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WASHINGTON SHOULD LISTEN TO ITS FRIENDS AND TAKE A MORE ACTIVE ROLE IN CAMBODIA

INTRODUCTION

January begins the dry season in Cambodia and with it, traditionally, military offensives. Since diplomatic talks — most recently the Paris Peace Conference on Cambodia last August — have failed to negotiate a settlement, anticipation is building that there will be a major increase in fighting next month between the pro-Soviet Cambodian regime in Phnom Penh, which in April changed its name from the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) to the State of Cambodia, and the U.N.-recognized Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a resistance coalition comprised of the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge; the Western-backed Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF); and the non-communist Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS).

While fighting is likely to increase, the United States, China, and the vast majority of non-communist nations showed remarkable unanimity in the United Nations General Assembly last month, when it voted for the eleventh time since 1978 on the Cambodian issue. The resulting U.N. resolution, supported by a record 124 nations and opposed only by India and the Soviet Union and its allies, called for a comprehensive political settlement in Cambodia that would include an interim government composed of all four warring factions, to be followed by internationally supervised elections.

Supporting Diplomatic Solutions. U.S. policy toward Cambodia for the last decade generally has conformed to the U.N. resolutions by denying diplomatic recognition to the Phnom Penh regime, supporting the

non-communist factions of the CGDK, and calling for U.N. observer forces to confirm the Vietnamese military withdrawal. The U.S. also has pledged its support for the diplomatic solutions backed by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), composed of the non-communist nations of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Like ASEAN, Washington sees the formation of an interim coalition government and subsequent supervised elections as the best way of demobilizing the formidable Khmer Rouge guerrilla organization, guaranteeing greater participation from the two non-communist factions in an interim coalition government, and bringing a semblance of economic and political stability to Phnom Penh.

This is in U.S. interests because stability in Cambodia will end a direct military threat on the border of Thailand; will ease the world refugee problem by allowing hundreds of thousands of refugees inside Thailand to return to Cambodia; and will remove a major stumbling block for improved U.S. relations with both Cambodia and Vietnam.

Aiding Non-Communist Resistance. While favoring a negotiated diplomatic settlement to the Cambodian issue, the U.S. has joined ASEAN in extending material support to the two non-communist Cambodian resistance factions. In 1979, Washington began providing small amounts of non-lethal covert aid to anti-communist resistance bands along the Cambodian border. By 1989, annual U.S. covert aid to the KPNLF and ANS was estimated at \$24 million. In addition, since 1985, Congress has approved non-lethal overt aid to the non-communist resistance. This totalled \$5 million last year; \$7 million has been requested for the current fiscal year.

Since coming to office, the Bush Administration has paid increased attention to the Cambodian issue and has called for increased assistance to the KPNLF and ANS forces. Such aid has become especially important following recent military gains made by them since October. Because the KPNLF and ANS have attracted new recruits and have depleted many of their supplies, including almost all of their anti-tank weapons, these gains have led to heightened calls from the guerrilla forces for material assistance. Aid also is needed for the refugees in zones liberated by the non-communists in northwestern Cambodia.

While pursuing a two-track approach of assisting the non-communist factions while pushing for a negotiated settlement, George Bush should heed the public and private requests ASEAN has made for years and take a more active role in Cambodia. Specifically, Bush should:

- ◆ ◆ Seek an immediate increase to \$10 million in non-lethal U.S. overt assistance to the KPNLF and ANS non-communist Cambodian resistance.
- ◆ ◆ Resist congressional efforts to curb his ability to provide lethal aid to the non-communist Cambodian resistance.
- ◆ ◆ Challenge Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to halt the shipment of major Soviet weapons systems to Phnom Penh.

- ◆ ◆ Announce early that Vice President Dan Quayle will lead the U.S. delegation to the next international conference on Cambodia, anticipated to take place in either Jakarta or Paris early next year.
- ◆ ◆ Stress to Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan the need to maintain a unified ASEAN position on Cambodia, so that Chatichai does not undercut pressure on the Phnom Penh regime.
- ◆ ◆ Insist that all persons responsible for the 1970s genocide in Cambodia, including those currently in the Hun Sen government, be investigated and punished as part of a negotiated settlement.

FAILED NEUTRALITY

Beginning with the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina which ended French colonial rule in Southeast Asia, Cambodia officially adopted a “neutral” foreign policy. For almost a decade this generally translated into cordial ties with Washington, which was then Phnom Penh’s major economic and military aid donor. In January 1964, however, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Cambodia’s young, extremely mercurial monarch, unilaterally rejected all U.S. assistance programs to protest growing U.S. military involvement in neighboring South Vietnam.

By 1966, Sihanouk’s neutral foreign policy had shifted decidedly leftward. Cambodia’s relations with China and the Soviet Union grew close as Phnom Penh received military shipments from both Beijing and Moscow. More telling was Sihanouk’s acquiescence to North Vietnamese use of the Cambodian port of Sihanoukville (now called Kompong Som) to ship huge amounts of weaponry to communist sanctuaries along the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border. By 1968, in fact, U.S. military intelligence estimated that 80 percent of communist arms reaching the Mekong Delta in South Vietnam passed through Sihanoukville.

Balancing Act. In contrast to its warm ties with Hanoi and Beijing, Phnom Penh was cool – even hostile – toward Saigon and Washington. In 1969, however, Sihanouk moderated this course and decided to improve relations with the U.S. The U.S. dispatched a small military delegation to Cambodia and began to discuss reopening its embassy in Phnom Penh. At the same time, while still granting permission for the North Vietnamese to ship armaments through Cambodian ports, Sihanouk allowed the U.S. to conduct B-52 bombing raids against North Vietnamese sanctuaries in eastern Cambodia.

By early 1970, Sihanouk’s precarious balancing act between Moscow, Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi began to fall apart. Cambodia’s economy was in shambles, and the Royal Cambodian Army was incensed over Sihanouk’s virtual concession of eastern Cambodia to North Vietnamese control. In March of that year, the Cambodian National Assembly, with the active encouragement of the military and the students, unanimously voted

Sihanouk out of power and replaced the Royal Government with a pro-Western Republic.

CIVIL WAR, GENOCIDE, AND INVASION

During the next two years, Khmer Republican military forces fought pitched battles against three veteran North Vietnamese army divisions. By early 1973, after breaking the back of the Republican army, the North Vietnamese withdrew the bulk of their infantry units and turned over the battlefield to the communist Khmer Rouge. Until then an obscure, fragmented guerrilla movement with factions aligned to both China and North Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge had as its chief spokesman Prince Sihanouk, who had loaned his support to the anti-Republican forces following his ouster in 1970. Sihanouk's popularity in the countryside assisted greatly in giving the Khmer Rouge a widespread appeal among the Cambodian peasantry.

Two Million Dead. Between 1973 and 1975, the Khmer Rouge strengthened its forces considerably and in April 1975 militarily defeated the Khmer Republic. What followed was a holocaust. Cities and towns quickly were emptied by the Khmer Rouge. It imposed a draconian policy of agrarian communism and severe political repression. Scores of thousands of Cambodians died almost immediately from the starvation that swept the country. Hundreds of thousands more perished from the massive shifts of population across the countryside and in forced labor camps. Still hundreds of thousands more were killed when Khmer Rouge factions began attacking each other. It is estimated that as many as two million Cambodians died during Khmer Rouge rule, headed by Prime Minister Pol Pot.

In December 1978, following border skirmishes with the Khmer Rouge on land and at sea, Vietnam invaded Cambodia and drove the Khmer Rouge from power. On January 7, 1979, Hanoi established the pro-Vietnamese People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) puppet government in Phnom Penh. In an ironic twist, former Khmer Rouge officials from the eastern provinces of Cambodia assumed leadership roles within the PRK. These ex-Khmer Rouge cadres had been trained by the North Vietnamese in the 1970s and, after being attacked by other Khmer Rouge factions during 1976-77, had fled to Vietnam. Because pro-Chinese factions of the Khmer Rouge under the command of Pol Pot were more closely linked to the genocide that swept Cambodia, media reports have generally been less critical of the "eastern" Khmer Rouge that shifted to the PRK. The "eastern" Khmer Rouge, however, proved no less brutal than other factions of the organization. Examples:

◆ ◆ In September 1973, sixteen Khmer Rouge battalions from the Eastern Region attacked Kompong Cham, the third largest Cambodian city. Commanding the operation was the Eastern Region military leadership, which included Hun Sen and Heng Samrin, later the Prime Minister and President of the PRK, respectively. During the initial phases of the attack,

the guerrillas threw hand grenades and plastic explosives into still-occupied houses.¹ They subsequently overran two hospitals in the city, into which they threw hand grenades and then slit the throats of critically ill patients. This attack is widely considered the most brutal Khmer Rouge operation of the entire 1970-1975 war.²

◆ ◆ While the Eastern Region Khmer Rouge leadership kept much of its autonomy in eastern Cambodia by maintaining sole responsibility for military operations east of the Mekong River, they often fought alongside what have been traditionally termed by some journalists as more “hardline” Khmer Rouge in the southern and northwestern regions. For example, Eastern Region contingents of up to two regiments were fighting in the outskirts of Phnom Penh in December 1973,³ and participated in pitched battles along the Bassac River throughout 1974. During these campaigns, the eastern Khmer Rouge allegedly were responsible for torching entire villages and for atrocities against the civilian population in “liberated” zones.

◆ ◆ During 1973-1974, tens of thousands of refugees fled from areas held by the Eastern Region Khmer Rouge to Republican government-held enclaves to escape brutal treatment and repression. This figure was little different from the number of refugees fleeing from areas controlled by other regional factions of Khmer Rouge.⁴

◆ ◆ Most of the leading figures currently in the Phnom Penh government held positions of influence in the Khmer Rouge regime. Among them: Prime Minister Hun Sen, a former Khmer Rouge regiment commander and reportedly leader of the largest Khmer Rouge cross-border massacre of civilians inside Vietnam⁵; Assistant to the Prime Minister Hor Nam Hong, reported to be the former commander of a Khmer Rouge re-education camp where at least nine of Prince Sihanouk’s former officials perished with their families; President Heng Samrin, a Khmer Rouge division commander under Pol Pot; and National Assembly Chairman Chea Sim, a former member of Pol Pot’s National Assembly and until recently Interior Minister and head of the PRK’s secret police. Armed Forces Chief of the General Staff Pol Saroeun, Politburo Member Mat Ly, Minister of Trade Tang Sareoum, and Interior Minister Sin Song also held influential positions in the Pol Pot government.

◆ ◆ Since it assumed power in 1979, the Hun Sen regime in Phnom Penh has continued systematically violating human rights and has tortured and killed its enemies. According to witnesses interviewed by a private human

1 *The Washington Post*, September 10, 1973, p. 1.

2 *Monthly Situation Report: September 1973*, U.S. Defense Attache’s Office, Phnom Penh.

3 *Monthly Situation Report: December 1973*, U.S. Defense Attache’s Office, Phnom Penh.

4 *Monthly Situation Report: February 1974*, U.S. Defense Attache’s Office, Phnom Penh.

5 FBIS-East Asia, February 7, 1989, p. 51.

rights delegation in the summer of 1989, “disappearances” of opponents to the Hun Sen government continue on a wide scale.⁶

A DECADE OF VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION

For a decade after 1978, the PRK regime was kept in place by a 200,000-man Vietnamese occupation army. The Vietnamese military, however, was frustrated in its attempts to wrest control of the countryside from the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), the anti-Vietnamese grouping established in 1982 combining the Chinese-supported Khmer Rouge, the anti-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF), and the non-communist Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS).

In December 1988, after failing to consolidate control of the Cambodian countryside from the CGDK and following its longstanding promise to remove its military forces from Cambodia by 1990, Vietnam announced a major reduction in its Cambodian occupational forces. While six previous “withdrawals” beginning in July 1982 proved to be no more than troop rotations, the December reduction, in fact, did reduce substantially Vietnamese strength in Cambodia. By this August, only 26,000 Vietnamese soldiers remained on Cambodian soil. Although Hanoi claimed the following month to have removed all its forces, Phnom Penh refuses to allow objective international observers to verify these claims. Indeed, numerous credible sources report that Vietnamese forces remain in Cambodia. Moreover, the U.N. General Assembly overwhelmingly approved a resolution last month skeptical of Vietnam's announced withdrawal.

Failed Negotiations. While Vietnam was reducing its forces in Cambodia, diplomatic activity to produce a Cambodian settlement increased sharply. Most notable were the two Jakarta Informal Meetings (JIM) held this spring in Indonesia and the conference held in Paris during July and August. These meetings failed to negotiate a settlement, due primarily to the refusal of the Hanoi-based PRK regime to accept a U.N. observer mission to monitor the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and free elections in Cambodia, and to accept the participation of the Chinese backed-Khmer Rouge in an interim coalition government before elections take place.

While another international conference on Cambodia is proposed for early next year in either Jakarta or Paris, all four factions are expected to launch dry season military offensives in January. The military balance in Cambodia favors both the pro-Hanoi Phnom Penh forces under Prime Minister Hun Sen and the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge. Since early this year, the Hun Sen army has grown more active in the battlefield as it assumed a greater portion

6 Testimony by Kassie Neou before East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 2, 1989.

of combat responsibility from the Vietnamese forces. Currently, the PRK fields a conventionally equipped army of 45,000 men, an 800-man air force (flying MiG-21 fighter jets, light transports, and Mi-8 helicopters), and a 70,000-man provincial militia. Its forces have received a flood of weapons from the Soviet Union and Vietnam. Soviet supplies alone have given Hun Sen enough arms to equip a military "three times its size."⁷ Among items provided to Phnom Penh by Moscow are a squadron of MiG-21 jets, hundreds of medium battle tanks and armored personnel carriers, and massive 130mm long-range artillery pieces.

Khmer Rouge Victories. Despite this infusion of military aid, the Cambodian armed forces have been conspicuous by their lack of competence and aggression. For example, when Khmer Rouge forces attacked several towns in western Cambodia in September, the provincial militia fled the region without a fight. Phnom Penh's elite reserve unit, the 789 Division, as well as the veteran 196 Division and the crack 95 Regiment were rushed to the front but were decimated by Khmer Rouge forces near the town of Pailin in October.

Many military observers speculate that Hun Sen's forces will try to lure the CGDK into a conventional attack on the western city of Battambang in January. Should the CGDK do so, the flat, thinly forested terrain around the city could favor the conventional armor and artillery of Hun Sen's government forces. His strategy would be not unlike that of Najibullah, the Soviet-backed leader of Afghanistan's communist government, who has demonstrated an ability to inflict heavy casualties on the *Mujahideen* Freedom Fighters while defending cities with conventional weaponry.

Military opposition to the Phnom Penh regime comes primarily from the pro-Chinese Khmer Rouge. It fields approximately 40,000 men, of which 28,000 are believed to be main force guerrilla combatants, while the remainder are support personnel. The largest Khmer Rouge concentrations are in the southwestern Cardamon Mountains, with smaller pockets in the north and central portions of the country.

Reports of Brutality. Khmer Rouge leaders, including Khieu Samphan and military commander Son Sen, claim that their movement has purged those leaders closely connected with its former genocidal policies, including the notorious Pol Pot. Reports persist, however, that Pol Pot retains much influence in the organization. Moreover, documented accounts of brutality within its own ranks and in Khmer Rouge-run refugee camps along the Thai-Cambodian border have cast doubt on Khmer Rouge claims that it has reformed since being ousted in 1978.

While some members of the U.S. Congress have warned of a Khmer Rouge victory in Cambodia during recent months, it is unlikely that the Khmer Rouge could defeat the Phnom Penh regime militarily in the next one or two

⁷ *Asiaweek*, October 20, 1989, p. 31.

years. There are several reasons for this. First, although its troops seem highly disciplined, the Khmer Rouge force is only around one-third of its size in 1974, the year before it last captured Phnom Penh. Second, the Khmer Rouge presence east of the Mekong River is negligible, allowing the Hun Sen regime to receive unimpeded material assistance from Vietnam via land and river routes. Blockage of these routes had been key to the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975. Lastly, internal Khmer Rouge factionalism appears to remain a problem within and could inhibit coordinated action.

While the Khmer Rouge may not be able to march into Phnom Penh for the foreseeable future, they remain a major threat to Hun Sen rule in western and southwestern Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge is likely to concentrate on the cities of Sisophon, Battambang and Kompong Speu during its anticipated dry season offensive. Khmer Rouge strength, moreover, is unlikely to wane in the near future, even if China ceases supporting the organization. The Khmer Rouge long has been able to fend for itself by capturing food and weapons from government forces. Given the ease with which the Khmer Rouge recently captured equipment from Phnom Penh forces, as well as reports that they allegedly have stockpiled tons of Chinese weapons inside Cambodia, no reduction in Khmer Rouge activity can be expected.

Non-Communist Factions. Lagging behind Cambodia's two communist factions in size are the non-communist Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) and the Armee Nationale Sihanoukienne (ANS). The KPNLF currently numbers approximately 12,000 guerrillas concentrated in the northwest. Its weapons come from China and ASEAN sources. In October, West German-made *Armbrust* anti-tank rockets, believed to have been delivered through Singapore, were added to the KPNLF inventory and proved highly effective in countering Phnom Penh's armored forces.

Following four years of relative inactivity, the KPNLF launched a military offensive against the Hun Sen government this October. While it initially failed to reach the northwestern town of Sisophon, the offensive did capture several villages near the town. Fighting intensified in mid-November, with the KPNLF again making territorial gains around Sisophon.

Though not possessing the military threat of the Khmer Rouge, the KPNLF recently has attracted the attention of the Hun Sen regime. Military observers speculate that the Phnom Penh government would like to deal the KPNLF a military defeat, eliminating it as a political alternative and thus enabling the Hun Sen regime to present itself as the only alternative to a return of the Khmer Rouge.

Competent Leaders. The ANS operates out of staging areas along the northern border of Cambodia and fields approximately 12,000 guerrillas. Long active in psychological warfare operations deep inside Cambodia, the ANS in October started to increase its combat patrols in northern and central Cambodia. While it has yet to capture any major towns, ANS performance appears comparable to the KPNLF. Just as important as its military strength, the ANS boasts some very competent military and civilian leaders, including Prince Norodom Rannaridh, the son of Prince Sihanouk and the ANS's

commander-in-chief. With the severe shortage of educated leaders in Cambodia, these ANS officials could be expected to assure crucial roles in an interim coalition government.

TOWARD A MORE ACTIVE U.S. POLICY

From the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia until the end of the Reagan Administration ten years later, the U.S. avoided major involvement in the Cambodian conflict. Even with Ronald Reagan's professed support for anti-communist insurgencies, Cambodia remained far overshadowed by U.S. assistance efforts to freedom fighters in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua. In Cambodia, Washington deferred to supporting the ASEAN position, which amounted to advocating an interim coalition between the four Cambodian factions, diplomatic opposition to the Vietnamese occupation and Phnom Penh puppet government, and limited material assistance extended to the two non-communist resistance factions. Washington resisted ASEAN pressure for the U.S. to take a more active role in bringing about a negotiated settlement in Cambodia.

Since January, the Bush Administration repeatedly has pledged greater U.S. support for the non-communist Cambodian resistance. Yet the new Administration has been slow to turn its rhetoric into action. So little had been done to bolster the non-communist resistance by the late spring, in fact, that many in the U.S. and ASEAN were predicting that the May summit in Beijing between Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping would result in a superpower settlement on Cambodia without American participation. While this did not happen, the Bush Administration still must do more to help bring about a Cambodian solution that will ensure strong participation from the non-communist resistance in a post-conflict coalition government in Phnom Penh. In particular, the Bush Administration should:

1) Call for an immediate increase to \$10 million in non-lethal overt assistance to the non-communist Cambodian resistance.

Since 1985, the U.S. has extended small amounts of non-lethal assistance to the non-communist resistance, usually ranging from \$3.35 million to \$5 million a year. The resistance has appreciated the important symbolism of this support. The Bush Administration has requested \$7 million in non-lethal overt aid for fiscal 1990. However, given the recent military gains of the non-communist resistance, Bush should ask for more to help the non-communist resistance build upon these gains. Both non-communist resistance factions have expanded in the past six months and need to equip their new forces with uniforms, food rations, and medical supplies. In addition, as non-communist guerrillas penetrate further into Cambodia, they need to create supply caches deep inside the country. Moreover, as the KPNLF has captured towns in northwestern Cambodia, it has been forced to care for the civilian populations in this liberated territory. This further taxes its food and medical supplies. With the need to bolster the hand of the

non-communist factions to force the Phnom Penh regime to the negotiating table, to win the support of the peasant population in liberated areas, and to raise the international profile of the non-communists before an interim coalition is formed, the Bush Administration immediately should request that \$10 million in non-lethal aid be provided to the KPNLF and the ANS.

2) Resist congressional efforts to curb his ability to provide lethal aid to the non-communist Cambodian resistance.

The Bush Administration correctly has argued that it must have the option of supplying such lethal aid. The non-communist resistance already gets lethal aid, including U.S.-designed rifles and grenade launchers, from China and some members of ASEAN. These U.S.-designed weapons have raised morale significantly among the non-communist guerrillas by allowing them to distinguish themselves to the Cambodian population from the Chinese-equipped Khmer Rouge and Soviet-equipped Hun Sen forces.

Congressional opponents of lethal aid to the non-communist resistance argue that U.S. weapons will fall into the hands of the Khmer Rouge. This is unlikely. First one thing, the staging areas used by the non-communist resistance use along the Thai-Cambodian border are located far from Khmer Rouge staging areas. The non-communist rear logistic bases are adequately overseen by U.S. and ASEAN officials. This makes it unlikely that the Khmer Rouge would be able to steal U.S. supplies from non-communist depots. For another thing, the Khmer Rouge already receives sufficient amounts of supplies from Chinese sources and has no need to steal non-communist supplies. In cases when Khmer Rouge units in the field have had to replenish their stocks, they have captured communist bloc equipment from poorly defended targets like the provincial militia of the Hun Sen regime. Lastly, the non-communist resistance already has used limited numbers of U.S.-designed equipment for several years and none has fallen into the hands of the Khmer Rouge.

To keep open his option of supplying lethal aid, Bush should oppose strongly attempts by Congress to curb his ability to begin covert lethal assistance to the non-communist Cambodian resistance. Bush and other members of the Cabinet, particularly Vice President Dan Quayle and Secretary of State James Baker, should restate publicly their intention to provide lethal aid to the non-communist resistance. In addition, as Reagan called attention to the Cambodian resistance in last year's State of the Union Address, Bush this January in his State of the Union should call for lethal aid to the non-communist Cambodian resistance.

3) Challenge Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev to cease shipping major Soviet weapons systems to Phnom Penh.

The Soviet Union already has sent MiG-21 jet aircraft, tanks, and armored personnel carriers to Cambodia both directly and through Vietnam. Bush should ask Gorbachev to close this pipeline and to increase pressure on Hanoi to push the Hun Sen regime toward a U.N.-sponsored settlement. Moscow's influence over Hanoi is considerable; it is believed to give the

Vietnamese military \$3 billion in aid annually. Soviet pressure on Vietnam could be critical: a recent high-level Cambodian defector from the Hun Sen government recently admitted that Hanoi controls all aspects of Cambodian domestic and foreign affairs.

4) Announce early that Vice President Dan Quayle will lead the U.S. delegation to the next international conference on Cambodia, anticipated to convene early next year in either Jakarta or Paris.

During the Paris Conference on Cambodia this July and August, Secretary of State Baker led the U.S. delegation during the most important sessions of the conference. It is important that the U.S. continue sending a high-level delegation to the talks to convey the importance it attaches to a Cambodian settlement. Quayle has toured Cambodian refugee camps along the Thai border and discussed the Cambodian situation with ASEAN leaders this past spring; he also spearheaded the Administration's call for lethal aid to the non-communist resistance in June, including a major speech on the subject at The Heritage Foundation.

5) Stress to Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan the need to maintain a unified ASEAN position on Cambodia.

Until recently, ASEAN has spoken with one voice on the matter of bringing about a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian crisis. The U.S. has supported ASEAN's position on Cambodia, including support for the two non-communist Cambodian resistance factions, the formation of an interim coalition that would be followed by U.N.-supervised elections, and economic and diplomatic pressure against the Hun Sen regime. Over the past year, however, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan has broken ranks with his ASEAN colleagues and has advocated improved relations with both Hanoi and Phnom Penh. His motivation seems primarily from the economic benefits he envisions for Thai businessmen in Indochina's market. He has hurt ASEAN solidarity and, by indirectly lending legitimacy to the Phnom Penh government, has undercut international pressure on the Hun Sen regime to move toward a negotiated settlement.

Bush had been scheduled to discuss the Cambodian situation during Prime Minister Chatichai's visit to Washington last month, which was cancelled because of heavy casualties from a monsoon in southern Thailand. If the visit is re-scheduled, Bush should make it clear that the U.S. does not view favorably Chatichai's disregard for ASEAN's collective security. Since a stable Cambodian government that includes representatives from the non-communist factions also is in the interests of Thailand, Bush should urge the Thai Prime Minister to refrain from encouraging further diplomatic and economic contacts with the Hun Sen.

6) **Insist that all persons responsible for the genocide in Cambodia, including those currently in the Hun Sen government, be investigated and punished as part of a negotiated settlement.**

The international community generally agrees that those Khmer Rouge officials most closely associated with the genocide of 1975-1978, including Pol Pot, Ieng Sary, and Ta Mok, should not be allowed into a future Cambodian government. Many leading figures of the Hun Sen regime are equally guilty of Khmer Rouge atrocities. The U.S. should oppose double standards when dealing with officials from the Hun Sen regime and state its support for investigations of all former and current members of the Khmer Rouge. The U.S. should insist that these investigations be carried out once an interim coalition is formed and before U.N.-supervised elections are held. The investigations should be carried out by Cambodians, with the U.S. providing legal advise and diplomatic support.

CONCLUSION

It serves American interests to usher in stability to Cambodia after two decades of warfare and bloodshed. A stable Cambodia decreases the direct military threat to Thailand and will allow over 300,000 Cambodian refugees to return to their homeland from their squalid camps in Thailand along the border. In addition, U.N.-supported elections in Cambodia offer the hope of reintroducing democracy to Cambodia containing the threat from Khmer Rouge insurgents and dismantling the suppressive elements of the Hun Sen regime. A stable Cambodia could create ripples of economic and political reform in Vietnam and Laos, ultimately allowing Washington to improve its relations with Hanoi and Vientiane.

Living up to the Rhetoric. With military operations likely to increase next month, an international conference on Cambodia touted for early next year, and the overwhelming number of non-communist nations favoring a negotiated settlement that Washington long has supported, the time is right for the Bush Administration to live up to its rhetoric and implement a more active U.S. policy in Cambodia.

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