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SDI AND ITS ENEMIES

The Greatest Obstacles Are Ideological, Not Technical

VICE PRESIDENT DAN QUAYLE

for most of our history, America was protected by the blessings of geography. The great oceans separating us from hostile foreign powers permitted us to mature politically and economically without having to deal with the burdens of foreign entanglements, alliances, and conflicts. And when developments abroad eventually did threaten vital national interests, our territorial security gave us the freedom to act overseas without immediate alarm about threats against our homeland.

Our virtual invulnerability came to an end after World War II. Technology reduced dramatically the time it took to traverse the oceans, and the destructiveness of deliverable weapons posed an unprecedented threat, with no realistic prospects for defense on the horizon. Given how unaccustomed we were to such a threat, it is remarkable how quickly and thoroughly we came to accept it as natural and irreversible. In the absence of technologically viable options for strategic defense, our doctrines of offensive deterrence came to be regarded not only as inevitable, but eventually as preferable, by the "Wizards of Armageddon" who preached an orthodoxy of defenselessness. The principles of assured destruction—"defending" ourselves by threats of offensive retaliation—acquired the status of a strategy, and were enshrined in treaties, alliance commitments, and weapon acquisition policies.

Reagan's Intellectual Breakthrough

President Reagan's historic speech on the Strategic Defense Initiative in 1983 reopened discussion of defense as a realistic element of strategic deterrence. Most of the programs under the SDI umbrella had already been underway for some time. But President Reagan's speech, and the uniquely organized programs it fostered, gave official "permission" to think once again about the prospect of defending ourselves. It was the liberation of the American mind that was strategically revolutionary, not just the emergent technology. SDI has faced technological, budgetary, and bureaucratic problems like any new program of such scale and cost. But, from SDI's outset, its principal obstacles have been political and ideological because it challenges entrenched thought.

The still widely held view that strategic defense must always be regarded as destabilizing is an obsolete remnant of the malaise that gripped our political and technological thinking for almost a generation. Strategic vulnerability may have been a necessity because of the uneven growth of offensive threats in the age of the ballistic missile. Indeed, it may remain a necessity for several more years. But vulnerability was not and is not a virtue, and it is irresponsible to embrace vulnerability if it is correctable.

Extraordinary Progress in Technology

We are beginning to see technological evidence that our vulnerability is correctable. In many cases, the progress of the SDI program has exceeded its proponents' own high expectations. As with other technical and engineering challenges we have faced as a nation—the Panama Canal, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Manhattan Project, the great transcontinental railroads and highways, the Apollo Program—we set high goals for ourselves and placed a premium on innovation to solve tough problems. Thus, SDI is in many ways a reaffirmation of a long-standing American belief—that the sustained, rational application of social energies can harness technology in the service of sound policy.

Examples of SDI's great achievements are manifold. Last March, I called public attention to the innovations that scientists at Livermore National Laboratory have made in the Brilliant Pebbles concept, one potential approach to SDI's first phase. Working more or less on their own, and relying on readily available technologies, they conceived an approach to the space-based kinetic interceptor mission that could be both affordable and survivable. The Defense Department has initiated study efforts by several governmental and nongovernmental groups to evaluate Brilliant Pebbles' cost and system concepts, and these will influence upcoming decisions on how the program will be structured.

Not so long ago, SDI's critics-including some of our

VICE PRESIDENT QUAYLE's article is an expansion of a speech he gave on June 29, 1989, before the American Defense Preparedness Association. more respected professional organizations—said that directed energy weapons were a distant vision. They are being proven wrong. A few months ago, SDI scientists near San Juan Capistrano, California, successfully fired the large Alpha laser. This same laser is scheduled for launch in the mid-1990s as a part of the impressive Zenith Star experiment. In July, another group of SDI investigators fired the BEAR neutral particle beam experiment into space, demonstrating that an accelerated beam of neutral atoms can proceed in a straight line in space—impervious to magnetic fields, which many had predicted would turn a particle beam in unpredictable directions. Many believe that we can put advanced technologies of this type into space orbit by the mid-1990s.

No countermeasure I have heard of, whether it be "fast burn boosters," multiple lightweight decoys, or merely multiple launchers and warheads, can cope with the lightning speed or the variety of environments in which directed energy weapons can operate at great distances from their targets. Operating in conjunction with kinetic kill vehicles, systems like these will one day alter radically the strategic equation between offense and defense.


While progress continues in directed and kinetic energy weaponry, a series of equally impressive demonstrations has shown us the future in sensor technology as well. The Delta experiments, one of which will continue to generate priceless data into 1990, were conceived, designed, built, and flown in a matter of months—and for less money than many government offices spend in an afternoon. One of my favorite stories is how the Delta 181 launch team, working in a converted boxcar as they awaited weather clearance for their launch, designed the Delta 183 follow-on experiment on a 50-foot roll of butcher paper.

Companion to Arms Reduction

But strategic defense is more than technology. It involves a vast political dimension as well. Our negotiators returned to Geneva in June to continue the Nuclear and Space Talks, which began just over four years ago. The president has directed his negotiators to

Many of SDI's critics would oppose it if it cost nothing and worked perfectly. They oppose it because they think American vulnerability is desirable.

continue the quest for verifiable offensive arms reductions that enhance strategic stability. He has also committed himself, his negotiators, and his administration to continue working with the Soviets to find the right



From the Panama Canal to the Apollo Program, America has met great technical and engineering challenges by setting its goals high and putting a premium on innovation.

formula for a cooperative transition to strategic defenses. The administration's recent review of strategy has convinced us not only that strategic defenses should not be traded for an offensive agreement, but also that the value, integrity, and stabilizing influence of an offensive agreement could be improved significantly by strategic defenses. In discussing strategic arms limitations with the Soviets, it is the president's intent to preserve our options to deploy strategic defenses when they are ready.

Why is a ballistic missile defense such a valuable companion to a stabilizing agreement to reduce offensive arms? To begin with, the Soviets have continued to emphasize destabilizing offensive weapons systems. With or without START, the Soviets will retain enough large warheads deployed on their huge, stationary, heavily MIRVed SS-18s to challenge the integrity of our retaliatory doctrine. And, despite formal and informal proclamations to the contrary, the Soviets' modernization of these weapons, and their planned development of a larger follow-on version, demonstrate that they will retain their first-strike orientation well into the 21st century. A reasonably reliable first-phase system of layered strategic defenses would diminish our anxiety over this heavy ICBM threat in much the same way that a START agreement would.

Second, mobile ICBMs, which the Soviets have been actively deploying for years, introduce serious verification and breakout problems. Mobile missiles are designed for concealment, deceptive movement, reloading, and easy adaptability to imperfect launch environments. The Soviet Union's 8.6-million-square-mile land mass offers considerable space in which to conduct these activities. If 100 ten-warhead mobile missiles were clandestinely deployed somewhere in these vast territorial reaches, 1,000 ballistic missile warheads would be uncounted. START would allow a total of fewer than 5,000. Since the Soviets insist on their continued right to produce, modernize, and deploy such systems, even under START, they should also understand our enhanced reliance on strategic defenses as insurance

against the range of threats these systems could pose against us. Analyses in and out of government have demonstrated that a space-based system of interceptors is impervious to the mobility of ballistic launchers' platforms. In fact, the more widely the targeted missiles are dispersed, the more reliably a constellation of interceptors can cope with multiple launches.

The more we reduce offensive weapons, the more we will need to rely on SDI to deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout.

Third, the constraints of a complex arms control agreement impede verification. The current draft of the START treaty is hundreds of pages long and is much more detailed than the unratified SALT II text, which was itself many times more complex than SALT I. This is partly because the threat itself is considerably more robust, diversified, and complex, and partly because we are now trying to limit actual warheads rather than just launchers or silos. Also, we have become increasingly aware with each treaty just how costly any unplugged "loophole" can be under an agreement that we are constitutionally bound to uphold, and whose terms might be interpreted and legislated by Congress in ways that we haven't anticipated. Under such conditions, when the complexity and difficulty of an agreement runs up against our standards of effective verification, strategic defenses can help bridge the chasm between the realities of a developing threat and the imperfections of constraining agreements.

Insurance Policy for START

Like any good idea whose time has come, strategic defense answers many of its detractors' own most vexing concerns. SDI could provide long-term survivability for our ICBM and (even more worrisome) our vulnerable command and control systems. It could buy time for decisionmakers in a crisis, even in the event of an irrational act by an adversary. It could reduce the threat from Third-World ballistic missiles. It could deter noncompliance with ballistic missile limitation agreements by diminishing the benefits associated with clandestine cheating or breakout. This would add a dimension of confidence building that arms control has failed to foster by itself, and thereby facilitate both ratification of current agreements and the stabilization of offensive limitations. In short, it would strengthen flexible response and extended deterrence, even while other agreements reduce offensive arsenals of all kinds.

For all these reasons, while the Bush administration rejects the Soviets' contention that progress on a START agreement should be held hostage to SDI, we do believe that there is a relationship between offensive and defensive arms. Offensive reductions contribute to the effectiveness of defenses; at the same time, the more we reduce offensive weapons, the more we will need to rely on SDI to deter, or deal with, possible Soviet cheating or breakout. In other words, SDI is an insurance policy for START. It is insurance against breakout, against cheating, and against qualitative breakthroughs not prohibited by agreements. Responsible arms control increasingly will rely on stable strategic defenses because both seek the same goal—a steady devaluation of the military utility of ballistic missiles.

Madmen and Accidents

The threat we are preparing to deter, it should be added, is hardly limited to missiles of intercontinental range. The security environment of the 21st century may see substantial reductions in strategic offensive weapons, but increasingly ominous signs point to a substantial increase in the number of nations capable of launching ballistic missiles. And the growing problem of ballistic missile proliferation—a major concern of mine for many years now—also points us toward a defense-centered response.

The Director of Central Intelligence observed recently that we can expect up to 15 developing nations to have ballistic launch capability by the turn of the century. Who are these emergent members of the missile club? In many cases, they are regional or would-be regional powers; many are not signatories to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; some are actively engaged in chemical weapons research.

These developments raise the prospect of "accidental launch" and "madman" scenarios in which an erratic national leader acquires ballistic launchers and marries them with primitive nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. Such concerns are anything but hypothetical. Iran and Iraq have already engaged in a ballistic missile conflict; Iraq made active and extensive use of chemical weapons in its war with Iran; and Libya, among others, is working energetically to develop chemical weapons.

Unpredictable Civil Strife

The frightening questions of who controls nuclear weapons during periods of intense civil strife, and of who has the authority to release them, are not discussed in public very much. What if civil war leads to an abrupt seizure of power by an unknown, unpredictable regime in a country that possesses an arsenal of ballistic missiles? Would we rest easily with the deterrent power of our current offense-only capability under these conditions? Or should the president have some other response at his disposal in case an irrational act were to arise out of such instability?

I raise this question because in many countries that are acquiring or seeking to acquire missile capability, instability is the rule rather than the exception, and because the possibility of accidental, unauthorized, or simply miscalculated missile launches is growing as the number of politically immature but missile-capable states expands.

There is much that can and should be done to curb this widening trend. Our own leadership role in the Missile Technology Control Regime is one example. I have been actively committed to strengthening this regime since my years in the Senate, and I remain so.

Existing and strengthened export controls are essential. They are high on this administration's national security agenda, and we are relying heavily on them to retard the spread of missile technology—on the supply side. But, like so many other problems we face in the international arena, this complex issue cannot and will not be resolved by one-dimensional solutions. While multilateral measures are at work on the supply side, unilateral measures to reduce the benefits of offensive weapons (such as a multilayered, ground- and spacebased ballistic missile defense), must be at work on the demand side.

Keep an Open Mind

I challenge many traditional opponents of strategic defense to keep an open mind as the technology continues to advance and the costs continue to decline. SDI is not the enemy of arms control and missile nonproliferation; on the contrary, it will be their most valued ally. Addressing problems as diverse as ICBM and command and control vulnerability, deterring noncompliance, and providing insurance against clandestine breakout scenarios, SDI's technical and potential strategic payoffs vastly exceed the investment we are making. Some of these payoffs are directly evident in improved weapons technologies and in the enhanced leverage provided by near-term options for strategic defense; others are "spinoffs" for advanced medical, industrial, and environmental technologies. Still others promise advancements in our parallel efforts to defend against such nuclear and non-nuclear threats as the manned bomber and cruise missiles.

In the coming year, the SDI program will conduct a broad variety of major experiments, laboratory tests, and data collection exercises. These will involve kinetic energy, sensors, data collection, directed energy, theater defense, key technologies, and potential countermeasures against enemy attack. Building on the more than 370 tests conducted in SDI research since 1984, these studies and experiments will span the entire spectrum of our investments in SDI to date. Collectively, they will bring us closer to an informed decision on deployment, a milestone President Bush has set for the administration to achieve within the next four years, but only if the program is adequately funded.

Disingenuous Criticism

It is ironic, if not disingenuous, for SDI critics to argue that the concept "won't work," and yet deny the money needed for the experiments and research necessary to determine whether it can work. Maybe the critics are right (although a remarkable amount of evidence suggests they are not) about the economic incentives favoring offensive measures, and about the likelihood that deployment of strategic defenses could impel an expansion rather than a reduction in destabilizing weapons.



START negotiators in Geneva. SDI is the ally, not the enemy, of a stabilizing agreement to reduce offensive arms.

These are the questions that the program has been designed to answer. President Bush has specified clearly that defensive systems should provide economic and other disincentives against attempts to counter them with additional offensive forces, and the research and testing have been planned specifically to enable such judgments.

Similarly, we are often told that a given line of research shouldn't be funded because it is "not feasible," as if technical uncertainty is itself contrary to the purpose of investigation.

The internal inconsistency of such arguments suggests an opposition that is not based on scientific, technical, or even strategic considerations. I'm afraid we are dealing with the peripheral rather than central reasons for opposition when we take such polemics seriously and engage them on their own merits. Many of SDI's critics would oppose it if it cost nothing and worked perfectly. They oppose it for a variety of reasons, some more valid than others, but ultimately because they think American vulnerability is normal, even desirable. I regard national insecurity as abnormal. I regard it as an unfortunate but temporary aberration in our strategic and technological history. It was one thing to develop strategies around offense-only destructiveness when we had no choice. Now that technology has once again broadened our choices, such a rationale may no longer be necessary. Strategic defense may finally offer us an opportunity to return to our most enduring strategic traditions by enabling us to provide—genuinely—for the common defense.

Of course, SDI is not the only answer to the problem of missile proliferation. Nor is SDI capable by itself of redressing all threats to strategic stability. In fact, there is no single, simple answer to the multi-dimensional challenges we face. But there are answers. And strategic defense is one of them. For these reasons, the Bush administration remains committed to the development and deployment of a robust strategic defense system. We continue to believe that strategic defense is technologically feasible, strategically necessary, and morally imperative. And we intend to continue working hard to ensure that Congress shares this understanding.

THE GENIUS OF ORDINARY PEOPLE

Senator Phil Gramm on Conservatism's Winning Ideas

AN INTERVIEW BY ADAM MEYERSON

hil Gramm, of College Station, Texas, was elected to Congress as a Democrat in 1978, and was reelected in 1980 and 1982. In 1983, when he was stripped of his House Budget Committee seat because of his leadership in pushing through President Reagan's 1981 budget and tax legislation, he resigned from Congress and won reelection as the first Republican congressman in the history of the 6th Congressional District of Texas. In 1984, he was elected to the United States Senate, receiving more votes than any Republican candidate for statewide office in the history of Texas.

Senator Gramm is co-author of three pieces of landmark economic legislation—the Gramm-Latta I Budget and Gramm-Latta II Omnibus Reconciliation Acts of 1981, and the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget Bill of 1985.

The Gramm-Latta budgets reduced the growth of federal spending, strengthened national defense, and enacted the 1981 tax cut. The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill set into place binding constraints on the federal government to balance the budget by fiscal year 1993.

A professor of economics for 12 years at Texas A&M University, Senator Gramm is one of several former professors whose intellectual firepower, combined with a strategic understanding of practical politics, has invigorated the conservative movement. Others include John Sununu, William J. Bennett, Newt Gingrich, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Representative Dick Armey—also a former Texas A&M economics professor.

Senator Gramm was interviewed in July 1989 by *Policy Review* editor Adam Meyerson.

Policy Review: It's now a little more than 10 years since you first took a seat in the House of Representatives—as a Democrat. What are the most important ideological and institutional changes in American politics since you took elective office?


Senator Phil Gramm: Well, obviously, the most important event since I took office in January 1979 was the election of Ronald Reagan as president. I vividly remember listening to Reagan say things at his first inaugural that I had believed all my life, and realizing that now we had

a president who thought exactly as I did on virtually every major issue facing the country.

Ronald Reagan created a new conservative majority in America. He did this by defining the central political issue of our times as the choice between more opportunity and more government. For 30 years there was only one idea in Washington and the Democrats had it. That idea was the expansion of government as the solution to every problem. Conservatives attacked big government and the American people knew something was wrong with it. But you can't kill an idea with criticism or counter-evidence; only an idea can kill an idea. The Reagan alternative was more freedom and opportunity to unleash the genius of the people to solve problems.

The American people voted in 1980 to limit the growth, power, and cost of government in order to provide more opportunity in the private sector. Today people have a natural skepticism about the ability of massive new government programs to solve problems. The profound ideological influence of the Reagan era has not been limited just to the United States. Our emphasis on freedom and opportunity was the ultimate catalyst for an international political movement that is having a profound effect even on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

Institutionally, the biggest political impact of the Reagan era is the growing ideological difference between the parties. By and large, the conservative Democrats in the Congress who voted with Reagan in 1981—I was one of them—are gone. Quite a few are now Republicans. Some have left politics. Some have moved to the left. There is no political middle anymore. Even in my part of the country, the state Democratic Party is more and more a reflection of the national Democratic Party. There are still some conservative Democrats in office who will stay in office as long as they want to, but they couldn't win the Democratic nomination in their current posts if they were just starting out today. That's because voters who voted for Republicans in national elections, and for like-minded Democrats in Congress and state legislatures, are now becoming Republicans. They are not voting in the primaries to nominate conservative and moderate Democrats.





Gramm with El Paso constituents: "We must never grant the liberals the moral high ground. We are the ones who love ordinary people. It's our program that benefits the average citizen."

P.R.: You don't seem to agree with the conventional wisdom that ideological conflict is less important today than in the 1960s, '70s, and early '80s.

Gramm: No, when you cut through all the rhetoric, there are two competing visions for America's future. The Democratic vision is more government providing more benefits to more people—and, along the way, creating more constituencies for the Democratic Party. The Republican and conservative vision is more freedom—with a growing America providing more opportunities for more people. You can't have both unlimited government and unlimited opportunity; you have to choose. Democrats cannot govern America unless government grows. Republicans can't govern unless opportunity grows. Both those things can't happen at the same time.

The budget debate goes to the heart of this conflict of visions. Some people who call themselves supply-siders fail to recognize that there is an unbreakable link between the capacity to create incentives and the requirement to control the growth of government. The budget debate today is really a debate about whether the Reagan program is going to become permanent. While we provided incentives through the reduction of taxes, we did not institute the controls on the growth of government that were necessary to finance those incentives.

P.R.: When you came to Washington in the late '70s, the conservative movement was very well organized both at

the grass-roots level and in Capitol Hill caucuses, although of course it was totally excluded from the White House. Is it fair to say that the conservative movement has lost some momentum since then?

Gramm: It's a bit of an overstatement to say conservatives were very well organized a decade ago. We were beginning to see the emergence of a conservative leadership in the country. I sensed this when I was running for public office and asked people back home to let me be part of a new wave of leadership, to reaffirm the sovereignty of the individual citizen and turn America around. But we really didn't have a concrete program in 1979 and 1980 for governing the country. We were just beginning to formulate a program. What really activated our efforts to put a conservative program into place was the election of Ronald Reagan, though of course a lot of the intellectual groundwork for the Reagan program had already been established.

Conservatives still win when we define issues in terms of our fundamental values of freedom and opportunity, and then take our message to the American people. We lose when we let the other side define the terms of debate, and when we don't get the general public involved in the debate. Republicans lost the majority in the Senate that we gained in 1980 because we did not maintain control of the agenda. We didn't define the cutting-edge issues that would allow people to see the difference between Republicans and Democrats.

In an ironic way, Reagan's successes made the voters a little less frightened of giving the Democrats control of the government. The people did not trust the Democrats to defend America and keep Ivan back from the gate. So the Democrats have benefited from the success of Republicans in defense and foreign policy since 1980, as the public has become convinced that Ivan is not the peril he once was. Similarly, Americans did not trust the Democrats to promote sound economic policies, but as the economy has grown and 20 million additional people have gone to work, the basic economic concerns that dominated the elections in 1980, '82, and '84 seem to be fading.

But part of the Republican problem lately has also been a failure to define the next step, to lay out a vision for the nation beyond the Reagan vision.

P.R.: What can be done to better mobilize conservative voters at the grass-roots level?

Gramm: The Democrats understand the nature of their political constituency and their program better than we do. The basic thrust of the Democratic program is to create new constituencies by expanding government benefits into the middle class and higher income groups. The natural constraint they face is the harm their policies do to the economy.

The Democrats nevertheless have a big advantage in being able to draw on a professional constituency. Activists for the Democratic Party are direct beneficiaries of government, and they perform in the election process as you would expect professionals to perform. They are consistent. They don't get confused about the issues, they don't let personality conflicts or factors related to the personal behavior of politicians interfere. They rarely get confused as to who is in favor of big government and who is not.

By contrast, the basic constituency we're trying to reach is a volunteer constituency. Our people have to be inspired. When they get up for a contest, as they did in 1980 and '84, they can run all over the professional competition. The group that we can draw from is larger, and the basic motivation, though not as long in duration, is greater in intensity. Our difficulty, especially in off-year elections, has been in activating this constituency. Not enough attention has gone into the development of issues and programs that would activate the grass-roots conservative majority.

P.R.: What vision would you suggest for the conservative movement beyond the Reagan vision?

Gramm: We need to stand for new foreign policy objectives in dealing with the Communist bloc. The containment strategy of the last 40 years has worked. We were able to keep Ivan back from the gate, and the natural superiority of our system of capitalism and democracy has started to emerge. If we can continue to strengthen our system by employing it at home, by exporting it to the Third World, and by expanding trade, we have the possibility in our lifetime of seeing the whole world free—including the peoples of the Soviet Union. Our

objective should be to liberate the peoples of Central America, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, not with arms but with the power of ideas. And that, in my opinion, should be the stated policy objective of the Republican Party. No other foreign policy objective is truly worthy of the American people.

I reject protectionism as a dagger aimed at the heart of everything America and the free world have achieved in the postwar period. We are on the verge of winning the Cold War because of the creation of a wealth machine through world trade. We have helped set up little models of American capitalism in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. We have rebuilt Europe through trade. It is the power of this wealth-creating machine that has brought the Soviets to their knees.

We need to expand trade rather than reduce it. We need to build on the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement until there is a free trade area that runs from the top of North America to the Antarctic. We should punish unfair traders, not by hurting our own consumers with protectionism, but by seeking out the competitors of unfair traders and giving them expanded access to our markets in return for expanded access to theirs.

Our biggest failure in foreign policy has been our approach to the developing world, which we have tried to put on American welfare. The welfare program has worked no better abroad than it has at home. What we have to share with a hungry world is not our cake, but

I reject protectionism as a dagger aimed at the heart of everything America and the free world have achieved in the postwar period.

the recipe we use to bake that cake. And that recipe is capitalism and democracy. We should promote trade. And we should give no assistance except humanitarian assistance to nations that do not follow the only approach that generates lasting economic growth. That system is economic freedom.

On the domestic front, our goal should be to let working people keep more of what they earn. Economic growth is currently generating about \$80 billion of new revenues a year for the federal government. The Gramm-Rudman law requires that half of those funds go to reduce the deficit—it allows the government to spend the other half. My view is that the \$40 billion left after we meet the Gramm-Rudman target shouldn't all go to the people riding in the wagon. Some of it should go to the people pulling the wagon. We need to declare a wagon-puller dividend, with half of the revenues generated from economic growth going back to the people who are generating the economic growth. After

the budget is balanced under Gramm-Rudman, the dividend for working people can be even bigger. Government is not the generator of economic growth; working people are. We should be debating ways of lowering taxes, providing more incentives, and granting more freedom to more people.

After all, the genius of the American system is that through freedom we have created extraordinary results from plain old ordinary people. A huge untouched reservoir of talent can be tapped by providing more incentives and more opportunities for individual initia-

The budget debate today is really a debate about whether the Reagan program is going to become permanent.

tive. When you look at what we achieved through the Reagan program, which was a very modest program, it's ample proof that we have only scratched the surface of what free people who have incentives can do.

P.R.: How would you evaluate President Bush's approach to Congress so far?

Gramm: I think President Bush has been effective in dealing with Congress. He has gone out of his way to be personally involved, and his hands-on approach has been very well received in Congress. Obviously, the real test is yet to come—in next year's budget, as well as in what we're going to do with the ABC child-care bill, the continuing pressures of protectionism, and the greatest failure of the Reagan administration, the tax hikes contained in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Bill. But at this point, I would have to give our new president high marks.

George Bush is not the visionary Reagan was, but as a hands-on, day-to-day administrator he understands how the government works and is more effective in executing policies than was President Reagan.

P.R.: Has President Bush picked the right issues for bipartisanship?

Gramm: Our stop-and-start Central American policy of the last few years simply could not work. In responding to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we had a consistent policy and we were successful, while in Nicaragua we have had an inconsistent policy and we have failed. A non-optimum but consistent policy that is well executed can be more effective than an optimum policy that is poorly and inconsistently executed.

I also give the president's budget agreement a better grade than most people do. Any time you can adopt an agreement that limits the growth of federal spending to 2 percent, even though the budget in the best spirit of bipartisanship has a little cheating here and there, you've made real progress.

Confrontation with the congressional leadership is destined to come on a lot of issues, and I hope we won't have the problem we had in the Reagan administration where the president was too reluctant to take Congress on. But we're in the first inning here with President Bush, and I think his going the extra mile to try to engage in bipartisanship is probably a good policy. It might have some successes, and even if it doesn't, it will put the president in a better position to go into combat. The public would then know that he tried to work out a bipartisan agreement, and the Democrats wouldn't work with him.

P.R.: What steps could President Bush and/or the House and Senate GOP leadership take to revive the 1981 coalition between Republicans and conservative Democrats that you played such an important part in?

Gramm: Since there are no real conservative Democrats in the Senate today, the only way we're going to implement conservative policies there is to win back a Republican majority. If Republicans gain substantially in the House, a handful of Democrats would be willing to work with us on a bipartisan basis, but probably no more than 10.

P.R.: What must Republicans do to win control of the Congress?

Gramm: People tend to vote for president based on their fundamental values and their highest aspirations for America. They view the president as the leader of the free world, as the initiator of policy in America. For that office, Republicans have done well.

The whole issue of crime without punishment is the hottest issue I've seen in my 11 years in politics.

The objective of the American people in electing congressmen and senators is different. People want their congressman to get things done for their district. They want their senator to get things done for their state.

To get elected and reelected, Republicans therefore have to be more effective in getting things done for their districts and states. You can do this well and at the same time promote the overall objective of letting people keep their money to begin with. Constituent service has to be a high priority. I might be interested in changing the fiscal policies of the nation, but if Aunt Sarah didn't get her Social Security check this month, to Aunt Sarah

that's the most important problem in the world. If you're going to govern, you have to deal with those problems.

Second, Republicans have to define the issues so clearly that the American people will see that there are policy issues involved in electing people to Congress. Most voters do not view Congress as setting national policy; they think congressmen and senators only represent their constituents and fight for their interests. Unfortunately, Congress does have a bigger and bigger role every day in setting national policy. Republicans therefore have to run on issues that show why it makes a difference for national policy whether you have a Democrat or a Republican in Congress.

P.R.: You'll be coming up for reelection next year. What do you see as the cutting-edge issues for GOP Senate and House candidates in 1990?

Gramm: To start with, a change in our foreign policy objectives, moving from maintaining the status quo to winning the Cold War. We should call for a combination of balancing the budget and letting working people keep more of what they earn. We should promote increased trade. We should roll back programs that don't work.

The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Bill is the first entitlement program in American history that the beneficiary has had to pay for, and, as a result, a substantial number of people have decided that it is not a good deal. In essence, collectivism has come up against the limits of fiscal reality. It would be a tragedy if we do not substantially overhaul that program.

The whole issue of crime without punishment is the hottest issue I've seen in my 11 years in politics. This is an area where government clearly has a legitimate role and where government has failed. It is also an issue in which the Democrats are wrong and the Republicans are right. In the past 20 years Democrats have generally taken the line that crime was a social problem and that criminals were victims of an unjust society. Their policies have produced the crime without punishment we suffer from today.

We need a major new crime and drug bill with a focus on putting violent criminals in jail and keeping them there, and penalizing the users of illegal drugs. Last year we started out with a fairly good drug bill, but it was debated far too late in the legislative session. Many members of Congress had gone home before the bill was completed, and most of the teeth in the bill were extracted. In fact, it helped the Democrats in the 1988 elections to be able to vote for such a package. I don't intend to see that mistake made again this year. Republicans need to come out with a concrete program for crime and drugs, and not allow it to be compromised away.

P.R.: Would it be politically suicidal for President Bush to raise taxes?

Gramm: Raising taxes is a mistake for a lot of reasons. Number one, tax increases are unnecessary in order to meet the targets of the deficit reduction law in place. Number two, raising taxes is not desirable, because what is desperately needed is the reordering of priorities and



"If we should vote next week on whether to produce cheese on the moon, I would oppose it. However, if the government institutes the policy, I would see that a Texas contractor builds this celestial cheese plant, that the milk comes from Texas cows, and that the earth distribution center is in Texas."

the termination of obsolete programs. Number three, raising taxes will simply allow the government to continue to grow. And that growth will be focused in areas where government policies clearly are not working. The deficit problem offers an opportunity to institute fundamental changes.

I would be happy to adopt President Carter's zero-based budgeting concept in writing the next budget and require every program, including entitlement programs, to be reauthorized and reappropriated. The Democrats would never allow that of course, but I think that's the kind of fundamental reordering we need.

P.R.: As both a congressman and a senator, you have been one of the more articulate spokesmen on Capitol Hill for market economics and limited government. At the same time you have been a member of a Texas congressional delegation that has been very effective in delivering federal goodies for its constituents—whether they be cotton price supports or easy regulation of the savings and loan industry or construction of the superconducting supercollider. What principles do you use in determining whether a policy good for some of your constituents is good for the country?

Gramm: Let's put it this way: If we should vote next week on whether to begin producing cheese in a factory on the moon, I almost certainly would oppose it. On the other hand, if the government decides to institute the policy, it would be my objective to see that a Texas

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contractor builds this celestial cheese plant, that the milk comes from Texas cows, and that the earth distribution center is located in Texas.

P.R.: What do you consider your three greatest accomplishments as a United States representative and senator?

Gramm: I'm proud of my work on the Reagan budget in 1981, which rebuilt national defense and was the only successful effort in American history to reorder government priorities and restructure entitlements.

The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981, which mandated the largest tax cut in American history and set into

Our objective should be to liberate the people of Central America, Cuba, Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union, not with arms but with the power of ideas.

motion the creation of incentives that have put 20 million people to work, is another legislative accomplishment that I'm proud of.

And third, the Gramm-Rudman Bill of 1985, although I would be the first to say it is far from perfect. For the

20 years prior to Gramm-Rudman, federal spending grew at almost 11 percent a year. Since its adoption, federal spending has grown at less than half that rate, and in three out of the last four years, government has actually gotten smaller relative to the private sector of the economy. The deficit has also been cut roughly in half.

P.R.: How important is it for conservatives to win more support among blacks and Hispanics? What are the best ways to do so?


Gramm: It is important that we define our vision in such a way that every American can understand it, and every American can feel a part of it. Since too many Hispanics and blacks have lower incomes, I feel that in a world of perfect communication they would be the mainstay of conservative support. This is because the largest beneficiary of a program for economic freedom is not the person who already has a piece of the pie, but the person who wants the opportunity to get one. The conservative program benefits the country, and therefore it provides marginal benefits to the people who are already successful, but it is aimed at generating the largest benefits to the people who want to use their God-given talents to advance themselves and their families.


Conservatives have to reject the idea that we can appeal for minority votes by imitating the Democrats. People will never buy imitations when they can have the real thing. If people want more government programs, they are going to vote for the Democrats. What Republicans have to do is to demonstrate that private-sector opportunities are going to help minorities. I believe they will, and I believe they have. We must never grant the liberals the moral high ground in this debate. We are the ones who love ordinary people. It's our program that benefits the average citizen.


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A FAREWELL TO ALMS

The Contras Can Win If They Break Their Culture of Dependency

F. ANDY MESSING JR. AND ALLEN B. HAZELWOOD

The Central American agreement to demobilize Contra bases in Honduras could be the final nail in the coffin of Nicaragua's democratic insurgency. Or it could be a big opportunity for the Contras to free themselves from their unhealthy dependence on foreign bases, foreign aid, and foreign advisers—a dependence that has limited their effectiveness in guerrilla warfare.

The 15,000 Contra fighters in the region still have sufficient strength to mount a successful insurgency against the Managua regime. Their rank and file have demonstrated extraordinary courage and perseverance, and, with better leadership, would be highly effective fighters. Meanwhile, popular support for the Sandinistas is at an all-time low; their attempts to impose Marxism on the Nicaraguan economy have left it on the brink of collapse, with even the most basic necessities in short supply. Perhaps even more important, the Sandinistas have lost control over the population; anti-government graffiti is to be found everywhere in the cities, and the totalitarian block-by-block apparatus of Sandinista Defense Committees is in disarray.

The Contras could therefore be in a good position to bring democracy to Nicaragua, should the elections scheduled for February prove to be the expected sham. To succeed in overthrowing the Sandinistas, however, the Contras need to make major revisions in their strategy, tactics, and organization. In particular, they must begin to wage a classic guerrilla war instead of the hit-and-run commando operations from foreign bases that they have conducted up to the present.

The Contras have been severely hurt over the last eight years by the vacillating and contradictory policies of the U.S. Congress and by the refusal of Latin American governments to support them. They also were confused and demoralized by Reagan administration statements that the objective of supporting their effort was to secure concessions at the negotiating table rather than democracy in Nicaragua. More important, though, have been several serious mistakes by the Contras and their

CIA advisers that have prevented them from attaining the victory within their reach.

The Contras' first weakness is that they started fighting too early, before they had prepared the political, social,

and economic infrastructure for a successful insurgency. Actual military combat constitutes only about 5 percent of a classic guerrilla warfare strategy. The other 95 percent involves winning popular support in the countryside and setting up a parallel government there, organizing underground movements in the cities, and developing a self-supporting system for food, clothing, and munitions. Military operations, no matter how extensive, cannot prevail when conducted in a vacuum that lacks these elements. This basic truth, however, has yet to be fully appreciated by the Contras.

Addiction to Outside Support

The development of a self-sustaining system of supply and materiel has been crucial for every successful insurgency in modern history. The Vietminh and later the Vietcong in South Vietnam, the guerrillas in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, and the contemporary FMLN insurgents in El Salvador have all been able to obtain the bulk of their day-to-day supplies within the country where they were operating. Battlefield acquisition from the forces of the opposing government should provide much of the needed military materiel—though, of course, sophisticated equipment such as Stinger anti-aircraft missiles and code cipher books for radio communications can come only from a country such as the United States. If the guerrillas have genuine support, the local populace will supply most of the rest of their requirements.

When successful guerrilla movements become better established, they even set up light manufacturing plants for munitions, explosive devices, and clothing. This occurred in Vietnam, Rhodesia, and El Salvador. The Contras instead became addicted to support from outside

F. ANDYMESSING JR., a retired major in the Army Special Forces Reserve and a veteran of Vietnam, is executive director of the National Defense Council Foundation. ALLEN B. HAZEL-WOOD, a retired master sergeant from Special Forces and an original member of Delta Force, is a veteran of Vietnam, Laos, and El Salvador. He currently coordinates the State Department's drug eradication and interdiction program in Peru's Upper Huallaga Valley. Their article is adapted from a longer paper, "U.S. Policy in Support of Democratic Insurgencies."

Nicaragua, leaving them vulnerable to the whims of a U.S. Congress that never demonstrated anything more than lukewarm enthusiasm at best.

Closely related to the need to establish a domestic supply infrastructure is the need to place a strong emphasis on nation-building. The guerrillas must establish a parallel system of government along with a presence in as many villages as possible. Only by maintaining this continuing presence, and living and working alongside the people on a daily basis, can they conceivably claim to represent them. The guerrillas' presence in the villages and towns throughout the country also gives them the capability to recruit new members for the movement. The Contras, relying on advice from the CIA and others, were not organized into semi-autonomous cells that would permit them to do this.

There are about 1,000 Contras in southern Nicaragua who have been living among the people and inflicting substantial damage on the Sandinista military; and it is significant that they have been operating outside the regular Contra command structure. This war in the south has received virtually no media attention. It is a rudimentary model for the rest of the Contra movement, which has tended to return the bulk of its forces to safe areas on the Honduran border after conducting operations within Nicaragua, thus artificially limiting its opportunities to build local support.


Celling Out

Underlying all successful guerrilla movements is the concept of cellular expansion. Guerrilla units are sent into the countryside to establish permanent cells. The cadres of each cell recruit and train new members, and establish networks for an intelligence and supply infrastructure. With a cell structure, a small number of guerrillas can give the impression of widespread activity and strength—a key psychological component of guerrilla warfare. Each cell operates semi-autonomously, but has the capability to join with others in combat operations against larger government units.

From the outset of the movement, the cells seek to win and sustain popular support, and help create a parallel government. They begin by providing services such as medical treatment and help with harvests. Later, the services become more elaborate—for instance, road-building and the administration of justice. In all cases, the purpose is to demonstrate the guerrillas' concern for the needs of the people. Within urban areas, the cells also help organize political activities, engage in economic warfare such as strikes and sabotage of key industries, and seek to penetrate important government and political organizations.

The failure of the Contras to establish an effective urban underground has made it impossible for them to engage in such economic and political warfare, and has made it highly difficult to obtain the intelligence necessary to conduct operations. Without a strong urban presence, especially in the capital, it is difficult if not impossible to mount attacks against the military targets that are normally located there.

Inadequate security has been a major reason for failure in the cities. Typically, recruits from urban areas



As individuals, the Contras are brave, effective fighters. But they have not been properly led and directed.

have been taken to the Contras' bases in Honduras for training and mixed with the general insurgent population. However, these bases are so thoroughly penetrated by Sandinista agents that their identities soon become known to Managua. Upon returning to Nicaragua, the Contra supporters have been readily apprehended or, worse, allowed to operate under close surveillance to expose other members of their networks before arrest.

Commandos, Not Guerrillas

A second critical mistake of the Contra leaders has been an overreliance on hit-and-run commando operations rather than guerrilla tactics. Commandos are uniformed semi-conventional forces that operate in small integrated units from fixed bases. They generally are used in operations against important targets in support of larger conventional forces, or in "surgical strikes." The Israelis employ such tactics, for example, against PLO strongholds in southern Lebanon.

By contrast, guerrillas are highly mobile unconventional units, and are generally not uniformed. They do not operate from fixed bases, but rather establish themselves in the countryside, and live and work among the people. In many instances, guerrilla fighters maintain the appearance of leading normal lives during the day, venturing out at night to attack the government's forces.

The Contras' CIA advisers, however, have been unenthusiastic about genuine guerrilla tactics. The Agency

Reuters/Bettmann Newsphot

evidently did not feel that genuine guerrilla warfare would afford it sufficient control over operations. Even if the CIA had been inclined to organize guerrilla operations, President Carter's massive cutbacks of paramilitary

Perhaps most damaging for the Contras' mystique has been the perception that they haven't planned to win themselves, but instead have been hoping for a U.S. Grenada-style invasion.

agents had stripped the Agency of the necessary experience and expertise.

Instead, the CIA convinced the Contras to adopt a model essentially based on commando-style raids that had been used in earlier CIA-led operations in Laos in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Laos commando raids were designed to support conventional operations in South Vietnam, and they were highly effective in blocking North Vietnamese divisions that otherwise would have entered the South. The commando model is wholly inappropriate, however, for the war in Nicaragua, where nation-building should be the paramount objective.

Avoiding Civilian Casualties

Commandos are trained to strike hard and fast, leaving the maximum devastation in their wake. Guerrillas, by contrast, must be far more careful in the selection of targets, and take pains to avoid collateral damage, especially civilian casualties. While cultivating the image of fierce opposition to the government's troops, insurgents must at the same time nurture their reputation as a friend of the people. As a result, guerrillas will stage attacks on the government's command, control, communication, and intelligence facilities, but pass up targets of lesser importance. Here, again, the Contras have failed to follow the genuine guerrilla model, with unfortunate results.

Many Contra commando units have been sent into Nicaragua without a well-thought-out plan of action—something that would have been easier to develop if they lived among the people and had adequate intelligence. The result is that, all too often, the Contras have struck at any target they have encountered—anything from passing patrols of local militia to civilian guards at coffee plantations. Such random attacks have led to unintended civilian losses and needlessly high Contra casualties, as they alerted the Sandinistas to their location.

The importance of avoiding military operations that result in civilian casualties underscores a fundamental difference between democratic insurgents and their Communist counterparts. Democratic insurgents must proceed with a high regard for human rights. Instilling this attitude must be one of the principal goals of the leadership. Every member of a democratic insurgency must accept a code of conduct that unconditionally refuses to resort to death squads, repressive actions, theft of property from civilians, abuse of women and children, and the mistreatment of prisoners of war.

Democratic insurgents must reject the tactics of Communists such as the NPA in the Philippines and the FMLN in El Salvador, which routinely engage in bank robberies, kidnappings, and the narcotics trade to finance their activities. Similarly, democratic insurgents must reject the use of assassinations of civilians, terror, torture, and the extortion of taxes.

Although the Contra directorate did not condone or encourage violations of human rights, it failed at the outset to provide the affirmative leadership that insists on proper conduct. As a result, a number of incidents occurred in the field, which damaged the Contras' reputation both in Nicaragua and abroad. Under the guidance of Lt. Col. Oliver North, the Contras' human-rights performance did improve in the mid-1980s, one area where U.S. influence was beneficial.

Insistence on respect for human rights is not just essential from a moral standpoint. It carries a practical rationale as well: Developing and sustaining the support of the populace is simply impossible if the guerrillas routinely abuse them. Proper conduct breeds loyalty and dedication. Terrorism only breeds fear.

The Good Life In Miami

The organizational structure of the Contra effort has also suffered from serious deficiencies. The national leadership and logisticians have been located away from the front, primarily in Miami and the Honduran capital of Tegucigalpa. Many leaders of the insurgency even brought their families. This practice implied a lack of commitment, which generated distrust and hard feelings among field combatants. Seeking to appease congressional critics, Washington planners insisted that the Contra directorate include Nicaraguan business and political leaders who had no military experience or any inclination to lead guerrillas in the field. This approach may have backfired, however, by undermining the revolutionary authenticity of the Contra movement.

The guerrillas must establish a parallel system of government along with a presence in as many villages as possible.

Moreover, the failure to monitor closely the support system in Miami and Honduras has opened the door to corruption and the misuse of funds. This lack of monitoring has been further complicated by the numerous avenues through which funds have flowed to the Contras. At one point, money was being provided to one Contra group by several U.S. agencies, several foreign governments, large private contributors, fund-raising dinners, and direct-mail solicitations of small donors. Contributions from each source went into different bank accounts, with no central disbursement authority, and no means of auditing the overall flow of funds, or, more important, setting priorities for expenditures. The potential for abuse in such a complex system is all too obvious. While most Contra leaders have resisted the temptation to line their own pockets, a few took full advantage of the situation and thereby sullied the reputations of all.

The most serious organizational flaw of the Contra directorate, however, has arisen from the CIA's insistence on a conventional "top down" command structure. While this may have permitted greater control, and is consistent with the CIA's conventional view of unity of command, it has hindered the development of a "divisible" force structure that can break down into smaller semi-autonomous components or cells. It has also deprived the insurgency of some extremely talented combat leaders who have found it difficult to follow orders from armchair generals in Miami.

Divisibility assures that the defeat or even annihilation of any one element of the insurgent force structure does not result in defeat of the overall movement. Like the many-headed Hydra of mythology, when one head is lopped off, another emerges in its place. Since each cell can generate additional cells through recruitment and training, the movement can recover from defeat as long as one cell survives.

About 1,000 Contras in southern Nicaragua have been living among the people and inflicting substantial damage on the Sandinista military; it is significant that they have been operating outside the regular Contra command structure.

Had the United States insisted that the Afghan mujahideen unify their command before we gave them Stingers, the Soviets would still be in Afghanistan today. Similarly, in Nicaragua there was no reason why the FDN (Democratic Nicaraguan Force) had to have a political monopoly over fighting factions. U.S. support for two or more competing military/political movements would



The Contras must avoid the field use of sophisticated communications equipment, computer banks, and other technology too cumbersome for guerrilla war.

probably have been more effective. The conventional military principle of unity of command does not rigidly apply to unconventional warfare, particularly in countries where there isn't a fully developed national leadership. Indeed, competition on the battlefield between rival guerrilla leaders can weed out defective organizations and leaders.

Under a competitive model, active participation in combat is a prerequisite for elevation to leadership. By its very nature, competition favors leaders who choose to fight, live, and work at the cutting edge of danger with their troops. The overfed guerrilla leader exhorting his troops to greater sacrifice from the steps of an air-conditioned trailer would not survive.

Lack of Intelligence

Another element missing from the Contra effort has been the ability to conduct operations in secret. Secrecy is essential to virtually every aspect of the insurgency, ranging from the creation of mystique to the success of assaults on targets and the protection of the insurgency's underground.

The absence of a working intelligence network and counter-intelligence system within the Contra structure has been one of its more serious deficiencies. For an insurgency movement, effective intelligence is often the difference between life and death. The development of a full-fledged intelligence network should have been one of the Contras' priorities at the outset. It is easiest to infiltrate the government's infrastructure, and to place agents in institutions capable of influencing the general public, before the regime pays much attention to the insurgency. Once the insurgency grows, the task of plac-



Effective guerrillas such as the FMLN of El Salvador obtain most of their day-to-day supplies within the country where they operate.

ing agents and building a network becomes immeasurably more difficult.

Still, this deficiency could be corrected if the Contras were to begin following a traditional guerrilla warfare approach. This would require that they shift the location of training for their urban underground away from the camps along the Honduras border to other remote and highly secure areas. They must make sure that anyone assigned to the task of training new members of the underground is thoroughly vetted—to help weed out the Sandinista agents that currently riddle their organization. They must jealously guard the identities of the

The most serious organizational flaw of the Contra directorate has arisen from the CIA's insistence on a conventional "top down" command structure.

members of the underground from the very onset of training. Finally, they must exercise great care in recruitment—the Sandinistas have a highly effective counterintelligence program, and have found it all too easy to place agents inside the Contra organization.

The Guerrilla Mystique

Above all, the Contras have failed to cultivate that key ingredient in a successful insurgency, mystique: the reputation for being everywhere and nowhere, all-powerful, always on the march, never at rest, and, most important, at one with the people. Every successful insurgency leader from George Washington to Fidel Castro has carefully developed a revolutionary mystique.

The Contras' reliance on base camps in adjacent countries, their inactivity in Managua and other Nicaraguan cities, their commando tactics, and their failure to address the political, economic, and social aspects of the insurgency have all contributed to the poor reputation of the Contras in the international community and in Nicaragua. Perhaps most damaging for the Contras' mystique has been the perception that they really haven't planned to win themselves, but instead have been hoping that the U.S. would eventually mount a Grenada-style operation and produce a quick victory.

Strategy for Victory

Despite the flaws in organization, planning, tactics, and structure, the Contras still retain the capability to win. As individuals, the Contras are brave and, when properly led and directed, effective fighters. They passionately want to see their homeland free. Many insurgents have demonstrated a willingness to endure hardship that some of their leaders would do well to emulate. The Central American agreement of August now gives them the opportunity to pursue tactics that will win.

Here is some of what they must do:

• first, and foremost, develop an insurgent mentality—in particular, they must give higher priority to the social,

political, and economic infrastructure for guerrilla war;

• change their structure from a monolithic command structure to a multi-insurgent movement with an emphasis on decentralized, independent action;

• develop the all-important element of mystique;

- change the location of their safe areas in Honduras to ones within Nicaragua, and maintain strict security concerning the new locations (possibly developing tunnel networks similar to those of the North Vietnamese and the Salvadoran FMLN);
- the leaders must relocate their families within the region, and induce their sons to fight;
- set up an effective intelligence and counter-intelligence system;
- establish an urban underground and carry the war to the capital;
- root out and eliminate corruption where it exists, and implement safeguards to prevent its return;
- develop a self-supporting supply system for food, clothing, and other war materials, and come to understand that their principal military suppliers are not U.S. taxpayers but ambushed enemy troops;
- maintain the level of insurgents at a number that can be supported by existing aid and logistical provisions, even if it requires reducing their numbers; and,
- avoid the field use of sophisticated communications equipment, computer banks, and other technology too

cumbersome for guerrilla war. There is no need, for example, for the Contras to have six 20-megabyte computers at their field headquarters; a guerrilla army that cannot break camp with all its gear in minutes is following the wrong strategy.

A sample of what the United States can do to help the Contras take advantage of its new opportunities

would be:

 put strong diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to end or reduce their military and economic support to the Sandinista regime;

- clarify organizational support responsibilities in Washington. The Central Intelligence Agency, the Agency for International Development, the State Department, and the Pentagon have all had various, and often conflicting, responsibilities for the Contras, with no one below the president fully accountable. Someone of high authority (and who knows unconventional warfare) must be in charge; and,
- end congressional micromanagement. A small team of unconventional warfare experts can be highly effective, if they are left in place for the duration, and given the latitude—within sound legal and moral guidelines—to get the job done.

Failing this, Nicaragua and its neighbors will be doomed to a long-term cycle of violence from an entrenched Communist government.

Home Economics

The Housing Crisis That Overregulation Built

WILLIAM TUCKER

Every decade the energies of American "activism" seem to coalesce around a single issue. In the 1960s it was crime and civil rights. In the 1970s it was energy and the environment. Except perhaps for nuclear freezes, the Reagan era was a lean period for leftist reformers. But now their energies seem to be consolidating once again around the issue of housing.

In many ways, of course, the choice is self-evident. The tragedy of homelessness has been the major domestic policy failure of the decade. The problem has grown visibly worse in many cities and now affects the quality of everyday life in media capitals such as New York, San

Francisco, and Washington.

With thousands of activists marching on Washington this October demanding "Housing Now!" homelessness is being portrayed as a national issue about which the Bush administration must "do something." At the same time, recent allegations of scandal at the Department of Housing and Urban Development have fueled the idea that the problem originates at the top. If people are sleeping on subway grates in New York, if affordable apartments are unobtainable in San Francisco, then the blame must lie in Washington.

On the surface, the problem of homelessness is a puzzle. The high cost of housing—and even outright shortages in some areas—is contrary to what one would expect from a free market. Logic says that as the economy grows more productive and household incomes rise, housing should become more plentiful and affordable. Yet, in many areas of the country this clearly is not the case. Particularly on the East and West Coasts, housing has become steadily more difficult and expensive to obtain. Rental vacancy rates are now below 3 percent in Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. (The national average is 7.8 percent.) The price of a home in California-which stood right at the national median in 1970-is now double the national average. In certain regions of the country there is definitely a "housing crisis."

What is happening in these areas? Some critics say the housing market is inherently flawed and cannot provide housing for low-income people. But, upon careful analysis, it emerges that the market could provide hous-

ing for all income-levels but is *prevented* from doing so by government intervention.

There are three basic local government policies that are inhibiting the housing market: 1) zoning, growth control, and other exclusionary strategies preventing new housing from being built; 2) rent control that constricts the rental housing market, which generally serves the less affluent; and, 3) "affordable-housing" and "inclusionary-zoning" schemes, which generally rationalize the preceding two tactics, while doing little more than subsidizing housing for middle-class people who don't need it in the first place.

Trickle-Down Brownstones

The most important thing to realize about housing is the extraordinarily long lifetime of a housing unit compared with other consumer items. Food is usually consumed within a few days of purchase. A new suit or dress may last a person 5 to 10 years. The average automobile has a life expectancy of 11 years. A major appliance may survive 15. Yet, with proper maintenance, a new house has a life expectancy of at least 75 years.

All this makes a tremendous difference in the way housing is consumed. Nearly everyone lives in *used* housing. The new housing constructed each year comprises only about 1 to 2 percent of the market, whereas almost 10 percent of the cars on the road each year are this year's model. Moreover, the value of a house is likely to *appreciate* as it grows older. By contrast, the value of just about every other consumer item, except perhaps vintage wines and rare works of art, is likely to depreciate.

New housing is usually consumed by the more affluent. People who buy new houses have an average household income of over \$50,000, while the average for the entire country is only \$28,000. But, once built, a house or apartment building will eventually "filter" down to people who are far less affluent than its original inhabitants. As fashions change and people migrate, a

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once-prosperous neighborhood may end up as a "slum" or a "ghetto." Harlem, Haight-Ashbury, or the downtown residential district of almost any American city are all now inhabited by people much poorer than their original owners.

Tenements vs. Mobile Homes

Thus, people who try to stop the construction of high-quality housing or gentrification are making a critical mistake. Housing built specifically for the poor usually turns out to be poor housing. Many 19th-century wooden tenements were built directly for the poor. The shacks that dot the landscape throughout the rural South were built for—and by—the poor. Mobile homes may be our best form of low-income housing, providing home ownership to millions of Americans with an average income of only \$18,000. Public housing has also been built specifically as poor people's housing.

Yet, what all these forms of low-income housing have in common is their short life spans. The wooden tenements and company housing of the 1800s soon became dilapidated. Mobile homes last only about 20 years and have no capital appreciation. At the end of their short life spans they are worth almost nothing. Many public housing projects are being torn down after only 20 years. Their cheap construction, plus excessive wear and tear, has rendered them virtually useless.

Construction of any type of cheap housing can be justified, however, when the market demands it—meaning it is what consumers want and better than what it replaces. Still, the most efficient long-term strategy for augmenting housing stock is to build high-quality housing and to *let it circulate*. In the end, the poor will be much better served by good used housing than by low-cost housing that is built for their immediate occupancy.

Why Rents Usually Stay Low

Because well-constructed housing lasts such a long time, it can also be rented more cheaply than other consumer items. Once again, let us try an auto analogy. A top-of-the-line Mercedes sells for about \$75,000. In

The "housing crisis" of the 1980s is like the "energy crisis" of the 1970s. Markets aren't allowed to work.

order to rent such a car, you would have to pay about \$1,500 a month. The average home in this country also sells for just over \$75,000. Yet to rent it, you would probably only have to pay about \$750 a month.

Why the big difference? Once again, the long life expectancy is the key. The owner knows his building is going to last a long, long time. The bank knows this, too. That is why it is willing to give the owner a 20-year



Harlem, 1927. A house or apartment building will often "filter" down to people who are far less affluent than its original inhabitants.

mortgage, which allows him to repay his debt with a low monthly payment. In addition, the house will probably appreciate and become worth more 30 years from now than it is today. For all these reasons, the owner of a house can rent it out at a fairly low monthly rate and still get a worthwhile return on his investment.

As a result, rents on housing have always been traditionally low when compared with other consumer items. In fact, during the inflationary 1970s, rents were the slowest rising item in the entire consumer economy. (Ironically, it was during this same period that 200 American cities imposed rent control as a way to "stop inflation.") Only since 1980 have rents begun to rise noticeably—and then only on the East and West Coasts. Adjusted for inflation, rents in the South are barely above what they were in 1965, and they have actually declined in the Midwest.

In any industry where price and profit margins remain so consistently low, we would expect to find a field that is littered with small competitors. This is exactly what we encounter in rental housing. The rental market is almost excruciatingly competitive. With the possible exception of farming, there is no industry in America where ownership is so widely dispersed among so very many small investors.

Half the rental market is in buildings with less than four units and one-quarter is in buildings with only one rental unit. In no city or state does a single owner control more than 4 to 5 percent of the market. The market is dominated by small, amateur operators who gain entrance with very little capital. This has led to a traditional pattern where landlords often "undercharge" on rents for a couple of reasons. First, landlords often develop personal relations with their tenants, and second, they tend to worry about vacancies more than about getting top rents. Anthony Downs of the Brookings Institution has identified this pattern as "turnover minimiz[ation] rather than rent maximiz[ation]":

One way to minimize turnover is to find good tenants who will stay a long while, pay on time, and not damage the property. Most small owners give such tenants an incentive to remain by keeping their rents relatively low. As a result, long-term tenants typically have lower rents than short-term ones....When a market is dominated by small-scale operators, most of whom restrain rent increases to avoid turnover, even large-scale operators may not realize they could charge more than the prevailing rents, based on the actual balance of supply and demand.

America's Forgotten Entrepreneurs

What is less commonly recognized is that landlords generally come from the *lower* strata of society. This fact runs counter to conventional wisdom, which perceives landlords as big, powerful, and greedy. Landlords may be a little more affluent than their tenants—although sometimes they are notably less affluent—but as a rule, landlords generally come from the same economic strata as their tenants. And, tenants themselves usually come from the poorest third of American society.

Two-, three-, and four-family homes are generally bought by people who cannot afford a single-family home and must rely on rental income to pay the mortgage. These smaller units owned by less affluent people comprise half the rental market. The pattern persists up the line as well. Many people buy larger buildings only after gaining experience with a small one.

Survey after survey has found that landlords tend to be local people who have acquired rental property either as a means of achieving home ownership, as an invest-

The most efficient way to augment the long-term housing stock in a way that will serve the most people is to build high-quality housing and let it circulate.

ment, or as retirement security. In New York City, the Arthur D. Little research organization found that 60 percent of all landlords own only one building and 63 percent earn less than \$40,000 a year from all sources. Half had only a high school education.

The business of being a landlord has generally been the province of amateur investors who see it as a path to upward mobility. It is particularly attractive to immigrants and people with minimal education, since the skills required are basically janitorial. According to the Arthur D. Little report, 54 percent of New York City's landlords are now foreign-born. Developers often come from similar backgrounds, beginning as carpenters, plumbers, or electricians. Donald Trump's father, who founded the family empire, was the son of a Swedish

carpenter who started his own business at age 16 by building a neighbor's garage.

Real Cause for Alarm

In light of all this, then, what can we say about the present "housing crisis?" First, the alarm is real. Tenants' incomes have lagged since 1975, while rents have risen. By 1983, 35 percent of tenants were paying more than 35 percent of their income on rent, as opposed to only 23 percent in 1970. In major cities, the figure has reached 40 percent.

Second, the rental crisis is concentrated on the East and West Coasts. When the figures are broken down nationally, the rent burden has been virtually level in the South and Midwest since 1967, but has increased 20 percent in the Northeast and 33 percent on the West Coast, mainly in California.

Finally, housing has become almost unattainable—for affluent and poor—in certain select markets. Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles now have vacancy rates below 3 percent. A normal vacancy rate is 6 percent. Ironically, these extremely low vacancies have occurred at a time when national vacancies have climbed to their postwar high of 7.8 percent. Chicago, Baltimore, and San Diego all have normal 6 percent vacancies, while cities like Houston, Dallas, and New Orleans are well above 10 percent.

The Reformers' Agenda

What is the explanation for this very unusually distributed "housing crisis"? The best place to look is probably the reform agenda itself, which is already being implemented in all these "crisis" cities.

As a representative sample, let us examine a brief list of proposals made in 1982 by Roger Sanjek, professor of anthropology at Queens College, in a booklet, "Rental Housing Programs and Their Impact on Homelessness," published by the National Coalition for the Homeless. According to Sanjek, "Experts and activists all recognize that it is no longer profitable to build housing that low and moderate income owners and renters can afford." In order to compensate for this failure of the market, he says, activists should work for:

- 1) Preservation of Rent Control. Federal policy to deny funds to localities with rent controls will increase, not prevent, homelessness.
- 2) A moratorium on—or, at least, increased tenant protection in the face of—cooperative and condominium conversion.
- 3) Housing production programs and/or mortgage subsidy efforts for new or rehabilitated low and moderate rent housing.
- 4) Policies that prevent landlords' abandonment of buildings.
- 5) Preservation of Single Room Occupancy housing through tax incentives and direct subsidies.
- 6) Tax policy reversing the trend of a decreasing proportion of [property] taxes paid by businesses.
- 7) National credit allocation policy ensuring a percentage of available credit to housing needs, at affordable interest rates.



Mobile homes provide housing for millions who earn an average income of \$18,000. The great difficulty is that a vast number of Americans do not want this kind of housing in their neighborhoods.

What is most remarkable about this agenda is that almost every proposal will have the effect of slowing the circulation of housing through the market. Construction will be diverted from its optimal point of entry at the high-quality end of the market. Conversions to home ownership will be blocked, decaying housing propped up instead of replaced, and the entire filtering process ground to a halt. Once the system is at a standstill, the power of the government will be enlisted to try to force down rents.

No-Growth Vigilantes

In New York City today, community groups, all funded with state and federal money, are blocking the rehabilitation of vacant buildings on the grounds that renovation will "push up rents" in their neighborhoods.

Since the 1960s, zoning and growth-control measures have been practiced with increasing intensity, particularly in affluent suburban areas. *Newsweek* captured the pattern in a recent cover story entitled "California: American Dream, American Nightmare":

Newcomers arrive with lots of equity from selling overpriced homes elsewhere. They drive up housing costs and build pseudo-French mansions with hot tubs and sprawling decks. They clog the roads. Anxious to protect their land from people just like themselves, the jealous pioneers of the new California dream outlaw development once they're settled, trying hard to close the door behind them.

Although housing construction and rental housing ownership is usually dominated by small entrepreneurs operating on limited capital, a home-owner majority in any community will usually portray itself as a Lilliputian minority ranged against gigantic forces of greed in "stopping the developers." Recently, this opposition has taken a more urgent turn. When Redwood City lifted a three-year building moratorium and allowed the construction of 200 new homes, a few residents took matters into their own hands and burned down 20 partially completed construction sites, doing some \$20 million in damage. "I've been treated kind of rudely by some of the people in the neighborhood," said builder Walter Baccala, who lost \$100,000 in equipment and three months' work.

Suburban resistance to growth has forced California home prices from the national average in 1970 to more than twice the national average today. This produces "back-filtering," wherein people who would ordinarily move up to home ownership are pushed back into the rental market. There they compete with people even less affluent than themselves, forcing up rents.

Rent Control, the Yuppie Subsidy

All this would not necessarily cause housing problems, since rising rents would usually attract new construction. But many cities have responded to these pressures by imposing rent control, which only makes matters worse. New construction slows, older housing is put in a cost squeeze, and a "housing shortage" emerges in the form of low vacancy rates. All the major cities with serious homeless problems—Boston, New York, Washington, San Francisco, and Los Angeles—have already gone through this cycle.

Santa Monica, which has the strictest rent control ordinance in the country (and one of the highest homeless populations) serves as a perfect example. A radical left-wing party, Santa Monica for Renters Rights (SMRR), led the move to adopt rent control in 1979, arguing that

it was necessary to preserve low-income housing. Yet, when SMRR won control of the city council in 1981, it was almost immediately presented with a comprehensive program for making housing more affordable, prepared by a neutral concerned citizen's advisory committee. The plan suggested that mobile homes be permitted in residential zones, that home owners be allowed to rent bedrooms, and that apartments be allowed on residential sites.

Despite its alleged concern for low-income housing, the SMRR majority summarily dismissed the proposal. Wrote Mark Kann, of the Los Angeles Herald Examiner, in

The American housing industry is an awesomely powerful engine, easily capable of providing enough housing for everyone in the country. There is now one bedroom for every living American.

a largely sympathetic book, *Middle Class Radicalism in Santa Monica*, "The rapid rejection, allowing too little public discussion, raised questions about the radicals' commitment to meeting the housing needs of the city's low income people." Added David Shulman, a local economist and housing activist, in the *Santa Monica Outlook:* "Middle income renters living in rent-controlled apartments will respond to low and moderate income housing in their neighborhood the same way as their home owner counterparts, with opposition."

Eventually, when a city has made a mess of its housing market, it will try to compensate by requiring builders to put up "inclusionary-zoning" units designed to provide low-income housing directly to the poor. San Francisco has been typical. After growth-control measures all over the Bay area pushed housing prices to the highest level in the country, the city responded with a "temporary"

rent control measure in 1979. The controls quickly became permanent and rental vacancy rates have shrunk below 2 percent. The city finally tried to compensate with an elaborate "inclusionary-zoning" program that requires developers to set aside 10 percent of their new units for people with "low to moderate incomes."

Yet, somehow these units always end up in the hands of the wrong people. A recent survey of 400 "inclusionary" units in six new developments around San Francisco found only 10 percent of the apartments were in the hands of minorities. Most of the new renters were young, educated whites who had qualified by being at the beginning of their earning careers. Since income qualifications are rarely reexamined, these "yuppies" will undoubtedly stay in their subsidized apartments a long, long time, creating less filtration and circulation than if the apartments had been offered at market rents in the first place.

Food without Farmers

The "housing crisis" of the 1980s, then, is very much like the "energy crisis" of the 1970s. It is a problem of overregulation. Municipalities zone out new housing and then try to undo the effects with rent control and inclusionary schemes that provide housing only for the well-informed and politically connected. When the housing shortages emerge, they run to Washington demanding that the federal government do something.

The American housing industry is an awesomely powerful engine, easily capable of providing enough housing for everyone in the country. There is now one bedroom for every living American. Prefabricated units can be rolled off the assembly line, adequate apartments can be built, and single-room occupancy hotels can be constructed and maintained where they are needed. If necessary, the government can provide housing vouchers. The great difficulty is that a vast number of Americans do not want this kind of housing in their neighborhoods. Prefabricated homes, SRO hotels, mobile home parks, apartments—all have been under continual regulatory attack for the past two decades.

The solution does not lie in Washington. It lies in restoring property rights to landlords and developers and allowing the housing market to function. Carpenters, plumbers, landlords, construction contractors—these are the people who provide America's housing. To try to regulate them out of existence—making them scapegoats in the process—is like trying to have food without farmers. It is a sure prescription for a housing crisis.

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
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
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
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
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


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
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





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CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S SECOND CHANCE

The Successful Chinese Revolution Was on Taiwan

LEONARD UNGER

orty years have passed since the government of the Republic of China (ROC) under Chiang Kai-shek was obliged to accept its defeat on the Chinese mainland and to move 90 miles away to the offshore island of Taiwan, the last piece of Chinese territory still under its control. In those 40 years, the Communist government has established itself securely on the mainland as the People's Republic of China (PRC). Despite recurrent crises, reflecting popular dissatisfaction with the leadership and some of its policies and programs, the PRC has been received almost universally as China's legitimate government. No more than a handful of countries, not including any world leaders, continue normal relations with the government in Taiwan. The United States, the last such world leader, switched its relations at the end of 1978; the United Nations had already made the change in 1971.

Despite these humiliating setbacks—first on the civil war battlefield and then in international diplomacy—the Nationalist or Kuomintang (KMT) Party that has governed the ROC has more to celebrate on the 40th anniversary of Communist rule on the mainland than does the People's Republic itself. The economic dynamism of Taiwan under Kuomintang rule-initially in agriculture, then in basic manufacturing, and now in advanced technology as well—has led to extraordinary prosperity that puts the mainland to shame and has spurred many of the PRC's market reforms during the past decade. Per capita GNP on Taiwan rose from \$150 in 1950 to \$6,000 in 1988, while it is still no more than \$500 on the mainland, and the blessings of prosperity have been spread rather evenly across the Taiwanese population.

While the Republic of China is still not a full-fledged democracy, the people of Taiwan enjoy many of the political liberties and opportunities for self-government that the protesters on Tiananmen Square were calling for. The Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek was a one-party dictatorship consisting mostly of mainlanders, with little participation by native Taiwanese. Nevertheless, Chiang's son Chiang Ching-kuo, who became premier in 1972 and president in 1978, gradually

permitted the emergence of democratic institutions, beginning with elections at the local level. Martial law was lifted in 1987 after 38 years, and opposition political parties have operated since 1986. When Chiang Chingkuo died in 1988, he was succeeded by a Kuomintang leader of Taiwanese origin, Lee Teng-hui.

The economic and political blossoming of the Republic of China has been all the more remarkable, given the corruption and internecine warfare of Kuomintang rule on the mainland prior to the establishment of the People's Republic. It is by no means clear that mainland China would be as prosperous and free as Taiwan today, had Chiang Kai-shek won the Chinese civil war instead of Mao Zedong. Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were chastened by defeat, and determined to do things right in the second chance afforded them on Taiwan, where they also enjoyed some advantages they did not enjoy in China as a whole.

Two Decades of Chaos

When the archaic and reactionary government of the Chinese empire was ousted by the Nationalist Revolution of Sun Yat-sen and his associates in 1912, the leaders of the new Republic of China faced formidable tasks that they and their successors wrestled with over the next three decades. Grafting republican government and a free economy onto a several-thousand-year-old empire presented complex problems further complicated, early on, by sharp political divisions that soon crystallized into the Nationalist-Chinese Communist confrontation. Into that tense scene came Imperial Japan's invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo. In 1937, Japanese forces moved southward, crossed the Marco Polo Bridge into Beijing and launched their campaign to bring the entire Chinese nation under Japanese rule. Chiang's government was obliged to retire, eventually to Chungking. The Chinese

LEONARD UNGER, a retired foreign service officer and former professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, was U.S. ambassador to Laos (1962–64), Thailand (1967–73), and the Republic of China (1974–78).

Communists, although nominally collaborating with Chiang against the Japanese, were rapidly expanding their control.

Only after Japan had widened its war into World War II and, finally, the bombing of Hiroshima and Japan's surrender to the Allies, could Chiang Kai-shek even begin to restore a measure of political normalcy and rebuild the nation. Then the uneasy wartime cooperation between Nationalists and Communists came to an end. Chiang Kai-shek's control shrank rapidly and by 1949 it had become clear that the mainland would soon be entirely under Communist rule.


Chiang decided to move his government and military forces across the Formosa Straits to Taiwan, explaining that the Nationalists required a secure area where, over time, they could rebuild their strength and "return to the mainland" to restore the Republic there. In all, about two million soldiers and civilians crossed the straits.

During the early years under Nationalist rule on Taiwan, soon after Chinese authorities from the mainland took over from the Japanese colonial officials, relations were tense and marked by occasional confrontations between Chiang's mainland group and the native Taiwanese. The Nationalists, who consisted mainly of military and civil servants and some business leaders (principally from Shanghai), were deeply distressed at their defeat at the hands, first, of the Japanese, and then the Communists. They viewed the Taiwanese with some suspicion because of their long (and perhaps willing) association with the Japanese colonial masters who had ruled the island since 1895. The mainlanders of that period were described by one observer as "stunned, embarrassed, and desperate; they had lost all their personal possessions but most, they had lost face."

Advantages of Confinement

It soon became clear, however, that being confined to Taiwan gave the Nationalists several distinct advantages that eluded them on the mainland. To begin with, the scales of operation are vastly different. Taiwan, for administrators, economists, and developers, is almost down to laboratory size and can be managed closely, especially if one has the security forces and the administrative apparatus that Chiang had at his disposal on Taiwan from 1949 onward. Effective administration of a "tight little isle" of 13,814 square miles is much easier than of a vast near-continent with 3.7 million square miles, a diversity of climate, terrain, and peoples, and a millennia-old tradition of regional conflict.

The second advantage was that Taiwan had experienced a half century of Japanese rule. The native Taiwanese had experienced abuse at the hands of the Japanese, but there can be no question that Japanese rule gave Taiwan a physical infrastructure far superior to that on the mainland. Major improvements had been made in the island's transportation and communication networks, and in agricultural techniques, in education, and in health and disease control. Several modern industries had also been started. Thus, although Taiwan was still a provincial backwater in 1945 when the KMT took over from the Japanese, it was ready for the "takeoff" stage of economic development.



Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang were chastened by defeat, and determined to do things right on Taiwan.

The Nationalists on Taiwan also enjoyed greatly improved security. From the 1930s onward, the Nationalists never had on the mainland a secure and unchallenged base of operations such as they enjoyed on Taiwan after 1945. Under the Japanese, Communist activity was totally forbidden on Taiwan and when Chiang Kai-shek took over it was relatively easy to nip in the bud efforts to establish any organizations deemed pro-Communist or, for that matter, even tolerant of Communist views.

Generous Foreign Aid

A further significant advantage for Taiwan from the earliest days of Nationalist rule was the generous support it received from abroad. In the years after World War II, the non-Communist and anti-Communist nations of the world were becoming increasingly apprehensive about Communism's worldwide ambitions. They were acutely aware of what had taken place in Eastern Europe and Northern Korea and what threatened in Southeast Asia, Western Europe, and the eastern Mediterranean. For them, and especially for the United States, the fall of mainland China in 1949 was a major defeat for democracy and the free world, and it was considered that Taiwan must be held, among other things, as a non-Communist or an anti-Communist bastion, a "Free China." It was hoped that with Taiwan as a base it would eventually be possible to recross the straits and "free the mainland from the Communist yoke"—though political and security assessments, and the situations themselves, have radically changed in the years that followed.

American aid amounted to \$743.1 million per annum



Had the successful land reform on Taiwan been carried out on the mainland, the Communist takeover of China might never have taken place.

in the critical years 1949-52; this included \$275.3 million for military assistance and the balance for financial and developmental help. The principal channel for assistance in the agricultural realm was the Joint (Chinese and U.S.) Commission on Rural Reconstruction, established in 1948. American across-the-board economic assistance was administered by the Agency for International Development and its precursors in Washington, with a mission in Taiwan that initially numbered in the thousands. On a per capita basis, Taiwan was one of the leading recipients of U.S. aid until the early 1960s, by which time the ROC's economic growth and prosperity had gained world attention and further economic aid was no longer needed. U.S. military assistance continued for many years thereafter, but the spectacular economic growth of the past quarter-century has occurred with little U.S. economic aid.

Purge of Corruption

Also important was the determination of Chiang and his associates to succeed in the "second chance" they were offered to govern. After their failure on the mainland, Taiwan provided another opportunity to show what the Nationalist Revolution and its leaders could achieve. More than a decade of Japanese aggression and civil war had so disrupted life on the mainland that it had become impossible to carry out many promising reforms that were meant to be part of the Nationalists' social, political, and economic program. Chiang Kai-shek quickly implemented on Taiwan a set of crucial reforms that had long been on his advisers' drawing boards.

One of the first of these reforms was to purge the Kuomintang of corrupt and dishonest officials. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, antipathies between Chiang's occasionally corrupt administrators and the native Taiwan population exploded into a series of bloody confrontations that left many dead and a residue of bitter resentment. In the notorious February 28 incident of 1947, KMT troops slaughtered at least 20,000 Taiwanese calling for the removal of corruption.

From these experiences, Chiang Kai-shek came to realize that strong and effective measures were immediately required in order to lay the groundwork for a secure, peaceful, and prosperous Republic of China. Chiang was obliged during the early Nationalist period on Taiwan to purge dishonest and incompetent elements from the governing and military groups that had crossed the straits to Taiwan. The Republic of China has since been a model of probity in administration.

Marketplace Economic Reforms

A second crucial measure was the Taiwan land reform of the early 1950s, which, unlike many land reforms throughout the developing world, actually gave land titles to peasants. The land reform gave the island's agricultural population a stake in the political economy, and contributed fundamentally to Taiwan's economic development. The measures to carry out this reform had been substantially worked out by Chiang's advisers on the mainland, and it is an irony of history that, had the land reform been carried out in time there, the Communist takeover of China might never have taken place.

Convinced that widespread property ownership was indispensable for a viable democratic society in China, Kuomintang officials had outlined many of the details of the land reform on the mainland. When these officials came to Taiwan and were given the opportunity to put their land reform ideas into practice, they secured valuable economic and technical assistance from the United States. One individual, Wolf Ladejinsky of the Foreign Agricultural Service, is particularly remembered for his initiative and guidance.

With associated research and educational extension programs, the land reform on Taiwan gave rise to a continual increase in agricultural output and foreign exchange. By boosting agricultural productivity, it also allowed a reservoir of labor from rural regions to move into industrial occupations, thus contributing significantly to the modernization of the economy.

The Republic of China on Taiwan has more to celebrate on the 40th anniversary of Communist rule on the mainland than does the People's Republic itself.

Putting the island's financial affairs in order was the first order of business and in this realm a brilliant and devoted Chinese public servant, Li Kuo-ting (known in Western circles as K. T. Li), played a central role. His work with U.S. experts and officials not only stabilized finances and put the banking system in order, but also fostered sound economic development on Taiwan. This included the diversification of the economy, the encouragement of competitive export industries, a strong emphasis on education and savings, and a holding in check of state enterprises. Taiwan is still not a pure market economy, and the state has held a generous view

of its responsibilities in providing infrastructure, but by contrast with many other developing countries, the Republic of China has encouraged the private sector to generate the lion's share of industrialization. According to K. T. Li, "Of the nation's total industrial output in 1952, private enterprise accounted for only 43.4 percent, with the production of state-owned enterprises making up the remaining 56.6 percent...in 1972 [private enterprise's] share soared to 75 percent, while that of state-owned enterprises dropped to a mere 25 percent." Taiwan is also one of the very few examples of developing societies that have grown rapidly and at the same time markedly improved their distribution of income.

Although Chiang Kai-shek himself was not an expert in finance, economics, agriculture, or industry, he was able to assemble a group of intelligent, well-informed, and highly motivated men and women to carry out on Taiwan the reform and the agricultural and industrial development that the Republic of China required. It must be assumed that for him an important motivation was to build strength—political, economic, and industrial, as well as military—which would enable him to take the mainland from its Communist "usurpers." He may have failed in his grander political objective, but he established on Taiwan a model of economic development that the mainland would be well advised to emulate today.

Later Political Reforms

The development of democratic institutions has taken much longer on Taiwan than the emergence of a vigorous economy, but here as well the Republic of China may have much to teach the People's Republic. In the first two decades on Taiwan, the reestablished Nationalist government exhibited a siege mentality left over from its recent experience on the mainland. The KMT limited democratic expression and was suspicious of any who called for more open press or political discussion. For some time all leadership was held in the hands of demonstrated "loyal" Kuomintang mainlanders, and the Taiwanese were regarded, when they questioned government policies or actions, as possibly pro-Japanese and, perhaps, of dubious loyalty. "Loyalty" included a commitment to "one China" and to the eventual effort to

One of Chiang's first reforms on Taiwan was to purge the Kuomintang of corrupt and dishonest officials.

retake the mainland and reinstall the KMT government. As time passed, however, and peace returned to Taiwan, with prosperity reaching remarkable levels, mainlander—Taiwanese tensions considerably abated.



The late President Chiang Ching-kuo and his Russian-born wife vote in 1986 election, the first with candidates from an opposition party. Today the Taiwanese enjoy many democratic liberties the protesters on Tiananmen Square were calling for.

The authoritarian one-party rule of Chiang Kai-shek was considerably moderated and liberalized under his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who began taking over from his father in the early 1970s. The legislative branch gained more influence and authority, and an opposition party (Tangwai) has been able to play an increasingly important role. Perhaps most important, Taiwanese have for years been able to elect their own provincial and local governments, in contrast to the citizens of many other Asian countries, where democratically elected national leaderships impose their own appointees on local populations.

The Kuomintang, still very much the major political force in Taiwan, has nevertheless accepted the establishment and functioning of rival political parties. Expression of controversial views, something that risked incurring official displeasure and even stern measures in the past, is now generally accepted, except for the advocacy of independence for Taiwan separate from China—a cause that still leads to bloody riots, including one in May 1988 in which 500 were injured. Contact with the mainland (at least until the recent crackdown at Tiananmen Square) is condoned and ROC Finance Minister Shirley Kuo even attended a recent international economic meeting in Beijing.

A danger hangs over the future of the Republic of China in the increasing attractiveness among the Taiwanese people of independence from the rest of China. While the resistance of the Taiwanese population to proposals for rejoining the mainland are all the more understandable in the wake of events at Tiananmen Square, both the Nationalist government on Taiwan and the Communist government in Beijing maintain that there is only one China, and prior to Tiananmen had begun a dialogue that might gradually have led to a loose relationship. One can hope that the genius of the Chinese people will find a solution acceptable to both sides of the Taiwan Straits, and that, should any dialogue resume, the leaders of the PRC will pay special attention to the economic and political achievements of the successful revolutionaries of the Kuomintang.

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Let a Dozen Flowers Bloom

Capitalism in China Is Only for the Favored Few

KARL ZINSMEISTER

The Chinese demonstrations that culminated in the Tiananmen Square massacre have generally been categorized as political protests, fired by desires for more democratic governance and better protection of civil liberties. Some observers have suggested that Chinese economic reform also contributed to the instability by proceeding too fast and too far. Overlooked is the possibility that inadequate economic reform and widespread frustration with bungled state direction of the economy were major sources of the mass anti-government outbursts.

In Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms of the early 1980s, China's rulers attempted a grand hybridization. They wanted prosperity with control, and the benefits of self-determination without the risks of individual liberty. Of course, the combination of a profit-driven but state-ordered economic sector with party rule in the political realm is a formula with a long, and infamous, pedigree. That, after all, is the Latin American recipe for state mercantilism. That is the old Philippine brew for crony capitalism, and the pattern by which many Third World despotisms are ruled. This cronyism, combined with 40 years of oppression, has made conditions in China explosive.

Government-Sanctioned Infanticide

In light of the modern historical record, it is a little hard to understand why any Western observers were surprised by the Chinese government's resort to deadly violence in Tiananmen Square. The brutality with which anti-government protests were suppressed in Tibet a few months earlier provided one very near precursor.

An even broader warning of the government's temperament toward its own people could have been drawn from the very harsh and coercive family control program that has been in effect across China throughout the 1980s. A whole range of observers (including perhaps most graphically Michael Weisskopf of the Washington Post) have documented that under this program tens of millions of Chinese women were forced to undergo abortions, even as late as at the onset of natural labor. Thousands of newborns have had their skulls crushed with forceps or had formaldehyde injected into their

craniums during birth by obstetricians under orders to see that a child not be born alive if it was a second or later birth. Hundreds of millions of women have had IUDs inserted into their uteruses without their consent, or sometimes even knowledge. And there have been massive violations of simple privacy, including the practice of making female workers chart their menstrual and contraceptive cycles on bulletin boards at the factories where they work, so that reproductive patterns can be monitored.

Just 20 years ago were the maniacal and often random attacks of the Cultural Revolution. Other than perhaps the Khmer Rouge experiment in Cambodia, there probably has not been a more thoroughgoing application of anarchic and obscurantist violence during this century. And before that was the stunning oppression that characterized the Great Leap Forward. It is astonishing that a calamity of this extent could have been hidden for so long, but it was only within the last few years that Westerners discovered, by working backward from population figures, that the famines that accompanied the forced collectivization of agriculture in China during 1960-61 (when Deng Xiaoping was General Secretary of the Communist Party) took an incredible 25 to 30 million lives.


These were entirely man-made catastrophes, direct consequences of the rigidity of communal farm ideology. At the end of the 1950s, prior to confiscation of peasant lands, China's annual grain production totaled 270 million metric tons. One year after the Great Leap, it totaled about 150 million tons, and it did not exceed this level for a decade. In fact, harvests did not exceed pre-collectivization levels until fairly recently, in the aftermath of market-oriented reforms of agriculture. Through the 1970s, famine remained a common part of life in much of rural China.

In the 40 years since the Communist takeover in China, no people anywhere have suffered more physical

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Photos: UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

The economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping owe more to Imelda Marcos and Anastasio Somoza than to Adam Smith.

oppression by their own government. It would, in fact, be difficult to find a middle-aged Chinese who has not had his life deformed by one or another of these various campaigns. So it is likely the calls for "democracy" and rights protections during the spring protests were not just slogans or the narrow yearnings of intellectuals and student leaders, but broad and deeply felt impulses. The grievances were hardly new, however. It was not a sudden translation of longstanding hurt into democratic aspirations that transformed the latest in a series of student demonstrations into an unprecedented general protest.

There is even less evidence to support the often-heard media suggestion that China's ferment was sparked by some ill-advised combination of full-blown economic liberalization with unbending political rigidity. The truth is that China's economic opening has been very selective and very incomplete. What distinguished the spring 1989 protests from earlier demonstrations was the enormous turnout of workers in support of the students and political agitators. It is the incompleteness of China's economic reforms that seems to have driven much of that mass discontent. Buffeted by gross mismanagement and frustrated by the curtailment of liberalization more than two years earlier, common Chinese took to the streets to try to jump start the economic opportunity movement back to life.

Bankrupt Treasury

Certainly the economic reforms spearheaded by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s and early 1980s, bringing a measure of free enterprise where before there had been none, were significant departures from modern Communist doctrine. Today, 800 million Chinese peasants have some stake in quasi-private farms. There are an estimated 15 million private businesses in China, compared with 1 million in 1980, and they employ up to 40 million Chinese. Reportedly, one-quarter of gross sales in China's commercial sector are now rung up by private entrepreneurs.

One need not credit Deng with special wisdom for taking this path. As the Sinologist Simon Leys has pointed out: "His reforms did not require peculiar courage nor imagination. The economy was bankrupt.... you need not be a brave man to jump from a sinking ship." Just the same, the introduction of some markets and a small measure of private ownership unleashed a major wave of growth throughout the Chinese economy, deeply felt after decades of stagnation during the nation's self-imposed isolation from the West.

But many of Deng's reforms peaked out quickly. Doubling per capita income from \$250 to \$500 is not so hard in a long-suppressed economy. Doubling it again, however, takes a lot more effort, and a much longer lever. Absent follow-on measures (in particular, a full-fledged move from administered to free prices), economic turmoil once again became a serious problem. In December 1986, street demonstrations calling for accelerated liberalization took place around the country.

These seem to have spooked Deng Xiaoping and many of his compatriots within the Communist Party, and unfortunately the ruling councils blamed the nation's distress on too much devolution of economic power, rather than too little. The protests were suppressed a few weeks later. Although China's economy clearly needed serious attention, nearly all further reforms were put on the back burner.

Deng's admirers in the West sometimes forgot during the 1980s that, despite his willingness to dabble in capitalist economic methods, Deng never wavered in his dislike for genuine pluralist competition. In each of his several leadership stints he had exhibited a conventional Stalinist intolerance for opposition or dissent, and he personally led several ruthless purges. This impulse came to the fore again after the 1986 marches, overpowering his devotion to economic decontrol. The many individuals among China's gerontocracy who were never enthusiastic about economic liberalization to begin with happily backed the freeze.

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The fatal climax took place in June 1988 during the Communist leadership's annual summer retreat at Beidaihe on the Bo Hai Gulf. A crisis was at hand. The treasury was broke, parts of the economy were overheating, critical output was falling. Riding in to take up the reform challenge was Communist Party Chief Zhao Ziyang. He brought with him a bold plan, officially called the "New Order for the Socialist Commodity Economy,"

Official corruption on the scale now seen in China results from too little economic freedom, not too much.

which proposed to punch through the chaos with fullblown price and wage decontrol and more economic freedom.

Chinese sources have characterized the plan as equally ambitious as Mao's Great Leap Forward, although its intent was radically different. The program proposed ending state price setting within four or five years and devaluing the currency to encourage exports. It called for gradual labor reform to eliminate featherbedding at state industries and agencies. It promoted a competitive credit system and open market bidding for labor and raw materials. At the same time, Zhao's camp was pushing for some home ownership and market rentals. For practical reasons, certain limited individual freedoms were to be encouraged (a free press, for instance, would serve as an anti-corruption watchdog). All the changes were to be institutionalized.

This was too much for the predominantly elderly caution-and-control camp. They blamed Zhao's earlier decisions to lift price controls and promote coastal development for the current upheaval. The ideological stalwarts feared this latest scheme would lead eventually to capitalism. Zhao's opponents, including Chen Yun, Yao Yilin and the new Prime Minister Li Peng, convinced the leadership, including Deng, that revived central planning and a forcible reassertion of authority over farmers, traders, money lenders and other economic agents were called for instead. Zhao and his allies suffered a startling rejection, and the government began an economic retrenchment that fall. Tiananmen Square came nine months later.

Agricultural Reform Backpedaling

It is of course true that some inflation and unemployment are a risk in any era of restructuring and growth, and that China's initial deregulation push was not well administered. But chronic shortages, 30 percent inflation, a stifling lack of job alternatives, production bottlenecks, black-market trading, tax evasion, and,

especially, official corruption on the scale now seen in China are not symptoms of too much economic freedom, but rather of too little.

Consider the situation in the agricultural sector. Although peasant farmers are China's truest "proletariat," comprising 80 percent of the population, Communism as practiced in China consistently bled down the living standards of rural cultivators in order to subsidize the more politically potent urban minority. Deng's reforms, which started in the countryside, began to change this. Control of crop land was effectively privatized, and grain production—which is the lifeblood of Chinese agriculture and society—soared. For a period during the early 1980s China actually became a net grain exporter.

But, China's leaders soon got a lesson in the limitations of partial liberalization. While peasants had been granted extensive new autonomy in land allocation and marketing, grain prices nonetheless remained strictly controlled. Even at artificially low prices, many rice and wheat farmers managed to do quite well. But it was not long before farmers, increasingly wily to the signals of a free economy, discovered that they could make even more money by growing crops whose prices were not regulated. And so there was a shift of significant amounts of land into the production of highly desired and profitable—but non-essential—products such as medicinal herbs, tobacco, sugar, cotton, silk, and vegetables.

With returns on grain capped by law, its true value to Chinese consumers was not transmitted to Chinese producers, and so food deficits once again became a big problem in cities. Deng and fellow pragmatists who thought they could harness entrepreneurial incentives piecemeal and exploit them selectively found themselves outflanked by the sheer size, complexity and power of market mechanisms. They discovered (as many other political figures have) the impossibility of manipulating one part of a free trading system without creating enormous unwanted bulges in another.

Because the government has refused to follow up the initial reforms with further liberalization, the obstacles to efficient farming have grown more serious every year. State mismanagement has led to horrible bottlenecks and shortages of raw materials. Officials in government monopolies use their positions to shift around short supplies of fertilizer, seeds, and chemicals, often in return for large bribes or price mark-ups.

Meanwhile, government purchasing boards have been too short on cash in recent years to pay farmers for their crops, and so have taken to compensating in IOUs. *China Daily* reported in the spring that the government can come up with only about half the 20 billion yuan needed to buy this summer's grain, vegetable oils, tea, and silk harvests. *Farmer's Daily* said state buyers will rely on paper chits for the rest and press farmers not to store their output or sell it through unofficial channels, as they have in the past.

As one might expect, widespread economic duress of this sort has powerfully affected popular opinion. While China's more than 800 million farmers enthusiastically supported Deng in the early years of the economic reforms, they are now reported to be frustrated, and in

many cases "furious," with the corruption and boundoggling that have set in with the attenuation of the free market movement.

In the cities, too, popular dissatisfaction is high and rising. The bankrupt central government has taken to printing money to pay its domestic bills and foreign loans, and workers have seen their standards of living damaged by an annual inflation rate of 30 percent. Panic buying and runs on banks have occurred in many places, and even basic goods such as food have sometimes become hard to obtain. While individuals working in the new private sector, such as cab drivers and cooks in noodle shops, have often earned very generous returns, civil servants, engineers, professors, and other employees in government enterprises have seen their salaries decline relative to the cost of living, with predictable resentment.

Rusty Iron Rice Bowl

In areas where rapid growth has occurred, monstrously inefficient state companies supplying raw materials, energy, and transportation have often been unable to keep up with demand, and many factories have shut down as a result. Other enterprises have simply gone bankrupt. A reported 17,000 companies were shuttered in the six months prior to May 1989. The "iron rice bowl" policy of guaranteed employment is fading, yet relatively little new job creation or economic opportunity has become available in compensation. Many workers are stranded in limbo: free to lose, but not to choose.

Managers, too, find they are operating under new rules, but with many of the old encumbrances intact. For instance, the Chinese are in the midst of setting up a huge \$840 million auto plant in Manchuria as part of a major new effort to produce cars for the domestic market under licensing agreements with Chrysler and Volkswagen. The president of the First Automobile Works points out that about 60,000 of his employees—80 percent of his total work force—have jobs completely unrelated to car production. They include barbers, daycare workers, nurses, policemen, you name it, all on the payroll basically because this is a big enough socialist enterprise to keep them busy.

"Each year," he says, "I have to worry about housing for 2,000 couples getting married, nurseries for 2,000 newborn babies, and jobs for 2,500 school leavers. I am mayor as well as factory head." Charged with achieving both heavy welfare responsibilities and economic efficiency, awkward compromises are often made. This factory, one of China's newest and best, is reported to be grossly overmanned and underproductive.

It has been said that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing. Likewise with a little economic freedom. While elements of Western-style risk and discipline (bank-ruptcy, some worker firings, limited competition) have been introduced into parts of China's system, workers and managers have been allowed few correlating, compensating, Western-style benefits. The hard-nosed part of enterprise economics has been imported, but little from its schedule of personal rewards.

Pay has not been increased to fully reflect higher productivity and increased job insecurity. Managers have been held accountable for the bottom line of their enterprises, but not allowed to price their products freely, or to have their suppliers bid directly against each other. Chinese leaders have seen fit to introduce lots of capitalist sticks, but relatively few capitalist carrots. That is an arrangement many workers view as unfair, even exploitative, and in Tiananmen Square they sent the leadership a message: If you want the enhanced motive and economic output of democratic capitalism, you are going to have to pay for it with increased self-direction and private incentives.

The People's Republic of Corruption

The biggest festering point for this year's Chinese protestors was official corruption. Associated Press reported this spring that a survey of 10,000 workers found that 46 percent listed corruption as China's most serious social problem. "Guandao," the system of milking official connections, sometimes makes it difficult for common people to obtain even something as simple as a train ticket unless they know the right person. Pay-offs are needed to acquire many officially disbursed goods and services, and jealousy of privileged government skimmers even has a name: the "red-eye disease."

Very simply, government authorities are parlaying their monopoly powers—special access to goods, and authority over job, apartment, health care, and other allocations—into personal gain. Even when urban entrepreneurs set up alternative private networks to provide those same products to starved markets, they must pay off government officials for the privileges of operating and receiving their raw material inputs. An elaborate

Chinese leaders have seen fit to introduce lots of capitalist sticks but relatively few capitalist carrots, an arrangement many workers view as exploitative.

structure of nepotism and graft has allowed Party officials and their chosen ones to gorge themselves on both the state-directed and unregulated economies.

The official favoritism extends from the level of petty clerk right to the very highest ranks. Deng Xiaoping's own son, Deng Pufang, held a principal role in the Kanghua Development Corporation, an entity recently found to have so many "management irregularities" that most of its operations were closed down by anti-corruption campaigners. One delegate to China's parliament, the National People's Congress, has reported that 134 different companies have a top government office-holder—a minister or the equivalent—on their payrolls.

The only hope for a solution lies in structural change. The Chinese justice system has tried an administrative response. The courts prosecuted 37,000 cases of official profiteering in 1988, up 50 percent from the year before. 101 embezzlers and bribe-takers were sentenced to death or life imprisonment. Centers for reporting official abuses of power are common in Chinese villages and communities. But, these measures have little effect on the prevalence of official graft. A national campaign launched against backdoor dealings last year quickly fizzled. In July a new crusade was announced, yet few observers believe it will achieve much.

And for good reason: so long as Chinese state industries fail to produce sufficient goods to meet consumer and industrial demand, so long as the gap between state-set and informal prices remains so wide, so long as there is no open market to efficiently allocate supplies among competing demands, then crude "private prices"—which is what bribes are—will be the only way to distribute scarce resources. Indeed, under the warped conditions of the Chinese economy, payola is not only probably unavoidable, it may well serve a positive function as a lubricator of creaky machinery and a sorter of competing claims. But, of course the economic effects are only half the story. As the recent public backlash showed, the political fallout of a system of widespread palm greasing is almost always negative, and can be life-threatening to the regime in power.

The Impossible Compromise

Deng-onomics, as it has evolved in the 1980s, is basically a market-tempered form of nepotistic economic

centralism. There is little new about such a regime, other than that it is being implemented by Communists. Unmodified, it will probably bring results very like those now seen in many South American nations. Everywhere it has been tried, state-managed capitalism has led directly to corruption, to debasement of the currency, to institutionalized favoritism. The alternative—entrepreneurialism and truly competitive markets—is something China's ideological leaders are unwilling to try.

The major question facing Communist countries in the 1990s is whether it will be possible for them to tinker themselves into prosperity and tranquility without fundamentally turning their backs on their pasts. The tranquility Communists have never found difficult to achieve, thanks to their willingness to use the whip. But the price of that kind of tranquility is always a steady-state society of low creativity and output. And in cases like those of Poland and the USSR during the 1980s, it isn't even clear that the coercive strategy can guarantee a low-level steady state anymore. A low-level downward spiral is more like it. Freedom is a little like Kudzu vine—if you've got some you'll soon have a lot. The practical result is you either don't have any, or your back yard is full of it.

The Chinese have wandered into a netherworld. With a chaotic economy that is neither truly free nor fully command-directed, their society is full of contradictions and often at loggerheads with itself. An epigram popular in Argentina these days states that that country lives under "socialism without a plan, capitalism without markets." This characterization could apply equally well to China. It is a recipe for economic chaos, widespread corruption, and continued popular resentment.

GULLIBLE'S TRAVELS

The Inaccurate Art of China Watching

STEVEN W. MOSHER

ne of the great scandals of modern intellectual history has been the gullibility of many prominent scholars and journalists writing about Communism in China. To read their remarks on Yenan during the Chinese civil war, on the Great Leap Forward at the end of the '50s, and on the Cultural Revolution in the '60s and '70s, one would think that Communist rule had created a bold new socialist civilization building on the best of Chinese traditions. The carnage in Tiananmen Square this June is only the most recent reminder of how profoundly the revolutionary socialist regime of the China watchers' imaginings differed from the despotism experienced by the Chinese people.

The wishful thinking of the China watchers did not begin with the founding of the People's Republic 40 years ago this October. Between the Japanese invasion in 1937 and the Communist triumph in 1949, almost all of the foreign correspondents reporting from China, along with many of our diplomatic representatives, believed that the Chinese Communist Party was a progressive, democratic force that would be the salvation of the peasant and working classes.

Yenan's Christian Brotherhood

Western correspondents first visited the Communist capital of Yenan in mid-1944. Later that same year a permanent official American presence was created with the establishment of the Dixie Mission. Both groups were tremendously impressed by this ideologically sanitized city and its carefully vetted inhabitants, and went on to spill much ink in its praise. The myth of Yenan, a tale first told by Edgar Snow in his 1938 book *Red Star Over China*, was expanded and embellished until it became the "Camelot of China."

John K. Emmerson, who was in Yenan during this period, in his memoirs compares its effect on visitors to the revival meetings he had experienced as a youth "where the converts suddenly got religion," and admitted that he, too, had "succumbed to the spell." His State Department colleague John Service reported: "To the skeptical, the general atmosphere at Yenan can be compared to that of a rather small sectarian college—or a

religious summer conference. There is a bit of the smugness, the self-righteousness, and conscious fellowship."

A few miles off in the hills, unbeknownst to the visiting China experts, was an installation that few sectarian colleges or religious summer camps find necessary—a concentration camp for those whose conscious (or unconscious) fellowship the regime found wanting. Colonel David Barrett, the first commander of the Dixie Mission, later remarked that he and his fellow Americans would have held a considerably less benign view of the Communist movement had they known of this camp.

Their ignorance of the dark underside of life in Yenan was, of course, no accident. It was in Yenan that the Chinese Communist Party first perfected the array of techniques it used to handle short-term visitors in later years. A small, comfortable cocoon of friendliness and conviviality was immediately spun around new arrivals. Most pilgrims spoke no Chinese and could communicate with the locals only through the English-speaking officials from the foreign affairs section who seemed to accompany them everywhere. They were feted at banquets, flattered by top leaders, and allowed to hear only praise of the new democratic society that the Communists were constructing. Little wonder they came to view Yenan as a secular version of Christian brotherhood.

Guenther Stein of the Christian Science Monitor, in an early adumbration of the "New Maoist Man" myth, wrote in 1944 that "the men and women pioneers of Yenan are truly new humans in spirit, thought, and action," and that Yenan itself constituted "a brand new, well-integrated society that has never been seen before anywhere." That same year Brooks Atkinson of the New York Times reported that the Chinese Communist Party was Communist in name only, and could better be considered "a farm labor party." Harrison Forman of the New York Herald Tribune and London Times declared that the political society of Yenan was not Communism "in

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As 25 million Chinese were dying of hunger, Edgar Snow wrote that he had "diligently searched, without success, for starving people or beggars to photograph."

Soviet Russia's definition of the term," a conclusion he later repeated in his book, *Report from Red China*.

Theodore White also called the Yenan Communists "agrarian liberals" in his dispatches, only to have that malapropism edited out by Whittaker Chambers, then foreign editor of *Time*, according to Chambers in his memoir, *Witness*.

Yenan and its environs seemed a thoroughly egalitarian society, a blessing that the correspondents attributed to Mao's "New Democracy." Guenther Stein described the democratic methods in use in the border region as "far-reaching," and the claims of the leaders that these would continue as "thoroughly plausible."

A. T. Steele of the *New York Herald Tribune* recalled, four decades later, that some of his colleagues were saying, "Well, these people are not Communists. They're promoting a new democracy up there." For Steele, a pilgrimage to the Communist citadel was uplifting. "A trip from Chungking [the capital of Chiang Kai-Shek's Nationalists] to Yenan was like going, in one sense of the term, from hell to heaven because everything in Yenan looks so orderly and the people were practicing democracy, or so they said, and to a large degree they were. And the Communists seemed to have found a formula that might open the way to a new day in China."

Under Zhou's Spell

The correspondents should have known that Yenan was not paradise. Before entering the Communist base, they had talked with, in Guenther Stein's words, a number of "deserters from Communist armies, disappointed ex-Communists from Yenan, persons from enemy-occupied areas who testified against the Communists." But neither Stein nor most of the other correspondents were disposed to accept these accounts as anything other than Nationalist propaganda. Stein wrote disparagingly: "Their statements, plausibly varied, all tied in with what we heard from officials." The Communists and the Nationalists were each trying to convince the China watchers that the other was an illegitimate political movement, unworthy of governing China. But the Nationalists

were at a considerable disadvantage in this propaganda war. "There was nobody on the KMT side who could touch Zhou Enlai [the senior representative of the Chinese Communist Party in Chungking for much of World War II] in persuasiveness or in intellectual charm," recalled free-lance writer Peggy Durdin, wife of New York Times correspondent Tillman Durdin.

A slim, strikingly handsome man then in his early 40s, Zhou possessed a mesmerizing personality and many foreigners fell under his spell. Henry Lieberman of the New York Times recalled that "Zhou Enlai was one of the greatest people I've ever encountered because of his charm, his skills, his mental and dramatic ability. One of the most important things of all, I think, is that he was one of the world's greatest actors." The China watchers had a weakness for this romantic and charismatic leftist leader, which he exploited to the full.

Zhou won over the correspondents to his point of view, leading many to dismiss the Nationalist Party as a corrupt, spent force well before its armies were defeated on the battlefield in 1949. Similarly, Zhou created in their minds an admiration for Communist accomplishments in the base area long before they had a chance to actually visit Yenan.

Famine Snow Job

Although the People's Republic of China remained generally off-limits for Americans well into the '60s, an exception was made for Edgar Snow, who in 1960 became the first American correspondent with prior experience in China to be allowed to return. Both the length and timing of his visit bear reflection. The Great Leap Forward, Mao's frenzied attempt to create an instant utopia, had just shuddered to a halt. Promising "three years of suffering leading to a thousand years of happiness," it had led instead to three years of famine. Emaciated hordes of starving refugees came tottering across the Hong Kong border in 1959-60 and told of villages stricken with hunger. Yet right at the height of this disaster Snow was allowed to poke about the country for five full months (and could have stayed longer). Was the China watcher whom Zhou Enlai had called in 1937 "the greatest of foreign authors and our best friend abroad" invited in the hope that his reports would counteract the bad publicity that followed the failure of the Leap? If so, Snow did not disappoint his sponsors.

In his book of 1962, Red China Today, Snow flatly denied that there was a famine: "One of the few things I can say with certainty is that mass starvation such as China knew almost annually under former regimes no longer occurs....I diligently searched, without success, for starving people or beggars to photograph." He conceded that some people were suffering from "severe malnutrition," but thought it unlikely that this had led to any significant number of deaths. Coming from someone who had traveled widely around the country for months during a time when tens of millions were dying in China's worst famine of the 20th century, such statements now read like an almost willful denial of reality. They call to mind New York Times correspondent Walter Duranty's infamous denials of famine in the Soviet Ukraine and North Caucasus in 1932-33, years in which Sovietologist Robert Conquest later estimated that 6 million died.

Did Snow know about the famine and deliberately deceive his readers to protect his access to China, as Duranty did in the Soviet Union? Or was he himself deceived by the denials of food shortages he received from Communist leaders? Or did he perhaps overlook the truth in his haste to validate his past optimism about Chinese Communism and to correct misimpressions about a regime that he saw as unfairly maligned in the Western press? It is known that he spent two days in the company of the charming Zhou Enlai, who, along with other information, provided him statistics on grain production that later turned out to be false. Zhou's attentiveness to Snow may have been part of a concerted campaign. At that time, Sinologist Edward Friedman writes, "Foreigners were fed a diet of lies to spread outside the country, to the effect that there was no famine in China." Anna Louise Strong, who was the most faithful of foreign camp followers of the regime, complained privately in Beijing: "I am not allowed to admit that anyone in these three years ever starved to death." With the government determined to prevent word of the famine from reaching the outside world, the cost to Snow of writing about it (except to deny its existence) would have been high: the loss of his unique and treasured access to China's top leaders.

Most American China watchers accepted Snow's "firsthand" verdict on the famine and denied or at least downplayed one of the greatest human tragedies of our century. John King Fairbank, former doyen of Chinese Studies at Harvard University, in his "classic" introductory history of modern China, The United States and China (fourth edition, 1979), devotes just one sentence to the subject: "Malnutrition was widespread and some starvation occurred." Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times in his 1973 China travelogue (dedicated to Edgar Snow) To Peking and Beyond, like many writers, makes no mention of this catastrophic event. Others went even further. C. P. Fitzgerald, a historian of China, claimed in 1973 that during these difficult years "the commune system...saved the lives of millions, simply because resources were centrally controlled, and rationing made possible." Maurice Meisner stated in 1977: "Massive famine was avoided (but only barely) through the institution of a highly efficient system of rationing and by huge wheat purchases from Australia and Canada."

Ignoring the Evidence

Can these and other China watchers fairly be called to account for not knowing about, or at least not writing about, a catastrophe that Beijing was anxious to keep under wraps? As early as January 1962, in a speech highly critical of the calamitous Great Leap Forward, no less a figure than then-Chairman of the People's Republic Liu Shaoqi was reported to have said that "our economy is on the brink of collapse....Our losses in manpower, fertile soil, and natural resources have been so heavy that it will take seven to eight years to put matters straight....The masses [have] starved for two years." Even though Liu may have overstated the difficulties to compromise his rival Mao, one would not have expected such an admission by China's No. 2 leader to simply be ignored by



John K. Fairbank called the Maoist Revolution "on the whole the best thing that has happened to the Chinese people in many centuries."

China watchers. But it was. The same fate awaited the report of Laszlo LaDany, a respected China scholar, that from 1960-62, China had seen a "real, black famine." Writing in the August 10, 1962, issue of China News Analysis, he offered a "realistic estimate" that starvation and deficiency diseases had taken 50 million lives during this period. This estimate disappeared as if dropped into a black hole. Also ignored were captured 1961 army documents that revealed that in Henan Province entire villages had been virtually wiped out. Local officials insisted, even after the famine had struck, that the Great Leap Forward was a triumph, proving their "success" by regularly shipping grain to the cities. It was the commune system, lauded by Fitzgerald for saving lives by "rationing," that made it possible to extract the last bushel of grain from the peasants. When relief grain finally arrived, the documents pointed out, the survivors were too weak to queue for the food.

By the '70s, the magnitude of the disaster was clear. In 1973, the meticulous German scholar Juergen Domes estimated that at least 10 million, and possibly a multiple of that figure, had perished. In 1976, Ivan and Miriam London published "The Three Red Flags of Death," an in-depth account of the famine based upon refugee interviews conducted in Hong Kong in the mid-1960s. By 1981, with the de-Maoization campaign in full swing, even an official Chinese journal, Economic Management, admitted to 10 million "excess" deaths during this period. The most reliable figure comes from the demographer John S. Aird, whose analysis of the 1981 census data led him to conclude that the net population loss during the famine years of 1959-61 was perhaps as great as 25 million people. What Fairbank calls "some starvation" and other China watchers ignore may well rank as the worst famine in the 20th century.

Hayden's Peking Duck

If Snow was an old-line socialist and long-time admirer of the Chinese revolution, Tom Hayden and Staughton Lynd, who visited China in 1966, were the forerunners of a new generation of American visitors who were radicalized by their opposition to the Vietnam War. Estranged by what they perceived as the imperialistic, immoral behavior of their own country, they cast about for a just society, free of capitalistic greed and imperialistic ambitions—and discovered the China of the Cultural Revolution. In their book of 1966, The Other Side, they rejoiced to find a country whose elite shared (or so they thought) their views: "[W]e felt empathy for those more fully 'other' members of the other side, spokesmen for the Communist world in Prague and Moscow, Peking and Hanoi. After all, we call ourselves in some sense revolutionaries. So do they. After all, we identify with the poor and oppressed. So do they."

Lynd and Hayden saw "progress...everywhere. Millions of Chinese are involved in its creation. In Peking we saw thousands of people digging a canal while music blared from outdoor loudspeakers." Most of all, they believed that class distinctions had been eliminated. Even when confronted with stark inequalities, they accepted the assurances of their hosts over the evidence of their senses. Lynd and Hayden recount that each time they visited a restaurant they found themselves "escorted to a separate room, where we could talk easily while eating; but, we were told, the restaurants are open to all, food is the same for everyone, and prices are low." Had they rubbed elbows with the noisy proletariat outside, they would have found that such rooms are actually res-

Harrison Salisbury described China's quasi-penal May 7th Schools, where party cadres were sent for ideological retooling and manual labor, as a "combination of a YMCA camp and a Catholic retreat."

taurants within restaurants, where VIPs can dine on specially prepared dishes in quiet splendor.

President Nixon's China initiative ignited enormous interest in China, especially among U.S. intellectuals, and made it possible for those who were neither as well-connected as Snow nor as politically reliable as Lynd and Hayden to obtain a visa from the Beijing regime. Mainstream political commentators went to Red China to learn about the societal virtues of a "New" China that they had never dreamed existed. Praise of the Maoist revolution in China, once limited to radical Left circles,

could now be found in the pages of the New Republic, the Atlantic Monthly, Time, and Foreign Affairs.

The China craze was not limited to the United States, nor to liberals. Writing in 1971 for the Italian magazine *Successo*, Galeazzo Santini described how "China is now the fashion around the world, and in no uncertain terms. Everywhere politicians of the most conservative and bourgeois kind are attempting to rebuild for themselves a compromised career by singing the praises of Mao Zedong." Nixon in China was no exception. After watching one of the Chairman's "revolutionary operas," surely the most relentlessly propagandistic and brazenly militaristic works ever to be trod upon the boards, he praised it as "Fantastic!...excellent theater and excellent dancing and music...the equal of any ballet I have seen."

Smile and Say Please

Prominent among those who painted in the details of this large and still largely blank canvas were respected academics from America's best universities. John Kenneth Galbraith was impressed in 1973 by the "easy, affable, and sensitive manners of the Chinese." He wrote: "One transfers his reaction to [these manners] to the society. Dissidents are brought firmly into line in China, but, one suspects, with great politeness. It is a firmly authoritarian society in which those in charge smile and say please." Unbeknownst to Galbraith, China's prisons during his visit were still full of victims of the Cultural Revolution, among them Nien Cheng, who describes in her best-seller, *Life and Death in Shanghai*, how her Maoist captors repeatedly tortured, starved, and abused her during her six-year incarceration.

Fairbank, writing in *Foreign Affairs* in 1972, characterized the Maoist revolution as "on the whole the best thing that has happened to the Chinese people in many centuries. At least, most Chinese seem now to believe so, and it will be hard to prove it otherwise." Like Guenther Stein before him, Fairbank admired the New Maoist Man, the result of "a far-reaching moral crusade to change the very human Chinese personality in the direction of self-sacrifice and serving others." He argued that America could learn much from the Cultural Revolution: "Americans may find in China's collective life today an ingredient of personal moral concern for one's neighbor that has a lesson for us all."

Another premier China watcher, and one of the most prolific, Ross Terrill, offered an equally hyperbolic assessment of the achievements of the New China in his 1972 book, 800,000,000: "In a magnificent way, it has healed the sick, fed the hungry and given security to the ordinary man." Harrison Salisbury described China's quasi-penal May 7th Schools, where party cadres were sent for ideological retooling and manual labor, as a "combination of a YMCA camp and a Catholic retreat."

Not all China watchers succumbed to the euphoria of the early 1970s. John Kenneth Galbraith observed, "Clearly, there is very little difference between rich and poor." He was corrected by sociologist Martin Whyte of the University of Michigan, who described how "officials and employees in the state bureaucracy were ranked from level 1 (top national leaders) to level 30...and the differential between the highest and lowest levels was

about 28:1....In regard to income differentials, then, one can say that the existing situation is quite different from the impression that the egalitarian rhetoric of the Cultural Revolution or the uniformity of dress of the population may convey."

Crumbling Facade

It was not until the late 1970s that the China watchers' carefully erected facade began to crumble, fatally undermined by the post-Mao leadership's attacks on the late Chairman. When Mao's closest disciples, the "Gang of Four," were arrested and put on public trial, the harrowing violence of the Cultural Revolution was exposed by the Chinese government itself. On the 30th anniversary of the People's Republic, in 1979, Ye Jianying, one of Communist China's top leaders, declared on the front page of *People's Daily* that "the 'Cultural Revolution' forced the country to endure an entire decade of oppression, tyranny, and bloodshed." The public cataloguing of Mao's failures, and the official correction of his misinformation (including a wholesale rewriting of China's agricultural statistics), delegitimized the regime in the eyes of the Chinese people and foreign admirers.

Some China watchers published self-criticisms. Orville Schell, originally among the most fawning of the New China's admirers, had by 1980 experienced a change of heart. As he wrote in the New York Review of Books: "A 'friend of China' felt constrained from disappointing his host by writing anything critical or unflattering....All the special treatment and effort extended on one's behalf seemed to require repayment....But one fear above all predominated: ...that if one uttered or wrote 'incorrect' thoughts one would never again be allowed back. And to one degree or another...most of us who have written about China did capitulate to this fear." In 1983, in the Atlantic Monthly, Ross Terrill also apologized for his earlier defense of what he now recognized as "first and foremost a repressive regime. The unchanging key to all Peking's policies is that the nation is ruled by a Leninist dictatorship that intends to remain such." Others, however, justified their earlier positions. Fairbank wrote in his 1982 autobiography, Chinabound: "I was committed to viewing 'Communism' as bad in America but good in China, which I was convinced was true."

Tiananmen, End of the Romance

The events of this June, when the Beijing regime answered the demands of its citizens for democracy with tanks and troops, may finally have taken the bloom off the rose. Even those China watchers with close ties to the Communist elite were taken aback by reports of armored personnel carriers running at full speed into crowds of people, or of soldiers firing indiscriminately into masses of unarmed students and workers. China remains a one-party dictatorship, ready to liquidate any political opposition that may arise.

Michel Öksenberg, who had earlier dismissed the possibility that the regime would use deadly force to suppress the demonstrations, issued a personal *mea culpa* in the form of an essay entitled "Confessions of a China Watcher." William Hinton, a Marxist China watcher whose friendship with the current regime predates the



As Nien Cheng was tortured in a Shanghai prison, John Kenneth Galbraith wrote: "Dissidents are brought firmly into line in China, but, one suspects, with great politeness."

revolution, left China in disgust on June 23, declaring: "I think it's a fascist government....As social problems get more acute, it is relying more on force and repression." He vowed not to return until the government condemns the assault on the students, a promise that may keep him out of the country for years to come.

Why have the China watchers been so susceptible to the claims of the People's Republic for the last 40 years?

Tom Hayden and Staughton Lynd saw "progress everywhere" in the Cultural Revolution.

Most were drawn to the study of China in the first place by the romance of the Middle Kingdom, a great civilization of ancient wisdom. Some were reinforced in their quest by a feeling of alienation from their own society, or a contempt for democratic and free-market institutions. George Kennan, the author of our postwar containment policy, once remarked that people who study the Soviet Union end up hating the Soviet Union; people who study China end up hating themselves.

However complex their motivations, let us hope that the next time they are tempted to romanticize China's leaders or policies they remember the Tiananmen massacre—and the students who paid for their criticisms of those leaders and policies with their lives.

Blackboard Jungle

The Collapse of Discipline Is Public School Enemy No. 1

BEN WILDAVSKY

As the 1980s draw to a close with little noticeable improvement in public education, school reformers continue to call for competency testing for students and teachers, a return to academic basics, more parental involvement, and public school choice. But the impact of these vital reforms will be limited if priority is not given to one other so obvious it is sometimes overlooked: discipline. For school discipline is without question the necessary, if not sufficient, condition for academic improvement.

Consider the achievements of Ben Jiménez. This year, 39 of his 40 Advanced Placement math students, almost all from the barrio around East Los Angeles' Garfield High School, passed the AP calculus exam, a record even more impressive than that of his better known colleague, Jaime Escalante, the hero of a recent movie, *Stand and*

Dolinsor

Nothing Jiménez has accomplished would have been possible without discipline. When he first started teaching math at Garfield in 1975, his students walked all over him. His predecessor had allowed things to deteriorate to the point where graffiti obscured the classroom's blackboards and the tables were covered with carvings; it was rumored that some students had spat in the cowed man's face. The students the 24-year-old rookie inherited were "pretty rambunctious," he says with a laugh, and after a tense face-off with one football player and constant battles against noise and disorder, he was ready to leave Garfield. Then, at an administrator's suggestion, he visited Escalante's classroom.

"He was a real sergeant in those days," says Jiménez, who was impressed by Escalante's quiet, industrious students. The summer after his first year, he thought seriously about quitting, but his colleague's example persuaded him that many of the discipline problems he

had experienced were his own fault.

The next year Jiménez resolved to be the boss. "The kids noticed the change. I wasn't going to take any crap." He instituted a strict homework policy, sending any students who failed to complete their assignments to the dean's office, with no questions asked. To combat perennial problems with tardiness and absences, he started to hold daily quizzes, with no make-ups allowed unless a

parent called to explain a student's absence. Jiménez says he has seen too many forged notes to give them much credence.

The new regimen worked. And Jiménez's ability to create an orderly environment and achieve such impressive results is especially encouraging because he is so different from Escalante. A soft-spoken man, Jiménez lacks Escalante's inimitable knack for hamming it up in class with magic tricks and pure charisma. But his accomplishments show that it is not necessary to be a star to make kids behave and to set exacting standards.

Violence and Theft

For most of the past 20 years, Gallup polls have shown that the general public sees discipline as the greatest problem confronting the nation's public schools. It's no comfort to know that discipline has dropped to the number two spot since 1986, since its replacement—student drug use—is only another manifestation of the same problem.

Although the percentage of schools seriously affected is relatively small, the absolute figures on school crime and violence nationwide are alarming. The most comprehensive data come from a 1978 study conducted by the National Institute of Education entitled *Violent Schools–Safe Schools: The Safe School Study Report to the Congress.* At the time of the study, nearly 282,000 students were attacked in the schools every month, while over 2.4 million students were victims of theft, and some 8 percent of urban junior and senior high school students reported missing at least one day of school a month out of fear. Over 5,000 teachers reported being physically attacked each month, and 6,000 per month were robbed through use of threats or violence.

More recent information, although not directly comparable to the 1978 study, suggests that the problem persists. The 1987 National Adolescent Student Health Survey, funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, found that more than one-third of the 11,000 8th and 10th graders surveyed said they had been threatened with violence at school, while 14 percent said

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they had been robbed, and 13 percent reported having been attacked within the past year.

Teachers are acutely aware of the magnitude of school discipline problems. Half of those surveyed in a 1989 *Phi Delta Kappan*/Gallup poll considered public school discipline a "fairly serious" or "very serious" problem. A July 1989 survey by the American Federation of Teachers found that over 80 percent of the union officials from around the country who were polled considered teen-age violence a bigger problem today than in the past. Sixty-three percent of respondents said union members feared school violence, and over two-thirds knew both union colleagues and students who had been victims of teenage violence.

There is little question that something is rotten in the inner-city schools. The teachers who are in the trenches every day describe a range of problems that make discipline an elusive goal, running the gamut from insubordinate students to ineffectual administrators to politicized school boards to laws that make it hard to do much about any of the above.

"I'm Going To Break Your Legs"

Christine Donato started teaching grade school in Jersey City in 1968, an unplanned career move made possible by an emergency credential she received during the Vietnam-era teacher shortage. The children in the elementary school where she worked were poor, with basically the same problems she says inner-city students have today. "Most of them are surrounded by an amoral world. You find yourself imposing your standards on the kids because they come with none."


When a student's older brother stole Donato's car during her second year at the school, she confronted the teen-ager on the doorstep of his family's house in the neighborhood near the school. After a few minutes of accusations and denials back and forth, Donato told the young man: "You've got 10 minutes to get my car or I'm going to break your [expletive] legs." She got her car back.

Donato, who describes herself with modest understatement as "a strong-willed person," prefers less confrontational methods inside the school, taking as her premise that students must be treated with respect and will respond in kind when rules are clearly laid out and consistently enforced. Donato says she has never felt threatened in her 21 years of teaching, despite seeing 8th grade girls slash one another with razors concealed in their hair, car windows next to her school shot out with BB guns, and local pushers coming into the schoolyard to ply their wares.

Donato's fortitude can hardly be expected of the average teacher. Indeed, 42 percent of public school teachers surveyed in the latest Gallup poll cited discipline problems as one of the main reasons so many teachers are leaving the public schools.

First Principals

When discipline is properly enforced, a school's success can often be traced to what is now almost universally acknowledged as the key to a good school: a strong principal. Ben Jiménez greatly admires the former prin-




When Ben Jiménez started teaching in 1975 his students walked all over him. This year, 39 of his 40 calculus students passed the AP exam.

cipal of Garfield High, one-time airborne ranger Henry Gradillas: "He was tough and he was strict and he was fair." Gradillas, says Jiménez, did not hesitate to throw out students for possession of drugs or weapons, and to transfer those involved in fights. More lenient principals worry Jiménez: "In my opinion some of them give too many chances."

Other teachers echo the need for administrative backup. Christine Donato admires the administration at her current school, the largest elementary school in Jersey City: "We have a top-notch vice principal. The administration enforces the rules and the kids know that," says Donato, whose previous school was much more unruly, with an uncooperative principal who made it hard for her to discipline disruptive students: "You couldn't get rid of a kid."

When principals fail to back up teachers, the problems can be enormous. In Tom Masty's first 10 weeks at a South Florida middle school, the 32-year-old teacher wrote over 300 referrals for student misconduct. Then he quit. At 6'2" and 260 pounds, Masty is hardly the type to be intimidated by adolescent high jinks. But he felt his situation was untenable. Masty had to confiscate weapons, break up fights, and attempt to teach social studies to restless teen-agers reading at 2nd-to-6th-grade



At Holy Angels, an all-black Catholic school in a drug-ridden Chicago neighborhood, strict discipline helps foster academic achievement. Eighty percent of the students go on to graduate from college.

levels, all with no help from the unresponsive school administration. "You didn't tell me half the kids would be on drugs," complained Masty to the principal, who downplayed the severity of the problem. The following day, says Masty, 17 of his students were picked up on an in-school drug sweep by local police.

Even when principals set and enforce policies in an exemplary manner, school discipline can still be undermined by tensions between school administrators and central-system bureaucrats "downtown." An Oakland Technical High School teacher aptly described this conflict, telling the East Bay Express that departing principal Dennis Chaconas, a strong personality who improved discipline and test scores at the school, was unpopular with defensive central administrators because his reforms challenged "their commitment to mediocrity."

One-Man Strike

The extent to which parents, students, and teachers will rally behind a principal who is not being supported further up the line was demonstrated in the recent one-man strike staged by Lewis A. Jones, principal of Ridgeview Intermediate School in Gaithersburg, Maryland. Jones, a respected disciplinarian with no reputation for bucking authority, refused to come to work for three days in April 1989, after school system officials vetoed his attempt to transfer a disruptive student. The 7th-grader had been involved in 15 incidents of misconduct since the previous September, ranging from fighting with classmates and insulting teachers to stealing girls' pocketbooks. When Jones, who is black, tried to transfer the student after repeated suspensions, the mother of the student, also black, claimed that her son was being removed because of racism.

An impressive display of community support for Jones ensued, from yellow wristbands worn by Ridgeview students in solidarity with their principal's stand to a PTA resolution endorsing his strike. Calls to a local radio show ran over 9-to-1 in Jones' favor, while the leader of the school's teachers' union told the *Washington Post* that he

had received dozens of calls from members backing their boss. Ultimately, the school district agreed to have the student tutored at home until the end of the school year.

Legal Obstacles to Discipline

Although the concerted efforts of teachers, principals, and central administrators are clearly necessary for school discipline to be achieved, they are not enough. Barriers to discipline have been erected in the form of laws originally intended to protect students. As James S. Coleman, a noted University of Chicago sociologist, writes with Thomas Hoffer and Sally Kilgore in their landmark 1983 study, High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared:

The growth of student rights constitutes a fundamental change in the relation of the school to the student, which had been that of trustee for parental authority. This has been replaced by a relation in which the student in a high school is regarded as having full civil rights (in particular the right of due process), undiminished by the student's status as a minor. The institution of due process rights for students, and the general reduction in the school's authority over the student, means that the public schools are not only constrained in the exercise of authority, they are also increasingly involved in litigation brought on behalf of the student.

An insightful historical account of the damaging effects various court rulings had on both legal and moral authority in one high school is given by Syracuse University professor Gerald Grant in his case study The World We Created at Hamilton High. Grant explains that the Supreme Court's 1967 Gault decision instituted a new standard of due process for juvenile court proceedings, and had a profound impact on school discipline. In the wake of Gault, notes Grant, schools disciplining students had to provide "notice of the charges, right to counsel, right to confrontation and cross-examination, privilege against self-incrimination, right to a transcript of the proceedings, and right to appellate review." During the 10 years that followed, explains Grant, "educational litigation of all types doubled in state appellate and federal courts."

Fast Times at Hamilton High

At Hamilton High (not the school's real name), the practical result of such elaborate procedures, even when not actually invoked, was to increase "both the degree of inhibition felt by adults and the degree of impunity felt by students." After one teacher was drawn into legal proceedings when she caught a student cheating, for example, other teachers hesitated to assert their authority. Broad child-abuse statutes also applied to teachers; one was arrested and handcuffed at his home after being accused of abuse by a student he had physically stopped from disrupting a test at school. As Grant puts it: "Adult authority was increasingly defined by what would stand up in court. Students were quick to tell teachers, 'You can't suspend me.' Behavior was regarded

as tolerable unless it was specifically declared illegal." One Hamilton student told an interviewer: "A few years ago, you knew if you did something wrong, you'd get your ass busted; but now it takes three, four, five times and they still don't throw anybody out."

Jackson Toby, a Rutgers University sociologist, elaborates on this theme in his 1983 article "Violence in School." Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Goss v. Lopez (1976), says Toby, not only did the Court find that a state that passed a mandatory attendance law was obligated to educate children until the age specified, but "greater due-process protections were required for students in danger of suspension for more than 10 days or for expulsion, than for students threatened with less severe disciplinary penalties."

Toby's article describes the problems the regulations spawned by the ruling caused a group of principals in Hawaii. Principals tended to downgrade offenses, in plea-bargaining fashion, as a way of avoiding the onerous hearings required for serious infractions. At the same time, a rule intended to prevent principals from getting around formal hearings forbade the imposition of a string of short suspensions if they totaled more than 10 days in one semester. "[W]hat this provision achieved," notes Toby, "was to prevent principals from imposing any discipline at all on multiple offenders. Once suspended for a total of 10 days in a semester, a student could engage in minor and not-so-minor misbehavior with impunity."

As Toby pointed out in a recent interview, the schools hardest hit by such regulations are not those in the suburbs, which have relatively few major discipline problems, but the urban schools, where the volume of incidents makes it impossible for a principal to rigorously follow the procedural requirements for each case and at the same time run an effective school.

Bruce A. Miller, special counsel to the American Federation of Teachers, agrees. "Due process is an enormous part of the problem. The rights movement has disrupted traditional institutional relationships; the due process system assumes bad faith on the part of teachers. But teachers aren't lawyers—they have to have some freedom of action. The best way we can improve the morale of teachers is to say, 'we assume you're acting in the best interests of our children.'" Miller believes that legal challenges to existing court rulings will need to be mounted if the status quo is to be changed.

In "Violence in School," Toby offers the sort of realistic assessment a court might consider when weighing the costs and benefits of giving back authority to school officials:

A generation ago it was possible for principals to rule schools autocratically, to suspend or expel students without much regard for procedural niceties. Injustices occurred; children were "pushed out" of schools because they antagonized teachers and principals. But this arbitrariness enabled school administrators to control the situation when serious misbehavior occurred. Student assaults on teachers were punished so swiftly that they were almost unthinkable. Even disrespectful

language was unusual. Today,...[g]reater due process for students accused of misbehavior gives unruly students better protection against teachers and principals and well-behaved students worse protection from their classmates.

Unintended Consequences

A useful piece of supporting evidence for Toby's view comes from Coleman's *High School Achievement*. Coleman shows how the law of unintended consequences has worked in the case of procedures ostensibly designed to safeguard students' interests. After describing how students at private schools, particularly Catholic schools, were more likely than their public school counterparts to rate the effectiveness and fairness of discipline in their schools as "excellent" or "good," Coleman comments:

The lower rating of public schools by their students in fairness of discipline is somewhat ironic. In the past decade and a half, legal strictures to ensure fairness of discipline, such as requirements for due process before suspension, elaborate review processes, and statistical comparisons of disciplinary actions by race to ensure racial fairness, have been imposed by the courts or the federal government on public schools. These strictures are much less fully imposed on private schools (in part, of course, simply because attendance at these schools is by choice rather than assignment). Yet, it is the private schools, less bound by the strictures designed to ensure fairness, that are more often regarded as fair by their students. This suggests that the legalistic approach to ensuring fairness in discipline may be less effective than other approaches....[I]t may indeed be counterproductive for effectiveness of discipline.

Not only are schools where principals and teachers have greater freedom seen by students as having fairer and more effective discipline—they also produce better academic results. *High School Achievement* shows that after controlling for race, socioeconomic status, and parental education, private and Catholic school students consistently outperform their public school peers.

A Pocket of Excellence

One such school is praised by Portia Shields, professor of education at Howard University, in a recent article in the *Journal of Negro Education*. Shields describes Chicago's Holy Angels School, the largest all-black Roman Catholic school in America, with an enrollment of 1,300 from kindergarten through 12th grade, as a "pocket of excellence" in a violent, drug-ridden neighborhood. At Holy Angels, despite a pupil–teacher ratio of 37-to-1, academic achievement is high, and discipline strict. Students test higher than their public school peers in most subjects, and 80 percent go on to graduate from college. Shields writes: "Truancy and dropout problems are virtually non-existent. Sanctions are applied in a consistent, uniform, and incremental fashion, and they are expeditiously

enforced. For example, an incident of tardiness incurs a 25 cent fine, but a repeat offense could mean detention. Acts of vandalism and fighting lead quickly and directly to suspension." Family involvement is essential at Holy Angels, and, says Shields: "Parents who find the regulations too restrictive are advised to seek schooling for their children elsewhere."

The Red Flag Patrol

In the absence of this ability to exclude students easily, what can public schools do to make their discipline standards—and thus academic achievement—match what Holy Angels is doing for even the most impoverished, disadvantaged students?

One workable solution to a typical discipline problem can be found at Palms Junior High, a West Los Angeles school with a mostly Hispanic student body, some from affluent homes, some recent immigrants. Assistant principal Lana Brody knows that a crucial aspect of school discipline is ensuring that the school's campus and hallways are safe and orderly; a 25-year veteran of some tough L.A. schools, she has twice known students who were killed in or around school buildings. She speaks admiringly of a teacher-initiated plan at her present school designed to solve what she calls "the hallwalker problem." Since there were too few administrative staffers to ensure that school hallways were free of loitering students during classes, each teacher agreed to forego one free "conference period" a week in order to personally escort students who had been legitimately excused from class to their destinations. Teachers call the program the "red flag patrol," named after the flag a teacher must hang on the classroom door to let the patrolling teacher know that a student needs to leave the

The question of discipline is not one of liberals versus conservatives. Describing herself as both an unreconstructed '60s liberal and a strict disciplinarian,

"A few years ago, you knew if you did something wrong, you'd get your ass busted; but now it takes three, four, five times and they still don't throw anybody out."

Brody sees no contradiction between the two. She understands the need for the kind of tight supervision of students the red flag patrol entails, and also speaks from experience of the importance of keeping outsiders out of the school, a universal concern of inner-city teachers and administrators. The degree of control required to achieve this—sometimes involving identity cards, security guards, and strict chaperoning of legitimate

visitors—may rankle absolutist civil libertarians with a selective understanding of individual rights. Nevertheless, if inner-city schools are to be effective, a safe environment must be created.

Blocking the Revolving Door

When faced with students who disrupt classes, some teachers favor in-school suspension, in a specially supervised room, as an intermediate disciplinary step that can be more effective than outright suspension. Students placed on in-school suspension are deprived of the opportunity many would welcome to get out of school entirely, while having such a room available gives teachers greater control over who stays in their classes, and helps eliminate the revolving-door syndrome whereby administrators often allow disruptive students to return to class too soon.

Improved counseling can also be useful, particularly as the burgeoning school choice movement provides students with more options about the kinds of schools they can attend. Brody tells of the day she encountered a 14-year-old student wandering on the school's campus. "He didn't feel he belonged in school," says Brody, who discovered that the student, despite a poor reading level, showed facility in woodworking. She arranged with a friend at L.A.'s largest occupational school to have the youngster transferred there, to a program more likely to retain his interest and keep him in school.

Smaller schools, another byproduct of school choice, also help discipline. Experts such as Herbert Walberg, professor of education at the University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, say that smaller public schools, along with smaller school districts, reduce bureaucracy and allow teachers and principals to get to know students better. The result, says Walberg, is that when compared with their peers at larger schools, students in small schools are more disciplined, achieve better academic results, and have higher rates of employment.

Even when a teacher has taken positive steps to create an orderly classroom environment, problems can still remain. Ruth Meltsner spent 20 years teaching 2nd and 3rd grade at Santa Fe School in Oakland, California, in a tough neighborhood where a number of her students' older brothers and sisters were members of the Black Panthers during the group's 1960s heyday. She thinks it's important for teachers to be able to eject children who prevent others from learning: "Eighty to ninety percent of the kids in a classroom are good kids; a small number are impossible and you spend all your time dealing with them." Meltsner expresses an increasingly common sentiment among educators and the public when she talks of the necessity of balancing the rights of unruly students against those of their more disciplined classmates: "It's a question of depriving [well-behaved] kids of their right to an education."

Ben Jiménez, too, feels strongly about the need to empower administrators to kick out troublemakers. Even Henry Gradillas was only able to transfer students to other schools, a solution Jiménez sees as incomplete: "They'll just cause problems somewhere else. If you have problem kids, there ought to be problem schools where they can handle that." Indeed, creating more alternative schools would be a politically acceptable way of embracing a commitment to universal public education without unjustly penalizing the majority of well-behaved students. As Elizabeth Lyttleton Sturz recently pointed out in the *New York Times*, Joe Clark, the controversial principal of Eastside High in Paterson, New Jersey, had unsuccessfully campaigned for alternative schools before being forced to throw out the "miscreants" he felt were making his job impossible. Despite his off-putting bombast, "Crazy Joe" apparently tried to do the right thing, taking the second-best option in order to do right by those students he thought he could help.

From Right to Privilege

Ultimately, no amount of special schools for what those in the trade call "at-risk" youth will resolve the thorny dilemma that underlies the problem of public

school discipline: just how far should the right to an education extend to students with behavior problems? Though few would question that younger students must be provided with schooling of some kind, the consensus may be evaporating at the high school level. In a recent article in The Public Interest, Jackson Toby makes a powerful case for the view that both school safety and academic quality would improve if some students were allowed to drop out without too much handwringing, so long as they could return to school fairly easily once they agreed to accept the

academic and disciplinary standards necessary to earn the privilege—not right—of staying in school. As Toby puts it: "Our national preoccupation with getting everyone through high school is weakening the educational system, especially in inner-city neighborhoods, where good schools can save kids from catastrophe."

It should not be assumed that making it easier to establish order in schools will unfairly impinge on students' rights and liberties: As with the developing consensus that welfare benefits should be seen as one part of the mutual obligation between citizen and society, so must parents and students understand that attending and benefiting from a public school implies a commitment to abide by its code of conduct.

Discipline need not be draconian for order to be achieved. Baseball bats are unnecessary, and teachers

should not mistake intimidated silence for the healthy spirit of inquiry that learning requires. But our legitimate desire to protect students from occasional instances of injustice at school should not lead us to straitjacket teachers and principals. Recent experience has taught us that seeking rigid procedural protection for all students all of the time may turn out to be unhealthy for most students most of the time.

Attracting Good Teachers

What will happen if and when inner-city schools become safe and orderly? For one thing, public schools will regain their longstanding function of inculcating social values—not through crude proselytizing, but by teaching students the kind of comportment that will be expected of them if they are to be members in good standing of society.

With discipline restored, public schools might once

again serve as a meeting ground for children from diverse backgrounds, a social good that many Americans, concerned that we not become more class-conscious and racially polarized than we already are, see as highly desirable.

In safe schools, educational reform could take on real meaning, not only because order is the prerequisite to any kind of learning, but also because it would again become possible to attract the good teachers many inner-city districts so sorely lack. While Washington, D.C., schools currently receive only about three applicants for every teaching job, officials in neighboring Mont-

cials in neighboring Montgomery County, Maryland, can choose from 13 candidates. With safety assured, it could become common for the energetic, well-educated young people who flock to the same cities whose public schools are in disarray to spend a few years in the classroom. Although it isn't reasonable to ask people to put their lives on the line in the name of the common good, safe schools would make it possible to appeal to the public-spiritedness of those who believe the best way to help their fellow citizens is to help advance their education.

After all, it is education, along with work, that has been the great equalizer in American life, serving as a stepping-stone out of poverty for millions of people. Until discipline returns to the public schools, neither teaching nor learning can take place, and the mobility education can provide will be tragically limited.



Veteran teacher Ruth Meltsner in her Oakland, California, classroom, 1968. "Eighty to ninety percent of the kids in a classroom are good kids; a small number are impossible and you spend all your time dealing with them."

HERD MENTALITY

Banning Ivory Sales Is No Way to Save the Elephant

RANDY T. SIMMONS AND URS P. KREUTER

on July 18, 1989, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi set fire to a 12-ton pyre of elephant tusks valued at nearly \$3 million. The tusks had been confiscated from poachers and were burned to demonstrate Kenya's dedication to saving the African elephant by ending trade in ivory. Although hunting elephants has been illegal in Kenya for over a decade, the country's elephant population has fallen from 65,000 in 1979 to 19,000 in 1989, a tragedy that Kenyan wildlife experts blame on poaching for the overseas ivory market.

In Harare, Zimbabwe, by contrast, shops openly sell ivory and hides from elephants culled to prevent rapid population growth in the country's game parks. Part of the proceeds of these sales returns to the game parks. Similarly, two dozen peasant villages in Zimbabwe will earn \$5 million next year from the sale of elephant-hunting rights on their communal lands to safari operators. The government of Robert Mugabe sees no contradiction between the protection of elephants and the carefully regulated sale of elephant products. On the contrary, Zimbabwe has found that the best way to protect elephants is to give its citizens the opportunity to benefit from their presence. The result: the elephant population has grown from 30,000 to 43,000 over the past 10 years. In neighboring Botswana, where limited hunting is practiced, the elephant population grew from 20,000 to 51,000 in the same period.

There are two conflicting approaches to elephant conservation in Africa today. Kenya's ban on hunting and efforts to suppress the ivory trade are typical of most of Central and East Africa, and the results have been disastrous. From 1979 to 1989, Central Africa's elephant population dropped from 497,400 to 274,800 and East Africa's from 546,650 to 154,720. Elephants in the game parks were only slightly better protected than those outside. In East Africa's parks, for example, 56 percent of the elephants were killed or died in the past 10 years. Outside the parks, 78 percent disappeared. Some projections show elephants could be extinct in East and Central Africa as early as 2005.

The elephant populations of Zimbabwe, Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa, however, are *increasing*, and now account for 20 percent of the continent's elephants.

These Southern African countries all support conservation through utilization, allowing safari hunting and tourism on private, state, and communal lands, and the sale of ivory and hides. The sale of hunting rights and elephant products gives Southern Africans an economic stake in elephant conservation. It also helps finance strict enforcement of poaching laws. South Africa's Kruger National Park, for example, earned \$2.5 million last year, 10 percent of its annual budget, by selling ivory and hides from 350 elephants culled for ecological reasons to prevent overpopulation. (Without culling, elephant populations will increase at a rate of 5 percent a year.) Similar ecologically-based culling programs and sales have been conducted in Zimbabwe for years and will commence in Botswana next year.

A Total Ban

Unfortunately, Kenya's approach to wildlife conservation is dominating international efforts to save the African elephant. A report issued this June by the Ivory Trade Review Group (ITRG), an international study group funded primarily by Wildlife Conservation International and World Wildlife Fund (U.S.), concluded: "It is the ivory trade and hunting for ivory, and not habitat loss or human population increase, that is responsible for the decline in [African] elephant numbers."

Upon release of the ITRG report, Kenya, Tanzania, and international conservation groups called for an immediate worldwide ban on the ivory trade. The United States and the European Community responded with a ban on ivory imports. Japan and Hong Kong, the destinations of most raw ivory, instituted some controls as well. In addition, Kenya and Tanzania requested the secretariat of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) to list the African elephant on Appendix I. An Appendix I listing would ban all trade in elephant products, including hides as well as ivory.

RANDY T. SIMMONS is a visiting scholar at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. URS P. KREUTER, a range scientist who lives in Zimbabwe, is a research associate of the Institute of Political Economy at Utah State University. The African elephant currently is listed on Appendix II, which allows some trade, with permits, in ivory and hide. Permits are allocated under a quota system administered by CITES. The quotas are based on the exporting countries' estimates of a sustainable yield.

Boots and Piano Keys

Elephant ivory has been prized for centuries and is now especially valued in the Far East. Ivory is made into piano keys and carved into chess pieces, figures, and the Oriental signature stamps known as "chops." Uncarved

tusks like the ones burned by Kenya sold for \$2.50 a pound in 1969, jumped to \$34 in 1978, and now fetch over \$90. Since an average elephant's tusks weigh 22 pounds, the value of each elephant's ivory is \$2,000 today. The hide is worth at least as much as the ivory and is made into boots, wallets, and other leather goods.

Even if income from poaching were not available, however, many rural Africans would have a powerful incentive to kill elephants. Unlike the Asian elephant, which has been domesticated as a beast of burden and is therefore considered a valued treasure in many Indian communities, the African elephant competes for scarce resources,

and frequently destroys human property. As Norman Myers put it in 1981 as he was leaving Kenya after working 20 years as a wildlife ecologist for international conservation organizations:

Wildlife in Africa is being elbowed out of living space by millions of digging hoes—a far greater threat than the poachers' poisoned arrows. When zebras chomp up livestock's grass, when elephants drink dry savannahland water supplies, when buffalo herds trample maize crops and when lions carry off prize steers, the animals must go—unless they can pay their way.

East and Central African policies do not allow elephants to pay their way, except through tourism. Tourism does generate income, but not for rural Africa's expanding agricultural population. In countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, where over 80 percent of the people live off agriculture, and human populations are rising at 3 to 4 percent a year, few families are willing to endure hunger so an elephant can live to provide a job for an urban-based tourist guide or a photo opportunity for a foreign tourist.

The simple reality is that elephants compete with people for scarce resources, and rural Africans must benefit if conservation is to be successful. The ITRG argument that the decline in elephant numbers is not due to "habitat loss or human population increase" ignores this reality and the incentive it creates for people to engage in poaching or simply to kill off local elephants.

Elephants are not even safe from such human pressures in the parks or wildlife reserves. Rural Africans who want land see a local park as a zoo catering to rich


foreigners and resent it greatly. The Serengeti Park in Tanzania, for example, is embroiled in a three-way conflict between wildlife managers, subsistence farmers who want land for crops, and the nomadic Masai cattle herders who regard the park as part of their traditional home.

So little is spent on patrolling the game parks in East and Central Africa that the chances of getting caught poaching are minimal. Game guards are ill equipped, woefully underpaid, and sparsely scattered, and park officials have a powerful incentive to supplement their meager government income by aiding poachers.

poachers.

High-ranking civil servants, members of royal families, and elected officials have participated in the illegal trade as well. During the mid-1970s, for example, it was revealed that Kenya's top wildlife civil servant, John K. Mutinda, was involved in poaching and smuggling. Hunting was subsequently banned to mollify international fund donors. Tanzania banned all trade in tusks in 1987, yet the Member of Parliament for Songea was caught last year with 105 tusks in his official truck.

The policies of East and Central African countries encourage poaching. Rural people have an incentive to eradicate elephants, law enforcement is underfunded and ineffective, and the political will has not been mustered to control corruption among government officials.



Because elephants compete with people for scarce resources, rural Africans must benefit if conservation is to be successful.

Poachers Shot on Sight

The incentives facing would-be poachers are very different in the southern countries. In Zimbabwe, poachers are shot on sight and over \$600 per square mile is spent to protect the wildlife estate. Elephants are marketed extensively under concession permits on state-owned safari areas and communal lands, and managed intensively in the national parks. Hunting and

photographic opportunities are sold primarily to an international clientele. The price of an average hunt in Zimbabwe, where elephant is the main trophy, is currently \$25,000. With such value at stake, the incentive to protect resident elephants is equivalent to that of protecting domestic livestock.

Ten thousand elephants live on Zimbabwe's communal lands—lands for peasant farmers but without individual ownership of land or wildlife. Rather than rely on prohibitions to protect the elephants, the Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management gives peasant communities the right to hunt a certain number of elephants. The communities can exercise this right themselves or sell the hunting permits to commercial operators. This has resulted in a much more positive attitude toward wildlife among Zimbabwean villagers.

One Zimbabwean subsistence community recently curtailed poaching in Gona-re-Zhou National Park and villagers withdrew from some land for wildlife in exchange for hunting permits for elephant and buffalo that overflowed from the park. The permits were sold to a safari operator and part of the proceeds were used to develop community facilities, while the rest was distributed directly to community members who lost crops to animal damage.

In addition to hunting permits, further income is generated for rural communities when animals that destroy property are eliminated by National Parks personnel. The ivory and hide from these animals belong to the community members. Since at least as many destructive animals as trophy bulls are killed each year, the sale of hides and ivory from marauding elephants represents a substantial component of the income to communal members.

Biological Imperialism

The expansion of Southern African elephant herds suggests that proponents of a global ban on ivory trade are asking the wrong question. They ask, "How do we stop the ivory trade in order to remove the incentive for poaching?" They should ask, "How do we make elephants

An international ban on ivory would only increase the price, encouraging poaching and political corruption.

valuable enough that people have an incentive to be careful stewards rather than careless exterminators?"

And why do they ask the wrong question? Perhaps those who wish to save the elephant are simply misled by the no-trade ideology of many American and European environmentalists—a biological imperialism imposed regardless of local realities and values for wildlife. The second possibility is less benign than good intentions gone astray. It is that an international ban is

expected to substitute for effective law enforcement at the national level and to cover up or ignore decades of mismanagement and corruption.

Economic theory teaches that a government ban on the supply of a valued commodity can never wholly eliminate demand. It does accomplish three things, however: prices increase, people with a comparative advantage at avoiding detection—usually criminals and corrupt public officials—take over the formerly legal market, and, in the case of a resource owned in common, the resource disappears. Legalizing trade and protecting property rights, however, reverses these outcomes: prices drop as the legal supply grows, there is no premium on criminality and corruption, and property rights encourage wise stewardship of the resource.

Parrots in Hubcaps

Trade bans on wildlife products have failed to protect species for which there is a commercial demand. Many species of Latin American parrots, for instance, are "protected" by a CITES Appendix I listing. Prices skyrocketed after the trade ban and the legal trade was taken over by poachers who make no effort to maintain birds on a sustainable basis. After all, the nest left today will in all likelihood be taken by someone else tomorrow. Native hunters go so far as to chop down nesting trees to get the parrots. The captured parrots are drugged, put in door panels and even hubcaps, and smuggled into the United States, where the few that actually survive are sold on the black market for more than \$20,000. The return for trading in protected birds is often greater than what can be made from producing illegal drugs. Rather than reducing the slide in native parrot populations, prohibition has accelerated it.

Prohibition has also completely failed to protect Africa's black rhino. About 50,000 existed in Africa when the 1976 CITES ban went into effect. The rhinos dwindled to 14,800 by 1980, 8,800 by 1984, and only about 3,500 exist today—most of which are in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Rhino horn is prized by Arabs for dagger handles and by Asians for its supposed value as a medicine and aphrodisiac. It currently sells for about \$8,000 per pound and each horn weighs about 10 pounds, making a rhino worth about \$80,000. Given such enormous economic values, Zimbabwean officials are moving some black rhinos from the Zambezi Valley, where they are poached by Zambians, to privately owned ranches. Black and white rhino populations have dramatically increased in South Africa.

All wild cats were listed on CITES Appendix I in 1976, and the fact that some leopard populations have been downlisted to allow sport hunting and some export for non-commercial, personal use is sometimes claimed as an Appendix I success. But, scientific data did not support listing these populations on Appendix I in the first place and the listing discouraged their preservation. The leopards in Zimbabwe, for example, were not endangered and they posed a serious threat to local livestock. Consequently, until the CITES downlisting was approved, leopards were killed in rural areas, not for skin sale, but for predator control.

Even if the probable outcomes of an Appendix I listing

are ignored, a further problem remains—reestablishing a legal market once it has been destroyed by a trade ban. In the case of American alligators, reestablishing the market in skins has been difficult even though alligator populations have rebounded under commercial management.

Conservation Through Commercialization

Contrary to the poor record of trade bans, commercialization has successfully protected a broad variety of species. Seabirds are farmed in Iceland, crocodiles and butterflies are raised in Papua, New Guinea, and Zimbabwe farmers ranch a broad variety of species. Crocodile farming is a multimillion dollar business in Zimbabwe, and is growing in Malawi. The crocodile has an Appendix I listing in most countries, but Zimbabwe has declared a reservation.

The white rhino, also listed on Appendix I, declined from 1,500 animals spread among five countries in 1960 to just 20 animals in 1989. In contrast, the white rhino population increased tenfold in South Africa, during the same time period and now totals about 6,000 in parks, reserves, and on privately owned ranches. White rhinos are hunted in South Africa, and the horns from hunting trophies and natural mortality victims are the source of several hundred pounds of rhino horn each year. These horns are not presently traded, but would be worth millions of dollars annually that could be spent on additional rhino protection.

Ivory Branding

An international ban on trade in ivory will increase the price of ivory significantly as the black market tries to satisfy consumer demand. Some countries have already established ivory stockpiles in anticipation of such a price rise. The *Economist* reports that Burundi has stashed 90–100 tons and Hong Kong has 500–700 tons set aside. One effect of the price rise will be to encourage more people to become involved in poaching. Likely candidates include the Southern Somali "Shiftas" who roam and plunder at will in northeastern Kenya. A second effect will be to encourage greater political corruption as the returns from aiding illegal shipments will rise with the price of ivory.

In addition, revenue derived from ecologically necessary culling programs in Southern Africa will be lost, leaving fewer financial resources to protect wildlife from poachers or for controlling expanding elephant herds. Wildlife officials in Zimbabwe believe a ban will make the elephant extinct in communal lands.

Consequently, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia have decided not to participate in a ban, and instead are developing a cooperative ivory marketing and control system. This system will include stringent controls and checks to reduce the chances of illegal ivory from other African countries being sold through the system. It will introduce a form of ivory identification, a type of branding, based on chemical analysis, X–ray spectrophotometry, electron microscopy, and other forensic techniques. This identification technology can pinpoint the origin of the ivory.



Tusk, tusk: Instead of burning ivory, Kenya's president should be learning why elephant populations are rising in Zimbabwe and Botswana.

Only that ivory originating in the countries that join the regional marketing system will be allowed to be sold.

Abrogation of Responsibility

Elephants are endangered in certain parts of Africa, not all Africa. Thus, the solution to saving the African elephant lies not in banning ivory trade, but in applying the successful elephant conservation policies of South African nations to East African nations that have mismanaged their resources. Where poaching and facilitation of poaching by corrupt officials occurs, the responsibility lies with the country's government. An international ban on trade in ivory will not solve internal problems and is an abrogation of responsibility to eliminate the true causes of elephant decline.

If the East and Central African nations sincerely wish to save their elephants they must begin by managing wildlife for the benefit of the human inhabitants of their countries. Current conflicts between people and protected areas must be replaced with a custodial and participatory relationship. To do that, rural Africans must be able to make discretionary use of wildlife.

Bans on hunting need to be replaced with policies that encourage game ranching, safari hunting, and indigenous use of wildlife. And patrolling efforts need to be funded at levels that make poaching too risky.

Zambia, the only Southern African country with a declining elephant population, is adopting just such a strategy in response to losing 75,000 elephants in the Luangwa Valley to poachers this decade despite a ban on hunting. In a policy reversal, they have started trophy hunting and ivory sales, with the proceeds going to pay for increased policing and to benefit local residents.

Commercialization and intensive management of wildlife are difficult concepts for many members of the American wildlife lobby to accept. But, there is still time to reconsider. With elephant herds expanding in Southern Africa there is no need for those in East and Central Africa to be rushing toward extinction.

Reuters/Bett

ABRAHAM'S OTHER CHILDREN

Is Islam an Enemy of the West?

DOUGLAS E. STREUSAND

A new specter is haunting America, one that some Americans consider more sinister than Marxism-Leninism. This new specter is Islam, which has reasserted itself as one of the world's most powerful political and cultural forces after centuries of relative quiescence. There are now 900 million Moslems, nearly 20 percent of the world's population. They include 175 million Arabs; 300 million Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis; 150 million Indonesians; 100 million black Africans; and some 50 million in the Soviet Union.

The sight of Iranian demonstrators shouting "Death to America" and calling the United States "the Great Satan"; the despicable treatment of hostages in Tehran and Beirut; the storming of the American embassies in Islamabad and Tripoli; the suicide bombings in Lebanon and Kuwait; the Rushdie assassination threat; the outbreak of virulent anti-Semitism not only in the Arab world but in Malaysia and Iran; the teaching by some Moslem clerics that the killing of infidels is licit and that martyrs for the faith will gain immediate admission to paradise; the hijacking of the Achille Lauro; the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; and hundreds of Libyan, Iranian, Syrian, and other Moslems' acts of terrorism against America, Israel, and the West-all suggest to increasing numbers of Americans that the 1,000-year battle between Christendom and Islam may be breaking out once more. and that Islam may be replacing Marxism-Leninism as the utopian revolutionary movement most committed to the destruction of Western civilization.

Nor is any comfort to be found in the one group of warriors for Islam with popular support in the United States, the mujahideen of Afghanistan. Their courage in the face of overwhelming Soviet firepower, their perseverance despite, in the beginning, the lack of cause for hope beyond their faith, reinforced the image of Moslems as religious fanatics undeterred by practical considerations. Many advocates of assistance to the Afghans now recoil at the prospect of a mujahideen victory and the establishment of a fundamentalist Islamic regime.

The reawakening of insurgent fundamentalist fervor in much of the Moslem world is a very real threat to America and to Western values. Understanding this threat, however, demands the recognition that Islam is as complex and diverse as any other of the world's great religions. The insurgent fundamentalism of Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini and his successors endangers world order. So does the terrorism inspired by Muammar Qadhafi's personal version of Islam—to the horror of fundamentalists, he has sought to substitute his own writings, the Green Book, for the Koran in the public life of Libya. But Islam itself does not threaten America and the West; indeed important traditions within Islam are compatible with both U.S. interests and Western values.

The Charity of the Koran

Islam belongs to the same monotheistic tradition as Judaism and Christianity, though of course there are important theological differences. Moslems look to Abraham as the originator of the true worship of the one God. Allah—which literally means "the God"—is the God of Abraham (Ibrahim), Isaac (Ishaq), Jacob (Ya'qub), Joseph (Yusuf), Moses (Musa), David (Da'ud), Solomon (Sulayman), and Jesus ('Isa). The Islamic view of cosmic history, the creation, departure from paradise, and final judgment, resembles that of Judaism and Christianity. The Bible says God "formed man of dust from the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life." In the Koran, God creates man of clay and breathes his spirit into him.

There are also some similarities with respect to prescribed behaviors and attitudes. Islam emphasizes the individual's moral responsibility for his actions, as do Judaism and Christianity, and stresses Allah's mercy to those who repent their sins. The Koran refers to the Day of Judgment, in which transgressors will be cast into Gehenna, while "whoever fears the All-merciful in the Unseen and comes with a penitent heart" shall enter eternity in peace.

The payment of alms, so central to Judaism and Christianity, is one of the five essential duties of a Moslem—the so-called Five Pillars of Islam—along with

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Fundamentalism has recurred for centuries throughout the Moslem world, but has rarely consolidated power for long and has mostly been a tradition of dissent.

recitation of the profession of faith, "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet"; prayer; the daylight fast during the month of Ramadan; and, at least once in a lifetime when possible, the pilgrimage to Mecca. One of the best-loved verses of the Koran speaks of charity in language reminiscent of the Hebrew Prophets and the Gospels: "True piety is this: to believe in God and the Last Day, the angels, the Books and the Prophets, to give of one's substance, however cherished, to kinsmen and orphans, the needy, the traveler, beggars, and to ransom the slave."


Flogging and Amputation

Western fears of Islam focus mostly on the Shariah, the elaborate corpus of religious law interpreted over the centuries by the *ulama*, literally "the learned," the religious leaders of Moslems. The Shariah, or "path," is based on the Koran, which Moslems believe to be the speech of God transmitted to Muhammad through the angel Gabriel, and on the *sunna*, the words and actions of the Prophet known through *hadith*, the reports of witnesses. The Shariah seeks to recapture the way of life in the pristine community of Medina under the Prophet Muhammad.

Fundamentalist Moslem countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran do try to enforce the Shariah with all its draconian punishments, including amputation of the hands of thieves and the public flogging and execution of adulterers, and its treatment of women—valuing their testimony in court less than that of men, limiting their share of inheritance, and forcing them to wear the veil. Fundamentalist rulers also enforce the requirement in the Shariah that non-Moslems submit to Moslem authority, as symbolized by a tribute or capitation tax to the government. Islamic rulers have for the most part allowed Christian, Zoroastrian, Hindu, and, until recently, Jewish communities to practice their religions in peace—indeed, forced conversions are prohibited by the Koran—but only on the condition that they accept Moslem superiority.

Even before the Shariah corpus took form, however, Moslem rulers found its provisions inadequate for dealing with political and economic realities. Taxes levied in accord with the Shariah provided insufficient revenues. Despite numerous efforts by pious rulers to eliminate extra-Shari levies, no dynasty did without them for long. The inflexibility of Shari criminal procedures made most Moslem rulers consider them incapable of protecting their subjects from crime. Most Moslem rulers supplemented even the civil and commercial provisions of the Shariah with their own regulations.

Also contrary to the Shariah, which divides the world



Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan. The vast majority of Moslem political leaders have not been and are not fundamentalists.

into an Abode of Islam and an Abode of War, where Moslems are required to spread Islamic rule by conquest, leading Moslem rulers have for centuries signed peace agreements, not mere truces, and have actually made alliances with non-Moslem states. Süleyman the Magnificent of the Ottoman Empire made an alliance with François I of France in 1535, recognizing him as an equal and promising peace for the lifetime of the two rulers. Today, most Moslem states adhere to the principles of international law without question.

Utopian Impracticality

Thus the reality of most Moslem governments has almost always fallen short of the Medina ideal. Moslems have responded to the resulting tension in three ways: political quietism, political activism, and adaptation.

Quietism calls for the withdrawal, as far as possible, into the realms of action in which the Shariah could operate. A non-Shari regime had no legitimacy and true Moslems would do no more than passively accept it and meet its demands. They would not rebel against it and cause strife among Moslems, but they would not serve it, endorse it, or accept income from it. Quietism has never been popular among leading intellectual or political leaders, but over the centuries it has been the position of a majority or at least a very substantial minority of most Moslem populations, including Shiites as well as Sunnis.

Activism is a revolutionary utopian movement that seeks to apply the Shariah strictly, whatever its practical difficulties. Historical examples include the Abbasid

revolution of the mid-8th century (though the resulting Abbasid caliphate quickly moved away from the Shariah in important respects); the Nizari Isma'ili Shiis of the 11th through 13th centuries, better known as "the Assassins," who sought to bring Islam into alignment with God's will through political murder; the rigidly legalistic Almoravides and Almohades dynasties of Spain and North Africa of the 11th through 13th centuries; and the Wahabi movement in 18th-century Arabia, precursor of the Saudi kingdom. Shari activism has recurred for centuries throughout the Moslem world, often with great strength, but, because it has been utopian in its inattention to practicality, it has rarely consolidated its power for long. It has primarily been a tradition of dissent. The fundamentalism of Khomeini is the latest manifestation of this tradition.

Twelve Centuries of Adaptation

The third response, adaptation, involves some compromise of Shari principles and/or a fusion of Islam and political, cultural, and philosophical elements from other sources. This tendency has dominated the political and much of the cultural life of Islam for most of its history, beginning with the assimilation of the Iranian theory of kingship.

Abu Yusuf (d. 799) was chief judge of Baghdad, the capital of the Abbasid empire that then ruled most of the Moslem world. He was one of the founders of the Hanifi rite, or school of legal interpretation, to which most Sunni Moslems subscribe. He saw no contradiction between his commitment to Islamic law and his teachings that the Abbasid caliph derived his authority from God directly and was responsible only to God, even though no such doctrine appears in the Shariah. Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), who probably influenced the development of Sunni Islamic thought more than anyone but the Prophet himself, also contended that kings received their authority from God just as prophets did, implying that politics has a sacred dimension outside the Shari realm. Outside the realm of politics, a similar openness to other cultural influences prevailed. Such Moslem philosophers as al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn Sina, or Avicenna (d. 1037),

When Islamic motivation leads to terrorism the United States must respond to terrorism, not to Islam.

integrated Aristotelian and Platonic philosophy with Islam. They were sharply criticized by al-Ghazali but defended by Ibn Rushd, also known as Averroes (d. 1198), the chief Shariah judge at the Almohades court.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-98), the founder of Aligarh Muslim University near Delhi, India, the most influential Moslem educational institution after al-Azhar in Cairo, sought to modify Islam to conform with modern science. He rejected much of the Shariah in favor of the Koran itself. The influential Egyptian writer Muhammad Abduh (1845-1905), who had the traditional education of the *ulama*, sought to transform traditional Islam by emphasizing *ijtihad*, free thought within the overall confines and processes of Shari jurisprudence, and rejecting *taqlid*, the acceptance of authority in religious matters. Essentially, the modernist variant of Islamic thought calls for Moslems to think for themselves. Modernists either reject *hadith* as a source of law or accept only a small number of *hadith* as authoritative.

The most prominent "adaptationists" in the modern world today are the millions of Moslem immigrants in Britain, France, West Germany, the United States, and other Western democracies. These immigrants do not see themselves as abandoning Islam or as being poor Moslems. They retain their Moslem identities, as shown by the proliferation of mosques from Los Angeles to Berlin. They also become law-abiding citizens of secular, pluralistic states. Although these communities may shelter some individuals with terrorist connections, these are clearly exceptions.

Fundamentalist Minority

Despite Khomeini's great prominence, the majority of Moslem political leaders have not been and are not fundamentalists. Of predominantly Moslem states, only Iran and Saudi Arabia qualify as fundamentalist, although Pakistan (under Zia ul-Haq) and the Sudan have moved in that direction. Elsewhere, fundamentalism is an insurgent force, directed primarily at established Moslem regimes, with little success. Fundamentalist movements have challenged the governments of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, Indonesia, and Malaysia. These movements have failed entirely or have brought only superficial changes in the governments they have opposed. This record shows the ubiquity of fundamentalism in the Islamic world, but also its failure to accomplish its agenda.

With the exception of Khomeini, the kings of Saudi Arabia, and, less emphatically, Zia ul-Haq, prominent Moslem political leaders since World War II have not been fundamentalists. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the dominant Arab statesman of the '50s and '60s, suppressed the fundamentalist Moslem Brotherhood in Egypt. Anwar Sadat died at the hands of fundamentalists. Although Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the father of modern Pakistan, led the cause of Moslem separatism in the Indian subcontinent, he was of secular rather than fundamentalist orientation. His principal opponent was another modernist Moslem, Maulana Abd al-Kalam Azad, one of the leaders of the Congress Party, which sought a united, secular India. Today, the most visible political leaders of the Islamic world-Kings Hassan of Morocco and Hussein of Jordan, Saddam Hussein of Iraq, Hafiz Assad of Syria, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Suharto of Indonesia—all are modernists to some degree and have faced fundamentalist opposition. Hassan and Hussein both depend on their prestige as pious Moslems and descendants of Muhammad to retain their position. Benazir Bhutto, although hardly a traditional figure, had

an arranged marriage in accord with custom and maintains the appearance of Moslem piety.

Most Moslem rulers and regimes today try to combine Islam with modernization. By doing so, they have permitted their pious subjects to maintain the quietist positions of their ancestors, clinging to the rock of the Shariah in the storm of social and economic change. Most Moslems attempt to live by the Shariah in their personal and social lives, even if the laws that their governments administer do not stem from the Shariah. Most of the legal codes do not. Many fundamentalist movements have concentrated on modest goals such as the elimination of immodest dress, the public consumption of alcohol, and similar affronts to Islamic sensibilities.

There may even be efforts to reconcile Islam with modern liberal democracy. Although no Moslem state has yet become a democracy on the American or European pattern, important Moslem politicians, including both Jinnah and Maulana Azad, have identified themselves with representative government. Numerous

Islam emphasizes the individual's moral responsibility for his actions, as do Judaism and Christianity, and stresses Allah's mercy to those who repent their sins.

Moslem apologists have sought to demonstrate that true Islam actually requires democracy. The historical validity of their interpretations is dubious, but their intellectual effort shows a desire to adapt Islam to the modern world. The late Ayatollah Kazem Shariat-Madari, Khomeini's chief opponent among the Iranian *ulama*, believed that sovereignty ultimately belonged to the Iranian people and criticized the constitution of the Islamic Republic for that reason.

Even states that commit themselves to a fundamentalist program by wholly or partially enforcing the Shariah rarely make it fully effective. Zia ul-Haq announced that Pakistan's laws would be brought into conformity with the Shariah, but moved slowly and unsystematically to do so. He established Shari criminal penalties, but no amputations or executions by stoning have taken place.

Modernist Resurgence

The persistence of Shari activism within Islam indicates that fundamentalism will not go away. Although it received enormous stimulation from the oil boom of the

'70s and early '80s, the Islamic revival was a product of the internal dynamics of Islam, part of a recurrent pattern. It will not disappear. If, as is quite possible, the Gulf producers regain dominance in the global oil market, an influx of oil revenue may stimulate fundamentalism. As the intractability of the problem of making the Shariah a program for all of society becomes clearer, the impulse that provoked the resurgence of fundamentalism in the past two decades may lead to a modernist reaction, in which successors of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muhammad Abduh become as prominent in the Islamic world as Khomeini has been. But even in the midst of a modernist florescence, fundamentalism would survive.

Fundamentalism need not always be cause for alarm. The desire of some Moslems to live by the Shariah, and even to require other Moslems to do so, does not endanger the United States. Americans may condemn the status of women and what they consider an unduly harsh and primitive legal system in Saudi Arabia, but few would consider Saudi fundamentalism a direct threat to the West.

When a fundamentalist government or group becomes insurgent, seeking to alter the status quo through violence, it does become a threat. Even so, the Moslem states that are insurgent without being fundamentalist, such as Libya and Syria, have troubled the West as much as Iran and nonstate fundamentalist organizations. Similarly, most Palestinian terrorists are secular rather

than fundamentalist, with some of the leading radicals being of Christian rather than Moslem origin.

The key lesson is not to judge Islam by fundamentalism, or even fundamentalism by insurgent fundamentalism. The behavior, not the beliefs, of Moslem fundamentalists, should form the criterion for American perception and response. Americans engaged in combat against Khomeini's Iran while maintaining close relations with Pakistan under Zia ul-Haq. When Islamic motivation leads to terrorism, the United States must respond to terrorism, not to Islam. Islamic terrorism—a term that most Moslems would consider an oxymoronis neither better nor worse than terrorism with any other motivation; it does not warrant special treatment. Khomeini, Assad, and Qadhafi have been enemies because of their insurgent activity and disregard for international law. If we identify Islam itself as the enemy, our misperception may become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Moslems continue to believe in the ultimate superiority of their own faith, as do Christians and Jews. This belief, however, differs immensely from the Marxist-Leninist doctrine that makes supersession of Western capitalism the central focus of the lives of its adherents. Islam is not an enemy of Western civilization the way Marxism-Leninism is; indeed, as an Abrahamic religion, Islam shares many of the West's deepest beliefs about the moral obligations of individuals before God. The cares of most Moslems begin with their own bodies and souls.

More Than the Doctor Ordered

Why Many Americans Can't Afford Health Insurance

JOHN C. GOODMAN

By some estimates, as many as 37 million Americans lack private health insurance or access to public programs such as Medicare and Medicaid. Their ranks are growing, increasing by 25 percent since 1980. The most common explanations for this phenomenon include the growth of employment in the small-business service sector, where employee health insurance is not as prevalent as in larger enterprises; and the collapse of the family, which leaves single mothers and their children especially vulnerable. Another important reason, which has received much less attention, is that regulation of health insurance by state governments is pricing many Americans out of the market.

In recent years, there has been an explosion in the number of state laws requiring private health insurance to cover specific diseases and disabilities and specific health care services. In 1970, there were only 30 such laws across the country. By the end of 1988, according to the Blue Cross and Blue Shield Association, there were 827. About 150 new state mandates have already been proposed this year and, if the experience of the past is a guide, at least a third of these will become law.

Mandated benefit laws cover ailments ranging from AIDS to alcoholism and drug abuse. They cover services ranging from acupuncture to *in vitro* fertilization. They cover everything from life-prolonging surgery to purely cosmetic devices—from heart transplants in Georgia and liver transplants in Illinois to hairpieces in Minnesota. These laws reflect the growing politicization of health insurance. Well-organized lobbies represent almost every major disease and disability, every important group of health care providers, and every type of health care service.

Accidental Addicts

One of the motives behind mandated benefits legislation is the desire to shift health care costs from the public to the private sector. In many states, governments are attempting to force private insurers to pay for the health care of people who otherwise would be dependent on public funds. Legislation benefiting AIDS victims provides a good example:

· Before Congress forced a reversal of policy, the

District of Columbia prohibited insurers from refusing to issue a policy or charging a higher premium to people already diagnosed as having AIDS.

• In California, insurers may not test insurance applicants for the presence of AIDS antibodies.

• Three states (Florida, New Jersey, and Wisconsin) prohibit AIDS testing for group insurance, and a similar regulation has been proposed in Rhode Island.

The clear purpose of these laws is to force policy-holders who do not have AIDS to pay for the health care costs of people who do. Mandated coverage for alcoholism and drug abuse has a similar motive. Currently, 40 states mandate coverage for alcoholism and 20 states mandate coverage for drug addiction. For instance, in Connecticut, insurers are required to provide at least 30 days of inpatient care for the "accidental ingestion" of cocaine, marijuana, morphine, amphetamines, barbiturates, hallucinatory drugs, and other controlled substances.


Whether or not alcoholism and drug abuse are properly classified as "diseases," they are the direct result of the purposeful behavior of the victims. Thus, insurance against alcoholism or drug abuse usually is not insurance against the possibility that someone "accidentally" will become a substance abuser, but is instead a commitment to pay abuse-related medical expenses for a policyholder who is already an alcoholic or a drug abuser at the time the policy is issued.

Carte Blanche for Chiropractors

Another motive for mandated benefits is to increase the incomes of politically influential providers. Not long ago most insurance carriers restricted their coverage to conditions diagnosed and treated by medical doctors. Today state regulations say otherwise. There are at least 142 allied health professions and as many as 240 occupational job classifications. Most are lobbying state legislators to force insurers to pay for their services.

At least 37 states mandate coverage for chiropractors, and in some states insurers must reimburse chiropractors

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Health insurance must cover heart transplants in Georgia, hairpieces in Minnesota, and acupuncture in Nevada.

at the same rate they pay physicians for performing similar services. In Alaska and Connecticut insurers must cover the services of naturopaths (who specialize in prescribing herbs). In Florida and Nevada insurers must cover the services of acupuncturists, and in California coverage for acupuncture must be offered as an option.

Special interest lobbies represent every conceivable health care service, from hearing aid fitters to athletic trainers. All recognize that the more mandates there are, the greater the demand will be for their services. Mandated benefits legislation is also expanding to preventive medicine (whether or not it is cost effective) and to elective procedures that have little to do with health care. For example, Florida now mandates coverage for a specific number of physician visits for children at different ages and prohibits deductibles in connection with the visits. Massachusetts and Kansas require coverage for Pap smear tests, and 12 states mandate coverage for mammograms. Four states (Arkansas, Hawaii, Maryland, and Massachusetts) mandate coverage for in vitro fertilization, and in Texas the procedure must be offered as an option.

Many of the benefits being mandated are worthy procedures. Other things being equal, children should get a certain number of physical checkups, women should get mammograms, and substance abusers should get medical treatment when programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous don't work for them. To prohibit deductibles for children's checkups, however, is to deny parents the opportunity to make fundamental choices about how

to finance health care—and may also encourage more preventive medicine than is medically necessary. To give a blank check for detox treatment raises the price of medical insurance for everyone, and discourages the use of less expensive and frequently more effective programs such as Alcoholics Anonymous.

Frills Don't Come Cheap

One consequence of state regulation of health insurance is that people are unable to buy no-frills health insurance, tailored to individual and family needs. In some states, couples who cannot have children are prevented from buying policies that do not provide for newborn infant coverage. Moderate drinkers and people who abstain from using drugs cannot buy policies that do not cover alcoholism and drug abuse. As a result, people cannot buy the type of insurance they want for a price that reasonably reflects the coverage they need. Denied the right to buy a Volkswagen policy, people must instead purchase a Cadillac policy, with whitewalls and all the accessories, if they purchase insurance at all.

Studies by the accounting firm Peat Marwick Main & Co. found that a mandate for alcohol and drug abuse treatment in Hawaii would cost policyholders as much as \$2.3 million, a mandate for chiropractic services would cost as much as \$8.1 million, and mandates for inpatient and outpatient mental health care would cost as much as \$19.1 million.

A nationwide study by Gail Jensen (University of Illinois at Chicago) and Michael Morrisey (University of

Alabama at Birmingham) estimated the effect on the price of health insurance of various provisions, whether or not they are mandated. They found that coverage for substance abuse increases premium prices by 6 to 8 percent. Coverage for outpatient mental health care is even more expensive—increasing premium prices by 10 to 13 percent. Psychiatric hospital care for the dependents of employees can raise premium prices by as much as 21 percent. If all three of these benefits were mandated, the cost of an average family health insurance policy in the United States would increase by \$500 to \$1,000 a year.

Tragedy of Mandated Benefits

One way to escape regulation of health insurance plans by state legislatures is to work for an employer who is self-insured. Under federal law, employers who self-insure their health care plans (rather than buy insurance in the marketplace) are exempt from the types of state regulations described above. And, according to a 1988 report by the Office of Technology Assessment, the principal reason companies self-insure is to avoid the costs of state regulations. Today, virtually all large firms and a substantial number of medium-sized firms manage their own employee health insurance plans, and roughly half of all employees work for a self-insured company.

In addition to employees of large corporations, others exempted from state-mandated benefits include all federal employees and all people covered under Medicare. It is also a common practice for state governments to exempt state employees and all Medicaid patients. As a result, the full burden of costly regulation falls on the shoulders of the remainder of the population: employees of small firms, the self-employed, and the unemployed. The tragedy of mandated benefits legislation is that it hits hardest those who are most vulnerable. In Texas, with a population of 17 million, the state mandates directly affect only about two to three million people. These are the people without the resour-

ces to self-insure—either they purchase regulated health insurance or go uninsured.

Nationally, according to the Employee Benefit Research Institute, about half of the uninsured are employed and two-thirds of those are either self-

Denied the right to buy a Volkswagen policy, people must buy a Cadillac policy, if they purchase health insurance at all.

employed or employees of small firms with fewer than 25 workers. These are people who have been denied the right to purchase no-frills health insurance, tailored to their individual needs. Many are unwilling to pay high premiums for benefits they neither want nor need.

Senator Edward Kennedy has introduced federal legislation to require employers to provide employees with a specific package of health insurance benefits. The Kennedy proposal would override existing state mandates. But it would also elevate to the federal level the same problem states now face. Experience at the state level teaches that once the federal door has been opened, every group from acupuncturists to naturopaths will pressure Congress for inclusion in the mandates. Whatever the initial package of benefits, it inevitably will expand. Whatever the initial costs, they eventually will be higher. And Americans and their employers will have less freedom of choice in meeting their medical insurance needs.

SHANTIES, SHAKESPEARE, AND SEX KITS

Confessions of a Dartmouth Review Editor

HARMEET DHILLON SINGH

Since its founding in 1980, the Dartmouth Review has drawn more national attention than any other student newspaper in the country. It has inspired over a hundred imitators on campuses nationwide, sending shock waves through America's academic establishment. Its unique style and colorful methods of reporting the news regularly bring out the media's big guns; in just the past year, 60 Minutes, CNN, the New York Times, the Washington Post, Newsweek, and countless others in the media have focused their eyes on the tiny off-campus office where news is made almost as often as it is reported.

By now most people are familiar with the rudiments of the *Review*'s story: it is a feisty, controversial, aggressive, and staunchly conservative weekly publication that has fought a guerrilla war against its college's faculty and administration. The events that have most often drawn the media's attention have leapt off the pages of the paper and onto the pristine ivy-and-brick campus in the form of physical confrontations, protests, college disciplinary hearings, and lawsuits—sometimes all four in one episode. In fact, these Dartmouth dustups happen with such regularity that many outside observers have found the Hanover scene to be one of almost constant entertainment, although it isn't always so amusing to those on either side of any given issue raised by the newspaper.

Jive Albatross

Some of the more divisive controversies engendered by the Dartmouth Review have been treated exhaustively in the press. Perhaps the first such episode to be given national attention was the publication of a column entitled "Dis Sho' Ain't No Jive, Bro'," an indictment of affirmative action quotas written entirely in mock urban dialect. Although the points made in the piece were construed by many as entirely sound, the biting nature of the satire was perceived by many college officials and students to be racist. When then-Congressman Jack Kemp, whose son played football for Dartmouth, resigned in protest from the newspaper's advisory board, the story got national attention. Even today, eight years after the column was printed, it serves as an albatross around the necks of current editors who are frequently forced to explain it in the press.

In 1986, another acrimonious exchange between Dartmouth officialdom and the Review's sometimes mischievous staff ensued when a dozen students, 10 of them Review editors and writers, took it upon themselves to remove several shanties that had occupied the center of the college green for several months as a South Africa divestment protest. The students, disguised by darkness and armed with sledgehammers, were stopped by campus police before completing their task. Disciplinary hearings for the students occurred simultaneously with massive protests, sit-ins, and calls for the immediate expulsion of all 12 students. The highly charged atmosphere and threats by radical students to shut down the college through further sit-ins if the "shanty-bashers" were not punished led to the suspensions of several of the students. Those suspended are the plaintiffs in a lawsuit still pending against the college. Although the shanties were illegally occupying space that was to be used for the annual Winter Carnival snow sculpture and were almost universally regarded as eyesores by the campus community, many Review writers have privately acknowledged that the shanty-bashing was not the wisest solution to the problem. Perhaps a more constructive approach, such as building a series of gulags on the green to demonstrate the logical extension of such physically invasive forms of protest, would have been more effective for the students' cause.

"Pre-Fascist Brats"

The Dartmouth Review has frequently employed broad satire to make a political point, following the lead of such noted writers as Jonathan Swift and Alexander Pope. Humorless administrative spokesman have always characterized this tendency as sophomoric, which it is, since the satires are frequently written by sophomores. But a column written in October 1988 entitled "Ein Reich, Ein Volk, Ein Freedmann[sic]" provoked the very serious charge of anti-Semitism. The hyperbolic column compared the Dartmouth administration led by President

HARMEET DHILLON SINGH was editor-in-chief of The Dartmouth Review during the 1988-89 academic year. She graduated this June with a degree in classical studies.

James Freedman, who is Jewish, to the leading figures of the Third Reich. The trustees were not amused. Even though the newspaper's editor (the author of this article) apologized for her lack of judgment in publishing it, the college news service alerted national media and obligingly supplied them with copies of the article and of previous insensitive allegedly columns printed in the newspaper, thereby engineering widespread attention to and criticism of the unfortunate column. Dartmouth professor of religion Rabbi Arthur Hertzberg called the editor a "pre-fascist thug"; alumnus Morton Kondracke wrote in the New Republic that the entire staff consisted of "pre-fascist brats." However, after several noted Jewish intellectuals, including Sidney Hook, came to the defense of the newspaper, pointing out its staunch support for Israel in the face of a


college-funded PLO solidarity group, the controversy eventually blew over with a little egg on everyone's faces.

Each such embarrassing media spectacle has eventually resulted in even greater popularity and support for the independent newspaper, which now has a weekly circulation of nearly 12,000 (the student body totals only 4,000; the majority of the newspaper's subscribers are alumni). Yet the unfortunate result of the extensive media attention is that most outside observers are aware only of full-fledged internecine brawls at Dartmouth, a saga that, while entertaining, presents an incomplete picture to the novice. It is perhaps more instructive to examine the Dartmouth Review's actual impact on Dartmouth's policies and cultural milieu in the context of the newspaper's stated goals. From time to time the newspaper has published editorials defining its positions on major issues of tradition and intellectual excellence, and has expanded upon those basic tenets in other editorial statements.

Core Lite

The Dartmouth Review believes that students in the liberal arts program ought to have a solid grounding in the recognized classics of Western civilization. The student should not receive an A.B. degree without understanding that Homer is not a line drive to the stands.

February 8, 1982



The Review made the case for a core curriculum by revealing the students' cultural illiteracy. Many professors who have been long-time critics of the Review concurred in its call for stronger requirements.

Although the issue of the Western core curriculum only began receiving widespread national attention during the Stanford "Hey hey, ho ho, Western culture's gotta go" protests of 1987, it has been the focus of much debate at Dartmouth since the Review began pushing it as one of its favorite topics. At Dartmouth, as at most Ivy League institutions, the only curricular imperatives are vague distributive requirements that students take three courses in each of the three areas of humanities, social sciences, and sciences. Students are also required to take a "non-Western" course, which could be anything from Arabic language to Chinese art of the Ming period. Any further obligations, such as requiring students to study U.S. or European history or read a few of Shakespeare's plays, are currently considered to be archaic and "ethnocentric," a word meant to characterize its target as

closed-minded, colonial, even subtly racist.

The problem with this grab-bag approach to education, according to the *Review*, is that students uneducated about the foundations of their own society will have difficulty placing any cultural and historical data in a proper perspective. In other words, the students must know themselves before they can know others. A 1986 poll by the newspaper showed that fewer than 20 percent of the students could identify a famous quotation from Hamlet, the mission of Aeneas, or the author of *Democracy in America*. Students were similarly ignorant of religious, geopolitical, and economic history. The problem permeates the highest reaches of Dartmouth's student body: last year a Rhodes scholar wrote flatteringly of students who spent days in the library studying Catullus "and other Greek writers"; Catullus, of course, was a Latin poet.

The disturbing results of the poll were subsequently incorporated into a speech at Harvard by then-Secretary of Education William Bennett, who was loudly booed for his remarks. Surprisingly, however, even some of Dartmouth's leftist professors concurred in the *Review's* assertion that stronger requirements were needed. One longtime critic of the newspaper, classics professor Edward Bradley, remarked, "I would insist that there be at least one Western requirement before asking for a non-Western requirement." Religion professor Fred Berthold

agreed, "[The] curriculum needs strengthening—students should have more of a sense of history, both of the West, and also of some other culture." Despite widespread agreement with the *Review's* findings, faculty members have yet to implement stricter requirements, although the issue is still under consideration.

Radical Fiefdoms

The present symptoms of Dartmouth's curricular malaise can be found in programs like Women's Studies, Afro-American Studies, Native American Studies, and other special interest departments. We do not assert that women, black, or Native American scholars lack merit, but rather that such courses belong in traditional departments. If Dartmouth's current main departments are indeed socially nonrepresentative, they should be corrected to reflect the contributions of significant female and minority scholars.

November 16, 1988

The Review has never objected to courses treating the role of women in society or black politics or Native American culture. Since its inception, however, the newspaper has opposed specialized departments for African and Afro-American Studies, Women's Studies, and Native American studies, on the grounds that segregating these departments from the mainstream only creates fiefdoms for radical political activity instead

"The student should not receive an A.B. degree without understanding that Homer is not a line drive to the stands."

of legitimate havens for scholarship. For example, Dartmouth's Women's Studies Department and the Black Studies Department are both active in extreme left-wing politics on the campus. Speakers paid by these departments such as Representative Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) and feminist Andrea Dworkin are often called upon to comment on the politics of Dartmouth. In addition, each of these studies departments is linked with a college-funded students activist group (Women's Issues League, Afro-American Society, Native Americans at Dartmouth), all of which actively lobby the administration for special perks.

Dartmouth's students are mostly moderate, and the *Review*'s reporting on the radicalism of the "studies" departments has made the classes unpopular. Aggressive advertising for the special courses indicates that many of them are undersubscribed; quite a number of these classes are cancelled altogether, while others suffer a ghettoization, populated mainly by the leftist fringe.

In addition to marginalizing radical departments, the

newspaper has been successful in deradicalizing some supercharged classrooms, including that of the notorious Professor of Music William Cole. The newspaper's history with Cole has been a long and colorful one with enough recriminations, hysteria, and melodrama to fill a book, but a short summary will have to suffice: In February 1988, the newspaper was alerted by a student that Cole's class, "Music in the Oral Tradition," bore some scrutiny because of its questionable content. A tape recording of one lecture passed to the paper provided the fodder for a scathing indictment of Cole's teaching method, which includes frequent use of foul, unprintable language, excerpts from Cole's unique personal philosophy, and references to students as "honkies." Seeking a follow-up to the story, three writers approached Cole after class the following week to invite him to respond to their charges. A shouting match ensued; Cole broke the flash attachment off the photographer's camera and then told the students to leave, which they did.

The following day, Dartmouth filed charges against the students for harassment, invasion of privacy, and disorderly conduct. They were convicted of the charges plus "vexatious oral exchange" and suspended for terms ranging from nine months to a year and a half. National media swooped down on Hanover to cover the fight, which had grown into a campuswide debate on the reporting methods of the newspaper and the conduct of Cole. In January, a New Hampshire state judge overturned the suspensions and ordered Dartmouth to take the students back, telling the college it would probably lose if it decided to take the case to trial. The *Review* retained a top New York law firm to handle the case, its fees paid by the donations of thousands of alumni, and the case is expected to come to trial this October.

Because Cole is black, political opportunists tried to cast the issue in terms of racism, and college President James Freedman condemned the students as racists even before college judicial proceedings began. He also lauded Cole as one of the nation's finest jazz musicians and historians. Privately, however, many professors conceded that they found Cole's teaching style to be an embarrassment and would prefer his discreet retirement to his lionization as a victim of the *Review*. For whatever reason (college officials remain silent on the issue), Cole's classes for the two terms following the incident were canceled. Since that time he has taught only small, upper-level seminars and faculty insiders expect that he will no longer teach any large introductory courses at the college.

Another victory for the newspaper concerns Cole's wife Sarah Sully, an associate professor of French at Dartmouth. During the last spring school term, Sully assigned a final essay topic to her students—they were to write, in French, their opinions about the Cole/Review imbroglio. The majority of the class knew of Sully's marriage to Cole and tailored their responses to suit her decidedly partisan opinion. One student, however, was blissfully unaware of the connection, and wrote an essay that took the newspaper's side in the conflict. He received a grade of "D," not for grammatical or syntactical errors, but for "racist" content. The student appealed the grade to the chairman of the department,

who agreed that Sully's grading had been inappropriate. The essay grade was ordered withdrawn and Sully was told in the future not to issue essay questions in which she held an obvious conflict of interest. Sully resigned, citing a violation of her academic freedom. It is important to note that in the past, even editors of the newspaper have been asked to write essays condemning themselves and have suffered academically as a consequence. Until the Sully incident, no professor had ever been rebuked for assigning politically onerous essay topics. The faculty's firm hand in dealing with one of its own is clearly a triumph for the newspaper and, more importantly, for fair play in the classroom.

"Oreos" and "Uncle Toms"


The Dartmouth Review is generally skeptical of reverse discrimination policies en-

forced by Dartmouth College. We are not inflexible about this issue. Quota-based policies are detrimental to other qualified applicants [and] the implication that less is expected of blacks, Hispanics, or any other minorities, is clearly insulting to the groups involved.

November 16, 1988

While the newspaper has scored several successes in the academic arena, it has failed to make much headway on affirmative action quotas and related issues. Since its inception the *Dartmouth Review* has agreed with the goal of expanding minority opportunities at Dartmouth, but argued that the quota-based system of reserving places for minorities and the consequent lowering of admissions standards for such students is inherently inconsistent with the demands of intellectual integrity. In doing so, the *Review* set itself up as a target of what has become an exceedingly ugly and intemperate campaign on the part of liberal activists to impugn the very morality of anyone who questions the validity of quotas in hiring and education.

The newspaper has always been called racist for its views on affirmative action and has viewed this criticism as inaccurate and therefore irrelevant. However, the personal price paid by staffers as a result of the bigotry label is less easily brushed off. For example, the author of this essay once wrote an in-depth analysis of



Music professor William Cole, seconds before breaking the flash of a *Review* photographer. Cole's classes were mysteriously canceled for two terms after the incident.

Dartmouth's admissions policies dating back to the mid-1800s, based entirely on official Dartmouth documents and publications. The article concluded that a decline in admissions requirements was roughly consonant with the early 1970s introduction of aggressive minority recruitment programs, including racial quotas. The cost of signing one's name to even such a tangential critique of affirmative action, phrased in dry and nonconfrontational language, was that every one of my black friends on campus refused to speak to me again.

The cost for blacks who join the newspaper is even higher: they are called "Oreos" (black on the outside, white on the inside), "incogs" (for "incognegro"), and even "Uncle Toms." One black freshman on the staff saw himself hung in effigy outside the Afro-American society's headquarters after the shanty incident.

During the Cole incident, three black staffers who attended an Afro-American Society meeting were told, in the presence of several professors, that they would be beaten up if they stayed. All three (one of whom is confined to a wheelchair) left the meeting after noting that the professors would probably do nothing to stop a beating.

Despite these harsh attacks, the newspaper has gone on to condemn college policies that allow the selfsegregation of blacks on the campus, especially in a black dormitory, three black fraternities, and two black sororities. The Review has condemned these insular enclaves and called for them to be integrated like every other house and dormitory on the campus. The irony is that Dartmouth's self-segregated blacks don't view their own actions as racist, whereas by the dictionary definition they clearly are. When Jin Kim, a *Review* staffer of Korean origin, tried to defend the newspaper's position at an anti-Review rally during the Cole incident, a black student accosted him: "You just got off the banana boat four years ago. What do you know about racial relations?" That such sentiments are openly expressed in opposition to the *Review's* position demonstrates that, at this time, a rational exchange of views on the topic of affirmative action is virtually impossible despite Review efforts to hasten the debate.

There is one positive postscript to the problem of the

newspaper's approach to affirmative action. A few months ago Dartmouth's Dean of Faculty Dwight Lahr proposed a new faculty hiring program called "Minority First." The gist of the plan was that Dartmouth would

Humorless administrators call the *Review* sophomoric, which it is, since it is frequently written by sophomores.

hire four or five minority professors each year before hiring any other professors. Their qualifications and the question of whether Dartmouth was even seeking a professor in the applicant's field would be overlooked if the professor was of the correct race. The *Review* expected that its screaming headlines, "Dwight Lahr Exposed! The Racist Policies of a Dartmouth Dean," would result in faculty excoriation. Instead, many professors privately sought out staffers and told them that the majority of the faculty agreed with the essence of the *Review* assessment. Lahr's appointment as dean of the faculty was not renewed; he has since placed himself on sabbatical, and the Minority First program has been abandoned.

Insipid Big Green

Dartmouth's Indian symbol, we believe, stands in honor of the Indians. It represents Dartmouth's raison d'être, its founding purpose: to educate Native Americans. The Indian symbol stands for values of heroism, courage, and character.

November 16, 1988

In 1972 Dartmouth's trustees abolished the college's ancient Indian symbol, giving in to the lobbying efforts of a handful of Native American students. Since then the college symbol has been the insipid "Big Green," and it is not surprising that alumni, students, and the *Review* have frequently lobbied for the return of the more dignified Indian as a symbol to inspire school athletes and unite the Dartmouth family. Each fall the newspaper gives free Indian t-shirts to the freshman class, encloses Indian bumper stickers in each issue, and encourages freshmen to fly Indian banners at football games. Freshmen who do paint and fly the traditional sheet-sized banners are reprimanded on their permanent records, fined \$50, and removed from the stands.

Many polls have shown that the majority of Dartmouth students and alumni prefer the Indian as the school symbol. To show that the symbol was not racist, the newspaper commissioned an independent poll of over 100 heads of Indian tribes around the nation. Over 90 percent agreed that the symbol was noble, complimentary to the Native Americans, and entirely appropriate

as a symbol for the college. Despite this overwhelming evidence, Dartmouth's trustees have refused to open the Indian issue for debate.

A similar *Review*-backed initiative that failed to sway the trustees was the issue of the alma mater, "Men of Dartmouth." Although the song is gender-specific, its eloquent words and tone fit the psyche of Dartmouth precisely. Yet Dartmouth feminists have clamored for a change in its wording since coeducation in 1973. When polled separately by the Review and by the student council, a majority of both men and women voted to retain the wording and the song as the alma mater. However, the trustees again caved in to pressure from protesters (who disrupted one year's commencement events to make their point) and changed the title of the song to "Dear Old Dartmouth," changing some of its verses as well. The problem for the newspaper in both these instances was that they held no leverage with the trustees, who can act unilaterally and are usually more influenced by threatened protests and sit-ins than by editorials or letters from alumni.

Selective Indignation

Armed with administrative powers and moral pomposity, the [President's Committee on Residential Life] has decided that the arbitrary predilection of a few appointees will supersede the collective will of Dartmouth's alumni and students. What is most ironic about the proposals under consideration is that while the administration preaches moral relativism concerning deviant sexual practices such as "fisting" and "rimming," the administration presupposes certain value judgments concerning the Greek system.

March 18, 1987


The Dartmouth Review has devoted a great deal of its attention to issues outside the classroom, demonstrably changing college policy on several fronts, while registering some reverses in others. One success story is that of the fraternities. In recent years administrators and faculty have agreed that Dartmouth's Greek system is detrimental to the educational mission of the college and should be phased out. Most alumni and students (over 50 percent of whom belong to the Greek system) contend that fraternal and sororal affiliations breed character, opportunities for leadership, and camaraderie. Nevertheless, restrictions on admission to fraternities were implemented, causing some houses to fold and threatening the existence of the entire system.

It is true that one can often encounter repulsive and anti-social behavior in most fraternity basements on a weekend. In particular, the gluttonous intake of alcohol makes one wonder what happened to the clubby, civilized, and genteel aura that used to characterize Ivy League fraternal and sororal organizations. The *Review*, as a socially conservative organization, might be expected to support regulations that would force the fraternities to uphold a minimum standard of decency. On the other hand, the newspaper plays a populist role as a consumer advocate for students' freedoms, defending their rights to assemble where and when they wish, and rejecting the college's attempts to squash financially independent organizations by forbidding students to join them. As a

result of the newspaper's continued reportage on the issue, alumni and students became organized and applied pressure on the administration: the fraternities, backed by the financial support of their alumni, threatened to disassociate themselves from the college altogether. The mutinous students were finally appeared when the college agreed to a compromise: instead of curtailing student participation in fraternities from their latter three years to two years, students would be allowed two and a half years of participation. Many alumni cited the newspaper as their primary source of information on the issue, and noted that they would never have even known of the controversy had they limited their reading to college-sponsored publications.

The *Review* has also found plenty of material in the question of whether Dartmouth should adhere to its founding moral and

ethical principles in its policies regarding student life. For example, two years ago students returning to school after vacation were surprised to find that, along with their registration cards and class schedules, each student would also receive a "safe sex kit" including condoms, sexual lubricant, something called a rubber dam, and a homoerotic pamphlet on various sexual practices published by an AIDS group. Many students were offended by the kit and protested the use of their tuition money for the encouragement of sexual acts, especially the bizarre ones suggested by the booklet and the accompanying sexual aids in the kit. The *Review* took the story public-editor Deborah Stone appeared on the "Donahue" show with the director of Dartmouth's Health Services; Stone talked about the Weberian fact/value dichotomy while Dr. Turco noted that his dentist used rubber dams. Many alumni and others around the country wrote letters to the college protesting the explicit nature of the material. While Dartmouth refused to withdraw the kit, the college did change the controversial pamphlet to a more mainstream, heterosexual-oriented one that was less explicit; also, Health Services officers now make a point of mentioning abstinence as a tactic for avoiding pregnancy and disease, although they contend that the more conservative approach has nothing to do with Review-inspired protests.



To show that the Indian symbol isn't racist, the *Review* commissioned an independent poll of over 100 heads of Indian tribes. Over 90 percent agreed that the symbol is noble and complimentary to Native Americans.

The Review wasn't so successful in another of its moral endeavors: defunding the Gay Students Association. Each year the college funds and provides office space and other facilities to the GSA, a group that funds gay social activities and "awareness" seminars. The newspaper approached the issue arguing that funding on the basis of orientation" "sexual should either be extended to every potential sexual category or none at all. First, the newspaper tried to get a Heterosexual Students Association funded, and was told by the college that numerous opportunities for hetero-sexual social fulfillment already existed. Then Review staffers tried to start a Bestiality Society and dutifully applied for funding, fulfilling all membership and other requirements set forth by the college, which ultimately rejected their claim on the basis that it wasn't sincere. In short, all the Review got for its efforts

to delegitimize the GSA was the label of "homophobic."

Wimmin Against the Tide

The newspaper used similarly facetious tactics to take the sting out of the radical feminist movement on the campus and managed to register a partial victory. Dartmouth's ultrafeminists are prone to calling the college's chief landmark, the Baker Library bell tower, a "patriarchal phallic symbol"—in fact, anything that is longer than it is wide could qualify as phallic under the feminist definition. The Review slyly suggested that the Leverone Hockey House, with its low, rounded profile, might qualify as a "mammic symbol." Another feminist operating technique is the avoidance of the words "man" or "his." Thus, women become "wimmin," "womyn," and, most frequently, "womben." When feminists began to demand funding for a Women's Resource Center, the illustration accompanying the Review's story was an engraving of a sinister-looking castle with a ring of bats hovering over it, and the caption "Welcome to the Wombat Zone"—a play on the feminists' self-designated title of "womben." Two years later, even after the feminists established a small-budget center on the edge of campus, most of the student body refers to them as "wombats." The Review's ridicule of feminist tactics has led to their effective political neutralization on the campus.

Revenge of the Words

[This is] President Freedman's barely disguised blueprint for Dartmouth: a Dartmouth that disinherits its past, disavows its original goals, and dismembers the tenets of academic freedom—[He] is slowly but surely accomplishing his objective: the sterilization of Dartmouth. He wants to change this vital, idiosyncratic, and profoundly traditional college into a bland, superficially diverse but fundamentally homogenous academic factory. Freedom of speech and professorial integrity are irritating hurdles to this goal, so he brushes them out of the way. Shameless pandering to minority groups and complete ignorance of alumni concerns aid his endeavors, so he indulges.

September 21, 1988

When President Freedman joined the college two years ago, his plans to change Dartmouth from a "study hard, play hard" school to a more scholastically centered institution like his alma mater, Harvard, rapidly alienated many alumni and students. His endorsement of an accreditation self-study report that called fraternities, freshman outing trips, and the *Dartmouth Review* the three greatest threats to Dartmouth's "diversity" received widespread criticism after it was assailed by the *Review*.

The faculty's firm hand in dealing with Sarah Sully is a triumph for the newspaper and for fair play in the classroom.

Freedman also misfired when he proposed that Dartmouth become a university—as the only college in the Ivy League, the Dartmouth family prides itself on offering the best liberal arts undergraduate experience. Alumni participation in the endowment fund drive

dropped slightly for the second year in a row. Although administrators point to a 34 percent increase in fundraising in 1989 over 1988, there had been a 33 percent drop the year before. In real dollars, both alumni giving and general fund-raising have declined by about 8 percent since 1987.

The trustees, faced with a recent injunctive decision against the college in the Cole/Review case, foresaw a potential alumni revolt, and early this year at one of their meetings, the president was reportedly told to cease and desist his espousal of the university plan and plans to abolish Dartmouth social traditions. The president used his February State of the College address, telecast to alumni clubs around the nation, to publicly repudiate his earlier positions. In response to skeptical questions phoned in by alumni, President Freedman stated that he supported fraternities, encouraged freshman trips, thought athletics were essential to a well-rounded college experience, and endorsed Dartmouth's mission as a liberal arts college.

It remains to be seen whether Freedman will follow up on his newly redefined educational agenda, but there has been a strong wind of change blowing through Dartmouth for the past several months. There is a very distinct tone of defensiveness to many administration pronouncements, and *Review* insiders contend that, inch by inch, they are slowly rolling back the tide of liberalism that has engulfed their college. The newspaper has made some major errors in the past and shot many arrows that didn't quite reach their marks, but the fact that the war continues despite these shortcomings is testimony to the remarkable success of the *Dartmouth Review*.

This fall in Hanover the multicolored canopy of leaves will once again shade staffers handing out Indian t-shirts. Others will make their way into the Afro-American Society to report on reverse racial discrimination. Still others will hold mock arguments over drinks with the college's news director, Alex Huppe (whom the newspaper once pictured beside Soviet propagandist Vladimir Posner with the headline "Separated at Birth?"). And the current directorship of the newspaper will probably operate under the chastened realization that the pen is mightier than the sledgehammer.

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
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Adam Smith's Welfare State

Generous Government Is Consistent with a Market Economy

ADAM MEYERSON

The global move to greater economic freedom, which has given the United States and other market economies seven years of sustained economic growth, continues to find favor among the world's voters. The tax revolt sweeping from Sweden to New Zealand showed its strength this spring in Japan, where the government of Noboru Takeshita was brought down as much by its planned tax increases as by corruption scandals. Poland's new Solidarity government is following the footsteps of French and Spanish Socialists and the Mexican PRI in experimenting with the privatization of state enterprises. The reelection of Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney over a demagogic blaster of the U.S.—Canada Free Trade Agreement shows that voters will prefer mutual reduction of trade barriers to protectionism.

The popular embrace of markets and lower taxes, however, should not be confused with a general dislike of government. Voters throughout the world continue to support a large government role in health, education, and social insurance; generous aid to the needy; and strong safety and environmental regulation. Ronald Reagan, for all his popularity, was forced to beat a hasty retreat when he was perceived as undermining Social Security. Thrice-elected Margaret Thatcher is trying to inject market competition into Britain's National Health Service, but knows it would be political suicide to take the government out of health care altogether. The spirit of the age thus seems to favor both some sort of welfare state and greater freedom for economic decisionmakers.

Regulate Safety, Not Competition

The rudiments of an ideology of "welfare state capitalism" can be found in the most moving elegy to economic freedom ever written, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations of 1776. Smith's greatest influence consisted in his systematic assault on government programs that restricted liberty: apprenticeship laws denying workmen the opportunity to choose their occupation; primogeniture laws restricting the transferability of land; state conferrals of monopoly power on favored merchants and manufacturers, keeping would-be competitors out; and import and export barriers restricting the freedom to scour the world for the best products and markets.

But, *The Wealth of Nations* also made the case *for* a number of government programs, among them universal public education, public health measures against contagious diseases, safety regulations such as the obligation to construct fire walls, and labor regulations protecting workmen against fraudulent payment by employers. Smith saw no contradiction between his general opposition to economic regulation and his support for safety regulation as well as programs providing opportunity for the less fortunate.

Hooray for High Wages

Smith cherished economic freedom—he called it "the system of natural liberty"—both for its own sake as one of the "most sacred rights of mankind" and because of the extraordinary prosperity it brings people of all walks of life. No "dismal scientist" in the later tradition of Malthus, Ricardo, and Marx, Smith liked the high wages he observed in high-growth market economies such as the American colonies.

He recognized 200 years ago what Communist parties and modern-day advocates of "industrial policy" have yet to learn—that ordinary people in a decentralized market will make more sophisticated decisions than even the wisest central planner. Each seller is constantly adjusting his prices and products according to his "higgling and bargaining" with customers. Each worker in a pin factory becomes an expert in his own specialized task, and, if he is sufficiently rewarded for his imagination, figures out ideas for improving his productivity. "What is the species of domestic industry which his capital can employ, and of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, every individual, it is evident, can, in his local situation, judge much better than any statesman or lawgiver can do for him."

Compassionate Populism

The compassionate populism that drew Smith to capitalism also led him to support government programs that genuinely help people. Smith did not write in *The Wealth of Nations* that an "invisible hand" *always* connects

ADAM MEYERSON is editor of Policy Review.

the pursuit of self-interest in the marketplace to the interest of society—only that it "frequently" does so. And, despite his suspicion of those clamoring for an expansion of government—especially of merchants and manufacturers seeking monopoly power through regulation—he believed government has important responsibilities that the marketplace alone cannot provide for.

Defense, Justice, Public Works

The sovereign, according to Smith, has "three duties of great importance": defense against hostile foreign powers; the administration of justice and the protection, as far as possible, of "every member of the society from the injustice or oppression of every other member of it"; and the erection and maintenance of "public works" and "public institutions" that serve the general interest but generate too little profit to individuals to be provided by the marketplace. The last two categories leave considerable room for interpretation, and Smith was generous in what he included.

Under the duty of "justice," Smith did not confine government to the enforcement of contracts and property rights. He also praised regulations that preemptively protect people from injury by others. Laws requiring workers to be paid in money rather than goods were thus a justifiable protection against fraud by their employers. Public safety and health rules were necessary to protect the spread of fire and contagious disease.

Under "public works," in addition to canals, turnpikes, bridges, and harbors, Smith called for a universal system of basic education such as existed in his native Scotland, where almost the entire population had learned to read and a majority knew how to write and account—to the great benefit of the Scotlish economy. "For a very small expense," Smith wrote, "the public can facilitate, can encourage, and can even impose upon almost the whole body of the people the necessity of acquiring those most essential parts of education." To enforce attendance, or at least mastery of the subjects taught in school, Smith suggested that passage of an examination be a prerequisite for entering trades.

Alleviating Suffering

Apart from these three duties of government, Smith was willing to entertain departures from the marketplace wherever complete economic freedom would lead to human suffering. Should the abolition of tariffs throw thousands out of work, for example, he wrote that "Humanity may...require that the freedom of trade should be restored only by slow gradations, and with a good deal of reserve and circumspection." In most cases, he argued, restrictions on economic freedom cause more suffering than they alleviate; thus price controls on corn convert the inconveniences of a shortage into the miseries of a famine. But where freedom can genuinely be shown to lead to suffering, he would not dogmatically oppose government intervention.

The historian Gertrude Himmelfarb has suggested that Smith implicitly endorsed the principle of poor relief. Though Smith sharply criticized England's Settlement Laws for permitting the exclusion of indigent newcomers, he made no mention, neither positive nor negative, of the law's requirement that each parish provide alms to needy citizens of more than 40 days' residence. He favored modest income redistribution through the tax system, recommending higher taxes on luxuries than on necessities and higher turnpike tolls for the carriages of the rich than for the wagons of the poor.

Limiting Leviathan

Smith favored neither minimal nor leviathan government. Government had many responsibilities, but its size was to be limited by six principles:

- 1) Taxes should be kept to a moderate level, to keep alive prospects for economic growth in the private sector.
- 2) Public works should be substantially financed by those who most benefit from them—for example, turnpikes and bridges by tolls on users.
- 3) Public responsibilities should be contracted to private organizations, unless this leads to monopoly power that is likely to be abused.

Smith supported universal public education, public health laws, and labor rules protecting workmen against fraud by employers.

- 4) Government programs that don't work should be abandoned. Ever the pragmatist, Smith supported retaliatory tariffs if he was convinced they would lower the trade barriers of other countries. If they failed to do the job, however, pragmatism required that the retaliatory tariff quickly be eliminated.
- 5) Government programs benefiting a locality or province should be financed by local or provincial revenue, and administered by authorities accountable to the local or provincial population—as a safeguard against slipshod management and abuse of power.
- 6) The accountability of market competition should be replicated in government. Smith suggested, for instance, that teachers not be automatically paid full salaries—lest they become slothful or teach subjects of little use to students. Instead teachers' pay should come at least partly from fees of students allowed to select their instructors—a precursor of "choice in education."

The Wealth of Nations gives no guidance on the biggest budget-buster in most countries today—providing income and medical care for the elderly. Nor does it really cover environmental policy, emerging as one of the great issues of the '90s. But for lovers of economic freedom who seek to govern, and therefore must get elected, Smith offers an intellectual framework for a generous and compassionate government consistent with a competitive market economy.

PRAGMATISTS FOR LIFE

Banning Abortions Is Not Always the Best Way to Reduce Them

JOHN-PETER A. PHAM

The Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Webster v. Reproductive Health Services has probably begun the unraveling of its earlier Roe decision granting almost unlimited abortion rights under the Constitution. It is still unclear whether Roe will go in one dramatic act or die slowly of a thousand wounds administered over the course of time. Either way the result is the same: the question of abortion is being returned to the arena from which it was severed by the 1973 ruling, the political processes of states and local communities.

For pro-life forces, the issue posed in the wake of Webster is how to effectively reduce the number of abortions from the 1.5 million currently performed annually. As David O'Steen, executive director of the National Right to Life Committee, notes, the goal of the movement is to "save as many children as we can as quickly as possible." If that is the goal, then what is required is an innovative political strategy that differs from state to state. More importantly, there needs to be a cultural and social anti-abortion strategy whose success is independent of legislative and regulatory whims.

Most states fall into one of three categories: states where there is widespread support for increased restrictions on abortions, states with strong support for legal abortions, and the majority of states—where large segments of the population are ambivalent and the battle could go either way depending on how the terms of debate are framed.

Testing the High Court

In a number of states, either through historical consensus or political predominance, anti-abortion sentiment runs high and the likelihood of increased restrictions or regulation is greatest. These include Missouri, Pennsylvania, Louisiana, and South Carolina, which have been on the forefront of recent anti-abortion legislation, as well as Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Wyoming, and most of the southeastern states.

Most of these states have either already passed or are considering parental consent and informed notification laws that go the maximum extent allowed by current Supreme Court interpretations. An Illinois case set to come before the High Court this term, *Turnock* v. *Ragsdale*, will seek to further the scope of such legislation. Many of these states have passed some sort of "abortion neutral" legislation such as the Missouri legislation upheld by *Webster* that banned the use of state personnel, facilities, or funds to perform abortions save where the life of the mother is threatened.

In these states, as suggested by Victor G. Rosenblum, acting chairman of Americans United for Life and a Northwestern University law professor, "The real cutting-edge legislation will be the legislation that puts prohibitions on abortions after the 20th week." In its Webster decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that states can have a "compelling interest in protecting potential human life" and hinted that a reasonable point at which its interests may be safeguarded is viability, generally thought to be around the 20th week. Legislation such as that suggested by Rosenblum would be a real test of the High Court's intentions and have a greater chance of passing constitutional muster than broader bans.

Broader legislative bans on all abortions except in the cases of rape, incest, or endangerment of the life of the mother could possibly pass many legislatures in these states, but would not be prudent until another anti-Roe justice is appointed to the Supreme Court. With the current membership of the court, and particularly with the very hesitant Sandra Day O'Connor as the crucial swing vote, a ban that directly challenges Roe could provoke the High Court to do what it would not do otherwise: reaffirm Roe, thereby setting the anti-abortion movement back to the pre-Webster days of uncertainty.

Regulating Abortion for Safety

A different strategy is called for in those states with a consensus in favor of legal abortions or at least a very strong pro-abortion force. These include New Jersey, Massachusetts, and California, whose state supreme courts have found abortions to be protected by the state constitutions; Washington and Delaware, states which had legalized abortions before *Roe*; and states with

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strong pro-abortion lobbies such as Maryland, New York, Oregon, and Vermont. Here, severe regulations and restrictions of abortion are unlikely to be accepted. And the rancorous losing debate a ban would provoke may actually prove counterproductive to the goal of saving as many lives as possible, as quickly as possible. With current attitudes, strict anti-abortion laws in these states would only create social upheaval and civil disobedience. Tens of thousands of abortions would still take place underground.

The most practical political strategy to reduce the number of abortions in these states would be to leave the issue of abortion rights alone and focus upon abortion as a surgical procedure, subjecting abortionists to the same restrictions and regulations as other physicians. The Illinois law in *Turnock* held abortion clinics to the same stringent licensing standards as other medical institutions. The trial judge has overturned the law, ruling that the regulations effectively limited the availability of abortions by raising the costs—which is precisely the point. Assuming the Supreme Court upholds the Illinois law, this indirect method of regulation not only cuts down on the convenience and availability of abortion on demand, but it forces the proponents of legal abortion to reveal that they are so concerned with abortion itself that they are unwilling to accept regulations that reduce risks to the health of the mother. The abortion debate in these states will be refocused from the almost unwinnable contest of choice versus anti-choice to one of reasonableness versus unrestrained excess.

Health of the Mother Compromise

The majority of states, however, fall into the ambivalent category. While they hardly have active pro-abortion lobbies or a clear-cut pro-abortion consensus, neither have they shown any inclination towards antiabortion legislation. While they may be politically conservative, the populace of many of these states have a tradition of personal privacy and non-interventionism.

The key here is how the issue is framed. A variety of tactics may be used. Regulating the abortion process through the use of parental consent, spousal notification, and informed consent requirements is one alternative. Polls indicate that a majority of the American public, including those describing themselves as "pro-choice," find these measures reasonable. A Los Angeles Times poll recently found support for parental permission among 85 percent of those surveyed and support for spousal consent among 58 percent. Opponents of such measures would be forced to defend the untenable position of being unwilling to involve families in family decisions. "Abortion-neutral" legislation such as in Missouri and legislation regulating the medical aspects of abortion would also have a chance of passage.

Another anti-abortion legislative strategy that may prove effective in these states is a short-term (although certainly not framed as such) compromise that would ban abortions but contain exceptions for rape, incest, and endangerment of the health of the mother. Rape and incest together cover less than 10 percent of abortions, even according to the Alan Guttmacher Institute,

Planned Parenthood's research arm. Even if "health of the mother" were stretched to cover one-third of abortions, such a loose ban would reduce the number of abortions substantially. And, very importantly, a loosely framed ban has a greater potential for passage and could pave the way to restrictive legislation more to the liking of pro-life forces, including restrictions on the rather loose "health of the mother."

The Strategy of Community Disapproval

While political strategies have the potential for curbing the number of abortions performed, the ultimate success in curbing the number of abortions will have to come from sociocultural and economic—that is, nongovernmental—strategies. On a pragmatic level, proabortion groups are correct in saying that outlawing abortions will not guarantee an actual end to abortions: what is required is the creation of an environment in which the bans would be both natural and obeyed. On the philosophical level, nonpolitical pressure is more in line with the traditional conservative-libertarian faith in the efficacy of the free market and distrust in government regulation by "sophisters, calculators, and economists," to borrow Edmund Burke's phrase.

Since the 1973 Roe decision, Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life and the Duluth Abortion Alert have staged a successful market-oriented drive to curb abortions in northern Minnesota and surrounding areas. As a result, in 44 U.S. counties and two Canadian provinces there is just one facility offering abortion services, the Women's Health Center in Duluth, Minnesota. While Minnesota law is relatively unrestrictive in permitting abortions to consenting adults, the clinic has faced a great deal of community pressure. Several of the local papers refuse to accept advertisements from the clinic either as a result of advertising boycott threats or editorial consistency. The Women's Health Center is staffed by four physicians who commute because local physicians found the costs-financial and social-of abortions too high. Clinic director Tina Welsh notes that in attempting to constitute a board of directors for the clinic she was turned down by nearly 30 local physicians. Welsh says, "It is very frightening for us in Minnesota. We are very vulnerable."

Similar cases are reported across the country. In March, Humana Hospital of Anchorage, the only hospital in Alaska to offer abortions, stopped performing them altogether. While a hospital spokesman explained that Humana wished simply to "be consistent with what other hospitals here are doing," consumer boycotts of all hospital services at Humana in protest of the abortions no doubt played a major role in the decision. As a result, although first-trimester abortions are still available in a few Alaskan clinics, women seeking second-trimester abortions must travel to Seattle.

History has shown that no legislation will be effective unless there are non-legal deterrents to back up the legal penalties. A public policy strategy that discourages and stigmatizes—but does not necessarily criminalize—abortions may be the winning strategy that bridges the chasm opening with the renewed abortion debate.

Wasting Away in Atchison County

My Neighbors Prefer Economic Depression to an Incinerator

BLAKE HURST

Instead of Edmund Burke and the Federalist Papers, I have to admit I spent my youth reading westerns. So, even though I should be an expert on the French Revolution, I can probably tell you more about the Lincoln County War or the shoot-out at the OK Corral. It's a fixture of all Western range wars that each side would hire gunfighters to champion its interests. This is the story of a latter-day gunfighter, a man named Hugh Kaufman, who came to my town, won his shoot-out by terrorizing the community, and left to fight again. Of course, gunfighters today use the 6 o'clock news instead of the Colt .45, but they still deal in fear and are paid in notoriety.

Atchison County, Missouri, has 8,000 people, half of our population at the turn of the century and 7 percent less than 10 years ago. The county has essentially no industry. The leading source of income in the area is Social Security, with farm income a distant second. A small Presbyterian college here has a theater program famous throughout the Midwest and several satellite campuses that rank highest in the nation for student loan defaults. At least running student loan scams shows more entrepreneurial imagination than is normally found in this depressed area.

Showdown at the Gym

Late last year, Waste-Tech, Inc., a Colorado subsidiary of Amoco, announced it was considering our county as a site for an incinerator of hazardous wastes—mostly oil refinery wastes, printers' ink, dry-cleaning fluids, and agricultural chemicals. The initial reaction to the news was positive. The small-town papers, civic groups, and chambers of commerce favored the project. When opposition did develop, the first signs were letters to the editor in the local papers quoting from environmental groups such as Greenpeace. Soon, handwritten fliers announced the arrival of a high EPA official in Atchison County to speak in opposition to the project.

Now, this seemed strange to me. After all, the company planning to build the incinerator had made it clear that the EPA felt that incineration was the "best available technology" to handle the wastes in question. So why were the opponents of the project bringing in someone

from the EPA to speak against official EPA policy?

Enter Hugh Kaufman. Kaufman first gained widespread attention when he blew the whistle on Rita Lavelle's dilatory cleanup of Superfund waste sites. However, that wasn't the first time Kaufman had been at odds with the EPA. In fact, under the Reagan administration, the EPA was stopped by court order from firing Kaufman. Well known as a spokesman for the radical environmental fringe, Kaufman receives 8 to 10 invitations a month to speak against various projects across the country during his leave time and on weekends.

The scene was set for the confrontation. In the western novels of my youth, the showdown would have occurred in the dusty main street of our small town, but Main Street is a lousy place for sound bites on the evening news, so Kaufman spoke at the local high school gym. The gunfighter of the past would have been tall, taciturn, and unshaven. Kaufman, on the other hand, is short, bespectacled, and personable, not the type of figure to strike fear into the heart of the populace.


Yellow Waste-Tech

Of course, it could hardly have been called a confrontation: Waste-Tech declined to attend. This was a major mistake because Kaufman made serious and incorrect allegations that cried out for immediate response. With the program held on a Saturday, the charges Kaufman made dominated the news all day Sunday with no reply from anyone on the other side.

In a telephone conversation with a Waste-Tech official, I asked if the company regretted its decision not to attend. He said it did not. However, it was clear that Waste-Tech's absence made an impression on the fold in attendance. The only way to deal with Kaufman's irresponsible attacks was to answer them forthrightly, honestly, and most of all, promptly. Waste-Tech's unwillingness to do so had to give even supporters of the project pause.

Kaufman began his remarks by accusing Waste-Tech

BLAKE HURST helps operate the family farm established by his grandfather in Missouri. He last wrote for Policy Review on agricultural subsidies.





Gunslingers in the old days used to terrorize folk by shooting up the town. Hugh Kaufman uses the 6 o'clock news instead of a Colt .45 to scare people out of their wits.

of "potential fraud and illegalities" in a permit application for a similar plant in western Nebraska. He called for a Nebraska grand jury investigation of these "criminal acts." The Nebraska attorney general did investigate Kaufman's charges and found them without basis. The attorney general's office remarked that it had some difficulty in its investigation because Kaufman failed to answer five different requests for substantiation of his charges in writing. One of the central charges made by Kaufman was the alleged failure to list an existing plant in Colorado in the application. Not only did Waste-Tech mention the plant in the appropriate place, but it gave tours of the plant to people from Nebraska and Atchison County. The company also mentioned the plant, and its exemplary test results, in each of its public presentations in Atchison County.

Kaufman went on to call hazardous waste incineration the "most dangerous operation in the world." The U.S. Congress doesn't think so: its Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976 bans the disposal of hazardous wastes in landfills, but allows incineration. The EPA contends that emissions from incinerators are a minor source of air pollution and "do not pose any threat to nearby residents or the surrounding environment."

Kaufman dealt with his disagreement with the EPA over the safety of incineration in two ways. First, providing no substantiation, he accused EPA scientists of not telling the truth for fear of losing their jobs. Second, he said EPA political appointees "are and are hoping to be working for hazardous waste companies." Waste-Tech does have one former EPA employee on the payroll; he was hired three years after he left the agency and was a civil service employee, not a political appointee.

Kaufman painted an alarming picture of the truck traffic necessary to haul waste to the plant. Visions of lines of tanker trucks festooned with skulls and crossbones clogging the local roads are frightening for any community. However, the Waste-Tech proposal mentioned an average of only three trucks a day. Kaufman flatly accused Waste-Tech of lying about truck traffic and said there was nothing in the permit limiting the number of trucks entering the plant. In fact, the permit applica-

I'd rather live next door to an incinerator than to some of the hog farms I've seen (and smelt) around these parts.

tion did specify the amount of waste to be treated yearly. If one divided the maximum permitted amount by the capacity of a tanker, and the result by 365, the answer was three trucks per day.

Nobody Next Door

Land values in Atchison County are a function of the price of grain, interest rates, and the perceived trend of government subsidies. Kaufman warned that if an incinerator were sited here, land values would drop 50 to 70 percent, perhaps even 99 percent. A survey of all land

that had changed hands in the area around Waste-Tech's planned facility in western Nebraska shows absolutely no

drop in land prices.

All in all, Kaufman gave a command performance that had its desired effect. Two days after his visit, Waste-Tech dropped Atchison County as a proposed site. I'm sure that if a referendum had been held, a majority of the citizens would have voted against the siting of the incinerator in their county.

Of course, I'd rather have a computer software firm in my backyard than a hazardous waste incinerator. But I'd also rather live next door to an incinerator than to

Farmers here work with "hazardous" chemicals every day, many of them the same chemicals that would have been destroyed in the incinerator.

some of the hog farms I've seen (and smelt) around these parts. An incinerator is also probably better than having nobody next door—on our farm there are four unoccupied houses. On my four-mile drive to farm head-quarters each morning, I drive by another four empty houses. A community of abandoned farmsteads, failing businesses, and crumbling roads and bridges is hardly a desirable one. Waste-Tech's project would have posed a negligible risk to our physical environment here in Atchison County, and it would have provided at least some hope of improving our business environment. Now in our second year of drought, we could sure use some

business here not so dependent on the vagaries of Mother Nature.

Decline of the Waste

The loss of 40 jobs by a depressed county in rural Missouri is hardly of national importance except for this: If the most environmentally safe way of dealing with a national problem cannot be built in Atchison County, what hope have we for dealing with the wastes our economy produces? After all, farmers here work with "hazardous" chemicals every day, many of them the same chemicals that would have been destroyed in the incinerator. We know they are dangerous, but if handled with care, their benefits far outweigh any risks to the environment. If a community used to dealing with these compounds takes the likes of Hugh Kaufman at face value, the reaction of other communities is likely to be even more extreme. And this is not an academic debate. A law passed by Congress in 1984 placed strict limits on what wastes can be landfilled. By 1990, a total ban will be placed on the dumping of untreated chemicals. According to Gregg Easterbrook in a recent Newsweek article, 96 percent of these wastes are handled where they are produced, but 4 percent will have to be treated, mostly by incineration. Easterbrook further points out that by failing to use new technologies, we are forced to continue using outdated methods of dealing with waste. So, in effect, Kaufman's efforts will result in more damage to our environment.

One final note. In the weeks after Kaufman's visit, three small businesses here in Atchison County closed their doors. Of course, it would have been too late to make any difference to those businesses. But it seems clear that the citizens of Atchison County have chosen a gradual decline in preference to any environmental risks whatsoever.

In the westerns I loved as a youngster, though the cow town might have been terrorized by the gunfighter, in the end, the citizens of the town overcame their fear and banded together for the good of the community. But, here in Atchison County, fear was the victor.

OFF WITH THEIR OVERHEAD

More Prison Bars for the Buck

KEVIN ACKER

Across the nation, burgeoning convict populations have prisons bulging at their limits. Tales of "homeless" inmates who carry their belongings in a pillow case during the day and sleep in the hall at night are not uncommon. Currently, 37 states operate one or more prisons under court orders to improve conditions and reduce overcrowding. At the same time, public support is growing for tougher sentencing measures to lock criminals up and keep them there.

The effects of this new consensus are widespread. The lack of public faith in rehabilitation helped George Bush defeat Michael Dukakis through effective use of the prison furlough issue. In Oregon, a 1988 ballot initiative that forbade parole or probation for twice-convicted felons passed by an overwhelming 79 percent. Clearly, to accommodate the public will, the nation needs to

expand its prison capacity.

Building a prison, however, is an expensive task. Prison construction costs average \$50,000 per bed nationally, ranging from \$2,995 per bed for a minimum-security cell in Alabama to \$140,000 per bed for a maximum-security facility in West Virginia. Contributing to the disparity in these figures are varying construction and labor costs, and conditions mandated by state legislatures such as the number of square feet or bathrooms per prisoner. Other reasons for disparity include weather conditions and efficiency in procurement.

Also, as the security designation of a prison becomes more restrictive, construction costs go up. According to the 1988 Corrections Yearbook, the average cost for a maximum-security prison is approximately \$67,000 per bed, for a medium-security prison \$53,000 per bed, and for a minimum-security prison \$26,000 per bed. It costs approximately \$16,000 to hold a prisoner in jail, more than the yearly tuition of an Ivy League college. Typically, about two-thirds of a prison's operating costs are personnel-related (salaries, employee benefits); another 15 percent is designated for food and medical services. The remaining amount goes to such things as rehabilitative services and physical plant maintenance.

With crime rampant and taxpayers balking at prison bond issues, finding ways to decrease the cost of corrections has become increasingly urgent. A few prison and jail systems have come up with innovative ideas—ranging from private sector management to the creative use of inmate labor—to reduce the cost of imprisonment.

Nebraska's Prison Industries

For most of the 20th century, public abhorrence of using "slave labor," as well as business and union concerns about unfair competition, have led to laws prohibiting prison systems from selling the products of inmates on the open market. The Hawes-Cooper Act of 1929 banned interstate trade of goods produced by prisoners. In the 1970s, the rapid growth of prison populations, accompanied by new concerns about the high cost of corrections, led to a new appraisal of this ban. Recognizing that almost no business can operate profitably if it is not allowed to sell its product across state lines, the 1979 Percy Amendment allowed exceptions to the federal prohibition on interstate trade of prison-produced goods. Today, the American Correctional Association is allowed to grant 20 such exceptions under the Private Industry Enhancement (PIE) program.

Nebraska is one state recognized under PIE. The state's year-and-a-half-old "private venture" program has generated hundreds of thousands of dollars for the state's prison system by bringing in outside businesses to employ inmates at minimum wage. Under the Nebraska program, in place at all five of the state's prisons, private companies pay prisoners to make clothing, outfit conversion vans, manufacture wooden products, and telemarket products such as farm supplies and loading equipment. Five percent of each inmate's wages is deducted for victims' restitution programs and one dollar an hour is deducted for room and board. Even after these deductions the inmates in the program still have a before-tax \$2.29 per hour for their families and themselves—far more than the maximum \$3.29 per day that other inmates earn.

Last year, the "private venture" program added nearly \$200,000 in combined taxes, room and board, and contributions to victims' restitution programs to help offset

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Under the Nebraska prison industry program, private companies pay inmates to make blue jeans and outfit conversion vans. Part of their wages goes for victim restitution and to defray the cost of incarceration.

the approximately \$15,000 per year it costs Nebraska to hold a prisoner. And the program is expanding quickly. In the first three months of this year at the Nebraska State Penitentiary alone, the 112 inmates participating in the program earned over \$100,000 for the state. At this rate, each inmate in the program will contribute approximately \$3,560 to the state, reducing the cost of his incarceration over 25 percent.

Don Lincoln, project manager for Cornhusker State Industries, the division of the Nebraska Department of Corrections that coordinates private ventures, calls the program a "real win-win situation," financially benefitting not only the prison system, but also the private businesses who set up the industries and the inmates who work in them. Private businesses gain access to a labor market that is able to work flexible hours on short notice and, says Lincoln, the program has a positive rehabilitative effect on prisoners.

Harvey Martin, president and owner of the Nebraska City-based Jade, Inc., whose LaPen subsidiary employs 90 prisoners to manufacture clothing, says he entered the Nebraska State Penitentiary program "to run a business, not to be a social worker." He adds, "The main advantage to us is available labor. There is a shortage of employees for manufacturing jobs, at least in Nebraska City."

"We gain access to a relatively stable labor base that lends itself to accurate planning," he says. Because the company is aware of each prisoner's sentence length, "you know how long each employee is going to be with you and can place each employee strategically." Martin says he trains inmates with longer sentences to do more complex jobs, while he assigns inmates with sentences of shorter duration to jobs requiring less training. He does not hire inmates who have less than two years left on their sentences.

Harold Clark, warden of the Nebraska State Penitentiary, calls the program a "blessing for management" that "does wonders for discipline." Clark says that because inmates who do have one of the limited number of jobs in the private venture program (there are usually 35 to 40 people on the waiting list) know that if they misbehave they will lose them, prisoner behavior has improved dramatically.

Inmates who work for private venture firms while in prison may find that they have jobs waiting for them when they get out. Martin calls his inmate workers "good, hard-working employees," whom he would "certainly" hire in his civilian operations upon their release.

Nebraska currently has over 200 inmates participating in the program statewide. Space limitations prevent wider implementation of the private venture program, according to Lincoln. Security considerations necessitating the location of private industries within prison walls, and the very overcrowding that indirectly helped to prompt the private venture program in the first place combine to make available space for prison industries quite scarce. Martin says that these space constraints mean that companies that set up shop inside prison walls should be labor intensive, employing as many inmates in as small a physical plant as possible.

Other states that have successfully experimented with private industry in their prisons include Minnesota, California, and Nevada. Tony Travisano, president of the American Correctional Association, says 18 states are currently allowed to bring the private sector into their prisons, with 10 more states' applications under review.


Bay County's Privatization

The limited private-sector involvement in Nebraska is not the only example of market forces contributing to a cost-effective prison system. In Bay County, Florida, fullscale privatization has reduced costs greatly.

The Bay County Jail in Panama City, Florida, is operated by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), a Nashville, Tennessee-based corporation that

South Carolina has decreased prison construction labor costs 30 to 50 percent by employing inmates to build new facilities.

runs 11 correctional facilities in four states. In October 1985, CCA took over the existing 206-bed Bay County Jail (which was operating under a court order to improve conditions) and built, in six months, a new 200-bed



Privatized jails such as this one in Panama City, Florida, cut out the waste of the public system while providing some of the best prison conditions in the country.

annex to relieve overcrowding.

CCA bid \$29 per prisoner per day, 15.9 percent less than the \$34.50 the county was spending to operate the facility and much less than the \$38.00 the sheriff bid to continue to run the jail, according to CCA spokesman Peggy Wilson. CCA also included a \$750,000 renovation package in its bid. Today, using a three-tiered pricing schedule that decreases the charge per prisoner as the number of prisoners increases, CCA charges the county approximately \$30 per prisoner.

Bay County Commissioner Rick Seltzer says he is "very pleased" with the CCA facility. "When the jail was run by the sheriff," he says, "the price was going up each year, and we constantly had legal problems. Now, we get the bill, pay it, and that's the last we hear of it."

Because personnel costs make up approximately twothirds of the average jail's operating costs, most of CCA's day-to-day cost savings are personnel-related. Wilson says although the company pays wages comparable to those of a publicly run facility, CCA is able to cut out much of the waste of the public system and offer employees incentives and career opportunities not available from the government. For example, CCA employees are promoted on the basis of ability not seniority, can take part in an employee stock ownership plan, and, if they desire, may be transferred to a CCA facility in a different part of the country.

CCA also cuts down on sick time, notoriously high in the public sector. "There are a lot of abuses in the public sector," Wilson says. "We don't allow a lot of sick time abuse or overtime abuse....We keep our overtime pay at a minimum and create a healthy atmosphere for our employees."

Private prisons are not subject to the same cumbersome procurement procedures that publicly run facilities are. "If we need to buy supplies, we get our own bids from two or three people locally and then go out and buy them," Wilson explains. This stands in stark contrast to public prisons, where purchasing a single tube of toothpaste could take weeks. "We cut through a lot of red tape," says Wilson.

Charles Logan, visiting fellow at the National Institute for Justice, says a "realistic" expectation of the cost savings of a private prison is about 10 percent. A private prison's greatest advantages, he says, are flexibility and efficiency. A private prison can be built more quickly than a public one and is better able to respond to new problems and changing conditions. The decreased construction time reduces inflation costs, Logan explains, and results in more favorable finance terms. He praises private prisons for "offering comparative standards by which to measure public prisons and their efficiency."

Besides costing less than a publicly operated facility, the Bay County Jail also provides some of the best prison conditions in the nation. Meals are served on insulated trays and inmates may watch thirtysomething on color television. Although some, including the Florida State Sheriff's Association, have criticized the jail for treating prisoners "too well," Seltzer calls the jail "absolutely a model of what a facility should look like." Dan Duda, appointed by the county to monitor CCA's operation of the jail, describes the facility as clean, but not extravagant: "It's still a jail, it's not a happy place...there aren't any frills."

According to Bob Verdeyen, regional administrator for American Correctional Association standards and accreditation, the Bay County Jail received one of the most favorable ACA accreditation ratings of any such facility in the country. All 11 of CCA's prisons and jails are ACA-accredited, a distinction earned by only about 5 percent of prisons and jails nationally. "A lot of jails get locked into noncompliance because of state regula-

tions and antiquated facilities," says Verdeyen. The Bay County Jail is able to avoid many of these problems, enjoying the freedom to procure materials without prohibitive bureaucratic regulations and having the economic incentive to design facilities that are easily expandable and modernizable.

Inmate Prison Construction

The use of inmate labor to construct and maintain prisons is not a new idea. States such as Florida and Texas have employed prisoners to expand and maintain physical plants since the inception of their corrections systems. But while inmate labor costs less than conventional labor, it often results in substandard construction and usually takes many times longer to complete than if the construction were carried out by a private firm. In South Carolina, an eight-year-old labor program using mostly

Inmates who work for private venture firms while in prison may find that they have jobs waiting for them when they get out.

minimum-security inmates has largely avoided many of these problems and, according to the state's Legislative Audit Council, inmate construction has decreased labor costs 30 to 50 percent, although projects typically take longer to complete. On five recent projects, including a drug abuse center, a multi-purpose building near death row, a 60-bed restitution center, a work camp, and a 30,000-square-foot warehouse, the South Carolina Department of Corrections saved approximately \$225,000 on labor costs through the use of inmate labor.

The South Carolina program combines strong incentive programs with motivated and involved management. An inmate who works on a construction job can earn up to \$28.25 every two weeks, in comparison with the maximum \$18.25 per two weeks inmates in the conventional work program can earn. Inmates also earn good-time credits (although by law, a prisoner cannot be released

before the minimum sentence mandated by the judge). A worker is given one of four classifications according to his skill level. As an inmate becomes more skilled, he moves up the classification ladder, in the process garnering higher wages and gaining earned work credits more frequently. A common laborer, such as a pipe-fitter, earns \$18.25 every two weeks and gets one day off his sentence for every five days worked. A highly skilled position such as design engineer pays \$28.25 every two weeks and earns one day off for every two worked.

Louisa Brown, warden of the Goodman Correctional Institution, which houses 245 of the 600 inmates participating in the construction program, cites other motivational tools that contribute to the comparatively high quality of work. "A lot of it depends on the superintendent or job supervisor....If [one of my] inmates doesn't go out on the construction job in the morning, I get him up and put him to work for me—he's going to be picking up cigarette butts around the grounds all day," she says.

Participants also work diligently because they know that if they do not, they will be demoted to a lower earned work credit/pay level or "fired" from the program altogether, according to Francis Archibald of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. "If we have someone doing sloppy work, we'll throw him back in with the general [prison] population," he says.

These various incentives have paid off. Brown reports that while constructing a waste plant for a prison in Allendale, inmates worked through the night to complete the water system. "They did an excellent job in the time no private company could," she says. "And they did all this while working under horrible conditions in the sewers." Brown says as a reward for their work the inmates were granted one week off and treated to a special dinner. "They built my cafeteria," she adds, "and they did a wonderful job."

Thus far, increased construction time, and concerns over unfair competition and work quality, have led the South Carolina Department of Corrections to restrict the use of inmate labor to relatively simple and minor projects. "We don't do any major, massive building projects with inmate labor," Archibald explains.

Along with prison industries and privatization, inmate construction offers a way for states to cut prison costs. Broadly applied, such programs could save millions of dollars, and help keep dangerous criminals off the streets.

"X" COMMUNICATIONS

Burton Yale Pines Responds to His Critics

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, FRED C. IKLÉ, PAUL M. WEYRICH, WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR., ANGELO CODEVILLA, JACK WHEELER, ALAIN BESANÇON

In his famous *Foreign Affairs* article of 1947, George Kennan under the pen name of "X" helped to crystallize the "containment" strategy that has dominated the foreign policy of the United States and its allies for the last 40 years.

Writing in *Policy Review* this summer, Burton Yale Pines argued that, thanks to the success of containment, America and Western Europe now need a new strategy as sweeping as Mr. X's—this time for the liberation of Eastern Europe and the democratization of the Soviet Union. Mr. Pines, senior vice-president of The Heritage Foundation and associate publisher of this magazine, did not pretend in "Waiting for Mr. X" to articulate the new strategy himself, but he did suggest some of the questions he thought the new strategy must address.

Mr. Pines suggested that the outlines of an "X" strategy were to be found in Henry Kissinger's proposals to offer the Soviet Union incentives in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. He also argued that the U.S. cannot be a passive by-stander as events in Eastern Europe dramatically unfold and that a new strategic blueprint is needed to prevent Bonn and other capitals from cutting separate deals more favorable to Moscow; to provide stability in Eastern Europe after a possible Soviet withdrawal; to reassure Britain and France, among others, that Germany will not fill the vacuum left by a receding Soviet empire; and to provide the basis for a reinvigorated, muscular containment policy should glasnost and perestroika fail or prove to be a sham.

Mr. Pines's article provoked the following comments, printed here together with a reply from the author.

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK

Mr. Pines's notion that the United States and the West can "insure" the independence of Eastern Europe with some combination of economic benefits and "Austrian type" security guarantees assumes, first, that Mikhail Gorbachev wants economic development more

than he wants political hegemony and believes he must choose between them; and second, that he believes an independent Eastern Europe would constitute a potential security threat against which the Soviet Union needs to be protected.

Both assumptions are extremely dubious. The notion that economic rewards will persuade Gorbachev to grant autonomy to the countries of Eastern Europe calls to mind Lyndon Johnson's effort to buy peace in Vietnam with promises of massive economic aid, and the efforts of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to give the Soviets vested interests in cooperating with the West.

Neither policy worked because, until now, Leninist governments have been more interested in power than in economic development. The Soviet government is still spending huge sums for empire and military budgets, indicating that it remains more interested in power than in economic development. There is another reason that the Soviets have no incentive to trade Eastern European independence for economic aid: they already get about as much credit and help from Western Europe and the U.S. as they can now use—and with no strings.

There is no evidence so far that Gorbachev is willing to withdraw Soviet troops from Eastern Europe. Had he decided to do so he might simply have withdrawn them as in Afghanistan; or he could have proposed negotiating rapid mutual withdrawals with the U.S., or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. He has done neither. Instead, he reacted with irritation to George Bush's suggestion of a rapid troop withdrawal from Poland. The reason is not that he believes Soviet security would be threatened by an independent Eastern Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev is no Joseph Stalin. He does not have paranoid delusions about capitalist encirclement. He has a realistic sense of the correlation of forces. He knows the military strength of the Soviet Union. We need not worry about giving him guarantees against an imaginary danger.

Mr. Pines is, I fear, less realistic than Gorbachev in estimating the relative power of nations. The simple fact is that the United States cannot prevent the develop-

ments in Eastern Europe from running their course. We did not cause them. We do not control them. We should not try. *Solidarnosc* is a Polish creation. The New Hungary is a Hungarian product. Glasnost is Gorbachev's contribution. It is true, of course, that new freedoms in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union create new potential points of conflict. Change means unrest, uncertainty, even disorder. But change is a prerequisite to greater freedom for Eastern Europe. We cannot "manage" it. Self-determination means people managing their own affairs.

We also cannot prevent our allies from seeking national advantages and cutting separate deals. West Germany is already deeply involved in the economies of Eastern Europe. France and Britain are working to expand their roles. They do not consult us before they act. Neither can we prevent the prospect of a resurgent and neutralist Germany from worrying our allies (and theirs) in Europe. We cannot prevent new correlations of power from emerging. It is idle to try.

Mr. X's appraisal was cool and realistic. A similarly cool appraisal of today's realities makes clear the limits of American power in Europe. We are part of an alliance of independent nations. We cannot control the policies of our allies. We can, of course, seek to influence their decisions, but we must understand that our influence may be marginal.

I do not believe the United States has entered a period of inevitable decline. I do know, however, that our *relative* power is far less than when Mr. X wrote. (Mr. X knows it, too.) Our former allies and enemies, devastated by World War II, have recovered, largely because of the success of our policies. They have their own plans and goals, and little inclination to take guidance from the United States in the conduct of their foreign affairs. Our allies have their own ideas about how to aid perestroika and glasnost, and should Soviet reform fail they will have ideas about what to do about it. We can discuss options

We cannot be architects of the new Europe. Our allies are no longer dependent on the United States. We have been largely freed of that burden.

—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick

with them and cooperate in common policies. We cannot be architects of the new Europe. Our allies are no longer dependent on the United States. We have been largely freed of that burden.

Americans should understand that the recovery of our allies, and the decline of an urgent Soviet threat, free us to do better something we do not do very well—that is,

looking after our own affairs and interests in a progressively more complicated world.

That is what Mr. X's next article should deal with.

JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations from 1981-85, is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

FRED C. IKLÉ

Mr. Pines accepts the obsolete view that the Soviet Union "needs" Eastern Europe as a security buffer. It might have been understandable for Moscow to have such a concern in the late 1940s and 1950s. Today, it makes no military sense. If Germany were ever reunited, and/or if Eastern Europe came under German influence, this could challenge the Soviet economy and exacerbate Soviet nationality problems. But in this age of intercontinental nuclear forces, to argue that such a new political map of Central Europe would pose a military threat to the Soviet Union is as farfetched as arguing that the reunification of Sweden and Norway would threaten a new invasion of the Ukraine by the king of Sweden. We must not let Russian militarists sell us this old chimera about German armies marching to Moscow.

Mr. Pines argues that the United States now needs to be more purposeful, more imaginative, and a bit more active about Eastern Europe. This is sound advice. Mr. Pines's suggestion for the "Austrianization" of Eastern Europe makes sense. Such an arrangement could ease Moscow's political problems during the transition in Eastern Europe (and soothe its alleged military anxieties).

Mr. Pines also correctly stresses that U.S. defense policy must be prepared for a possible brutal reversal in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. The economic malaise in Moscow's empire is no guarantee that a new Bolshevik-fascist group could not grab power and launch a fast arms race and new military expansion. Nazi Germany wasn't in great economic shape when it became the world's strongest military power within the span of six years. North Korea has always had a wretched economy and yet it remains the world's most totalitarian dictatorship with threatening military strength. Communism as an economic philosophy and worldwide ideology is dying, a century and a half after that bearded German scribbler wrote its manifesto. But modern totalitarianism, invented by Lenin, perfected by Stalin, Hitler, Kim Il Sung, Mao, Castro & Co., is far from dead. As Mr. Pines argues, we need a "muscular" policy to deal with both Moscow's defeat in the Cold War and the new dangers that may replace the old.

Now, my complaint about the way this article has been dressed up: The title is preposterous. George Kennan wrote a fine piece in 1947, but why gild the halo once more in the hagiography of his article? We all know that major U.S. government policies are never created by a piece of writing—not by an internal memo, much less by a journal article. Major policies are shaped by a convergence of presidential speeches, proposals and demands from allied leaders, congressional hearings and

consultations, the opinionated facts and factual opinions of the media, and the endless flow of telegrams, meetings, and memos within the bureaucracy. Even the lead concept of a policy cannot be implanted into the government—forgive me, editors of *Policy Review*—by a learned article.

The need to stop, or to "contain," the expansion of Stalin's evil empire was recognized well before 1947. For example, one of Kennan's predecessors as U.S. ambassador in Moscow, Averell Harriman, foresaw this need. The most influential and eloquent proponent was, of course, Winston Churchill. Immensely helpful for a common Western effort was British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin (yes, a Laborite!). Others in this hall of fame include the American labor leader George Meany. The policy for stopping the Evil Empire clearly had ecumenical roots. The protracted, arduous struggle could not have been won without a grand coalition.

No one understood this better than a former governor of California who recreated this coalition after it had fallen apart because of Vietnam.

FRED C. IKLÉ was Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 1981-1987. He is currently affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

PAUL M. WEYRICH

Mr. Pines is half right on the question of providing Moscow economic benefits and security guarantees in exchange for a Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe. It is perfectly fine to offer Moscow security guarantees in exchange for such a withdrawal; it is, however, *not* all right to offer Moscow Western credits, aid, and other "appropriate help."

The effect of such Western aid to the Gorbachev regime would be totally counterproductive. It is precisely the economic catastrophe in which the Soviet Union now finds itself that is fueling the engine of reform. Any measure that relieves the economic crisis—even only a little—impedes further reform. Western credits to Moscow would allow Gorbachev to restructure his economy without having to make the tough choices we've waited so long for him to have to make—especially, the decision to shift resources from the military to the civilian sector.

Added to the savings realized by Moscow as a result of its military withdrawal from Eastern Europe—a savings estimated by some Western analysts to be worth upwards of \$10 billion annually—would give Gorbachev the ability to consolidate his hold on the remaining, *internal* part of the Soviet empire. The Soviet Union, unlike most previous empires in world history, not only *has* a colonial empire, it *is* a colonial empire, composed of dozens of smaller nations, which, if given the chance, would choose to be free and sovereign, and no longer would tolerate rule by Moscow.

Thus, an exchange of Western credits and aid for a Soviet military withdrawal from Eastern Europe would provide Moscow with a double boon: both the savings resulting from its military withdrawal, and the Western credits offered in exchange for it. Why should we offer

Moscow incentives to do something that is in its own interests to do anyway?

As to whether the West must forge a new, aggressive, coordinated strategy, to prevent Bonn and other NATO capitals from cutting separate deals, again I believe Mr. Pines to be half-right. Clearly, we do need a new, more

Our policy should be: no Most Favored Nation status, no credits, no loans, no technology, no deals, until and unless Moscow lets the whole empire go.

— Jack Wheeler

aggressive strategy, but not for the reasons he suggests. Sadly, the reaction of the West German people and government to Gorbachev's June visit indicates that, no matter what coordinated strategy might be devised in Washington, Bonn will cut its own deals with the Soviet Union. And as for Japan, it seems clear that the same situation exists: if Tokyo gets a deal from the Kremlin returning the Kuril islands, nothing Washington can do would stop the flow of Japanese credits to Moscow.

Rather, we need an aggressive strategy aimed not at merely pulling the external segments of the Soviet empire from the Soviet Union, but at pulling the internal segments apart from each other. Why should we tolerate any longer the status of the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania? If we mean what we have been saying for the last four decades, why do we continue to allow Moscow to rule there? The Baltics are now in ferment, with millions of citizens demanding the right to choose their own government, and to be allowed full independence from the Soviet Union. Why do we not support more fully the demands of the people of Soviet Georgia to secede from the USSR, as is their right under the Soviet constitution? Why did our State Department take almost three weeks to condemn (and then, only under the most extreme pressure) the use of toxic gas by special forces of the Soviet Ministry of the Interior against unarmed, peaceful demonstrators at a pro-independence rally in Tbilisi, the capital of Soviet Georgia? It seems ludicrous that the public calls of outrage over this act should be louder coming from certain segments of the new Soviet Congress of People's Deputies than from our own government. What kind of signal does that send to the world about our commitment to human rights and individual freedoms?

It has become increasingly clear that glasnost and perestroika are failures. The long-anticipated price reform, which Gorbachev originally scheduled for 1988, has already been postponed to the mid-1990s. Likewise, international convertibility of the ruble, necessary for increased Soviet international trade, will not come for at least another decade. The Soviet Union's economy will not last that long.

Neither, most likely, will Gorbachev. Unless, of course, we bail him out.

PAUL M. WEYRICH is president of the Free Congress Foundation in Washington, D.C.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR.

Mr. Pines has the perception to see the makings of a New "X" essay—a fundamental reformulation of western foreign policy—in the incomplete sketches outlined by Henry Kissinger early in the year to James Baker and others.

Essentially, the new policy would say to the Soviet Union: Look, the Big Dream—the ideological conquest of the world—is about as realistic, given the developments of the last 40 years, as Ponce de Leon's search for the fountain of eternal youth. It isn't going to happen.

The economic malaise in Moscow's empire is no guarantee that a new Bolshevik-fascist group could not grab power and launch a fast arms race and new military expansion.

-Fred C. Iklé

Not only is it not going to happen, other things aren't going to happen, namely a permanent, miscegenetic annexation of Eastern Europe by you. So let's make a deal.

Mr. Pines reminds us that the Austrian treaty, which has served us so well, absolutely guarantees the demilitarization of Austria, giving the signatory powers the rights, even, "to add to this Article prohibitions of any weapons which may be evolved as a result of scientific development." Write language of that kind into fresh constitutions for Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and you capitalize on the mounting psychological, economic, and cultural burden of loose canons in the Soviet ship of state. As Mr. Pines rightly says: "If Gorbachev views Eastern Europe as a mounting burden, then he will consider a graceful, honorable way of relinquishing it if he receives something in return."

Mr. Pines is correct that Kissinger's vision is central

to the dire need of a fresh doctrine by which we assess the irradiations of our dozens of conferences, our military negotiations, our ambition to bring constitutional order to East Europe and, eventually, to the Soviet Union itself.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR. is editor-in-chief of National Review. This is excerpted from his column distributed nationally by Universal Press Syndicate.

ANGELO CODEVILLA

Mr. Pines's outline of a new approach to the Soviet Union and to Europe is based on assumptions both mistaken and self-contradictory. The prescriptions in Mr. Pines's article would likely bolster Soviet control of Eastern Europe, continue to foster West Germany's eastward slide, and perhaps even influence internal Soviet events in the Communist Party's favor.

Mr. Pines's first assumption, that such diminution of the Soviet threat as there may have been is the result of pressure from Ronald Reagan's foreign and defense policies, is omphaloskeptic. In almost every category, from counterforce missile warheads to combat aircraft, the military gap between the Soviet Union and the United States is greater after Reagan than before. It is ridiculous to ascribe military significance to America's SDI program when only the Soviet Union is actually turning out anti-missile equipment.

As for foreign policy, what lesson does Mr. Pines really think Reagan taught the Soviet Union in Nicaragua? In Angola, why is the Soviet puppet government ebullient about the U.S.-brokered deal while Jonas Savimbi frowns and retrenches? Perhaps Mr. Pines will explain to the mujahideen, as they sit before the well-supplied fortress valleys of Afghanistan, without the means of breaking in and with their own foreign support eroding, that Reagan and Gorbachev really engineered a famous victory for them.

The turmoil in the Soviet Union is due not to our pressure but to internal causes. But Mr. Pines's assumptions about these causes—Gorbachev marshaling "resources for internal reform" in order to "march into the 20th century as a great power," all resulting from long-term "necessity"—are wholly gratuitous. There is no evidence of market reforms on the scale of Lenin's New Economic Policy, much less a commitment to a new regime—only of a massive struggle for power, in which the protagonists are bidding for the support of the people. This bid has produced a truly amazing loosening of control on speech, and has ensured that so long as the struggle goes on, there will be no new overt acts of aggression such as another invasion of Poland. Yet the struggle may end at any time, if only because the lower level of fear among the population is shaking the Soviet regime to its roots.

Mr. Pines's assumptions that the Soviet rulers view Eastern Europe as an economic and political liability to be shucked if at all possible and useful only as a buffer against German troops, *and* that there is "at least an even chance" they would intervene forcibly in an Eastern

Europe that is moving away from the Soviet orbit, obviously cannot stand simultaneously. Nor does it make sense to say, as Pines does, that Gorbachev will "sell" Eastern Europe into freedom in exchange for Western economic aid that he would get anyway.

Finally, Mr. Pines wrongly assumes that unless Washington makes a deal with Moscow to safeguard all of Europe from a resurgent Germany, the French, British, et al. will make their own deal with Moscow. The Soviet Union is looking for a special relationship with West Germany only. It is willing to alienate Britain and France to get it. For their part, the French (and to a lesser extent the British) are futilely doing all they can to keep Germany as anti-Soviet as possible. The only fear of Germany in Paris, London, and Rome is that it will lend itself to Soviet designs, not that it will itself reassert latent military ambitions.

What then of the policy recommendations that follow from Mr. Pines's assumptions? The Soviet Union, we may be sure, will gladly accept any and all economic assistance we may give it for whatever reason. The Soviets might even withdraw most of their troops from the regionkeeping perhaps 100,000 and urging that the United States keep a similar number in Germany for the sake of "stability." But such an arrangement would not "Austrianize" Eastern Europe. On the Soviet leaders' scale of importance Eastern Europe is not Austria. Moreover, the correlation of forces today is not what it was in 1955. After "the deal" it would tip even further to the East. What then would prevent the Soviet Union from warning the Poles that, however they might amuse themselves in parliamentary elections, any attempt to unseat Jaruzelski would be too destabilizing to tolerate?

The most immediate effect of the "Kissinger deal" that Mr. Pines endorses would be in West Germany. For better or worse, democracies can go in only one direction at a time. Over the past generation, a succession of deals and negotiations under the impulse of George Ball, Paul

To even talk of the "Kissinger deal" is to damage the means for any kind of containment should it fail.

—Angelo Codevilla

Nitze, Henry Kissinger, and Ronald Reagan have undercut anti-Soviet German politicians, turned the Adenauer era on its head, and made German politics into a contest to see who can be friendliest to the Soviet Union. The Kissinger-Pines deal would be instantly interpreted by Germany's now largely anti-American political class as anti-German. It would thus remove the last shred of credibility from those Germans who oppose the fullest possible cooperation with the Soviet Union.

Reinvigorated, muscular containment? Were we to try to make "the deal," the need for such a policy would probably manifest itself quickly. But to even talk of "the deal" is to damage the means for any kind of containment. American politicians, rather than acknowledge that their bet might be going sour, would likely try to call events "victories" as long as possible, making it harder and harder for public opinion to face what needed to be done. Mr. Pines's assertion that we must keep up our armed forces while making "the deal" is as feasible as Kissinger's pleas in the 1970s that his arms control agreements be accompanied by new armaments. The U.S. has never built all the weapons allowed to it under arms control agreements.

Democracies cannot be expected to arm while disarming, or to disarm while arming, or to mistrust while trusting. Alas, the Soviet leaders seem to know this better than does the American establishment.

ANGELO CODEVILLA is a senior research fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

JACK WHEELER

The main debate in the West for the last 40 years has been how best to *contain* the Soviet empire, how to get along with it, how to avoid war with it while also avoiding capitulating to it. Mr. Pines's article may prove to be a substantial contribution to Western security interests by helping to shift the entire discussion to a new focus, a new debate on how best to *dismantle* the Soviet Empire.

We must remain, however, clearly focused on the final goal, which is the dismantlement of the *entire* empire. This means the liberation of Moscow's colonies not only in the Third World and in Eastern Europe, but those within the Soviet Union itself: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Turkestan, and Russia. Liberating the Kremlin's colonies of Eastern Europe is only an intermediate, not a final goal. Eastern Europe must not be purchased at the price of short-circuiting the liberation process for the Soviet Union itself.

The last thing in the world we should do, therefore, is provide money and assistance to the Soviet government. It is the lack of money and technology that has brought the Soviet empire to the brink of collapse. Now is no time to delay the process of dissolution. This is precisely what the Kissinger plan would do: give the Kremlin the money it needs for its dictatorship in the USSR to survive.

It is condescending to argue that we Americans are somehow smarter than the Europeans, that our money can buy concessions the Europeans can't. In fact, the rate of Western European investment in the Soviet bloc is down drastically from the 1970s. European bankers are not going to give Gorbachev \$100 billion just because they like him.

Mr. Pines also overstates "The German Question." The KGB is doing its best to whip up anti-German hysteria, and it is in our interests to reject it. The specter of another rise of German militarism threatening Europe and Russia again is a chimera and the Kremlin knows it. The Germans are facing a monumental demographic

No matter what coordinated strategy might be devised in Washington, Bonn will cut its own deals with the Soviet Union.

-Paul M. Weyrich

catastrophe. The West German fertility rate is now at 1.7, far below replacement level, and East Germany's is lower still. At present rates, by the year 2030 the West German population will have dropped from 62 million to 37 million, a drop of 40 percent. The male cohort of army age for the year 2000 (already born in the early '80s) is now 200,000 men short for the West German army. German military domination of a post-Soviet Europe is simply not in the demographic cards.

"Austrianizing" Eastern Europe is an intriguing suggestion, but in its present form it is counterproductive and too limited in scope. We should, rather, cease negotiating with the occupants of the Kremlin as Soviets, and start to negotiate with them as Russians—or as the employees of Russians (such as Shevardnadze). Kissinger's plan should be applied not to the Soviet Union relinquishing colonial control over Eastern Europe, but to Russia relinquishing colonial control over the entire empire, from Cuba to Ukraine, and liberating itself in the process by becoming a genuine democracy.

In sum, our strategic vision should be: Peace through the decolonization of the Soviet Empire. America and the West should offer a helping hand to Russia, not the Soviet Union; welcome a democratic Russia, not the Soviet Union, into "the community of Western nations." Our policy should be: no Most Favored Nation status, no credits, no loans, no technology, no deals, until and unless Moscow lets the entire empire go.

JACK WHEELER is director of the Freedom Research Foundation in Washington, D.C.

ALAIN BESANÇON

Mr. Pines's excellent article requires two qualifications. First, Mr. Pines considers the USSR a unified nation. It is not. Should a crisis occur in Eastern Europe, the same crisis will follow in the Soviet Union itself. This is one of the reasons Gorbachev will not easily accept the emancipation of Eastern Europe. Freedom in Eastern Europe will coincide with the liberation of the non-

Russian republics, which is in turn the necessary condition of the "decommunization" of the country. As long as the Soviet Union remains intact as a political entity, it will be Communist.

Second, Mr. Pines overestimates Soviet concerns and fears about its "security." Gorbachev knows the Soviet Union does not risk aggression from the West; indeed, he said as much to a private intelligentsia meeting two years ago. But he plays with this idea on the diplomatic theater, in order to make believe that there is a sort of symmetry between "us" and "them." The best thing would be to abstain from joining this game.

ALAIN BESANÇON is a professor at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes in Paris, and the regular political essayist of the French weekly L'Express.

BURTON YALE PINES RESPONDS

My article calls for an "essential foreign policy debate" on what America and the West can do to ensure that they and the peoples of the Soviet Empire are winners in the post-Containment world. The preceding learned and provocative letters and Bill Buckley's newspaper column from which his comments above have been excerpted contribute significantly to this debate.

I agree with Jeane Kirkpatrick that we must "look after our own affairs and interests in a progressively more complicated world." But how can we do this if we are as weak and as unable to influence our allies and shape events as she says we are? Maybe we are much stronger than she thinks. Surely she is not as resigned as she sounds to America playing a passive international role. If so, this would trouble me greatly because it is Mrs. Kirkpatrick who taught me the power of ideas—and what my article says, above all, is that we need a powerful new idea of how to deal with the post-containment world.

She is right, of course, that we can't call the shots of our allies; but surely we are not without influence—considerable influence. After all, the original X article was written not (despite what she says) when America was powerful, but in 1947 when we were at the nadir of our military might. We had demobilized; Stalin had not. And yet we drew a line and declared that his tanks dare not cross it. It would have been easy then to write that we could not prevent the Soviets from taking all Berlin, from taking Austria, from rolling into and imposing their own solution on Germany. The smart money in 1947 would have bet on France and Italy going Communist and Germany becoming neutralist, at best. It could have been said then, as Mrs. Kirkpatrick says now, that it is "idle to try" to prevent major geopolitical changes. Yet we did try and we did influence them enormously because, despite our puny military muscle, we knew what we wanted to do.

Surely it is in our interests to try now. My article suggests that we start by crafting a new strategy to make irreversible the Kremlin's concessions in Eastern Europe and inside the Soviet Union and that, as one way of doing this, we try to engage Moscow in the process.

Paul Weyrich may be correct that my suggested credits, aid, and other appropriate help to Moscow could be counterproductive and impede further reform. This is a matter requiring extensive discussion and analysis. Our aim, after all, absolutely is not to bail out Gorbachev; nothing in my article says or hints at this. The aim, as the article repeatedly states, is to roll back the Soviet Empire.

Little Faith

What is distressing, however, is that Mr. Weyrich seems to have so little faith in the subversive powers of free enterprise. Surely it must be possible to give the Soviet Union economic help tied to conditions that will create pockets of free enterprise within the command economy. As the past decade in mainland China demonstrates, these pockets become a virus carrying the infection of democracy and reform. Will it be easy to devise and monitor such targeted forms of economic aid? Of course not. But this should not rule it out automatically. Nor should it be ruled out, as an uncharacteristically defeatist Mr. Weyrich does, that America can influence Bonn and Tokyo. We can—with the right vision and policies and strategies and tactics.

Jack Wheeler serves the debate very well by planting a marker at the extreme end of the spectrum of reasonable options. No deals, he declares, and no credits and no technology unless Moscow surrenders its entire empire. And, he adds, we must not treat with the Soviet Union but only with Russia. I'd be ready to say that maybe he's right if I knew more about what he means. What does it mean, for example, to deal with Russia and not

the Soviet Union? And do we bar all loans to Moscow until all the empire is surrendered or do we consider some loans as some parts of the empire (like Poland or Estonia) wriggle away? Some months ago Mr. Wheeler wrote calling for a "Soviet Commonwealth along the lines of the British Commonwealth." Is this how surrender is to be defined? He has said that this could take a decade. What should U.S. policy be during this process? The answers to these questions are what we have to figure out. Too, we have to recognize what Mr. Wheeler apparently dismisses: even if America does not act, other Western nations and Japan will, and while America can influence their actions it only can be by leading, not remaining passive.

I am flattered by the kind words about the article by Bill Buckley, Alain Besançon, and others who have written. I welcome Fred Iklé's echoing the article's point that we must remain militarily muscular and must be prepared for dealing with new dangers that will replace the old. Mr. Iklé, too, stresses that the Austrianization of Eastern Europe could ease Moscow's political problems during a transition period. For this reason, I have argued, the Austrian model merits consideration. Lastly, I appreciate—and fully agree with—Mr. Iklé's recognition of Ronald Reagan's key role in creating some of the conditions that have pushed the Soviet Empire into the crisis whose outcome will change the world. That the world is changing is now beyond question. Whether this will be good for America depends, to a great extent, on what America does. And this depends on whether we devise a new vision of where we want to go and a strategy

to take us there.

LETTERS

Paul H. Blackman, Lynn Montgomery, Rod Smith, Thomas J. Aveni Jr., Donald Baldwin, Larry Pratt, J. Randolph Mainfort, Dean C. Spraggins, Michael S. Dukakis, Sandra S. Gardebring, Dennis D. Boyd, Gaston Caperton, Keith Schafer, Robert W. Glover, Charles Royer, David I. Mayerhoff, Paul S. Appelbaum, Martin R. Baron, Charles G. Ray, Antonia Hernandez, Rafael Valdivieso, Julie Quiroz, Ramon E. Daubon, Angelo Falcon, Dale Gieringer

The NRA Fires Back

Dear Sir:

Patrick McGuigan's article ("Loose Cannons: Self-Inflicted Wounds at the National Rifle Association," Summer 1989) is rife with erroneous and misleading statements. The NRA is not a conservative but exclusively a pro-gun owner organization and, therefore, cannot take positions on issues unrelated to firearms and hunting. As a result of the article, the NRA has been placed in the awkward position of being attacked by anti-gunners for allegedly being "right-wing kooks" and of being attacked by Mr. McGuigan for failing to be "right-wing kooks." So be it.

The NRA did not "initially resist...legislation banning armorpiercing bullets." The NRA, along with the U.S. Departments of Justice and Treasury, as well as the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Safari Club International, opposed legislation that did not focus on armor-piercing bullets, but instead banned common hunting ammunition. For that reason, the legislation was not of "minor concern for hunters and sportsmen." I might add that after passage of a bill actually focusing on armor-piercing ammunition-which the NRA authored-Representative Biaggi (the original bill's sponsor) stated that "our final legislation product was not some watered-down version of what we set out to do. In the end, there was no compromise on the part of police safety."

While it is true we supported "liberal Democrat Willard Murray in his race against conservative Republican state assemblyman Paul Zeltner," it is not accurate that "Zeltner was a strong opponent of gun control." Zeltner was in fact a supporter of more restrictive gun laws and made it a key issue in the campaign; Murray, on the other hand, is an NRA life member and campaigned against gun control. We have not been disappointed. Murray's voting record, during very trying times in the California legislature, has been solidly pro-gun without any prompting from the NRA.

It was not our support of a liberal Democrat, however, that first incited Mr. McGuigan to lambaste the NRA. It was another matter raised in his article: the NRA's refusal to endorse the confirmation of Robert H. Bork to the Supreme Court. Mr. Mc-Guigan says this refusal was despite his finding that Bork had once decided a case our way, because he couldn't find proof that Bork was more than 80 percent pro-gun, and for fear that Bork's opposition to the exclusionary rule would hurt gun owners. We did, indeed, sit out that battle. The NRA has rarely been involved in judicial confirmation battles and then only when there was a clearcut position on "gun control" by the nominee. Bork had no such position. At the time, aside from Mr. McGuigan's personal assurance, there was no reason to believe Bork to be pro-gun owner. McGuigan's article suggests he was pro-gun, but

without "evidence of an overly broad reading of the Second Amendment."

Mr. McGuigan is mistaken. On March 15, 1989, the Los Angeles Times reported that Judge Bork said the Second Amendment's "intent was to guarantee the right of states to form militias, not for individuals to bear arms," and that all gun control was "probably constitutional."

The NRA rests its case.

Paul H. Blackman Research Coordinator National Rifle Association Institute for Legislative Action Washington, DC

America's Culture of Violence

Dear Sir:

I disagree with many of Mr. McGuigan's basic assumptions, such as where the debate really belongs.

We are just beginning to focus on the real problem—America's fascination with the culture of violence created by the fanaticism of the gun advocates. The emphasis does not belong on apprehension and punishment. It belongs on making our society safe for *everyone* by curtailing the insane proliferation of a large number of weapons in the hands of untrained, untested individuals. What good does it do the victims to focus on apprehending and punishing those who misuse firearms?

It is not just the "criminal element" that we have to protect against. As we have seen time and time again, even the most normalseeming citizen will pick up a gun and blow away a loved one or perfect stranger in a fit of anger simply because a gun was readily available.

Isn't it time we reexamined the costs to our society of this lenient attitude toward gun ownership? I, for one, believe it's long overdue.

Lynn Montgomery
Principal Assistant to the
Assembly Speaker Pro Tempore
California State Assembly
Sacramento, CA

Whose "Natural Allies"?

Dear Sir:

Mr. McGuigan is right to assert that some police officers oppose the NRA, but I see little evidence that rank-and-file policemen have deserted the fold. In fact, during the recent hearings in Washington, D.C., concerning the banning of assault rifles, 225 police officers from 49 states visited their congressmen and senators to point out that such legislation was misdirected and useless. Is the citation of Dewey Stokes, president of the Fraternal Order of Police, enough to make a sweeping conclusion that the NRA has abandoned its "natural allies"?

And now we come to the Bork nomination. Something tells me there is more than meets the eye here. It sounds to me as if the White House did not want public support of the candidate by the NRA. Why else a "plea not to come out early"? Surely this phrase has no other meaning than "we don't want your organization to help." Is Mr. McGuigan's complaint with the White House or the NRA? Would Judge Bork have fared any better with Kennedy, Metzenbaum, and others with the support of the NRA? **Rod Smith**

Niceville, FL

Dear Sir:

As Mr. McGuigan seems to have swallowed the groundless liberal diatribe about the National Rifle Association alienating police, the perspectives of a life-long conservative and 10-year police veteran may provide him with a new insight.

As founder of Law Enforcement for the Preservation of the Second

Amendment (LEPSA), I can attest to the fact that Dewey Stokes is receiving an enormous amount of hate mail concerning his unholy alliance with Howard Metzenbaum, and his support of unreasonable and unconstitutional legislation. Mr. Stokes' home state of Ohio has seen police in absolute rebellion against his misrepresentations concerning police firearms legislation, so much so that his own political survival appears in doubt.

Let's now address the issue of whether the NRA should be a "rubber stamp" for conservative causes, as Mr. McGuigan asserts. For those unfamiliar with the NRA's history, it was founded in 1871 for promotion of civilian marksmanship, not as a lobbying entity. It only assumed this responsibility because of the magnitude of misdirected congressional efforts toward controlling criminal misuse of firearms through subjugation of legitimate firearms ownership. This does not mean that the NRA is guilty of the "single issue

Beyond having a fierce, possessive love for their weapons and a cussedly independent streak, gun owners represent no unified ideological grouping conservatives can reach. Lots of owners care not a fig for the pro-life movement, nor for the defeated Bork nomination.

—Dean C. Spraggins

myopia" that Mr. McGuigan complains of. The NRA has been pushing for criminal justice reform for years (*i.e.*, mandatory sentencing for crimes committed with firearms, reduced reliance on plea bargaining, and early parole for violent criminals).

Foolish Compromises

Mr. McGuigan admonishes the NRA for not supporting a national firearms-purchase "waiting period" after he himself admits that such a scheme wouldn't work. Aside from the ineffectiveness of waiting periods, and aside from the fact that they present another burden for lawabiding citizens, let us not forget the most serious reason for steadfastness on this issue: the Left, when given

an inch, will take a mile. Just a year ago, leftists insisted that they wanted only to ban "small, cheap, and concealable handguns." Remember that lie? Now they boldly push for abolition of expensive, non-concealable semi-automatic rifles! In furthering this effort, they have exploited our foolish compromise of 21 years ago (the 1968 Gun Control Act) to prohibit importation of firearms that have seldom been used in the commission of crime.

Thomas J. Aveni Jr.
LEPSA Founder/
New Jersey Representative
Waterford, NJ

McGuigan's Hard Truths

Dear Sir:

Mr. McGuigan's article was hard hitting, no doubt. But much of it had to be said.

I am a life member of the NRA and more than generally supportive of its positions. On the other hand, I represent a large segment of the law enforcement community and deal with them on a daily basis.

The NRA needs to be more flexible about owning and using firearms. I would not, for a minute, restrict gun ownership by law-abiding citizens. NRA members are sportsmen, almost exclusively. But a few criminal gun owners are not sportsmen and do use their weapons to kill innocent people.

Law enforcement officers, en masse, testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee in favor of the nomination of Judge Bork because they felt Bork's strong support of the Constitution was in the best interest of law enforcement. Many officers were mystified by the NRA's refusal to support Judge Bork, just as many are mystified today because the NRA takes such an unyielding stand against efforts to bring the gunusing criminal under a strict law; at least a law requiring a waiting period for the law enforcement officer to check to see if a person wishing to buy a handgun has a criminal

Mr. McGuigan should be commended for speaking out.

Donald Baldwin Washington, DC

Blood on Stokes' Hands

Dear Sir:

Contrary to Patrick McGuigan's analysis, Dewey Stokes' views no more represent the opinions of the average cop on the beat than the views of the AFL-CIO hierarchy match those of American workers.

Mr. McGuigan's analysis of the dynamics of Second Amendment politics is truly Exhibit A as to why gun owners' rights groups have had trouble working with the conservative coalition. While other groups are encouraged to fight tooth and claw for their beliefs, gun owners are supposed to keep playing team ball, even when our "team" is trying to ram the ball across our own goal line.

Second Amendment issues seem to embarrass conservatives even though gun owners are a tremendous voting bloc. One out of every two households contains at least one firearm. Not all of those households base their votes on a candidate's position on firearms, but many do.

The Bush campaign clearly understood this. Its candidate talked about the evils of gun control in July and August. The Bush administration, however, has governed as if President Bush had campaigned upon the platform of Michael Dukakis. Thanks to President Bush, there is a better chance of new gun controls passing now than there has been in a decade.

If gun owners are remembered by other conservatives only when their support and votes are wanted on non-gun issues, conservatives shouldn't be surprised when help from gun owners is not always forthcoming.

Let there be no mistake: Constitutional rights are precisely what the firearms debate is about. The Bill of Rights was added to our Constitution 200 years ago because the Founding Fathers did not wish to trust their liberties to an all-powerful government. That is why the states insisted upon the addition of those protections of individual liberty.

Even if we ignore the essential question of what is to be the relationship of the individual to the state, there remains a basic flaw in Mr. McGuigan's proposals of appease-

ment through accommodation. Accommodation should at least achieve a more workable policy. The "waiting period" issue Mr. McGuigan thinks pro-Second Amendment groups should concede on is a good example of the problem.

Most felons don't buy firearms from retail stores; 93 percent of predatory criminals do not, according to a Justice Department study. Yet waiting periods are touted as the solution to crime.

And waiting periods are an open invitation to abuse. The actual waiting period, as opposed to the one on the statute books, is often a good bit longer. Abuses of this sort are a natural consequence of giving the police the power not only to screen out criminals but to decide who is worthy to own a firearm.

Gun control is not only unconstitutional, it doesn't work. In New York City, it has been illegal to own a handgun without a police permit since 1911. Do honest people feel safe there? Is it safe for a woman to jog there alone at night?

The blood of those people who died because they lacked the means to defend themselves is on Dewey Stokes' hands, and on the hands of those who would join him in disarming the American people.

Executive Director Gun Owners of America Springfield, VA

The Heart and the Left Ventricle

Dear Sir:

The Bill of Rights is the heart of the Constitution, and the Second Amendment is the left ventricle. The wording is clear: "...the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed." The mind-set of the Founding Fathers is also clear. George Washington stated: "Firearms stand next in importance to the Constitution itself. They are the American people's liberty teeth and keystone under independence... they deserve a place of honor with all that's good." And, Patrick Henry said: "The great object is that every man be armed."

Gun control is not a police issue.

It is a police state issue. The NRA fights so hard in politics in order to avoid fighting gestapo midnight raids. A wise government will respect the rights of millions of armed people—as the Constitution intends.

Mr. McGuigan was much closer to home with ways to keep guns out of the wrong hands. The conservative way is to institutionalize serious violent offenders (not peaceable gun owners) until they are feeble.

J. Randolph Mainfort, M.D. Farmville, VA

No Easy Pigeonhole

Dear Sir:

Mr. McGuigan seems frustrated that the NRA won't cooperate more fully with the conservative organizations he sees as its natural allies. He might have profited from deeper analysis before he put his annoyances on paper.

Conservatives are sure to be surprised and may be dismayed if they try to muster gun owner support for issues outside the Second Amendment. Beyond having a fierce, possessive love for their weapons and a cussedly independent streak, owners represent no unified ideological grouping conservatives can reach: the NRA cannot even drum up a membership greater than 2 to 3 million from a probable gun-owning population of over 100 million.

Though social and economic conservatives might constitute a plurality, a gun-owner survey would find quite a number of radical libertarians; white (or black) supremacy extremists and conspiracy theorists dot their landscape. Even a liberal or two stands out incongruously, loudly asserting the importance of armed self-defense in the early days of the civil-rights movement.

Lots of owners care not a fig for the pro-life movement, nor for the defeated Bork nomination. One owner I know is fond of quoting Thomas Jefferson: "A little revolution now and then is a good thing," and some obscure passage about "the people" having not only the right but the responsibility to overthrow "the government" if it becomes unresponsive and unrepresentative.

The NRA leadership now sees itself as a bulwark, defending the ideologically pure (those who don't recognize other issues) against incursions from the impure, both Left and Right. Even the mildest regulatory suggestions appear as underhanded attacks on the Second Amendment. No one who opposes the NRA leaders can be allowed any motives from good faith; thus they counter the armor-piercing bullet ban by calling it an attempt to ban all bullets. Lead-shot hunting regulations are condemned not as environmental regulations but as sneaky attempts to restrict gun use. Police leaders calling for sensible gun sales limitations are denounced as "political appointees," "lackeys for liberal gun-grabbers," and deliberately, contemptuously out of touch with their own rank and file.

Gundamentalist Paranoia

To "fundamentalist" gun owners, single-issue voting is not a short-sighted, ill-considered expedient exploited by pandering politicians; it is as basic as the air they breathe or the Bible some believe in.

Though Mr. McGuigan finds hope in the NRA's support for instant background checks, greater prison space, and less plea bargaining, I am less confident gun owners in general will follow with much enthusiasm. Most view even sensible gun laws as endemic political bad faith, thinly veiled attempts to hamstring and harm them and theirs. More than a few owners are now voicing disgust (not mere dissatisfaction) with President Bush over semiautomatic rifle import bans. Owners are certain gun control advocates want to foist totalitarianism on the public-no matter how innocent their motives or insubstantial the controls proposed. The gun-owning segment of the public is not really a community, and it will be slow to trust conservatives urging it to display greater political realism and maturity.

> Dean C. Spraggins Rapid City, SD

Patrick McGuigan responds:

Paul Blackman of the NRA thinks I'm too tough on the NRA, while

Lynn Montgomery of California Assemblyman Mike Roos' staff thinks I'm too easy. With regard to the NRA's decision to sit out the Bork confrontation, I found more than "one" (Blackman's assertion) decision in which Bork ruled in favor of gun owners. All of those cases were passed on to sources at the NRA, constituting quite a bit more than my "personal assurance" as to Bork's jurisprudence. I never asserted that Bork was personally "pro-gun" but that he would rule for the law, and not for his personal views one way or the other. As for Bork's recently expressed views on the constitutionality of gun-control measures, he has never said that "all" (Blackman's word) gun control is constitutional, but that the Second Amendment deals with militias, and that—for example—bans of some so-called assault weapons could withstand constitutional scrutiny. That may explain why the NRA itself has not brought aggressive challenges to the constitutionality of guncontrol provisions recently. The real scandal of the NRA leadership's 1987 decision to sit out the Bork battle was that it flowed from opposition to his criticisms of the judicially created exclusionary rule.

I appreciate Rod Smith's citation of the involvement of several hundred law enforcement officers who expressed support for gun owners recently, but point out that some 80 percent of the 5,000 in attendance at the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP) convention in Oklahoma City in early August supported Dewey Stokes' views on gun control. While conceding it is possible the White House pressured the NRA to stay out of the Bork battle in 1987, I note that this was never offered as a reason for NRA silence until last spring. I encourage Mr. Smith to read my forthcoming book, where he will discover much more attention devoted to the White House role in the Bork loss than to the NRA.

As for Dewey Stokes' "political survival" being in doubt, I point Thomas Aveni to the results of the recent FOP convention.

Larry Pratt's letter is particularly offensive to me. As he knows, I and many other conservatives have inter-

vened in countless instances on behalf of the interests of gun owners, at the request of Gun Owners of America, the NRA, and other progun organizations. I know of several instances of help from GOA and Bill Richardson on matters of generic judicial reform. However, other than its intervention in one judicial confirmation three years ago, I am not aware of any National Rifle Association involvement at the federal level in support of judicial reform efforts. The NRA, to its credit, did back Oregon Congressman Denny Smith's 1988 initiative toughening sentences for second-time felony offenders. As my article pointed out, there is increasing evidence of a broadened focus in behalf of anticrime measures at the NRA-a development I welcome. Mr. Pratt's conclusion is offensive not only to the rank-and-file law enforcement officers whom Dewey Stokes represents-even if he represents them

The NRA has been placed in the awkward position of being attacked by anti-gunners for allegedly being "right-wing kooks" and of being attacked by Patrick McGuigan for failing to be "right-wing kooks."

-Paul H. Blackman

imperfectly. The blood of those who have died without means of defense is on those who pulled the triggers—not on the leadership of law enforcement who have worked to apprehend and convict those who murder and otherwise prey upon the innocent.

There are many admonitions, however, in these letters that I will take to heart. I continue to harbor grave doubts about the efficacy of all the gun control proposals in place and contemplated. I suspect they not only will not work, but are unwise—even while conceding they would largely withstand constitutional challenges.

On one matter, I have no doubts, however: The NRA has conducted itself in recent years as if determined to alienate its natural allies. The result is that pro-gun organizations are standing almost alone in opposi-

tion to the latest spate of gun control proposals. Despite this, instead of seeking to broaden its reach, the NRA at times seems to be asking Americans to choose between the NRA and the men and women who enforce the law. If the NRA continues on that path, instead of pursuing the hopeful paths I pointed to in my article, I have no doubt what will happen. The NRA will lose—and so will all of us.

Dukakis on Torrey's Diagnosis

Dear Sir:

I found the historical analysis and recommendations for policy changes in E. Fuller Torrey's article, "Thirty Years of Shame: The Scandalous Neglect of the Homeless Mentally Ill" (Spring 1989), to be extremely insightful and to the point. Dr. Torrey has correctly articulated the neglect and abandonment of the deinstitutionalized mentally ill, which has contributed to the dehumanizing life on the streets to which many of our most vulnerable citizens are driven.

As you may know, Massachusetts is entering the fourth year of implementing a comprehensive plan to improve services for persons with major, long-term mental illness, with specific concern for the homeless mentally ill.

The Massachusetts legislature has appropriated \$349 million in capital construction funds and \$110 million in additional operating funds to implement this initiative.

Michael S. Dukakis

Governor

Commonwealth of Massachusetts Boston, MA

Dear Sir:

Dr. Torrey is right to say that the community mental health system was not ready for the number of people with mental illness discharged by our hospitals and that, over the years, it has focused more on the worried well than on serious and persistent illness. Perhaps the Reagan administration can be thanked for revealing the results of this direction when, through cutbacks in social services, it exposed mentally ill homeless people to the

cameras and eyes of the world.

However, placing the blame for homelessness so clearly on the shoulders of an inadequate mental health system or on alcohol or drug addiction ignores the complexity of the situation. Despite a natural desire to do so, we cannot look to a single cause for the dramatic increase in homeless people.

In Minnesota, as in some other states, the percentage of homeless people with serious and persistent mental illness is far less than Dr. Torrey's estimate of one-third. The largest reason for homelessness in our state is a lack of money and a place to live.

More good jobs and decent, affordable housing will go further in reducing homelessness in Minnesota than will more improvements in the mental health system.

But that doesn't mean we should ignore Dr. Torrey's advice. Of particular merit is his suggested division of responsibility between the federal and state governments. The federal government can and should be the primary research center on causes and treatment of mental illness. And the states are best suited for developing community systems that work. It is important to emphasize, however, that should the federal government shift total responsibility for care and treatment to the states, the level of spending for mental health must not be reduced in the process.

People who provide services to the homeless should be saluted for their efforts to hold together any semblance of street sanity. In their eyes, many mental health experts have abandoned their most difficult clients for a cleaner and better economic environment. As Dr. Torrey argues in his essay, mental health administrators could be encouraged, as part of their jobs, to give more direct patient care.

Sandra S. Gardebring
Commissioner
Minnesota Department of
Human Services
St. Paul, MN

Don't Forget Housing

Dear Sir:

I agree with Dr. Torrey that the first "mistake" that followed dein-

stitutionalization was that being out of an institution and on medication was not the complete answer; lacking were community support programs, such as social rehabilitation, job training, support groups, housing, and crisis response services. Kentucky has a Community Support Program working very diligently to provide the necessary community support services.

Another "mistake" identified by Dr. Torrey, the fact that persons with severe mental illness cannot be hospitalized or treated involuntarily because they have not demonstrated a danger to self or others, has become a critical, unresolved issue obvious in the courts, jails, community treatment centers, and lives of homeless persons with severe mental illness who rotate from shelters to jails.

More Research

The last issue mentioned by Dr. Torrey, a failure to conduct research on causes and treatment, is one with which we heartily concur. Research programs at the federal level need to be expanded. The overall research coordination should exist at one central point while grants to universities continue.

Amid all the factors contributing to successful community living for those with severe mental illness, the problem with the availability of moderate to low-income housing has become obvious to Community Mental Health Center support staff. We agree that people with severe mental illness are among the most poignant and helpless of the homeless population. Yet, we must not forget that state mental hospitals are for those experiencing acute psychotic episodes and are not homes for the helpless. A major part of the answer is affordable, decent, and stable housing in the community, housing with available-asneeded support services.

Dennis D. Boyd Commissioner

Kentucky Department for Mental Health and Mental Retardation Services

Frankfort, KY

Dear Sir:

The casual reader of Dr. Torrey's article may well be impressed with the simple formulas offered to

resolve major problems. I believe some important factors are missing.

People with less than \$400 a month income, such as those individuals with a long-term mental illness who receive Supplemental Security Income, cannot afford safe, sanitary housing. This is true whether the income comes directly to them or is channeled through the state in a formula grant of the type proposed by Dr. Torrey. The lack of affordable housing can, and does, contribute to stress in anyone's life. The effect of this stress can be debilitating to a person with a long-term mental illness.

Psychiatric hospitalization, whether in a state-operated hospital or at the community level, is expensive. Whether insurance benefits such as Medicaid are tied to individuals, as they are presently, or provided to states to administer for a group of people does not alter the fact that funds are insufficient to provide a whole range of services, not just hospitalization.

Requiring mental health professionals trained with federal or state funds to serve people with long-term mental illness is certainly worthy of consideration. However, training programs are in need of modification. To require public service without changes in curricula and attitudes would be akin to conscription. What has been learned from research and service demonstrations should be taught. Such change in West Virginia will be greatly enhanced by a recently passed higher education reform act making the Director of Health the Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs for our medical schools.

Gaston Caperton Governor State of West Virginia Charleston, WV

Dear Sir:

We strongly agree with Dr. Torrey's recommendation that mental health professionals devote more attention and energy to the seriously mentally ill rather than individuals with non-life-threatening mental health problems. In an era of limited resources, states will have to choose more carefully who should receive their services. Seriously mentally ill

persons should have priority based on their level of disability and the subsequent cost to the states if we don't begin to address their problems earlier in the disease process.

Keith Schafer
Director
Missouri Department of
Mental Health
Jefferson City, MO

Flawed Prescription

Dear Sir:

Dr. Torrey forcefully points out the failure of traditional mental health services to meet the needs of those mentally ill individuals who become homeless. Indictment of the whole mental health profession or the existing mental health service systems for this failure, however, does not generate the sort of analysis that produces viable solutions. Certainly Dr. Torrey's suggestion of requiring one hour per week of contributed mental health service from each licensed mental health professional is unlikely to help create a cohesive community support system for severely mentally ill individuals who become homeless during a recurrence of symptoms.

Dr. Torrey correctly identifies a

Dr. Torrey has correctly articulated the neglect and abandonment of the deinstitutionalized mentally ill.

—Michael S. Dukakis

need for a change in public policy regarding the use of public funds to provide training for people who will be working with the severely mentally ill. He suggests, however, that requiring a year of public service for each year of public funding made available to an individual for training would be a sufficient return to the public for the investment in training. Actually, the training needed for working with the severely mentally ill homeless is not the same kind of training as would prepare a mental health professional for private practice.

Long-term commitments to working with people who are experienc-

ing severe mental illness are required. Training should be provided for workers willing to make such extended service commitments.

A fundamental change in public policy should be considered to reduce the proportion of funding used to prepare professionals for careers in private practice with the "worried well." Instead, public funding for training should be redirected to prepare staff to work with consumers and families in community mental health centers linked with coordinated human service programs. The fact that most severely mentally ill people are not homeless strongly supports the current directions of public mental health programs when necessary legislative, funding, and training changes are undertaken.

> Robert W. Glover Deputy Health Commissioner Philadelphia Office of Mental Health and Retardation Philadelphia, PA

Dear Sir:

In Washington State and Seattle we are attempting to face up to the issues Dr. Torrey describes. Funding through the state's Mental Health Services Act is targeted to the most severely mentally ill populations. State higher education systems are improving their training programs for working with public clients and more dysfunctional clients. In Seattle, housing programs that are designed to house and assist mentally ill persons are being developed through funding from locally produced revenues such as the city's housing levy and the state's Housing Trust Fund, and through the Mc-Kinney Act.

These initiatives would not be possible without funding. The Washington state legislature recently demonstrated its intention to improve assistance to the mentally ill by increasing funding by \$63 million over the next two years. These funds are connected to reforms in the State Mental Health Act that will encourage greater local control and more effective cooperation between service providers, and provide additional incentives for professionals to serve the more dysfunctional population.

While Dr. Torrey does a good job defining the problem, his list of incentives for making the "homeless population decrease dramatically" is dependent on too many "what ifs." Without a clear mandate to improve service to a population such as the mentally ill, the problems Dr. Torrey outlines may just be exacerbated as some states and local governments choose to fund other priorities. Just block granting all federal funds will not ensure that local politicians and bureaucrats will make wise and thoughtful choices.

Federal funding assistance must remain strong to truly give local communities the tools to shelter and assist the mentally ill.

Charles Royer Mayor Seattle, WA

Shrinks and Snakepits

Dear Sir:

As a young investigative psychiatrist pursuing a career in the clinical research of the major mental disorders, I can echo some of the frustrations Dr. Torrey so aptly describes. Given the current state of affairs, one could forcefully argue it would have been more humane to maintain the old state hospital system rather than implement deinstitutionalization the way it is currently practiced.

Even a "snakepit" is better than no "pit" at all for those who are disorganized. Moreover, even in today's age of antipsychotic neuroleptics as well as lithium, there is a large minority of treatment-refractory psychotics whose numbers appear to be growing in this "revolving-door" age. Coupled with this is growing evidence to suggest that the same medications might not be as effective as originally believed. This is especially true in a subgroup of patients known for their "negative symptoms," marked by withdrawal, apathy, anhedonia, alogia, poor concentration, and other features of chronic brain disease. Therefore, the concept of once-a-month maintenance medication visits cannot be considered adequate treatment for a large group of the chronically ill, even when compliant with the pharmacotherapy regimen.

Rights at All Costs

Possibly most frustrating are the legal and bureaucratic entanglements that psychiatrists have to struggle with in dealing specifically with the seriously ill. In an effort to safeguard patients' rights "at all costs," the traditional therapeutic stance maintained by psychiatrists for so long has evolved into a quasiadversarial role with the patient and his family. I can't begin to recall how

Of particular merit is Dr. Torrey's suggested division of responsibility between the federal and state governments.

-Sandra S. Gardebring

many times I or my colleagues have been stationed in emergency rooms or locked inpatient units when seriously mentally ill patients had to be released because they didn't meet the criteria of dangerousness that would allow for care against their will. The threats of lawsuits for incarceration versus the threats of lawsuits for medical malpractice have reached ridiculous proportions in this area. Moreover, the incapacitated mentally ill who occupy the streets in our urban centers should not be allowed to do so, both for their benefit as well as society's.

> David I. Mayerhoff, M.D. Clinical Research Fellow Hillsdale Hospital Glen Oaks, NY

Cash, Not Coercion

Dear Sir:

Dr. Torrey is very right about the causes of the current problems of the homeless mentally ill, but very wrong about some of the solutions.

Deinstitutionalization has been the failure that Dr. Torrey describes because it was implemented with no consideration for how to care for the thousands of mentally ill persons turned out of state hospitals. This occurred, in part, because the movement to close down large institutions became a crusade that proceeded, and continues today, oblivious to the consequences for the severely mentally disordered. Having concluded that institutions were evil per se, the

proponents of deinstitutionalization were determined to shut them down at all costs. Nor is this just history. The continuing power of the ideology that motivates mass discharges of helpless patients is reflected in New York State's current plan to eliminate 1,300 state hospital beds this year, and 7,000 over the next 10 years, even as the streets and emergency wards of Manhattan are clogged with distressed, mentally ill people.

Dr. Torrey and I part company on some of his suggestions for correcting this problem. Although centralizing control of funding for care of the mentally ill is a good idea, Dr. Torrey makes two fundamental mistakes in proposing how such a program might be implemented nationwide: he overestimates the desirability of coercion and he underestimates the costs of the effort.

Dr. Torrey would address the manpower shortage in public sector programs by compelling mental health professionals to work one year for each year of "publicly subsidized training." The simple response to this proposal is to note that federal funds now play almost no role in supporting training in mental health disciplines; state funds play only a minor role. Thus, the hook Dr. Torrey is looking for is not there. Even if it were, however, the chances for success would be dubious. What would the effects be on choice of specialty if medical students were told that choosing psychiatry (already one of the lowest paid specialties) would mean four years of compulsory service, while their friends in internal medicine and surgery were establishing their practices and careers? I cannot think of a better way of deterring people from entering psychiatry, clinical psychology, and psychiatric social work.

The real answer to the manpower shortage is to make careers working with severely mentally ill patients as attractive as other kinds of mental health work. This means affiliating public sector programs with universities (as the successful Maryland system does), providing adequate levels of support services, and encouraging innovation in practice. All this, of course, costs money, which brings

us to the next problem with the Torrey plan.

Dr. Torrey wants to make correcting the deinstitutionalization mess painless. He would decrease federal funding to the states by 5 percent, transferring that amount to augment admittedly inadequate research efforts. The remainder, along with "existing state funds," would fund the reformed system of care he advocates. Unfortunately, the history of mental health services reform is littered with proposals to save money on the backs of the mentally ill; deinstitutionalization itself was sold to penny-pinching state legislatures on that basis. The sad fact, however, is that improving the current abysmal level of care is going to cost a good deal of additional money, whether federal or state.

Cut the Cant

Run-down hospitals will have to be renovated and, for the first time since the Civil War, adequately staffed. New outpatient clinics must be established to serve the tens of thousands of persons now going untreated. Aggressive outreach programs, which have been shown to be the only effective tool in keeping mentally ill people on medications and off the streets, must be created. Affordable housing for disabled persons who subsist on welfare payments is badly needed. And enthusiastic personnel, not conscripts, will only be attracted by improved working conditions and salaries.

If we are not willing to bear the cost, let's cut the cant and accept the inconvenience of stepping over prostrate street people on the way to and from the office. In psychiatry, as elsewhere, you get what you pay for.

Paul S. Appelbaum, M.D. Law and Psychiatry Program University of Massachusetts Medical Center Worcester, MA

Piecemeal Care

Dear Sir:

Dr. Torrey is right to say that mental health professionals should devote much more attention and energy to "the seriously ill" than they currently do. However, it is unrealistic to ask that more attention be paid to "the seriously ill...than the wor-

ried well." There are, unfortunately, severe problems in modern society related to family integrity, the wellbeing of children, crime, achievement of personal satisfaction, alcohol- and drug-abuse, and societal alienation, which need to be addressed. Many argue that we need to deal with the problems of the worried well and charge enough for those services to cover many of the costs of research and treatment of the seriously ill.

A Continuum of Care

The division of responsibilities proposed by Dr. Torrey between the federal government and state and city government is intriguing and certainly worth trying on an experimental basis. Some have argued that our present system of federal encouragement and project support has led local governments and service providers to focus narrowly on the projects themselves without looking at the whole problem. I am encouraged by a growing interest in a "continuum of care" for mentally ill people, which includes services to meet a wide range of patient needs (medical, social, occupational, housing) coupled with contact over a long period of time with care providers who have gained each patient's trust.

> Martin R. Baron Louisville Coalition for the Homeless Louisville, KY

Underfunded Follow-Up

Dear Sir:

Dr. Torrey is misleading in his assertion that community mental health centers were designed to serve only one particular diagnostic group. The Community Health Centers Act of 1963 established a community-based model comprised of accessibility of services, comprehensiveness of services and programs, and continuity of care. The act placed a heavy emphasis on prevention, education, and health consultation, as well as mandating five essential services. These services-inpatient care, outpatient care, partial hospitalization, emergency services, and community consultation and education—were later expanded by seven more mandated services under the Community Mental Health Centers Act of 1975. This expanded mission required community mental health centers to add services for children and the elderly, screening and follow-up care, transitional care, and alcohol- and drugabuse counseling.

We strongly agree with Dr. Torrey's recommendation that mental health professionals devote more attention and energy to the seriously mentally ill rather than individuals with non-life-threatening mental health problems.

-Keith Schafer

Furthermore, Dr. Torrey gives no credit to community mental health centers for their involvement in federally funded community support programs begun 10 years ago. These programs were specifically designed to provide follow-up treatment for people who were deinstitutionalized. These programs demonstrated that CMHCs know how to serve this population; they simply have not been given adequate resources to do it. This program has also pointed out that states need to reallocate resources so that they will follow the consumer of mental health services out of state and into community health programs. This has not been done, and approximately 70 percent of the states' mental health funds still remain within state institutions and do not follow the consumers of mental health services to community-based programs.

Standing in Line

Dr. Torrey's analysis of the homelessness problem among the mentally ill is inaccurate and simplistic. Community mental health providers are but a segment of the community support services continuum. The true plight of the homeless is a complex social and economic dilemma that includes inadequate national low income housing policies, severely fragmented services and provider responsibilities, and inflexible Medicaid and Medicare coverage policies. Dr. Torrey's frustration with the mental health care delivery

system must not be allowed to serve as an obstacle to the development of linkages among a variety of service providers, and advocacy, consumer, and family groups that are necessary to help the homeless population.

Dr. Torrey persistently avoids the issue that services are not cost-free—someone must pay for them. Today the mental health care system mirrors the strained national health care system. There are simply not enough resources to serve some 37 million people in this country who have no health care coverage of any kind.

Advocates such as Dr. Torrey should understand that people with serious mental illnesses stand in line with 37 million others for whatever scraps of services society makes available to those who do not pay.

Charles G. Ray
Executive Director
National Council of Community
Mental Health Centers
Rockville, MD

E. Fuller Torrey responds:

I appreciate the thoughtful comments of the respondents. Proposed solutions to the disaster of deinstitutionalization give rise to honest differences of opinion that need to be publicly debated more widely.

Ms. Gardebring, Mr. Boyd, and Governor Caperton all note that a paucity of low-income housing contributes to the problem of the homeless mentally ill. This is, of course, true, but mentally ill homeless individuals who are not being treated often cannot utilize housing because of their symptoms, even when it is available.

Governor Caperton, along with Mr. Glover and Mayor Royer all correctly note the need for states to use their training funds to train professionals who will treat the mentally ill. Indeed, we have enough mental health professionals; what we need are some mental illness professionals, and any state that so desires can attach a payback obligation for public service to their state-supported training programs. Who will be the first?

Dr. Appelbaum and Mr. Ray both argue that much more money needs to be spent on the public mental health system. But approximately

\$20 billion is already being spent annually, most of it for salaries of mental health professionals. Currently advertised openings for psychiatrists in state mental hospi-

I cannot think of a better way of deterring people from entering psychiatry, clinical psychology, and psychiatric social work than requiring four years of compulsory service.

—Paul S. Appelbaum

tals offer salaries of \$87,500 to \$107,000. At one of Mr. Ray's community mental health centers in Fort Wayne, Indiana (which received \$12.7 million in federal funds), the psychologist-director was offered a bonus of \$200,000 if he would stay for 10 years—on top of his \$87,000 salary, pension plan, and car. The majority of mental health professionals, whether in the public or private sector, are very comfortable indeed. "Mental health" is big business, as the executive director of the American Psychological Association (salary \$157,500) can attest. Virtually every mental health professional in the United States, it should be recalled, has had his training largely subsidized with federal (in the recent past) and state public funds.

Dr. Appelbaum says that "in psychiatry, as elsewhere, you get what you pay for." Unfortunately, this is not true. New York State is spending \$126 per capita on public mental health services, whereas Rhode Island is spending \$45 and Wisconsin \$28. Yet services for the seriously mentally ill are markedly better in Rhode Island and Wisconsin than in New York. The reasons for this include New York's bloated mental health bureaucracy, high rehospitalization rate, fragmented services, and failure to give priority to the seriously mentally ill.

This leads directly to Mr. Ray's point that "people with serious mental illness stand in line with 37 million others" for services. Similarly, Mr. Baron says the seriously mentally ill must compete with individuals whose problems have to do with "family integrity, the well-being of children, crime, and achievement of

personal satisfaction." There are undoubtedly many millions of individuals with personal problems in our society. The question is whether such individuals should have the same access to public mental health services as the 2 to 3 million individuals with serious mental illnesses such as schizophrenia and manic-depressive illness. Public psychiatric services, including community mental health centers, were and are funded by state legislatures and by Congress with the clear expectation that seriously mentally ill individuals will be given priority for these services. The fact that they have not been give such priorityand in many public systems have, in fact, been relegated to the back of the line—is the major reason we are getting such poor services for the \$20 billion being spent.

It should also be asked what evidence exists that shows mental health professionals can do anything to solve social and personal problems such as "family integrity" and "achievement of personal satisfaction." The divorce rate has risen linearly with the number of marriage counselors. And, is there any evidence of increased "personal satisfaction" in 1989, when we have over 150,000 practicing mental health professionals, than there was in 1946 when we had only 9,000 of them? Studies have shown that professionals can help the truly mentally ill; let us concentrate on that task as a first priority and lay aside our grandiose illusions of helping alleviate "societal alienation."

Public psychiatric services, like public medical services, must operate with a finite pot of money and must therefore select priorities. In many states (Oregon, for example) and counties (such as Ala-meda County in California) such a selection for medical services is being made. For example, prenatal care is assigned higher priority than plastic surgery, and the treatment of acute disease higher priority than organ transplantation. Assigning priorities for public psychiatric services is long overdue. The seriously mentally ill and their families have grown tired of waiting for services in lines in which everybody else seems to go to the front.

Subtle Discrimination

Dear Sir:

Linda Chavez inaccurately portrayed the Hispanic community in this country and offered the unfounded hypothesis that Hispanics would progress more quickly if their leaders did not advance the proposition that Hispanics are a "more or less permanently disadvantaged minority group" ("Tequila Sunrise: The Slow But Steady Progress of Hispanic Immigrants," Spring 1989).

Economic mobility most assuredly is intertwined with educational attainment, and proficiency in English is an important part of that process. However, the article distorts the relationship between poor Englishlanguage skills and low wages. The idea that an individual need only learn English for all doors to be open to him is unrealistic. Studies show that Hispanics with the same educational experience, language ability, and other characteristics will nonetheless be underemployed and unemployed in greater numbers than their native-born Anglo counterparts. Job discrimination continues to have a major effect on Hispanics and other minorities in their struggle to find jobs commensurate with their qualifications and experience. Our assertion is supported by Hispanics who regularly call our employment phone-line with job discrimination problems.

Americans would like to believe that the issue of race and color is no longer a problem in our society, but it is. Because discriminatory treatment against Hispanics is much more subtle than in the past, it is more difficult to rectify. But it must be corrected. While many gains have been made, Hispanics remain undereducated, underemployed, and are the most disenfranchised population in the country because of policies and inherent problems within our social institutions.

Beyond Victimization

Self-determination is the key to the future success of the Hispanic community. No minority group must ever feel so victimized by past discrimination that it loses control over its own destiny. Fortunately, Hispanic leaders and the Hispanic community have known and understood this for quite some time. To pursue our objectives any less aggressively now than we have in the past would be unwise and detrimental to the progress we have made thus far.

Antonia Hernandez

President and General Counsel Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund Los Angeles, CA

Addressing Children's Needs Today

Dear Sir:

While I agree with Linda Chavez's contention that we should not lump new Hispanic immigrants with native-born or long-resident Hispanics when assessing their social mobility and prosperity, I disagree with her thesis, since even native-born Hispanics are affected disproportionately by national trends toward declining earning power for high school dropouts.

Today's pre-school Hispanic child is more likely to have a dropout than a high school graduate for a mother. Most of these mothers are native born or long-term residents.

Young Hispanic adults are also separating and divorcing at a higher rate than comparable non-Hispanic whites. This increase in femaleheaded families is more typically seen among native-born and long-term Hispanic residents than among recent immigrants, and in 1987 more than half these families lived in poverty.

In any case, are we simply to ignore recent Hispanic immigrants? Given sufficient time, according to Ms. Chavez's reasoning, most of their problems will disappear. But time does not always solve problems. The effects of pervasive, sustained poverty—malnutrition, inadequate health care, overcrowding, bad schools—are not easily erased. Children cannot wait for a distant prosperity; their needs must be addressed today.

To say that today's undereducated immigrants will make it on their own—eventually—is to ignore the present economic circumstances of our society as well as to belittle the fortuitous combination of fac-

tors that contributed to the success of earlier immigrant communities. We now have virtually none of the settlement houses, ethnic parishes, local political machines, and other institutions that helped lift those immigrants out of poverty. And we have proportionately many fewer factory jobs that non-English-speaking immigrants could fill.

One parallel may exist between today's Hispanic immigrants and the European immigrants of the early 1900s. The labor of the earlier wave was needed; our northern states were undergoing an industrial transformation. A new set of labor shortages may provide leverage for today's immigrants to succeed. But, unlike those of the past, today's undereducated immigrants cannot succeed without education and English language fluency.

No Big Spending Needed

Hispanics pay taxes, too, but—contrary to the quotation attributed to me—I am not an advocate of big

Linda Chavez seems to believe that government aid will derail Hispanic progress, but applauds the successes of Cuban Americans who, unique among Hispanics, benefited from a federally-funded refugee assistance program.

-Julie Quiroz

government spending to solve all Hispanic problems. What is required is a combination of public and private resources to provide the comprehensive child development programs that Hispanic preschoolers need and the intensive job training, adult education, and English language training that their young parents need. Nor do I overlook the absolute necessity of help from the Hispanic community itself—from those who have made it.

Rafael Valdivieso

Vice President for Research Hispanic Policy Development Project Washington, DC

Dear Sir:

Ms. Chavez does not define what she means by the federal government's "policy toward Hispanics," but nonetheless concludes that it has been a "failure." Chavez seems to believe that any government involvement will "derail the progress that ordinary Hispanic men and women are making now on their own," but is willing to applaud the status of the Cuban American community, which, unique among Hispanics, was the recipient of a federally funded refugee assistance program.

Signs of progress among immigrants are paralleled by signs of difficulty. Ms. Chavez recognizes these difficulties but does not see them as cause for concern. For example, Ms. Chavez points to a study that found that immigrants who have been in the United States for 10 years and have nearly adept English reading skills earn wages of \$7.03 per hour: for a full-time, full-

year worker who heads a household,

the sum of such wages (about

Job discrimination continues to have a major effect on Hispanics and other minorities in their struggle to find jobs commensurate with their qualifications and experience.

-Antonia Hernandez

\$14,000) falls just above or at the poverty level—even lower for a worker who can't find full-time, full-year work. More importantly, Ms. Chavez ignores what observers such as Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole have so forcefully argued: much has changed since the immigrant waves of the early 20th century. The work force demands much different skills than it did 70 years ago—skills that even native-born workers are having a hard time keeping up with.

Recent research confirms that poverty among non-immigrant Hispanics is both real and serious. For example, Dr. Paul Ong of UCLA has shown that in Los Angeles, population growth and immigration do not account entirely for the city's large growth in Hispanic poverty. While both factors are important in contributing to poverty, significant growth in poverty among native-born Hispanics is also apparent.

No meaningful discussion of Puerto Ricans' low economic status can ignore the exceptionally severe economic conditions which Puerto Ricans continue to face. In her discussion of the so-called Puerto Rican exception, Ms. Chavez ignores the fact that Puerto Ricans have suffered some of the worst effects of Northeastern and Midwestern industry shut-downs and relocations. Chavez does not mention such facts, leaving the door open to the "ethnic prejudice" she claims to be avoiding.

Ms. Chavez's article fails to address the complexity of both poverty and immigration.

Julie Quiroz Senior Policy Analyst National Council of La Raza Washington, DC

Chavez's Misconceptions

Dear Sir:

Separating Hispanic populations into long-time residents and new arrivals, Ms. Chavez finds that Puerto Ricans have fared worst of all in terms of income progress over time. She attributes lack of advancement among Hispanics in general to low educational attainment and to lack of fluency in the English language. For Puerto Ricans she adds that low labor force participation is a contributing factor, and states flatly that "Welfare may indeed be the culprit." Ms. Chavez's arguments appeal in their simplicity but collapse under probing.

Puerto Ricans in 1960—recently arrived, with low educational levels and poor English skills—had higher mean incomes per capita than Mexican Americans. Yet the latter had a higher proportion of U.S.-born (vs. Mexican-born) residents than they do now. By 1984, with Puerto Ricans now largely long-term residents and English-dominant, and Mexican Americans more foreign-born and Spanish-dominant, the Mexicans fare better. So much for that

Ms. Chavez also identifies two Puerto Rican communities: "one made up of persons who have jobs and are doing well and another of those who are out of the labor force and are struggling economically." Since the latter is the one on welfare, she concludes, it must be welfare that's causing it. Ms. Chavez's logic is warped.

That our present welfare system is demeaning and promotes a dehumanizing dependence that inhibits escape from poverty, no one questions. Everyone hates welfare, most of all the people on it. To *blame* welfare as the culprit, however, is

simple-minded.

Puerto Ricans moved in large numbers to the continental U.S. during the postwar expansion. They settled where the economic activity was, in the Northeast and the Midwest. By 1960, "West Side Story" notwithstanding, they were doing as well as any other immigrant community had done at a comparable stage. Between 1960 and 1989, though, a profound change occurred in the U.S. economy. The Rustbelt withered, the Sunbelt shone, and the bloom came back to the Northeast and Midwest only after 20 years' lapse, and in industries for which few blue collar workers qualified. Puerto Ricans, as well as blacks and other minorities in those cities, were caught in a vise.

As their jobs disappeared from under them, Puerto Rican families, neighborhoods, and communities buckled under the stress. All those who could, the better off among them, left. They took with them their status as role models and their contributions to the stability of their communities. The least able to move got increasingly trapped. The cycle engulfed families, schools, and all the institutions of a dying community. As people lost hope in the search for work, labor force participation rates dropped. Bereft of the support of family and community, women with children came to rely increasingly on welfare; men unable to provide increasingly dropped out of the statistics. Meanwhile, competition for the remaining blue collar jobs increased with arrivals from political and economic crises in Latin America and Asia, eager new arrivals with solid community and family bonds.

Such is the origin of the "two" Puerto Rican communities. That someone uninitiated on these issues, Hispanic or not, would entertain simpler conceptions, is sad but understandable. That *Policy Review* would choose to print them is lamentable.

Ramon E. Daubon Vice President National Puerto Rican Coalition Washington, DC

Half Full or Half Empty?

Dear Sir:

In broad terms, one can find much to agree with in Ms. Chavez's arguments. However, to attribute Latinos' social problems solely to government intervention is to ignore problems created by the market. To argue, as Ms. Chavez does, that most Latinos are doing better economically than is generally recognized appears to downplay the serious social problems this population faces every day. While the glass may be half full, this does not change the fact that it is half empty as well. In the Latino case, it appears, in fact, to be more than half empty.

Angelo Falcon
President
Institute for Puerto Rican Policy
New York, NY

Linda Chavez responds:

Ms. Hernandez would have us believe that disparities in income and other social and economic indicators are a simple proxy for discrimination against Hispanics. She refers to studies that she contends take into account regional differences, educational experience, language ability, and other common characteristics, and still show Hispanics to be underemployed and unemployed in greater numbers than their non-Hispanic counterparts. Since she fails to cite the specific studies, it is difficult to tackle her criticisms head on. I cited studies by McManus et al., Rivera-Batiz, Chiswick, and others that contradict her assessment. Those studies show that at least 80 percent of the earnings differentials between Hispanic males and non-Hispanic white males can be explained by poor English proficiency.

Ms. Quiroz takes issue with my reference to the Rivera-Batiz study, which shows a direct link between English proficiency and higher earnings. However, her criticism that immigrants who have been in the U.S. 10 years and who have nearly adept English reading skills earn wages (\$7.03 an hour) that put them at the poverty level is misleading. In 1985 (the year in the Rivera-Batiz data) the average hourly earnings for all U.S. workers were \$8.57; thus the immigrants in the Rivera-Batiz study were earning 82 percent of the average of all workers. Poverty is usually measured by using the poverty index developed by the Social Security Administration, which measures money income. In 1985, poverty for a family of four in the U.S. was defined as income below \$10,989. In other words, the immigrants in the study were earning 33 percent more than families living at the poverty level. Moreover, the earnings of the immigrants in this study do not reflect family income; other earners likely contributed to the immigrants' family income, which would have further increased their earnings above the "poverty levels" to which Ms. Quiroz relegates them.

Dr. Valdivieso, a usually careful and thoughtful scholar, makes some important observations about the stresses that currently plague Hispanic families. His comments about family breakup, however, are more applicable to the Puerto Rican community than to other segments of the Hispanic community. Nonetheless, he is right that we should be concerned with disturbing trends in out-of-wedlock births, teen-age pregnancies, and female-headed households, which are increasing in every segment of the Hispanic population, if not at the alarming rates within the Puerto Rican community. The question is what to do about it. Government programs to date have been unable to reverse the trend and arguably have hastened family breakdown.

Finally, Mr. Daubon unwittingly supports my suspicions about the role of government policies in the precipitous decline of the Puerto Rican community. His comments about the downturn in the economy of the Northeast in the 1970s and '80s notwithstanding, welfare policies in states like New York made

it more desirable for those whose job prospects diminished to remain where they were rather than seek opportunities in the Sunbelt and elsewhere. He's right. The more enterprising left, which is why the Puerto Rican community, like the black community, shows signs of both hope and despair.

Drug Testing Distortions

Dear Sir:

It is a pity that Robert DuPont, who makes a living counseling firms to inspect their employees' urine, should so badly distort the issues about random drug testing ("Never Trust Anyone Under 40: What Employers Should Know About Drugs in the Workplace," Spring 1989).

Contrary to Dr. DuPont's assertion, there is widespread scientific agreement that drug urine tests cannot measure mental impairment. This is because they do not detect psychoactive chemicals, but rather non-psychoactive byproducts that linger in the body long after drug effects have vanished, at levels that vary drastically according to individual metabolism. As it happens, urine tests are highly sensitive to marijuana, a single use of which can register positive for a week or more. Urinalysis is less sensitive to more dangerous drugs such as cocaine, which washes out in a couple of days. Meanwhile, it is virtually blind to alcohol, which is rarely tested at all. While the accuracy of testing can be improved by testing not urine but blood, which at least manifests the active presence of both illicit drugs and alcohol, blood tests have been disregarded as too obviously invasive of bodily privacy.

No Long-Term Impairment

Despite Dr. DuPont's claims, random urine testing is hardly fair and "impartial." On the contrary, it rules out even the most responsible, weekend use of marijuana, while permitting the most blatant drunkenness and alcoholism. Drug tests therefore in no way assure a drug-free work force: workers in drug-tested industries report a shift from marijuana to alcohol and other less detectable drugs, including cocaine and LSD.

Contrary to Dr. DuPont, there is no scientific evidence that a single marijuana cigarette produces serious impairment for "days." The longest hangover effect that has been reported is 24 hours, and that in a single, disputed study. Other studies indicate that marijuana impairment lasts a few hours at most. Brain cell loss from marijuana in humans is unproven and speculative; a number of studies have failed to detect significant abnormalities even in heavy chronic users. It is therefore altogether commonplace for behaviorally normal, unimpaired subjects to show high levels of urine metabolites, just as it is for impaired subjects to pass as negative.

To declare as Dr. DuPont does that "in the absence of objective criteria," the only "scientifically sound approach" is to establish a per se definition of impairment via urine testing, is to fly in the face of the consensus of scientific judgment. One might as well arbitrarily define the possession of so many beer bottles as drunkenness. For every true drug abuser detected by drug urinalysis, at least as many innocent users may be falsely labeled abusers. Insofar as urine tests also miss the majority of drug abusers, who are alcoholics, urinalysis is probably a substantially less accurate test of abuse than the lie detector-which has been banned for its inaccuracy!

Despite Dr. DuPont's claims, the need for drug testing is far from self-evident. The oft-cited statistics on absenteeism and productivity of drug users, quoted by the Bureau of National Affairs, are grossly distorted by biased sample populations. Better designed studies indicate that illicit drug use is a contributing but not dominant indicator of job performance, on the order of age, sex, or tobacco smoking. Recent statistics in the railroad industry indicate that accident rates are no higher among illicit drug users than workers in general.

As for the Conrail accident, it scarcely required random testing to divine that the crew was accidentprone: the crew had an extensive record of traffic violations and drunken driving, and was known by management to have drinking problems. While it is unclear whether the accident would have been averted by urine testing, it certainly could have been prevented by an emergency braking system of the kind widely used in foreign countries. This is why the National Transportation Safety Board recommended management and equipment changes, not random drug testing, in its review of the accident.

Of course, this is not to deny that random testing could avert a few accidents, at least in the short run. So could preventive detention. It is the means, not the ends, which are at issue. In principle, random testing is akin to searching through employees' homes and firing them if empty liquor bottles are found. Most Americans would agree that this would be an intolerable invasion of their privacy; how much more so a search of intimate bodily fluids? Conservatives who are so anxious to get government off their backs would do well to ponder the consequences of putting it into everyone's bladders, lest their own rights someday come to be jeopardized by the likes of Dr. DuPont.

Dale Gieringer
Stanford Decisions and
Ethics Center
State Coordinator, National
Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws
Oakland, CA

Robert DuPont responds:

Dale Gieringer makes many sound arguments. The precise nature and duration of impairment after smoking marijuana remains an unsettled issue in science. Drug tests are an invasion of privacy, especially when the testing is done without individualized suspicion, as it is in the random tests in the workplace that I support.

The larger question, legally and politically, is how we as a nation balance the costs and benefits of random testing at work. How does

Mr. Gieringer compare the invasiveness of going through a metal detector at the airport, having his physician send his records to an insurance company, having the Internal Revenue Service do a random audit of his taxes, or having a credit check run when he applies for a bank loan against the invasiveness of a urine test? For me, giving up some

Conservatives who are so anxious to get the government off their backs would do well to ponder the consequences of putting it into everyone's bladders.

—Dale Gieringer

urine once a year or so as a condition of employment is a lot less intrusive than those other four breaches of my privacy, which have become commonplace in our complex, interdependent society.

Then there is the benefit side of the test. How much is it worth to end the drug abuse epidemic from which we have suffered for the past two decades? Seventy percent of illicit drug users hold paying jobs. If we are serious about taking the user away from the seller as part of our effort to reduce the demand for illicit drugs, the workplace is the major battleground in the war against drugs.

The best argument for random drug testing at work, however, is not the benefits such tests bring to nonusers, but the benefits that testing brings to current users of illicit drugs. After two decades of work as a psychiatrist treating drug abusers I have learned that it is the tough love of saying "no more" to drug use that begins the journey of recovery. A drug-free standard at work will prevent drug problems, and, failing that, permit the identification of drug abuse as the first step in rehabilitation. I urge Mr. Gieringer to go to some of his local Narcotics Anonymous meetings to find out how many people today are grateful that someone cared enough to say "no" to their drug abuse.

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Spring 1999

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CONSERVATISM and the Black Voter

Alan Keyes

Alan Keyes

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This is the story of a latter-day gunfighter, a man named Hugh Kaufman, who came to my town, won his shoot-out by terrorizing the community, and left to fight again. Of course, gunfighters today use the 6 o'clock news instead of the Colt .45, but they still deal in fear and are paid in notoriety.

Blake Hurst

Wasting Away in Atchison County: My Neighbors Prefer Economic Depression to an Incinerator

