

December 31, 1990

PREPARING FOR A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

INTRODUCTION

Few political, economic or social systems have been held in such universal disrepute as South Africa's system of racial segregation and discrimination, called apartheid. But now, apartheid is being dismantled rapidly by a reform-minded South African government, which says that it is committed to fostering a non-racial democracy in that country. Whether or not South African President F.W. de Klerk achieves this remains to be seen. One thing, however, is certain: A post-apartheid South Africa is now within sight, and Washington should be thinking now about the South African leaders and political system it would prefer to see emerge once apartheid is gone.

American policy toward South Africa since 1986 has aimed to isolate and punish that country and to coerce South Africa's leadership to abandon apartheid. That year, Washington imposed harsh economic sanctions against South Africa. Now that Pretoria has committed itself to abandoning apartheid, Washington should rethink its South Africa policy. The most significant challenge for the U.S. no longer is convincing South Africa's leadership to scrap apartheid. Rather, the challenge now must be to ensure that apartheid is replaced with a political and economic system that respects the fundamental liberties of all South Africans.

Bitter Divisions. This will not be easy. Like most African nations, South Africa is deeply divided along ethnic lines and lacks a democratic political tradition. Strong tensions exist not simply between blacks and whites, but increasingly between different ethnic groups in the black majority and between whites of Afrikaner and British descent.

These tensions have created bitter and heated divisions over South Africa's future political and economic direction, raising concern that a post-apartheid South Africa may fragment into Lebanon-style violence. Already, radicals to the left and

right of the government are arming themselves in preparation for a power struggle, while violence of blacks against blacks, stemming primarily from bitter rivalries between South Africa's Xhosa and Zulu tribes, has taken over 800 lives since August. Over 5,000 blacks have lost their lives in such infighting since 1985.

Democratic or Authoritarian Future? South Africa now finds itself at a crossroads in its political evolution. On the one hand, there is the possibility that apartheid's demise will pave the way for a genuinely democratic political system which will be friendly to American interests in the region. But on the other hand, there is the possibility that apartheid's demise will open the door for intensification of ethnic-driven violence, and could lead to the emergence of an authoritarian, anti-American government.

Washington should be concerned about the political system that could emerge in a post-apartheid South Africa. The West long has sought an end to South Africa's apartheid system, and now this objective is within sight. But as America learned in Cuba, Iran, and Nicaragua, the demise of non-democratic regimes can lead to new, equally authoritarian governments that can endanger American security interests.

South Africa may be such a case. To be sure, if Soviet influence in Africa as a whole wanes, then whether South Africa is ruled by a pro-communist regime is less important strategically for the U.S. than it was when Soviet influence in the region was expanding. The weakening of the Soviet Union has made it less likely than before that a pro-Soviet government in South Africa could become a tool of Soviet expansionism and thus a direct threat to U.S. interests.¹ But South Africa nonetheless remains the single most important nation in sub-Saharan Africa for American strategic and economic interests. Such minerals as fluorspar, industrial diamonds, manganese, and platinum are very important (some would say even vital) to American industry and defense. In peace time, it is unlikely that American access to these minerals will be endangered in a post-apartheid South Africa. But in a moment of international crisis, when these minerals probably would be most critical to American interests, a hostile South African government could try to deny these minerals to the U.S. to protest American foreign policy or as part of an international campaign to refuse the U.S. access to its critical defense needs. How successful such an embargo would be is, of course, uncertain.

Nationalized Mines. Several political parties in South Africa, such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), say they will nationalize the mines should they take power. A significant possibility thus exists that the decision of whether and where to sell the country's critical minerals will be made not by private industry, but by government. With the mines in government hands, the South African government would hold the power to

1 For further information on Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's policy toward southern Africa, see Michael Johns, "Soviet Policy Towards Southern Africa: The Gorbachev Factor," *Southern African Freedom Review*, Summer 1988, pp. 53-60.

refuse to sell minerals directly to the U.S. The South African government also could try to force other governments and industries that purchase these minerals to sign agreements prohibiting third party sales to deny — or at least severely restrict — American access to these minerals on the international market. Enforcing such agreements, of course, would pose enormous problems for South Africa. As such, the attempted embargo would be, at most, an inconvenience for the U.S.

South Africa guards, moreover, the Cape of Good Hope — where the Atlantic and Indian Oceans converge. It is among the world's most important waterways for military transport and commerce. Some 20 percent of oil destined for America passes around the Cape, and some 60 percent of oil destined for Western Europe follows this route. As a result of the Persian Gulf crisis and the potential instability of the Suez Canal, the Cape's importance for military and commercial traffic is magnified even further. The Cape also can handle tankers too large to fit through the Suez Canal.

A post-apartheid government controlled by a hostile power such as the ANC, which maintains a close political alliance with Cuba, Libya, and other anti-American governments, could seek to close the Cape to Western commercial and naval ships. They may want to do this, for example, in a time of international conflict between the U.S. and a hostile Middle Eastern or other nation aligned with the ANC. Denying this access would be relatively easy, and would not require significant military might. The placement of mines around the Cape or the use of Iranian-style hit-and-run attacks by coastal raiding craft would be enough to destroy a ship's rudder, rendering it dead in the water. Short of this, the new government would also have the ability to impose harsh taxes on commercial and naval traffic around the Cape, which would raise the costs of American

SOUTH AFRICA

Official Name — Republic of South Africa.

Area — 472,359 square miles; about twice the size of Texas.

Capitals — Pretoria, administrative capital (population 850,000); Bloemfontein, judicial capital (population 232,000); and Cape Town, legislative capital (population 1.9 million).

Population — 37.5 million (1988 estimate).

Ethnic groups — African (black), 28 million; white, 5.4 million; colored (mixed race), 3.2 million; Asian (Indian), 1 million.

Religions — Predominately Christian; also, traditional African, Hindu, Muslim, and Jewish.

Work force — 11 million: Services 34.5%; Manufacturing and commerce 32%; Agriculture 25%; Mining 8.5%.

Natural Resources — Almost all essential commodities, except petroleum.

Agriculture products — Corn, wool, dairy products, wheat, sugar cane, tobacco, citrus fruits, wine.

Source: *South Africa: Background Notes*, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public

defense and commerce. These actions, of course, could mobilize much of the industrial world in opposition to South Africa.

Perhaps the least likely, but potentially most devastating threat to American security interests in South Africa is the country's nuclear weapons capability. In July 1989, South Africa successfully test fired a rocket booster, which could be used to launch nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. These weapons could be used by a post-apartheid government to force its way with neighboring African states.

Near to Nuclear Weapons. Should South Africa's nuclear program continue to develop under a post-apartheid government, the country eventually may possess an intermediate-range nuclear capability. Like Argentina, Brazil, India, Israel, and Pakistan, South Africa is widely viewed to be near to developing a nuclear weapons capability, but they have refused to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which would restrict nuclear weapons production and permit international inspection of nuclear sites. Should a post-apartheid government refuse to sign this treaty, Washington would have virtually no way of ensuring that South Africa does not develop a nuclear weapons capability.

Having spent the past five years attempting to isolate South Africa, primarily through the severe 1986 economic sanctions, Washington has lost much of its diplomatic and economic influence there. Thus at a time when American engagement could help ensure a peaceful, democratic outcome in South Africa, Washington now finds itself scrambling to reestablish its influence. To regain this influence and help ensure a peaceful transition to freedom and democracy, the Bush Administration should:

- ◆ ◆ **State that the goal of American policy in South Africa is a non-racial democratic society that protects the individual rights and economic freedoms of all South Africans.** There is no justice in liberating the black majority from apartheid while simultaneously depriving ethnic minorities of their rights and freedoms. Nor does Washington have an interest in seeing apartheid merely replaced with another type of dictatorship, which could happen if some radical groups gain power. It is under this situation that American access to critical minerals and the Cape of Good Hope most likely would be threatened.
- ◆ ◆ **Assist financially, through the Agency for International Development (AID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), anti-apartheid organizations that support democratic, free market ideals.** This is an effective way for Washington to foster democratic institutions in South Africa.
- ◆ ◆ **Immediately lift economic and financial sanctions against South Africa once the conditions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) are met.** De Klerk will meet the conditions of this 1986 U.S. law once he completes his release of all South African political prisoners. This is expected shortly.

- ◆ ◆ **Grant South African commercial aircraft permission to land at American airports.** This will signal that Washington is encouraged by de Klerk's reforms, and will inspire the South African leadership to continue down the anti-apartheid path.
- ◆ ◆ **Withhold American financial assistance to the ANC or its front groups until it terminates its alliance with the South African Communist Party.** Washington has no interest in strengthening the ANC, which, because of its radical orientation and ties to communists, has a dubious commitment to economic and political liberty.
- ◆ ◆ **Invite anti-apartheid leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi to Washington to meet with George Bush, Administration officials, and members of Congress.** Buthelezi is an important alternative leader to the ANC's Nelson Mandela, and he should be treated as such by Washington. Buthelezi is a popularly elected leader, whose political organization, the Inkatha Freedom Party, represents some 1.7 million black South Africans. Additionally, Buthelezi vows that a post-apartheid South Africa under his leadership would respect the political and economic liberties of all South Africans. In Inkatha's political stronghold, Natal province, for instance, Buthelezi has supported a multi-racial, democratically-inclined power sharing program, and he contends that he would like to apply this political approach nationwide.

THE EMERGENCE OF DE KLERK'S REFORMS

The election in September 1989 of F.W. de Klerk as South African President is the most significant political spur to the South African government's abandonment of apartheid. De Klerk opposed apartheid in his campaign, and his election was viewed domestically and internationally as a mandate for continued reform in South Africa. He said in his campaign that "White domination — as much as it exists — must come to an end. That is the goal of the National Party."² The new South Africa, de Klerk said during a visit to Washington in September, will include "a new constitutional and economic dispensation which will offer equal opportunities and full democratic rights to all its people."³

Since taking office, de Klerk's reforms have been sweeping. On October 16, he abolished the Separate Amenities Act, a pillar of apartheid that enabled local white governments to deny blacks access to public facilities. Now such facilities as movie theatres, parks, libraries, swimming pools and beaches are open to all races. De Klerk also has lifted bans on political parties and released all political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, the ANC Deputy President, who had been imprisoned 27 years because he helped lead a violent campaign against the

2 John Battersby, "Election Held Amid Protest," *The Christian Science Monitor*, September 6, 1989, p. 4.

3 Departure statement by President F.W. de Klerk, The White House, September 24, 1990.

government in the 1960s. De Klerk also plans to release over 1,400 other prisoners, many of whom were jailed originally for violent activities. By releasing political prisoners and legalizing previously banned political parties, de Klerk has opened the door for political debate in South Africa. Few countries in Africa permit as wide-ranging political debate as South Africa.

Disintegrating Laws. The remaining apartheid laws, meanwhile, are beginning to disintegrate. For instance, the 1950 Group Areas Act, which permits the government to segregate residential areas, is now essentially defunct in most urban areas, such as Cape Town and Johannesburg, where local governments are allowing free settlement of all races.⁴

The elimination of apartheid's remaining statutes will require South Africa to adopt a new constitution. Led by South Africa's Minister of Constitutional Development Gerrit Viljoen, de Klerk's government is engaged with the ANC in "talks about talks," which are designed to lay the groundwork for constitutional negotiations. An agreement between the government and ANC representatives on May 3, called the Groote Schuur Minute, expressed both sides' commitment to the "peaceful process of negotiations." If successful, these negotiations are expected to lead ultimately to the abdication of power by de Klerk's governing National Party, something virtually unheard of in African politics. But while politics in a post-apartheid South Africa is likely to be dominated by black political parties, there exists a significant possibility that the National Party – and perhaps other white parties – will forge political alliances with blacks and maintain some political clout.

De Klerk appears committed to the free enterprise system. "The experience of Eastern Europe, and Africa's own experience with various forms of a controlled economy, show that nationalization [of industry and commerce] does not work," he writes. "By educating the entire South African population on the merits of the free enterprise system, by broadening private ownership and by stimulating business development, we can create wealth and opportunities for all."⁵

Ending Economic Control. Like his support for a democratic political configuration, De Klerk's support for free market economic values is a major departure from previous policies held by the South African government. Before de Klerk, significant government control of the economy was a convenient mechanism for reinforcing apartheid. With approximately 60 percent of industry and commerce in government hands, de Klerk's predecessors such as John Vorster and H.F. Verwoerd extended apartheid into the South African workplace

4 This August 28, for instance, the Johannesburg City Council applied for the entire city to become a "free settlement area."

5 F.W. de Klerk, "The South Africa I aim to build," *The Times of London*, July 9, 1990.

by allowing the government to control non-whites not just politically, but also economically. Example: "job reservation" laws frequently reserved top level jobs for whites. Example: black South Africans were denied the right to own property. Before de Klerk, South Africa ranked among the most socialist economies in the non-communist world.⁶

Opposition to Privitization. Despite de Klerk's commitment to a free market economy, anti-free market sentiments still exist in many segments of South Africa's white community, especially among "modern Verwoerdiens," who, like former South African Prime Minister H.F. Verwoerd, feel that government economic control is necessary to maintain a segregated society. De Klerk's efforts to privatize state-owned industries also are opposed by many civil servants, who feel that this threatens their own livelihoods. So far, de Klerk has privatized some \$28 billion in government assets, including the national airway, the national mint, and part of the government-controlled post office. Ironically, this privatization effort, which is eliminating white government control of many major economic sectors, is opposed by the ANC.

De Klerk's reforms, while enjoying wide support in both the black and white communities, have heightened political anxieties in some sectors of society. There is mounting concern among many whites and moderate blacks that the rise to power of the largely Marxist-dominated ANC will not lead to genuine political and economic freedom but to a one-party, Marxist regime. There is concern too that apartheid's demise is heightening ethnic-driven violence between such rival black political groups as the Xhosas and Zulus.

But unlike Eastern Europe's dogmatically authoritarian political parties which were thrown out of office last year, de Klerk's party may have a political future. By opening itself to non-whites and potentially seeking alliances with Indian and coloured parties and such moderate black parties as Inkatha, the National Party eventually may forge a political alliance capable of rivaling the ANC. Shocking many South African whites, de Klerk said last month that he would even be willing to serve in a post-apartheid government led by Nelson Mandela, though he conceded that such a political alliance was unlikely.

There remains a possibility that de Klerk's reforms could be halted by the white Conservative Party, which opposed black rule in South Africa and now seeks an independent nation for South African whites. Members of the Conservative Party and even some members of the National Party feel that de Klerk, in seeking an end to apartheid, has far overstepped the mandate given him by white voters,

HOUSE OF ASSEMBLY SEATS	
National Party	102
Conservative Party	41
Democratic Party	34
Undecided	1

6 For further information on the role socialist economic measures have played in upholding apartheid, see Frances Kendall and Leon Louw, *After Apartheid: The Solution for South Africa* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1987); and Michael Johns, "Swiss Family Buthelezi," *Policy Review*, Spring 1988, pp. 80-84.

though support for the Conservative Party had been growing somewhat even before de Klerk's election. In South Africa's last national election, held in September 1989, the Conservative Party gained 17 seats in the 178-member House of Assembly, giving it 23 percent of the total assembly seats. Moreover, a July 1990 South African poll found that 87 percent of blacks feel de Klerk is leading the country "very well" or "fairly well," compared with 70 percent of whites who share that feeling.⁷

Race Against Time. The political threat by the Conservative Party represents one of the most significant challenges to de Klerk's bid to eliminate apartheid. A possibility exists that the Conservative Party and other white opponents could overturn de Klerk's reforms if they succeed in calling and winning a special election or if they force de Klerk from office through a coup. Conservative Party leader Andries Treurnicht on May 26 called for de Klerk's ouster, declaring that an Afrikaner freedom struggle had begun and that de Klerk's move toward a post-apartheid South Africa "will just have to be stopped."⁸

Responding to the threat from the Conservative Party, de Klerk now finds himself and his party in a race against time. His objective appears to be to reach a political settlement and a new constitutional arrangement for South Africa before he is forced to face another all-white election and possible defeat in 1994.

There are two main possible obstacles to this: 1) A successful call for new elections by the Conservative Party, and 2) refusal by the ANC to negotiate with de Klerk, followed by its return to a campaign of violence against the government and South African civilians. This could happen if the ANC concludes that negotiations are inhibiting its bid for total power. If such political parties as the PAC and Inkatha begin asserting themselves in constitutional negotiations, the ANC may feel so threatened.

THE REAL AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS

Though the release of ANC leader Nelson Mandela this February has highlighted the ANC's prominent role in the struggle against apartheid, there is no evidence that the ANC, if it takes power, will support economic and political freedom in a post-apartheid South Africa.

7 Heribert Adam, "Ironies of transition in South Africa," *South Africa Foundation Review*, September 1990, p. 5.

8 David B. Ottaway, "60,000 Afrikaners Protest de Klerk's Dialogue With ANC," *The Washington Post*, May 27, 1990, p. A29.

The ANC is aligned closely with the South African Communist Party (SACP), one of the world's most Stalinist parties, and has been since 1930. Of the 35 members of the ANC's National Executive Committee, 28 belong to the SACP.⁹ According to a May 1990 report by the authoritative newsletter *Africa Confidential*, the SACP "has not been content with dominating the ANC ideologically. It has gone on to take virtually every position of influence in the organization."¹⁰ In his first speech following his release from prison on February 11, Mandela hailed "great communists" of the SACP. He added on February 17 that "no dedicated ANC member will ever heed the call to break with the SACP."¹¹

"Inconceivable" Change. Despite the worldwide rush away from socialist economic policies, the ANC continues to demand nationalization of industry and commerce. Said Mandela on May 25: "the nationalization of the mines, the financial institutions and monopoly industries is the fundamental policy of the ANC and it is inconceivable that we will ever change this policy."¹²

Troubling too is the ANC's treatment of blacks who refuse to cooperate fully with it. Mandela admitted on April 13 that the ANC has detained and tortured ANC dissidents, saying that "it is true that some of these people who have complained were in fact tortured."¹³ Several of them fled to Kenya in April, and reported that at least 120 political prisoners are being detained and tortured by the ANC in their camps in Angola and Uganda.

ANC cadres share at least some of the blame for the violence that currently is rocking South Africa. Tensions between the ANC and its main political rival, Inkatha, have escalated since Mandela's February 11 release from prison. Still, Mandela refused until October 22 to agree to a meeting with Inkatha's leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who had been requesting such a meeting since February to discuss how the violence could be ended. Instead, in an effort to frighten black South Africans from joining Inkatha, the ANC intensified a violent campaign against Inkatha. The result: 800 black South Africans have been killed in black-on-black violence since August.

9 *Africa Confidential*, May 4, 1990. Additionally, in a briefing for British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher prior to Mandela's last visit to Britain, British intelligence officials reportedly stated that 400 of the ANC's top 500 officials are SACP members. "ANC Bid To Destroy Opposition," *The Aida Parker Newsletter*, September/October 1990 [Issue No. 139], p. 2.

10 *Ibid.*

11 Speech by Nelson Mandela, February 17, 1990.

12 *The [London] Sunday Telegraph*, April 1, 1990.

13 "Mandela: ANC Tortured Mutineers," *The Washington Post*, April 15, 1990, p. A30.

Embracing Violence, Marxism. Mandela and the ANC also have backed anti-democratic forces and governments worldwide, raising further doubts about their commitment to democratic principles. Mandela has compared the struggle of the ANC to that of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), saying in March: "We are in the same trench struggling against the same enemy."¹⁴ On May 10, Mandela hailed the Marxist regimes of Angola and Cuba, praising Cuba's "love of human rights and liberty."¹⁵ And he has hailed Libya's Muammar Qadhafi, praising the Libyan dictator's "fight for peace and human rights in the world."¹⁶ According to South Africa scholar Michael Radu, on topics "ranging from El Salvador and Nicaragua to the invasions of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and Afghanistan in 1979, from demilitarization of the Indian Ocean to the issue of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe, the ANC has been as consistently loyal to Moscow's policy line as any Warsaw Pact regime. The ANC condemned U.S. 'aggression' in Korea in the early 1950s, and praised the Stalinist policies of the 1930s."¹⁷

Finally, there is concern that the ANC has not abandoned armed violence, even though it declared on August 6 that this would end. Since this declaration, known as the Pretoria Minute, there have been thirteen ANC military attacks against government and civilian targets.¹⁸ Nelson Mandela's wife, Winnie, said three days following this announcement that suspension of ANC-supported military action was merely tactical and would not mean a cessation of violence by the ANC.¹⁹ ANC spokesman Gill Marcus remarked on October 30 that the ANC may arm its supporters to "defend" South Africa's black townships from such rival political groups as Inkatha.²⁰ And in October, Chris Hani, the chief of staff of the ANC's military wing, known as *Umkhonto we Siswe*, or "Spear of the Nation," conceded that the ANC was continuing to recruit and train guerrillas.²¹

The ANC was identified in November 1988 by then Vice President George Bush's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism as an official terrorist group. The task force's report, *Terrorist Group Profiles*, concluded that the ANC's attacks have been "indiscriminate, resulting in both black and white civilian victims." The

14 *The [Johannesburg] Star*, March 9, 1990.

15 Speech by Nelson Mandela, [Luanda, Angola, May 10, 1990], *Human Events*, June 2, 1990.

16 Speech by Nelson Mandela, [Tripoli, Libya, May 18, 1990], United Press International, May 18, 1990.

17 Michael Radu, "The African National Congress: Cadres and Credo," *Problems of Communism*, July/August 1987, p. 74.

18 See David Ridenour, "Aid to the ANC Would Violate U.S. Law," *National Policy Analysis* No. 53 [National Center for Public Policy Research], September 1990.

19 "Violence Will Not Cease, Says Winnie," *The [Pretoria] Citizen*, August 10, 1990, p. 2.

20 "Police Warn SACP on Defence-Units Plan," *The [Johannesburg] Star*, November 1, 1990, p. 5.

21 "Shadow 'Army'," *The [Pretoria] Citizen*, October 10, 1990, p. 6.

task force report also stated that "the ANC receives many of its weapons from the Soviet bloc."²²

BLACK ALTERNATIVES TO THE ANC

The ANC is not the only black political movement in South Africa. Washington would make a major mistake in assuming that it will be the ruler of a post-apartheid South Africa.

In addition to the ANC, other major black political and labor organizations include:

Inkatha Freedom Party

This is the largest non-Marxist, anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. Unlike the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party aims to create a post-apartheid South Africa rooted in democratic, free market principles. Inkatha draws its 1.7 million members primarily from South Africa's Zulu tribe located in Natal province, along South Africa's east coast. There is no official membership figure for the ANC, which draws most of its members from the smaller Xhosa tribe. The significant support Inkatha enjoys from many South African blacks makes it the most politically powerful alternative to the ANC.

Inkatha's political support is likely to continue growing. Inkatha leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi on July 14 opened his black liberation movement to whites, Indians, and mixed-race Coloreds. Buthelezi contends that Western sanctions against South Africa have contributed to the 47 percent black unemployment and underemployment in the country. Buthelezi has condemned the West's financial support for those South African organizations, such as the ANC, "who seek to support revolutionary violence within South Africa."²³ In contrast to ANC calls for nationalizing South African industry and commerce, Buthelezi wants "a dramatically highlighted role for free enterprise."²⁴ Says he: "governments cannot create jobs, free enterprise must do so."²⁵

Buthelezi has tried to end the violence between the ANC and Inkatha, demanding last February that "blacks throw their instruments of death into the sea."²⁶ He also emphasizes the need to address the fears of white South Africans that

22 *Terrorist Group Profiles*, U.S. Government Printing Office, November 1988, pp. 129-130. For further information on the African National Congress and Nelson Mandela, see Michael Johns, "For Mandela's Visit, Some Words of Caution," Heritage Foundation *Executive Memorandum* No. 269, June 14, 1990.

23 Dr. Mangosuthu Buthelezi, "South Africa's Road to Change," speech to the British Conservative Party Conference (Blackpool, England, October 10, 1989), *Southern African Freedom Review*, December 1989, p. 54.

24 *South Africa Update* (Volume 2, Number 4), February 15-28, 1990.

25 *Ibid.*

26 "Zulu Leader Meets With Bush, Urges Sanctions Be Lifted Soon," *The Washington Post*, March 1, 1990.

minority rights will not be respected in a post-apartheid South Africa. "[T]he question of minority group protection [is] highly relevant to whether or not we are ever going to reach the democracy we are aiming for," Buthelezi said last month.²⁷

Pan Africanist Congress (PAC)

Like the ANC, the PAC was a banned political organization in South Africa from 1960 until last February. It was founded in 1959 after a split in the ANC over the latter's decision to admit whites and communists into the movement. But like the ANC, the PAC now toes a largely Marxist line, supporting the nationalization of the economy. Also like the ANC, the PAC's military wing, known as the Azanian People's Liberation Army, has taken up arms against the government. PAC cadres have received military training from mainland China, Libya, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.²⁸

Like Inkatha, the PAC has expressed reservations about the ANC's bid for total political control in South Africa. Thus the PAC opposed a nationwide ANC-sponsored labor strike this July 2 designed to press de Klerk into stripping Inkatha's Buthelezi of his political powers. This strike was enforced by some 3,000 ANC cadres, who erected barricades and set fire to rubber tires on roads in an effort to close down public transportation. As fears of ANC domination in a post-apartheid South Africa continue to grow, the PAC is likely to distance itself still further from the ANC.

The Coalition of South African Trade Unions (COSATU)

Founded in 1985, COSATU is a loose political organization sympathetic with the ANC and the United Democratic Front (UDF), an anti-apartheid coalition group that supports the ANC. When the UDF was banned in 1988, COSATU stepped up its involvement in anti-apartheid activities.

COSATU urges South African workers to join the anti-apartheid effort. Like the ANC, the organization supports the nationalization of the economy, especially the banking sector. It enjoys close political relations with the South African Communist Party, on whose board serves COSATU Vice President Chris Dlamini and Deputy Secretary General Sydney Mafumadi. At COSATU's July 1987 national convention, the organization endorsed the ANC's guiding platform, known as the Freedom Charter, which lays out the ANC's Marxist economic vision.

27 Michael Holman, "Buthelezi may seek special rights for minority groups," *The Financial Times*, November 8, 1990.

28 "The Reemergence of the PAC," *Freedom Bulletin*, Number 7, 1987, International Freedom Foundation, p. 3.

AMERICA AND SOUTH AFRICA

Washington has an interest in ensuring that the fall of apartheid opens the door for genuine freedom in South Africa. Having assumed a leadership role in opposing apartheid, Washington has an investment in seeing that apartheid's collapse does not open that country for dictatorship of a different sort. Washington has led the charge against apartheid not merely because it wishes to see that unjust system gone, but also because it wants to see a democratic political system take root there in its place.

The success or failure of democracy in South Africa likely will also have regional implications. With the exception of Botswana, the country just north of South Africa, there is no functioning democracy in southern Africa. The success of democracy in South Africa would increase pressure on these governments to democratize. With more democracy, there likely would be more political, social, and economic stability and therefore less threats of governments emerging unfriendly to America. Democratic governments will give America more reliable access to strategic minerals, and at some point even greater markets for U.S. goods.

Longstanding Ties. American ties with South Africa date back to 1799, when the U.S. opened a South Africa consulate in Cape Town, then part of the Cape Colony, controlled by Britain. American missionaries have been active in South Africa since this time. During World War II, South African forces fought alongside America against Nazi aggression. Some 330,000 South African troops volunteered for service in North Africa, France, Italy, and the Balkans, and over 12,000 were killed in action.

During the immediate post-war years, relations between Washington and Pretoria were generally warm. But in the 1960s, Washington began taking several steps against apartheid. In 1963, the U.S. enacted an embargo on American arms sales to South Africa. In 1977, Washington supported a mandatory international arms embargo passed by the United Nations Security Council. Washington's arms embargo was tightened further in 1978 to ban all exports destined for South Africa's military, police, and other apartheid-enforcing agencies.

Stiff Sanctions. The most significant, and controversial, policy adopted by Washington was the enactment of economic sanctions against South Africa in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) of 1986. Congress on that October 2 overrode Ronald Reagan's veto of the bill by a vote of 318 to 83 in the House of Representatives and 78 to 21 in the Senate. CAAA bans all new investments in South Africa, except in those firms owned by black South Africans. The bill also denies landing rights in the U.S. to South African commercial aircraft, prohibits loans to South Africa's private sector, and imports of South African iron, steel, textiles, food, sugar, and other agricultural products, and bans the export of American crude oil and petroleum products to South Africa. These sanctions are stronger than those imposed by South Africa's other major trading partners, including Britain, Japan and West Germany. Even despite sanctions, however, South Africa is America's largest trading partner on the African continent. Last

year, the U.S. exported \$1.66 billion worth of products to South Africa and imported \$1.53 billion worth of South African goods.²⁹

CAAA also requires the White House to encourage the ANC and the PAC to halt their violence and start negotiations to bring about a nonracial and genuine democracy in South Africa.³⁰ CAAA binds the U.S. to encourage the ANC to "suspend terrorist activities," and urges the ANC to "strongly condemn and take effective actions against the execution by fire, commonly known as 'necklacing', of any person in any country." Only this August 6 did the ANC renounce violence as a means of achieving its political objectives; whether it will keep its word is still uncertain.

American opposition to apartheid led the Reagan and Bush Administrations to establish contact with prominent opposition figures in South Africa, many of whom are Marxists. Then Secretary of State George Shultz met with ANC leader Oliver Tambo in January 1987, even though the Pentagon recognized the ANC as an official "terrorist" organization because of its involvement in violence against civilians. George Bush met with Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other anti-apartheid South African clergymen in May 1989. And during Nelson Mandela's visit to the U.S. this June, he and his ANC delegation met with Bush, Secretary of State James Baker, and other Administration officials.

U.S Aid. To strengthen democracy in South Africa, Washington financially has helped black organizations and projects in South Africa. The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) has disbursed some \$150 million since 1982 to support South African human rights groups, black education, community development, labor union training, and black private enterprise development. AID budgets \$42 million in such assistance for the 1991 fiscal year.³¹

The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) gave \$275,000 to South African anti-apartheid programs last year. Of this, \$200,000 went to a Los Angeles-based organization, the Center for Foreign Policy Options, to send twenty South African black community leaders to Israel for training in how community organizations can help build democracy. NED gave \$75,000 to the Washington-based United States-South Africa Leader Exchange Program to support community leadership training.³² This year, Congress has asked NED to dramatically step up its engagement in South Africa. It appropriated \$10 million for NED programs in South Africa, which NED is scheduled soon to disburse.

29 U.S. Department of Commerce.

30 "Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986," Public Law 99-440, October 2, 1986, Section 102.

31 "AID Assistance to Disadvantaged South Africans," Agency for International Development press release, June 25, 1990.

32 *National Endowment for Democracy 1989 Annual Report*, p. 12.

PREPARING FOR A POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA

The visits to America this year by Nelson Mandela in June and by F.W. de Klerk in September reveal that what Washington does, and who it supports and does not support in South Africa will be among the most important factors in determining South Africa's political and economic future. Washington should make clear that its objective in South Africa is not simply abolition of apartheid, but the emergence of a political and economic system that protects individual liberty for all South African citizens, regardless of race or ethnic origin.

So far, however, the Bush Administration, while rhetorically supporting de Klerk's reforms, has done nothing to alter American sanctions policy toward South Africa. Similarly, Congress refuses to modify its policy to reflect changes in South Africa.³³ The result is that Washington is losing its opportunity to influence events in South Africa.

With apartheid's demise, Washington should cease trying to punish South Africa, and try instead to empower all South Africans with economic growth, freedom and democracy. This policy should:

- 1) **Help institutionalize a free market economy in South Africa.**
- 2) **Encourage the emergence of a democratic system of government in which power is not centralized in one political party or movement, but rather is rooted in individual rights.**
- 3) **Promote a peaceful political transition, free of ethnic or political violence.**

To foster a post-apartheid South Africa that is economically and politically free, the Bush Administration and Congress should look beyond economic sanctions to a more activist policy. There are indications that the Bush Administration is already leaning in this direction. Following his meeting with de Klerk on September 24, Bush said: "Clearly, the time has come to encourage and assist the emerging new South Africa." But to date, Bush has yet to spell out what sort of assistance this will entail.³⁴

Sanctions' Harm to Blacks. One of the first steps in updating American policy would be to lift economic and financial sanctions against South Africa. Since they were implemented in 1986, American sanctions economically have hurt South

33 See Michael Johns, "Time to Rethink U.S. South Africa Policy," Heritage Foundation *Executive Memorandum* No. 282, September 21, 1990.

34 President George Bush, "South Africa: Toward A New Political Reality" [Remarks made following his meeting with South African President F.W. de Klerk at the White House, September 24, 1990], *U.S. Department of State Dispatch*, October 1, 1990, p. 146.

Africa's blacks. Because South African exports have been denied access to U.S. and other international markets, South African exports have fallen. This has resulted in production cutbacks and a growing pool of unemployed in labor-related fields. Most of these workers have been black.

Until these sanctions are lifted, South African blacks will continue suffering. A secret study by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), circulated to fund directors on August 22, predicts that unless sanctions are lifted, South Africa's economy will spiral downward, a development that will likely set back the economic standing of blacks still further. Says the report: "Until these constraints are lifted, the South African economy will create less wealth and consequently have less with which to address its pressing needs."³⁵

Diminished Leverage. The harsh economic climate for South African blacks also has contributed to political extremism. South African blacks who have lost their jobs have become recruits for the ANC's armed struggle. The negative affect of sanctions also has led many South Africans to become hostile to the U.S. Many South Africans equate their country's economic downslide with policies initiated in Washington. This hostility to America, combined with the diminished level of trade and business involvement in South Africa, has caused Washington to lose credibility and leverage in the country.³⁶

De Klerk has now met nearly all the conditions set by Congress in 1986 for the lifting of sanctions. He has repealed the state of emergency, released political prisoners, including Nelson Mandela, legalized previously banned political parties, and initiated negotiations with black political representatives. What de Klerk yet must do to rid his nation fully of apartheid is repeal the Group Areas Act, repeal the Population Registration Act (which requires that all South Africans be labeled by race at birth), and free prisoners who black South African political groups contend are being held for political reasons. On November 1, the government and the ANC agreed on a phased release of these remaining prisoners. Once de Klerk releases them, the CAAA stipulates that Bush can lift American sanctions against South Africa. Following his meeting with de Klerk in September, Bush said that once the requirements set by Congress in 1986 for the lifting of sanctions are met, he will recommend their lifting.

The time has now come for Washington to cease isolating South Africa and instead assist that nation to institutionalize freedom. To help foster liberty in a post-apartheid South Africa, Bush should:

35 "Secret IMF Study Opposes Sanctions," *Business Day* [South Africa], October 25, 1990.

36 For further information on the negative ramifications of American economic and financial sanctions against South Africa, see Michael Johns, "Ease the Economic Sanctions to Reward Reform," *San Diego Union*, June 17, 1990, p. C-1.

- ◆ ◆ **State publicly that a goal of American policy in South Africa is the emergence of a non-racial democratic society that protects the individual rights and economic freedoms of all South Africans.** Congress has been very vocal in its opposition to apartheid. Now Congress must be as vocal in spelling out specifically what kind of South Africa America wants once apartheid is gone. Congress and the Bush Administration should declare that American support for a new government in South Africa will be predicated on its support and respect for economic and political liberty, for a free market, for multiparty democracy, and for abolition of all racial laws.
- ◆ ◆ **Assist financially, through the Agency for International Development (AID) and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), those anti-apartheid organizations that support democratic, free market ideals.** Instead of backing the ANC, with its close ties to the South African Communist Party, Washington should back organizations in South Africa likely to respect economic and political liberties. Foremost among these is the Inkatha Freedom Party, led by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Bush should invite Buthelezi to Washington, and urge NED and AID to support Inkatha.
- ◆ ◆ **Lift economic and financial sanctions once the conditions of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (CAAA) are met.**
- ◆ ◆ **Allow South African commercial aircraft to land at American airports.** A House of Representatives bill introduced April 26 by Representative Toby Roth, the Wisconsin Republican, would send a small, but important, signal of support to Pretoria in response to its dramatic reforms. Roth would lift the landing rights restrictions against South African commercial aircraft, which are part of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act. This gesture would show that Washington is pleased with de Klerk's progress toward dismantling apartheid. Lifting landing rights restrictions also would help convince skeptical white South Africans that de Klerk's reforms are recognized and appreciated by Washington. So doing, Washington would be encouraging further reforms.

CONCLUSION

At no time since apartheid's institutionalization have the prospects for genuine political change in South Africa been so great. Having spent the past two decades working for fundamental political change in South Africa, Washington must now switch its emphasis from opposing apartheid to supporting freedom. Tearing down apartheid cannot be the end of American policy.

The greatest danger to freedom in a post-apartheid South Africa is that one political party or movement will monopolize power, paving the way for either civil war or authoritarianism. Already, there are signs that the ANC is seeking to do this. Washington can help prevent this by providing financial assistance to other

anti-apartheid movements, such as the Inkatha Freedom Party, whose distaste for apartheid is as strong as the ANC's but whose economic and political values are more rooted in individual liberty and the free market.

Time to Repeal Sanctions. With apartheid's collapse near, Washington should help strengthen a free market economy in South Africa. To do this, Washington should repeal economic and financial sanctions against South Africa as soon as the provisions established by Congress in 1986 are met. "South Africa shall be free" was a chant heard frequently throughout the past decade at anti-apartheid rallies across America. But apartheid's demise will open the door for genuine freedom only if South Africa's new government learns the lessons of past failures in centralized, non-democratic government. Having led the international battle against apartheid, Washington should not turn its back on South Africa now when that country's moderate, pro-democratic forces need it most.

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