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The Bush-Gorbachev Mediterranean Summit

December 2-3, 1989

Challenging Moscow to End the Cold War

*By Leon Aron and
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THE BUSH-GORBACHEV MEDITERRANEAN SUMMIT

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CHALLENGING MOSCOW TO END THE COLD WAR

by Leon Aron and Jay P. Kosminsky

INTRODUCTION

George Bush heads for the Mediterranean next week to meet with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev aboard American and Soviet warships off the coast of Malta. It is the first time that the two leaders have met since Bush's election as President. They are meeting, of course, at a time of enormous ferment in Eastern Europe and enormous change in East-West relations. It is this that makes the Malta Summit momentous.

In an important sense, Bush arrives at the summit as the emerging victor in the Cold War. America's and the West's patience and tenacity in the past four decades are paying off. Yet Bush at the summit must not gloat. In victory he should not humiliate the Soviets but should carry a simple but powerful message: The United States is ready to resume working with the Soviet Union to complete the task begun when American forces went ashore at Normandy in 1944 — to liberate Europe from totalitarianism and the threat of war.

For the past four decades, it is the Soviet Union that has posed these threats. Now Gorbachev says that he is interested in ending the Cold War. Bush therefore should come to Malta willing to call Gorbachev's bluff. In essence, Bush should say: "Fine. Let's end the Cold War. Here are America's peace terms designed to create a Europe free and secure, and a peaceful world order in which no state dominates or tries to dominate another."

Establishing a New Order. If the Cold War ends, America and the Soviet Union will have special responsibility for setting the terms and sketching new arrangements for the future. These two countries not only are the two superpowers, it is they that have been the Cold War's main antagonists. And it is the stability or instability of their relations that will determine whether indeed the Cold War really is over or whether it merely is subsiding in its European theater.

As such, Bush should head for the Malta meeting prepared to open discussions, in effect, on a Cold War Peace Treaty with Gorbachev — the arrangements and responsibilities for keeping the peace. If a parallel for this moment in history is sought, it well may be the ferment prior to the Congress of Vienna in 1814, which capped the three decades of ideological turmoil ignited by the French Revolution and carried across Europe by Napoleon. The accords that followed the Congress of Vienna established a new order, lasting nearly a century.

America's Vision. Bush should start his conversation with Gorbachev by laying out his vision of the world in the post-Cold War era. He should sketch what harmonious U.S.-Soviet relations could be, what could happen in Europe, what the U.S. could do for the U.S.S.R., what the Soviet Union could do for the U.S., and what this would mean for regional conflicts, for Third World economic development, and for the suppression of terrorism and the spread of nuclear and chemical weapons in the Third World. This should be a general conversation, not a demand for specific agreements. Its purpose is to demonstrate that America has a vision of the future and is prepared to think boldly and remain a player in the world.

Bush should then proceed to make a vitally important point to Gorbachev: Just as Gorbachev is trying to de-Stalinize the communist system through *perestroika*, he must also de-Stalinize Soviet foreign policy by acknowledging Stalin's guilt in causing the Cold War. Stalin began the Cold War by refusing to live up to the 1945 Yalta accords, and his successors perpetuated this conflict by subjugating Eastern Europe, supporting violent revolution in the Third World, aiding and abetting terrorist states, and threatening the West with military force. The Red Army in Eastern Europe and Soviet aid to Cuba, Afghanistan, and other anti-Western countries are as much a legacy of Stalin as the Gulag.

Championing Change. If Gorbachev were to accept and act upon the reality that the Soviet Union has indeed lost the Cold War and that Stalin was wrong in starting it, then normal relations with the U.S. would be only a matter of time and negotiations. If Moscow ceases to threaten the U.S. and its allies militarily, eliminates its capability to intervene rapidly in Eastern Europe, ends Soviet help for tyrants and terrorists in the Third World, dismantles the Soviet surprise attack nuclear capability and allows the deployment of strategic defenses, and continues democratic and economic domestic reforms to where they were irreversible, then the U.S. would be free to establish more harmonious relations with the Soviet Union.

Bush should approach the Malta meeting with confidence that the West is winning the Cold War but also with understanding that vigilance, military strength, and a bold vision are still needed to see it to an end. He should not fear change but champion it. He need not worry that pressing a strong U.S. agenda on Gorbachev at the Malta summit will provoke a Soviet crackdown in Eastern Europe or make Gorbachev less cooperative. He should speak his mind freely and openly. If a Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe happens, it will be for internal reasons, not because of anything George Bush said about spreading freedom and democracy into Eastern Europe. Bush at the summit, therefore, should specifically:

- ◆◆ Seize the initiative with a far-reaching agenda addressing the most fundamental issues dividing East and West.
- ◆◆ Outline U.S. peace terms for ending the Cold War.
- ◆◆ Keep strategic arms control from dominating the talks.

It will be no easy matter to end the Cold War. The obstacles are many, including:

- ◆◆ The continuing Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.
- ◆◆ The Soviet military threat to Western Europe.
- ◆◆ Soviet support for anti-Western regimes and terrorists in the Third World.
- ◆◆ The expansion of the Soviet arsenal.

- ◆◆ Soviet opposition to German reunification.
- ◆◆ Fear of change in Europe and America.

If Moscow is prepared to meet U.S. peace terms for ending the Cold War, America would be prepared to:

- ◆◆ Join the Soviet Union in signing a new “Atlantic Charter” outlining a set of principles for international behavior.
- ◆◆ Offer security assurances to Moscow in exchange for troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe.
- ◆◆ Put U.S. “good offices” at Moscow’s disposal to negotiate neutrality for East European countries.
- ◆◆ Promise economic assistance to Third World countries leaving the Soviet orbit.
- ◆◆ Offer a joint U.S.-Soviet blueprint for German reunification.
- ◆◆ Reassure Moscow that U.S. strategic defenses will be used only for defense.
- ◆◆ Provide aid if peace terms are met.

For the U.S. to take the actions listed here, the Soviet Union must first:

- ◆◆ Accept historical responsibility for the Cold War.
- ◆◆ Institutionalize *perestroika* to make its reversal very difficult.
- ◆◆ Carry out promised military reductions and destroy the equipment removed.
- ◆◆ Move toward conventional arms reductions in Europe.
- ◆◆ Declare that Warsaw Pact members are free to quit the alliance.
- ◆◆ Move clearly and unambiguously toward major reductions in arms spending and production.
- ◆◆ Agree to strategic offensive arms reductions without insisting on curbs on America’s Strategic Defense Initiative.
- ◆◆ Move toward resolution of conflicts in Central America, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.
- ◆◆ Stop the global anti-U.S. disinformation campaign.

Gorbachev, of course, will have his own agenda at the Malta Summit. Bush should be prepared for Gorbachev to ask for:

- ◆◆ Payment for Soviet “good behavior.”
- ◆◆ The dissolution of all military alliances in Europe.
- ◆◆ The reunification of a neutral Germany.
- ◆◆ Help in “stabilizing” the situation in Eastern Europe.
- ◆◆ “Understanding” by the U.S. if he has to crack down on such non-Russian minorities as the Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, and Moldavians.

- ◆◆ U.S. assurances that Washington will not exploit the Soviet disengagement from Eastern Europe to the detriment of Moscow's legitimate security interests.

OBJECTIVES FOR A SUCCESSFUL MEETING

The Malta meeting between Bush and Gorbachev could be the most important superpower summit of the post-war period. At no other time have East-West relations been more fluid. This means that the Malta meeting is both risky and hopeful. If Bush wishes this meeting to be a success, he should have clear in his mind a set of specific objectives. They should be to:



Seize the initiative by addressing the most fundamental issues dividing East and West.

Seizing the initiative with a bold agenda is badly needed. The Bush Administration has pursued a cautious but mainly reactive strategy toward the Soviet Union, preferring to be one or two steps behind Gorbachev than one step ahead of him. To continue this will allow Gorbachev to set the pace and content of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. Bush thus should take the initiative at Malta by setting a bold agenda that puts him squarely on the side of revolutionary democratic change in Europe and the world. He should lay the blame for the onset of the Cold War where it belongs: with Stalin's failure to make good on the promise made at the Yalta conference to respect self-determination and sovereignty in Eastern Europe. He should tell Gorbachev that if he genuinely wants to end the Cold War, he will have to state that Stalin's subjugation of Eastern Europe was illegal, and that Gorbachev now supports free elections and self-determination for all East European countries.



Outline U.S. peace terms for ending the Cold War.

Bush should outline the conditions for U.S. agreement to full normalization of relations with the Soviet Union. To satisfy these conditions, the Soviet Union should:

- 1) Embark on a steady, step-by-step withdrawal** of all or most Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, eventually eliminating the Soviet military threat to Western Europe.
- 2) Eliminate its military ability to launch** a surprise attack on Eastern Europe.
- 3) Stop aiding such anti-Western regimes** as Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia, Libya, Nicaragua, and Syria.
- 4) Stop supporting armed communist and terrorist groups** in the Third World and cut aid to those Soviet allies who assist such groups.

- 5) **Dismantle its nuclear first-strike capability** and consent to the deployment of strategic defenses.
- 6) **Cease espionage activities** and disinformation campaigns against the U.S. and its allies.
- 7) **Ensure that its internal reforms** are irreversible by making progress toward multi-party democracy, free markets, and the rule of law.

✓ **Discuss anything but agree to nothing.**

The Malta meeting is intended to be a forum for open discussion, not a session for negotiating agreements. Bush should therefore declare to the American people before he departs that notwithstanding his willingness to raise very important questions at this meeting, he will enter into no formal agreements. By clarifying beforehand that the U.S. will reach no agreements at Malta, Bush can guard against the type of policy ambush sprung on Ronald Reagan by Gorbachev at the 1986 summit in Reykjavik, Iceland.

✓ **Do not allow strategic arms control to dominate.**

Putting strategic arms control at the top of the U.S.-Soviet summit agenda, as Gorbachev would like, diverts attention from the Soviet policies that caused the Cold War, such as the domination of Eastern Europe. This summit is an opportunity for Bush to move beyond Gorbachev's East-West agenda of arms control and to focus on the most basic political issues dividing East and West. While Bush should welcome any new initiatives on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) talks and Strategic Arms Reduction (START) talks, he should make it clear that no new arms control positions will be agreed to or put forward by him at the summit. If such a proposal is presented to him by Gorbachev, he should refer him to the professional START and CFE negotiators in Geneva and Vienna.

OBSTACLES TO ENDING THE COLD WAR ON TERMS FAVORABLE TO THE U.S.

The Cold War is not over. The obstacles to its ending include:

✓ **The continuing Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe.**

Unlike U.S. troops in Western Europe, Soviet forces in Eastern Europe are not there at the invitation of freely elected governments. Freely elected governments in Eastern Europe will never feel safe until the military capability of the Soviet Union to intervene is removed or drastically reduced.



Soviet military threat to NATO allies.

Soviet forces in Europe pose a serious threat to America's NATO allies. Even if the Soviet Union carries out the promise made by Gorbachev at the United Nations last December 7 to withdraw forces from Eastern Europe, Moscow will still maintain over 550,000 troops in Eastern Europe and enjoy numerical advantages over NATO forces of 2.5:1 in tanks, 2.4:1 in artillery and 2:1 in combat aircraft. Moscow deploys roughly 1,500 short-range ballistic missiles in Europe to NATO's approximately 60. These forces greatly exceed the requirement for defense; they thus threaten peace and stability on the continent.



Soviet opposition to German reunification.

The rapid spread of reform in East Germany and the opening of the Berlin Wall raise the prospect of German reunification. Moscow seems strongly opposed to any kind of reunification, probably because Moscow is unwilling to let East Germany leave the Warsaw Pact. Opposition to German unity implies a resistance to ending the division of Europe as a whole. Although Moscow is opposed to German reunification now, however, it may be unable to control a democratically elected East German government which could conceivably want to leave the Warsaw Pact.



Soviet support for anti-democratic regimes and terrorists in the Third World.

The bloody guerrilla offensive launched last week in El Salvador was paid for and encouraged by the Soviet-backed Sandinista government in Nicaragua. Soviet support for such regimes, including Cuba's and Afghanistan's communist rulers, is a serious obstacle to the creation of normal relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Moscow also continues to wage disinformation campaigns against the U.S., including an ongoing campaign disclosed in an August 1989 State Department report entitled *Soviet Influence Activities* to spread the charge that the Pentagon is running Nazi-style medical experiments on human beings, and that the CIA assassinated former Panamanian leader Omar Torrijos.



The continuing Soviet military threat.

Soviet military spending has increased by an average of 3 percent per year over the past four years. There are unconfirmed reports that Soviet military spending may drop slightly this year. Soviet tank production this year, while likely to show a drop from the record

high pace of 3,500 per year reported early in 1989, still is expected to continue at a rate of roughly four times that of the U.S., which now produces 650 tanks per year. Most dismaying is the continued Soviet strategic nuclear buildup.

Fear of change by West Europeans and Americans.

In Europe and the U.S. there are officials and politicians who are uneasy with the fast pace of developments in Europe, a concern that events may be getting out of control. Their's is a nostalgia for stability, a desire to return to the predictability of the Cold War, and among some Americans at least, a fear of being outsmarted by Gorbachev in the high-stakes game of East-West politics and public relations. In particular, despite official statements to the contrary, French, British, Polish and other European governments are concerned that an end to the division of Europe would lead to an unwelcome reunification of Germany. And some Americans, such Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, worry that too much change too quickly in Europe will lead to the demise of NATO and to free falling U.S. defense budgets.

WHAT AMERICA SHOULD BE PREPARED TO DO

If the Soviet Union meets the conditions set by the U.S. for ending the Cold War, Bush should tell Gorbachev that the U.S. would be willing to:

Join the Soviet Union in signing a new "Atlantic Charter."

Bush should propose to Gorbachev that the two superpowers jointly commit themselves to achieving a whole, free, and secure Europe by signing a new "Atlantic Charter," modeled roughly on the statement of World War II war aims signed by Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt off the coast of Newfoundland in August 1941. A new Charter would be based on:

- 1) **Self-determination** through free and fair elections and restoration of sovereign rights to all countries of Europe.
- 2) **The right of European states** to engage in collective self-defense, as guaranteed by the United Nations Charter.
- 3) **Renunciation of armed intervention** and violent revolution.
- 4) **Commitment to the reduction of armaments** through arms control and rejection of unilateral military advantage.

These tenets would enable Washington to get Soviet acceptance of Western codes of behavior at least in principle. It would codify the principles upon which the U.S. expects normal relations between states to be conducted.



Offer security assurances to Moscow in exchange for troop withdrawals.

The U.S. could assure Moscow that no country leaving the Warsaw Pact would be admitted to NATO membership, and that NATO would not station troops in any country from which Moscow had withdrawn troops. The U.S. also could assure Moscow privately that the withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe would be matched by the withdrawal of most U.S. troops from Europe, provided that Moscow's remaining forces in the Soviet Union were restricted sufficiently by arms control, and provided that West Germany maintained security ties with the West. The U.S., however, should not agree to a Soviet proposal for dissolving the military blocs in Europe. That would forfeit the right of European nations to collective security, which would be necessary even if Soviet forces were drastically reduced in Europe.



Offer America's "good offices" to help Moscow negotiate neutrality for East European countries.

As Eastern Europe moves toward democracy, increasing numbers of East European states are bound to seek neutrality and the removal of Soviet troops from their territory. Hungarian leaders already are speaking openly about this possibility, and some Soviet spokesmen accept it as likely. The U.S. should be prepared to participate in negotiations, if requested by freely-elected East European governments, to assist in achieving their withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, to co-guarantee their neutrality through international agreement, or whatever other measures these governments may request the U.S. to undertake.



Offer a compromise plan for German reunification.

A reunified Germany within the NATO alliance would be acceptable to the U.S. but unacceptable to the Soviet Union. The U.S. cannot expect the Soviet Union to begin a massive withdrawal of military forces from Europe if it has to face a reunified Germany allied to the West. Although a democratic, reunified Germany probably would not pose a danger to the Soviet Union, the perception inside the Kremlin may be that it would do so. This perception has to be considered in devising U.S. plans for German reunification. A solution to the German Question, one that would be acceptable not only to Germans but to the Soviet Union, could be a compromise between the two extremes of complete division and full reunification. The U.S. should propose the creation of a German Confederation of limited sovereignty; the two current German states would retain separate armies and foreign policies, but would develop close

political and economic ties and have common policies on inter-German administrative matters, such as the mail, transportation, and the environment.

✓ **Reassure Moscow on strategic defenses.**

Washington repeatedly has told the Moscow that the U.S. seeks no unilateral advantage with the Strategic Defense Initiative program, or SDI. The U.S. has tried repeatedly to engage the Soviets in serious discussions at the Geneva-based Defense and Space Talks (DST) on how both sides could make a predictable transition to a new strategic environment based on both offensive and defensive strategic forces. At the 1987 Washington Summit Gorbachev and Reagan agreed in principle to begin such discussion in Geneva, but the Soviets failed to follow through. Bush should tell Gorbachev that the time has come to begin such discussions seriously. There is no reason why the Soviets should be afraid of strategic defenses if they no longer seek strategic superiority over the U.S.

✓ **Provide aid if peace terms are met.**

If all U.S. conditions for normalizing U.S.-Soviet relations are met, the U.S. should be prepared to provide financial, technical, and managerial assistance for developing free markets inside the Soviet Union, develop better trade relations, impose fewer restrictions on the transfer of advanced technology (although many restrictions would always remain), and seek greater cooperation in such areas as settling regional conflicts, exploring space for peaceful purposes, and engaging in economic joint ventures.

WHAT GORBACHEV MUST DO TO END THE COLD WAR

Bush should be both comprehensive and specific about what he expects of Gorbachev. There should be no misunderstanding about what U.S. peace conditions are, and that although the U.S. greatly desires better relations with the Soviet Union, it is prepared to stand by them even at the risk of bad relations with Moscow. Bush must ask Gorbachev to:

✓ **Accept historical responsibility for the Cold War.**

Gorbachev already has denounced Stalin for his internal crimes, and committed himself and his government never to repeat them. One of the most pernicious of Stalin's crimes was his crime against Europe. Gorbachev thus must commit himself to reversing this policy and abjuring a policy of force and threat of force.

✓ **Institutionalize *perestroika* to make reversing it very difficult.**

In the long run, the key to peace is the evolution of the Soviet Union into a lawful and democratic state. Within the next year the U.S. should be prepared to respond positively to measures that would make reversing *perestroika* extremely difficult — a goal that Gorbachev himself has proclaimed repeatedly, most recently in a discussion last month with the Communist Party's Central Committee. Bush should present Gorbachev with a list of criteria by which the U.S. will judge Soviet progress. Some of these criteria, which are openly discussed in the Soviet Union, are: releasing all political prisoners in jails, camps, and psychiatric wards; repealing the law forbidding independent publishing; adopting a law abolishing censorship and allowing greater independence of the media from the state; adopting a law to give the legal system greater independence; abolishing residence permits (*propiska*) by which the Soviet Union, like South Africa, limits where its citizens can live; eliminating the "territorial nomination meetings" (*okruzhnye sobrania*), used by the local Communist Party organizations to screen candidates; and abolishing the *nomenclatura* system, which establishes the Communist Party monopoly on all executive and managerial positions in the economy, government, and mass media.

✓ **Carry out promised military reductions and destroy the equipment removed.**

Gorbachev has sent mixed signals regarding his willingness to follow through on unilateral military reductions in Europe. On the one hand he announced at the United Nations on December 7, 1988, major unilateral force reductions in Europe, including the withdrawal of 5,000 tanks from Eastern Europe, an additional 5,000 tanks in the Western Soviet Union, and a total of 8,500 artillery pieces. On the other hand, these withdrawals have not been proceeding as expected. Tanks removed from Eastern Europe are not being destroyed or converted to civilian use as Gorbachev promised last January 18, but instead are being redeployed or put in storage within the Soviet Union. Other equipment, including artillery and armored troop carriers, are not being withdrawn from Eastern Europe. Weapons and equipment withdrawn from Eastern Europe must be completely destroyed or converted as promised by Gorbachev. Credible evidence of their destruction should be supplied to U.S. officials.

✓ **Maintain momentum toward conventional arms reductions in Europe.**

Moscow should be expected to move quickly to conclude a conventional arms control (CFE) agreement in Europe.

✓ **State that Warsaw Pact members are free to quit that alliance.**

Soviet spokesman Nikolai Shishlin said on October 30 that Hungary “surely” could leave the Warsaw Pact if it should decide to do so. Gorbachev personally should endorse the statement, making it official Soviet policy. The Soviet Union must be prepared to abide by its own declarations of non-interference in these countries.

✓ **Move clearly and unambiguously toward major reductions in arms spending and production.**

The U.S. needs to see evidence of major military reductions that substantially reduce the Soviet military threat to the U.S. and its allies before it changes its own security policies in any significant way. There should be strict symmetry between changes in the Soviet military threat and the U.S. military response. As such, Bush should tell Gorbachev that he expects major reductions in Soviet military spending to become evident to Western intelligence services in the coming year. He should say that this would be considered a good start toward fulfilling the promise made by Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov on June 7 to cut Soviet military spending by 33 percent by 1995. And the most ominous trend in Soviet military production, the acceleration of the Soviet nuclear strategic missile program, should also be reversed. As of this year the Soviets had deployed about 170 single-warhead SS-25 mobile ballistic missiles, a model comparable to the U.S. Midgetman missile, which has not yet been deployed. Moscow should eliminate from its force its missiles capable of posing a first-strike threat to U.S. land-based missile forces, the SS-18 *Satan* and its follow-on, called the SS-18 “Mod 5” by the Pentagon, which is a new missile with twice the killing power of the older SS-18.

✓ **Agree to strategic offensive arms reductions without demanding U.S. concessions on strategic defense.**

At the September 22-23 Jackson Hole, Wyoming meeting between Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, Moscow dropped its longstanding position that it would not sign a START agreement unless the U.S. agreed to continue adhering to the 1972 ABM Treaty banning most strategic

defenses. It then immediately raised a new barrier to reaching a START agreement, however, by announcing that if the U.S. were to move toward strategic defense deployments after a START agreement had been signed, it would scrap the START Treaty and begin building more offensive forces such as missiles and bombers. Bush must press Moscow to separate the issues of strategic offensive forces and SDI completely, allowing START to move forward, and commit itself to dealing with strategic defense issues separately through the ongoing Defense and Space Talks.

✓ **Move toward resolution of regional conflicts.**

In:

- 1) **Afghanistan**, stop military support for the discredited communist regime of Najibullah; stop cross-border high altitude bombing of *mujahadeen*-held territory, which is prohibited by the April 1988 Geneva Accord on Afghanistan; remove the 300-plus Soviet military advisors who are in some cases participating in combat in contravention of the Afghan accord signed by Moscow.
- 2) **the Middle East**, diplomatically recognize Israel and call on the Arab states to follow suit; and stop arming Syria, Libya, Iran, and other supporters of international terrorism.
- 3) **Africa**, terminate all military support, amounting to \$1.5 billion per year, for the communist regime in Angola, and support free and fair elections there; pressure Cuba to fulfill its commitment to remove all troops from Angola by July 1991; end all military assistance, totaling \$1 billion last year, to the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam.
- 4) **Latin America**, cut off all aid to Cuba and pressure Fidel Castro to stop arming and training such Latin American terrorists as the FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador; remove all Soviet MiG-29s recently supplied by Moscow to Cuba; stop supplying such arms as Mi-24 *Hind* helicopters and T-55 tanks to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua via Cuba; end all aid to Nicaragua and pressure the Sandinista regime to hold free and fair elections next February.
- 5) **Asia**, cease supplying an estimated \$1.1 billion worth of arms (including tanks, armored personnel carriers, and MiG aircraft) through Vietnam to the Phnom Penh regime and push it to a compromise with the coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea.



Stop its anti-U.S. global disinformation campaign.

Moscow should stop its global “active measures” campaign including the use of forgeries, disinformation, covert intelligence operations, and front groups to discredit the U.S. These activities persist despite Gorbachev’s promise to United States Information Agency Director Charles Wick during the December 1987 Washington Summit that there would be “no more disinformation.” Gorbachev must make good on his word.

GORBACHEV’S AGENDA AT THE MALTA SUMMIT MEETING

To avoid a repeat of the 1986 Reykjavik summit, where Gorbachev sprang a dramatic — and unacceptable — proposal on Reagan, Bush should be prepared to identify and avoid dangerous surprises. From Moscow’s point of view, the timing of the summit is propitious. Gorbachev is in a strong position to capitalize on his popularity in the West generated by the dramatic changes in Eastern Europe. Bush thus may find Gorbachev coming to Malta demanding to be rewarded for this in the form of political, military and, most important, economic assistance. Gorbachev may try:



To collect payment for Soviet “good behavior.”

Gorbachev may ask Bush “to help save *perestroika*” and reward the Soviet Union for all of the good things it has let happen in Eastern Europe. As such, Gorbachev may ask for a general U.S. commitment to a large-scale Western financial assistance to the Soviet Union; the elimination or weakening of controls on the transfer of militarily useful technology to the Soviet bloc; the repeal of the 1974 Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson Amendments which link Most Favored Nation trade status for the U.S.S.R. with levels of Soviet emigration to the West; and U.S. support for a Soviet membership in such international financial organizations as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.

Bush should respond by stressing that U.S. economic assistance will depend upon changes in Soviet military, international, and domestic political and economic behavior. The current Soviet economic system, for example, cannot utilize Western economic assistance; Moscow must first introduce such substantial free market economic reforms as lifting multiple restrictions and heavy taxation of private enterprise. As for the transfer of sensitive goods to the U.S.S.R., Bush should tell Gorbachev that restrictions will exist as long as there is a Soviet military threat to the U.S. and its allies. And Soviet membership in international financial organizations will depend on the success of reforms of the Soviet economy. When Moscow qualifies for membership, Bush should say, Moscow will be given membership.

✓ **To propose the dissolution of the military alliances in Europe.**

As the Warsaw Pact crumbles, Gorbachev may offer some variation of his longstanding proposal, made most recently on November 9 in Moscow by Soviet spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov, for the "mutual dissolution of the two blocs" — NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Or he may try to tie a substantial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Europe, which may be forced upon Moscow by its increasingly more independent "allies," to a withdrawal of the U.S. troops from Western Europe. Another possibility is a proposal to remove all foreign troops from East and West Germany.

Bush should respond by stressing that NATO and the Warsaw Pact are not comparable. NATO is a voluntary association of freely-elected governments exercising their right to "collective self-defense," while the Warsaw Pact is installed and kept in power by Moscow. Each NATO member has the sovereign right to decide whether to remain in the Alliance or withdraw from it, and the U.S. has no right to negotiate over its allies' heads. While, in principle, Washington is prepared to respond to Soviet withdrawals from Eastern Europe by reducing U.S. troops to the minimum necessary for defense of its NATO allies, those troops in Europe are there at the invitation of its sovereign allies. The issue of their withdrawal from the Continent can only be decided in extensive consultations with the allies and in a manner that will not jeopardize Western collective security.

✓ **To play the "German card" by supporting the reunification of a neutral Germany.**

The Soviet Union historically has opposed German reunification. Since the very existence of its ally, East Germany, depended on the division of Germany, Moscow had no choice but to oppose reunification. This could change if Gorbachev feels that East Germany is about to be lost entirely to the Warsaw Pact. He then could propose reunification of a neutral Germany in which West Germany, the American ally, must leave the NATO as well.

Bush should reiterate that the U.S. welcomes German reunification so long as it is approved by the freely-elected governments of West and East Germany, does not lead to a reunified neutral Germany, and does not jeopardize West Germany's security ties to the West. It is not appropriate, moreover, for the U.S. alone to negotiate on behalf of the German people. In the meantime, Bush should seek Gorbachev's endorsement of a set of principles on German reunification, including: free and fair elections in East Germany and the end of the Communist Party's monopoly on power; open borders between East and West Germany; a total dismantling of the Berlin

Wall; inviolability of Germany's borders with bordering states; and maintenance of West Germany's security ties with the West.

✓ **To seek U.S. help in "stabilizing" the situation in Eastern Europe.**

Gorbachev may tell Bush that it is dangerous for reform to move too fast in Eastern Europe. Riots and violence could erupt if the U.S. encourages reforms to proceed too quickly.

Bush should agree that no one wants to see Europe swept up in violence. But he should stress "stability" must not be equated with the status quo. Rather, true stability requires independence, democracy, and economic freedom for Eastern Europe. Bush should warn Moscow against interfering to retard, halt, or reverse reforms in Eastern Europe. Scuttling of the reforms would damage immediately U.S.-Soviet relations. This warning may also help Gorbachev back home in the Kremlin in his debates with hardliners who could be pressing for suppression of reform in Eastern Europe.

✓ **To seek U.S. "understanding" of a possible crackdown in the U.S.S.R, especially on the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Moldavian non-Russian minorities.**

Gorbachev may ask Bush to "understand" that the Kremlin cannot tolerate chaos inside the Soviet Union. The success of *perestroika* inside the Soviet Union and reform in Eastern Europe, he may argue, depends on his personal success and on his ability to keep "radical" nationalist demands for independence in Estonia, Moldavia, and elsewhere from tearing the Soviet Union apart.

Bush must understand that America's goal is not to keep Gorbachev in power but to assure that the reforms he started deepen and become irreversible. Bush must tell Gorbachev that if he ceases to be a reformer by using force against dissidents and other reformers, then supporting him would make little sense for the U.S. Gorbachev should be warned strongly against a crackdown against nationalist and democratic forces inside the Soviet Union. Washington once again would lead the charge in the West to keep relations with Moscow at a minimum and to block Western aid.

✓ **To ask for U.S. assurances that Washington will not exploit the Soviet disengagement from Eastern Europe to the detriment of Moscow's legitimate security interests.**

To this Bush should state unequivocally that the U.S. has no intention of exploiting changes in Eastern Europe to the detriment of the Soviet legitimate security needs.

The U.S. has no plans to spread its military influence into Eastern Europe.

CONCLUSION

The meeting between Bush and Gorbachev off the coast of Malta next week could be historic. At no other time in the post-World War II era have East-West relations changed so quickly.

This is an occasion to which Bush should rise. He has the opportunity to take up where Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman left off at the conferences of Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam. He has a chance to succeed where they failed, to begin the long and difficult process of ending the Cold War once and for all by telling Gorbachev that the U.S. is willing to normalize relations with the Soviet Union if Moscow will agree to certain peace terms. He has a chance to complete the task of liberating Europe, begun on Normandy's beaches 45 years ago.

For this to be a successful summit, Bush should seize the initiative with a far-reaching agenda addressing the most fundamental issues dividing East and West. He should not be afraid of bold proposals so long as he has a clear idea of what the U.S. conditions are for ending the Cold War. The most important thing Bush must tell Gorbachev at Malta is that the Cold War will never end until Gorbachev acknowledges that Stalin started it and that his successors perpetuated it by conducting a foreign policy based on force, the threat of force, and the subjugation of other nations. Gorbachev must "de-Stalinize" Soviet foreign policy, as he has tried to de-Stalinize domestic policy.

Criteria to Measure Progress. If Gorbachev agrees to undo the legacy of Stalin, then meeting U.S. terms for peace will not be difficult. Bush should tell Gorbachev that these terms are eliminating the Soviet military threat to all of Europe, ceasing Soviet help for anti-Western and terrorist forces in the Third World, dismantling the Soviet surprise attack nuclear capability, endorsing the deployment of strategic defenses, and ensuring the irreversibility of Soviet domestic reforms.

Bush can say that he does not expect such changes overnight. They are, however, the criteria by which the U.S. will measure progress in U.S.-Soviet relations and upon which the U.S. will base its willingness to normalize relations with the Soviet Union.

Bush should tell Gorbachev that the U.S. is prepared gradually to develop more harmonious relations with the U.S.S.R. and to deal with it as the U.S. would any other non-hostile state. To speed the course toward better relations, the U.S. should offer security assurances to Moscow in exchange for troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe. Bush should also put U.S. "good offices" at Moscow's disposal to negotiate neutrality for East Europe countries if they should leave want to leave the Warsaw Pact.

Reassuring Gorbachev. To make it easier for Gorbachev to accept U.S. conditions, Bush could tell Gorbachev that he will not press for a reunified Germany allied to NATO, will reassure him that deployed strategic defenses will be used for defensive purposes only, and will provide financial and other types of aid to the Soviet Union once all conditions are met, especially those with respect to domestic reform.

Avoiding an Ambush. Bush should be aware of what Gorbachev may ask for at this summit. He may ask Bush for payment for Soviet "good behavior" in Eastern Europe. He could ask the U.S. to agree to the dissolution of the military alliances in Europe and the neutralization of Germany. He may ask Bush to help him "stabilize" the situation in Eastern Europe, to provide some tacit understanding for the need not to move reform in Eastern Europe very quickly. By the same token, he could ask Bush to "understand" the need for a possible military crackdown in the U.S.S.R.

Whatever Gorbachev asks for, Bush should counter Soviet proposals with his own and sketch what a post-Cold War world would look like. An international order based on self-determination, democracy, freedom, and open economic markets is one which in the long run suits not only Americans, but the peoples of the Soviet Union. If Gorbachev is a serious reformer, bent on doing more than keeping the Communist Party in power and the Soviet Union as a military superpower, then he will not object to this vision.

The task at Malta is for George Bush to find out just how serious a reformer Mikhail Gorbachev really is.

