embassy closed. Moi then closed the border, denying land-locked Uganda its access to the sea. After two weeks of tension, vitriolic rhetoric and finger-pointing, Moi and Museveni met on December 28 and agreed to stand down their border forces.[21] The tension has abated, but distrust continues.

U.S. POLICY TOWARD KENYA

The U.S. long has regarded Kenya as a key ally in Africa. Washington thus should do more to help Kenya face the mounting threats to its economic and political stability. Particularly as tension mounts in the Persian Gulf, U.S. needs for access to Kenyan naval and air facilities require an economically strong, politically stable and friendly government in power in Nairobi. The U.S. should:

◆◆ **Encourage further privatization efforts.** Kenya should be commended for its efforts to date, and encouraged to press ahead with privatization. Parastatals in particular, with their vast overheads, contribute heavily to the government budget deficits and should be privatized. Two leading candidates are Kenya Airways and the National Cereals and Produce Board.

U.S. officials of the Agency for International Development (AID) also should provide information to the Kenyan government on specific strategies and techniques to privatize. For instance, in selling a public asset, the Kenyan government should be advised to consider an Employee Stock Ownership Plan, in which stock in the company being privatized is sold directly to its own workers. This gives the workers a stake in the future profitability of the company, and, hence, in the free enterprise system itself.

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20 For a fuller discussion, see "Disturbances at University of Nairobi Resume," *The Standard,* November 16, 1987, p. 1, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Africa [hereinafter referred to as "FBIS-Africa"], November 16, 1987, p. 10. See also "Moi Condemns Nairobi University Student Riots," in FBIS-Africa, November 17, 1987, p. 2; "Student Jailed for Libyan-Backed Plot," in FBIS-Africa, December 2, 1987, pp. 7-8; "Libyan Envoy Expelled for 'Gross Interference,'" FBIS-Africa, December 4, 1987, p. 5; and "Foreign Ministry Orders Closure of Libyan Embassy," FBIS-Africa, December 18, 1987, p. 1.

21 See "Paper Reports Shoot-Out Along Uganda Border," FBIS-Africa, December 15, 1987, pp. 3-4; "Further Reportage on Border Tension With Uganda," FBIS-Africa, December 17, 1987, pp. 3-5; Blaine Harden, "Kenya Expels Uganda's Ambassador," *The Washington Post,* December 19, 1987, p. A17; and "Moi, Museveni Meet, Reach Accord," FBIS-Africa, December 29, 1987, pp. 1-3.

♦♦ **Press for further market reforms.** Kenya's leaders already realize through their experience that the free market offers the best chance for continued economic growth. But powerful segments of the Kenyan business community, fearful of new competition, have opposed lowering import barriers. Washington should press Kenya to lower tariffs to promote this greater competition, which would lower prices for consumers and create new jobs. Kenya's money market also should be deregulated; this would ease the difficulty many Kenyan entrepreneurs have in obtaining venture capital to start new businesses, which are the key to job creation.

♦♦ **Offer to encourage U.S. firms to consider joint ventures.** In exchange for the Kenyan government's enacting these policy reforms, Washington could promote Kenya as a good location for joint ventures between Kenyan firms and U.S. multinationals, especially manufacturing firms. Kenya is well suited to direct foreign investment: it has a well-educated labor force, the primary language is English, there is an excellent port, and there are good inland transportation routes.

♦♦ **Increase military assistance.** Kenya has suffered severely from cuts in U.S. military assistance. Washington should recognize the importance of maintaining stability in Kenya and should provide the military assistance to ensure this. This year's projected $5 million in U.S. assistance includes no funds for training and education and only modest funding for replacement of spare parts for helicopters and jets in the Kenyan air force. Cutting funds for training, especially training in the U.S., is penny-wise but pound-foolish: not only does such training bolster Kenya's military, it also creates an officer class in Kenya that is well acquainted with the practical workings of democracy, that is mindful of human rights concerns, and that harbors good feelings toward the U.S.

♦♦ **Press for democratic reforms.** Kenya is known as one of Africa's most democratic states. But recent trends indicate slippage away from its traditional democratic practices and toward centralization of power. The Reagan Administration should press Kenya to return to a secret ballot in its party primary voting, in the hope that political pluralism will be preserved. U.S. officials in Kenya should stress to the Kenyan government the link between political stability and economic growth. A return to Kenya's traditional democratic practices, U.S. officials should advise, will lead to a better economic climate.

♦♦ **Press for human rights.** Washington also should continue to press for adherence to basic human rights in Kenya. Secretary of State George P. Shultz, during a January 1987 visit to Nairobi, stressed the significance of this issue with President Moi, as did Ronald Reagan during Moi's visit to Washington two months later. But U.S. economic assistance should not be made conditional on Kenya's performance in human rights. To do so could jeopardize good relations over a relatively minor problem. It also would make inconsistent U.S. aid programs to a host of other nations with worse human rights records.

♦♦ **Compile a better data base on Kenya.** For too long the U.S. has paid too little attention to the Third World, and Africa in particular. Basic information on Kenyan politics, economics, and social life, for instance, is not available to the serious scholar or policy maker. Now that many African governments have recognized the failures of socialism, they are turning to the West for advice. But before sound advice can be given, sound information must be available. U.S. officials must do a better job of collecting, analyzing, and disseminating such information.

CONCLUSION

Since independence, Kenya has been a model of political stability and economic progress in a continent where either is the exception to the rule. Through the sensible application of economic policies to foster growth and development, Kenya has outperformed all but a few African nations, even as its population growth rate has been the world's highest. Washington correctly has seen the value of encouraging this model of development in Kenya and has rewarded Kenya appropriately. As three decades of socialist experimentation in Africa come to a close, other African nations would do well to imitate the Kenyan model.

Vital U.S. Stake. But there are clouds on Kenya's horizon. The Moi government faces determined threats to its political stability, from within and without. Libyan dictator Qadhafi seems ready to strike at the U.S. wherever he can; it is clear that he believes U.S. ally Kenya to be an appropriate target. Kenya also must find a way to keep its economy growing at a rate fast enough to provide jobs for the 300,000 educated Kenyans entering the work force every year.

The U.S. has a vital stake in the continued success of Kenya. Its strategic location, its proximity to the sea lanes that carry Persian Gulf oil to the Western allies, and its willingness to allow the use of its facilities by U.S. armed forces make it an indispensable friend in a hostile area of the world. The U.S. commitment to the defense and stability of Kenya must continue.

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