



DEALING WITH WAYWARD NEW ZEALAND

INTRODUCTION

The Australia-New Zealand-United States Alliance, known as ANZUS, was formed in 1951. Since then it has been the foundation for U.S. strategy in the South Pacific. Because of ANZUS, the U.S. could rely on Australia and New Zealand to promote pro-Western stability in that area.

For nearly four years, however, ANZUS has been a hollow shell. The cause: New Zealand's strict antinuclear policy that has barred from its ports and waters ships that it perceives to be carrying nuclear weapons, or are nuclear propelled, thus making military cooperation with the U.S. impossible. These policies, promoted largely by anti-U.S. leftists, were adopted by New Zealand's Labor Party, which has been in office since 1984. This makes New Zealand the only nation to "resign" from an alliance with the U.S. because of pressure from an antinuclear lobby.

Weakening Deterrence. In February 1985, New Zealand refused port entry to the conventionally powered destroyer *USS Buchanan* on suspicion that it might be carrying nuclear weapons. Last year, New Zealand Prime Minister David Lange rejected the whole concept of nuclear deterrence. Lange has promoted an antinuclear policy without any regard for how it weakens the ability of the Western Alliance collectively to deter nuclear attack.

The Soviet Union has sought to exploit the New Zealand antinuclear movement to undermine ANZUS. Moscow also wields influence in New Zealand's Socialist Unity Party, which has strong trade union links. These unions have promoted the Labor Party's antinuclear policies.

Moscow-supported unions in the Pacific's tiny island nations also promote antinuclear policies. Moscow apparently hopes to deny South Pacific basing alternatives to the U.S. should U.S. forces have to vacate their Philippine bases after the current agreement expires in 1991.

Long-Loyal Ally. For most Americans, watching recent New Zealand diplomatic and political behavior has been painful. New Zealand long had been a loyal member of the Western Alliance; U.S. and New Zealand soldiers fought together in two World Wars and in Korea and Vietnam. Now New Zealand acts like a Third World country. Although it has not withdrawn from ANZUS formally, it has done so effectively. After giving Labor time to reconsider its policies, Ronald Reagan in early 1985 suspended most U.S. military cooperation with New Zealand. Most important, the U.S. withdrew from military intelligence-sharing agreements and planned military exercises. New Zealand's military capability has diminished because it has not been able to make up for the loss in intelligence and the opportunity to train with advanced U.S. forces.

As long as New Zealand refuses port access to U.S. ships, which all other U.S. allies grant, the Bush Administration should continue suspending U.S. military cooperation with New Zealand. At the same time, the Administration should be ready to welcome New Zealand back to ANZUS if it changes its policy. Specifically, the Bush Administration should:

- ◆ ◆ Expand the activities of the U.S. Information Agency, such as speaker and scholar exchanges, to encourage greater New Zealand support for ANZUS.

- ◆ ◆ Continue to refuse to sign protocols of the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty because they may constrain future military cooperation with Australia.

- ◆ ◆ Expand military cooperation with Australia.

- ◆ ◆ Urge Australia and New Zealand to counter Soviet front groups that seek to undermine ANZUS.

- ◆ ◆ Stand ready to resume military cooperation with New Zealand when it changes its antinuclear policies that have been making such cooperation impossible.

U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

While intended to provide a Southern Pacific counterpart to the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the ANZUS Alliance requires a less formal commitment from its members than does NATO and requires no permanent staff or assigned military forces. Australia and New Zealand sent Air Force Army and Navy forces to help prevent communist expansion in South Korea, and both sent Army units to help U.S. forces in Vietnam.

Until the U.S. and New Zealand ceased cooperating militarily in 1985, the ANZUS allies worked together broadly in such military activities as the 1951 Radford-Collins agreement, which defines respective naval escort duties, multilateral military exercises like the biannual RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific) naval exercise, and several intelligence-sharing activities.

Extensive Cooperation. Despite New Zealand's rejection of its responsibilities under ANZUS, Washington's military cooperation with Australia remains extensive. Last November, Washington and Canberra signed a new ten-year agreement covering jointly manned electronic intelligence-monitoring facilities in Australia.¹ The U.S. also maintains a military communication facility on Australia's Northwest Cape and a support facility in Christchurch, New Zealand, for Antarctic research.

Following its major 1987 defense review, Australia has begun an arms modernization program that includes new frigates, modern submarines, and up to 75 F-18 *Hornet* fighter-bombers. Australia will contribute to the region's stability by stationing F-18s and P-3C *Orion* antisubmarine aircraft in Malaysia and expanding military cooperation with Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Thailand.²

Huge Soviet Fleet. Australia's forces will help the U.S. counter a growing Soviet military threat in the Pacific region. Despite Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's skillful peace initiatives for Asia, the Soviet Pacific Fleet is now the second largest in the Soviet Navy and contains some of the most modern Soviet ships. This fleet boasts two *Kiev*-class antisubmarine cruisers carrying vertical take-off jet fighters, the nuclear-powered cruiser *Frunze*, and 83 attack submarines, of which 50 are nuclear-powered. It also includes the very modern *Akula* class, plus 90 *Backfire* attack bombers.³ In the early 1990s these forces will be supplemented by larger *Blackjack* attack bombers and a *Tblisi*-class nuclear powered aircraft carrier, which may carry modern Sukhoi SU-27 *Flanker* fighter-bombers.⁴

From their major base in Vietnam's Cam Ranh Bay, the 25 or so Soviet Navy ships and submarines plus 16 to 20 older TU-16 *Badger* strike bombers threaten Southeast Asian sea lanes which are important to Australia and New Zealand. This threat will grow if Moscow moves supersonic *Backfire* bombers and the much larger *Blackjack* bombers to Cam Ranh Bay. Currently, the Soviets are checked by U.S. air and naval forces based in the Philippines, but the stationing of U.S. forces there is strongly opposed by nationalist and

1 "Australia, U.S. Sign Accord On Two Bases," *The Washington Post*, November 23, 1988, p. A15.

2 Hon. Kim C. Beazley, MP, Minister of Defense, "Australia and the Region: The Next Twenty Years," address to the 61st Annual Summer School, The University of Western Australia, January 17, 1989.

3 International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1988-1989* (London:IISS, 1988), p. 43.

4 Norman Polmar, "The New Soviet Carrier," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1988, p. 66.

leftist Philippine politicians and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The CPP is fighting to overthrow the Philippines' democratic government and is also developing ties with Moscow.⁵ Possible South Pacific alternatives for the U.S. to the Philippine bases, whose leases expire in 1991, include Australia, Guam, Palau, and Tinian. Australia supports the continued U.S. military presence in the Philippines, but last January, Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans stated Australia would consider hosting U.S. forces if they leave the Philippines.⁶

Soviet Target. New Zealand's attitude toward ANZUS has helped Moscow's efforts to undermine U.S. interests in the South Pacific. New Zealand's antinuclear policies lend credibility to a wider South Pacific antinuclear movement that seeks to deny alternative military bases to the U.S. This movement is supported by pro-Soviet trade unions in Australia and New Zealand. For example, the 1978 meeting of the Soviet-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions decided that Australian and New Zealand unions would promote a "nuclear free" South Pacific. In 1980 these unions formed the Pacific Trade Union Community; its goal, apparently, is to radicalize the political systems of developing South Pacific island states. This group helped form the Fiji Labor Party in 1985, which promised a strict antinuclear policy.⁷ The Fiji Labor Party won a 1987 election but was soon overthrown by a military coup.

In recent years Moscow has aggressively sought trade and diplomatic ties with developing South Pacific island states. Moscow signed fishing agreements with Kiribati in 1985, and Vanuatu in 1987, but both agreements lapsed after one year. Moscow now seeks fishing deals with Australia and the Forum Fisheries Agency, which manages fishing agreements for fourteen South Pacific island states.⁸ These agreements would be militarily useful to Moscow because Soviet fishing ships are integrated into the Soviet Navy's intelligence network.

Sensitive Space Program Sites. The U.S. needs to deny the Soviets access to bases in the South Pacific to prevent Moscow from threatening U.S. outer space defenses being developed there. The Kwajelain Atoll of the Marshall Islands, a former U.S. territory, hosts a major testing facility for strategic missiles and for the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. In July 1987, it is

5 See the author's "Gorbachev's Philippine Initiative," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 13, 1988, p. 10.

6 January 26, 1989, interview on GMA 7 Radio-Television Network, Manila, in *FBIS-East Asia*, January 26, 1989, p. 55.

7 "Western complacency opens door for Moscow in South Pacific," *News Weekly* (Melbourne), January 14, 1987, p. 9.

8 "Soviets Seek Fishing Deals in South Pacific," *Agence France Presse*, Hong Kong, April 2, 1989, in *FBIS-East Asia*, April 4, 1989, p. 89.

believed that Soviet naval commandos penetrated Kwajelain and stole U.S. missile parts.⁹

The Soviets probably want access to South Pacific territory for the Soviet space program. From current launch sites in the Soviet Union, Soviet spacecraft enter outer space over the South Pacific.¹⁰ The Soviets in recent years have begun to deploy space-tracking radar ships to the South Pacific.

NEW ZEALAND'S ANTINUCLEAR POLICY

New Zealand's Labor Party's adoption of a strict antinuclear policy in 1984 reflected that party's political evolution away from the country's traditional support of Western alliances.¹¹ Many of the current generation of Labor leaders, like Prime Minister David Lange, did not share the World War II experience, in which the U.S. helped save New Zealand from naval blockade and possible invasion by Japan. Instead, many of these leaders began their political careers protesting the Vietnam War.

During the 1970s, the New Zealand Labor Party became a leading opponent of nuclear power and weapons. This antinuclear stance was fueled by the popular opposition in New Zealand to French nuclear testing in the South Pacific in the 1960s and 1970s. The Labor government of Norman Kirk adopted a policy in 1972 that excluded nuclear propelled ships from New Zealand territory. This was reversed in 1976 by the National Party government of Sir Robert Muldoon. But by the late 1970s, a moral antinuclear stand was becoming part of a developing New Zealand nationalism that emphasized New Zealand's links to the Pacific.

Radical History. The Labor Party's antinuclear stance was promoted also by radical anti-ANZUS trade unions. In 1984, Jim Knox, President of the New Zealand Federation of Labor, then the largest union coalition, proclaimed to a meeting of the Pacific Trade Union Federation, "We do not want the United States or the ANZUS Pact. We want to see it destroyed."¹² Also pushing the anti-ANZUS line was the Socialist Unity Party (SUP); with only 200 to 300 members, it is the major pro-Soviet communist party in New

9 Andrew Rosenthal, "Tale of a Soviet Cap and a Missing Flight Recorder," *The New York Times*, January 12, 1989, p. A 20.

10 Aadu Karemaa, "What Would Mahan Say About Space Power?" *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, April 1988, p. 48.

11 Colin James, *The Quiet Revolution* (Wellington: Unwin and Allen, 1986), p. 174.

12 Anthony J. Neary, "Communist Infiltration of the New Zealand Trade Union Movement," Draft, March 1987, p. 8.

Zealand. SUP President Ken Douglas is now President of the Council of Trade Unions, currently the largest collective bargaining body in New Zealand. In 1981 the Soviet Ambassador to New Zealand was expelled after he was caught personally giving money to a SUP member.

Concession to Unions. Before the 1984 national election, the left wing of the Labor Party, backed by antinuclear activist and SUP-generated union votes, gained dominance in the party's policy-making National Executive Committee.¹³ Because of trade union strength in the party, it is widely believed that non-communist Labor leaders backed a strict "nuclear free" policy, as a concession to antinuclear activists and unions, with the understanding they would not oppose Labor's free market economic policies.¹⁴

In the July 1984 general election, the Labor Party played up fears that U.S. warships, which regularly visited New Zealand and possibly could be carrying nuclear weapons, would invite a nuclear attack on New Zealand. After Labor won, it banned nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships and aircraft from its territory, and proposed a law that would codify the ban. The U.S. suspended ship visits to New Zealand after the 1984 election to avoid a confrontation, but Washington made clear to Wellington that it would not compromise its longstanding policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. ships or aircraft.

At times, Labor Prime Minister David Lange appeared to favor compromise with Washington. In January 1985, seeking to avoid a showdown, the U.S. requested permission to send the conventionally powered destroyer *USS Buchanan* to visit New Zealand.¹⁵ But when antinuclear forces claimed that the ship might be nuclear-armed, the Labor government gave in to their pressure and denied the ship port entry.

Downgrading Relations. By that March, Washington had suspended military exercises and intelligence exchange agreements with New Zealand. The White House also downgraded relations with Wellington by barring any State Department officials above the rank of Assistant Secretary to meet with New Zealand diplomats. In June 1986, Washington withdrew formal security guarantees to New Zealand. Technically, both countries remain members of the original ANZUS pact.

The Lange government has tried to make a virtue of its antinuclear stance, saying it only wants to withdraw from the nuclear aspects of the alliance, while being ready to meet alliance defense obligations in a conventional

13 "Lange denounces communist infiltration of NZ Labour," *News Weekly* (Melbourne), June 1, 1988, p. 4; "Socialist Unity Party tightens grip on 'peace' politics," *Plain Talk, The Journal of the Plains Club* (Christchurch), October 1987, p. 1.

14 James, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

15 Robert Manning, "Non-collision course," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 31, 1985, p. 26.

manner. In November 1987, however, Labor passed a strict New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone law, which essentially codifies the criteria that Labor used to deny port entry to the *USS Buchanan*. Besides banning nuclear weapons on New Zealand territory, this law states that no New Zealand citizen, outside the nuclear free zone, shall "aid, abet, or procure any person to manufacture, acquire, possess, or have control over any nuclear explosive device."¹⁶ This law would appear to make conventional alliance cooperation with U.S. forces illegal as long as they possess nuclear weapons. Lange repeatedly has said ANZUS is a "non-nuclear" alliance. Yet, New Zealand leaders who signed the 1951 ANZUS Treaty realized the increasing importance of nuclear weapons and the importance for the U.S. to have nuclear weapons to deter Soviet nuclear attack.¹⁷ Lange himself rejected the concept of nuclear deterrence, even after his Foreign Minister, in a speech the previous day, had credited deterrence with having preserved peace for 40 years.¹⁸

Soviet Connection. The Labor Party's policies could become even more anti-U.S. At its annual conference last September, resolutions were passed calling for the adoption of a "non-aligned" foreign policy, active promotion of its antinuclear policy, and economic assistance to the communist government of Nicaragua.¹⁹ And Labor MP Sonja Davies, the Chairman of the Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs, is also a Vice-President of the Soviet-controlled World Peace Council.²⁰ But there is opposition to communists in the Labor Party. Last year Lange denounced Socialist Unity Party infiltration of Labor after they tried to unseat one of his Cabinet ministers.²¹

Labor's main opposition is, of course, the National Party. While it prefers to keep nuclear weapons out of New Zealand, it rejects Labor's unilateral policies that have made military cooperation with the U.S. impossible. National Party Leader Jim Bolger accuses Lange of wanting to get out of ANZUS.²² Should it win the election scheduled for late next year, the National Party is expected to seek to resume alliance cooperation with Washington.

16 No. 86, 1987, New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control, An Act to establish a New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone....

17 J.G. Starke, *The ANZUS Treaty Alliance* (Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1965), p. 230.

18 Richard Long, "Deterrence idea firmly rejected," *The Dominion* (Wellington), March 17, 1988.

19 New Zealand Labour Party 1988 Annual Conference, Remit Book, September 2 to 5, Dunedin Centre, p. 35.

20 "Pro-Soviet activist heads Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee," *Plain Talk, The Journal of the Plains Club* May 1988, p. 1.

21 "Lange denounces communist infiltration of NZ Labor," *News Weekly*, June 1, 1988, p. 4.

22 Hon. J.B. Bolger, Address to the New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, "Restoring Credibility: The Defense and Foreign Policy of the New Zealand National Party," July 9, 1987.

National Party leaders stress, however, that the election outcome will be determined more by economic than by foreign policy issues. New Zealand unemployment is now about 12 percent.²³ In addition, the Labor Party's consensus on economic issues has broken down. His recent firing of Finance Minister Roger Douglas led to Lange's most serious leadership crisis to date.

IMPACT ON NEW ZEALAND OF THE ANZUS SPLIT

New Zealand currently faces few visible military threats. But without the protective U.S. security umbrella, New Zealand becomes vulnerable during some future war. New Zealand's small naval defense force of four aging *Leander*-class frigates and 6 P-3 *Orion* antisubmarine aircraft would not be able to defeat the most modern Soviet attack submarines. Political support for the military has been traditionally low, but the Armed Forces of New Zealand have a strong professional reputation. This had been possible largely because of their access to U.S. intelligence, advanced U.S. military technology, and rigorous training with U.S. forces.

Lange has been trying to pursue a defense policy of what he calls "greater self-reliance" along with greater cooperation with Australia, as outlined in a recent New Zealand defense review. And he has boosted defense spending somewhat. So far, however, there have been only modest defense improvements. A new refueling tanker has been added to the Navy, and the Air Force's 22 A-4 *Skyhawk* jet fighters are being upgraded with advanced radars.

Opposition by Military. This is far from "self-reliance." And even this is under attack by the left wing of the Labor Party. New Zealand has not been able to compensate for the loss of access to U.S. intelligence, U.S. spare parts, ammunition stocks, and the knowledge of new developments in military doctrine that had been available in its ANZUS relationship.²⁴ New Zealand military officers have strongly opposed Labor's antinuclear policies. This may account for an increasing number of resignations by military officers.²⁵

New Zealand has increased military cooperation with Australia, and Canberra has been bearing some of the cost of the added exercises. In return, New Zealand is being pressed to buy Australia-made weapons. Australia is building eight new frigates, and wants Wellington to buy four. This is straining Australia-New Zealand relations, and has increased criticism of Lange from

23 This figure in New Zealand includes individuals on government-funded work programs. The U.S. does not include this category in unemployment figures, so a comparable New Zealand figure would be 6 percent.

24 Peter Jennings, *The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences*, Wellington: New Zealand Institute for International Affairs, p. 86.

25 *Ibid.*, pp. 44, 101.

the left wing of Labor Party.²⁶ Meanwhile, the modest boost in New Zealand defense outlays may be rolled far back; a March government-commissioned report suggests a 12 percent cut in defense spending. This may prevent New Zealand from replacing aging ships and aircraft.²⁷

New Zealand's break from ANZUS has damaged its credibility abroad. The Tory government of Britain strongly opposes New Zealand's stand and has muted its support of New Zealand in trade disputes with the Common Market countries. In the South Pacific, former New Zealand defense guarantees carried some weight because of the U.S. alliance. Today, these guarantees mean little.²⁸

IMPACT ON THE U.S.

Like the vocal opposition to the deployment of U.S. nuclear cruise missiles and Pershing II intermediate range missiles in Europe in the early 1980s, the ANZUS crisis has tested Washington's ability to promote an allied consensus on nuclear issues. The failure of the European antinuclear campaign and the subsequent deployment of the missiles demonstrated NATO resolve. In contrast, New Zealand's antinuclear policies so far have succeeded in weakening ANZUS. This should be considered a victory for Moscow. Indeed, the ANZUS crisis has also shown that Western democracies are vulnerable to Soviet political manipulation. Moscow's patient cultivation of New Zealand trade unions, through the Socialist Unity Party, helped influence the New Zealand Labor government's decision to adopt strict antinuclear policies.

The crisis with New Zealand has brought the U.S. and Australia closer together. Though the Australian Labor Party (ALP) has a loud antinuclear lobby, ALP Prime Minister Bob Hawke has remained a strong supporter of ANZUS and rejects New Zealand's antinuclear policies.

Controversial Treaty. One U.S. problem with Australian relations, however, involves Washington's refusal, in February 1987, to sign protocols to the 1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. This treaty has been signed by fifteen South Pacific countries including Australia and New Zealand. The protocols, offered only to the nuclear weapons powers, would commit those countries not to station, use, or test nuclear weapons within the zone. Britain

26 Colin James, "Naval maneuvers," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 2, 1989, p. 12.

27 Colin James, "Lean and hungry," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, March 23, 1989, p. 34.

28 Air Marshal Sir Ewan Jamieson, "Folly of irrational nuclear policy," *Pacific Defense Reporter*, October 1988, p. 35.

and France also refuse to sign the protocols; Moscow and Beijing have signed. Australia's Labor government helped write this treaty, which it feels represents the antinuclear aspirations of the South Pacific island states.²⁹

Washington refused to sign the protocols because it would preclude the U.S. from stationing nuclear weapons on the U.S. territory of American Samoa, which is in the treaty zone, and also because of concerns that the treaty might limit U.S. military flexibility needed to maintain nuclear deterrence.³⁰ While Canberra still wants Washington to sign the protocols, its refusal to do so has not damaged overall U.S.-Australia relations.

Courting Pacific Nations. The ANZUS crisis has prompted Washington to increase its diplomatic and economic presence in the South Pacific. The U.S. is doing more to assist the economic development of the small island states and to counter Soviet initiatives in the region. In 1987, for example, Washington signed an agreement with the fifteen South Pacific states regarding U.S. fishing access to their territorial waters. As part of this agreement, Washington agreed to provide these states \$10 million in aid over five years. This year the aid will total \$4 million; this is a relatively large amount for a group whose combined population is only about five million.

The U.S. also has opened new embassies with nonresident ambassadors, in the Solomon Islands and Western Samoa. Washington suspended military and economic aid to Fiji after that country's 1987 coup, but economic aid has been requested by the Administration for fiscal 1990. Washington has started sending military aid program to Papua New Guinea. Australia and New Zealand, however, will remain the primary aid donors to the South Pacific. In fiscal 1989, Australia will provide \$319.7 million, and New Zealand will provide \$39.9 million in assistance to the region.

RESOLVING THE ANZUS CRISIS

When New Zealand's Labor government in 1972 declared a "nuclear free" policy, Washington chose not to challenge Wellington in order to avoid inflaming New Zealand nationalism. Washington's patience was rewarded in 1976 when the succeeding National government of Sir Robert Muldoon reversed the Labor Party's policies. Though Washington has reacted to the current Labor government's antinuclear policies by ending military cooperation with Wellington, New Zealand's Labor government has not reversed its policy. It seems likely that Wellington will change its policy only if Labor loses the next election.

29 Ambassador Rawdon Dalrymple, "A Modest Request for a Nuclear-Free South Pacific," *International Herald Tribune*, January 17-18, 1987, p. 4.

30 Statement before the Subcommittee On Asian And Pacific Affairs, Committee On Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives, Rear Admiral Edward D. Baker, Jr., Director, East Asian And The Pacific Region, Office Of The Secretary Of Defense, International Security Affairs, June 9, 1987, pp. 4,5.

Nonetheless, George Bush should not reverse U.S. military policy toward New Zealand. To do so would reward behavior that has threatened the West's system of nuclear deterrence. New Zealand does not merit the benefits of Western Alliance membership if it is not willing to carry the responsibilities accepted by all other countries that have defense treaties with the U.S.

Standing Firm. The Bush Administration also should continue limiting to low levels the meetings between U.S. and New Zealand officials. This symbolic gesture demonstrates continued U.S. displeasure with New Zealand's antinuclear policies.

The Bush Administration should not sign the protocols of the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. The restriction on stationing of nuclear weapons in the Zone, as stated in Protocol Two, could be used by a future Australian government to restrict U.S.-Australia military cooperation.³¹ Increased cooperation between Canberra and Washington may become necessary if the U.S. is forced to vacate Philippine bases.

While the U.S. should not lift the restrictions it has placed on military cooperation with New Zealand, it should not wait until the next New Zealand election to try to reverse the damage to ANZUS caused by the Labor government. The longer the crisis lingers, the greater the chance that New Zealand public support for the alliance will wane.³² The Bush Administration should seek to rebuild public support for the alliance in New Zealand and to further enhance stability in the South Pacific.

To do this, the Bush Administration should:

- ◆ ◆ Increase the resources allocated to the U.S. Information Agency to expand speaker and other visitor exchange programs to build support for ANZUS in New Zealand. Currently USIA is allocated about \$6.7 million for such programs in the South Pacific. This is slated to be cut to \$6.3 million for fiscal 1990, but it should be increased to \$7 million. This additional money would allow students and opinion leaders from New Zealand and the South Pacific island states to visit the U.S. Also, Washington's Ambassador to New Zealand should speak out boldly in support of ANZUS.

- ◆ ◆ Expand military cooperation with Australia to include a greater number of bilateral military exercises and Australian participation in U.S. military exercises in Southeast Asia.

- ◆ ◆ Increase U.S. military contacts in the South Pacific island states. This should include increased ship visits and visits of the U.S. Army Corp of

31 See the author's, "Why The U.S. Must Oppose The South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone," *Asian Studies Backgrounder* No. 55, December 23, 1986, p. 10.

32 "Regional Security Developments In The South Pacific," Report Of A Minority Staff Study Mission To Honolulu; Fiji; Vanuatu; Auckland And Wellington, New Zealand; Sydney and Canberra, Australia, November 28 to December 13, 1988, TO The Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, March 1989, p. 17.

Engineers and Marine "Seabees," when needed, to help these small island states recover from the region's frequent hurricanes and typhoons.

◆ ◆ Urge Australia and New Zealand to identify publicly Soviet front organizations that seek to undermine Western interests in the South Pacific. Washington also should identify these groups in order to help discredit them.

Washington must be ready to resume military cooperation with New Zealand when and if it removes the antinuclear restrictions that currently make that cooperation impossible. As soon as New Zealand states its intention to remove the restrictions, for example, the Administration should lift its ban on high-level diplomatic contacts with New Zealand officials. The Bush Administration should seek assurances from Wellington that New Zealand leaders will promote public support for a reconstituted ANZUS.

CONCLUSION

In Western Europe, early this decade, the U.S. and its allies defeated an antinuclear movement trying to halt the deployment of U.S. missiles in response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles. A similar antinuclear movement, however, has prevailed in New Zealand. As in Europe, Soviet front groups have played an important role in undermining the ANZUS Alliance, especially in New Zealand. Moscow seeking political and military advantage in the South Pacific island states.

Rebuilding the Relationship. The Reagan Administration reacted correctly to these developments by ending U.S. military cooperation with New Zealand. The Bush Administration should continue this policy until New Zealand changes its antinuclear policies. At the same time, the Bush Administration should seek to rebuild support in New Zealand for ANZUS and expand U.S. military cooperation with Australia and other South Pacific island states.

New Zealand once was a part of the West and a member of the Western Alliance. One day it again may be so. The U.S. must be ready to encourage this and welcome New Zealand back.

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