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RUSSIAN ROULETTE

The Dangers of a Collapsing Empire

CHARLES H. FAIRBANKS JR.

This is an exhilarating time to be alive. It will forever be remembered as the moment in history when Communism collapsed at its center, and 20th-century totalitarianism came to an end. The demise of Leninism is an awe-inspiring victory for freedom, a testament to the spiritual strength of the humble people who bore the burdens of Communism and ultimately proved more formidable than the clattering hosts paraded through Red Square twice a year to unnerve mankind.

The collapse of Communism is a victory for the West and above all for America, which shouldered the responsibility of leading the free world. Americans were not intimidated by the greatest preponderance of military power in world history. Americans outlasted a system that was disciplined to endure by terror.

This is a victory, too, for conservatism. It was American conservatives, more than any other group in the world, who kept up the lonely anti-Communist vigil when others, at various times, wanted to give in, compromise, or move on to other preoccupations. It was conservatives, more than anyone else, who held on to confidence in Western principles. Indeed the collapse of Communism is the greatest affirmation of conservative principles since the miscarriage of the French Revolution. Communism failed for the reasons conservatives said it would fail: because it was repugnant to human nature; because it made war on religion, family, and property, the institutions that bring out the best in mankind; because central planners are incapable of managing an economy; because the mind and the soul of the individual are free and cannot be permanently suppressed by a tyrannical state that wants to think, to feel, and to love for him.

The triumph of freedom does not mean that security threats from the Soviet Union or its successor regimes have disappeared. Substantial dangers still confront the West, both from the enormous Soviet military and from the disorder that attends the collapse of empires. The central threat from the Soviet Union that has preoccupied American military planners for the past 40 years—the threat of a blitzkrieg attack on Western Europe—has greatly diminished. But Soviet nuclear forces are likely to become more threatening, rather than less threatening, as a result of the present upheaval. The

Soviet use of surrogates to destabilize the Third World, though temporarily in decline, could easily reemerge as an important threat. The disintegration of the empire opens the risk of war along the border between the Soviet/Russian and the Islamic worlds, as well as in European tinderboxes such as Moldavia. And the breakdown of the Kremlin's authority during a time of economic crisis is a recipe for instability that might be difficult to contain within Soviet borders.

Shattered Blitzkrieg Strategy


To begin with the good news about security threats: The danger to the central NATO front has faded. The collapse of the Communist position in Eastern Europe during 1989 was an utterly unexpected blow to the stomach for Soviet military planners. While Soviet forces are still in parts of Eastern Europe, and may well be used to cause various sorts of trouble, they are too exposed to serve as the spearhead for an attack on the West. Future Soviet military strategy must plan the main effort from the border of the USSR. The loss of Eastern Europe disrupted almost everything that had been carefully prepared for war for 40 years: the bases, command posts, hardened storage bunkers, airfields, railroads, roads, communications links, the satellite armies, and the war plans themselves.

The Soviet logistics system is shattered. It relied largely on the railroads, which have a different track gauge in the Soviet Union (5 feet) and in Eastern Europe (4 feet 8-1/2 inches). At the Polish-Soviet border supplies must normally be unloaded and reloaded onto new railroad cars. When the Soviet Union held the satellite countries it had large stockpiles west of the break of gauge. The Soviet railroad troops, working behind the advancing

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Drawing by Anatol Stotsenko Woolf for Policy Review



Photofest

Because Soviet trains operate on a different track gauge than the rest of Europe, the loss of Eastern Europe has destroyed the railway logistics system for a Soviet blitzkrieg attack on the West.

Soviet army, could repair the Western European railway net and load their stockpiled supplies directly on it in Eastern European rolling stock. Now this logistics system is in total disarray.

The particular scenario for which Soviet forces have been optimized since 1945 was a blitzkrieg offensive across the West German frontier. The aim was to reach the English Channel in a very few weeks, splitting the allied armies and destroying large parts of them by encirclement. While the Soviet military has always hoarded large reserves of troops and equipment, this short-war scenario strongly shaped Soviet organization, tactics, training, and leadership. Soviet doctrine also emphasized the importance of surprise to deprive NATO of warning time to mobilize reserves and bring American reinforcements from across the sea.

Liberated Eastern Europe now becomes a gigantic burglar alarm for the West; a Soviet incursion will produce Western mobilization several days before the two sides' ground forces are in contact. Surprise is not made impossible for the Soviets to achieve, but it is made far more difficult.

Distance matters, because a blitzkrieg strategy can be countered if defensive forces have time to regroup. This is one of the most important reasons Hitler's blitzkrieg, so successful against France, failed against the USSR. And this has been the biggest impact of the loss of the forward position in Eastern Europe: to invalidate Soviet short-war planning by vastly increasing distances and times. The new attack starting-point on the Soviet-Polish border is nearly four times as far from the Channel as the old one. While Eastern Europe, as an essentially demilitarized area, would be easier going for a Soviet army than the old NATO area, an offensive would still probably take twice as long. This change in the world picture alone requires the scrapping of decades of Soviet planning and organization, and it is exacerbated by many specific factors. To cite just one, Soviet tactical aviation generally has a shorter range than NATO's; its threat to NATO's "deep rear" is therefore drastically reduced. And, because a Soviet attack is less likely to be successful, it is less likely to be carried out.

Even now, of course, the Soviet General Staff is working to knit together its shattered strategy. As it does so, the problem of military imbalance on the continent of Europe will slowly reemerge. The utterly new conditions of war planning will force the scrapping of NATO's old plans and systems as well. But, because the Soviet side had foreseen taking the offensive and was generally seen

as stronger, it is far more deeply damaged by the events of 1989. Between September and November 1989 the Red Army was routed without a battle.

Death of Communism

A second change that will leave the West far more secure is the decisive defeat, within the USSR, of Communism as a doctrine and as an organization unified by that doctrine. This is the most important change since 1985. Many American conservatives fear that reactionary forces within the Soviet Union will reestablish the old system, and Gorbachev will cast his lot with them. But Communism as an ideology will never again be able to

The most important change since 1985 is the decisive defeat, within the USSR, of Communism as a doctrine.

evoke loyalty from large groups of people in the Soviet Union; it is supported by approximately 15 percent of the population in recent polls. The public was already cynical about the system in 1985. Since then Communism has been further discredited by the revelations of its past crimes and by the accelerating slide of the economy.

An example of how significant this shift has been is reflected in the comments of Colonel Viktor Alksnis, one of the most vocal leaders of the reaction. "You call us reactionaries, you call us scum," he recently said. "That's right, I am a reactionary, I am scum." Those are the words of someone who feels subject to principles of legitimacy that he resents and refuses to accept. Five years ago, he would have affirmed that he was the representative of the working class against bourgeois imperialism and its lackeys. He does not say that any longer because he cannot. It simply would not be credible. Indeed he seems to be the harbinger of a new political wave, the non-Communist authoritarians.

The appeals the party is now making are to order and to managerial competence. These are not appeals that will win popular support for revolutionary activism throughout the world. The Soviet Union will no longer

have a systematically expansionist agenda. Even if reformers fail to establish a new democratic order, Soviet foreign policy will most likely be a Gaullist one that alternates between moods of isolationism and self-assertion. For several decades non-Communist Russian nationalists have been unenthusiastic about an expansionist agenda—that is, systematic attempts to increase Soviet influence.

To be sure, Russia was a threat to its neighbors before the arrival of Bolshevism. And whatever regime or set of regimes succeeds the Soviet Union will cause concern in Europe. The Ukraine alone is comparable in population and resources to France, Britain, or Italy. The Russian Republic, in the unlikely event it comes to stand alone, with its 150 million people, its continental scale, and its enormous resources, far outweighs any single European power. Indeed, since the Cossacks rode down the Champs Élysées in 1814, there has been a question whether it was possible to build a balance to Russia on the European continent. In 1914 Russia had more soldiers under arms than any other state on the globe. In 1939, again, the Soviet Union had more troops, tanks, and aircraft than any other power. A post-Communist Russia would boast the world's most terrifying nuclear arsenal and one of the largest standing armies.

There is, however, a world of difference between the foreign policies of Imperial Russia and of Soviet Russia, in the scale of their ambitions and in the ruthlessness of their tactics. The Soviets' support of terrorism, their still-mysterious role in the attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II, the shooting-down of civilian airliners, their interest in chemical and biological warfare and in the subversion of governments were all practices uncharacteristic of czarist foreign policy. These tactics probably were connected with the specific political culture of Bolshevism and the sense of a war for the world between utterly antagonistic faiths. Hence, the collapse of Communism will probably bring with it a gradual decline in the belligerence of Soviet tactics.

The USSR will also have much less appeal for revolutionary forces around the world, and that will be good for the West. Some former supporters will be estranged by the failures of the system, which glasnost has revealed, others by the USSR's very retreat from extremism.

The West may eventually benefit because the Soviet Union may not be able to continue to spend 25 percent of its GNP on defense. Non-Communist systems—even the fascist ones—have never been able to maintain such a high defense share of their national wealth over long years of peace. This trait of the Soviet system is probably linked to Communism—to its missionary faith and extreme secrecy. So far, there have been only marginal cuts in the defense budget. But any government that succeeds Gorbachev's will probably need to appeal to the public, and the government will find it hard to do this over the long run with so large a portion of the economy going to defense, not to human needs.

Gorbachev, the Destroyer

How threatened America will remain will be determined above all by the internal evolution of the USSR. Unfortunately, nothing is less clear. We can rule out the



Pictorial Parade / AGIP

Gorbachev's central problem is that he has disrupted the habits of obedience without creating any new legitimacy.

expectation, which apparently has guided some officials in the Bush administration, that Gorbachev will succeed in managing a gradual transition from an inhumane Communist system to a more humane system that is neither Communist nor anti-Communist. They have expected Gorbachev to remain in power and to bridge two quite opposite systems.

Gorbachev is a rapidly waning force in Soviet politics because he is entirely incompetent as an administrator. He is a very great revolutionary leader, very good at smashing old systems, but very poor in managing a government, issuing orders, and getting things done. He is now despised by both sides of the Soviet political debate—despised by those who want to restore order, despised also by his old allies among the democrats. So he maintains his position essentially by being a mediator between two groups that hate him, which is intrinsically a very fragile position.

Gorbachev's central problem is that he has disrupted the habits of obedience without creating any new legitimacy. Beginning in 1987, Gorbachev destroyed the legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism through glasnost. Yet Gorbachev has refused to this day to break with the ideology he has delegitimized.

He has also systematically dismantled the governing structures of the Communist system. He has eliminated, at least in Moscow, the dominant role of the party apparatus in state administration. He has effectively dismantled the Politburo and Secretariat, the party bodies that used to command the country. In a centrally planned economy, to dismantle the government is to take apart the economy. With the constant shortages and lines, everyday life has become harder than ever, making the Soviet population even more resentful of authority.

But at the same time, Gorbachev ignited vast new hopes, both political and personal. He mobilized parts of the population, particularly the intellectuals and the national minorities, against the old order. In so doing, he liberated people to make new demands on the system

at precisely the time the system's capacity to fulfill those demands was declining. And he created a democratic opposition that took hold of what legitimacy there is, yet has no power.

Masterless Samurai

This last point is little understood in the West, but is fundamental to understanding the crisis of authority in the Soviet Union. When Gorbachev shattered the powers of the party apparatus, he chose to give power to the network of "soviets," or legislative councils, at every level from top to bottom of the Soviet system. These soviets, largely filled with lathe operators and milkmaids, were always part of the democratic facade of the regime. They had no more power in the Soviet system than the House of Lords or the Privy Council has in Britain. Even in the union republics, which did have some real autonomy from the center, the soviets and the local governments controlled only a small fraction of the industries and farms on their territories. The economy was fundamentally controlled from Moscow. The soviets that are now controlled by democratic forces have little power to change anything in their jurisdictions.

By freeing people to make new personal and group demands, Gorbachev eroded the artificial sense of community that had existed. And Gorbachev has provided no new definition of the community: it is Communist

A serious danger is that there will be no easy line of demarcation between Eastern Europe and whatever succeeds the Soviet Union.

but not quite, Western but not quite. In earlier revolutions, when there was this kind of rapid change, with its vast personal opportunities, when loyalties, habits, and predictability were dissolved, one outcome was a tendency for everyone to be out for himself. Although revolutions appeal to noble aspirations, they also liberate selfishness of the individual and of the group. As the economist Stanislav Shatalin said,

The philosophy of looting, of social parasitism, of the distribution, of plunder and arbitrary partition, of the parvenu, and of the plebeian have now become the alpha and the omega of our existence. We live in a world of individuals in decay, of uncontrolled passions, of contempt for our neighbors....

Individual Communists and some Communist groups remain powerful in this new atmosphere. They operate like mafias, getting what they want, seizing property if they like. But they are only able to do this out of sight

because they have no legitimacy for their actions. A great many powerful people in the Soviet Union are accustomed to obeying a boss, but they no longer have a boss they can respect. They are like the masterless samurai in Japanese history. They are soldiers waiting for a commander and a banner.

Power-Legitimacy Divorce

It is in these conditions that the rival Soviet and republican leaders are attempting to assemble new governing institutions that will have legitimacy, meet the new and conflicting demands, and create a new sense of community. They are finding that the resources that build new institutions have been squandered, fragmented, dispersed: nationalism, principle or "ideology," effective performance, the power of the administrative machine, even armed force. There are now a hundred nationalisms at large in the country, as well as dozens of democratic parties. As in other revolutions, any particular set of new institutions confronts at once the newly liberated demands of one group or another. For instance, the nationalities that control union republics want a union treaty that gives greater power to them than to the USSR government. The smaller nationalities reject this and are trying to use the USSR government against the union republics. It is becoming a war of all against all.

Particularly crippling has been the divorce between power and legitimacy. The army and the KGB have the power, but no legitimacy. Boris Yeltsin and other democratic leaders have great legitimacy, but no power. Neither of these forces can consolidate new institutions against the other; they are locked in a stalemate.

The momentum of change is itself a resource in revolutions. Sometimes it has been possible to solidify revolutionary order by establishing it in final form before the revolutionary surge is spent. But Gorbachev has squandered this resource by his improvisation and dithering. In every revolution the bulk of the public eventually reaches a phase of disillusionment, of apathy, and retreats from the public arena. It is at this point that the early idealism of many ordinary people who may have been attracted to the revolutionary project is overtaken by a longing for order at almost any price. During such a phase, politics tends increasingly to be left to the people who are out for themselves or to fanatics. In the autumn of 1990 this phase arrived in the Soviet Union, with the demands of Colonel Alksnis and other military-KGB leaders for a crackdown, and Gorbachev's partial cooperation with this mood.

There have been since 1985 as many new constitutional arrangements as there were during the French Revolution or the English civil war. Gorbachev's current formula of presidential rule will soon be as forgotten as the French "Constitution of the Year III," or Cromwell's "Humble Petition and Advice." In fact, the successive experiments that are so characteristic of Gorbachev's revolution make it harder to assemble a new institutional structure because they undermine the last vestiges of the predictability within which people live and act. The crowning stupidity was the "currency exchange" of 1990, or, more accurately, the confiscation from the popula-

tion of one-third of the country's money supply. This frivolous act destroyed the last vestiges of confidence and belief in future stability.

There are many in the United States and in the Soviet Union who believe that there is a philosopher's stone, an Aladdin's lamp, whether it be the union treaty, the roundtable discussions, or the market, or \$150 billion from abroad, that will reverse entropy and magically raise from the whirling dust storm the serene white marble pillars of the New Order.

This outcome is possible; in the American constitutional convention it somehow came together. But it is very rare in all of history, and depends on favorable circumstances, leaders of genius, and luck. Whatever emerges from the Soviet dust storm will depend very heavily on chance.

The more likely result is continued confusion, stalemate among the political forces, and growing disintegration of the government and the economy, with periodic intervals in which someone, either democratic or authoritarian, attempts to restore order. Most of these attempts will not gel.

Shades of 1914

During the next years and decades, the dangers from disorder in the Soviet Union may be even greater than the dangers from ordered control of Soviet resources by the Soviet government. The threats we still face from centrally organized and focused Soviet power are likely to diminish because governments will be weak, illegitimate, and preoccupied with desperate internal problems. In this climate, so different from that of 1945–85, whatever government may be in power at a given time will probably be unable to discipline the population and focus Soviet resources in the traditional way on a limited set of objectives. Most of all, these governments will be coping with the collapse of the economy, for which there are dozens of evanescent plans and no clear answer.

Disorder in the Soviet Union poses a special problem for an America whose entire governmental structure is geared to dealing with other states that are in firm control of their populations and their armies. Our national performance in coping with the politics of disorder abroad—with guerrilla wars, insurrections, civil wars, and illegitimate governments—has been poor. Now we have to confront in the Soviet Union the same kind of circumstances that caused World War I—the disintegration of an imperial social and political system, with all the disorder, tensions, terrible fears, and ambitions brought to the surface by that collapse.

Periods of imperial decline are always dangerous. This one will be no exception. It is already apparent that many horrors—famine, death squads, riots, probably civil war—will happen on the soil of the former Soviet Union. Millions of refugees will flee Russia and other republics.

The risk is not the same as with the collapse of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, which set off great contests to pick up the pieces. There will be no rush by Poles or Germans or Japanese to grab pieces of the Soviet empire. The Islamic fundamentalists would like to, but they will not be powerful enough to do so.

The situation will resemble Latin America after the collapse of Spanish colonial dominion when there was tremendous disorder, and no one moved in to take advantage of it for themselves.

A greater danger is that there will be no easy line of demarcation between Eastern Europe and whatever succeeds the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe, in the main, will rapidly become part of the West. The problem is that Eastern Europe overlaps with Russia and the Ukraine: there is the Kaliningrad Oblast (the former East Prussia, now resettled with Russians), Northern Bukovina, Moldavia (two-thirds of whose population is made up of Romanians who will want to join Romania, one-third compact masses of Ukrainians, Gagauz, and Bulgars who are already resisting bitterly). Moldavia is, over the next few years, probably the single most dangerous spot on

Russia is seething with resentments, hatreds, and apocalyptic forebodings of doom similar to those of Germany before Hitler.

Earth. The Slavs in Moldavia are already being protected by Soviet military power. The Romanians and the Romanian nation will not be without their protectors, friends, teachers (the French, traditionally), and investors. Here is the possibility of a direct clash.

An important and virtually inevitable fact of contemporary history is the slow, reluctant extension eastward of Western attempts to influence events. President Bush tried to prevent a crackdown in the Baltic states; not hard, but enough to postpone a summit. When attempts to influence events are serious enough to trigger changes in our behavior, they are in the process of turning into vague, ambiguous *commitments*. Commitments entangle; they can involve one in conflicts, even if they are ambiguous. It was precisely because the British commitments to France and Belgium in 1914 and to Poland in 1939 were ambiguous that they involved Britain in war.

Weimar Russia

A further danger of collapsing empire can come from the apprehensions of the people whose lives are suddenly disorganized. For many years, beneath the Communist system's crust of empty enthusiasm, a mood of deep pessimism has been gathering in the USSR. Its pioneers seem to have been the conservative Russian nationalist intellectuals, but it rapidly spread to many democratic intellectuals and to many of Gorbachev's own officials. With the disappointments and failures of perestroika this mood has deepened into apocalyptic forebodings of doom. Every day one hears that the nation is on the brink of catastrophe: the destruction not only of the

state, but of society, culture, and the environment. Stephen Sestanovich has given this mood the appropriate label “Weimar Russia.” It is difficult for Americans to understand this mood, because no native-born American has ever felt anything like it. In such a mood, anything is possible.

The “Weimar Russia” mood both reacts to and draws on the Soviet popular mood. People in the Soviet Union have resented the state for many decades, but were prevented from expressing their disapproval. Resentment was channeled against other individuals, other groups. Now hatred has burst into the open. People don’t like officials, they don’t like rich people, they don’t like other ethnic groups. They are seething. The rage is probably much more intense than it was in 1917.

It is difficult to feel that everything has gone wrong and that you are responsible. It is easier to hold someone else responsible, to turn despair into revenge. What one often hears from those in grip of “Weimar Russia” is “You will pay.” For people who have already lost everything and only want to feel someone else suffering like themselves, the kind of rational calculations on which foreign

Barring a KGB–military coup, central control over nuclear release in the Soviet Union is likely to be lost within four to five years.

policy and nuclear deterrence are based no longer work.

In the winter of 1990-1991 the reflex to blame outsiders took over high Soviet officials. The new prime minister justified his theft of one-third of the nation’s money by an alleged plot of Canadian bankers to take over the Soviet economy by buying up rubles abroad. This is the rhetoric of high Stalinism; it could have come from the Moscow trials or the “Doctors’ Plot.”

Even many anti-Communist leaders talk this way. Here is the democratically elected president of Georgia on the other political grouping among the anti-Communist Georgian nationalists: “The entire Georgian people must unite in order to sever these traitors from the nation, traitors who are leading the Georgian nation to ruin....It is the Kremlin and Moscow that are behind all this.” Or, again, a founder of the Kazakh Alash Party: “The wolf is our symbol...nothing can now be achieved without venom. What is needed *first of all* is to get rid of those who have been living off the fat of the land, and *then* to establish the just society.”

These attitudes are by no means typical of the opposition movements, but they show the wide resurgence of a certain kind of Stalinism—without a revival of Marxism-Leninism. And Stalinism minus Marxism-Leninism equals fascism.

Growing Nuclear Menace

The popular mood is relevant to assessing what remains the greatest Soviet threat—the nuclear arsenal. The Soviet strategic buildup is continuing rapidly, a situation that will most likely persist until disorder in the Soviet Union becomes far more serious. And even if the overall military budget continues to decline, Soviet nuclear forces are likely to become more of a problem for the West rather than less of one. The Strategic Rocket Forces, as an elite force, are likely to remain intact for longer than the bulk of the conscript army; they are more immune, although certainly not entirely immune, to the social disintegration afflicting much of the rest of the military. Moreover, strategic forces are cheap; they are probably no more than 10 or 15 percent of the Soviet defense budget. Before public order began to break down in the Soviet Union, the military doctrine espoused by figures such as Marshal Ogarkov was already advocating a gradual shift to the use of higher technology. The Gulf War and any pressures for professionalization of the Soviet armed forces will speed this transition. Finally, large and potent nuclear forces are the easiest way for the Soviets to maintain the superpower status they are otherwise losing.

Threatening to use nuclear weapons, or to deploy them in a menacing manner, has been a mainstay of Soviet diplomacy. This began with Soviet threats against Britain and France in 1956 over the Suez. It continued with a long, carefully orchestrated campaign employing the successes of the Soviet space program to make deceptive claims of ICBM strength, from the launch of Sputnik in 1957 through 1961. As Arnold Horelick and Myron Rush have shown, these claims were carefully orchestrated by Khrushchev to bring pressure on the West over Berlin. These threats culminated, and almost became inadvertently real, in the tremendously risky missile deployment to Cuba in 1962.

From 1979 through 1983 the Soviet Union returned to the use of nuclear threats against the United States, the NATO countries, and Japan in an attempt to deter the American intermediate nuclear forces (INF) deployment. Soviet leaders, including Brezhnev, publicly suggested that the American INF deployment would make obsolete the U.S.–Soviet agreement after the Cuban missile crisis. Soviet diplomats filled in this hint privately by saying that an American deployment would give the USSR the right to deploy missiles next to the United States in Cuba, Mexico, or Nicaragua. This was a frightening move because the Cuban missile crisis was the closest the two superpowers have come to nuclear war. Nuclear threats are an aspect of Soviet behavior that we may well see returning. They would be highly compatible with a post-Communist foreign policy of national self-assertion rather than expansion. They lend themselves to securing respect. And, of course, the “Weimar Russia” mood is one that conduces to frightening others, to making other peoples undergo the miseries that you are undergoing in a different way.

We can probably anticipate more Soviet violations of arms-control treaties as well. The Soviet Defense Ministry is currently wriggling out of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty negotiated by the Foreign Ministry.

The Soviet leadership crisis makes the violation of arms-control treaties even more likely because a disintegrating government does not necessarily control its arms levels. Already, most of Gorbachev's domestic decrees have simply been disregarded. The example of the 1920s and '30s, in which Japan was bound by the Washington and London Naval Treaties but the navy had substantial autonomy from the civilian government, is not encouraging. Japan violated these treaties in a number of ways.

Another danger is the potential of civil disorder and shattered sovereignty to undermine verification capabilities, particularly in the area of on-site verification, which America is now emphasizing. There is no point in having a certain number of visits by right if the site is blocked by mobs of Georgians with rifles and bandoliers. Arms-control agreements will thus be useful only if they physically destroy entire classes of weapons (as in the INF Treaty) or move them out of areas to which they cannot easily return (as with Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe).


Collapsing Chain of Command

Control over many conventional weapons has so broken down that one can buy an armored personnel carrier in the Soviet Union today for the cost of a 1982 Toyota in America. It is therefore natural to ask what will happen to the approximately 30,000 nuclear warheads that the government now controls. As regards the location of Soviet nuclear weapons and the custodial personnel, the situation is fairly reassuring. Almost all strategic weapons are located in the Russian Republic or at sea. The personnel who have custody over Soviet nuclear warheads themselves are specially selected and trained KGB forces. The overwhelming majority are Russians and Ukrainians, as is the case in the Strategic Rocket Forces. So the possibility that Armenian or Azerbaijani nationalists would get their hands on an SS-18 and launch it probably belongs to fiction.

But here a misunderstood truth about the current Soviet crisis is relevant. The rebellion of the nationalities, while important, is not the main problem. The main problem is the collapse of the legitimacy of the Soviet state; the collapse of its officials' authority—especially Gorbachev's—and the growing disintegration of the administrative machinery at every level. This disintegration is taking place within the Russian Republic as well as among the other republics.

So the location of Soviet nuclear weapons, and the nationality of the personnel who control them, is not the decisive issue. It is the collapse of normal chains of command, of loyalty and professionalism throughout the system, that is ominous. Last year enlisted men in the Strategic Rocket Forces at a missile base in the Urals formed a strike committee and threatened to leave the base unless their demands for better food were met—a stark reminder that the enormous lethal power of the Soviet Union may be up for grabs as the system controlling that power further unravels.

In general, the USSR has been far more centralized in allocating authority to use nuclear weapons than has the United States, more jealous of the prerogative of the top leaders. Even if Soviet technology remains somewhat



Soviet nuclear forces are likely to become more threatening, rather than less threatening, as a result of the present upheaval.

more primitive, overall Soviet security procedures have, until now, remained more reliable and harder to break. There are, however, two difficulties.

First, most security procedures do not deal with the possibility of rogue use of nuclear weapons by the leader authorized to release them. Under ordinary political conditions this issue scarcely arises, because a national leader has interests that are substantially identical with his country's survival. The exceptions that one might imagine—sudden insanity, for example—are sufficiently easy to recognize and cope with. Under conditions of loss of leadership authority, national disintegration, and civil war, everything is different: a leader's interest is not necessarily the same as his country's, and the circumstances that define a "proper" use of nuclear weapons become ambiguous, debatable.

A second problem involves the possibility of unauthorized release by lower officials, such as the military, under conditions of loss of leadership authority. The American president depends on lower officers to set the codes that he can use to order the release of nuclear weapons. Apparently the president does not even have the combination to the lock on the "football," or briefcase containing nuclear release codes. The danger in the Soviet Union is that lower officials may no longer respect the authority of Gorbachev or his successors.

The foregoing difficulty is exacerbated by the dual authority or *dvoevlastie* that has arisen in the Soviet Union. Because the Communist Party was ultimately higher than the state administration, nuclear release authority belonged to the general secretary of the CPSU,



UPI/Bettmann

Soviet troops in Azerbaijan. The disintegration of the empire opens up the risk of war along the border between the Russian and the Islamic worlds.

not to the president. The deepest kind of loyalty that the general secretary's subordinates felt toward him was party loyalty, or democratic centralism. Gorbachev has formally relocated nuclear release authority to the enhanced position of president, which he now holds. But in a system where old habits are dropped every day, it is questionable whether the merely formal and legal change can secure a shift of loyalty from general secretary to president if these offices should be separated or if they are not held by Gorbachev. In fact, Gorbachev, after excluding the Communist Party from state administration, remains general secretary. Why? The most obvious answer is that Gorbachev is not sure that without the office of general secretary he could continue to command the loyalty of the KGB and the armed forces in the stark circumstances that may arise. Currently, the coexistence of the offices of general secretary and president in the same person assures centralized control over nuclear release.

But Gorbachev is surely the last president of the USSR who will be general secretary. No Communist leader could win the presidential elections that are now scheduled into the future. Nor could the president of the Russian Republic, Boris Yeltsin, or any likely winner of a union-wide presidential election, win acceptance by the Communist Party as its own leader. Barring a KGB-military coup, central control over nuclear release in the Soviet Union is likely to be lost within four to five years.

Rethinking Nuclear Deterrence

In the Soviet Union, as in the West, there is a strong aversion to nuclear weapons, and they would never be

used easily or frivolously. Nevertheless, as the Soviet conscript army becomes less reliable, and perhaps even dissolves altogether, it will create incentives to turn to elite forces and the high-technology weapons that they use. In the Russian civil war, for example, the Whites created regiments composed entirely of officers. Nuclear weapons are in the category of high-technology weapons that may still be available for use at a point when the decay of the military structure has made the traditional forces of crowd control, coups, and civil wars unusable. Of course, Soviet nuclear weapons are under different command from the rest of the weapons: the most powerful are used by the Strategic Rocket Forces, and the warheads and launch arrangements seem to be under the control of the KGB. Thus, nuclear weapons may attract attention simply as the weapons available to a certain group against the groups who control other weapons. One possible civil war scenario might be a conflict in which the bulk of the army is on one side, the KGB and the security forces on the other side. In such a conflict, nuclear weapons might be a KGB resource.

The use of nuclear weapons in a Soviet civil war or border war is unlikely, but certainly not impossible. The use of strategic weapons against us is far less likely, but not impossible. Any use of nuclear weapons would produce a drastic change in the world mood, comparable perhaps to the reaction to World War I during the 1930s, and that change would produce still other unpredictable transformations.

However unlikely the use of Soviet nuclear weapons may be, the horrifying cost of their use against anyone

should oblige us to take measures against them. In 1945, when people first had to confront the human significance of the existence of nuclear weapons, the first answers suggested were disarmament and world government. These answers were of a magnitude that did justice to the problem, but were unrealistic in the circumstances. Subsequently, deterrence and arms control were devised as interim answers that would bridge the period until a more comprehensive solution became available. Then, beginning in the late 1950s, the distortion of deterrence known as minimum deterrence (the doctrine that any quantity of survivable nuclear weapons however configured serves to deter nuclear use) came to seem to many a permanent answer to the problem of nuclear weapons, an answer that enabled us to purge the ultimate nuclear fears from our minds.

Minimum deterrence presupposed a world of orderly, centrally controlled, rational states, something like the world of recent decades. The unravelling of the Soviet state shows starkly how exceedingly fanciful this expectation is over a long period of history. How long will deterrence work? Fifty years? One hundred years? One thousand years? Whatever may be the real fate of Soviet nuclear weapons as the Soviet Union unravels, the present situation ought to force us back to more fundamental solutions to man's nuclear problem. Over a long span of time, these answers would combine arms control with the development of new weapons technologies that make nuclear weapons less attractive as weapons. In the short term, the Soviet crisis makes arms control more difficult. Thus, it tremendously increases our incentives for moving toward a world in which conventional weapons are accurate enough to replace nuclear weapons, and in which the strategic defensive is dominant over the offensive. We need the Strategic Defense Initiative more than ever. It is more important to move in the defensive direction, to begin some sort of deployment, than to have a perfect system.

Soviet-Islamic Seismic Zone

Some other traditional threats from the Soviet Union remain. Indeed, if the threat to NATO's central front has diminished, the vulnerability of its southern flank may have increased. It is already clear that Turkey's neighborhood—the Balkans and the Caucasus—will be in chaos for years or decades. In the Caucasus the Moslem Azerbaijanis are already signing diplomatic agreements with the Turkish Republic, trying to draw it into the Soviet melee. Other Moslem groups whose autonomy the Georgian nationalists are trying to take away—the Abkhaz and the Adzhars—may appeal to Turkey as the Ossetians are already appealing to Russia. Many of these irredentisms are yet to emerge, but every reader of the newspaper knows the most serious: the Armenian-Azerbaijani struggle. The last series of guerilla fights and massacres between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, in 1918, was ended when the Turkish army marched victoriously to Baku and northward. Further movement toward independence by Armenia has an obvious potential to involve NATO and the Russian or Soviet government in what may be the world's most lurid drama of revenge and retaliation, the Turkish-Armenian

antagonism. It is only prudent to give greater attention to the military security of Turkey.

And it is prudent also to give attention further east in the Moslem world. Of all the ancient civilizations eroded by modernity, the Islamic has displayed the greatest pride and the greatest instinct to resistance. Accordingly, the zone of contact between the West and the Islamic world has been a zone of disorder, from Algeria to the West Bank to the Philippine island of Mindanao. Soviet repression put these tensions, like many others, in the deep freeze. Since Gorbachev's arrival in 1985 the pugnacity of Soviet Moslems has reemerged with startling rapidity: in 1986 the Alma-Ata riots in Kazakhstan, followed by the pogrom at Sumgait in Azerbaijan, and massacres at Noviy Uzen in Kazakhstan and the Ferghana Valley (Kirghiz Republic). The Moslem peoples of the USSR have shown a terrifying capacity for mass violence against the Russians and against each other.

As the USSR unravels, there will be more conflicts along the southern fringe of the Soviet Union that have the potential to draw in on one side the armies of the Soviet Union, of Russia, or of other independent

The Soviet leadership crisis means we can probably anticipate more violations of arms-control treaties.

republics, and on the other side the forces of neighboring states, mainly Moslem. (China has a potential to be drawn in by conflicts among the same peoples in Soviet Central Asia and in Sinkiang.) Intervention by neighboring Islamic states is made more likely by the fact that only here in the world is there anyone who wants to pick up the pieces of the disintegrating Soviet empire. The Islamic fundamentalists in Iran, perhaps soon in Afghanistan, cherish old-fashioned dreams of revolution and conquest, even of martyrdom, of the kind that seems to be dying out in most other places today.

If serious conflicts do arise over the Soviet-Islamic seismic zone, they could spill over to the Persian Gulf. Iran stretches from Azerbaijan to the oil fields, whose riches are vital for the West and not without interest to the Soviet Union. As Saddam Hussein's invasion illustrates, the oil-rich Gulf region is like a plump cow tethered next to an alligator. Over the next few years the USSR will grow hungrier and hungrier.

In the near future, of course, Soviet use of its vast military superiority toward the south will be heavily discouraged by domestic preoccupations and by the memories of Afghanistan and Desert Storm. Yet the Soviet-Islamic seismic zone is an area in which conflict is certain to increase and in which the West has intrinsic though limited interests. The forces that gave us the power in the theater to beat Saddam Hussein were



UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

The Third World can still supply a valuable resource almost totally exhausted in the USSR: Communists. The U.S. cannot assume the Soviets will no longer use them as proxies.

originally sized to deal with Soviet threats to the Gulf. This possibility should not be forgotten as we trim and redistribute our forces.

Third-World Proxies

Recent Soviet reverses in Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Angola do not necessarily signify an end to East-West conflict in the Third World. There is a widespread view, both in the West and in the Soviet Union itself, that the Soviet activism of the 1970s in the Third World only created useless burdens; the remaining Third-World clients, such as Cuba, have become quite unpopular. There is much truth in this view; the ill-judged adventure in Afghanistan played a substantial role in triggering the collapse of the system.

However, the Third World can still supply a valuable resource almost totally exhausted in the USSR: Communists. In the present-day USSR scarcely anyone believes in Communism in the old way, as a cause and a faith. Over the long run, the collapse of Communism in the USSR will have a devastating effect on the Soviet ability to attract Third-World ideological movements. But in parts of the Third World fanatical Communists still exist: Peru, the Philippines, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, to take only some examples. As I have suggested in the *National Interest*, world Communism is like a fire that burns outward, leaving ashes at the center;

rather than a centralized mass, it increasingly assumes the shape of a ring or doughnut. The Soviet Union, if it ever wishes to become difficult again, would find some of its Third-World client states and guerrilla movements among the best instruments.

The costs of empire cut in two directions. A hungrier Soviet Union can ill afford subsidies like those to Cuba. The cost alone virtually rules out Soviet acquisition of new Third-World client states during the next few years. Cost and popular attitudes rule out the dispatch of new Soviet expeditionary forces. At the same time, the use of clients produces "a bigger bang for the buck." If the Soviet Union wants to pressure the West and to shape Western behavior, it can do so effectively in the Third World at little cost, and in a way that is deniable. As recent experiences in Central America show very clearly, Third-World client movements can tie the U.S. in knots for the expenditure of relatively small resources. The United States cannot assume that the experience will not be repeated.

Directions for U.S. Policy

To confront the dangers of a dying bear, several clear directions for American policy can be sketched.

First, it is essential not to slash the defense budget. Some old dangers are now reduced. It is now much easier to protect Western Europe from a Soviet blitzkrieg. But we are moving into a dangerous epoch of world history, one in which military force will remain crucial. In particular, we will need as much protection as we can get against Soviet missiles.

Second, it is important for our leaders to prepare the public for disappointed hopes, and for dangers that are unfamiliar and strange. With the confidence and sense of responsibility we take away from Desert Storm, this spiritual preparation is now easier.

Third, our bureaucratic structures, organized to deal with the old problems, need to be reorganized. Intelligence (both collection and covert operations) becomes more important. Human intelligence becomes more important relative to technological means of surveillance. The U.S. Information Agency becomes more important relative to the State Department; whole classes of people, yesterday the literary intellectuals and today the young colonels, are entering Soviet politics for the first time without a clearly defined worldview.

Fourth, we need new kinds of professionals to cope with the revolutionary problems of imperial decay and disorder, of weak governments and insurgent movements. We must abandon the strangely entrenched notion of foreign policy as government-to-government relations. The American concept of diplomacy and national security policy has been shaped predominantly in the past 30 years by crisis management and negotiation, particularly arms-control negotiation. Both crisis management and negotiation assume we are dealing in isolated, ahistorical situations with governments as solid entities. This perspective informs not only our analysis of the problems but our entire educational system for public policy professionals (for instance, the Kennedy School case-study approach). That educational system is now outmoded, guided as it was by long-abandoned

social-science hopes and by technocratic optimism in our approach to the world. In recasting our educational system for public policy, we need to give much greater emphasis to the understanding of complexity, to geography, history, anthropology, and the rising study of transitions to democracy.

Ludicrous Disproportion

Finally, we need some circumspection about the ability of U.S. policy-makers to shape events in the Soviet Union. A commonly heard argument is that we have to save Gorbachev and prevent the disintegration of the USSR by giving the central government loans and symbolic support such as summits. The other side argues that we have to save the democrats from Gorbachev by withholding the same kinds of assistance. Only within the peculiar horizon of Washington or Bonn, where tomorrow's vote or export license or presidential press conference seems the biggest thing in the world, could either of these arguments be taken seriously. Both share a ludicrous disproportion between ends and means. We are dealing here with something on the historic scale of the fall of the Roman Empire. Titanic forces are at work that have accumulated over 70 years of oppression and misery and are now being released in a few years. How likely is it that one summit or a few billion dollars can dam up or deflect these titanic forces? The closest parallel we have seen in our times was China's Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. No one in the West thought we could determine which leader would emerge from that upheaval on top. This is a measure of our desperate illusions about Gorbachev.

Loans to the central government will not help. Neither, it follows, will they really hurt. The money will simply disappear. There are some exceptions to this rule. If people are starving, we ought to give compassionate relief as we usually do. There may in the future be an opportunity to aid specific areas under democratic control where the democrats have succeeded in getting control over the local economy. Aid to such areas might tip the balance by showing that democracy can work.

We may also have the opportunity to support specific projects that are clearly in our interests. To pay for the construction of housing for army officers' families would deal with the most serious cause of the military dissatisfaction that might cause a coup. To modernize the Soviet coal mines would maintain the democratic allegiance of the miners, who are probably Boris Yeltsin's only source of real power. Another project that would serve our interests would be to provide or pay for paper (now in short supply) for democratic newspapers and magazines. Such exceptions can be defined by three criteria: 1) The aid must be used for specific, identified purposes; 2) the donors, not the Soviet authorities, must choose projects; and 3) the funds must be disbursed and used up quickly, so that, as in so many cases of foreign aid, they do not aid different people in a different social and economic situation.


An exception in the other direction is technology transfer. The Soviet economy cannot effectively use hard currency, but the military machine can still use advanced

technology; we cannot know, in the existing situation, whether it will some day be used against us.

The ways in which we use symbolism—summits, diplomatic reactions to crackdowns, *etc.*—can have a marginal influence on events. In this unexplored, incredibly complex, and shifting scene we simply do not know enough to be clever; we might as well be guided by our principles and sympathies but without illusions about our powers. This dictates, first of all, that we show we are not indifferent to the hopes and sufferings of the peoples of the USSR. To give the opposite impression is to reinforce the "Weimar Russia" mood. Second, we should help our friends and oppose our enemies. It is clear that Yeltsin and the other democrats are our friends. It is less clear whether the post-Communist authoritarians such as Colonel Alksnis are our enemies;

We are dealing here with something on the historic scale of the fall of the Roman Empire. How likely is it that one summit or a few billion dollars can dam up or deflect these titanic forces?

it is important to remain in touch with them. Finally, we cannot save Gorbachev, but (as Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak has said) it is not in our interest to see him depart soon. Gorbachev in power, nominally, is a talisman that wards off a KGB-military coup.

Does this mean that our mighty nation is condemned to ineffectiveness? If we looked only at the present and at the influence the American government acting on other governments can have, the answer would be yes. But a free people has both a state and a society. The great influence we can have is the influence of Western society on Soviet society. It is instructive to think back to the Chinese example. We could not determine what leader or cause emerged victorious from the Cultural Revolution, but we could shape the allegiance of the students who rose in Tiananmen Square. In this way, we can powerfully influence the future even if we are weak in our ability to influence the present. Perhaps the most important function of American diplomacy is to hold open the opportunity for the two societies to interact. During the rest of our lifetimes the former Communist empire will be seeking and receiving new institutions, new businesses, new ideas, new habits, and new heroes. It is a virgin continent, almost as open to different destinies as the New World was 500 years ago. For us, it is the last frontier. 

TOP GUNS

Rating Weapons Systems in the Gulf War

DOV S. ZAKHEIM

Everyone loves a winner, especially defense contractors. Nothing boosts sales, both domestic and foreign, more than what industry advertisers call “proven combat capability.” The Persian Gulf War has thus been a salesman’s bonanza, as initial reports from the trade press and congressional hearings have spewed forth glorious details of target kills, high mission-capable rates, phenomenal accuracy, and minimal losses.

The euphoria over what truly was “a famous victory” has not, however, erased the grim realities facing Pentagon budgeteers. Real defense expenditures have fallen every fiscal year since 1986. The 1990 budget summit agreement, which called for a 1-percent real decline in defense spending for fiscal year 1991, continues to hold. The \$3.5-billion supplemental appropriation for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm is considered an emergency funding requirement, not subject to the defense caps in the agreement. It will not affect the baseline for projected future budget reductions.

One of the most important challenges for the Pentagon, therefore, is to study how to redirect diminishing defense resources in light of the Gulf operation. The current defense posture simply cannot be allowed to continue on its pre-war decline without a serious accounting of what weapons systems worked, what didn’t work, what could have worked, and what was irrelevant to the allied victory over Iraq.

Their Brilliant Careers

Any assessment of the different systems must begin with the efficiency of the people who manned them. The Gulf War was the first major overseas American operation that drew upon the all-volunteer force. Hundreds of thousands of troops, many of whom had been attracted to the military by prospects of career advancement, were deployed to an area of the world that was as climatically inhospitable as it was culturally alien to them. Nevertheless, these troops, men and women, performed their tasks brilliantly. There were few reports of malingering, desertion, or crumbling morale. The incessant intrusiveness of television cameras served only to reinforce the impression that the American officer corps was highly educated, motivated, and articulate, while the enlisted

force was well-trained, capable, and in good spirits.

That the United States was able to deploy such a capable force was directly due to the compensation and training programs that had been implemented during the late 1970s and the 1980s. Compensation for the military was pegged at levels competitive with many sectors of the civilian arena. Advancement was achieved on the basis of merit. Racism was virtually eliminated, as was drug abuse. Training was made ever more sophisticated, drawing not only upon advances in simulator technology, but also upon realistic training centers and regiments, such as Red Flag at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and the Navy Air Combat Maneuvering Ranges at Oceana, Virginia, and Miramar, California.

In the main, U.S. weapons systems proved superior to their enemy counterparts. Yet, even more important, many U.S. commanders sincerely believe that, had American troops exchanged their equipment with Iraqi forces, the allies would still have won the war.

Triumph of Air Power

Air Force Chief of Staff Merrill McPeak boldly proclaimed in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf operation, “It was the first time in history that a field army has been defeated by air power.” There is considerable evidence to support McPeak’s assertion. The precision attacks of the F-117s, F-15s, and F-16s; the anti-armor strikes of the A-10s; and the contribution of allied aircraft, coupled with B-52 carpet bombing, severely demoralized and disoriented Iraqi forces. The air attacks disrupted the Iraqi command-and-control system, led directly to the exodus of the Iraqi air force to Iran, and resulted in major damage to the Iraqi armored inventory, including 1,700 tanks, 1,000 armored vehicles, and over 1,500 artillery pieces.

The Air Force’s performance, however, does not con-

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AP/Wide World Photos

The brilliant performance of the all-volunteer force should banish any thought of restoring a draft or weakening military compensation.

clusively validate the requirement for all of its current programs. Indeed, it raises some questions about the B-2 in a conventional warfare role, the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF), the planned multi-role follow-on to the F-16, and the Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS).

Proponents of the B-2, and even more so of the ATF, have argued that the war conclusively demonstrated the effectiveness and contribution of stealth aircraft. They point out that the F-117 performed flawlessly, flying approximately 1,600 sorties without a loss, and destroying 37 targets in Kuwait and Iraq on just the first night of the war. Its performance in this respect was not unique: the F-117's sorties accounted for a tiny fraction of the total of 110,000 allied sorties, during which only 14 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft were lost. But stealth technology was very important at the beginning of the conflict in eluding Iraqi air defenses when they were most powerful.

The F-117 was not without deficiencies. It apparently was unable to function when there was low-level cloud cover, as might be expected in operations elsewhere in the world. It also was not armed to deal with air-to-air missiles should it have been detected by enemy interceptors. Of course, stealth aircraft are not meant to be detected. Nevertheless, stealth technology cannot fully

mask an aircraft under all conditions. According to the House of Commons Select Committee on Defense, British destroyers operating in the Gulf were able to identify the aircraft at up to 40 miles away. In theory, at this distance the plane's flight profile could have been tracked and patrolling fighters vectored to intercept it.

B-2 or Not B-2

On balance, the Gulf War showed that highly capable stealth aircraft are necessary in conventional conflicts if the U.S. is to maintain the edge over countries such as Iraq that operate sophisticated air defenses. The war did not make the case, though, that the U.S. needs both the ATF and the B-2 for this purpose. Given budgetary constraints, the ATF will probably be sufficient.

After the Gulf War, it will be harder to justify pursuing the B-2 program on non-strategic grounds. The Air Force did not employ the B-1 in the Gulf War. (Indeed, the Air Force might not have employed B-52Gs to the extent that it did, had not the B-1 already entered the strategic nuclear force and had not those B-52s been dropped from the strategic nuclear triad.) It is exceedingly unlikely that the Air Force would ever risk the even more costly and precious B-2 (there will be only 75 aircraft under the current plan) in a war against any nation other than the Soviet Union or its technological equivalent.

Presumably, the B-2 could be useful in a Libya-style raid if no overseas bases were available for the shorter-range stealth aircraft, but that is a highly unlikely contingency.

If the B-2 program is to be pursued, it should be on the basis of the bomber's contribution to a strategic deterrent that already includes the B-1 bomber and will incorporate the advanced cruise missile. The B-2's fate is also inextricably tied both to its huge cost and to assessments of future strategic arms control agreements with the Soviet Union.

The performance of the F-16, as well as of the F-15, so dominated the Gulf theater that it is also worth reconsidering the need to develop an entirely new multi-role fighter, particularly given funding of an ATF and

Supposed requirements yet to be validated include the B-2 bomber in a conventional role; the JSTARS reconnaissance system; large reserve forces; and the C-17 airlifter.

the potential for upgrading the F-16 force. There is no question that the United States is the dominant air power in the world today. The ATF is likely to guarantee that dominance, at least technologically. At the same time, it must be recognized that fixed-wing aircraft are only one part of a multifaceted attack force. The Gulf War witnessed the successful employment of a combination of attacks initially by stealth aircraft and Tomahawk missiles, and then by Stand-off Land Attack Missiles (SLAM) and Air Force laser-guided bombs against Iraqi targets. This combination, potentially supplemented by anti-radar remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), provides the model for future operations, just as it drew upon the Israeli success against the Syrian air force in 1982. Such a combined-arms model permits the utilization of capable, but lesser systems, such as the F-16, or an improved F-16 version in a much less hostile environment. A multi-role fighter may well be redundant, and the need for it remains to be established.

Fallen JSTARS

The program for the JSTARS radar system also requires something more than the results of Desert Storm to justify its current magnitude. Two JSTARS aircraft, which had been rushed to the Gulf, were credited with providing important targeting information against enemy armor and especially against mobile Scuds. But this information could have been available through other means, most notably remotely piloted vehicles

(RPVs). In fact, it is well known that the United States has been extremely slow in developing capable RPVs to provide the kinds of near real-time target information that was already available to Israel during the Lebanon War nearly a decade ago. Moreover, the record of the allied hunt for mobile Scuds left much to be desired, given the coalition's general knowledge of where the missiles were located (by calculating flight profiles), and the heavy involvement in targeting activities by Special Operations Forces. Finally, while JSTARS survivability was never in doubt, it might be more vulnerable in other scenarios.

While questions may linger regarding the future of the B-2 or JSTARS, they do not challenge the Air Force's basic proposition that air power can play a far more critical role in combat than previously was assumed. The primary adversaries facing the United States today, or in the likely future, are all highly centralized dictatorships—such as North Korea or Vietnam—whose people may be unwilling to fight and whose forces are rigidly controlled from headquarters. Against such adversaries, air forces, if they retain their technological superiority, can be expected to play the type of devastating role they did in Desert Storm with similar results in terms of not only damage to materiel but to morale as well.

Naval Aviation's Minor Role

Desert Storm did not directly demonstrate the centrality of naval aviation. The Navy's EA-6B jammers provided crucial support to Air Force strikes into Kuwait and Iraq. Naval aviation provided protection for American shipping, which carried 95 percent of all supplies into the Gulf. And of course, the Navy provided air cover for its own surface units, as well as for the Marine amphibious exercises: without the realism afforded by naval air support, the Iraqis might have concluded that those exercises were indeed a feint.

Otherwise, naval aviation played a relatively minor role in the Gulf War. Navy fighters shot down only two of the 35 Iraqi fighters destroyed by the coalition forces in air-to-air combat (the Air Force shot down 31). Navy aircraft flew fewer than one-third as many sorties as the Air Force, and one-third of those sorties were support missions. Navy FA-18 aircraft had insufficient range to hit Iraqi targets, while longer-range A-6 aircraft took a back seat to the Air Force's deep-strike planes.

The Navy has not helped itself by creating an impression of total disarray in its aviation program, with the cancellation of the A-12 stealth attack aircraft and of the remanufactured F-14 (the F-14D), which Congress is seeking to restore. These developments have simply reinforced the prejudices of long-standing opponents of the aircraft carrier force program.

Yet, paradoxically, the Navy's secondary role in the Gulf conflict might strengthen the case for employing naval forces in other Third-World imbroglios. The Gulf War presented the United States with an extremely favorable logistical environment. Saudi bases were built to U.S. military specifications. Saudi infrastructure likewise was geared to meet American needs. Once King Fahd had indicated his approval shortly after the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, access to these facilities was assured. The

Air Force then had five months to prepare itself for combat in an increasingly familiar environment.

Future conflicts may not afford American land-based forces such a hospitable logistical climate. Even a conflict in the southern Gulf might open with direct attacks on Saudi airfields; no potential aggressor contemplating American intervention is likely to give American forces the free ride that Saddam Hussein did. In such circumstances, naval aviation would presumably play the role that the Air Force played in Desert Storm. At least five carriers would be necessary to support a full-time Indian Ocean presence, not including carrier requirements elsewhere.


Vindication for Army

In most respects, it was the land forces whose performance was subject to the greatest uncertainty and potential criticism prior to the Gulf War. To begin with, land forces had not participated in large-scale operations since the Vietnam War. The largest post-Vietnam operation was in Panama, which called for less than the equivalent of a reinforced division and did not involve the use of heavy armor. The Army's backbone—its armored forces—had not been tested in two decades.

In addition, the Army's lackluster record of program management throughout the '70s and '80s cast a shadow over its predicted performance in the field. The Army had taken well over a decade to develop the much-criticized M-1 tank. Its mechanized infantry vehicle, later called the Bradley, was constantly troubled by reports of everything from poor performance to rigged testing. The Apache helicopter was criticized for its poor readiness rates. These systems at least made it to the field. The Sergeant York air-defense gun and the Aquila remotely piloted vehicle did not. Both proved to be too costly, as well as far less effective than the Army had originally advertised.

Desert Storm thus proved to be a most pleasant vindication for the land forces, and notably the Army. The M-1 tank consistently outperformed its Iraqi counterpart, the Soviet-made T-72. In particular, its 120mm gun outranged the T-72's 125mm gun, and proved to be far more accurate and lethal. The Bradley surprised even its own advocates by registering a number of tank kills with its 25mm gun firing depleted uranium rounds. It also demonstrated its ability to keep pace with the M-1 during the Army's lightning strike across western Iraq. By all accounts, the Multiple Launch Rocket System was a major factor in silencing Iraqi artillery batteries. The Apache helicopter compiled a maintenance record that exceeded its programmed goals. It also demonstrated its assault capability as early as the first hours of the land attack when Apaches destroyed three Iraqi radars as part of a special forces operation.

These systems did not perform flawlessly, nor did they put to rest questions about the future path their programs might take. The M-1 did prove to be a gas guzzler, forcing crews in at least one case to refuel between two mine fields on the Kuwaiti border. Four Bradleys were lost to enemy fire. The Apache's readiness was due to what could only be described as a band-aid approach to maintenance—the taping of rotor blades to



Eric Schulzinger

The Gulf War showed that highly capable stealth aircraft such as the F-117 are necessary in conventional conflicts.

counter erosion in the Gulf sands.

Will all of these systems and their programmed successors work next time? The M-1 has justified its role as the Army's main battle tank. But it has not justified the need for a follow-on heavy tank. Indeed, as the Bradley demonstrated, a much lighter vehicle, armed with a smaller gun but with potent ammunition rounds, might prove to be a formidable centerpiece for armored divisions, while affording them far greater strategic mobility than the 70-ton M-1 could offer. The Army must look closely at the potential cost effectiveness of a 35-ton tank, armed with a large-caliber gun. A C-141 transport plane (which can carry 47 tons) could carry one; a C-5 transport plane (which can transport 132 tons) could carry three.

The Army's anti-tank program likewise deserves some careful review. The TOW anti-tank missile was not a major performer in the Gulf War. To be sure, with the Army on the offensive, the M-1 performing as well as it did, and the skies full of attack aircraft and helicopters, there was far less scope for TOW to shine. Yet published reports indicate that even when TOW was given its chance, it did not perform as effectively as might have been expected.

The Army is currently developing a new medium Advanced Anti-Tank Weapons System (AAWS-M). The program has suffered from both technical difficulties and sharp developmental cost increases. Given other budget needs, as well as the likelihood that in other Third-World conflicts where American air superiority is likely to be maintained, anti-tank missiles will again be relegated to a secondary role, the case for delaying AAWS-M development and production appears especially compelling.

There may also be a case for scaling back, if not delaying, the new \$9-billion light helicopter (LH) program. Proponents of the LH have begun to argue that the Gulf War validated the need for an armed reconnaissance escort for the Apache helicopter. In fact, there is still some question whether the Apache proved its worth as a tank killer, given the stellar record of the Air Force's own A-10 attack aircraft, which reportedly destroyed about twice as many tanks. Yet even if it is conceded that Apache offers a useful supplement to the A-10, it is questionable just how much money should be spent on developing a supplement to the supplement. Certainly,

Patriot's shortcomings demonstrated the need to pursue its upgrades in a more systematic manner in tandem with related programs that could defend wider areas.

some reconnaissance dedicated to the heliborne attack mission is in order. Possibly some armored capability for that reconnaissance platform is also justified. But the LH is being advertised as a multiple-capability armored system that appears to be able to operate as an attack helicopter in its own right. That much of an adjunct to the main tank-killing force may be too much.

Sunshine Patriot

On a much more positive note, Patriot for the first time proved the operational feasibility of an anti-missile missile within the U.S. force structure. Patriot was so lionized by the press and public during the war that an understandable reaction has set in. Israeli critics, and their American counterparts, are correct in pointing out that Patriot radars failed to discriminate between the warhead and other portions of the Scud as it broke apart in mid-air; that Patriot therefore fired at false targets; that Patriot hits still led to debris falling on the heads and roofs of Israeli civilians.

On the other hand, Patriot was designed to defend small areas, such as air bases, rather than cities. Army personnel did not train for the large-area defense mission. Nor did they have the luxury of training in Israel for five months prior to combat, as they did in Saudi Arabia. Instead, U.S. forces were called into action within days of their arrival in Israel at the request of an obviously hesitant Israeli government. It is, therefore, sheer nonsense to assert that Patriot caused more harm than good in Israel because there was more damage after Patriot arrived and more Scuds were fired at the Jewish state. The most devastating Scud attack was the one when Patriots did not fire at an incoming missile over Saudi

Arabia and 28 American troops lost their lives. If anything, Patriot's shortcomings demonstrated the need to pursue its upgrades in a more systematic manner than in the past—in tandem with related anti-missile missile programs that could defend wider areas.

Tomahawks on Target

Although naval aviation played a rather minor role in the war, certain other naval systems truly made a difference for U.S. capabilities.

Foremost among these was the Tomahawk cruise missile, in both its sea-based and submarine-launched versions. Tomahawks were especially effective early in the war, complementing the F-117s in their attacks on key Iraqi installations. Their accuracy diminished markedly as the war wore on, hampered by insufficient mapping support. Even so, nearly 70 percent of all Tomahawks intended for launch struck their targets. The lesson might simply be to give the missile a more autonomous homing and discrimination capability.

Despite the Tomahawk's record, the Navy has been far less forthcoming about the missile's performance than the Air Force has been about its aircraft or the Army about its armored units. Like remotely piloted vehicles, whose relative absence in the force structure despite an enviable performance record continues to be lamented by analysts, Tomahawk represents a threat to manned aircraft. Impending budget cuts, and the prospect of new and expensive fighter programs (the Navy intends to develop its own advanced tactical fighter as a derivative of the F-22) are likely to depress force levels even further than currently planned. Perhaps at long last the services will become serious about improving long-range conventional cruise missiles.

Damn the Torpedoes

Tomahawks were launched primarily from battleships. Battleships also provided critical gunfire support for the Marines. It is puzzling, therefore, why the battleships are again being consigned to the mothball fleet.

The battleship is the perfect combatant for entering narrow, potentially dangerous seas such as the Persian Gulf. A mine seriously damaged the billion-dollar AEGIS cruiser USS *Princeton*. The same mine exploding in exactly the same place under a battleship would have caused negligible damage. In an era when budget constraints have become so tight that even carrier advocates concede the need to reduce from the current 15 battle-group level, the utility of the battleship as the core of a forward-deployed battle group becomes even more pronounced. If anything, the battleship's performance should justify a review, if not reversal, of the decision not to retain it in the active fleet.

On the other hand, the Gulf War raised serious questions about the size and nature of the Navy's submarine force. Thirteen submarines, less than one-seventh of the total force, participated in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. That force was sized on the basis of assumptions not only regarding the Soviet threat, but also regarding the need to protect aircraft carrier battle groups. Those battle groups are soon to be reduced, and the threat to them appears marginal.

The Soviet submarine threat is significant, but has never truly been the analytical basis for submarine force levels. With the SSN-21 Seawolf attack submarine costing about \$2 billion per copy, the program has become a major drain on naval resources. The Navy should reconsider, in light of the Gulf War, whether the security environment of the next 20 years permits a significant reduction in planned SSN-21 force levels. Moreover, it should evaluate whether the initiation of a program of less costly nuclear, or even modern non-nuclear propulsion submarines specifically tailored for Third-World operations might be more appropriate for anticipated threats of the next few decades.

Marine Diversion

Like the Navy, the Marines took something of a back-seat role in the Gulf War. Marines did not carry out a new Inchon-type landing. Instead they functioned more as the Army would, moving from fixed positions on land to attack Iraqi forces. Nevertheless, just as the Gulf War cannot be said to have undermined the rationale for maintaining a healthy naval aviation force for Third-World contingencies, so, too, it cannot be argued that the war eviscerated the case for maintaining a viable amphibious assault capability.

First, had the Marines not had such a capability, Iraqi defensive positions and orientation would have been quite different. Iraqi planning maps at their headquarters in Kuwait City make clear that the Iraqis truly expected a Marine landing to be the primary coalition thrust against Kuwait. Otherwise, they would have been oriented toward the desert approaches into Kuwait and western Iraq, and would have posed a more difficult obstacle for coalition forces.

Second, Saudi Arabia proved not only a benign but a welcoming forward staging facility for the forces. No such hospitality can be presumed in future contingencies, even in the southern Gulf. One lesson that is sure to be learned by a potential attacker is to seize territory quickly and require the U.S. to conduct "forcible entry" operations. The Marines, together with Army airborne units, are the key to the success of such operations. Their amphibious role may yet prove to be invaluable not only as a diversion, as it was in the Gulf, but as a concrete means for establishing an American foothold in any desired area of military operations.

Airlift's Critical Importance

The Gulf War highlighted yet again the critical importance of airlift. This was the largest airlift operation in history; reserve airlift forces performed capably. In addition, the civil reserve air fleet was activated for the first time and carried the majority of troops to the Gulf.

Although the wear and tear during the war hastened the demise of the C-141 fleet, it did not necessarily validate the Air Force's oft-stated requirement for the C-17 lifter. Theoretically, the C-17 could have made more use of ramp space and flown from shorter runways than the C-5 or C-141. But this advantage has its limits, because the C-17 could support moves of entire units only with great difficulty. Moreover, the large number of upgraded C-130s remain available to the land forces for tactical



Department of Defense

The battleship is the perfect combatant for entering narrow, potentially dangerous seas such as the Persian Gulf.

mobility missions. Finally, the C-17 would be unlikely to operate in remote staging areas if serving as a strategic lifter since logistical support for major operations would be unlikely in such areas. There is, therefore, a case still to be made for reopening the C-5B production line, particularly since the C-17 remains mired in technical and schedule difficulties, while the C-5 performed creditably during the Gulf War.

The American lift effort was significantly enhanced by the availability of prepositioned equipment in the Gulf theater, and particularly the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) that carried Marine equipment from Diego Garcia and Guam to Saudi Arabia. Each group of four such ships carries 30 days of supplies for a Marine Expeditionary Brigade of about 10,000 troops. One of these MPS ships landed combat equipment within days of the decision to deploy forces to the Gulf.

Space-Based Support

The Gulf War was the first in which the United States relied heavily on space-based forces for a large variety of tasks over a sustained time frame. It demonstrated the criticality of space for conventional conflict, and underscored the need to protect space-based assets in non-nuclear contingencies. In general, space-based systems worked as advertised. But there were problems with availability, particularly during the early days of the crisis.

The Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) appears to have been a star performer. GPS provided critical positioning and supporting coordination for the forces dashing across the Iraqi desert. It was used to locate cleared areas through Iraqi mine fields. It provided accurate guidance to the target area for aircraft weapons delivery. It enabled helicopters to carry out night attacks over featureless terrain.

If there were any complaints about the GPS, it was that land forces had to link their systems by dismantling their vehicles. In addition, the system was still unable to provide 24-hour three-dimensional support: the program will not be completed until fiscal year 1993.

The Defense Support Program, whose satellites reportedly provide critical intelligence to field commanders, fulfilled a variety of functions during the deployment and the war. One major role was that of providing early warning of Scud launches. At a minimum, this warning



The much-criticized M-1 outperformed expectations and has justified its role as the Army's main battle tank.

enabled Israel, whose Ministry of Defense had a direct channel to the Pentagon, to alert both its Patriot batteries and its citizens to impending strikes. The few available minutes allowed most people to enter their sealed rooms and put on gas masks, thus lowering the probability of fatalities from a chemical attack to small single-digit percentages.

The Air Force reports that the Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) met the requirements of commanders for intra- and inter-theater communications even though those increased by a factor of 30. In fact, there appears to have been a significant temporary shortage of DSCS assets during the early stages of the Gulf deployment, so that as much as half the satellite communications were provided by civil and commercial satellites. Only after a satellite was reportedly repositioned from the Pacific Ocean was the Defense Department able to meet the military's demands. Such movement takes several days, however, and a future crisis might not provide as much unrestricted deployment time as did the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Special Role of Special Forces

Throughout the 1980s the Department of Defense continued to add to the size and capabilities of Special Operations Forces (SOF). SOF units were employed in the lesser U.S. operations that took place during that decade, but neither to the degree nor extent of their participation in the Gulf War.

The Special Operations Forces fired the first shots of the war in a heliborne raid against Iraqi radars. This was only one of the 43 missions that the special forces conducted during Desert Storm. In all, 9,000 troops served in the Special Operations Command and none was lost in ground combat (although 14 men were lost when an AC-130 gunship crashed after an unspecified mission).

Reportedly, Special Operations Forces were the linchpin in maintaining command-and-control integrity between the Arab forces and Western allies. SOF units hunted for Scuds and fought alongside Kuwaiti resistance units. Navy SEALs carried out direct-action destructive raids on targets along Iraq's border. They also

carried out deception missions in the Gulf and assisted with mine clearing. SEALs, together with Army Special Forces, also provided reconnaissance support for the conventional forces, including using laser designators to guide allied bombers. As is usual with the Special Operations Forces, the extent of their activities will probably remain classified for some years to come, but the outline of their contribution is sufficiently clear to justify the increased resources allotted to their mission over the past 10 years.

What Might Have Worked Better

The initial glowing reports of success in the Gulf War were incapable of masking, even then, some of the more egregious failures that the operation revealed. Weaknesses include an insufficient number of remotely piloted vehicles, inadequate sealift and identification-friend-or-foe systems, and ill-prepared reserve round-out brigades.

During the 1980s, the Army failed miserably to develop a capable, long-endurance remotely piloted vehicle. In Desert Storm, the services relied on two such systems, the Israeli-designed Pioneer and the Pointer. The Pioneer provided target designation for battleships, and enabled Marines to find weak spots in arrayed Iraqi defenses. Pioneers, which operated both day and night, also supported Navy special operations teams, searched for Iraqi Silkworm missile sites, command-and-control bunkers, and anti-aircraft artillery sites. The shorter-range Pointers were considerably less effective, providing only black-and-white photos in featureless terrain.

Clearly the Army, like the Marines, could have benefitted from RPVs with ranges even longer than the Pioneer's. Such systems might also have enabled the Air Force to locate Scuds more easily, and to respond to Scud repositionings more quickly. As with Tomahawk, fear for the future of manned aviation has stunted the RPV's development. The U.S. military could take note of Israel's view of RPVs as important complements and not as a threat to the vaunted Israeli Air Force.

Insufficient Sealift

The U.S. record on sealift is one of insufficient planning, incomplete programs, and unavailable assets when they were most required. For years the Navy and the Defense Department have been studying ways to enhance the means whereby the overwhelming proportion of supplies reach forward-deployed units. For years the Defense Department has resisted acquiring new fast sealift ships. In the 1980s, the Navy purchased and modified eight roll-on roll-off ships. All but one of these 35-knot units successfully carried equipment to the Gulf.

The remainder of the sealift fleet consisted of Ready Reserve Forces, whose size had quadrupled over the 1980s, but whose availability left much to be desired. Private shipping had to be called upon, at rates that owners and operators themselves admitted to be handsome. Foreign ships were used, as were foreign sailors, some of whom refused to deliver goods to the war zone. The military sealift command was forced to recall ancient mariners; even one 82-year-old reportedly volunteered to serve. Would they be available in a future contingency?

Would a future aggressor give the sealift forces sufficient time to organize themselves properly? The situation remains nothing short of scandalous, and requires more than additional study.

Misidentification Friend or Foe

Improvements in identification-friend-or-foe (IFF) likewise have languished in a morass of program mismanagement, high costs, and policy reversals at the highest levels of the Pentagon. For years the Defense Department sought to develop a system known as the Mark XV, which was slated to be interoperable with French, British, and German systems. After considerable wrangling among the four countries, the system's operating frequency was finally established. But the program initially intended for both the Army and the Air Force was cut back as the Army assigned higher priority to other programs. Although it was approved in 1988, the Mark XV program was canceled in early 1991. U.S. forces thus entered Desert Storm with only a vintage 1950s system that was incapable of supporting allied operations. Not surprisingly, some French aircraft had to be grounded at times during the Gulf War because the Iraqis were operating identical Mirages. Worse still, the absence of an effective IFF system contributed to the loss of 23 soldiers to "friendly fire."

IFF systems are costly; ultimately Desert Storm was a success without them. Nevertheless, if the United States intends to operate in a combined-arms environment, and to do so in conjunction with its allies, it cannot endlessly defer development of an effective IFF system. The fog of war will always claim some lives to friendly fire. Still, every effort must be made to lift the veil of that fog as much as possible. The Air Force would do well to restore its Mark XV program, though perhaps with restructuring.

Untrained Combat Reserves

As noted earlier, reserve airlift units made a major contribution to the American effort in Desert Storm. Similarly, Army reserve units provided critical combat support and service support to the deployed active forces.

The record of combat reserves was an entirely different matter, however. The National Guard brigades that were meant to serve as "round-out" units for active divisions never saw action. They were deemed to have been insufficiently trained and led for combat duty, even after undergoing additional desert training in the United States. As a result of their poor performance, the Army is reportedly planning to revamp its total force concept by eliminating all but three of its round-out brigades. It should consider eliminating these as well.

The Persian Gulf conflict was initially viewed as the source of many lessons for the future. More recently, some analysts have begun to argue that it was a unique war. It involved a unique coalition arrayed against a uniquely maladroit dictator whom General Norman Schwarzkopf, in his wrap-up briefing, characterized as something less than a military genius. The truth, as in most cases where opposing views are stridently aired,




AP/Wide World Photos

The U.S. cannot assume that in future conflicts it will have as favorable a logistical environment as the Saudi air bases.

probably lies somewhere in between, and the implications for future defense programs cannot be uniformly applied to all elements of the defense budget.

Certain long-standing priorities were validated by the conflict. These include the importance of top-flight tactical aviation as a critical element in defense posture; the role of strategic airlift; the need for armored and mechanized forces even in Third-World contingencies; and the importance of Special Operations Forces.

A number of requirements that have long been debated in defense circles received a major boost from the successful operation. These include the need for defense against ballistic missiles; improved and more robust space-based systems; additional battlefield reconnaissance assets; an ongoing need for improved precision-guided munitions; a continuing stealth attack capability; the ability to identify friend from foe; and expanded U.S.-based sealift. Other supposed requirements have yet to be validated. These include the B-2 bomber in a conventional role; the JSTARS reconnaissance system; large reserve forces; and the C-17 airlifter.

The debates no doubt will continue to rage, as supporters and opponents of particular weapons systems will attempt to derive maximum support for their causes from the record of the Gulf War. What cannot be denied is that the general American emphasis on a combination of high technology and highly capable, well-trained volunteer forces paid off, not merely in victory, but at a human and material cost that was far lower than military leaders ever dared to imagine. Thus, at a minimum, the notion that somehow quantity, at lower levels of capability, can replace quality systems should be put to rest. So too should any thought of restoring a draft, or of creating a compensation system that will be less attractive to the quality of personnel currently in the force. There are no cheap shortcuts either with respect to the systems or to the people who man them. In fact, if that is the only lesson to be drawn from the Gulf War, it is lesson enough. 

GENERAL SCHWARZKOPF'S NEW PARADIGM

Domestic Lessons of Desert Storm

JAMES P. PINKERTON

The success of Operation Desert Storm has led to a revival of military competence as a metaphor for the efficacy of collective action. If we can win the war in the Gulf, so the formula goes, why can't we do better at home, making the American Dream a reality for everyone? It's a fair question, but the inquiry will be strengthened if we also ask how the military learned from its own mistakes in Vietnam.

Ronald Reagan once said we fought the War on Poverty, and Poverty won. I prefer to think of the past few decades as a lost battle, not a lost war, because I believe that we can create a greater society. But we have to start by admitting to ourselves that we can't get there from here with the current methods. Losing policies didn't get better as they got older in South Vietnam, and they won't work over time in the South Bronx.

If the military can learn from the calamity of the Vietnam War, then the rest of us can learn from the reverses in the War on Poverty. More than any other institution in the federal government, the Pentagon studied its failures, learned from them, and reformed. These changes were much more qualitative—rethinking and restructuring—than quantitative, *i.e.*, bigger budgets. And yes, many of these crucial reforms took place in the stringent '70s, not the anything-goes '80s.

The result: the military works. The Pentagon stands in sharp contrast to the domestic bureaucracies here at home, which are reluctant, if not reactionary, in their attitude toward change.

The Pentagon learned that bigger is not better. Better is better. When it was losing in Vietnam, the Pentagon had three million soldiers and spent 10 percent of the gross national product. It defeated Iraq with two million soldiers and 5 percent of GNP.

With bad leadership and a bad attitude, it is easy to imagine the military shrinking in the '70s the way the New York City government is shrinking today. According to Henry Stern, the former parks commissioner, the city's government can be likened to a fat person trying to lose weight. But instead of dieting, he cuts off his fingers! Similarly, the Pentagon could have gone from big and inept to small and inept. Thanks to good leadership, however, it used the downsizing as a catalyst for reform.

The Pentagon demonstrated a professional desire to improve, not just a bureaucratic desire to survive.

Fighting Smart


The Pentagon also re-learned Clausewitz's lessons about the linkage between politics and military success. When we reflect upon the difference between the deliberate firebombing of Dresden or Tokyo and the accidental bombing of civilians in the Baghdad bunker, we are reminded of how far we have progressed. Our air forces, refereed by CNN and judged by the intangible but not inconsequential thing we call world public opinion, were instructed to minimize civilian casualties in Desert Storm. Smart weapons aren't just humane; they're smart, if the goal is to preserve support for military action in the information age.

Weapons like napalm were not used on civilians. Pilots were told that if for any reason, such as cloud cover, they weren't sure of hitting their targets, they should return to base. So great was the concern about hitting anything that hadn't been targeted that pilots usually did not have the option of simply jettisoning their loads on the way back. This is an example of the larger political necessity superseding military standard operating procedure—no pilot wants to land carrying a couple of tons of high explosive under his wings!

At the same time we were newly careful about enemy civilian casualties, we faced the additional concern of allied civilian losses. Scud missiles taught us a new lesson in the Gulf War: no matter how militarily inconsequential missile strikes against civilians may be, in a networked world, the military must shift gears and react immediately, lest the overall political alliance be destabilized. Thus, we diverted 15 percent of our air assets in the Gulf to the destruction of Scuds.

Furthermore, the post-Vietnam Pentagon learned that if its credibility was the first casualty of this war, then the institution itself would be crippled. The U.S.

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UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

If the military can learn from the calamity of the Vietnam War, then the rest of us can learn from the reverses in the War on Poverty.

government's media effort was much shrewder than Iraq's, whose video use and abuse of hostages and POWs backfired.

This sophistication was no accident, but the result of an agonizing reassessment by the military in the wake of Vietnam. The Naval War College sponsored military media conferences, hosting its most trenchant critics—among them Seymour Hersh, who had blown the whistle on My Lai. Listening to abhorrent opinions might be painful, but it sharpens the mind. The new determination to get the truth out—not to crouch, in cover-up mode, while “60 Minutes” ferrets out the story—is a good example of the right thing also being the smart thing. Look how quickly the military came forward with the facts on U.S. casualties from “friendly fire.”

Newfound Credibility

Credibility was reinforced by the data used to gauge success in Desert Storm. The Pentagon duly reported on sorties flown and bombs dropped, but the brass never pretended, as they did in Vietnam, that these “inputs” were proof that we were winning the war. Instead, they reported “outcomes,” that is, how many Iraqi targets—airfields, radars, tanks—were actually damaged or destroyed. Those of us who retained just a little Vietnam-era skepticism were impressed when we discovered that Iraqi estimates of battle damage closely paralleled the Pentagon's.

The military's newfound credibility paid immediate dividends: it was able to brush off accusations that it had bombed the notorious “baby milk factory,” and the air campaign was barely affected by the furor over the

accidental civilian deaths in a Baghdad bunker.

If we can impose accountability on the Pentagon, why can't we extend it to the domestic bureaucracies as well?

Inputs, Not Outcomes

Most civilian bureaucracies measure success by highlighting inputs, not outcomes. In Washington, most budgets, fact sheets, and talking points trumpet levels of spending, not results—for example, test scores, more people housed or cured or returned to work. Tell the voters and taxpayers anything, the civilian bureaucracies seem to be saying, except what was actually accomplished. So rudimentary and unrevealing is the language of accountability here at home that domestic generals win praise for itemizing the sacrifices required, as opposed to the goals achieved.

Clever use of new technology helped the military internalize accountability. “War games,” for example, have long been a part of military training. Yet until recently, there was no way to really figure out what was happening. After a lot of blanks and smoke grenades were fired, a supervisor would step in and say “OK, you, you, and you are dead.” To which the typical response would be “Hell, no. I'm not dead. I ducked!” The result: nobody really knew what had happened, and so nobody really learned anything.

The introduction of “laser tag” technology turned the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, into a laboratory in which simulated combat could be strictly monitored. Overnight, war games went from play-acting to something remarkably close to the real thing. The careers of officers rose and fell as their superiors could

finally ascertain their effectiveness at keeping their soldiers “alive” while destroying “the enemy.”

Parallel technologies could be used to improve performance and accountability here at home. Unfortunately, there is no parallel enthusiasm for doing it. Too much of the bureaucracy seems to subscribe to Woody Allen’s line that “90 percent of life is just showing up.”

Weapons of Choice

The Pentagon can also teach domestic bureaucracies about motivation. The all-volunteer force is a striking example of the power of choice. People work better if they want to be there. While the Pentagon opposed the end of the draft in the ’70s, it has learned what it can do with motivated volunteers. You never hear about “fragging” today.

The military didn’t necessarily change because it wanted to. Usually institutions only change when they have to. The Pentagon also learned that the best and the brightest are often women and minorities. It has discovered that choice works, and so the military now opposes a return to the draft. The president realizes that monopoly schools are equally outmoded, and that’s why he so strongly supports choice in the schools. Unfortunately, students and their parents here at home are still waiting for the entrenched “educrats” to make the same admission.

Those who advocate universal national service should consider the enormous contribution of *esprit* to the effectiveness of an organization. The world has changed a

Desert Storm reminds us that government can work when the mission is understood and agreed upon. But the participants must be willing to think anew.

lot since Vietnam. I think that some of those who looked upon the men and women of Desert Storm as economic or racial victims were just a little bit annoyed to discover that these young soldiers were winners, with a justifiable faith in themselves and in the future.

James Fallows, writing a decade ago, cited evidence “that many of today’s soldiers have trouble running tanks and firing missiles.” That was the bad news. The good news was that generals read his book *National Defense*, understood the problem, and worked to solve it. Along the way, they discovered that young people can do a lot more than commonly imagined. The average age of the 5,000 crew members of the supercarrier USS *Enterprise* is 18 years and 9 months! As any parent knows, young people perform up to the level of expectations.

Empowerment Under Arms

Even in its worst moments in the ’70s, the military never abandoned the three traditions that have always provided the strength for recovery:

First is a deep and resonant “corporate culture” of mutuality, hard work, shared burdens, and, if necessary, sacrifice. When you set foot on any military base, you are immediately confronted with the totems and taboos of the military way of life: murals, mottoes, injunctions, and warnings, all repeated and emphasized over again. When I visited Fort Jackson, a basic training facility in South Carolina, I was struck by how visually dense the environment of reinforcement was, all the way down to the admonitions stenciled on the risers of the stairs: words like “courage,” “integrity,” and “loyalty.” This community provides “the sense of place” that thoughtful critics of modernity seek to restore in our cities. The fact that the military has succeeded at creating communitarian public space does not suggest a specific plan for Manhattan. But that success gives us confidence that we are on the right track when we advocate choice in schools, tenant management and ownership, enterprise zones, and other strategies for deregulating the poor.

Second is an unquestioned commitment to meritocracy. General Colin Powell would say that the military cares less about what race you are, where you went to school, or the wealth or class of your family than any other major institution in American life. The military radiates a New Deal-like commitment to hard work and upward mobility for all. In keeping with that ethic, it strongly opposes quotas of any kind.

It is hard to think of any other organization that so reinforces the self-esteem of those who work with their hands and their hearts—a surviving refuge for the blue-collar ethic of sweat and solidarity. The overtness of military hierarchy actually reduces hypocrisy and game-playing. Everyone in the military knows exactly where he or she stands. Your achievements are right there on your collar, sleeve, or chest.

Bill Stofft, the former chief historian of the Army, notes that the military tradition judges people not against one another, but against well-articulated, objective standards. The military’s embrace of accountability contrasts sharply with the frequent, if not chronic, unwillingness of public employees to be judged or paid according to any criteria of merit.

Third is an intense focus on the mission. Concepts like “discipline” and “motivation” sound antique in the realm of the politically correct, but they do seem to inspire goal-oriented behavior. Either you captured the hill or you didn’t. Failure in the military often means death. This stark subtext underscores the seriousness of military training and indoctrination, even in peacetime. In sharp contrast, I’m reminded of sociologist Richard Nathan’s anecdote about visiting three different welfare offices and getting three very different answers from the caseworkers about what their mission was.

War on Bureaucracy

James Q. Wilson’s *Bureaucracy* considers Germany’s remarkable victory over France in 1940. Historians attribute Hitler’s triumph to superior resources, superior

technology, and Nazi fanaticism. In fact, Wilson demonstrates, virtually the opposite was true. The defending Anglo-French forces outnumbered the Wehrmacht; they even had more and better tanks. The Germans did have a superior strategy, but just as important, they had superior tactics, down to the level of the individual. The Germans had learned from the catastrophe of World War I: simple frontal assaults against entrenched defenders would fail. They realized that victory could not come from human robots stumbling to futile deaths across no-man's-land. Rather, victory would come from soldiers empowered by good training to improvise and think for themselves. The German command manual from 1936 called for "independently thinking and acting fighters who exploit each situation in a considered, determined, and bold way....Only results matter."

Effective armies, like effective organizations of any kind, link authority and responsibility. As the battlefield gets more complicated, each soldier has responsibility for a more complex task. So he or she must have sufficient authority to execute that task. If the system works, each soldier is empowered with the training and the latitude to operate an airplane, a tank, or a Patriot missile battery. These are not jobs for puppets. Just as in the civilian economy, the old distinction between those who work and those who think had to be done away with.

Clausewitz wrote 160 years ago: "The general can command only the overall situation and not the separate parts. At the point where the separate parts need guidance, the military spirit must take command." His wisdom is embodied in the Army Field Manual: "In the chaos of battle, it is essential to decentralize decision authority to the lowest practical level because over-centralization slows action and leads to inertia."

It takes well-trained forces, empowered with "spirit," to prevail in an ever more complex battle environment. Motivated people who clearly understand their objective can be trusted to undertake long and complicated missions without relying on headquarters for continuous guidance. Good soldiers can learn new "doctrine" (the military term for the general consensus on waging war).

The whole idea of standardized, systematized processing of people was entirely consistent with the industrial conveyer-belt, interchangeable, one-size-fits-all world of 50 or 100 years ago. In Max Weber's time, bureaucracy was a great reform. But today, it is obsolete.

David Osborne argues that the old top-down command model must be replaced by entrepreneurial government if we are going to deliver the government services people need and are paying for, but are not getting. And the result should be, borrowing from Michael Barone, a more supple, responsive, effective civilian government, just as we have created a more supple, responsive, and effective military.

Doctrinal Overhaul

In 1981, James Fallows emphasized the difference between the old military paradigm of firepower and attrition and the new paradigm of surprise and maneuver: "In attrition warfare, enemy dead are the most reliable indicator of progress. In a maneuver approach,



Reuters/Bettmann

More than any other institution in the federal government, the Pentagon studied its failures, learned from them, and reformed.

enemy prisoners are a more telling indicator. Their capture suggests that the enemy has not been able to adapt to changing situations, that 'friction' has overwhelmed him, that his internal systems of discipline and command have broken down."

Ten years after, General Mike Myatt led the First Marine Division into Kuwait: "The mission was to defeat the Iraqis, not to destroy them. There is quite a difference. If we were to destroy them, we would probably still be there trying to root out every Iraqi position. But we can defeat [Saddam Hussein] by getting behind him, causing him to collapse, and moving quickly to unhinge him. Speed was very important."

In the decade after Vietnam, General Donn Starry studied the failure of attrition warfare in Vietnam and the desperate need for a new military paradigm. The result was a new doctrine, "AirLand Battle," which emphasizes hitting the enemy from the front, from the rear, from the side, and from above. Only highly trained units, in constant contact with each other but acting independently, enjoying superior logistics, can strike behind enemy lines with the force and coordination necessary to make the AirLand doctrine work.

Just Cause, the operation that broke Noriega's hold on Panama in a single evening, was the first test of AirLand doctrine. Remember, the question was not whether U.S. forces could prevail. The question was whether our soldiers could strike so quickly that the will of the Panamanian Defense Force to resist would be instantly shattered, avoiding a drawn-out guerrilla battle in the jungle, with heavy casualties on all sides, including non-combatants. The plan that General Maxwell Thurman put together called for U.S. forces to make use of 40 percent of all the airlift capacity in the entire U.S. military. Thus, on six hours' notice, American troops hit Noriega's forces in 27 different places within five minutes.

In the shock of the new doctrine, the ability of the enemy to communicate actually works against him, like an overloaded switchboard. For a single unit to report that it is under surprise attack is unnerving. When every unit reports to every other unit simultaneously that it is under attack, the result is nervous breakdown. In

Panama, the panic overload shorted out the command-and-control grid, and resistance collapsed. The new doctrine of a “just-in-time” war was firmly established.

Building on the lessons of Panama, General Schwarzkopf hit the Iraqis so hard in so many places that their will to resist simply collapsed; a chain reaction of bad news creating a critical mass of demoralization and defeatism.

The thousands of daily sorties in Desert Storm—without a single mid-air collision and with only minimal casualties from friendly fire—could not have been

The military’s embrace of accountability contrasts sharply with the unwillingness of public employees to be judged or paid according to any criteria of merit.

managed from a central point. Only individuals, empowered with training, doctrine, and confidence, can make the trillions of decisions that create a Hayekian spontaneous martial order.

Domestic Westmorelands

The Pentagon hasn’t totally reformed itself, of course. The acquisition and procurement process is arguably no better. One veteran of the Packard Commission from the mid-1980s still recalls with bitterness the frustration of implementing suggested reforms in an area that accounts for \$214 billion of the Defense Department’s \$293-billion budget. That the Pentagon can be effective while three-fourths of its budget wallows in politicized micro-management, if not outright waste, fraud, and abuse, is proof that human capital counts for a lot more in the success of an organization than physical capital. Given a choice between a factory full of the latest computer technology and a factory full of motivated, drug-free employees operating equipment that is merely sufficient, the savvy executive will always choose the latter.

The Reagan–Weinberger defense buildup of the early ’80s obviously made a difference. As Lenin said, quantity has a quality all its own. However, it is hard to argue that much of the current system would survive Peter Drucker’s simple test: If we weren’t doing it now, would we start? Too often the process of acquisition—the desire


to spend money—overrides the need for weapons that work. Pentagon appropriations are one of the last redoubts of congressional Keynesianism, where individual solons prime the pump back home with money from someone else’s state or district. The Goldwater–Nichols legislation of 1986, which clarified the position of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, was a breakthrough. It prevented a repeat of Desert One, the abortive rescue attempt in Iran, when interservice jockeying led to Marine pilots flying Navy helicopters carrying Army troops to a rendezvous with Air Force planes. That may sound like harmony, but the reality was chaos.

If we are to take any lessons away from the military experience, it should be the one that Clausewitz emphasized the most—the need for clear, goal-setting leadership that operates on the basis of a consensus about what needs to be done and how to do it. Desert Storm reminds us that, unlike either the war in Vietnam or the War on Poverty, government can work when the mission is understood and agreed upon. But the participants must be willing to think anew.

In an important article in *The American Prospect* entitled “Renewing the Public Sector,” Steven Kelman emphasizes the need for results, not process. He uses very specific examples, citing the need for “concrete performance indicators to measure the results of public services, from keeping the streets clean to providing visitors to national parks with a rewarding experience.”

The Pentagon succeeded because it faced up to the challenge of change. Yet domestic policy-makers are gun-shy about innovation. They would rather cope with failure than fight for success. After the Tet Offensive, General Westmoreland’s response was entirely predictable: more American soldiers. Today, the domestic brass wants to draft more tax dollars. Senator Moynihan recently said: “We are utterly enthralled to a set of issues where our prescription is spending money, and we have no money.”

The federal, state, and local government will spend approximately \$1.5 trillion this year on domestic programs—triple the total spending for defense and the national debt. So of course, Senator Moynihan’s declamation is not to be taken literally. Instead, it points to the larger issue of accountability: what are we getting for the money? Is our enormous investment yielding an adequate return? Put bluntly, are we getting enough domestic bang for the buck?


During the 1980s, the American military thought hard so it could fight smart. It completely overhauled its doctrine, enabling it to win more quickly, with fewer casualties, at lower cost. Now is the time for the rest of the government, especially those institutions that care for the most vulnerable Americans, to take the same clear-eyed look at themselves and make the needed reforms. Then, and only then, will the home front be a kinder, gentler place. 

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
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UNPLANNED PARENTHOOD

Easing the Pain of Crisis Pregnancy

FREDERICA MATHEWES-GREEN

The voluble cashier wears a locket containing her toddler's picture; coming through her checkout line is brightly entertaining, like rejoining a show already in progress. You know that she works another job, that her landlord is a jerk, that she has a weakness for ice cream, that her little girl loves Big Bird. You suspect that her immigrant status may not be entirely in order. One day she is pale and subdued; another baby is on the way, and she loves babies, but how can she ever manage? With a stricken look she whispers, "But how could I have an abortion?"

On your more recent visits she is changed, much less talkative, preoccupied, with a gray and sorrowful air. Then you realize that it's almost fall again. She never began to show.

As pro-lifers push for laws against abortion, women just like this are pushing back, one at a time, each with her own story. A college student fights morning nausea, remembering with loathing the creep who laughed at her when she told him she was pregnant. A young executive, eager to move up, studies the home pregnancy test with horror; how can she impress the boss with her maturity and responsibility when she's pregnant and unmarried? A med student, just about to slam into an exhausting residency, realizes that her body cannot do that and pregnancy at the same time. A grieving widow is comforted a little too thoroughly by her departed husband's best friend; how can she explain her swelling belly to her teen-aged daughter?

The time is past due for pro-lifers to cease speaking of abortion as a matter of convenience. Situations like these are not merely inconvenient, and no woman pops in for an abortion just because the clinic is handy. Even in a normal, much-desired pregnancy a woman must go through daunting physical changes, emotional stress, and a cataclysmic ending she may well approach with fear. How heavy these burdens must be to the woman whose pregnancy was unplanned and unwanted.

Yet those who believe that abortion is a good solution to these tragic situations are offering women only a consolation of sand. Abortion is not convenient, either, except for a society that doesn't want to be troubled by pregnant women's problems. At some level the woman

choosing abortion knows that it is her own child who is dying; to achieve this bitter end she must pay several hundred dollars cash and endure the invasion of her body by a suction probe—an experience that can leave its own scars. Abortion may appear the least painful of several excruciating choices, but it makes women neither happy nor free.

There is tremendous sadness, loneliness, in the cry, "A woman's right to choose." No one wants an abortion as she wants an ice-cream cone or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught in a trap, wants to gnaw off its own leg. Abortion is a tragic attempt to escape a desperate situation by an act of violence and self-loss.

How might our society begin to help her find better alternatives? Merely putting a padlock on the clinic door is not the solution. The woman who has an abortion is alone and isolated as she makes this "deeply personal decision." To overcome the forces that drive her toward this tragedy we must explode the shell of her isolation, making her problems our problems, building concentric rings of support from the mother-child dyad outward to all society. Some of this work is already being done by pro-life agencies; some must entail changes in society at large. Such changes may cost us some comfort, some convenience, even some money. The alternative is to continue adding one more woman every nine seconds to the long and silent line, and one more tiny corpse to the pile already 25 million high.

Offering Genuine Choice

The irony of the "pro-choice" position is that it is so scarce of choices. Abortion is promoted as the only sensible, mature thing to do in an unexpected, unwanted pregnancy, and poor women are especially encouraged to eliminate babies that might burden the public purse.

So much attention has been focused on the "choice"

FREDERICA MATHEWES-GREEN, a certified childbirth educator, is public affairs associate for education for Americans United for Life and vice president for communications for Feminists for Life of America. She and her husband are registered with the Nurturing Network as a host family to provide housing to pregnant women in need.

of abortion that often overlooked are the large numbers of maternity homes, adoption agencies, and other services offering genuine alternatives. There are approximately 3,500 pro-life agencies in America offering crisis pregnancy services. About half of these are crisis pregnancy centers, simple store-front operations where walk-in clients are offered shelter, medical care, counselling, maternity clothes, legal assistance, or other forms of aid. These centers see an average of 300 to 500 clients yearly (although some large agencies, such as the Northwest Center in Washington, D.C., serve thousands). There are no hard figures, but these centers aid an estimated 700,000 women a year.

Most centers may be charitably described as homey: furnished with hand-me-downs, decorated with posters, and staffed by volunteers, the atmosphere is neighborly rather than slick. When the costs of continuing a crisis pregnancy run so high, centers must make ambience a secondary concern.

These centers usually draw their support primarily from the local community, a simple neighbor-helping-neighbor response to pregnant women in need. While some are independent operations, there are also three large chains of centers, still dependent on local support. The largest, Birthright, was founded in 1968 and includes about 600 locations in America, with others abroad. Birthright centers take a gentle, low-pressure approach, eschew "scary pictures and films," and do not become involved in political issues.

The Christian Action Council does not avoid controversial tangles, and currently is promoting a boycott of donors to Planned Parenthood. It also sponsors over 400 crisis pregnancy centers. In addition to the usual sorts of aid, Christian Action Council centers stress equipping women with tools to improve their lives, and give them help with budget counselling and training in employment skills.

Most controversial is the Pearson chain of 200 centers. The Pearson approach includes allowing the impression that the center will perform or refer for abortion services, in the hopes of attracting abortion-minded women for pro-life counselling. While reluctant to engage in public criticism, non-Pearson centers generally disapprove of these tactics. The Christian Action Council training manual stresses that pleasing God is even more important than eliminating abortion, and that deceptive tactics do not please Him.

Middle-Class Women over 20

A creative variation on the crisis pregnancy center theme is the Nurturing Network, an agency organized by Mary Cunningham Agee when she noted that aborting women are less often poor teens than they are middle-class women over age 20. For these women, simple poverty was not the goad toward abortion; it was the conflict between motherhood and life plans. The average crisis pregnancy center was not going to meet these women's needs with a Medicaid form and an application to a maternity home.

Agee has organized a national network of resources to keep the client's life, and resumé, intact. If it is preferable for the client to leave her environment for

the duration of her pregnancy, the Nurturing Network has 130 colleges that will transfer her in within weeks and 650 homes across the country that will open their doors to her. If she would like to continue her career with the least disruption, there are 450 employers who will offer her a job. The Nurturing Network has no local centers; Agee runs this entire program by telephone out of a small office in Boise, Idaho, with a mostly volunteer staff and a correspondingly low overhead.

Some agencies offering crisis pregnancy services specialize in helping women after the pregnancy. Bethany Christian Services was founded in 1944 when two women began taking in homeless children; it now maintains 57 offices and a nationwide hotline that offer a number of services to pregnant women and to children, including adoption placements. Other organizations, like NOEL House in Fairfax, Virginia, offer housing to mother and child after the birth to help her get back on her feet.

Another category of crisis pregnancy services is the mushrooming number of groups that provide counselling for women who have had abortions and are begin-

No woman wants an abortion as she wants an ice-cream cone or a Porsche. She wants an abortion as an animal, caught in a trap, wants to gnaw off its own leg.

ning to feel the effects of grief. Names such as Women Exploited by Abortion, American Victims of Abortion, and Victims of Choice express some of the bitterness these women feel; the video produced by Open ARMS is titled "One Dead, One Wounded." Women in these organizations point to a group of commonly shared symptoms (anger, depression, nightmares, substance abuse, suicidal thoughts) that is termed post-abortion syndrome. These symptoms may not emerge for a dozen years after the abortion; when they do, they may actually be a positive sign, an indication that the wall of denial is collapsing and that healing is about to begin.

The work of crisis pregnancy centers is a valiant attempt to help women in practical ways, and their growth—more volunteers, more centers, more donations—can only help women more. But no matter how extensive this work becomes, it will never be enough. These agencies intervene at a moment of crisis with emergency aid, but they cannot change the situations that cause the crisis to arise. To really help women, to make both abortion clinics and crisis pregnancy centers obsolete, will require changes in society as a whole.

Somehow the "private, personal" dilemma of unplanned pregnancy has become one that we as a society



Pictorial Parade

Even in a normal, much-desired pregnancy a woman must go through daunting physical changes, emotional stress, and a cataclysmic ending she may well approach with fear.

expect a woman to face alone. If she grieves or struggles, mourns an abortion, or battles to support herself and a hungry child, well, that was her choice, wasn't it? She has become invisible to us. In order to help her we must begin to see her again, and to see her as one of our family: a woman, a mother, a sister in need.

Women's Right to Know

The lonely rhetoric of choice is too accurate; a pregnant woman alone is set in an unfriendly landscape that requires her to make great sacrifices to have her child, and suggests that the wise and easy choice is abortion. So thorough is this isolation that even her own child appears to be an enemy, an evil alien who has invaded her body and seeks to destroy her life. As we as a society begin to break down this besieged isolation, the first step will be providing her with simple information about the risks of abortion and the availability of alternatives; the first human connection must be to her own child.

Informed-consent legislation has long been in the vanguard of pro-life activities, often bearing a title like "Women's Right to Know Act." The most vocal supporters of such legislation are often women who have had abortions and learned too late that what they aborted was not a "glob of tissue," but a son or daughter with hands, eyes, a face, and a beating heart.

While even normal pregnancy may pose some health risks, defying that normal process has dangers of its own. Some of these women bear evidence of this with physical, as well as emotional, scars: the forced dilation of the cervix in abortion may have so weakened it that every future pregnancy is doomed to miscarry; the scraping of a suction tube inside the uterus may have caused scarring that leads to tubal pregnancy, or even sterility. A puncture, infection, or embolism-induced stroke may have brought these women to hysterectomy, colostomy, or life in a wheelchair.

An informed-consent package usually requires that women be given information about 1) the risks of abortion, 2) alternative support for continuing a crisis pregnancy, and 3) the development of the fetus. Abortion clinics do not always give thorough counseling; many

women complain of encountering an assembly-line experience in which cash is demanded up front, so-called counseling takes place in a group setting in the span of a few minutes, and when they first meet the doctor their legs are already in stirrups.

Pro-lifers have for years approached women outside abortion clinics with information about the availability of abortion alternatives and the development of the fetus. They might proffer brochures with photos like those in the celebrated *Life* magazine series, depicting the fetus at the earliest abortable age already baby-shaped, floating serenely with shoe-button eyes and her veiled red heart beating like mad.

This approach is often not effective, as the woman, panicked by the vision of her life collapsing around her, decidedly does not want to hear about the baby or anything else that would add to her guilt or ambivalence. A new approach in Chicago is having more impact by stressing the health risks of abortion. Practitioners of the "Chicago Method" find that it gets an abortion-bound woman's attention very quickly when they hand her a list of malpractice cases against the clinic.

It is the speedy efficiency of abortion that appeals so seductively to the first shock of an unplanned pregnancy. Informed-consent legislation can help slow down this flight, by exposing the real dangers of the abortion procedure and tarnishing its image as the perfect solution. Information about fetal development encourages a woman's natural loving bond to her own child, the instinctive urge to protect and defend. A directory of local support—medical, legal, housing, and other—can tip the scale for her to choose a courageous and difficult, but life-giving, path.

Walking Checkbook

At this point a very small family, only mother and child, is begun. How best to support them? Those who would immediately leap to the resources of public assistance have skipped several interim steps. The most obvious next move is often the most neglected— involvement of that phantom figure who is the child's other parent.

It is perplexing that the father has become such a negligible figure, as if his entire role in human reproduction were exhausted at the end of its initial 15 minutes. The truth is that he fulfills a role in the lives of the mother and the child that nothing else can replace. The exhaustive efforts of a crisis pregnancy center are, in a sense, those of inventing an artificial husband, trying to meet the needs that in nature's design the child's father would supply. These efforts inevitably fall short.

Yet, activists on both sides of the abortion issue rarely expect the child's father to be a significant source of help in a crisis pregnancy. After 20 years of sexual revolution, social expectations of male responsibility have plummeted to almost zero. The presumption is that men just want to use women for sex and then walk away; the sole obligation they feel toward these women extends just as far as one-half the abortion fee.

To re-establish the child's father at the center of the mother's support system will require challenging this myth, and regaining the social expectation that men are

not only obligated to help their mates, but desire to do so. Perhaps there is something about the “do it and run” mentality that men find ultimately hollow, disconnected, sad. Perhaps there is something about protecting and providing that is foundational to a man’s self-esteem, even in the face of cultural counter-incentives.

This noble desire can be undermined, of course, and fear of failing as a provider can drive men to flee the scene entirely. When the public message is that men are unnecessary, that they can provide nothing that women can’t get for themselves (with a little help from Uncle Sam, perhaps), that delicate mechanism of pride in fathering can be severely damaged. If our culture recognized fathering as a useful and challenging job that men were equipped to meet, we might see a reversal of the tragic figures concerning abandoned women and children in poverty.

Because the expectations for the father’s behavior in a crisis pregnancy are so low, he is reduced to a fragment of his role—that of the walking checkbook. The child-support system is in disarray, as only half the mothers with a judicial child-support order are receiving full payment; a quarter receive nothing at all. If the mother never married the child’s father, her chances of receiving any support plummet still further. Garnishment of the father’s wages fails if he is determined to avoid payment and changes jobs. Men are often reluctant to pay child support if the mother is denying him access to his children; while this raises fury among child-support advocates, the fact that the father-child connection is important to men is one more faint signal of the way men naturally view their own complete parenting role.

Ultimately, there is no substitute for a faithful man in a family. With his encouragement, many a woman will endure great hardships to give life to her child; without it, the best we can offer her may not be enough. The pain of knowing oneself an abandoned woman, carrying the child of a man who has rejected her, outweighs nearly all else. While a rare woman may spurn her baby’s father, in most cases his support is a crucial factor in sparing or ending the child’s life. The woman in a crisis pregnancy, more than she wants money or aid, wants a loving man to make it not be a crisis. Whatever we do to encourage him in this role, we do to help her as well.

Crazed Parents

As the circle around the mother and child expands, we turn next to bringing in the woman’s parents. To a frightened teen, the initial response to such a prospect may be panic. The adolescent years are marked by a disproportionate fear of parents finding out about failings; not only is there a fear of punishment, but also a fear of being revealed as still a fallible child, not quite as competent, independent, and adult as one’s brave posturing implies.

Secret abortion feeds off these irrational fears. Those who promote its availability insist that the fears are accurate: the girl’s parents won’t understand, they will reject her, they will beat her. The lonely isolation of “choice” is repeated. The pregnant teen is led to believe that her only course is to give the abortionist all her scraped-together babysitting money and ache and bleed

in loneliness, wishing she could ask for her mother’s love. Readers may remember, as teens, being easy prey for such fears; we may be fortunate now, as parents, to know how boundless and powerful love for a child can be. Although a parent may be more or less stunned, worried, angered by the initial news, fierce love sweeps in and seeks to protect and guide the errant daughter through the difficult days ahead.

There may be some bad, crazed parents who batter their children, yet the law has never treated these evil parents as the norm. They may beat a child for a poor

Secret abortions are dangerous for teens, whether legal or illegal; making it easier to keep them secret does not help the young women involved.

report card, but all parents are not, therefore, prevented from seeing report cards. A handful of bad parents have no right to revoke the intrinsic right—and duty—of parents to be involved in their children’s lives. Without a law to guide them, reflexive fear is likely to push these teens down a lonely and dangerous path; but if they will come to their parents, even with trembling knees, they are likely to find a love more deep and broad than they had ever suspected before.

Secret Terrors

Those who oppose parental-notification laws argue that, regardless, some teens who fear a parent’s anger will still have secret, dangerous abortions. But this is exactly what is happening in *legal* abortion clinics across the nation today. Secret abortions are dangerous for teens, whether legal or illegal; making it easier to keep them secret does not help the young women involved. The case of Becky Bell, trumpeted by abortion advocates as a symbol of teens who will choose illegal abortions and die rather than tell parents of their pregnancy, has been collapsing ever since copies of her autopsy began to circulate last summer. That document reveals evidence of a spontaneous miscarriage, but no signs of any induced abortion, either legal or illegal, no uterine infection, and no use of instruments. The autopsy reveals that the culprit in the tragic death of this lovely 16-year-old was a raging pneumonia of the variety that killed muppeteer Jim Henson.

Unfortunately, examples of teens who died on legal abortion tables are not hard to come by. A Manhattan jury found an abortionist and a nurse anesthetist negligent in the death of 13-year-old Dawn Ravenell. Her parents did not know of her abortion plan until they

were called to the hospital; she had already passed into the coma from which she would never recover. According to court testimony the abortionist did not weigh their daughter, check her age, explain the risks, or even speak to her before the legal abortion procedure.

Erica Kae Richardson of Cheltenham, Maryland, was only 16 when she was allegedly left to bleed for four hours on a clinic table; she died soon after in a nearby emergency care center. Again, her mother did not know that she was going to have an abortion. In St. Louis, Sandra Kaiser, 14, jumped to her death after her legal abortion. Her mother did not know that she planned an abortion, but she did know something that the clinic couldn't discover: Sandra had already been hospitalized three times for psychiatric problems.

Worrisome as well is the case of 14-year-old Erin G., who suffered serious medical complications three days after a secret abortion. The girl was taken for a legal abortion by her teacher, who told the girl's mother that Erin was needed to babysit and would be home late.

A pregnant teen fears her parents won't understand, they will reject her, they will beat her.

When Erin and her mother filed suit against school and clinic officials, all the defendants except the school superintendent settled before trial. The court threw out the case against the superintendent, saying that because California law permits a minor to have an abortion without her parents' knowledge that any third parties who assist the minor in an abortion are not violating the law even if their actions are deceptive. This story could happen again in any of the 33 states where there are no enforced parental involvement laws.

Although the majority of state legislatures have passed laws requiring parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision, half of these states do not enforce them. Laws requiring parental consent are in force in Alabama, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Wyoming. A less stringent requirement, that the parent merely be notified of the abortion, is in force in Arkansas, Idaho, Maine, Minnesota, Ohio, Utah, and West Virginia.

The Minnesota experience demonstrates that these laws can have unexpected good effects. During a four-year period when the law was in effect (prior to its being challenged in the courts, then finally upheld by the Supreme Court) the abortion rate for minors fell by 27 percent; the pregnancy rate *also* fell by 21 percent. When it is inevitable that parents will find out about a pregnancy, many teens are motivated to make more responsible choices about sexual activity. According to the March 1991 *American Journal of Public Health*, some of the positive

claims made for these laws are that they "promote responsibility (by encouraging teen-agers to 'think before they act'), foster parent-child communication," and "facilitate mature decision-making."

There is no doubt that the best thing for a pregnant minor is her parents' loving support. Nor is there much doubt that, given the nature of adolescence, she will not be eager to seek it. The law here can be a guide for vulnerable teen women, encouraging them to act responsibly both before and after pregnancy.

What Will I Tell the Boss?

Moving beyond the ties of blood and into the larger community, we next consider ways to bring in employers. For many women, pregnancy is a major blow to work life. Many a boss is reluctant to hire a pregnant woman ("She'll quit when the baby is born, and drive up health insurance costs as well"). Even for the woman who already has a job, pregnancy may threaten her position. A case several years ago in the Washington area illustrates a typical Catch-22: a counsellor at a youth center for teen women became pregnant while unmarried, and was fired for being a bad example. If she had concealed the pregnancy with an abortion her job would have been safe. Similarly, prison guards in New York revealed that they had been told to get abortions or lose their jobs.

Some of these problems are knotty and admit of no easy solution; it may well be that pregnancy would dangerously hamper the physical agility and strength that prison guard work requires. Unwed pregnancy in a youth leader may model an irresponsibility that is not helpful. Yet when women see no alternative, when bearing the child would mean that both of them would go hungry, abortion again appears the only "choice." If her employer must make a change, an attempt to assign alternate work for the duration of her pregnancy would be kinder than a pink slip.

The difficulties of combining a job and parenthood do not end when the pregnancy does. A flood of ideas to give working parents more time with their children have been touted by both Left and Right, including flexibility in choosing one's working hours, the opportunity for two employees to share a single job, the ability to commute by home computer, and a renewed interest in home entrepreneurship.

The woman who is not yet in the work force but still completing her education generally has more flexibility in completing an unplanned pregnancy. Public high schools have done much to make teen childbearing less onerous, with the unintended result of lowering the costs of sexual irresponsibility.

Sex and Birth Control

It may be useful here to turn for a moment from examining ways to support the woman in an unplanned pregnancy, and toward ways of preventing these undesired pregnancies altogether. The simple answer of providing more and better contraceptives is failing for reasons unknown; although condoms are available for less than the price of a pack of cigarettes in stores across the land, half of all women having abortions were not using any form of birth control at all during the entire

month when they became pregnant; the half that were includes users of such non-methods as douching and withdrawal. In addition, women who have had abortions are thoroughly instructed at the clinic in contraceptive use, yet the abortion repeat rate is nearing half the annual total. It may be that the very availability of abortion makes contraception seem a less urgent concern: "I'll take a chance this one time; I can always have an abortion." Even for those who do use it, method failure is a constant shadow. If contraceptives properly used are 95-percent effective over a year, a sexually active woman using them faithfully over a 10-year period still stands a 43-percent chance of getting pregnant at least once. Her chances jump dramatically if they are used with less than exacting care.


Although the Roman Catholic Church holds a moral opposition to artificial birth control, neither that church nor any major pro-life group is seeking to legally ban contraceptives that in fact prevent conception. (Even though IUDs and some low-dose birth control pills can act instead as abortion-inducers, no one is presently attempting to have them restricted either.) But even among non-religious groups there is a pervasive skepticism about the effectiveness of the contraceptive solution for many of the reasons above. Some would also cite the dangers of tampering with a woman's body to the extent necessary to overcome the finely balanced ecology that sustains reproduction. Most would pinpoint the cause of unplanned pregnancy as, not messy or inadequate or too-expensive contraception, but sex itself.

Sex is still the leading cause of pregnancy. A curious, almost Victorian, circumlocution encourages us to deny this: we speak of the woman who "finds herself pregnant," as though she had just happened on the baby in a parking lot. In fact, pregnancy is nearly always the result of consensual activity between two partners who are aware that pregnancy is a possible result. (Only 1 percent of all abortions are for rape and incest pregnancies, according to Planned Parenthood's Alan Guttmacher Institute.) To decrease the number of crisis pregnancies will ultimately require restoring to sexual activity the kind of respect such a potentially volatile experience deserves.

Many would assume that a goal of sexual restraint and fidelity is futile and naive; the past 20 years of sexual revolution is taken to be the bedrock experience of human sexuality for all time. But there is ample evidence that the sexual revolution has been harmful to women, as the rates of divorce, unwed childbearing, sexually transmitted disease, and abortion increase. A particularly poignant indicator is the proliferation of self-help books aimed at women suffering one form or another of heartbreak. Women's sexuality is not a mechanical but a delicate and trust-based thing, which uncommitted sexual activity smashes; the same may be true of men. It is not only for the sake of the unborn child that sex should be sheltered by the marriage bond, but for the sake of the participants' own vulnerable hearts as well.

Transracial Adoption

Casting the net a bit wider, we can now bring in another circle of support for the pregnant woman, people who may paradoxically ever remain strangers.




Photofest

The woman in a crisis pregnancy, more than she wants money or aid, wants a loving man to make it not be a crisis.

These are the potential adoptive parents of her child.

Although it is common knowledge that babies are in great demand, figures are hard to come by; the federal government ceased collecting adoption information in 1975. There are over 40 infertile couples for each child available, an unknown number of whom would like to adopt; we may add to that figure legions of singles, and couples with biological children who would also adopt a child. The scarcity of babies, and the expense and red tape of adoption, may discourage many from ever applying. There is no way to estimate how many homes there are for adoptive children, but it is certain that demand far exceeds the supply.

Healthy white babies get adopted quickly; minority babies take a little longer, but seldom more than a few months. It is more difficult to find enough homes for black children for several reasons. For some black families, making formal adoption plans with the assistance of an agency is simply not part of the cultural tradition, and for other families the fee is a barrier. Although black families adopt at about the same rate as white families, black children are overrepresented in the pool both as babies and as older children. The largest hurdle, however, is that many agencies are reluctant to place minority babies with white families, although these



UPI/Bettmann

The birth mothers of Olympic skaters Kitty and Peter Carruthers chose the heroic path of giving their children life and placing them for adoption.

families may be eager to give such children a home. According to the National Association of Black Social Workers, "We view the placement of black children in white homes as a hostile act against our community." In accordance with this policy, a white Maryland family was told that it would not be considered for a child who had one black parent, but in the case of a child with one black grandparent they would be competitively considered with single black women.

A poignant side-effect of this policy is that young, pregnant black women are getting the message that "nobody wants your baby," which carries at least an undertone of "nobody wants you." Because of this placement double-bind—shortage of black adoptive families, and barriers to placement in white families—some adoption agencies are reluctant to deal with minority babies at all. Bethany Christian Services is active in this field, and has hired black social workers to recruit black adoptive families; they will place black children in white families if the birth mother agrees and the adoptive family's community will be supportive. Bethany receives seven to eight calls per day from black pregnant women seeking adoptive families for their children. Many of these women have been referred to Bethany by other agencies that did not want to get involved.

The barriers to transracial adoption may be more apparent than real. A 1977 study showed that three-

quarters of black households surveyed felt a white home would be acceptable if no black home were available; only 7 percent were "most unfavorable" to that solution. The fears of seeing one's ethnic identity dissolving into the larger white pool are worthy of respect, but it seems unfair to work this out in the lives of babies who merely want homes.

But what of babies who are not healthy, and older children in foster care? Surprisingly, these comprise fully half of all adoptions each year. Janet Marchese runs the National Down Syndrome Adoption Exchange from her home; she has placed 1,850 of these children in families, and reports a current waiting list of 125 more families seeking to adopt. There are waiting lists also for spina bifida babies, even for terminally ill and AIDS babies.

The situation for foster children is not well understood; although there are approximately 285,000 children in foster care, only roughly 13 percent are legally free and available for adoption. Couples who wish to adopt from this pool face a rigorous progression of tests, home studies, and psychological surveys that may go on for years, perhaps culminating in rejection. For many, it is easier to adopt a child from overseas; these international adoptions have doubled since 1982. Adoption of black foster children is, of course, slowed by the same bias against allowing placement in white families. In addition, more-adoptable younger children may age years in the foster system without being released for adoption, as ambivalent birth parents and overburdened caseworkers who struggle to reconstitute the birth family sometimes see adoption as a sign of failure.

Mother Courage

The strongest message we can give to the pregnant woman in crisis, then, is that her baby is not unwanted, and that there are many loving homes for her child, no matter what his color or health. But she faces other conflicts, including pervasive and illogical bias against making an adoption plan. Her friends may say, "I would never do that to my baby. I'd have an abortion first." There is a self-preserving impulse to be rid of the child quickly, before the intimate growth of nine months' time can weave bonds that are strong as steel.

We must not speak too lightly of the sacrifice of the birth mother. It is tempting to say that it will only cost her nine months of her life to give perhaps 90 years to the life of her child. This presumes that the mother's feelings are cut when the cord is severed, that she will not wonder throughout her life about her child, his health, his happiness, his own children.

Yet crisis pregnancy is bound to involve some sorrow, no matter what choice is made. There will be a poignant twist in the heart forever, no matter what course is followed in these anxious days. As we see soldiers return from the Persian Gulf to festivals and acclaim, we wish that there were some way to offer a bit of the same praise to the brave woman who sacrifices so much to give life to a child she may never see again. This is truly heroism.

Regarding the choice a single woman faces between raising her child or placing her for adoption, evidence is strong that the latter course will have the best results for both of them. Compared with a single mother, the

birth mother who chooses adoption is more likely to finish school, to have a higher-paying job, and to eventually marry. She is less likely to become pregnant again out of wedlock. Good results for the child are comparatively strong: in terms of financial security, emotional health, school success and other achievements, children do far better in two-parent homes.

Most birth mothers who place their children for adoption do so out of love, because they believe it to be the best thing for their children. Ignoring the advice of our pain-avoidance culture, these courageous women find bittersweet satisfaction in knowing they have done the right thing by giving their children life and by placing them in sound families where they can enjoy the best prospects for a full and healthy life. But a birth mother's sense of loss can still be wrenching, especially in the first year after she parts from the child. We owe her our deep gratitude, respect, and support for the pain she bravely endures. Truly she gives life twice: once when she refuses an abortion, and again when she releases the child to be raised, and loved, in another family's home.

Help from Taxpayers

Returning to our image of concentric rings of support, we come at last to the widest ring, that of the larger tax-paying community. We are already spending money to support the unwed mother, money that might be spent more effectively, especially in the areas of public health care and public assistance.

Those who work daily to help poor women continue their pregnancies are probably the best experts on how public support meets or fails these needs. Crisis pregnancy workers across the country generally say that there are good, effective programs to help these women, such as the Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) nutrition program and public prenatal and maternity care, but that these programs usually don't have enough money. A woman may have to wait weeks to see her doctor and then spend all day in a waiting room (perhaps wrestling with a restless toddler) before she sees the doctor for a few minutes.

While all who work with needy pregnant women are grateful for the availability of programs that meet a desperate and constant need, there is division on the issue of funding. Some say that they would definitely appeal for more funding, and are willing to pay higher taxes to cover it. Others wish to place more funds in the service of clients, but think that these could be found by cutting red tape and controlling fraud.

A computerized network uniting all the helping services would be a tremendous step forward; one could type in a client's information and then be shown at once all the varied support for which she would be eligible. Similarly, "one-stop shopping" that offers a client all her programs in one place would be an inestimable help to the woman who presently may be discouraged from taking advantage of parenting or nutrition classes by the necessity of several bus transfers with a stroller under her arm.

The cost of childbearing is another obstacle. When an abortion costs only \$250 but a birth is more than ten times that, a heavy thumb rests on the scale. One who

has left welfare and Medicaid for a low-paying job without health benefits may well wonder if she was better off on the public tab when a heavy health expense comes home.

Some private volunteer health-care programs falter because doctors are reluctant to treat charity clients, who are far more likely to sue than paying clients. Some form of malpractice protection for good-faith health care may attract more Good Samaritans to this work.

Experiment in Wisconsin

As currently structured, public assistance frequently perpetuates and subsidizes the least beneficial family arrangements: single-parent households. Susan Olasky, co-founder of the Austin Crisis Pregnancy Center in Texas, suggests that we turn this around by counselling each woman with an eye to establishing her in a network of support. The best alternative, both for her and the child, would be a healthy marriage with the child's father. If that is not a reasonable goal, a good alternative might be encouraging her to live with her parents, if they can offer a stable home with a granddad to fill the child's need for a father. In some cases, the woman should be strongly urged to place her child for adoption.

The very last alternative, the one most likely to lead to poverty and child abuse, is establishing the mother and child in a new, isolated household. Olasky fears that when a pregnant woman seeking help is immediately offered public funds, it leapfrogs her over the better choices to this last and lonely one. To succeed, marriage and family relationships require irksome personal change and some loss of autonomy; the woman is offered

Friends will discourage the adoption option. "I would never do that to my baby. I'd have an abortion first."

the deceptive fantasy that she can forgo such trials and sustain herself and her child on meager public resources. The child's father may feel that instinctual desire to provide for his new family, but cannot compete with a governmental sugar-daddy with unlimited funds; and why should she marry him and lose health and financial benefits? The fragmentation of the family continues one generation more.

A controversial plan is being considered in Wisconsin: Governor Tommy Thompson is proposing a Parental and Family Responsibility initiative that would cap AFDC benefits to unmarried women at the one-child level, no matter how many additional children she had. But teen couples who marry would receive increased benefits per child, and be allowed to earn up to \$14,500 without losing any of the children's benefits. Will we see more successful families encouraged to make their marriages work and earn their own way? Or will the abortion rate



UPI/Bettmann

Merely putting a padlock on the clinic door is not a solution for post-abortion America.

rise as the poorest abandoned women see support for their children cut off? Yet how long can we continue to subsidize the most counter-productive behavior? Those who work with poor women and face these perplexing problems every day tend to give Governor Thompson's plan a cautious, but hopeful, thumbs up.

Challenge for Pro-Lifers

The abortion battle has been fought for too long solely over the issue of legality, a Pushmi-Pullyu beast of an issue for the activist poles that is quickly exhausting the patience of the rest of the nation. Legal protection for the unborn is indeed a vital goal to pursue with tenacity; a civilized nation simply cannot approve violence as the solution for social problems. But we should take a note from the vast number of pro-life groups who focus less on legal change than on bringing hope to a desperate situation that is happening today.

What could we have said to the sad cashier, the student, the widow, or any other desperate woman trapped in an unwanted pregnancy? Perhaps practical aid from a local crisis pregnancy center would help ease the burdens; perhaps the Nurturing Network's knack for keeping a resumé intact would be the boost she needs.

As a larger society, there is more we can say to her.


We can give her whatever we have to share, medical and legal help, food, shelter, clothing. We can encourage the baby's father to do right by her, and call out in him his best self, the self that wants to do so. We can help her turn to her own parents for help, trusting that their love for her is stronger than she ever had need to test. We can encourage her boss to work with her so that she can keep both her pregnancy and her job. We can help find adoptive parents to give her child a loving home, while setting her free to continue her own life plans. We can help her with food and health care, even with our taxes.

And perhaps this is not enough; perhaps she will still feel that abortion is the choice she must make. We can still be there for her, as thousands of women who have had abortions fill pro-life organizations, turning their own grief into a resource for others who need someone who can listen, without blame or censure, and truly understand.

The lonely woman, racked by this difficult "personal decision," must be met by our willingness to help her if our assertions that we value life, or that we support her choices, are to have any meaning at all. There is much we cannot do, will never be able to do, to ease her pain. But there is no excuse for our not doing whatever we can.



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
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
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AMERICAN WAY

The Enduring Interests of U.S. Foreign Policy

MARK P. LAGON AND MICHAEL LIND

"We have no eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and these interests it is our duty to follow."

—Lord Palmerston, 1848

One of the extraordinary misconceptions in conventional wisdom is the notion that the United States pursued an isolationist foreign policy for most of its history prior to World War II and the Cold War. In fact America has played an important role in world affairs from the earliest days of the Republic, when New England sailors pierced the Royal Navy's blockade of Revolutionary France. Because internal affairs were chiefly a local concern, foreign policy was a principal activity of 19th and early 20th century presidents and congressional leaders, from House Speaker Henry Clay, leader of the "War Hawks" in 1812, to President James K. Polk, who secured the Pacific Northwest through his diplomacy with Britain and won the Southwest by conquest from Mexico, to President Theodore Roosevelt, who won one of the first Nobel Peace Prizes by negotiating a peace treaty between Japan and czarist Russia that served America's goal of containing Russian expansion.

Four primary interests have guided American foreign policy from the founding of the Republic: preserving the integrity of the American nation from secessionist movements and cultural disintegration; securing control over the national frontier; protecting the continental security of North America, an objective that, from the beginning, has required maintaining a balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere; and securing access to markets and resources around the globe. These interests have been obscured during the past half-century, as American foreign policy has been defined in terms of specific enemies: Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the Soviet empire, and, most recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq. During the coming decades, it is not clear that the United States will face any such arch-enemy. The permanent interests of the United States, however, will endure. Even in the absence of a single overriding threat, they can and should supply the basis for a vigorous foreign policy.

National Integrity

Preserving the integrity of the American nation is the fundamental interest of American foreign as well as domestic policy. Integrity—the harmony of diverse elements—is a more appropriate goal than unity for a society as pluralistic as America.

The American nation is older than the United States. While it has grown through immigration and the inclusion of previously excluded groups such as blacks, the American nation originated with the Anglo-American colonists in the 17th and 18th centuries who shared a common consciousness of American (as distinct from British) identity. Unlike some countries, American identity is not defined by ancestry or religion. Nor is it defined simply by political belief; the ideology of liberal democracy, for example, is shared with other societies as diverse as France, Switzerland, India, and Costa Rica. Indeed, it is a mistake to define the American identity exclusively in terms of its political elements, the United States government and the Constitution. Political union and constitutionalism are not ends in themselves; they are merely instruments by which a pre-existing American people have sought to realize their collective purposes.

The quest for American political integrity is considerably older than its particular form, the federal government. As early as 1727, Daniel Coxe, a Welsh-American, called for "all the Colonies appertaining—to the Crown of Great Britain on the Northern Continent of America, [to] be united under a Legal, Regular and firm Establishment; over which, it's propos'd, a Lieutenant, or Supreme Governour, may be constituted, and appointed to preside on the spot, to whom the Governours of each Colony shall be subordinate." Britain, however, preferred to keep its American colonies divided and dependent. It refused to permit the formation of a common North American parliament, federated with, but not subordinate to, the London parliament. The

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refusal of the British to convert the empire into something like the 20th-century British Commonwealth led the American people (with the exception of loyalists in Canada) to secede.

After America won its independence, several attempts at closer national union such as the Articles of Confederation failed before the federal Constitution was adopted. Thereafter the chief threat to political integrity came from regional secessionist movements. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, nationalists in the U.S. government were alarmed by fears that disaffected westerners would secede, or set up their own new republics in French or Indian or Spanish-Mexican territory. President Jefferson, for example, was convinced that his vice president, Aaron Burr, had committed treason by conspiring to set up a new western republic. During the War of 1812, while the United States attempted to conquer Canada, pro-British New Englanders contemplated seceding from the Union and perhaps rejoining Britain. The greatest secession crisis was of course the Civil War with its half-million deaths—almost as many as in all other U.S. wars combined.


Cultural Separatism

The major threat to national integrity today is not territorial secession, but cultural separatism. From its colonial origins, American identity has been defined by shared language and shared culture, which are all the more important in the absence of common descent and religion. The distinctive American variant of English has been championed by nationalistic American intellectuals from Noah Webster to H. L. Mencken; and the United States, unlike Switzerland, Canada, or Belgium, has never been sympathetic to linguistic federalism. While usually welcoming to immigrants who learned English, Americans have been intolerant of substantial linguistic minorities, to the point of persecuting even the private use of foreign languages, for example, by German-

From the beginning, the American nation has faced encirclement by hostile European powers.

American schools and newspapers during World War I. This was not an isolated outbreak of nativism. Jefferson sought to discourage foreigners from “settling together in large numbers, wherein, as in our German settlements, they preserve for a long time, their own language, habits, and principles of government”—a concern shared by Benjamin Franklin.

The United States has been in this respect less “universal” and less “tolerant” than a number of other Western democracies. The idea that the identities of other nations are based on common ethnicity and culture, while the



Pictorial Parade

Admiral Perry opening up Japan in 1853. Access to foreign markets and resources has been a goal of American foreign policy since colonial days.

United States is unique in being a nation of immigrants dedicated to an ideal of freedom or democracy, is a half-truth at best. There is as much ethnic diversity in Brazil and France as there is in the United States. Americans could, of course, adopt a “Canadian” or “Swiss” view of citizenship—a “mosaic” rather than a “melting pot”—and accept the possibility that the United States would become a single state containing several distinct nations. That would represent a revolution in American government and consciousness. Because Americans have always expected immigrants to assimilate fairly quickly to a common, English-language American culture, the United States has no models in its own history and traditions for accommodating large and permanent linguistic minorities (tolerated ethnic enclaves have been small—American Indian reservations, Amish areas, Chinatowns).

For most of our history Americans perceived the greatest threat of cultural separatism as coming from German speakers. Today the biggest worry concerns Hispanic separatism. The number of Americans who speak Spanish as their first language is 10 times the number of others with primary tongues other than English. The greatest challenge to American cultural integrity in the next century may thus be to avert a “Hispanic Quebec” in Sun Belt states and cities with Hispanic majorities.

Tighter restriction of immigration will not be the answer. On the contrary, high levels of immigration to the United States will be necessary into the next century, if for no other reason than to provide enough working men and women to support our aging population. Hispanic immigrants should be welcomed to the extent that they wish to assimilate to American norms like other immigrant groups. Most likely they will assimilate quickly, because of the pervasive influence of the English-language media, and their own desire to better themselves in the larger American society. However, affirmative action, official bilingualism, and minority set-asides could encourage Hispanic-American immigrants to per-



UPI/Bettmann Newsphotos

The possible return of chaos and revolution to Mexico, of the sort that led to Pancho Villa's raids, must remain a nightmare for U.S. strategists.

petuate a separate Hispanic identity. In practice, this would make Spanish-speakers dependent upon a new elite of bilingual leaders, who would act as intermediaries between the barrio and the government and business community, perhaps exploiting their fellow ethnics in the process. Institutionalizing Hispanic separatism would also inevitably create a political backlash by resentful white, black, and Asian Americans. The consequences of Hispanic linguistic and cultural separatism, if it were artificially encouraged by the government, could be even more disastrous for the American melting pot than Québécois nationalism has been for the Canadian mosaic.

Frontier Control

A second permanent interest of the American nation has been control of its borders. Control was threatened first by the incursions of nomadic Indians and then by banditry and political chaos in Mexico. The nearest historic parallel is European Russia, which bordered on primitive Asian tribes in the northeast and on a declining Muslim civilization (the Ottoman Empire and the Central Asian khanates) in the south. Today the best comparison might be Germany, which not only borders on the impoverished societies of ex-Communist Eastern Europe, but includes one within its boundaries. The geographer L. D. Kristof has made a useful distinction between frontiers and boundaries. A boundary is simply a territorial limit, whereas a frontier is the zone of contact

between two different societies or civilizations. Adopting his terminology, one could say that Canada and the United States are united by a boundary, while the United States and Mexico (and the Caribbean countries) are separated by a frontier.

During the early days of the Republic, the major challenge to frontier control was posed by hostile Indian nations of the trans-Appalachian West. European powers such as France and Britain often armed and encouraged Indian peoples hostile to the Anglo-Americans, who themselves created hostility by pushing steadily westward into Indian lands. The conquest and confinement of the Indians solved that problem, at substantial cost to the displaced Indians.

The Mexican War created a new frontier challenge, by giving the United States a 2,000-mile border with a much poorer and sometimes anarchic country. Fortunately the United States has not needed to garrison this border and has long tolerated a certain amount of extralegal migration and smuggling (alcohol during Prohibition, drugs today). The major exception was during the decade-long Mexican Revolution 75 years ago, when General John Pershing entered Mexico in response to Pancho Villa's raids, at a time when the United States was concerned not only about Mexican chaos but a possible Mexican alliance with Germany of the sort proposed by Berlin in the Zimmermann telegram of 1917.

Chaos and revolution in Mexico, which would send millions of refugees streaming northward, remains a nightmare for American strategists. Although there is no such threat in the immediate future, one of the priorities of U.S. foreign policy-makers should be to regularize the conditions along America's "soft underbelly" by promoting political liberalization and economic development in Mexico, by replacing the extralegal migration for jobs with a guest-worker program, and by revising naturalization, education, and civil rights policies in the United

The United States has no models in its own history for accommodating large and permanent linguistic minorities.

States to encourage Mexican immigrants to assimilate rapidly to mainstream American culture. Freer trade with Mexico should be a high objective for the United States not just because it could benefit Americans economically, but because it could make Mexico more prosperous and stable, and would reinforce decisions by the Mexican ruling elite to liberalize their economy. If, generations from now, a prosperous, democratic, and capitalist Mexico should join the United States and Canada at a

level of actual equality, the second major interest of the United States, border control, would finally cease to be an interest at all. The Mexican–American frontier would be replaced, at long last, by a mere Mexican–American boundary.

Continental Security

The third permanent interest of the American nation—continental security—arises from its location in North America. In geopolitical terms the Americas are offshore islands of Eurasia, the continent that contains 80 percent of the world’s population, most of its arable land and resources, and all of the other great powers.

From the beginning, the American nation has faced encirclement by hostile European powers. In 1716, for example, the governor of New France predicted, “The English, on the first rupture between France and England, would employ all their efforts to seize the entirety of North America, whence might follow the loss of Mexico, from which they would expel the Spaniards in a few years without any resistance.” To strangle Anglo-American expansion, the French sought alliances with the American Indian nations and Spain. France lost its North American empire in the French and Indian War only to help the American colonists in their struggle against Britain in 1776. After the French Revolution, a new threat from France against the newly independent United States led to an undeclared naval war between France and America in the 1790s. Even the removal of a renewed French presence in the center of the continent by the Louisiana Purchase did not end French dreams of a North American empire.

The subtle but firm attempts of the United States to reverse French entrenchment in next-door Mexico illustrate its permanent interest of continental security. In 1838 the Mexicans under General Santa Anna repelled a French invasion. France intervened again in 1862-63 to overthrow President Benito Juarez. Napoleon III installed Maximilian of Austria as emperor in Mexico in 1864. Occupied with the Civil War, the United States was hardly in a position to expel the French from Mexico. However, in 1866, with the Civil War won by the North, Secretary of State William Seward pointedly informed Napoleon III, “We shall be gratified when the Emperor shall give to us...definitive information of the time when French military operations may be expected to cease in Mexico.” General Ulysses S. Grant dispatched 50,000 troops to the Texas border, and France, already under pressure from the forces of Juarez, began removing its troops from Mexico within a few months.

Britain, too, sought to contain the growth of the American nation, which threatened its possessions in Canada and its control of the Oregon Territory. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain interfered with American shipping and commerce until the United States was provoked to war in 1812. Later, in the 1840s, Britain, frightened by the continental ambitions of its former colony, tried to interest France and Mexico in an anti-American alliance to preserve the separate status of the Republic of Texas, Mexico, and perhaps California and Oregon. The masterful diplomacy of President James K. Polk prevented this attempted encirclement by forcing

the British to compromise in the partition of the Oregon Territory, and winning California and the Southwest in the Mexican War of 1846-48.

In the late 19th century the possible British threat to the continental security of the United States was eclipsed by the rise of Russia, Japan, and Imperial Germany. Concern about a possible German naval threat to the Western Hemisphere did not begin in 1914; in the late 19th century, Germany and America both sought to control Samoa, and German naval forces were poised to take over the Philippines if the American navy had not pre-empted them during the Spanish–American War. After World War II, of course, the Soviet Union became the major Eurasian threat to American continental security.

Unquestioned Hegemony

The response of U.S. leaders to the recurrent threat of extra-continental powers has taken the form of four general rules. First, no balance of power in the North American quartersphere will be tolerated. The United States must be the unquestioned hegemon, so that outside powers cannot play one North American state against another—as Britain and France sought to do with their support of the Confederacy. This concern was important in fostering the Louisiana Purchase, the annexation of Texas, and the defeat of southern secession.

Second, the United States must control the sea, air, and now space approaches to the North American quartersphere. American continental security has been enhanced, deliberately or incidentally, by the acquisition of Great Lakes territory, New Orleans, San Francisco Bay, Alaska, Hawaii, the Panama Canal, and Guantanamo. As

Theodore Roosevelt’s efforts to set up a peace conference to end the Russo–Japanese War were motivated by a concern over the balance of power in Asia.

permanent sites for American naval and air forces, Greenland and Iceland, which are crucial links in the GIUK (Greenland–Iceland–UK) gap, might be added to the list. Continental security requires that the North Atlantic, the North Pacific, the Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the Arctic be “American lakes.” The United States was brought into both world wars in part by threats to its control of the continental sea approaches—by Germany’s initiation of unrestricted submarine warfare during World War I, and by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) seeks to extend this 200-year-old principle to defend the space approaches to the U.S.



The Bettmann Archive

One of the highest aims of foreign policy is to prevent secessionist crises such as the Civil War.

Third, as enunciated in the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, military alliances of other North American countries with hostile extra-continental powers will not be suffered gladly. As Cecil Crabb has written in *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*:

[T]he Monroe Doctrine remains in many respects the sheet anchor of American foreign and defense policy. According to several criteria—its venerable position in the annals of American diplomacy, the extent to which it has come to be viewed at home and abroad as an integral part of “the American way of life,” the degree of overwhelming and consistent public support for the principles associated with it, or the willingness with which successive administrations in Washington have been prepared to defend its principles by reliance on armed force—the Monroe Doctrine has no peers among the foreign policy pronouncements identified with later presidents.

Like so much of U.S. foreign policy, the Monroe Doctrine has precedents in colonial history—in the Anglo-Spanish Treaty at the end of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1713, which guaranteed that no Spanish territory in the Americas would be alienated to any European power. The Monroe Doctrine has been reapplied and reinterpreted many times since 1823. Theodore Roosevelt added his “corollary,” which held that the United States monopolized the right to restore order and enforce foreign claims against governments in the Western Hemisphere. The Roosevelt corollary was used to justify several instances of “gunboat diplomacy” and intervention in Central America, but was disavowed by the government of the second Roosevelt as part of the “Good Neighbor” policy of the 1930s.

During the Reagan years, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams argued that the principles of the Monroe Doctrine still apply, and pointed to the membership of Cuba in the Soviet bloc as a galling symbol of the failure of the United States to enforce this policy. Timothy Ashby argued that the Soviet Union sought to foment revolution in the Caribbean and Central America (through Cuba, Nicaragua, Grenada,

the Salvadoran guerrillas, and other surrogates) to divert U.S. attention and resources from Eurasia, where the chief Soviet designs remained. He pinpointed as a major objective of the Soviet’s Caribbean strategy, “Forced withdrawal of U.S. influence from other parts of the world due to an enhanced security threat along the U.S. southern flank, thereby leaving the ‘principal theaters’ of Europe and Asia vulnerable to Soviet aggression.”

Balance of Eurasian Powers

The fourth method of ensuring continental security is preserving a strategic balance among the great powers of Eurasia. The previous three methods—American hegemony, control of North American air, sea, and space approaches, and the Monroe Doctrine—have the purpose of protecting the United States from a hostile Eurasian superpower. The purpose of a balance-of-power policy is to prevent such a potential threat to continental security from forming at all. Where the other strategies represent reactive defenses of North American continental security, the balance of power is a preemptive defense.

American interest in preventing Soviet domination of Eurasia is only the most recent example of U.S. efforts to maintain the Eurasian balance. The roots of American concern over that balance of power long predate the United States’ endeavor to prevent Eurasia’s domination by Nazi Germany in World War II or by the Soviet Union in the Cold War.

The United States harbored pro-French sentiments in the aftermath of the Revolutionary War, given French aid to the Americans in their battle for independence. However, this tilt toward France was short-lived. Even Thomas Jefferson, who was sympathetic to France and hostile to Britain, perceived that British independence and power was in America’s interest after Napoleon invaded Russia. In a letter he remarked that, if Napoleon conquered Russia, “England would be but a breakfast,” and France could use English ships to attack the United

In their Open Door policy of 1899, McKinley and Hay sought to prevent one great power from monopolizing economic access to China.

States in the Western Hemisphere. By the 1860s, concern over the European balance of power became increasingly important to American elites, with a France that had just intervened in Mexico then the principal worry. American ambassador George Bancroft wrote in a letter to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish in 1870,

A true guarantee for Germany against future attacks from France would be the political union of

Germany itself; and the most earnest negotiations are now pending between North Germany on the one side and South Germany, especially Württemberg and Bavaria on the other, for the accomplishment of that object; Germany, being united, will have nothing to fear from France on the one side or Prussia on the other.

To preserve a balance, many Americans favored German unification and war aims against Napoleon III in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870.

President Theodore Roosevelt's efforts to set up a peace conference at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, to end the Russo-Japanese War were motivated by a concern over the balance of power in Asia. While Roosevelt won the 1906 Nobel Peace Prize for his role as intermediary, he was by no means a neutral party, writing in a letter to his son in 1904:

For several years Russia has behaved very badly in the Far East, her attitude toward all nations, including us, but especially toward Japan, being grossly overbearing. We had no sufficient cause for war with her. Yet I was apprehensive lest if she at the very outset whipped Japan on the sea she might assume a position well-nigh intolerable toward us. I thought Japan would probably whip her on the sea, but I could not be certain, and between ourselves—for you must not breathe it to anybody—I was thoroughly well pleased with the Japanese victory, for Japan is playing our game.


By recognizing who was "playing our game," Roosevelt identified an American interest in preventing Russia from expanding its influence in Asia. He accepted Japan's secret request to set up peace negotiations, pleased to help Japan keep the balance.

Although premised upon the language of moral crusades, U.S. involvement in the two world wars was in good measure based on an interest in stopping German hegemonic designs. These full-blown efforts to maintain the Eurasian balance were merely the outgrowth of the gradually developing view before the United States became a global power that Eurasian equilibrium was connected to the continental security of North America.

Global Economic Access

Access to foreign markets and resources has been a fourth goal of American foreign policy since the colonial period, when the colonies disobeyed British imperial regulations to trade with the colonies of France and Spain (even when their respective empires were at war). Throughout its history the United States has proposed the principle of nonpreferential trade for regions from which it feared its traders would be shut out by rival powers. In the Oregon Territory in the early 19th century, Britain and the United States agreed to share equal trading rights with the local Indians (ultimately this was replaced by a policy of partition).

Since the 19th century much of the American concern with free access for trading has been focused on East Asia. Perhaps the first major U.S. effort to secure com-



As Americans learned again at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. must control the sea, air, and space approaches to North America.

mercial access to the Far East was Commodore Matthew Calbraith Perry's visit to Japan with four ships in July 1853, and with seven ships in February 1854. Perry's show of force and firm diplomacy opened the door to a very important future of commercial relationships between the two countries.

The most famous American policy aimed at commercial access to East Asia was the Open Door policy. In September 1899, McKinley's secretary of state, John Hay, recommended the principle of equal commercial access to China in communications to Britain, Germany, Russia, France, and Japan. McKinley and Hay sought to prevent one great power from monopolizing economic access to China. Hay followed up this suggestion with another in July 1900, after the nationalist Boxer Rebellion sought to rid China of its emperor and of foreigners. He called for the great powers to uphold the principle of Chinese sovereign autonomy. This call for Chinese independence was also aimed at preserving American access to trade in East Asia.

During Woodrow Wilson's presidency, the United States continued to be concerned with maintaining the "open door" to China. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan agreed to help China fend off threats to its independence, and warned Japan not to violate equal commercial access to China or China's autonomy when it entered World War I against Germany.

Similar logic animated American support for decolonization in Africa and Asia, and U.S. support for multilateral trade liberalization through the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) after World War II. The goal of commercial access can also be achieved through bilateral deals, for example, the U.S.-Canada free-trade agreement and its possible extension to Mexico, although too many such deals might undermine the open world trading system if carried too far.

National Interest in the Gulf

Access to natural resources, too, has been a goal of American diplomacy. The war in the Gulf is the latest of a series of American actions undertaken to keep Persian

Gulf oil flowing, beginning with Anglo–American cooperation during and after World War II. Strategic minerals have often been cited as a reason why the United States should be concerned about South Africa. American diplomacy has also sought to vindicate the rights of American fishermen and whalers to access to the renewable resources on which their industries depend. Another kind of nonpreferential access to the “global commons” may become more important in the future, as the United States develops the technology to mine the seabed and perhaps the moon, the asteroids, and other extraterrestrial bodies. The Reagan administration rejected the Law of the Sea Treaty, which would have set up an international bureaucracy to license

The United States must be the continental hegemon, so that outside powers cannot play one North American state against another—as Britain and France sought to do with their support of the Confederacy.

seabed-mining companies in order to redistribute profits to Third-World governments. The alternative favored by the United States is unrestricted access to ocean resources by anyone with requisite technology. Whether this approach is compatible with the preservation of renewable resources such as fisheries remains to be seen. Because people are more likely to take care of their own property than they are to look after common property, in the long run the conservation of fisheries and other natural resources may be best served by their “appropriation” by private entities, governments, or multinational enterprises. Although the details of the enterprise to have been set up by the Law of the Sea Treaty made it unacceptable, the underlying idea of the appropriation of hitherto common resources is fully in keeping with the conservative emphasis on property rights.


Although global economic access is one of the four permanent interests of the United States, it has not been the most important in the “high politics” of war and diplomacy. In spite of claims by revisionist historians on the Left, purely economic imperialism has rarely played

a role in U.S. foreign policy.

Whenever economic motives have been invoked to justify a policy, security reasons usually provided the major rationale. The acquisitions of New Orleans, San Francisco Bay, Hawaii, and the Panama Canal were as important for defense as for commerce. The vindication of the principle of freedom of the seas against Britain in 1812 and Germany in 1917 was a necessity for defense. Most 20th-century interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean, such as those during the Wilson administration and the Cold War, have been motivated by fear (sometimes exaggerated) of the establishment of German or Soviet beachheads in the North American quartersphere. Furthermore, the United States has frequently sacrificed its interest in economic access to its interest in continental security. Throughout the Cold War, American policy-makers tolerated East Asian and European discrimination against American goods and services to avoid disrupting the American-led anti-Soviet alliance with bitter trade disputes. Whether these disputes increase in importance now that the Soviet threat is declining remains to be seen.

Separate Strategies for Separate Interests

In the perennial nightmare of American strategists, all four permanent interests of the United States—national integrity, border control, continental security, and economic access—are threatened simultaneously. A Eurasian superpower, monopolizing the industries, markets, and resources of the Old World, might use its military superiority to besiege the North American quartersphere, stir up turmoil on the U.S. border, and encourage social division and even secessionism within the United States.

For most of American history, however, such a hegemonic threat has been extremely remote. The present is such a period. Soviet power, while still a menace, is in significant decline. Although a revitalized Soviet Union or Russian successor state, or some other power, may strive for global hegemony in the future, in the near term the United States will have the luxury of crafting separate strategies to deal with separate interests. In the nature of things, the problems of national integrity and border control intersect in the problem of Hispanic assimilation, which will call for coordination of trade, immigration, education, and civil rights policies. In other areas, however, there is no need for a “grand strategy” that would subordinate diverse American interests in the free flow of Middle Eastern oil, naval and space defense, and access to European and Asian markets to some single overarching goal or theme. In times like these, an anti-ideological, conservative understanding of society and the world leads to the conclusion that the best guide in American foreign policy is not the shadow of America’s past or present enemies, but the beacons of her permanent interests. 

GEORGE BUSH'S QUOTA BILL

The Dismaying Impact of *Griggs*

TERRY EASTLAND

President Bush says he wants to sign a civil rights bill but not a quota bill. Meanwhile, congressional Democrats insist that their civil rights bill is not a quota bill. Obviously, no one in either party wants to be seen as favoring quotas. But the irony of the current legislative battle over civil rights is that both President Bush and his liberal opponents in Congress have more in common than they are publicly willing to admit. Both bills support the dreaded "Q" word: both, to one degree or another, support quotas. Both the president and congressional Democrats would require employers to justify any hiring or promotion standards that result in less-than-proportionate employment of minorities and women. In so doing, both accept a 1971 Supreme Court decision called *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*. For two decades *Griggs* has forced employers to resort to preferential treatment of minorities and women in order to avoid litigation and liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

In 1989 a Supreme Court concerned about the negative impact of *Griggs* sensibly acted to contain it in *Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio*. How—not whether—to revise *Wards Cove* has led the Bush administration and congressional liberals to fight about quotas. It is a superficial battle; whoever really wants to dismantle America's quota culture must not only accept *Wards Cove* but also take the bold step of asking for further reform of *Griggs*. Whatever its value 20 years ago, *Griggs* today is bad public policy, and in an economy facing ever stiffer international competition, it can only make matters worse.

Breathtaking Judicial Activism

Griggs is one of the Supreme Court's most important civil rights decisions and the most significant of all of the Court's decisions concerning employment discrimination. The media have largely neglected *Griggs* in their coverage of the now two-year-old effort to pass new civil rights legislation. But that struggle cannot be understood apart from a knowledge of *Griggs*.

In *Griggs* the Supreme Court made its first significant interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which created a federal right to equal employment opportunity, free of racial discrimination. In a breathtaking

instance of judicial activism, a unanimous Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger, wrote into the statute the equal results standard demanded by "disparate impact" theory and its model of proportional representation in the workplace.

Willie Griggs and 12 other black employees at Duke Power's Dan River Steam Station near Draper, North Carolina, charged in a class action that the company had discriminated against blacks in violation of Title VII. Duke Power had compiled a long record of overt discrimination, having restricted blacks prior to 1965 to the plant's labor department, where the highest-paying jobs paid less than the lowest-paying jobs in the four all-white operating departments. In 1955, in an effort to upgrade the quality of its work force, the company had required a high school diploma for initial assignment to any department except labor and for transfer from one of the "white" departments (coal-handling) to the three other white departments, all of them higher-paying. When Title VII took effect in the summer of 1965, the company ended its practice of limiting employment opportunities for blacks to the labor department and also extended to employees in that department the high school requirement for transfer to the better jobs elsewhere, although not for initial employment. Whites hired before 1955 without high school diplomas, however, were exempted from the new educational requirement. The company also required that anyone seeking a job in any department but labor pass two professionally developed general aptitude tests. Employees without high school diplomas could qualify for upward transfer by passing the two tests.

Griggs and his colleagues contended that, whatever their intent, the company's employment requirements had an adverse impact upon blacks and that these requirements did not measure the ability to perform a particular job. Duke Power replied that under Title VII ability tests were permitted so long as they were not used

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to discriminate on the basis of race.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected the claim of the plaintiffs that requirements not explicitly job-related violated Title VII because of their disparate impact upon blacks. The appeals court held that for Title VII to have been violated, the plaintiffs had to show that Duke Power had in fact intended to discriminate against blacks when it adopted the diploma and test requirements. There had to be, in other words, discriminatory purpose.

“Built-in Headwinds”

When the case moved to the Supreme Court the plaintiffs’ attorneys focused not on Griggs or any of the other individuals in the class action; indeed they professed not to know which employees, white or black, had taken and failed the tests used by Duke Power, although some of the plaintiffs had taken and passed them. The lawyers urged the Supreme Court to think of the case in terms of the impact of the employment requirements upon blacks *as a group*. They succeeded.

The Court said that the objective of Title VII was to remove “barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other [*i.e.*, non-white] employees.” An employment selection practice or procedure or test can be neutral on its face, “and even neutral in terms of intent,” but if it operates to “freeze” the status quo of “past discriminatory employment practices,” it violates Title VII. Basic intelligence, said the Court, cannot manifest itself fairly in a testing process unless it has “the means of articulation.” And blacks as a group do not have this means because they have “long received inferior education in segregated schools.” In a footnote, the Court reported U.S. census figures for 1960 showing that 34 percent of white males, but only 12 percent of black males, in North Carolina had completed high school. It also noted statistics from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission showing that 58 percent of whites had passed a battery of tests including those used by Duke Power, while just 6 percent of blacks had done so. The Court assumed that the failure of blacks to do better—and presumably on a par with whites—was “directly traceable to race.”

Blacks, in short, had been the victims of societal discrimination in regard to education. It no doubt helped the argument in the Court’s mind that the particular society in question had been one of Jim Crow. Burger, in his opinion, relied on a 1969 voting rights case, also from North Carolina, *Gaston County v. United States*, in which the Court had struck down a literacy test for voter registration. In *Gaston*, while observing that there had been no intentional discrimination, the Court said that the literacy test effectively discriminated against blacks because North Carolina’s formerly segregated inferior education had prevented them from acquiring the skills needed to pass the test.

Burger wrote that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.” The touchstone, he elaborated, is “business necessity.” Thus, if an employment practice that operates to exclude blacks “cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice

is prohibited.” Duke Power had not met this high standard; by its own testimony it had adopted its educational and testing requirements to improve the overall quality of its work force but without any specific job assignments in mind.

Burger seemed to accept the company’s declaration of a lack of discriminatory intent, noting Duke Power’s special effort to help its undereducated employees by underwriting two-thirds of the tuition for high school training. But “good intent,” he said, “does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in-headwinds’ for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”

Burger maintained that when Congress wrote Title VII it was concerned about not simply the motivation of employment requirements but also their consequences, and that, in fact, Congress had placed “on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” At the end of his opinion Burger reiterated: “What Congress has commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract.” The Court gave practical guidance by approving EEOC guidelines interpreting a section of Title VII that authorizes the use of “any professionally developed ability test” that is not “designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race.” The EEOC guidelines said that Title VII permitted only the use of job-related tests and that employers using such a test must have available data “demonstrating that the test is predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated.”

Contradicting Title VII

The *Griggs* decision contradicted both the language and legislative history of Title VII. The text of Title VII defines “an unlawful employment practice” as “discriminat[ion]...because of [an] individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” In the remedial section of Title VII, courts are required to find that the defendant has “intentionally engaged in or is intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment practice.”

The legislative history makes clear that Congress rejected racial imbalance, or disparate impact, as a definition of discrimination. The decision in a 1964 Illinois case, *Myart v. Motorola*, had worried some members of Congress: Under that state’s fair employment practices act, a racially neutral test had been invalidated on grounds that it had a disparate impact upon blacks; the employer was told he could not use it until he showed that it did not cause a racial imbalance within his work force. Senator Clifford Case, one of the leading authorities on Title VII, assured his colleagues that the new federal law would not permit *Motorola*-like cases; a federal court, he said, could not read Title VII to require an employer “to lower or change the occupational qualifications he sets for his employees simply because fewer [blacks] than whites are able to meet them.” An authoritative Senate memorandum maintained that bona fide qualifications tests would not have to be aban-

done where, "because of differences in background and education, members of some groups are able to perform better on these tests than members of other groups." An employer "may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine which applicants have these qualifications, and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis of test performance."

Burger dodged the text and history of Title VII, saying that employers whose employment requirements have a "markedly disproportionate" impact upon minorities must demonstrate their "business necessity," a term found nowhere in Title VII or in previous Court opinions. In approving the EEOC guidelines, Burger said they reflected the will of Congress, yet they did no such thing. The EEOC itself was aware that its enforcement of Title VII conflicted with congressional intent, as Hugh Davis Graham points out in *The Civil Rights Era: Origins and Development of National Policy*. The EEOC's own *Administrative History* of 1969 acknowledged that Congress had defined discrimination as one of "intent in the state of mind of the actor," and that it did not consider professionally developed ability tests as discriminatory. The EEOC, though, had come to disregard "intent as crucial to the finding of an unlawful employment practice" and instead emphasized forms of employer behavior that "prove to have a demonstrable racial effect without clear and convincing business motive." The EEOC thought that either Congress would have to amend Title VII to embrace disparate impact theory or that the agency would have to change its policy to return to Congress's model of intentional discrimination. Thanks to *Griggs*, neither had to occur.

Race-Norming and Other Evils

Griggs was handed down the same year the Court approved racial busing as a remedy for school segregation in *Swann v. Mecklenburg* (another North Carolina case and another opinion for a unanimous Court by Chief Justice Burger). Yet down through the years *Griggs*, while far less publicized, has perhaps had more influence upon both public and private employment than *Swann*, soon constrained by other rulings, has had upon public education. *Griggs* ratified the policy direction of the EEOC, which since 1965 has been given the authority to enforce Title VII in private employment. This became Justice Department policy in 1972 when Congress authorized that agency to enforce Title VII in public employment.

Griggs meanwhile inspired private civil rights lawyers to bring disparate impact cases, leading to a series of decisions that further eroded the original intent of Title VII. In 1975 the Court said in *Albemarle Paper Company v. Moody* that even tests having a rational relationship to job performance are subject to litigation under Title VII if they adversely affect minorities. Significantly, it added that when an employer does validate his test, the plaintiff still has an opportunity to prove the test was a pretext for discrimination by showing that other measures having less of a disparate impact upon minorities would serve the employer's business purpose.

By the mid-1970s, Title VII had become a strong plaintiffs' statute. Virtually no employment practice

having a "disparate impact" has been immune from legal attack based on *Griggs*: a wide range of recruitment, hiring, assignment, testing, seniority, promotion, discharge, and supervisory selection practices have been successfully challenged. Relying on *Griggs*, a federal judge told the Drug Enforcement Administration that it may not consider previous work experience in promotion decisions. Similarly, a federal judge in Alabama told the Birmingham police department that when hiring new officers it may not take into account applicants' felony conviction records.

The disparate impact theory of *Griggs* also has helped promote the trend over the past decade toward race-norming, in which scores on ability tests free of cultural

The Bush administration committed a serious strategic mistake by failing to make a public case for the original understanding of Title VII.

bias are "adjusted" for differences among whites, blacks, Hispanics, and other groups. Just a few years after *Griggs*, E. F. Wonderlic & Associates, a major marketer of cognitive-ability tests, promoted an "Ethnic Conversion Table" by which employers could ensure racially proportionate test scores. Wonderlic sent employers information on how to race-norm, with this advice: "Select to fill proper ratios and quotas. Select the best-suited individuals by ethnic class."

Hiring by Numbers

No one has yet produced a comprehensive study of the practical impact of *Griggs* upon the American workplace. Probably some employment requirements adopted out of racial prejudice have been scrapped; at the same time many benign employment requirements have probably also been thrown out. Doubtless, too, some employers have simply hired by the numbers in order to avoid litigation. (Of course, there is no merit in announcing preferential treatment for certain minorities, since employers also can face lawsuits from those not preferred.) As one personnel officer quoted by Nathan Glazer has revealed:

You can avoid violating Title VII and also avoid rocking the boat until you have enough hard data at hand to prove or disprove the actual relevance of various selection factors to the prediction of job performance for all groups. You do it by temporarily equalizing the impact of each factor being considered on each group in the applicant population while you study it.

For example, our company had been using a

particular test to select employees for one job. Approximately 25 percent of the white males in the applicant population had been passing the test by scoring above a certain score. Now we just make sure that the top 25 percent of the applicants from each of the groups protected by Title VII also pass that test. We don't worry about what score becomes the cutoff for the various groups; we stick with the percentage passing from each group.

This racial hiring by numbers would not occur apart from the judicial interpretation of Title VII provided by *Griggs*. In fact, this practice is in direct conflict with Title VII, which states: "Nothing in this title shall be interpreted to require any employer...to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which

Following *Griggs*, a federal judge told the Birmingham police department that when hiring new officers it may not take into account applicants' felony conviction records.

may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or group." Yet that is exactly what *Griggs* has required employers to do.

Wards Cove

In 1989, a Supreme Court concerned about extravagant lower court uses of disparate impact theory sensibly acted to contain it in *Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio*. The case involved Alaskan salmon canneries that employed a mainly white work force in skilled jobs and a mainly nonwhite work force in unskilled jobs. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had ruled that this imbalance created a *prima facie* case of disparate impact against the company, thus obligating it to show that its hiring and employment practices were justified by business necessity. The Supreme Court disagreed, relying on a 1977 ruling in which it had held that the proper comparison in a disparate impact case is between "the racial composition of the qualified persons in the labor market and the persons holding at-issue jobs."

If the Ninth Circuit's decision of what constitutes a *prima facie* case of disparate impact had been allowed to stand, it would have paved the way for additional Title VII litigation and liability, thus forcing more and more employers to resort to racial preferences. Justice Byron White, writing for the Court, said that the Ninth Circuit's

theory "would mean that any employer who had a segment of his work force that was—for some reason—racially imbalanced, could be hauled into court and forced to engage in the expensive and time-consuming task of defending the 'business necessity' of the methods used to select the other members of his work force. The only practicable option for many employers will be to adopt racial quotas, insuring that no portion of his work force deviates in racial composition from the other portions thereof; this is a result that Congress expressly rejected in drafting Title VII."

No one in Congress has dared propose overturning *Wards Cove* on this point. It is the Court's next holding in *Wards Cove*, however, that congressional liberals aim to reverse. The Court insisted that a *prima facie* case of disparate impact cannot be made *without* attributing the disparity to one or more employment practices. Thus, a plaintiff must isolate and identify the specific employment practices said to cause the statistical disparity. He cannot simply point to the disparity, even when properly drawn. Here the Supreme Court was correcting lower federal courts that had held that plaintiffs in disparate impact cases do not have to specify the particular practice(s) responsible for the disparity. Justice White observed, correctly, that every one of the Supreme Court's disparate impact cases focused on the impact of a particular employment practice. Congressional liberals who say they merely want to return to *Griggs* are disingenuous on this issue; they want the further judicial gloss on *Griggs* added by some lower courts that the Supreme Court in *Wards Cove* erased.

Wards Cove also clarified the plaintiff's burden of proof. The Court held that once a *prima facie* case of disparate impact is established with respect to a particular employment practice, the burden of producing evidence of a legitimate business justification for that practice will shift to the employer. The burden of persuasion, however, remains with the plaintiff, who must disprove an employer's evidence that his practice has a legitimate business justification. The Court said that what is at issue is whether a challenged practice "serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer."

Dispute over "Business Necessity"

Both the administration and congressional liberals agree on overturning *Wards Cove* in respect to burden of proof; both say it should always fall to the employer. The disagreement concerns the definition of "business necessity." For a challenged practice to serve a "business necessity" under the administration's definition, it must bear "a manifest relationship" to the employment in question—a term directly from *Griggs*. But this line from *Griggs* is not enough for the civil rights lobby. It wants another, not unreasonable reading of the imprecise opinion in *Griggs*, which has been supplied by lower courts, one that basically requires an employer to demonstrate the absolute indispensability of a challenged practice to the employer's business. In *Wards Cove* Justice White was rebuking lower court interpretations on this point when he said "there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable'

to the employer's business for it to pass muster." With his eye on the realities in the workplace, White said that such a high standard would be "almost impossible for employers to meet" and would "result in a host of evils," such as racial-preference hiring. Congressional liberals have a different view of "business necessity"; they propose that employers must show that their selection practices bear "a significant and manifest relationship to successful job performance," which is close to another locution in *Griggs*, that of "a demonstrable relationship to successful [job] performance."

The legislation preferred by congressional liberals would increase the pressure upon employers to resort to racial preferences. President Bush is right to say that theirs is a quota bill, yet his alternative is not invulnerable to the same charge, because it assumes the validity of disparate impact theory. The reality under *Griggs* is that any theory of discrimination driven by numbers leads to hiring by the numbers. Still, the administration's bill is preferable; the legal structure it proposes would not pressure employers to resort to preferences to the same degree as the bill favored by the civil rights lobby.

Even at this late date in the legislative debate, the question that deserves to be addressed is not how *Wards Cove* should be overturned but whether it should be overturned, and beyond that, whether it is not time to think anew about the case that started and provided the theory for preferential treatment, *Griggs v. Duke Power Company*. *Wards Cove* was a badly needed clarification of judge-made law; if we are going to have disparate impact theory, we must have the kind of constraints placed on it by *Wards Cove*. We cannot have law developing in the lower federal courts that only encourages increasing resort to racial preferences, which after all do violate the explicit text of Title VII.

When *Wards Cove* was first handed down, Bush's Justice Department indicated its agreement with the decision. While allowances can be made for the practical demands of politics, President Bush himself would have been well advised to have considered taking a strong stand in defense of *Wards Cove*, and against any changes to it.

Return to Congressional Intent

The great unwritten story about *Wards Cove* is that, together with a case decided in 1988, *Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Company*, it suggests the Court's willingness to rethink its Title VII jurisprudence. This is the prospect congressional liberals fear. Down through the years the Court has treated two kinds of cases—disparate impact and disparate treatment, *i.e.*, intentional discrimination, cases—and some members of the Court may want to do away with this two-track approach and unify the law of Title VII in terms of its original understanding. Ironically, *Griggs* might well have been decided in the plaintiffs' favor on the basis of disparate treatment, thus sparing the nation its fateful dalliance with disparate impact and proportional representation. (Indeed, as Herman Belz in his new book, *Equality Transformed: A Quarter Century of Affirmative Action*, points out, the southern setting of


Griggs in which racial discrimination had once been the law of the land and Duke Power's own history of purposeful discrimination invited the inference that what the Court really objected to was intentional discrimination.) The Court's emphasis in *Wards Cove* that the burden of proof in disparate impact cases should *at all times* [the Court's italics] remain with the plaintiff suggests its possible direction; the burden of proof in disparate treatment cases has always rested with the plaintiff.

If the Bush administration survives the current effort to codify disparate impact theory, it should rethink its civil rights strategy. It may have committed a serious strategic mistake by failing to make a public case for the superiority of the original understanding of Title VII. While it is too late to criticize *Griggs* purely in terms of judicial activism, solid policy arguments can be made against disparate impact and its harmful consequences.

Information about the number of minorities hired for a certain job is relevant, under a proper understanding of Title VII, to an inquiry into whether purposeful discrimination has occurred; but it cannot be considered *prima facie* evidence of discrimination. Even when the most appropriate statistical comparison is made, it does not follow that the remaining statistical differences between or among racial groups can be attributed to racial discrimination, whether on the employer's part or society's in general; age, location, and education, among other variables, are also explanatory.

Attacking High Standards

The use of disparate impact theory has worked against the setting of reasonable standards not simply for getting a job but for achievement in life. If an employer may only test for what is "essential," and thus is effectively forbidden to test in ways that might demonstrate relative qualifications, then why test at all? And why should those who take tests have any incentive to do well on them? Or to study in school? *Griggs* was written against the backdrop of the Jim Crow South, but the nation cannot afford to be saddled with a theory of discrimination that has a disparate impact upon minorities today. All forecasts indicate that by the year 2000 the majority of new entrants in the American work force will be minorities. If America is to compete effectively in today's international economy, testing must no longer be regarded as synonymous with racial discrimination. The anti-high-standards mentality encouraged by *Griggs* must be ended. This is an especially important goal for President Bush, given his education agenda, which has committed itself to stiffer testing that prepares students, in the words of the president, for "productive employment in our modern economy."

In time, unless new civil rights legislation is passed that would prevent it, the Supreme Court itself might reform *Griggs*, making all but arbitrarily imposed tests permissible under a Title VII shorn of disparate impact theory. The superior course would be for Congress and the president to join hands in legislating this change. It is time to go after *Griggs*. 

FAMILY FEUD

Is the Conservative Movement Falling Apart?

AMY MORITZ

In the aftermath of the October 1990 “Budget Summit Agreement,” economic conservatives did more than simply protest President Bush’s betrayal of his tax promise. They quickly put together legislation—the Wallop–DeLay–Tallon bill—that would cut a broad range of taxes and promote economic growth. Instead of waiting for leadership from the White House, they became leaders themselves, and although Wallop–DeLay–Tallon never got very far in the Congress, it defined the issues and laid the groundwork for potential future victories. By most accounts, economic conservatives acted the way they are supposed to if they are to influence policy in Washington.

Not, however, by the accounts of some of the movement’s leading strategists: social conservatives who are upset that Wallop–DeLay–Tallon did not raise the value of the dependent tax exemption, providing tax relief for families with children. “The coalition is breaking apart,” said one such strategist. “If we don’t do something, we won’t have one movement. We’ll have four or five.” “Economic conservatives must decide whether or not they want us around,” said another. Even these remarks were too tame for some. “There are more than just tensions,” said a third. “We’re on the brink of civil war.”

FDR’s Uneasy Coalition

The modern conservative movement is an alliance of “social conservatives,” whose highest priorities are such issues as abortion, parental prerogatives, family cohesiveness, pornography, homosexual rights, and education, and “economic conservatives,” for whom the dominant consideration is usually the size, scope, and expense of government. This diverse coalition includes wage-earner and entrepreneur; fundamentalist and Catholic; white southerner and northern ethnic; western farmer and urban blue-collar; “blue blood” and immigrant; dropout and MBA. Its components were consolidated by Ronald Reagan, and inspired by his rhetoric. But can such a divergent coalition survive the end of the Reagan era? Can it be more than a fluke of history?

Conservatives can learn much about the utility—and the fragility—of political coalitions from the liberals.

Nearly 60 years ago, Franklin Roosevelt’s dynamic rhetoric and skillful appeals to special interests brought together a powerful coalition of southerners, immigrants, Catholics, blacks, union members, and other key groups, and left economic conservatives opposed to the New Deal’s expansion of government both isolated and politically impotent. Roosevelt’s success in coalition-building gave liberals the political power they needed to claim a “progressive mandate” for decades of social engineering, and was a significant factor in making this America’s “liberal century.”

But success eventually led to strains. In the 1960s and 1970s key constituencies of the Roosevelt coalition were contemplating defection as they increasingly found themselves opposed to liberal policies on busing, racial quotas, abortion, school prayer, crime, limitations on parental authority, homosexual rights, and other issues. Millions of social conservatives, who once had little in common with economic conservatives, now found themselves in sympathy with them on a key belief: government must be constrained.

But unplanned events were to delay the dissolution of the Roosevelt coalition: the unexpected ascension to the presidency of a southern Democrat in 1963; George Wallace’s 1968 candidacy (which permitted 10 million members of the Roosevelt coalition to vote anti-liberal without voting Republican); and, just as a “new majority” based on the 1972 anti-McGovern landslide was beginning to emerge: Watergate.

After Watergate, Republicans aided the survival of the Roosevelt coalition. While Ronald Reagan in 1976 courted voters disenchanted with progressive government (voters by then known as “social conservatives”), Gerald Ford largely ignored them. Jimmy Carter, a southern Democrat with conservative rhetoric, reunited the Roosevelt coalition one last time.

But the political dynamics at play in 1976 were not to be repeated. Jimmy Carter could not appeal to social

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Drawing by Alexander Hunter for Policy Review

To be successful in the long term, the conservative movement must appeal both to the economic and to the moral interests of the American people.

conservatives on his right while appeasing Democratic party regulars on his left. The political gymnastics necessary to win both re-nomination (by moving left to crowd out Ted Kennedy) and the general election (by moving right to keep social conservatives from defecting to Reagan) proved impossible. And unlike Ford, Reagan, a former member of the Roosevelt coalition himself, actively courted disaffected social conservatives. On November 4, 1980, the conservative movement we know today was born.

Frictions of Victory

From the beginning, it was clear that the newly fused elements of the conservative movement had different political instincts. Social conservatives, for example, stress protecting “communities” and “values,” while economic conservatives emphasize “individuals” and “choice.” The former oppose the evil done by government without necessarily opposing government *per se*; the latter are instinctively distrustful of government itself. Furthermore, the political tradition of many social conservatives (coming, as they do, from the Roosevelt coalition) is that groups deliver votes to a candidate in exchange for policy concessions commensurate with the number of votes delivered. Economic conservatives, on the other hand, have been powerfully influenced by a free-market philosophy that considers “pandering” to special interests repugnant.

Now, a decade after Ronald Reagan’s inauguration, there are four new major sources of strain between economic and social conservatives.

The first is the perception that victory in the Cold War is imminent. During the height of the Cold War, most economic and social conservatives agreed that a strong U.S. defense posture was vital, while most liberals disagreed. Defense policy was a key unifying issue. Now, however, both social and economic conservatives prefer to focus on the issues paramount to their own constituencies. What’s more, they expect conservative coalition partners to support them. After all, say social conservatives, did we not rally, lobby, and educate on defense issues? After all, say economic conservatives, did we not acquiesce to an otherwise unpalatable level of government activity in order to combat Communism? Both ask: Should not other elements of the conservative movement do us a favor now and address our concerns?

Both groups have a point. Nations all over the world are finally learning—the hard way—that the free market works better than a planned economy. Free-market conservatives say correctly this is the perfect time to mount a campaign against the growing public sector here at home. Likewise, the moderate Left is beginning to admit that stable families and moral values are the foundation of a healthy society. Social conservatives say correctly that the movement should seize this window of opportunity to build a consensus in favor of those values, and against

government policies that have encouraged crime, drug abuse, dependency, and poverty.

Second, George Bush is no Ronald Reagan. Reagan was the spiritual leader of both social and economic conservatives. The charismatic “Great Communicator” had a genius for inspiring conservatives to want to work together on key projects. He also preserved the coalition by serving as a lightning rod for conservative criticism: When disappointed with the pace of progress on favorite issues, each group could blame Reagan or, more often, his staff. Conservatism has no leader now, and because of this we have no scapegoat for our troubles, no one to set our goals for us, and no one to remind us that we’re all on the same team.

Third, abortion has become a more divisive issue between conservatives now that the pro-life cause is making progress. During the Reagan years, differences over abortion were easily resolved, because the *Roe v. Wade* Supreme Court decision permitting abortion on demand was best opposed by appointing advocates of judicial restraint to the Supreme Court—something all conservatives were willing to do. In July 1989, however, that situation changed dramatically when the Court, in *Webster v. Reproductive Health Services*, thrust the issue back into the electoral arena by dramatically expanding the ability of states to regulate abortions. Abortion suddenly became a central issue in state elections. And some economic conservatives are developing “cold feet,” apparently sharing the conventional wisdom, unsubstantiated by the 1990 election results, that a pro-life position alienates more voters than it attracts.

Fourth, as liberal Democrats have increasingly realized that they cannot win the White House without the votes of at least some conservative Americans, they have stepped up attempts to appeal to conservatives. Both social and economic conservatives have been tempted to abandon partnerships with each other in favor of new alliances with liberals. For example, economic conservatives have found an active partner in liberal Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) as they push for cuts in the payroll tax. Likewise, liberal Representative Pat Schroeder (D-CO) ardently supports the social conservatives’ Wolf-Coats bill, which would raise the dependent exemption.

Still Vigorous Alliance

Despite these strains, however, there are significant reasons to believe that the conservative movement will retain a vigorous alliance between social and economic conservatives.

- Conservative success in forming coalitions with liberal groups and lawmakers has not led them to the false belief that conservative allies can easily be replaced. Supporters of both Wallop-DeLay-Tallon and Wolf-Coats have reached out successfully to liberal coalition partners, but each group realizes that new partners are no substitute for old friends. As a top social conservative noted at a congressional hearing on the dependent exemption: “Liberals and conservatives in this room would disagree on everything, including the time of day, but not on this issue.” Occasionally, both economic and social conservatives hint to one another that they will

leave the conservative coalition in favor of an alliance with liberals and moderates, but these threats are usually delivered during moments of frustration and contain more drama than substance. Leading Democrats have done little more than offer lip service to the chief concerns of social conservatives. Indeed, to do more could incite political fratricide within their own ranks. The gulf between Right and Left in America is wide: There is simply no middle ground on many of the key issues separating conservatives from modern American liberalism.

- Issues continue to unite conservatives more than they divide them. Indeed, most conservatives still disagree with most liberals on most issues: for example, the 1990 tax hike; the Gulf War; the proper role of judges in constitutional interpretation; environmentalism versus blue-collar jobs in the “spotted owl” dispute; parental-consent laws; and public funding for abortions.

It is no coincidence that economic and social conservatives often find themselves in agreement on issues: very many social conservatives are experts on and advocates of free-market economics, while very many economic conservatives agree with the social conservative agenda.

- Even when philosophical differences appear between social and economic conservatives, they are often differences in approach rather than goals. Social conservatives say, “Families need a tax cut.” Economic conservatives say, “The economy needs a tax cut.” The policies advocated by conservative groups are closer to each other than they are to the policies of other powerful segments of the Washington political community, including the Bush administration, which opposes tax cuts both for families and for workers in general.

Examples are common: at a panel on the wisdom of new federal automobile regulation, a social conservative complained that large families cannot fit into the small cars dictated by government gas mileage standards, while an economic conservative stressed the negative effects of regulation. But both voted thumbs down. Economic conservatives don’t think taxpayers should be forced to subsidize art. Social conservatives don’t think tax revenues should finance blasphemy and obscenity. Both groups would abolish the National Endowment for the Arts.

- Neither social nor economic groups make particularly high demands on one another. As one social conservative put it, “We should help each other as much as possible,” but “when other groups don’t share our agenda, such as on abortion, all we ask is that they...not work against us.” Likewise, even though most economic conservatives prefer the economic stimulus of the Wallop-DeLay-Tallon tax cut package, when asked about the more family-specific Wolf-Coats alternative they tend to reply: “Any tax cut is a good tax cut.”

- Conservative groups are, by and large, loyal to one another. President Bush’s chief of staff, John Sununu, has exacted political retribution against conservative lawmakers who voted against the budget summit agreement last year, and President Bush himself has approved the greatest expansion in government spending in real percentage terms of any president during the past 50 years. Many economic conservatives are, quite simply, fed up.

Their antipathy to the present administration is deep and intensifying. Many believe that it would be easier to fight a liberal proposal from a liberal president than it is to oppose the same proposal from a man many Americans consider to be conservative. But many social conservatives recoil at this, as they hope that a future Supreme Court will overturn *Roe*. And social conservatives still see John Sununu as an ally. It is the loyalty of economic conservatives to social conservatives, perhaps more than any other factor, that has maintained civility in the Right's relations with George Bush.

Complementary Skills

- The organizational structures and political skills of economic and social conservatives are complementary. In general, one is weak where the other is strong. Social conservatives often use a church model: high-visibility leaders, a leader-follower tradition, strong emphasis upon rhetoric and mass communication, and long-term goals. Economic conservatives, on the other hand, have low-key leaders, goal-oriented management, minimal emphasis upon rhetoric and mass communication, and short-term objectives—just as business does. Social conservatives were the first to attempt to organize the grass roots, while economic conservatives have tended to rely upon experts and lobbyists.

There is much the two groups (and their recruits) can learn from one another. "We're trying to learn to organize more around issues, not individuals," the head of a major social issues group said. "All of our main [social conservative] groups are to some extent personality-driven, and this causes problems as our goal is developing autonomous state and local chapters that are self-funded and have professional staff." Free-market conservatives can learn from social conservatives, too. A top social conservative now works as a mentor with business groups to increase their political effectiveness and bring them further into the coalition: "Business groups have better communication with lawmakers but do not in general have as great an understanding of politics as we do," she believes. "Business needs to be educated on who their enemies are."

- Conservatism is a stronger, more appealing movement with both its social and economic strains intact. As a top social conservative put it: "A pro-family agenda, if adopted by economic conservatives, would give economic conservatives a 'human face.'" To be successful in the long term, the conservative movement must appeal both to the economic and to the moral interests of the American people. We must have both a program for economic opportunity and a vision of a just society. The coalition of social and economic conservatives is, therefore, a necessity of practical politics: each group makes the other more attractive to the American people.

- Conservatives of all persuasions have in recent years increased their efforts toward grass-roots organizing. Social conservatives still hold the lead, with new, action-based groups continuing to spring up. But economic conservatives are catching up. Grass-roots programs, including a national "tea bag" campaign, were sponsored against the congressional pay raise; and during last year's tumultuous budget summit, several groups organized

grass-roots-style protests that involved thousands of Americans directly and alerted millions more. It is encouraging, too, that not all efforts have been based in the nation's capital: tax protests in New Jersey were such a dramatic example of citizen activism that they frightened tax-raising politicians in all 50 states, while the newest anti-tax group, which plans to organize the grass roots nationally, is based in New Hampshire. Capitol Hill staff already report that business groups generate more mail to Congress than other elements of the conservative coalition, and even this impressive achievement will magnify if business groups follow the lead of social conservatives and use cable TV and radio programs as an organizing tool. A telling point: whereas

Most conservatives still disagree with most liberals on most issues: e.g., the 1990 tax hike, the Gulf War, the proper role of judges.

three years ago whenever conservatives gathered they tended to discuss fund-raising, today many are more likely to discuss activist training and recruitment.

Stale Slanders

There are several things conservatives of all persuasions can do to limit strains in the alliance.

First, we can avoid unnecessarily exaggerating points of difference by intentionally misrepresenting the beliefs of conservative partners. Two examples are instructive:

Example 1: A leading economic conservative, asked to explain tensions between the two conservative groups, proclaimed that social conservatives "want to outlaw fun." But he could not supply examples. The truth is that no leading social conservative group (save the pro-life movement—which is not, in any case, opposing "fun") is attempting to impose an agenda by legislation. One uses the free market, via economic boycott, to discourage sex and violence on TV. Another seeks voluntary labelling of rock and rap albums with sexual or violent lyrics so potential consumers with no knowledge of the album (in most cases, parents) will be able to make an informed purchasing decision. Anti-pornography groups are working to encourage a voluntary "popular rejection" of pornography, and not seeking new legislation. "Here as everywhere," a top anti-porn strategist notes, "there are limits on what government can and should do." The truth is: social conservatives are not fans of Big Brother. "It's ironic," says one social conservative leader. "Because you need legislation to cut taxes but not for a 'moral awakening,' social conservatives are actually more skeptical of the usefulness of a legislative remedy than are economic conservatives." Those who publicly oppose the

agenda of any group of fellow conservatives without first acquainting themselves with it are doing the movement a disservice. Conservatives owe each other more than stale repeats of the slanders of the Left.

Example 2: Social conservative advocates of the Wolf-Coats proposal to raise the dependent tax exemption use politically appealing but misleading terminology that is anathema to economic conservatives. “It’s a decision between babies and BMWs,” said one. “Diapers versus cruises,” said another. But these slogans are needlessly divisive as they insinuate that new taxes on the childless, not budget cuts, should pay for Wolf-Coats. A family-specific tax cut is more likely to split the coalition (and less likely to attract votes) if it is pursued in a manner that scorns the incentive and free choice/personal responsibility system upon which our economy is based. A more inclusive slogan: “Babies versus boondoggles.”

Second, conservatives should not malign each other. “We’re seen as redneck and stupid,” a leading social conservative strategist complains, and other social conservatives agree that economic conservatives belittle them. Social conservatives often respond, sometimes plaintively, by publicly stressing that social conservatives have the most activists and that their issues are the most important, or they respond with insults, dismissing all or many economic conservatives as “immoral.”

But social conservative leaders also speak of another, related, problem—the tendency of their own members

Conservatism has no leader now, and because of this we have no scapegoat for our troubles and no one to remind us that we’re all on the same team.

to undervalue themselves. “Even when our own people are successful in ‘taking over’ local Republican organizations,” the head of a national social conservative group noted, “they emphasize points of difference rather than points of agreement. They are so used to being outcasts, they feel uncomfortable when they are not. So they repel people, almost intentionally.” This leader is so concerned he’s planning special training programs to combat this problem.

Third, conservatives can welcome constructive intra-conservative debate as a healthy sign, and not as an indication of weakness. During the years of liberal domination, it was child’s play for all conservatives to agree to oppose the socialist, amoral Left. For conserva-


tives to promote their own agenda, however, requires them to resolve differing perceptions as to what that agenda should be. Offensive wars—the only kind that gain territory—always require strategy.

Newfound Maturity

The modern conservative movement faces tremendous opportunities. The Left has been reduced to shambles—its philosophy repudiated, its interest groups at war with one another. The liberals’ control of government and the bureaucracies is due to past, not present, successes. Forty-nine percent of America’s young people call themselves conservative (as opposed to 39 percent who call themselves liberal) while the number of people calling themselves Republican is now greater than those saying they are Democrats (36 percent to 29 percent). The major issues are mostly conservatives’: education reform, crime, taxation, family, an equal-opportunity society, economic growth, individual freedom. It is a sign of the Right’s strength that the Left now brazenly steals our rhetoric.

But best of all: the conservative movement is maturing. Conservatives of all stripes volunteer the opinion that their colleagues and allies now think more strategically, more aggressively, and in longer-range terms than they did but a few years ago. Programs that take years to show results (grass-roots recruitment and training, the development of state-based think tanks, coalition-building, the establishment of legal foundations) have supplanted an emphasis on projects that provide immediate but less valuable returns.

Three years ago, in an article for this journal (“The New Right, It’s Time We Led,” Spring 1988), I decried the state of a conservative movement I believed was self-centered and short-sighted. Some of the problems I described then remain. With conservatives claiming seven of the top 14 money-raising political action committees but only two of the top 14 PAC campaign contributors, the movement has yet to restore the “enforcement mechanism” (groups such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee) that in the late 1970s so effectively made liberal lawmakers answer to their conservative constituencies. And problems such as intra-conservative rivalries and misunderstandings distract us from our mission and jeopardize our opportunities to win. But with the newfound maturity demonstrated by this new emphasis upon long-term grass-roots organization, the conservative movement is now free to switch from expectations to goals, from frustration to confidence, from dependence to leadership.

When FDR began his crusade for the “Liberal Century,” he faced a resentful establishment, a conservative media, and a hostile Supreme Court. All he had was his vision, a message of confidence—and his new and fragile coalition. Today, much of that coalition is ours. The opportunities lie before us to begin America’s “Conservative Century.” The Romans said it best: “*Carpe Diem.*” Seize the Day. 

FIRST PRINCIPALS

The Leadership Vacuum in American Schools

MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER

Behind almost every effective school is an effective principal who functions not as a middle manager but as a leader, and whose actions mold a school culture conducive for learning and character formation. It is the principal who sets the level of academic and moral expectations for a school's students. He or she determines whether teachers can spend most of their time teaching, instead of drowning in paperwork or struggling to maintain order in their classrooms. And it is the principal who is, ideally, most accountable to parents in shaping the kind of school they want for their children.

Yet principals are the forgotten men and women of American education. Most of the debate about high schools simply underestimates their importance. And many of the attempts to transform schools in the 1980s, particularly the "first wave" of school reform in 1983-84, ignored the obstacles that make it harder for principals to perform their jobs.

Over the past 30 years, the principal has steadily lost power, authority, and clout. Central offices of school districts have bound him by regulations and red tape. Teachers' unions have enabled teachers to bypass his authority and undermine his power. Federal and state funding have created positions and support staff that he cannot control. Court decisions have given him an incentive not to discipline unruly students lest he be tied up in lengthy appeals procedures. It is still possible for principals to take charge of their schools—and there are hundreds across the country who effectively mold their school cultures. But doing so usually requires a heroic willingness to do battle with the school board, the unions, the courts, and sometimes even with parents themselves.

Community Pillar

Principals were never fully independent actors, and calls to restrict the authority of central offices are one of the recurring themes in the history of American education. As early as 1913, Ellwood P. Cubberley, a professor of education at Stanford, saw that principals were being hampered by regulations. Hired to study the schools in Portland, Oregon, Cubberley observed that principals were guided by eight pages of rules, including the re-

quirement that they be at their schools precisely one hour early in case of cold weather to make sure the furnace was running. "Both in letter and in spirit the functions imposed on principals are routine and clerical," Cubberley wrote. "The system...fails utterly to encourage, much less does it require, the assumption of real educational responsibility, the exercise of professional initiative and originality by principals."

For the rest of his life Cubberley strove to ensure that principals could achieve as much independence as possible. "Whatever can be done to add strength and dignity and responsibility to the office should be done, with the view to making each principal feel that his work is large and important," Cubberley wrote in the 1929 edition of his textbook *Public School Administration*. "The knowledge, insight, skill, and qualities for helpful leadership of the principal of the school practically determine the ideals and standards of achievements of both teachers and pupils within the school."

Cubberley's prescient advice went largely unheeded because, at the time, it was largely unnecessary. In most cases, principals felt free to give orders and make decisions without being overruled by boards of education or the courts. They also strove as part of their jobs to be part of their communities. For example, when University of Chicago sociologist August Hollingshead spent 1941 and 1942 studying the citizens of a rural Illinois city he called "Elmtown," he observed that the principal of the high school had strong ties to the community through his membership in the Rotary Club and the town's Methodist Church, where he sang in the choir "for policy's sake." The principal not only personally advised parents when children cut class, but also physically punished students who missed detention. Although members of the local gangs talked about beating up the principal in retaliation, Hollingshead said, they limited their comments to drawing "derogatory pictures."

Most principals in the 1930s and 1940s felt comfortable in their positions. A typical memoir of the time was that of Frank P. Whitney, who was principal at Collin-

MARTIN MORSE WOOSTER, *Washington editor of Reason, is writing a book on reforming public high schools.*



Over the past 30 years, the principal has steadily lost power, as teachers' unions have bypassed his authority and central offices have bound him in red tape.

wood High School in Cleveland between 1935 and 1955. The principal, Whitney wrote, was freed “by an efficient central administration from most of the difficult problems of finance and public relations and...by capable teachers from the laborious routine of classroom instruction.” His “middle position [is] the most advantageous of all for the promotion of the great ends of education and life itself.”

Principals had reason to be happy; the school, after all, was their domain. Once a principal made a decision, parents, teachers, and students had little recourse. Until the 1960s, observe scholars Frederick Wirt and Michael Kirst, “An administrator’s response to any student even politely questioning why he or she had to dress, walk, eat, speak, and otherwise act in the prescribed manner was much like that of writer Ring Lardner when his children questioned him: ‘Shut up, I explained.’”

Undermined by Unions

But beginning in 1960, the principal’s “middle position” began to erode. The first assault on the principal’s power came from the rising militancy of teachers’ unions. Unions did not take over the schools, but the authority unions gained was largely taken from the principals. Moreover, union-supported restrictions on teacher firing further hampered principals’ ability to lead.

The National Education Association (NEA) initially considered itself a professional organization that supplied services and held conferences. Its smaller rival, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT), was a loose confederacy of big-city union locals that had not yet cohered into a national force. But in 1960, previously unaffiliated teachers in New York City merged with a small existing AFT local to form the United Federation of Teachers, which then became the AFT’s largest local. In December 1960, and in April 1962, these teachers did something rarely done until then—they went on strike.

Teachers’ strikes quickly spread across the nation. In 1965, there were nine strikes involving 1,720 teachers; by 1975, 218 strikes involved 182,300 teachers. At first most of these strikes were conducted by the AFT. Then NEA affiliates, seeing the gains made by their rivals, switched their allegiance and became AFT locals in several of America’s largest cities, most notably New York and Philadelphia. In response, the NEA leadership first began to advocate collective bargaining (a decision not made until 1962), but soon became as committed to unionization as its rival. The NEA is today the largest union in America and, with the possible exception of trial lawyers’ associations, the most powerful political force in state legislatures.

Many of the early teacher strikes involved issues that today would not be disputed. The 1962 New York teachers’ strike was over the role teachers should play in making decisions in their schools (a precursor of what is now known as “school-based management”). They struck again in 1967 over teachers’ rights to expel unruly students.

In a less divisive age than the 1960s, teacher militancy might well not have occurred. But as United Federation of Teachers leader John O’Neill noted in 1966, “Public agencies move only in crisis, so we had to create one.” The end result of NEA and AFT agitation was that the union contract became an integral part of high school administration.

The best research on how the rise of teachers’ unions affected high schools was conducted by Susan Moore Johnson in the late 1970s and reported in her 1984 book, *Teachers’ Unions in Schools*. Surveying dozens of high schools, she discovered few cases where a union had forced radical change on a school. In general, the process of unionization was gradual, and grievances were reasonable.

But principals lost ground steadily, at least in many cases. Few teachers, for example, felt willing to work overtime if it was not authorized by the union contract. Further, a rising number of union officials were placed in central offices to administer contracts. In New York City, Mayor John Lindsay put union employees on city payrolls, claiming that the time they spent administering contracts was “time devoted to the public interest.” Today the city pays the salaries of six employees of the United Federation of Teachers and provides pensions for 27 others, even though the union collects a hefty \$46 from each teacher each month in mandatory dues. While the union members do not, as a rule, directly control principals, the regulations they produce to enforce a contract further limit the power of the principals.

Many of the principals surveyed by Johnson, faced with a world where challenges to a contract resulted in extensive hearings and red tape, gave up much of their independent initiative. Other principals felt even more frustrated when it took the initiation of grievance procedures to force bureaucracies to perform when principals on their own could do nothing. In one high school Johnson examined, a leaky roof had remained unrepaired for years despite numerous requests. The principal admitted to Johnson that if the union were to file a grievance procedure the roof would be fixed. “Now

isn't that sad?" the principal said. "When my teachers come to me and say, 'We know you've tried. Now let us try,' then I know they have more authority than I."

Despite these encroachments on the authority of principals, the teachers Johnson interviewed still wanted strong principals. Teachers, Johnson noted, "were critical of laissez-faire principals who relinquished too much power.... Teachers did not want to run the schools, but they were prepared to support a principal who demonstrated that their schools could be run well."

Tied Up in Court

The principal's room for maneuver was further restricted by a series of Supreme Court decisions on student rights. While these court decisions did not, in themselves, greatly impede the principal's authority, they created an environment of legal uncertainty that discourages disciplinary action.

In *Tinker v. Des Moines* (1969), the Supreme Court ruled that suspending four high school students who wore black armbands to protest the Vietnam War was unconstitutional because the action violated the students' right to free speech. But the decision was not as clear-cut as it first appeared. For although the court declared that in certain situations suspensions could be used to block student actions, as when they created "substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline," it failed to define what "substantial" meant, thus resulting in considerable litigation.

In 1975, the Supreme Court, in *Goss v. Lopez*, went further in expanding students' rights by declaring that a student given a suspension of more than 14 days must have a formal hearing in order to validate the suspension. Not to do so, the Court ruled, violated a student's right to due process.

At the same time, the Court worried that the *Lopez* decision might result in endless litigation. "The prospect of imposing elaborate hearing requirements in every suspension case is viewed with great concern," noted Justice Byron White in stating the decision of the majority.

But insofar as the impact on schools was concerned, in the wake of *Tinker* and *Lopez* circuit and district courts were making decisions that, in years past, would have been made by principals and school boards. According to historian David Tyack, the number of court cases involving students (including disputes about discipline, curriculum, truancy, and compulsory attendance laws) increased from 554 between 1957 and 1966 to 1,691 between 1967 and 1976.

In most cases, courts acted to uphold authority: circuit courts ruled that suspending a student for yelling obscenities at a vice principal at a shopping mall was valid (*Fenton v. Stear*, 1976); that reducing the grades of students caught drinking on a field trip was acceptable (*New Braunfels v. Armhe*, 1983); and that a student carrying a switchblade to the classroom could be indefinitely suspended (*McClain v. Lafayette County Board of Education*, 1982). In the most peculiar case following *Lopez*, a circuit court in 1983 (*Bernstein v. Menard*) ruled that a mother could not sue a high school for expelling her child from the school band.

But even while upholding the power of administrators, the courts ensured that lawyers would still be a force in the high school. In *New Jersey v. T.L.O.* (1985), the Supreme Court considered the case of a 14-year-old girl who was caught smoking in a bathroom. Upon searching her purse, a vice principal discovered rolling papers, marijuana, a roll of dollar bills, and an index card headed "People Who Owe Me Money." The vice principal turned "T.L.O." over to the police, and she was subsequently convicted of drug dealing.

The New Jersey Supreme Court overturned the conviction, arguing that the search of T.L.O.'s purse was illegal because the vice principal did not have a warrant. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the girl's conviction, but said that students were protected by the Fourth Amendment ban on unreasonable searches and seizures. Only when there was a "reasonable suspicion" that a student was engaging in illicit activity, the court declared, could a search be conducted. But by not defining this "reasonable suspicion" standard, the Court once again opened the door for litigation.

The result of these court cases was twofold. First, a successful principal must be a master of the law. As William Sparkman, a professor of education at Texas

Court decisions created an environment of legal uncertainty that discourages disciplinary action.

Tech, notes, principals not only need to understand constitutional law (particularly the ramifications of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments) but also the Civil Rights Act of 1964, tort legislation, the laws governing the rights of the handicapped, and the legal status of non-traditional families. Second, the end result of most of these laws was to penalize action. Why take steps to punish a student or get rid of a bad teacher if the result would be an endless and costly legal battle?

Contempt for Parents

By 1980, principalship was at its lowest ebb. Using a method known as "open-systems analysis," the graduate schools of education taught that principals were the victims of ambiguous, chaotic, uncertain, and unpredictable social forces beyond their power to influence or control. And in the most extensive analysis ever conducted of how principals function, a team of researchers at the University of Illinois-Chicago led by Van Cleve Morris spent 1980 and 1981 examining principals in that state and discovered that in most cases principals were shirking time-honored duties.

Few principals whom Morris studied, for example, bothered to spend time observing how teachers taught. "Evaluating teaching is generally a very unpleasant task,"



Teachers' unions usually have more authority than principals—not only in personnel decisions but even in fixing leaky roofs.

Morris observed. "Standing in judgment of other people is always difficult, especially when the judge (the teacher) has attended a teacher training institution and knows as much about pedagogy as any principal."

As for parents, they were at best tolerated, at worst ignored. While the principals thought parents might occasionally be useful as volunteers, they overlooked efforts to involve parents in their children's education and complained instead of the mother "whose self-appointed role goes beyond augmenting the staff." This sort of woman is "not interested in schedules, union contracts, central office bulletins, or other constraints of organizational life. Her suggestions, therefore, seem crazy, because they contradict what is possible organizationally." Far too often, Morris reported, principals, faced with the "seeming bureaucratic aimlessness" of many initiatives, adapted a "low-profile, paper-shuffling, keep-the-lid-on-and-the-boss-happy style of caretaker management."

Coleman and Chubb

Clearly, paper shufflers and caretakers are hardly the best people to lead high schools. Several major studies published in the late 1970s and 1980s concluded that successful schools were precisely those where the principal took charge.

In 1979, a team of British researchers led by psychologist Michael Rutter published *Fifteen Thousand Hours*, detailing the results of a four-year examination of British high schools. They discovered that students had higher test scores in schools where decisions were made "at a senior level rather than in the staff-room." Rutter and his colleagues also discovered that "exam successes were more frequent and delinquency less common" when discipline policies were set by the school rather than left to individual teacher initiative.

In *High School Achievement* (1982), co-written with Sally Kilgore, and *Public and Private High Schools* (1987), James S. Coleman, a sociologist at the University of Chicago, and Thomas Hoffer, a researcher at Northern Illinois

University, contended that private high schools (particularly Roman Catholic ones) outperform their public high school counterparts largely because private high schools are "functional communities" where parents share values and motives for placing their children in school. In contrast, Coleman and Hoffer argued, students in public high schools have nothing in common except that they live in a particular area. Thus, public high schools lack "social capital," and their students do less well than their private high school counterparts.

To build communities, said Coleman and Hoffer, principals should create opportunities for students, parents, and teachers to work together. Teachers and principals should meet frequently with parents and other community leaders, they advised, and principals should hold assemblies celebrating student achievements.

In *Politics, Markets, and America's Schools* (1990), Brookings Institution senior fellow John Chubb and Stanford political scientist Terry Moe determined that where principals had a substantial degree of autonomy and vision, schools were effective; whereas where central offices or superintendents restrained principals from independent initiative, schools tended to be less effective. In 92.1 percent of the ineffective schools, central offices had above-average control over the firing and transfer of teachers; in effective schools, central offices handled firing only 43.6 percent of the time. In ineffective schools, unions dominated the process of hiring 52.3 percent of the time; in effective schools, unions were in control of hiring 13 percent of the time.

But even though autonomous principals perform better than those bound by regulations and the central office, Chubb and Moe reported that the trends in school administration were against giving principals more autonomy. Most of the changes proposed in the "first wave" of school reform in 1983–84—tougher graduation requirements, longer school days, greater emphasis on homework, a more difficult process of teacher certification, and so forth—totally ignored the questions of restoring the authority of principals. These recommendations—passed down from national commissions, to state boards of education, to district offices—did little to help principals who were given no say in the changes.

After 1984, principals were faced with teachers with seemingly better qualifications, but they were still would-be generals who had no control over the troops. The result, said Chubb and Moe, is that most public high schools cannot be true communities because their staffs are assembled by bureaucratic fiat. "For the most part, the principal is stuck with the teachers the system gives him. They are stuck with him. And the teachers are stuck with one another."

Paperwork Burden

The findings of Chubb and Moe are partially supported by the decennial survey conducted by the National Association of Secondary School Principals, a professional organization located in Reston, Virginia. In the two volumes of *High School Leaders* (1988, 1990) a team of researchers led by Leonard Pellicer of the University of South Carolina surveyed principals across America and determined that much of the alarm about



Photofest

Band supporters and athletic boosters are among the strongest outside influences on principals.

principals was justified.

By 1987, when the survey was conducted, many of the fads and trends of the 1960s had faded. The schools were no longer overrun by outside groups with their own agendas. The three most common groups principals said influenced them in a “moderate” or “extreme” way were athletic boosters (61 percent), band supporters (61 percent), and teachers’ organizations (60 percent). Among the groups with the least influence were women’s or minority rights organizations (12 percent), local labor organizations (10 percent), and legal aid groups (7 percent).

But the burdens on principals—many of them due to regulation and paperwork—are still heavy. Eighty-three percent of the principals surveyed said they spent too much time on administrative details, 69 percent considered new state guidelines and requirements burdensome, only slightly less than the 70 percent who complained about “apathetic and irresponsible parents.”

Principals’ authority was also steadily being reduced. Thirty-three percent said they had little or no authority to hire teachers, 42 percent had little control over staffing practices, and 39 percent had no say over the budget. In contrast, in 1977, only 8 percent of the principals were limited in hiring teachers, 32 percent couldn’t tell the teachers how to teach, and 33 percent were blocked from budget discussions.

Yet despite these burdens, principals were largely happy. Surprisingly, principals’ job satisfaction has *increased* over time. Sixty-six percent of principals surveyed

reported “considerable” satisfaction with their jobs, up from 48 percent in 1965; and 69 percent say their job has a considerable amount of prestige, up from 50 percent in 1965. While the reason for this leap in satisfaction is not certain, it is not due to money; adjusted for inflation, principals are earning the same pay they were getting 10 years ago.

Multitude of Programs

But can these happy principals be called leaders? Can they inspire students as did their predecessors in earlier generations?

These questions are more complex than might appear at first glance. High schools are not the same organizations they were in the days of August Hollingshead or Frank Whitney. The modern high school is loaded with a multitude of programs and support staff—pregnancy-prevention counselors, drug treatment staffers, instructors for the handicapped—whose funds and ultimate authority rest in the state capital or Washington. Because of these programs and the large increase in electives, a principal has to oversee a far larger and more complex corporate culture than did his counterpart in 1960.

Researchers, however, have determined ways principals can become better leaders. Simply being visible and available to the staff helps a good deal. In a 1989 study from the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development, Wilma T. Smith and Richard Andrews reported that being seen frequently by staff and students was “the most important factor” in ensuring that

a principal be considered a “strong instructional leader.” Principals that teachers considered strong, said Smith and Andrews, established a “visible presence” in schools 93 percent of the time; weak principals established their presence only 46 percent of the time.

Other researchers are beginning to use time-tested techniques from management theory (as popularized by Peter Drucker and Tom Peters) in the schools. In a 1990 study for the U.S. Department of Education, Terrence

The reforms of 1983-84— tougher graduation requirements, longer school days, greater emphasis on homework—did little to help the principal.

E. Deal of Peabody College, Vanderbilt University, and Kent D. Peterson of the University of Wisconsin at Madison argued that treating a high school as a corporate culture and gradually making it more effective could, in the long run, be a better strategy than imposing policies from outside. “Bureaucratically implementing a reform policy can become a superficial exercise in compliance that never disturbs the underlying operations of schools,” they contended.

Expresser of Symbols

In Deal and Peterson’s view, the symbolic aspects of the principalship have been critically neglected. Simple actions have long-term consequences, and the successful principal can act to ensure that even “seemingly innocuous actions” can be performed with a touch of *gravitas*. A daily tour of the building or a staff meeting can either be a chore or “a symbolic expression of the deeper values the principal holds for the school.” The walls and location of the principal’s office, as well as his or her clothes, memo-writing style, demeanor (“a wink following a reprimand can have as much effect as the verbal reprimand itself”), and personal idiosyncrasies all determine whether a principal is revered or reviled.

The effective school is portrayed by Deal and Peterson as one where ceremonies matter. These ceremonies should reach out to the community, reaffirm the school’s purpose, and serve as symbols to transmit values. The authors relate an inspiring example. Frank Boyden, legendary headmaster of Deerfield Academy, in an annual assembly told the story of Tom Ashley, an exemplary student and teacher at the school who died in the World War I battle of Chateau-Thierry. By recalling Ashley’s life, Boyden transmitted the virtues that Ashley—and the school—stood for to future generations.

Deal and Peterson also pointed to exemplary leaders

in public schools. Hank Cotton, in his first year after taking control of troubled Cherry Creek High School in the Denver suburbs, suspended 235 students for cutting classes, eliminated dozens of elective courses, and freed teachers from most of their non-teaching duties such as monitoring the halls and cafeterias. (Cotton called such duties “administrivia.”) Bob Mastruzzi revitalized the culture of Kennedy High School in New York City by giving prizes for high attendance, having students and teachers give collective presents at Christmas for the poor and unfortunate, and sponsoring the Special Olympics.

But bureaucratic and cultural obstacles ensure that such principals are the exception rather than the rule. As Susan Moore Johnson observes, the history of most public high schools “is confined to the construction date chiselled above the door and a trophy case standing in the front hall.” She believes that most public high schools have lost their history irrecoverably; the few time-honored observances schools retain are tied to religious holidays. If schools have lost their past and can only celebrate events with no Jewish or Christian roots (the “holiday concert” instead of the Christmas concert) what traditions can be established? “Large schools dependent on a public bureaucracy cannot be intimate settings where school leaders inspire others with visions of what a school might become,” she contends.

Moreover, while principals can certainly take many helpful actions on their own, a powerful central office can easily block these actions and demote or transfer principals. Principals fret at such rule from above; in a 1987 survey from the National Center for Education Information, the three organizations principals were most likely to name as groups who prevented them from “doing their jobs the way they would like” were teachers’ unions, state departments of education, and the U.S. Department of Education.

Principals’ frustration about their bosses is understandable, because such centralized control pervades high schools with an aura of remoteness and inflexibility. The concerns of superintendents and school boards are not those of parents. Each year *The American School Board Journal* surveys school superintendents and school board members about what they want schools to do, and compares the results with the annual Gallup Poll on education. As of January 1991, school board members were chiefly concerned with facilities (37 percent), satisfying state mandates (36 percent), and devising a curriculum (30 percent). Parents were primarily concerned with drug use (38 percent), lack of discipline (17 percent), and school finances (13 percent).

But if and when power is devolved, principals may come under the control of teachers by bureaucratic fiat, and also find themselves bound by regulations. In Chicago, for example, parent-teacher councils recently acquired the authority to hire and fire principals, ending the long-established practice of giving principals tenure for life. Between January 1990 and February 1991, scores of the city’s principals quit rather than run the risk of not being rehired by the councils.

Chicago principals who attempt to take any action must still wend their way through a bureaucratic maze. To change a bus stop location, for example, a principal

must request permission from a district coordinator, who forwards the request to the Chicago Department of Education's transportation bureau, which may take up to 60 days to render a decision. Principals in Chicago also have no control over janitors, cafeteria workers, and school bus drivers, as these city employees are controlled by their separate union contracts.

A Clear Mission

Without changes in school bureaucracy, the changes principals can effect are minimal. As evidence, consider a report issued by the RAND Corporation in 1990 about New York City high schools. Like James Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, John Chubb, and Terry Moe before them, RAND researchers Paul T. Hill, Gail E. Foster, and Tamar Gendler discovered that both Roman Catholic and public high schools with clear purposes and missions produce better achieving students than "zoned" high schools locked into bureaucratic hierarchies. In the average New York high school, RAND reports, students routinely roam the halls wearing Walkmans; tardiness is not only the rule, but diligent students who want to get to class on time cannot, since a directive from the central office allows only three minutes between classes. Students not only do little work (failing two classes is considered standard) but in class students frequently eat, talk, rummage through purses, and even walk out. On pleasant spring days, average class attendance falls from 25 to five. While teachers record attendance (as required by their contract) little is done to enforce discipline because, in most cases, the school has no records of the addresses and telephone numbers of the parents of frequent absentees. Classrooms are littered with candy wrappers and soda cans, and the halls are occasionally defaced with graffiti.


In zoned schools, teachers and students operate under the rule that "adults agree not to demand too much in return for the students' agreement not to cause trouble." Principals in New York not only have no power to hire teachers, but cannot even be sure how many teachers they will have at any given time. As students



Bruce Barton/Deerfield Academy Library Archives

Ceremonies led by the principal should reach out to the community, reaffirm the school's purpose, and serve as symbols to transmit values. Here, Deerfield Academy's Frank Boyden carries on the tradition of the weekly school assembly in 1946.

drop out throughout the year, departments are cut (by up to 20 percent) and teachers reassigned. Efforts by principals to change the system "require tremendous amounts of paperwork, physical and emotional energy, and often fail anyway."

How does a "zoned" school become one with a mission and purpose? The first step, say the RAND researchers, is for central offices to "delegate budgetary and staffing decisions to the school-site level." The central office "must become less a regulatory and evaluative organization and more a facilitator of school-level problem solving." Central office thinking must change if the authority principals once had will be restored. The key is to eliminate most layers of bureaucracy between principals and school boards. The school-based management movement offers one way to achieve this. School choice offers another way by making principals more accountable to the parents who pay their salaries. Only when devolution of power becomes permanent, either through school-based management or through choice, will principals be free to lead. 

FROM KAFKA TO HAYEK

Eastern Europe's Slow Road from Serfdom

JULIANA GERAN PILON

As the countries of East-Central Europe awaken, a year and a half later, to the still exhilarating but also slightly nauseating “morning-after” effect of their revolutions, the realization is sinking in that rapid and miraculous transformation into Western-style consumerism is out of the question. These mutilated nations, which had experienced a Kafkaesque existence for over four decades, are faced with the reverse predicament of poor Gregor Samsa, the anti-hero of Kafka's novel *Metamorphosis*. Gregor awoke one day to find that he had become a cockroach; by contrast, Eastern European nations are trying to figure out how to metamorphose from the grotesque economic monsters that socialism had made of them, into viable market systems fit for humans.

The process will require expertise that is often lacking. It also asks a population suddenly to trust free-market principles about which it had been kept in medieval darkness. Nonetheless, the transformation has already begun in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Each of these countries—at different speeds and in its own style, with Hungary moving rather less rapidly than expected—is introducing reforms that can only be called, for lack of a euphemism, capitalist. The word is too candid perhaps for many of the former dissidents whose early aversion to totalitarianism was inspired by a humanist leftism. Yet a poll conducted by Freedom House and the American Jewish Committee in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, released on April 23, 1991, finds that one-half of the respondents want to see a purely free-market economy, with about as many opting for a mixed system—a result enviable even by Western standards.

Lech's Make a Deal

Poland witnessed in November 1990 the overwhelming presidential victory of Lech Walesa over his more social-democratic rival, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. Trusting the wisdom of the common man over the central planning of elites and sensing that the voters wanted a more rapid radical change, Walesa campaigned against “third way” options combining socialism with markets. The pro-Walesa Central Alliance carried the day at the polls with a vengeance. Whereupon Gdansk economist Janusz


Lewandowski, a Hayek disciple who had helped shape Walesa's economic ideas a decade ago, became Minister for Ownership Changes. The modest, soft-spoken Lewandowski intends to turn around the snail's pace of reform that has seen only six of 8,000 state enterprises put under private ownership in the past year (five through public share offerings and one through a management buyout). He notes that 3,500 medium-sized firms with fewer than 100 employees would be good candidates to be next in line.

Lewandowski and his colleagues hope that more than half of the state-owned economy will be privatized within three years. As a first step, the Warsaw Stock Exchange has begun operation for the first time since World War II. Another positive sign is that some 60,000 previously state-owned shops are now in private hands. And while a year ago only 5 percent of the retail trade was private, it is now up to 40 percent. Confidence that property rights will be respected is undoubtedly an important factor in this flowering of small-scale enterprise.

On the other hand, new businesses must contend with a maze of red tape in getting permits, inadequate credit, difficulties in securing space, and inadequate manufacturing products. More generally, the main problem in Poland remains the enormous state sector. Virtually all large enterprises remain state-owned.

Poland under Mazowiecki embarked on several important reforms. The zloty is now convertible, so Poles, unlike Russians, have a currency that provides genuine price information and offers a genuine store of value. Food shortages came to an end with the raising of prices to market levels. Trade was substantially liberalized. But 44 percent of Poles say their personal economic situation is the same as before the elections of 1989 and a sizeable 41 percent say it is actually worse. Timothy Lane of the International Monetary Fund suggests that sources of anxiety include “the persistence of inflation, the precipitous output decline in the socialized sector, and emerging signs of popular impatience with the reform program.”

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Drawing by Anatol Stotsenko Woolf for *Policy Review*

The Privatization Act, not passed by Parliament until July 1990, was unimpressive—an uneasy compromise between proponents of massive Western capital involvement and protectionists more committed to a piecemeal return of the nationalized assets to the citizens themselves (a version of the “let’s not sell away the country” syndrome that infects East-Central Europe in various degrees). With agriculture and consumer industries having fallen into recession, and unemployment somewhat on the rise (up to an average of 6.1 percent of the work force by the end of 1990, as high as 15 percent in northern Poland), people are demanding a more radical change in the direction of capitalism. As many as 63 percent of Poles, according to a new poll, say that economic changes are not proceeding fast enough.

Haveling Along

Pro-free-market attitudes are no less strong in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, where reform has been rather slower in coming but is well on its way. The courageous (if somewhat impatient and disarmingly candid) Minister of Finance Vaclav Klaus, also a Hayek disciple, was elected leader of Civic Forum last October with 70 percent of the vote, defeating President Vaclav Havel’s candidate, philosopher Martin Palous, to his left. Klaus’s childhood friend Tomas Jizek, whose translation of Hayek’s *The Road to Serfdom* was just published for the first time officially in Czechoslovakia (he had done an

earlier *samizdat* translation), is the Minister for Privatization. Czechoslovakia’s ambassador to the U.S., Rita Klimova, attributes Klaus’s success to the strength of his ideas and those of a few economists around him. “No one else had any real alternatives,” says Klimova. The people of Czechoslovakia appear ready to try his bold, imaginative voucher system, whose aim is to introduce incentive and ownership as soon as possible. Some 20 percent of the nation’s capital will be given away to its citizens. Convinced that the sooner a price mechanism is in place the better, Klaus says that this system “will allow people to start owning property and make market decisions” immediately.

Most of 1990 was spent discussing the relative merits of “shock therapy” versus “staged transition” models, with the Federal Assembly finally approving in September a shock economic plan. Despite continuing uncertainty over some issues—such as ownership, the price of land, taxation, protection of investments, and exchange rates—since April 1990 over 700 new firms have been registered in Czechoslovakia, many of them foreign-owned.

With parliamentary approval now in place since February, some 4,500 large industrial enterprises valued at about \$130 billion are available for purchase by domestic or foreign investors. A law was also passed that will return as much as \$10.7 billion of nationalized property to private owners. A useful aspect of the new Czecho-



Reform has been partly stalled in Hungary, which before 1989 was the most market-oriented country in the region.

slovak economic plan is the 54 percent devaluation of the koruna implemented last October—although it remains to be seen whether this is its market level.

Underpinning all these measures is the price liberalization that took effect January 1, 1991, when virtually all obstacles preventing market determination of prices were removed. In response to popular pressures against anticipated price increases, a ceiling was imposed. (Only about 30 percent of prices, including some food items, will continue to have ceilings imposed.) Economist Jiri Kappel, formerly with the Czech Ministry of Trade, argues that “considerable resistance to the changes is to be expected from the trade unions” in the future still. And what is more, says Kappel, the current plan probably “underestimates the basic monopoly structure of the economy which will take a long time to alter.”

Klaus may have found unexpected if not sizeable support in Slovakia, which never had quite as well developed an entrepreneurial sector as the Czech areas. According to National Forum Foundation Visiting Fellow Anton Andras, a member of the Slovak Parliament and the vice chairman of the Christian Democratic Movement, “Many Slovaks—certainly members of the CDM—are behind Klaus’s strong market reforms.” Yet the majority of Slovaks tend to be more worried about privatization than are the Czechs: 70 percent of Czechs favor privatizing state-owned companies while only 55 percent of Slovaks do so. Sixty-four percent of Slovaks say that salaries should be determined by the marketplace, compared with 77 percent of Czechs.

This is still a strong endorsement for the free market. The future, therefore, is likely to be with Klaus, whose principal constituency is young. “It is a generational divide in Czechoslovakia,” according to Ambassador Klimova. “The young people are ready for change, and they like Klaus. They want capitalism.”

Hungary for Change

Young Hungarians want capitalism as well. The pro-market Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), which became the third largest party in Hungary after the

March 1990 elections, fared even better—together with the Alliance of Free Democrats (AFD)—in the local elections held last October. According to an April 1991 poll, FIDESZ is now the most popular party in Hungary with a popularity level of over 30 percent, with the next party, the AFD, trailing by nearly 10 points. Their combined success came at the expense of the amorphous and rather timid Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF), the party currently in power. According to a poll conducted in February by the Budapest-based Median Public Opinion Research Corporation, only 14 percent of respondents would have voted for the HDF were the elections held at that time.

The HDF never quite recovered from its 1989 decision to form a coalition with the now-defunct Socialists. It also failed to fully dismantle the hated secret police or to dismiss former Communist-Party functionaries. For example, Kalman Kulcsar, Minister of Justice under the previous Communist regime, has recently been named Hungary’s ambassador to Canada.

Nor did the HDF impress the people with its program of economic reform in what before 1989 was the most market-oriented of all Eastern European economies. After the first democratic elections in May 1989 inflation and the budgetary deficit increased. The government’s “Program of National Revival,” published in September 1989, failed to establish a clear direction toward a market economy. After a resounding defeat at the polls in local elections in October 1990 and a massive strike by transportation workers, the Forum leadership decided to reshuffle the cabinet and to appoint a new finance minister. He is Mihaly Kupa, a former department chief in the then-Communist Ministry of Finance but also a businessman, who will be working on much-needed taxation legislation. Anders Aslund, the director of the Stockholm Institute of Soviet and East European Economics, describes Hungary’s current tax system as simply “disastrous.” The tax rate is as high as 70 percent—a strong disincentive to new investments and entrepreneurship. Despite the legendary Hungarian work ethic (about 80 percent of its people worked in the private sector, mostly in second jobs, even during the years of Communism), the economic advances are lagging.

Privatization Goulash

To be sure, the Hungarian government has a big job. Almost 90 percent of the Hungarian economy is still to be privatized. But while the government reportedly envisages reducing its share of the GNP to no more than one-third during the next three to five years, it is not clear that adequate measures are in place to reach such a goal. Minister Kupa’s just-published economic program for 1991–1994, titled “Stabilization and Convertibility,” announces that the next two years will be devoted to fighting inflation and unemployment, with the following two years devoted to economic growth and balance of payments. To attract more investment from the West, Kupa proposes that foreigners be able to own land outright, without having to engage in a joint venture. He also wants to open the banking system to foreign capital, except for the three largest banks, which he suggests should remain under state control. The program is now

before the parliament.

One reason for the relative economic stalemate has been the issue of restitution for confiscated property. Among various schemes being debated by the Hungarian Parliament have been so-called compensatory bonds to former property owners, returning property to former landowners (whose identity is often in dispute), and even offering to every Hungarian citizen something called "people's shares" of 20,000 forints each.

On April 24, 1991, the Parliament finally passed a bill designed to return much of the nationalized property. It turned out to be much harder than anticipated. Says economist Martin Tardos, a leader of the AFD: "There is no solution that is moral, efficient, and leads to positive results." The AFD was joined by other opposition parties in voting against the bill, arguing that a partial return of farmland will trigger a rash of competing claims that will paralyze the courts for years. The London *Financial Times* reports that signs of a land rush may be seen already: prices of land-surveying equipment are up, as are lawyers' fees.

Happily, the Constitutional Court overruled this law in late May, to the satisfaction of Bela Glattfelder of FIDESZ. Glattfelder says Hungarians should rather worry about "the revenue gained by the privatization process on clearing the national debt and the enormous expenses [they] have before [them] as a nation" and get on with the job.

And soon. For the Hungarians are very disappointed with their new leaders. Social psychologist Endre Hann, the executive director of the Median Foundation, is struck by the pessimism that infects Hungarian society. Hann found, for example, that about two-thirds of all Hungarians believe that the transition to democracy "took off on the wrong track," and nearly three-quarters

A legacy of Marxism-Leninism is a rapacious egoism antithetical to a free-market economy.

feel that their life is more difficult now than before free elections. This impression is not caused by a notion that change is occurring too quickly, but, on the contrary, 70 percent of those Hann questioned felt that economic change has not occurred fast enough.

Balky Balkans

The southern tier of East-Central Europe is also beginning to show signs of progress, despite its far greater initial handicaps: Yugoslavia's unmeltable boiling-pot of nationalities and its disastrous legacy of neither-here-nor-there economic halfway measures; Albania's Stalinist isolation; Romania's sadistic Ceausescocommunist; Bulgaria's palpable, excruciating poverty, whose allevia-



Reuters/Bettmann

The region's most exciting progress is the flowering of small-scale Polish enterprise.

tion presents a daunting challenge to the uneasy coalition between the democratic forces and the renamed but not exactly renegade Socialists.

Among the Balkan countries, Bulgaria has moved closest to reform. In February, the coalition government, led by Prime Minister Dimitar Popov, allowed prices to rise in response to free-market demand—which they did, by no less than 250 percent. Predictably, food appeared in the shops, and the IMF agreed to extend a loan as well as to reschedule part of Bulgaria's crippling \$11-billion debt. Bulgaria's ambassador to the United States, free-market economist Ognian Pishev, is happy to report that his government is resisting the temptation to print more money, as well as establishing a new independent central bank that will try to normalize lending policies and make money available to private investors. There are even plans to make the currency convertible.

Unfortunately, all the capitalist reforms in the world will not change the simple fact that at least for the moment there is not a lot for Bulgaria to sell, especially not abroad. In particular, Bulgaria's pride and joy, its computer industry, originally designed to serve primarily the Soviet market, is no Silicon Valley. So a shift in production is taking place: one computer company is making agricultural machinery, others are mass producing everything from floppy disks and satellite dishes to videotape.

Romania has made virtually no progress so far. Despite some concessions to foreign investors—such as allowing profits made in local currency to be transferred abroad after a 50 percent levy—the price increases that went into effect on April 1 seem almost designed to give "privatization" a bad name. Absent any commitment to render the leu convertible in the near future, and lacking a privatization scheme, let alone a constitution that guarantees private property, the price hikes cannot possibly effect the necessary market response of a capitalist system—for which the leadership is eminently unprepared. Argues Nicolae Manolescu, a leader of the Civic Alliance and editor of *Romania Literara*: "The Romanian government appears to be trying to salvage a gangrenous leg by administering injections, when in fact

what we need is amputation—lest the whole patient die.”

Romania is afflicted, thanks largely to a particularly barbarous Communist legacy, with the most virulent viruses that currently infect all of East-Central Europe. These are nationalism, economic ignorance, fear, self-

The protection of economic liberty will ultimately require a more mature civic consciousness and political culture.

doubt, envy, and political immaturity. Romania is in real danger of slipping into a fascist-style authoritarianism and emigration is way up.

Corrosive Envy

Nearly five decades of living under the shadow of an omnipotent secret police has obviously left an indelible imprint on the souls of East-Central Europeans. People continue to fear and distrust, to look behind their backs. The people of East-Central Europe were denied the opportunity to fend for themselves—the state has claimed to take care of them. Therefore the idea that state protection is not only undesirable but unnecessary was neither tested nor experienced. People must now learn to swim in the ocean of choice, and this after years of exhaustion and compliance. Will they have confidence in themselves after years of silence, after putting up with lies and oppression, after having made myriad compromises to survive?

There is no way to answer such a question adequately. At best we have opinion polls—which indicate that people are rather tired, expect price increases and more inflation, and are afraid that the reforms undertaken so far will fail. And yet the general mood—at least in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland—is ultimately optimistic. Nearly half the people believe things will improve in the next five years (the Czechs are especially upbeat—three-quarters of those polled believe the future is looking good). Evidently it will be easier for the young. But even they must learn to trust themselves in


the absence of a track record of success—for there were no tracks on which to run, no records kept.

Nearly five decades of Marxist-Leninist quasi-altruism—“pursuing the good of society”—have paradoxically encouraged a rapacious egoism that is antithetical to a free-market economy. Prevented from cooperating with each other in open, voluntary exchanges, individuals have frequently been able to advance their economic fortunes only through corruption and personal betrayal. And in the process true individualism, which involves pursuing one’s goals in a harmonious fashion—simultaneously respecting the rights of others to do the same, for the good of all—became all but extinct. The result has been a war of each against all and against each, a burning desire to see no one better off than oneself. The inescapable result—that everyone suffers in the process—seems almost irrelevant. That most destructive of all emotions, envy, may yet prove the undoing of these economies and political systems.

Civic Immaturity

The protection of economic liberty will ultimately require a more mature civic consciousness and political culture. The embryonic political parties will have to put aside their volatile factional conflicts based on personality disputes and minute philosophical differences.

None of the problems faced by the countries of the region is insuperable; yet neither do they have clear solutions, easily prescribable by “experts” from the West. They all involve considerable soul-searching and require not only the courage of one’s convictions—assuming that one has them in the first place—but also the skill and finesse of conveying them to others and of fine-tuning coalitions to see that they succeed.

The Hungarian writer Gyorgy Konrad, president of the International PEN Club, describes well the state of mind of many in the region. On the one hand, he feels that “many people feel that their past has been stolen.” For it turns out that a large part of what they learned “was mere stupidity.” It is hard to face the reality of so much wasted life and energy. Accordingly, many “are not enthusiastic about the future, [but] they will bear it, and perhaps like it, but only because it will be.” Only because it is still, after all, their life. Yet Konrad himself admits to being an optimist. “I can see that many tenacious people have bursts of energy, that the country is working and there are prospects, not only for swindlers, but also for founders. This is their time, mostly a time for the foundation builders.” It appears that the foundation builders understand this. May they prevail. 

WHO'S THE FAIREST OF THEM ALL?

The Truth About the '80s

BILL ARCHER

The most remarkable characteristic of the last Congress was the level of misinformation that accompanied the now infamous budget debate. Democrats skillfully deployed a series of charges against the Reagan-Bush policies of the 1980s to advance their case for increased taxes and spending. The charges were repeated incessantly by the media and became a kind of muzak against which the budget minuet proceeded. When the music stopped, Americans were left with a huge new bill for an exceedingly fat troupe of federal dancers. Now that the music has started again, it seems advisable to conduct a dispassionate analysis of the critics' arguments.

The case against the Reagan-Bush policies boils down to four assertions: 1) tax cuts of the early 1980s starved the federal government of revenues; 2) reduced revenues forced Congress to slash spending, particularly on social programs, creating a "social deficit"; 3) this social deficit was exacerbated by the growth of income among the rich and the reduction of income among average and low-income families; and 4) tax policy favored the rich by shifting the tax burden to less wealthy families.

These bumper-sticker slogans belie the facts. In reality, during the '80s, Congress had an additional \$1.9 trillion to spend on favored programs, including \$1.1 trillion from higher tax revenues; social spending on children and families increased 18 percent; the mean inflation-adjusted income of families reached an all-time high of \$41,506, about 11 percent above its level at the peak of the last business cycle in 1979; the mean income of every income quintile rose every year between 1983 and 1989, though the bottom quintile in 1989 still had a lower mean income than in 1979; and the percentage of federal taxes paid rose for the top 5 percent of families while falling for the remaining 95 percent.

Congress's \$2.4-Trillion Spree

The first charge, that tax cuts have led to lower federal revenues, is the starting point in most media debates about the economy. Like much conventional wisdom, it's simply not true. Revenues stood at \$1.07 trillion in 1990, 35 percent above the 1980 level when adjusted for inflation. Federal revenues in 1980, the last year of the

Carter administration, were \$796 billion in 1990 dollars. Over the next 10 years, federal revenues averaged \$906 billion annually in 1990 dollars, about 14 percent higher than in 1980. Over the decade, a total of \$1.1 trillion flowed into the Treasury in excess of that which the Treasury would have received if revenues had remained at the 1980 level.

Of course, revenues are not the only source of money available to Congress. Congress occasionally borrows money to maintain—or create new—levels of federal spending. The federal deficit was \$114 billion in 1980. Over the next 10 years, the deficit averaged \$196 billion, about \$82 billion above the 1980 level. Over the decade, Congress had at its disposal a total of \$822 billion in borrowed money above the 1980 level of borrowing adjusted for inflation.

With its \$1.1 trillion in additional revenue and \$822 billion of borrowed money, Congress had more than an additional \$1.9 trillion to spend. But even this figure is an underestimate of the additional money at the disposal of Congress during the decade. The famous Reagan spending cuts, to be discussed in greater detail below, resulted in substantial savings in some government programs. The federal government spent less in nine of the 18 federal budget functions over the 10-year period than it would have spent had the 1980 spending level, adjusted for inflation, been maintained. The major reductions came in energy, employment and training, community and regional development, and general government. Taken together, about \$500 billion was cut from these various functions.

Add this to the \$1.9 trillion in new revenue and borrowing, and Congress had a grand total of \$2.4 trillion additional or reallocated money to spend over the decade. Not bad for a pauper like Uncle Sam.

"Savage Budget Cuts"

As a result of budget starvation, so the media and Democratic folklore goes, Congress was forced to cut spending, especially on social programs. Members of

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Table 1
Constant Dollar Spending on Major Social Programs in 1981 and 1989

Spending Program	Year		Change	
	1981	1989	In \$	In %
Income Support				
Aid to Families with Dependent Children	\$9,112	\$9,000	\$-112	-1%
Earned Income Tax Credit *	2,562	6,632	4,070	159
Child Support Enforcement	588	941	353	60
Supplemental Security Income	8,576	11,300	2,724	32
Social Security Dependents	15,410	11,000	-4,410	-29
Military Survivors	441	804	363	82
Workers Compensation—Federal	840	988	148	18
Black Lung	2,144	1,400	-744	-35
Subtotal	\$39,673	\$42,065	\$2,392	6%
Nutrition				
Food Stamps	10,988	10,300	-688	-6
School Lunch	3,216	3,100	-116	-4
School Breakfast	430	510	80	19
Child-Care Food	390	669	279	72
Commodity Assistance	847	530	-317	-37
WIC	1,206	1,900	694	58
Subtotal	\$17,077	\$17,009	-\$68	0%
Social Service				
Social Services Block	4,020	2,700	-1,320	-33
Dependent Care Credit*	1,538	2,442	904	59
Head Start	1,072	1,200	128	12
Foster Care	407	1,023	616	151
Community Services Block	705	381	-324	-46
Subtotal	\$7,742	\$7,746	\$4	0%
Education and Training				
Education of Disadvantaged	3,484	4,000	516	15
Education Block Grant	686	463	-223	-33
Handicapped Education	1,172	1,475	303	26
Vocational Education	820	826	6	1
Impact Aid	914	733	-181	-20
Defense Schools	512	821	309	60
Training Disadvantaged	2,814	1,800	-1,014	-36
Jobs Corps	752	742	-10	-1
Summer Youth Training	1,124	709	-415	-37
Subtotal	\$12,278	\$11,569	-\$709	-6%
Health				
Medicaid	5,494	7,700	2,206	40
Maternal & Child Block	519	554	35	7
Community Health Centers	434	415	-19	-4
Alcohol, Drug Abuse Block	695	806	111	16
Indian Health	925	1,081	156	17
Federal Employees	3,350	7,800	4,450	133
Military Health	7,638	12,700	5,062	66
Subtotal	\$19,055	\$31,056	\$12,001	63%
Housing				
Public Housing	3,216	3,200	-16	0
Leased	4,154	9,800	5,646	136
Rental	891	626	-265	-30
Subtotal	8,261	13,626	5,365	65
Grand Total	\$104,086	\$123,071	\$18,985	18%

Note: All figures are millions of constant 1989 dollars; some of the figures include expenditures for adults other than parents. **Source:** House, S.L. Federal Programs for Children and Their Families (90-131 EPW). Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1990, Table 3, pp. 25-29. * These are updated figures taken from Background Material and Data on Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, pp. 901, 907.

Congress, special interests, and members of the media hummed a refrain of deprivation, claiming that millions of Americans lost vital government benefits because safety net programs were savagely slashed to the bone. A careful examination of government budget figures, however, reveals that over the eight-year period beginning in 1981, during which the population increased 8 percent, the population under age five increased 11 percent, and the number of people in poverty increased by less than 1 percent, federal spending on children and families increased 18 percent.

Table 1 summarizes federal spending on major federal programs designed primarily to help families with children. In constant dollars, the federal government spent \$19 billion more in 1989 than in 1981 on 38 different programs that provided income support, nutrition, social services, education and training, health services, and housing to America's children and families.

Table 1 does not include the nation's two largest social programs, Social Security (except the small fraction of benefits paid to dependent children) and Medicare. These programs were excluded in order to focus attention on programs that provide primarily for nonelderly families, the very programs critics assert were most devastated by cuts. If Social Security and Medicare had been included, the increase in social spending over the period would have been \$89 billion rather than \$19 billion and 25 percent rather than 18 percent.

The Reagan-Bush years were hardly a period of declining federal spending on social needs; indeed, social spending during the period sometimes seemed exceedingly generous. Consider developments in the funding of child-care programs. Throughout the period, but especially after 1985, the nation was subjected to insistent claims that families were experiencing a day-care crisis. Census Bureau

reports showed that the federal government was already paying about one-third of the nation's total day-care bill, not including \$4 billion or so provided directly to low-income families with children through the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Even so, a lively three-year battle was fought over additional funding for day-care and the EITC.

Republicans argued that whatever funds were available should be used to expand Head Start and to give money directly to working families with children through an expanded EITC. Democrats agreed that Head Start should be expanded and that some money should be spent on the EITC. But many congressional Democrats, and their allies in the day-care community, countered with their traditional big-government message that the day-care crisis could be effectively addressed only by a huge federal program that would impose federal standards on state authority to regulate, would professionalize care, and would provide day-care subsidies to families earning up to \$40,000. Against these two positions, both notable for the amount of new federal spending involved, only a few isolated voices could be heard making the quaint argument that whatever Congress decided to do, only moderate new funds should be spent.

Although the original bill sponsored by the Bush administration proposed spending about \$10 billion over five years, every round of the debate resulted in more expensive proposals. By the time Congress actually passed a bill, most of the major players got at least part of what they wanted—at a price tag of \$23 billion over five years.

The federal government expects to spend about \$85 billion over the next five years on “old” day-care and children's tax credit programs that existed before last year's bill. This figure includes, among other programs, \$19.8 billion for Head Start, \$6.6 billion for the Child Care Food Program, \$34.5 billion for the Earned Income Tax Credit, and \$16.6 billion for the Dependent Care Tax Credit. Adding to this amount the \$23 billion in new spending approved in last year's bill brings total spending on day-care, Head Start, and the EITC to the spectacular sum of \$108 billion.

Income Stagnation for the Poor

The third charge levied against Republican policies is that family income declined or remained stagnant during the 1980s. Unlike congressional pauperism and reduced social spending, the issue of income stagnation and decline for some families is real and serious. But we must peel through several layers of rhetoric to get at the real problem.

The basic claim that average family income has declined is hopelessly incorrect. After 1983 the economic recovery increased the income of families in every quintile, including the lowest, and families in every quintile except the lowest achieved and then surpassed their highest income ever. In 1989, the mean inflation-adjusted income of families increased for the seventh straight year and reached its all-time high of \$41,506, about 11 percent above its level at the peak of the last business cycle in 1979 and 17 percent above its low during the recession year of 1982. (During this same

period, median family income increased nearly 13 percent, from \$30,394 in 1982 to \$34,213 in 1989.)

A more sophisticated version of the declining family income charge is that the income of families at the bottom of the income distribution decreased. There is some truth in this assertion. In 1989, the mean income of families in the lowest 20 percent (quintile) increased for the sixth straight year to \$9,431 (see **Table 2**). Unfortunately, this amount was still about 4 percent below the mean income of \$9,801 registered by families in the bottom quintile in 1979. And in relative terms, at 4.6 percent, their share of the total income pie in 1989 was lower than at any time since at least the 1960s.

It is troubling that low-income families are not sharing equally in our nation's economic growth. But before we

The highest quintile of earners paid 42 percent of Social Security taxes, but received only 12 percent of the benefits.

rush to blame government policy for this disparity, we should examine the underlying causes of income stagnation at the bottom of the income distribution.

Declining Male Wages

One problem is wages. Again, despite claims to the contrary, average wages increased throughout the economic recovery if we include supervisory as well as production workers and all forms of employee compensation including fringe benefits. However, if we examine wage growth at various points in the income distribution during the 1980s, we find some very unsettling numbers. For males, real hourly earnings decreased for all but earners in the top quintile. The decline in hourly earnings was less than .3 percent for males in the next-to-highest income quintile, slightly under 1 percent for those in the middle quintile, and slightly greater than 1 percent for those in the bottom two quintiles.

Most economists agree that education plays an important role in this wage decline. Over 85 percent of Americans, including 81 percent of blacks and 62 percent of Hispanics, now receive a high school degree before the age of 29. Unfortunately, our economy no longer has very many high-paying jobs for young people who have only a high school education or less. Richard Freeman of Harvard and his colleagues have shown that between 1973 and 1987 the real wages of high school dropouts fell by about 20 percent. Wages of those with 12 years of education fell by over 13 percent. The reality of today's global marketplace is that high wages go to the highly educated. Brawn and stamina are not as well rewarded as they were in a less technological society.

We now offer one of the most expensive, if not the most effective, public education systems in the world. We provide generous college grants and loans to students from low-income families. Last year the Congress significantly expanded the already extensive tax breaks we provide for low-wage workers, especially those with families. Thus, the federal government continues to maintain and even expand programs that help young Americans assume a productive place in the nation's economy; Congress also subsidizes the wages of those who are able to command only low wages. But the major responsibility for low wages does not lie with government programs. At some point we simply must help young adults face the cold facts: if they want good wages in our technological society, they must obtain education or training beyond high school. Those who emphasize the role of government programs obscure the extensive and difficult changes in personal behavior upon which our future depends.

Three Million Single Mothers in Poverty

Another important contributor to income stagnation is family breakdown. In 1989, married-couple families had median incomes of \$38,547. By contrast, female-headed families had median incomes of \$16,442. Similarly, the poverty rate for married-couple families was under 6 percent as compared with over 32 percent for female-headed families.

Between 1980 and 1988 the number of female-headed families with children increased by 830,000. Worse, this increase was accounted for almost entirely by out-of-wed-

lock births. Earnings of never-married mothers are even lower than those of divorced mothers. These disastrous demographic trends added substantially to the number of Americans receiving low wages or living in poverty. The most generous social policies will be ineffective in greatly reducing poverty and dependency, so long as the number of children living with single mothers, and especially with never-married mothers, continues to increase.

In addition to declining wages and the increasing number of out-of-wedlock births, a third factor contributing to problems with family income is lack of participation in the work force. Unfortunately, there are several indications that the level of nonwork among low-income families increased even during a period of rapid job creation. Between 1959 and 1989, for example, the percentage of poor families reporting some earnings declined from 67.5 to 50. Over the same period, the percentage of poor families headed by a full-time worker declined from 31.5 to 16.2.

Table 3 illustrates the problem in the starkest terms. Families in the highest income quintile had an average of 1.28 year-round, full-time workers in 1970. By 1986, these families had increased work output substantially to an average of 1.42 workers. By contrast, as shown in the last panel, families in the bottom quintile had only an average of .42 workers in 1970. Over the next 16 years, as the number of workers in wealthier families increased, the number of workers in families in the bottom quintile decreased to .27—a decline of over 35 percent.

The reason for this decline is apparent. Married-couple families in the bottom quintile had an average of

Table 2

Mean Family Income by Quintile in Constant 1989 Dollars, 1970–1989

Year	Income Quintile				
	Lowest Fifth	Second Fifth	Third Fifth	Fourth Fifth	Highest Fifth
1970	9,070	20,341	29,412	39,674	68,224
1971	9,103	20,047	29,331	39,723	68,419
1972	9,518	20,968	30,799	42,059	72,945
1973	9,783	21,351	31,370	42,872	73,557
1974	9,636	21,035	30,783	42,172	72,121
1975	9,291	20,235	30,153	41,288	70,541
1976	9,509	20,740	31,017	42,379	72,440
1977	9,361	20,817	31,394	43,325	74,276
1978	9,650	21,475	32,319	44,530	76,566
1979	9,801	21,623	32,657	44,970	77,922
1980	9,286	20,852	31,588	43,828	75,049
1981	8,906	20,144	30,916	43,411	74,419
1982	8,427	19,834	30,381	43,093	75,903
1983	8,409	19,869	30,634	43,668	76,823
1984	8,692	20,406	31,554	45,123	79,518
1985	8,808	20,677	31,985	45,845	82,510
1986	9,095	21,396	33,204	47,447	86,423
1987	9,248	21,734	33,749	48,301	88,271
1988	9,284	21,712	33,787	48,524	89,033
1989	9,431	22,018	34,206	49,213	92,663

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census. Money Income and Poverty Status in the United States, 1989, Series P-60, No. 168. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 30. **Note:** Mean incomes are in 1989 CPI-U-X1 adjusted dollars.

about .6 workers, but single-mother families had only .03 workers. Neither of these figures varied much over the 1970–1986 period. As the proportion of single-mother families relative to married-couple families in the bottom quintile increased, the average number of workers in all families was pulled down.

In 1989, there were about 7.4 million female-headed families with children; approximately 3.2 million of them lived in poverty. Here is the heart of America’s greatest social problem: over 3 million single mothers in poverty, virtually none of them working full-time.

Partisan congressional debate on changing family income during the 1980s was too simplistic. Yes, average wages of production workers declined. Yes, family income at the bottom of the income distribution failed to reach the levels reached in the 1970s. Democrats were only too glad to ascribe these developments to alleged help-the-rich, forget-the-poor instincts of Republicans. Republicans, overly sensitive to this charge, acted as if denying the problem would make it disappear. But careful analysis, by both liberal and conservative scholars, has shown that education, family composition, and work effort play the lead roles in the drama of family income.

Only on the editorial pages can government play the role of *deus ex machina*. In the real world, the solution is for the nation to return to strong family values, for our children and young people to once again take effort and responsibility seriously, and for adults to turn away from welfare and choose instead the uncertainty that inevitably comes with self-reliance. Social policy can play no more than a supporting role in these achievements.

Lower Income Taxes for All

Yet another charge against the policies of the 1980s is that changes in the tax code favored the rich. This accusation is the centerpiece of the onslaught against Republicans and the issue of “tax fairness” became a central theme of the budget wars.

According to estimates made by the Congressional Budget Office, in 1980 the 20 percent of families with the highest earnings paid 27.3 percent of their income in taxes. This percentage then declined to 25.8 in 1990. By contrast, the percentage of income paid in federal taxes by the lowest quintile of earners increased over the same period from 8.4 to 9.7.

Mountains of myth and \$165 billion in new taxes were built on the foundation provided by these data. The plausibility of the fairness case was further advanced by the fact that marginal tax rates in the top brackets had declined in 1981 and again in 1986. When Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, the top tax rate was 70 percent; by the end of his second term it was 33 percent.

Both the changes in percentage of income paid by low-income and wealthy taxpayers and the decline in tax rates provide plausible evidence that fairness—defined by Democrats as making middle-income and wealthy citizens pay an ever-increasing percentage of their income in taxes—decreased during the 1980s. But before we leap to any conclusions, a more detailed analysis is in order.

Total federal taxes are a summary measure of several

Table 3

Number of Full-Time, Year-Round Workers in Various Family Types by Income Quintile

Family Type	Year		
	1970	1980	1986
Highest Quintile			
All Families with Children	1.28	1.38	1.42
Married Couples	1.31	1.41	1.45
Single Mothers	.75	.93	.92
Middle Three Quintiles			
All Families with Children	.95	.99	1.06
Married Couples	.99	1.09	1.18
Single Mothers	.31	.39	.39
Bottom Quintile			
All Families with Children	.42	.28	.27
Married Couples	.63	.57	.61
Single Mothers	.05	.02	.03

Source: Congressional Budget Office. Trends in Family Income: 1970-1986. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988, Table A-15.

quite different types of taxes. The biggest revenue producer is the individual income tax, which is explicitly designed to collect a higher percentage of income from the rich than the poor. As we have seen, families in the top quintile paid a lower percentage of their income in total federal taxes in 1990 than in 1980. Similarly, they paid lower effective *income* taxes (as opposed to total taxes) over this period; the decline was from 17.1 to 15.6 percent.

Families in the bottom four quintiles also paid less in income taxes. A major purpose of the tax code changes of 1981 and 1986 was to reduce everyone’s income tax rates—and that is precisely what happened. Between 1980 and 1990, the decline in effective income tax rates for the highest quintile was about 9 percent, the decline for the middle three quintiles was around 20 percent, and the decline for the bottom quintile was 275 percent (in part because the 1986 reforms removed around six million families from the tax rolls altogether).

Regressive Payroll Taxes

Next to the income tax, the federal tax that has the biggest impact on taxpayers is the Social Security payroll tax. In fact, counting both the employer and employee share of the tax, roughly 75 percent of American families pay more in Social Security taxes than they do income taxes. Unlike the income tax, the payroll tax is a flat percentage for everybody. Moreover, it applies only to the first \$51,300 (in 1990) in earnings. Any amount above \$51,300 goes untaxed (although the tax increases of 1990 included raising the wage base for the Medicare portion of the payroll tax to \$125,000).

Unfortunately, the payroll tax has increased several times since its inception in 1935. Just between 1977 and 1990, both the rate for employers and the rate for employees increased nine times from 5.85 percent to 7.65 percent.

The CBO tax model shows that payroll tax increases during the 1980s were regressive if measured as a percentage of family income. For the lowest-income quintile, the effective payroll tax rate increased by 41 percent from 5.4 to 7.6 percent; for the middle quintile by 23 percent from 8.7 to 10.7 percent; and for the upper quintile by only 15 percent from 5.9 to 6.8 percent.

This regressivity of the payroll tax is the major cause of the disproportionate impact of federal taxes on low-income families. By direct contrast, the income tax is progressive and getting more so. Thus, the most direct way to increase progressivity in the federal tax code would seem to be to reduce the payroll tax for low-income earners. But before anyone starts writing legislation, consider the following three points about payroll taxes.

First, in addition to increased rates, the taxable wage base was raised from \$22,900 in 1980 to \$51,300 in 1990, thereby subjecting more of the income of wealthier families to taxation.

Second, concerned with the impact of payroll taxes on families with children, in 1975 Congress enacted an earned income tax credit (EITC) that provided income

Outlays will be at 25 and 24 percent of GNP in 1991 and 1992—their highest ever except during World War II.

tax forgiveness or, in the case of families that did not earn enough to owe income taxes, actual cash rebates. Substantially expanded several times since 1975, the credit now provides tax relief or cash rebates of as much as \$1,000 to nearly 10.5 million families earning less than \$20,000. When the expansions enacted last year are fully implemented in 1994, the maximum value of the EITC will leap to \$3,000.

Even now, the EITC more than offsets the entire amount of federal income tax paid by families in the lowest quintile. In 1980, families in the bottom quintile “paid” federal income taxes equal to a negative .4 percent of their income. In other words, the amount these families received back from the EITC was greater than the income tax paid in by an aggregate of around \$600 million (in 1990 dollars). By 1990, the amount forgiven or returned to these families had more than tripled.

Third and most important, emphasizing payroll tax regressivity without paying attention to Social Security benefits produces approximately the same result as estimating the size of an iceberg by measuring the part sticking out of the water. A recent study by the Social Security Administration indicates that in 1987, the highest quintile of earners paid 42 percent of Social Security taxes, but received only 12 percent of the benefits. By contrast, the lowest quintile of earners paid

2 percent of the taxes, but received 19 percent of the benefits.

The famed regressivity of the Social Security tax, then, is mitigated by several factors that do not often find their way into speeches and editorials about the regressive impact of Social Security taxes on American families.

Rich Man's Burden

Thus far, our discussions of tax fairness have been confined to effective tax rates—the percentage of income paid in taxes by families at various points in the income distribution. Another useful measure of tax fairness is what might be called the tax burden, that is, the percentage of federal taxes paid by each income group. As a percentage of federal income taxes actually paid between 1981 and 1987, the burden on the upper 5 percent of earners increased while the burden on the remaining 95 percent of families decreased. **Table 4** contains actual tax return data collected by the Internal Revenue Service for 1981 through 1988. Here we see that the tax burden of both the upper 1 percent and 5 percent increased between 1981 and 1988, the former by nearly 56 percent and the latter by about 31 percent. Meanwhile, the tax burden of the bottom 50 percent declined by 25 percent.

Perhaps the most arresting number in **Table 4** is the burden ratio. The burden ratio is obtained by dividing the average tax bill for families in the upper 1 percent by the average tax bill for families in the bottom 50 percent. In 1981, the burden ratio was \$118; families in the upper 1 percent of the income range paid an average of \$118 for each dollar paid by families in the bottom half of income. By 1988, the burden ratio had more than doubled to \$240.

Incentives That Worked

A final set of numbers from federal tax returns also deserves consideration. A fundamental tenet of incentive economics is that low tax rates encourage investment and growth while discouraging tax dodges and shelters. As a result, low tax rates can lead to increased tax revenue, as well as more fairness. The first post-war president to practice incentive economics was John Kennedy, who led the move to cut the top tax bracket from 91 to 70 percent in 1961. An economic boom followed, perhaps by coincidence. The next president to enroll in the incentive club was Ronald Reagan, who convinced Congress to reduce the top bracket from 70 to 50 percent in 1981 and 1982. An economic boom followed, again perhaps by coincidence. Reagan liked the results so much he lobbied for further reductions in tax rates amidst an overall reform of the tax code to abolish many deductions and credits and to encourage investment and saving. The 1986 simplified rate structure of 15, 28, and 33 percent became effective in the midst of an economic recovery. The recovery subsequently became the greatest in post-war history, with a 30 percent increase in GNP and around 18 million new jobs created between 1981 and 1990.

Critics maintained that cutting taxes would reduce federal revenues. The incentive economists countered that cutting the rates would increase revenues both

because taxpayers would shelter less of their income and because new investments would stimulate growth and thereby increase the tax base. The incentive economists were right.

In constant dollars the federal individual income tax produced revenues of \$360 billion in 1980 and \$416 billion in 1988. That's an increase of over 15 percent in real dollars. Meanwhile, income taxes paid by the upper 1 percent increased from \$66 billion to \$106 billion, an increase of over 60 percent. The increase for the top 10 percent was from \$177 billion to \$237 billion, an increase of 34 percent. The remaining 90 percent of taxpayers actually paid \$5 billion less in taxes in 1988 than in 1980, a decline of 2.5 percent. Thus, tax policy of the 1980s might be fairly summarized by three developments, all felicitous: lower rates, increasing revenues, increasing progressivity.

All-Time Spending Highs

Ronald Reagan and George Bush tried to alter the course of the nation by reducing the size of government and the scope of its authority to interfere in almost every aspect of American social and economic life. Theirs was a view of limited, efficient, effective government that would leave in place the major programs of the New Deal and the Great Society. The safety net was not simply left intact; it was expanded substantially throughout the decade.

The three most significant domestic achievements of the era were reforming the tax code by reducing rates, broadening the tax base, and removing millions of poor and low-income families from the tax rolls; slashing inflation from about 10 percent in the Carter years to an average of around 4 percent during the Reagan-Bush years; and inspiring an economic expansion that created 18 million new jobs, raised average family income to an all-time high, and carried the GNP to nearly \$5.5 trillion by 1990.

But the government containment strategy had limited success. On the tax side, the reforms of 1981 produced worthwhile reductions. Federal taxes declined from over 20 percent of GNP in 1981 to just under 20 percent in 1982 and to 18.1 percent in both 1983 and 1984. But after 1984, taxes once again began to rise. By the time of last year's budget debate, they were at historic highs: 1990 was the fourth consecutive year in which taxes were greater than 19 percent of GNP, a sustained level of taxation that has never before afflicted the nation.

The reason, of course, was monstrous levels of federal spending and borrowing. If we take federal spending as a percentage of GNP in five-year chunks beginning in 1955, the relentless rise is astounding: 17.9, 18.8, 19.3, 19.6, 21.3. Even the average during the first five years of the 1980s, including three years of the "savage" Reagan cuts, was 23.2—by far the highest in history. The combination of Reagan spending cuts working on the numerator and a rapidly expanding economy working on the denominator, abetted by the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings law and universal concern about the deficit, managed to reduce federal outlays slightly as a percent-

Table 4


Percentage of Federal Income Taxes Paid by Various Income Groups, 1981-1988

Year	Income Group				Burden Ratio *
	Top 1%	Top 5%	51st-95th Percentile	Bottom 50%	
1981	18%	35%	57%	8%	\$118
1982	19	36	56	7	129
1983	20	37	56	7	142
1984	21	38	55	7	143
1985	22	39	54	7	152
1986	25	42	52	7	191
1987	25	43	51	6	202
1988	28%	46%	49%	6%	\$240

Note: Based on IRS tax return data; income data is for families. **Source:** Frenze, C. The Federal Income Tax Burden, 1981-1987: A Senate Staff Report. Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic Committee, Republican Staff, 1990. * Computed by dividing the average tax paid by families in the upper 1 percent by the average tax paid by families in the bottom 50 percent.

age of GNP in the years after 1985. During 1987, 1988, and 1989, spending did not exceed 23 percent of GNP. This level of spending was still higher than that of any peacetime period before the 1980s. But at least the federal giant had been contained.

Alas, the containment was only temporary. In 1990, the year of the great budget war, spending again jumped almost a full 1 percent of GNP, from 22.3 to 23.2, and was projected to grow even more in subsequent years. Under assault from the four charges examined above, Republicans were unable to defend either the tax reforms or spending containments they had achieved during the 1980s. As a result of the 1990 budget agreement, outlays will be at 25 and 24 percent of GNP in 1991 and 1992—their highest ever except during World War II. That's the bad news. The good news, such as it is, is that if Congress adheres to the budget agreement, spending will decline to about 21 percent of GNP by 1994. In view of the fact that this level of spending, though lower than the level for 1991 and 1992, was virtually unheard of before the 1980s, one's enthusiasm may be somewhat muted. Moreover, taxes will not decline at all. At 19.9 percent of GNP in 1994, they will be the third-highest in peacetime history.

Budget and tax reforms that had done so much for the nation during the 1980s are now being overcome by bumper-sticker arguments: Uncle Sam is a pauper; the safety net is tattered; family income is depressed; tax policy favors the rich. While the truth value of these arguments ranges from moderately incorrect to spectacularly false, proponents of the Reagan-Bush policies are now on the defensive. The facts are on our side. But unless we marshal them at every opportunity, we are guaranteed additional setbacks on the major tax and spending issues that define our political parties and chart the nation's future. 

LANSING WITH WOLVES

Can Michigan's Engler Pull Off His Taxpayer's Revolution?

GREG KAZA

South of Detroit is an area called Downriver that is home to smokestacks, factories, and 375,000 mostly blue-collar, middle-class residents. It is one of the most heavily industrialized and traditionally Democratic territories in the United States.

The most important political event in Michigan this century took place in Downriver at the Ford Motor Company's gigantic Rouge plant. There, in 1937, thugs in the employ of Harry Bennett, Henry Ford I's security chief, savagely beat four United Auto Workers organizers, including Walter Reuther, in what became known as the Battle of the Overpass. Pictures of the assault shaped state politics for decades. The working man with a family thought Ford and Bennett had gone too far, and identified with the UAW as a protection against corporate power. The Democratic Party achieved political control of the state for nearly half a century by appealing to middle-class voters in areas like Downriver and Macomb County, a blue-collar area of 800,000 people northeast of Detroit.

Potentially the second most important political event for the state this century took place last November, when Michigan's Silent Majority broke ranks with the UAW and the Democratic Party and elected John Engler as the first conservative Republican governor since the Great Depression. Campaigning for lower property taxes, increased funding for education, and cuts in government spending for just about everything else, Engler won a squeaker 17,595-vote-margin victory over two-term moderate Democratic incumbent James Blanchard. Most significantly, his Taxpayers Agenda did well in some traditional Democratic strongholds. He won pluralities in eight of 17 Downriver communities, and captured 55 percent of the vote in the 27th State House District, a key seat. In Macomb County, Engler won 53 percent.

Reagan Realignment

Engler's victory suggests that the Reagan realignment is beginning to be translated into state as well as national politics. Ronald Reagan stunned the Democratic Party by carrying Macomb County in 1980. In 1984, Reagan won Downriver, and retained Macomb County. By 1988, both areas were in the Republican column for George

Bush—not that Michael Dukakis didn't try to recapture them for the Democrats now that Michigan has emerged as the bellwether state in the Midwest. Dukakis took his infamous tank ride in Macomb County. Bush wrapped himself in the Reagan Revolution by vowing “no new taxes,” and won electoral victories in both areas, as well as Michigan and the Midwest.

The new governor is now trying to achieve his Taxpayers Agenda, over the opposition of the state's powerful unions and the Democrat-controlled state House of Representatives. Engler's proposed fiscal year 1991-1992 budget would cut spending for 11 of Michigan's 19 state departments, while increasing funding for education, which he calls “the top priority of any state government.” He has already abolished the Michigan Council for the Arts, arguing that it is a luxury the state can ill afford when schools need improvement. He is similarly trying to cut social services expenditures (with a 17-percent cut for AFDC) on the grounds that the money would be better spent on education. And he has proposed a 20 percent cut in property tax assessments—though so far the House has agreed only to freeze assessments.

By proposing the most sweeping overhaul of Michigan government in the 20th century, Engler has the opportunity not only to redefine the economic future of a major U.S. industrial state, but to profoundly influence national politics as well. To do so, however, will require building and sustaining political support that can overcome his House opposition. And this will mean appealing to Reagan Democrats in Macomb County and Downriver on behalf of a program that involves more than electoral victory—action Engler has yet to take.

Michigan's Liberal Crackup

James Blanchard launched his career as a congressman best known for engineering the federal bailout of Chrysler. He was twice elected governor by a coalition of union corporatists, which included Chrysler and many other business interests as well as the UAW, the New

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Class of left-liberal cultural and media elites, and blacks led by Detroit Mayor Coleman Young, whose political machine controls the state's largest city. A traditional liberal on issues of spending and taxation who was touted by many UAW leaders as a potential presidential or vice-presidential candidate, Blanchard also projected a tough-on-crime image, boasting that he had never pardoned a criminal. But as liberalism reached its fiscal limits—Blanchard faced a \$1.1 billion deficit in his last year, forcing a 9-percent cut in spending in the final days of his administration—Blanchard could not keep his coalition together. He lost the Reagan Democrats—especially middle-class families struggling because of skyrocketing taxes. And he could not hold both Detroit and the New Class, which hates Mayor Young.

Last November Blanchard still ran strong in suburban Wayne County, the union towns of Flint and Saginaw, and the New Class strongholds of Lansing, the state capital, and Ann Arbor, home of the University of Michigan. But busy appealing to pro-choice Republicans, Blanchard forgot his blue-collar base in Downriver and Macomb County, where a ballot initiative mandating parental consent for minors seeking abortions passed in a landslide.

He was also abandoned by Young, who kept his machine home on election day. To court suburbanites and the New Class, Blanchard had snubbed Young by making sure the mayor wasn't invited on stage with the governor at the state Democratic Party convention last fall. In addition, many of Blanchard's programs were aimed at well-to-do suburbanites, and blacks thought Detroit wasn't getting its proper share of state attention and patronage. For example, more than 25 percent of enrollees in Blanchard's pet college-tuition-finance program, the Michigan Education Trust, resided in wealthy Oakland County. Bloomfield Hills, a Detroit suburb with

Engler's proposed budget would cut spending for 11 of Michigan's 19 state departments, while increasing funding for education.

the state's highest per capita income, had nearly as many MET enrollees as Detroit, which has a population 200 times greater.

Low voter turnout in Detroit helped Engler, whose coalition includes middle-class families like the Reagan Democrats; small businessmen and entrepreneurial baby-boomers; farmers and rural residents; and proliferators, who mounted a massive effort, even though Engler himself did not emphasize abortion as an issue in the campaign. Engler ran strongest in greater Grand Rapids, the state's second largest city, and Ottawa County in



UPI/Bettmann

Michigan politics was shaped for half a century by the savage beating of UAW organizers in 1937. Blue-collar voters identified with the victims and the Democratic Party as a protector against corporate power.

western Michigan. He also did well in rural areas and Oakland County.

But the key was in Downriver and Macomb County, where the biggest issue was property taxes. Michigan has the fourth highest property taxes in the United States, surpassed only by New Jersey, Oregon, and South Dakota. And virtually every community in Downriver and Macomb County levies property taxes higher than the state average. Engler promised to cut property taxes by 20 percent over three years—through changes in the formulas for state aid to school districts and sharp cutbacks in non-educational spending.

Engler's Audacious Budget

Engler's political success will ultimately depend on whether he can carry out this promise. In April he secured agreement of the Democratic majority in the House to freeze 1992 property tax assessments at this year's level. The Democrats also promised to allow a referendum in 1992 on whether to permanently limit future property tax hikes to the rate of inflation or 5 percent, whichever is lower. Engler vows to go beyond holding the line and to pursue actual cuts in assessments. He must secure some tax relief if he expects to be re-elected in 1994.

Meanwhile, Engler's budget proposal keeps his promise to redirect state priorities. He proposes to slash social services by 14 percent (with a 17-percent cut for AFDC), arguing that much of the money going to welfare would be better spent on education. His FY 1991-1992 proposal eliminates \$150 million in general assistance payments to able-bodied males and females. "They should go to work," Engler said of the estimated 100,000 welfare recipients affected by the action. He is targeting corporate welfare as well as programs for the poor. The largest cut (51 percent) is proposed for the Department of Commerce. Other large cuts are at the Labor (50 percent), Civil Rights (21 percent), and Agriculture (14 percent) departments. The last cut is significant given Engler's upbringing on a Michigan farm and his political



Greg Domagalski

Now conservative Republican Governor John Engler (left) is courting the state's middle class with his agenda of tax and spending cuts, and increased funding for education.

career representing agricultural districts in the state legislature.

Fifty-two percent of his proposed FY 1991–1992 budget is devoted to education, up from 42 percent a decade ago and 48 percent in FY 1990–1991. It also boosts K–12 funding by 4 percent, and increases spending for “at risk” preschool children 6 percent. Following in the footsteps of Governor Tommy Thompson in Wisconsin, Engler is proposing a Learnfare program that would reduce AFDC payments for parents whose children have too many unexcused absences from school. He hopes the policy will raise school attendance and graduation rates. He has been much less enthusiastic than Thompson in pushing for school choice, however—perhaps because families that fled Detroit and other Michigan cities to escape busing do not welcome the thought of inner-city teen-agers in their suburban schools. A strategy to overcome these race-based fears might be to link public and private school choice to further property-tax relief—giving suburban taxpayers an incentive to accept inner-city students in their schools.

Abolishing the Arts Council

Although Democratic control of the House makes it difficult for Engler to push through his legislative agenda, his power of executive order combined with Republican control of the Senate has given him a powerful weapon for reducing spending. Overturning an order requires a majority vote of both House and Senate within 60 days, and Engler signed 13 orders through April 25—all of them sustained. “It’s a remarkable tool for consolidating functions and eliminating superfluous commissions, of which Michigan has hundreds,” said attorney Bill Wittbeck, a legal advisor to the governor.

On May 1, the legislature failed to overturn Engler’s order abolishing the \$11 million Michigan Council for the Arts, despite artists’ protest demonstrations in Lans-

ing and a media barrage accusing Engler of philistinism. An article in the *Detroit News* decried the “persistence of an anti-intellectual attitude” in America and dismissed Engler as an “arts ogre...whose idea of high culture is a weekend with [his wife] at Boblo,” a Downriver amusement park favored by blue-collar families. The Council for the Arts has been the private bank for the cultural Left, its grants going to groups like “Dance for the Homeless,” “Inmates’ Creative Writing Program,” and “Latin Americans for Social and Economic Justice.” One \$5,000 grant was given to the anti-General Motors (and anti-Blanchard) movie *Roger and Me*. But on October 1, the council will go out of business. Engler is also planning to challenge an additional \$20 million to \$25 million the state gives separately to cultural organizations.

Several executive orders affect the Department of Commerce, which Blanchard and his predecessor, liberal Republican William Milliken, used to build constituencies among big business. One Engler order abolished the state’s Department of Licensing and Regulation, and transferred its few remaining functions to Commerce—saving almost \$25 million. A separate order abolished four gubernatorial councils, including Jobs and Economic Development. Another order abolished Commerce programs that gave state government a greater role in economic development.

Other executive orders have discontinued some of Blanchard’s pet projects. Engler axed a \$2.7-million grant to Chrysler to build a Technology Park in Oakland County. And he ended Blanchard’s Home Ownership Savings Trust (HOST), a savings plan designed to help first-time home-buyers come up with a down payment, which was marred by interest rates bearing no connection to the cost of money in the market.

Selling Downriver

Engler’s budget proposals have put him on the map as one of America’s most innovative and entrepreneurial governors. Getting them through the legislature, and selling them to an electorate that only narrowly elected him, is another matter—and one to which the governor and his staff have given insufficient attention. Engler’s first public meeting on his budget proposal was a disaster: it was held in Lapeer County, a UAW stronghold, and the evening news showed the governor being booed and heckled by hordes of anti-budget-cut demonstrators.

The biggest communications threat to Engler won’t come from the unions or the Coleman Young machine. It will come from the cultural Left, with its many friends in the media, which is sure to strike back at the governor who took away its patronage base. Engler and his staff do not seem to realize that opposition from the cultural Left can be turned into a political asset, particularly in swing areas such as Downriver and Macomb County. The way to frame the issue is to argue that once upon a time the Democratic Party appealed to the working man with a family. Today, the blue-collar spirit of the late Walter Reuther has been replaced by a New Class that is culturally at war with middle-class values.

Macomb County and Downriver are critical to Michigan politics. Their combined population is greater than Detroit or Oakland County. Both areas are key to


Republicans gaining control of the last Democratic bastion—the State House. Nowhere has the middle class moved faster and further to the right. But despite the importance of Downriver and Macomb County to Engler's election, he has not done what is necessary to consolidate his base there. Engler has visited Macomb County three times since his election. He has not been in Downriver. His administration does not include a public figure from either area. But both are natural places for him to sell his Taxpayers Agenda—building the case for budget cuts by tying them directly to lower property taxes and better schools.

A recent survey of 800 state residents by Public Sector Consultants, a moderate group, found that 41 percent approve of Engler's job performance, while 38 percent disapprove. The poll, the first non-partisan survey of Engler's performance since he took office, found only 33 percent approved of the legislature's performance. Eighty-one percent of survey participants supported Engler's proposal to eliminate General Assistance, while 59 percent favored reducing state arts funding.

Engler could build support by paying greater attention to the role of symbolism in politics, and by using his powers to shape the news in ways that advance his

agenda. Establishment of a Privatization Task Force or state-level Grace Commission would draw public attention to unessential programs the state cannot afford. Symbolic acts against the cultural Left, including use of

Engler has been much less enthusiastic than Wisconsin's Governor Thompson in pushing for school choice.

the governor's line-item veto against arts funding offensive to middle-class values, would strengthen his appeal among Reagan Democrats. And taking his Taxpayers Agenda to the families hit hardest by taxation, particularly in Downriver and Macomb County, would put pressure on the legislature to agree to his imaginative and creative but so far politically vulnerable proposals. 

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COLLABORATORS WITH THE LEFT

The Monstrosity of Big-Government Conservatism

M. E. BRADFORD

In Dallas, on November 30, 1990, Professor M. E. Bradford delivered the keynote address before the John Randolph Club, a national association of libertarians and conservatives whose goal, in the words of Professor Bradford, “is to reconstitute the Old Right as it stood in 1945 and to purge ‘big-government conservatives’ from the conservative intellectual movement.” We publish Professor Bradford’s speech as given.

According to your request and in keeping with the decorum of a first meeting of the John Randolph Club, I am here tonight to be admonitory, to urge a course of action. Furthermore, though conservatives and libertarians enjoy speaking of what is theoretically right and generic in the good regime, my discourse on this occasion is circumstantial, and, above all, political. For you have also asked me to assess the present situation of the American Right in a political landscape that acknowledges only the resurgent voices of interest group assertiveness, the pragmatism of reactive management styles, and a monstrosity well-labeled by our quondam “friend,” Fred Barnes of the *New Republic*, as “big-government conservatism”—a policy that will “help [people] get what they want.” William Bennett, almost our “representative” Republican and chairman of the Republican National Committee, argues in the same vein for a conservatism not hostile to the positive or unavoidable works of Leviathan, but ready to “move the ball.”

The emergence of this third force on the political scene, its success thus far in relegating what has been the characteristic rhetoric of the American Right to the pages of history, poses a challenge for most of us gathered here in the cause of limited government—the good old cause of our tradition, rooted in hostility to remote, arbitrary, and potentially malevolent authority—more serious than all of our theoretical differences put together. Of such squabbles I will have very little to say because at present we lack the luxury of time that would permit us to engage in leisurely deliberations concerning such questions. First we must recover our historic character and a position from which to speak—ground on which to stand—as related elements of a now dispersed Old Right. For after the derailed Reagan counterrevolu-

tion and anticonceptual vacuity of the Bush presidency, what we here maintain concerning the aberration of the teleocratic state is lamentably more timely than at any moment in our 200 years of national existence.

Lincoln’s Un-American Dream

Such a labor of self-restoration and collective refocusing begins in recollection that it is an American conservatism—not the conservatism of throne and altar or the modernist variety in which state and society merge in some purposive future—to which we would give rebirth. After-the-fact reflection may result in a systematic explanation of American political doctrine, or the labor of the historians may produce a source or prototype for every act and saying of the Fathers of the Republic. But neither procedure explains the version of limited government implicit in the U.S. Constitution and demanded of our judges, lawmakers, and other public servants by its language. The American regime to be restored to its late 18th-century splendor—always our source and destiny—is and forever shall be the result of a practice, a network of common experience and well-established institutions united in a common way, and of what Patrick Henry calls the “genius of the people,” welling up out of their collective memory of how they had once been ordered to submit to a remote power ready to govern them (if they proved difficult) “in all cases whatsoever.”

Against such a sovereign, our ancestors by blood (or adoption) had waged war, risked their lives: against such ostensible benevolence and justice-suspending law, such tyranny hidden under a mask of good intentions and patriarchal concern. Contrary to High Federalist mythology, their paradigm in such recalcitrance was not a government that, in the language of that great Federalist/Whig, Abraham Lincoln, sets out to do for “a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or cannot do, so well, for themselves—in their separate and individual capacities.” Nor should it have been—given the logic of their experience.


M. E. BRADFORD, *professor of English at the University of Dallas, is author of A Better Guide than Reason, an interpretation of the thought of the Founders.*

As I wrote a few years ago, “The dream of the Good Authority which corrects our disposition to irreligion or compels us to respect in others an ability to reason and seek the good is a heady dream. But it is not an American dream.” [*Professor Bradford has long argued that, in contrast to much of the European Right, American conservatism does not permit the state to enforce or promote virtue.—ed.*]

Once our countrymen look closely at Lincoln’s aphorism or at any of a thousand equivalent effusions—texts that embody, “for our own good,” a design upon our liberties—they should remember that the historic American position is something else, less ambitious in its official purposes. Our primary task, the ground of all else that we attempt, is to assist them in moving to this realization: to encourage and (in the rhetorical sense) compel all those who still honor their peculiarly American heritage to see that they cannot live peacefully under a government so powerful and full of good intentions without selling away their birthright in the prescription and achievement of the American Revolution. Libertarians might prefer, I realize, to speak of this enterprise in the language of principle. However, most of the objectives that they affirm are as well-served for the moment as they can be by the rhetorical simplicity that I recommend. It is a matter of political judgment to say that we should put aside other concerns to emphasize at every opportunity our opposition to the incompetent state and the “politics of compassion” with the speech of historic liberties and inherited identities. Yet if we are to forestall such stalwarts as Secretary Bennett, Congressman Gingrich, Secretary Kemp, and the erudite George Will in the intellectual combats of the present decade, we are going to find it necessary to stand on very high ground.

The Subversion of Reaganism

All of which brings me to venture something diagnostic concerning our adversaries in the case that we must plead. It is still difficult to explain how the campaign to elect Ronald Reagan of California to the presidency of the United States resulted in the near disappearance of the legitimate American Right from the larger conversation of American politics. The language of the three Reagan campaigns was, to be sure, not responsible for this change, and what Reagan as president said was rarely its source. His construction of our nation’s problems is summarized in the familiar formula that “government is not the solution but the problem.” So the trouble came somehow from the actual process of government under restraint by a Congress either half or altogether hostile, by way of a national press or media coverage that refused to treat the Reagan administration as a legitimate government (that is, except where it failed to carry out its announced conservative objectives), and from those servants of President Reagan who never agreed with his formula. “Big-government conservatism” is the institutionalization of the deadlock at the heart of the Reagan Revolution into a permanent feature of American politics, and therefore at bottom is a servile teaching—defeatist in both origin and consequences, quiescent and (with respect to the conservative agenda) cowardly.



The Bettmann Archive

Lincoln was no conservative when he said that government should do for “a community of people whatever they need to have done, but cannot do at all, or cannot do, so well, for themselves—in their separate and individual capacities.”

To quote once more the astute William Bennett, “If you couldn’t get rid of substantial portions of government with the conservative revolution led by Ronald Reagan, you are probably not going to do it with anybody.” As if the Reagan administration had really tried to effect counterrevolution! As if some of its architects had not subverted the elements of counterrevolution that were possible under its authority! As if we had enjoyed a genuine conservative revolution in 1980, with the House of Representatives still in Democratic hands!

In an interview in *Policy Review*, Bennett says further: “Some amount of government is going to be with us in the modern state whether we like it or not.” Which is a way of saying that he has enjoyed the experience of governing; and despite the demurrals concerning any new additions to the power of the states, he thinks more readily of how “programs will be put in place” and “action will be taken.” And Secretary Kemp speaks more readily of “energy” or “activism” or “compassion” than of freedom as a precondition of virtue in responsible men and women.

Teleocratic Redefinition

Bennett praises admirable government programs that promote conservative values, suggesting that good ends can go some distance in rationalizing questionable means, and remarks impatiently on foolish conservatives who make suspicion of government “into an inflexible article of faith.” To depict as providential, beyond the reach of popular outrage or political ingenuity, that version of the state that entails what Michael Oakeshott

calls the “teleocratic principle,” which exists not to embody a proven way but to effect change, is to redefine the meaning of American conservatism without defending or explaining that redefinition—making political failure and weakness of the will into a metaphysical profundity, a facet of Being itself. But Bennett is never so foolish as to maintain “that government is best that does the most for people”—Kemp’s formula, which reaches beyond even the nonsense of Abraham Lincoln. To which that athletic sage adds in clarification, “Just being a minimalist is not being consistent with a more activist, programmatic model.” Neither is Bennett so thoughtless as to write a book that insists, with all the requisite pomposity, that “if conservatism is to engage itself with the way we live now, it must address government’s graver purposes with an affirmative doctrine of the welfare state” (George Will in *Statecraft as Soulcraft*).

Most of big-government conservatism has no central or essential component, and exhibits only a modest capacity for rationalizing its preferences in matters of policy. To put a check upon such pusillanimous time-serving all that has been needed is the determination to report its works and sayings accurately and with reference

Equality achieved is the mainspring, the central teaching of the Left’s secular theology.

to the originals whose example they ignore—and to do so even when President Bush is the offending party: to register in public the shock and anger that come of apostasy pretending to be the church. While breath is in us, we must make plain that we will never accept as a *fait accompli* a situation that at any time might be overturned—especially with the growing anger of the American people respecting taxes and public debt.

Egalitarian Collaborators

I might now offer a catalogue of the vulnerabilities of the big-government conservatives, one that would run the gamut of the well-intentioned legislation that they failed to resist and other needed laws that they neglected to introduce. Or I could emphasize how commitment to the preoccupations of any number of interest groups or voting blocks is not the same as support for the common good—may indeed be the opposite. But there is no scope here for such detail. And besides, it would be misleading, since one attitude of the contemporary Left tells its entire story: an attitude that is at the heart of what is wrong with the big-government conservatives as opportunistic collaborators with the Left. What I refer to here is egalitarianism, the true opiate of the masses in our time. It was not, however, a poison visible in the politics of our

Fathers, even in the period of the war between the states. In the Virginia ratification convention of 1788 James Madison observed that our Constitution embodied few objectives and created only a few powers, “most of them external.” To what Madison said, Federalist spokesmen in the nation-making assemblies of other states added assurance that all powers not expressly granted to the new government were reserved to the states and their citizens. Furthermore, they promised to be energetic in enforcing that limitation. Genuine conservatives on these shores, in all of their various free social combinations, come always under the protective shadow of this promise, one that leaves all questions of personal rights to regulation at the state and local level. For the alternative, however intended, can be only tyranny.

A rigorous fidelity in sustaining these familiar premises and in observing the letter of the original Constitution and Bill of Rights, with no concept of modifying circumstances apart from serious efforts to amend, is in our inheritance, central to a limited-government conservatism. I see at the very core of the new statist alternative emanating from Washington, D.C., an attenuation of that commitment/concern—or rather, an effort to foster such an attenuation. Among our erstwhile allies who listen to Bennett, Kemp, Gingrich, and Will the cause of that shift away from an anti-egalitarian position has been their inability to understand properly the Declaration of Independence, the 14th Amendment, and the narrow meaning of equality before the law in those few matters covered by it that belong as components of the American political tradition. [*Professor Bradford has argued that the 14th Amendment guarantees to Americans of all races the rights of federal citizenship protected under the Civil Rights Act of 1866—the protection of property, enforcement of contracts, the right to appear in court—but cannot be used as a basis for restraining private discrimination.—ed.*] Linked to that confusion is an attendant inability to resist the ideological passion of the Left on precisely these issues. For equality achieved is the mainspring, the central teaching of the Left’s secular theology, or the kind of equality of opportunity that insists on the right results in every contest. The Left realizes that so long as the most influential conservatives don’t reject its dogmatics on that subject it must win out in the end.

Fortify and Dig In

It is therefore no marvel that when confronted with the negative to their views on equality much of the Left explodes in rage, behaving like persons seriously threatened as never before. Big-government conservatives either lack the conviction and understanding to resist such pressure, or they quietly agree with the common enemy on this issue, allow him to define what non-liberals may believe, and are not about to answer his calumny while rejecting his favorite absolute. A warning against commitment in American politics to anything more than our effort to have a law with limited scope to be the same for all our countrymen who stand before it has been the most important theme of both my academic and political careers. My views of the status of equality as part of the American value system have not changed

in 30 years. And will not. For in 1990, I do not believe that I have been mistaken about where to fortify and dig in—where to give battle and hold the line. For conservatives, however they may feel about the metaphysical equality of men or about a colorblind equality of opportunity, to advocate a policy of social or economic engineering that is not permitted under limited government is to disappear from the ranks of the Right.

We here intend otherwise. Hence we must thunder against equality produced and required by the power of the state, and live to confront big-government conservatives at the point of their most serious compromise with ordered liberty. With all the energy at our command and with endless repetition, we must make philippic and jeremiad, expose the error and draw a line, regardless of happy associations in bygone days with certain mild egalitarians. For by maintaining that position on constitutional morality and the plural doctrine that the equality of the Declaration is the equality of peoples [*as distinct from the equality of individuals—ed.*], we resist folly not only in the fever swamps of civil rights but also in educational and cultural policy. On forced equality Americans are not of several minds. The Left and big-government conservatives see in the Constitution as informed by the Declaration an engine for facilitating all kinds of government discipline, and for making broad steps toward the misty mountains of *égalité*. If we begin our conservatism by putting up a picture of Dr. King and with three cheers for busing and the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, the rest of our labor will be beside the point. In avoiding such confusion and insisting on the old view of what the Constitution allows we will put out a signal not to be ignored. And in the ensuing conflict we can make our point on a wider range of subjects—our general view of American government and the protection of everyone's liberties. Certainly with this issue opened, fur will fly.

Great Expectations


In making war on the big-government conservatives we not only deal with our most immediate tactical problem but also give a momentum to resolving and reconciling ourselves as a company in our irreducible multiplicity. A fierce struggle joined together in restoring limited-government conservatism to its rightful place as the recognized representative opinion of the American Right, in behalf of our largest objectives, provides an optimistic ground for the resolution of lesser but nagging differences. For out of common enemies and common projects we must, if our cooperation is to grow, work outward—as do people who have acquired the habit of listening well to one another, who will forfeit only a little amity to irritations brought on by ordinary inattention and otherness.

None of this confrontation sounds very pleasant. The situation that I have described as producing the big-government conservatives is far along in its development. But given the rich inheritance undergirding our position, we have no reason to accommodate ambitious, unprincipled men, to slip away into the darkness with

no noise. For to speak of the beginnings of statist conservatism is to take note of the illegitimacy of its claim to represent anything central and vital in the history of the American Right and of its smug assumption of superiority and fashionable respectability, heard both in Secretary Kemp's address for *National Review's* 35th anniversary dinner, and in his frequent adversions to the

It is an American conservatism—not the conservatism of throne and altar or the modernist variety in which state and society merge in some purposive future—to which we would give rebirth.

rights of man: an assumption that his brand of conservatism has special claims upon the future of our politics. Concerning these diluted conservatives I say that it is time to spit in their eye, and to shape a rationale for 1992 that, under certain circumstances, could develop into a political effort from outside the Republican Party—certainly outside of what others have recently made of it.

Our troubles with each other as conservatives and libertarians stand a better chance of being resolved if we observe an order of priorities and focus, with renewed joy at freedom from contamination by pragmatists, on breaking away from habits we got while “our man” was in the White House. When next in power we must arrive in Washington ready to govern, and must do better at governing in a more rigorous, relentless spirit. This time no one can tell us that it cannot be done. President Reagan gave us an answer to that old commonplace about electing conservatives. What must be attempted now is to hold power without trying to make our enemies happy. They have had their way long enough, even when it was “our turn,” and could, I believe, profit from a little healthy disappointment. But first comes work, fortunately of the kind we know best: work both in “selling” and in organization. No cowards or temporaries will join with us in our labors, and no mad *philosophes*, which will be a welcome change in circumstances for most of us. But remember what it cost John Randolph of Roanoke to be most of the time politically correct about the needs of his country. The task, we must believe, is an end in itself; and we need not think of what its completion will cost us in the immediate future. 

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

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LETTERS

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, Steve Bezanson, Phyllis Schlafly, Nicholas Davidson, Celeste Colgan, Catharine R. Stimpson, Cecilia Royals, Heidi L. Brennan, Connie Marshner, Nancy R. Pearcey, Dale O'Leary, Karen I. Vaughn, Daniel O. Graham, James T. Hackett, Donald F. Anderson, Ernest van den Haag, Stephen Moore, Lewis L. Gould, Andrew Gray

Conservative Feminism and Economic Reality

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten paints a seductive picture of the conservative feminist who, striving for balance in everything, cultivates her own garden and character, resists identification as a victim, and rejects the temptation to blame all her woes on "the system." In "What Do Women Want? A Conservative Feminist Manifesto" (Spring 1991), Ms. Kersten argues that women "have largely won their battle for equality before the law," although she allows that divorce and child-support legislation still require attention. But the main battle concerns the cultivation of responsible behavior. The great threats to women's well-being lie in crime, cultural degradation, sex without commitment, and the feminization of poverty. This battle, above all, demands moral fortitude, prudence, and the quest for knowledge.

Ms. Kersten has traced a model of the good citizen in feminine guise, appropriating for women many of the virtues previously reserved for men but insisting that they must be adapted to traditional female roles. There can be no doubt that our society would benefit from large doses of loving and enlightened child-rearing, not mention intelligent and responsible volunteer labor. Such was the model of the liberal bourgeoisie at its most generous, and I frankly doubt that civilization has produced anything more attractive.

There is but one small problem. Who is to pay the bill? Notwithstand-

ing her evocation of the feminization of poverty, and her genuine compassion for the fate of economically disadvantaged women, Ms. Kersten falls strangely silent on the problem of women's economic vulnerability in particular and the (widening) economic inequality of our society in general. She glowingly describes her own life as mother and volunteer worker. But how many women enjoy those opportunities? How many women (even middle-class women) can afford to treat marriage and motherhood as a career?

A Privileged Life-style

There can be no doubt that the women's movement has, however inadvertently, fostered dangerous tendencies toward statism and political correctness. There can also be no doubt that civil society has woefully failed to provide for women's needs. Ms. Kersten evokes the ideal of balance, yet ends by supporting a return to the status quo ante. The economic realities of our advanced capitalist society foreclose that return, except perhaps for the extremely privileged. Might we not try for balance in public as well as private matters? Might we not treat health care, day-care, benefits for part-time workers, and related issues as matters of pressing national concern and turn our imaginations to devising models of public support that strengthen local communities rather than reinforcing centralization? Might we not combine lady-bountiful moral exhortation with enlightened public policies that recognize our priorities and interdependence?

Make no mistake. I warmly wel-

come Ms. Kersten's intervention. The time for the elaboration of a conservative feminist position is long overdue. But rather than providing the last word, her intervention should be seen as opening a healthy debate. I only hope that other feminists will embrace the discussion—and the challenge—she has offered.

Elizabeth Fox-Genovese
Director of Women's Studies
Emory University
Atlanta, GA

Feminism and Conservatism Incompatible

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten wants to have it both ways. She tells us that she shares the feminist's "boldness in pursuit of reform" and the conservative's "respect for fundamental social values and institutions, which embody the collective wisdom of generations." But if our "fundamental social values and institutions" do in fact "embody the collective wisdom of generations," then there is no need to reform them. Ms. Kersten can avoid the contradiction only by breaking completely with feminism as it exists today and arguing that the conservative feminist seeks to reform only certain things that are peripheral to our "fundamental social values and institutions." She does not do this.

Ms. Kersten tells us that she favors "justice and equality," but feminist ideas of equality are incompatible with our traditional notion of justice, which requires that equals be treated equally and unequals be treated unequally.

Victim without a Cause

Ms. Kersten also tells us that “the word victim does not trip easily off [the conservative feminist’s] tongue.” Maybe so, but the *concept* of victim pours off Ms. Kersten’s tongue in a mighty torrent. She asserts as a central premise “that women have historically suffered from injustice, and continue to do so today.” This charge is made repeatedly in one form or another. Ms. Kersten buttresses the argument with the oft-asserted but never

(morally and factually) not because of certain excesses that are associated with them, but because their fundamental premises lead societies that embrace them inevitably toward those excesses.

Marxism and feminism, along with national socialism (racialism) and fascism, are part of a 19th-century intellectual paradigm that has found its full expression in the tyrannies of the 20th century. This paradigm holds that the masses of humanity, like a secular god, are the

ing and deficits, larger bureaucracies, and less individual liberty.

The goal was noble, but wholly futile. New Deal liberals were successful in their theft, and their pals in the media accorded them proprietary interest in the word liberal.

As the years went on, conservatives gradually gave up their effort to reclaim the word. It became increasingly clear that “liberal” meant being liberal with other people’s money and other men’s wives. The *coup de grace* to the word liberal was dealt by Michael Dukakis in the 1988 presidential campaign. Hardly anybody in public life wants to be called a liberal any more.

Now *Policy Review* has published a tedious 12-page tome by a woman who wants to recapture the word “feminism” from the feminists who have been using it as their favorite word ever since “women’s libbers” became a no-no because it evokes images of bra-burning demonstrators.

There were classical feminists in previous centuries, but the current flock of feminists cannot trace their lineage to them. The Big Mama of modern feminism is Simone de Beauvoir, who called marriage “an obscene bourgeois institution” and told Betty Friedan, “No woman should be authorized to stay home and raise her children.”

One really cannot discuss feminism without coming to terms with de Beauvoir and feminists Betty Friedan, Kate Millett, Germaine Greer, Gloria Steinem, Molly Yard, and Eleanor Smeal. These are spokespersons for a movement that promotes divorce on demand, abortion on demand, and lesbian rights, and that engages in public tantrums against Ronald Reagan, George Bush, Robert Bork, and David Souter.

Even *Time* magazine reported last fall, in a special issue on women, “The feminist label is viewed with disdain and alarm; the name of Gloria Steinem is uttered as an epithet.”

So why would any respectable conservative want to be called a feminist? Adding a prefix such as “classical” or “conservative” simply cannot erase the stigma of the word.

How many women (even middle-class women) can afford to treat marriage and motherhood as a career?

—Elizabeth Fox-Genovese

verified feminist “facts” that women historically have not received equal pay for equal work and that “a host of artificial barriers have been added to women’s inability to realize their human potential in ways that have been open to their male counterparts.” Nevertheless, Ms. Kersten would have us believe that such rank injustice can be corrected without substantially changing American mores and institutions. She can’t have it both ways—either the oppression of women is real, necessitating a reconceptualization of the social roles of men and women and the restructuring of such fundamental institutions as the family, or the oppression of women is not real, implying that no concessions should be made to feminism.

Is Conservative Marxism Next?

The plain truth is that radical feminism is a redundancy and conservative feminism is a contradiction in terms, like conservative Marxism. Suppose your magazine had received an article asserting that despite the continuing exploitation of labor by capital, we could still hope to bring about a conservative Marxism that seeks to overthrow this injustice while maintaining such traditional American values as free enterprise and private property. Would you have accepted it?

Marxism and feminism are wrong

proper objects of our devotion and that history can only be understood as the confrontation between the oppressed and their oppressors.

This view of history begins not with a positive notion of justice, and the question of how such justice is to be achieved; rather, it begins with a personal and subjective feeling of injustice and asks, “How are the perpetrators of injustice to be destroyed?”

If conservatives join liberals in seeing oppression where it does not exist, they will inevitably, sooner or later, join liberals in being unable to see oppression when it stares them in the face.

Steve Bezanson
Austin, TX

Feminism Is Dead

Dear Sir:

In the years immediately following World War II, a common goal among the few conservative publications that then existed was the rehabilitation of the word “liberal”—to “take it back” from the FDR New Dealers who had stolen the word from the classical liberals. Indeed, classical liberalism of the 19th century stood for individual liberty against government, whereas the New Deal “liberals” stood for big government, higher federal spend-

“Feminism” today is a word as malodorous as “liberal.” Conservatives should use both as epithets.

Phyllis Schlafly
President
Eagle Forum
Alton, IL

Feminism Too Exclusive

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten’s “What Do Women Want? A Conservative Feminist Manifesto” will usefully bring home to many people that not all conservatives are antifeminist.

Conservative feminism is a fact. Anyone who has been active in the conservative movement can easily think of at least a few people to whom this expression applies.


That conservative feminism exists does not mean that it is intellectually coherent. The word “conservatism” in its modern sense seems to have been invented by Louis de Bonald, co-editor with Chateaubriand of the influential journal *Le Conservateur* (“The Conservative”) in the early 19th century. One of de Bonald’s key writings, *On Divorce*, begins with this statement: “It is a fertile source of error, when treating a question relative to society, to consider it by itself, with no *relationship* to other questions, because society itself is only a group of relationships.”

Conservative feminism, like any form of feminism, falls squarely into this trap. Women do not exist—in the sense that women have no existence outside of society. (Naturally, this is equally true of men and children.) There are no women’s issues; there are only social issues. To analyze any social question in terms of one sex or age group is a fundamental epistemological error. Carried into practice, this error, rather than benefitting that group, tends to subvert the relationships that not only make life meaningful but that actually constitute society.

Thus, an inescapable problem with any feminism is that it is a woman-centered perspective. Because women depend on society, feminism supports women in the same sense that socialism supports the working class. Just as workers’ well-being depends on employers’, women’s well-being depends on

men’s and children’s. For feminism to become a balanced point of view, it would have to reinstate the perspectives of men and children—and give them equal weight relative to the perspectives of women.

But even this would not be enough, according to de Bonald’s insight. Rather than analyzing society in terms of individuals, we should analyze society in terms of relationships—for instance, those of husband to wife, father to son, and grandmother to granddaughter. Such a position cannot reasonably



be called feminism—unless the word “feminism” is redefined to the point of emptying it of content, so that a “feminist” becomes simply a “well-meaning person.” But then why attribute good intentions to yin and deny them to yang?

These problems cannot be evaded by redefining conservatism as classical liberalism. Classical liberalism knows nothing higher than liberty and equality—despite the fact that piety, virtue, duty, honor, nature, and reason could also enter claims of preeminence. The classical liberal must accept feminism in its essentials, since his apotheosis of liberty and equality leads him to conclude that women

are oppressed in traditional society, and hence have a particular claim to victimization. Having of necessity accepted feminism, the classical liberal is thrust squarely into the atomized vision outlined above. What the classical liberal cannot acknowledge and still remain a liberal is that the inequalities of natural society reflect the mutual sacrifice of both sexes to the human race, and are consequently an essential source of dignity rather than an infringement of it.

Conservative feminists will be with us for years to come. I also suspect that someone as obviously intelligent and womanly as Katherine Kersten will not long choose to be counted among them.

Nicholas Davidson
Author,
The Failure of Feminism
New York, NY

The Importance of Being Learned

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten’s noble effort to lay out the tenets of conservative feminism deserves praise and thoughtful response. Although it may be a while before many are comfortable with the phrase “conservative feminism,” Ms. Kersten’s article says plainly that it’s all right to be a woman who wishes to have a firm hold on her own destiny, and at the same time be a woman who sees wisdom in conservative policies. In her exploration of how individualism and traditionalism are reconcilable, she has staked out important territory.

Imparting Western Values

In reading Ms. Kersten’s concerns with crime, cultural degradation, sex without commitment, and the feminization of poverty, however, one senses that the main issue is yet unspoken. If, as Ms. Kersten maintains, the values of the Western tradition have been responsible for the progress made so far toward women’s individual freedom, a reader is surprised that she does not identify elementary and secondary education as a main concern of conservative feminists. The teaching, learning, discussion, and consideration of history, literature,

philosophy, and political theory should be foremost on the list of interests.

Our schoolchildren need ready access to myriad human experiences. They need knowledge of significant ideas and their consequences. Understanding the institutions, ideas, events, and human accomplishments—as well as mistakes and failures—of Western Europe and North America is the basis for the continued amelioration of the condition of women. Understanding other civilizations and cultures is equally critical for an appreciation of the context of women's

ideal of manliness; and a "political and social agenda" that, *inter alia*, attacks crime, the cultural degradation of women, and the feminization of poverty.

However, the essay is also replete with inconsistencies, errors, and omissions.

First, the term "conservative feminism" is not new. The sociologist Judith Stacey used it in 1983 as a rubric for the writings of Alice Rossi, Betty Friedan, and Jean Bethke Elshtain. Ms. Kersten's apparent ignorance of this is perhaps most important as a symptom of her larger misreadings of feminism. Not

own happiness." Legitimately, like feminists of every stripe, she praises self-reliance. However, her essay strips social context away from the act of making choices. This is ironic for a piece that declares that "the conservative feminist knows that it is impossible to forge an identity for herself outside a social context." A woman's socioeconomic position, which today includes her class and race, helps to determine both the meaning of choice and the alternatives that actually seem available to her. Moreover, Ms. Kersten evades the issues of abortion (except for an uncharacteristically snide crack or two) and of sexual preference. Is Ms. Kersten willing to extend choice to the act of giving birth? To the act of making a loving commitment to someone of the same sex?

Market Utopianism

Probably I am a greater utopian than Ms. Kersten. I also believe that utopian narratives perform a function similar to that of the heroic narratives she praises, *i.e.*, they give people an enriched sense of possibility. However, Ms. Kersten's unqualified praise of the capitalist system as the launching pad for women's moves toward "social equality and economic independence" swerves toward utopian dreaming. Arguably, capitalism is a greater engine of general equality than any other system. However, as such historians as Martha Howell or Lenore Davidoff and Catherine Hall have shown, the relationships between the development of modern capitalism and gender equality are complex and contradictory. Indeed, this development may have decreased the economic strength of one class of women and created some inequities of its own. I also wonder how women working in a sub-contractor's sweatshop in a Third-World country might respond to Ms. Kersten's declarations.

In brief, like other tracts, "What Do Women Want?" needs to be "more prudent in...[its] expectations, [more] tireless in...[its] quest for knowledge..." especially if it is to be the basis of policy.

Catharine R. Stimpson

Dean of the Graduate School
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ

Understanding the institutions, ideas, events, and human accomplishments—as well as mistakes and failures—of Western Europe and North America is the basis for the continued amelioration of the condition of women.

—Celeste Colgan

lives. Broad-based, rigorous elementary and secondary education for all Americans, then, is of utmost concern for women.

Celeste Colgan

National Endowment for the
Humanities
Washington, DC

Need for Social Context

Dear Sir:

I respond to Katherine Kersten's "What Do Women Want? A Conservative Feminist Manifesto" with respect and dismay.

The essay is thoughtful and principled. Although it emerges from the same cultural moment as the *Good Housekeeping* advertisements that feature the "New Traditionalist" woman, it must be read far more seriously than they. I agree with many of Kersten's positions: the belief in uniform standards of "justice and equality"; the commitment to a balance for both men and women between self-fulfillment and communal obligations; a particular

only is "classical feminism" a more complex matter than her essay allows. Not only does she misrepresent many positions and conditions, *e.g.*, her assertion that women's studies programs do not investigate "the causes and consequences of divorce and the realities of balancing a family and career." The 1970s and 1980s were also a period of great ferment in feminist theory, practice, and women's studies programs. Yet too often Ms. Kersten erases the differences within and among them, a strategy that permits her to contrast a vicious, misguided feminism against a virtuous, enlightened conservative feminism. An unfortunate parallel is her frequent erasure of the differences among women. Such a statement as "Until recently, women could not...live independent of the authority of father or husband" is at best absurd as a description of African-American slave women.

Limits on Choice

Second, Ms. Kersten wants every woman to be the "architect of her

Biology Is Destiny

Dear Sir:

There is no surer sign that feminism has fallen on very hard times indeed than the current proliferation of newly emerging "women's movements." Once the consequences of radical feminism became apparent to most women, they turned their backs on it and are now floundering to find a new philosophical framework that will guarantee them happiness and so-called equality and justice. The latest entry in this endeavor is called "conservative feminism" as laid out by Katherine Kersten. This philosophy proposes to be a synthesis of conservative and feminist principles that will help women make wise choices in pursuit of happiness.

Ms. Kersten's philosophy of conservative feminism suffers from a serious problem, which it shares with other feminist philosophies: some of its premises are in error. Ms. Kersten begins by asking what will make women happy and then attempts to



construct a philosophical framework around incorrect answers. Her argument runs something like this: Since men and women share the same human nature, and since the differences between them are irrelevant in most spheres of life, then whatever makes men happy will make women happy. Thus women must be able to achieve what men

are able to achieve. Hence, "uniform standards of equality and justice" for both sexes becomes one of the tenets of conservative feminism.

The differences between men and women are not irrelevant in most spheres of life. Ms. Kersten runs the risk of trivializing the radical awareness that the human person has of his corporality and his

of her noble destiny. Her femininity is not only evidence of her destiny of mutual self-giving and enrichment with man but also of her being entrusted to safeguard and respect the human person. To disparage a woman's sexuality as merely a source of pleasure and useful for the survival of the species but otherwise irrelevant and in need of control is

Ms. Kersten's unqualified praise of the capitalist system as the launching pad for women's moves toward "social equality and economic independence" swerves toward utopian dreaming.

—Catharine R. Stimpson

sexuality; and she is in danger of discarding the only tangible empirical basis for understanding the human person, *i.e.*, his corporality.

No philosophy can propose to make a woman happy if it has not determined what a woman is. To suggest, as Ms. Kersten does, that for all relevant purposes a woman is the same as a man is not only to misunderstand woman but to continue the age-old problem of defining her in terms of man. Woman will find happiness insofar as she acts in harmony with and is not doing battle with her underlying nature.

Ms. Kersten's logical conclusions can lead us to conditions that are not only a nuisance but repugnant—for instance, unisex public bathrooms and women in combat. Another logical extension of this idea proposes maternity leave for fathers when it is the woman's body that needs healing, and it is her breasts that swell with milk. Would a woman no longer have the right to engage in purely maternal activities such as nursing her child or even having children since these activities would render her less available for outside work than a man? Already there is evidence of subtle and not-so-subtle coerced infertility, sterility, and abortion.

Why such flight from a woman's biology? A woman's biology is a sign

to despise woman. No philosophy that leads woman to scorn her biological nature can claim to understand or respect woman, much less promote her happiness.

Or take Ms. Kersten's notion that we should each be judged on the basis of our individual accomplishments. What of the aged, the handicapped, the infant, the oppressed, those who have no array of merits to display in order to be given value? Do we not want to consider that the human being has a dignity and is due respect regardless of his human accomplishments, that this dignity is inalienable and unconditional, and that the human person is endowed with it simply by virtue of being a human being?

Although she gave much credit to the vocation of child-rearing, her considerations were within the framework of duties, jobs, and role-playing. She does not seem to recognize the fundamental essence of the family. Ms. Kersten encourages behavior that would stabilize and strengthen the traditional family because she believes it can rescue women out of poverty. The fact is that many families cannot rescue the woman, or for that matter the man or child out of poverty. Yet the family must be preserved because it is only the family—not society—that can rescue the human person from

anonymity. It is the family that knows the person's name, knows who he is, and expends the energies to foster his development and enrich his life.

Ms. Kersten needs to reconsider whether she is serving either man or woman by her overemphasis on the universality of human nature. We suggest that mankind is best served when neither the similarities nor the differences are exaggerated but when both are given their full and equal importance. Not sacrificing one for the other while recognizing the respect for the differences leads to the affirmation of the inalienable dignity of each person.

Ms. Kersten proposes many worthy notions for women to consider, among them: citizenship entails

interests of women. However, identifying a new model of feminism, and entitling it a "conservative feminist manifesto," may not be sufficient to successfully open up the debate on feminism or to increase women's participation in it.

While many American women express reservations and even anger about contemporary feminism, they are often unsure of how to strike a balance between appreciation of some aspects of the women's movement and rejection of its current principles and actions. Perhaps this is because any discussion of women's issues tends to assume the cultural myth that there has been one unified women's movement that has consistently articulated the concerns and needs of most women, and that

identities and handicap their various capacities by embracing motherhood as a significant life force. Their favorite social solution, to be reinforced by political mandate, is to redirect the natural desire of women to nurture into an androgynous parenting ideal for women and men. Argument between feminists is not about the rightness of androgyny, but whether their new model for human behavior should be more male or female in character.

Since women of all political views, from the most conservative to the most liberal, are inclined to recognize this and other flaws of feminism, it is important not to label the debate about feminism as one between conservatives and liberals. American women hold views across the political spectrum. However, the satisfaction of their goals and values will be best met when their political participation, regardless of partisanship, becomes unchained from the yoke of contemporary feminism.

For this reason, I would not select "conservative feminist manifesto" as a description for a new women's movement agenda. Despite my concerns about her choice of labels, however, I heartily applaud Ms. Kersten's thoughtful challenge to the status quo of the women's movement. I hope that she pursues leadership in the public discussion and that others will join her in rethinking and changing our prevailing cultural values regarding women, men, family, and their roles in a democratic society.

Heidi L. Brennan
Co-Director
Mothers at Home
Merrifield, VA

Women's status cannot be enhanced, nor can women's dignity be preserved, in the absence of sexual morality. And sexual morality must be a societal, not merely a private, matter.

—Connie Marshner

responsibility, it is better to do what is right than what is convenient, and it is of vital importance to serve and preserve the community our children will inherit. We encourage her to continue her examination of the changing role of women in today's society, but urge her to rethink the philosophical construct from which these ideas emerge.

Cecilia Royals
President

The National Institute of
Womanhood
Washington, DC

Ignorance of Feminism's Flaws Is Fatal

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten has bravely stepped forward to add her voice to those of others who have challenged contemporary feminist orthodoxy and its perverse dominance of any discussion of the political and social

it alone has been uniquely responsible for improvements made in the lives of women.

I have been struck by how little women know of the history of the women's movement and how unaware they are about the continuing hostility of radical feminists to their life choices and personal beliefs.

Women need to become objectively informed about feminism in order to challenge or change it. Unfortunately, they are not likely to develop a broad understanding in today's women's studies programs (as Ms. Kersten points out), which remain perverse in their dogma.

Mother-Hate

Perhaps the fatal flaw in contemporary feminism is its insistent denial and denigration of the most transforming experience in a woman's life—motherhood. Too many feminists insist on viewing this role as dangerous—they seem to believe that women submerge their

Need to Legislate Sexual Morality

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten's article is an example of the power of educated common sense to overcome educated non-sense: the former is in harmony with human nature, the latter is controlled by ideology; the former is what she calls "conservative feminism," the latter is what I call "macho feminism."

As for myself, I am not comfortable with the moniker of "conserva-

tive feminist,” mainly because my first reaction to the term was to assume that it implied a contemporary feminism with respect to human relationships, but with the veneer of free-market economics—an unsavory combination. In 1982, I used a term to describe essentially what Ms. Kersten is describing today: that term was “new traditional woman.”

There is one fundamental principle at which Ms. Kersten only hinted. Women’s status cannot be enhanced, nor can women’s dignity be preserved, in the absence of sexual morality. And sexual morality must be a societal, not merely a private, matter.

Ms. Kersten’s sentence, “Reform is essential...in laws that affect family life,” is true, but incomplete. The continuation of the thought must be that reform is essential in laws that affect sexual life. I say this with full realization that laws cannot compel morality, but in the firm conviction that since private acts do have public consequences, laws must punish immorality. Of course, society must want to punish immorality. The tragedy is that our current culture prefers to enshrine it.

Thanks to clear thinking like Ms. Kersten’s, the old, futile debate about “what is morality?,” which paralyzed our society for generations, can be put on the shelf with the old, futile arguments about how many angels fit on the head of a pin. What Ms. Kersten has shown, and others are showing, is that, for purposes of laws governing sexuality and the family, immorality is that which destroys, demeans, and degrades women and children. Should that not be enough of a basis on which to write laws to protect them?

Connie Marshner

Author,
Can Motherhood Survive?
Gaithersburg, MD

Human Nature Must Be Defined

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten says that women need a philosophical framework, but she offers little of the kind. She appeals to “universal human nature” as the basis for women’s rights,

arguing that it “confers on all human beings certain natural and inalienable rights.” But does a bare appeal to human nature really form the basis for rights? I submit that it does not. Human nature must first be defined before one can derive its proper duties and privileges, and definitions vary depending upon philosophical commitment.

For example (to take two broad philosophies current in the West today), in scientific materialism, human life is a cosmic accident in a blind evolutionary process. In New Age pantheism, humans are spiritual kin to the beasts and trees. Neither philosophy leads logically to a very exalted view of humanity or provides an adequate basis for human rights. Ms. Kersten claims to build her position upon the “Western intellectual and cultural tradition,” but that tradition itself encompasses diverse and sometimes opposing philosophies.

Religion and Inalienable Rights

The West also harbors a rich religious tradition that Ms. Kersten all but ignores. Yet the American Founders’ notion of a universal human nature, to which she alludes, was greatly influenced by biblical religion (“endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights”). Biblical religion was also the root of the Founders’ conviction that human nature, though noble, is finite and flawed, a notion Kersten correctly regards as the key counterweight to feminist utopianism.

Ms. Kersten’s “conservative feminism” attempts to take the best of both movements but, like many forms of eclecticism, it ends up as a patchwork of assertions with only a tenuous basis. Her position needs more than appeals to a self-evident “human nature” or encomiums to “the West.” It needs a specific philosophical framework that will provide a basis for the rights she so fervently wishes women to enjoy.

Nancy R. Pearcey
Washington, DC

Authentic Womanhood

Dear Sir:

Katherine Kersten says she is looking for a working philosophy for women and believes that women will

be best served by a “conservative feminism.” But her analysis of the various philosophies of gender identity and their effects neglects the most promising option.

Ms. Kersten rightly rejects as oppressive those theories that deny the full equality of men and women, whether they are promoted by male or female chauvinists.

She also wisely separates herself from the radical feminists, who insist that equality for women must rest on denial not only of the differences between the sexes but also of human nature itself, and who demand enforcement of equality as a result. She chooses instead to emphasize the common humanity of men and women and insist that equality of opportunity and treatment are sufficient to assure justice for women. But in doing so she falls into the same trap as the radicals. She does not want women pigeonholed according to “superficial external characteristics.”

But the differences between men and women are neither “superficial” nor “external.” Men and women have different instincts, reproductive potentials, life experiences, physical construction, hormone



levels, even differences in brain patterns. If the goal is to stress the ways that men and women are the same, then what makes them different is inevitably viewed as evil. Woman’s body, her reproductive potential, her very nature become things to be overcome, and modern feminism always ends up anti-woman.

Biology and Moral Equality

Only a philosophy that defends each person as a full human being, insists upon the complete moral

equality of men and women, and recognizes the real differences between the sexes can really serve the true interests of women. The differences between men and women are not evils to be overcome, but positive goals to be encouraged and protected. Being fully women does not make us less human. Biology is part of our humanity, as is our nature. Women must be respected as full, equal human beings—and as women.

Ms. Kersten's desire to identify "transcendent human interests" inevitably neglects those interests that are specific to women. Recognizing woman's specific originality does not have to reduce her to second-class status, but denying her special interests certainly will.

What is needed today is a promotion of an authentic womanhood founded on the belief that a woman can be fully human and completely equal without sacrificing her nature as woman.

Dale O'Leary
Barrington, RI

Conservative Discrimination Against Working Mothers

Dear Sir:

Congratulations for publishing Katherine Kersten's outstanding essay. After years of keeping a careful distance between myself and any identification with contemporary

gle motherhood, home, and career—an act, I am the first to admit, that often comes apart at the seams. In so doing, however, I have become aware of a problem that Ms. Kersten's brand of conservative feminism may help alleviate.

Ms. Kersten extols the many virtues of being a full-time homemaker, virtues that have been overlooked by the conventional brand of radical feminism that sees women at home with their children as either victims of oppression or as self-indulgent sloths.

Career Witch

Conservatives harbor another stereotype—that of the selfish, hard-bitten career woman who is suspected of neglecting her children's welfare to pursue life in the fast lane. To many full-time homemakers, the career woman is guilty of this particular brand of sin until proven innocent. Yet the career women I know all care deeply about their families and wouldn't hesitate to sacrifice their career accomplishments if their children's welfare were at stake. Neither stereotype is fair, but conservatives are more likely to give the benefit of the doubt to the full-time homemaker than to the mother who pursues a career.

As we articulate the propositions, goals, and policy agenda of conservative feminism, we must guard against repeating, from the opposite pole, the extremism of the radical

good arguments to show why all mothers, no matter where they choose to work, need to be concerned about the safety of our streets, the quality of our popular culture, and the public promulgation of moral virtues. These are issues that directly affect the efforts of all mothers who are concerned about raising their children to be responsible adults. In fact, one could argue that working mothers are even more dependent on wholesome community values to reinforce their moral teachings than are their stay-at-home counterparts, since their children are more often in the care of others.

Conservative feminism will forgo the aid of a powerful force on its behalf if it chooses to exclude working mothers from its agenda. Moreover, to take a disapproving attitude toward mothers who work outside the home would be to violate the very principles of responsible freedom of choice that are the hallmark of modern conservative philosophy.

Karen I. Vaughn
Professor of Economics
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

Katherine Kersten replies:

I am gratified at the support of a feminist as eminent and learned as Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. Clearly, we agree on essentials—the need for virtuous, responsible living, and "large doses of loving and enlightened child-rearing," for example. We part company, however, on how large a role the state can productively play in alleviating social problems. I can find few examples of government intervention—no matter how well-intentioned—whose primary effect has been to "strengthen local communities," rather than "reinforce centralization."

Catharine Stimpson notes that although my article inspired respect, its "inconsistencies, errors, and omissions" prompted dismay. Ms. Stimpson is easily dismayed. She insists, for example, that the term "conservative feminism" is not new, since the sociologist Judith Stacey applied it in 1983 to the writings of Alice Rossi, Betty Friedan, and Jean

Conservative feminism will forgo the aid of a powerful force on its behalf if it chooses to exclude working mothers from its agenda.

—Karen I. Vaughn

feminism, I now feel that I have found a kindred feminine spirit.

Although my own life experiences have paralleled Ms. Kersten's to a surprising extent, my resolution of the problem of meeting the competing demands between home and career was different. Instead of opting for full-time motherhood, as Ms. Kersten did, I attempted to juggle

feminist movement. Just as radical feminists often unfairly belittle the cares and concerns of full-time homemakers, conservative feminists can easily fall into the trap of belittling and ignoring working mothers. This would be a tragedy, because there is really no need for antagonism between the two groups of women. As conservatives, we have

Bethke Elshtain. One gets the impression that the three feminists named are part of a conservative feminist movement of which I was culpably ignorant, and that this ignorance is symptomatic of my "larger misunderstanding of feminism." In fact, Rossi, Friedan, and Elshtain have never identified themselves as conservative feminists, nor do they subscribe to conservative feminism as I conceive it (although Elshtain may come closest).

Third-World Conservatives

Ms. Stimpson is also dismayed to hear me praise capitalism, though she acknowledges it to be "a greater engine of general equality than any other system." But apparently being best is not good enough, for she finds my praise callous. "I wonder how women working in a sub-contractor's sweatshop in a Third-World country might respond to Ms. Kersten's declarations?" she asks. We know how millions have responded—they have packed their bags, when they could, and headed for the Statue of Liberty.

Nicholas Davidson insists that "conservative feminism" is a contradiction in terms, since no one who discusses women as a group can be a conservative. "There are no women's issues," he says, "only social issues." I agree that everything that affects women ultimately affects men and children; such an idea of community is central to my thesis. But even women who think of themselves first of all as human beings recognize that certain ills harm women most directly and immediately. Mr. Davidson should consider the plight of women elsewhere in the world who are striving to eradicate genital mutilation, the chador, polygamy, and a host of laws and customs that make their lives particularly difficult.

I disagree with Phyllis Schlafly concerning the rehabilitation of the word "feminist." One may, after all, reject the excesses of the new "race consciousness" movement while retaining respect for the fundamental concept of "civil rights."

Several respondents insist that men and women have different natures, and find happiness in different ways. My point is that individual men and women should be

free to pursue happiness in whatever ways they choose, so long as their choices are consistent with their

tween government adherents of the all-offense MAD doctrine and the left-wing pacifists in the body politic.

Women should be free to pursue happiness in whatever ways they choose, so long as their choices are consistent with their obligations to family and community.

—Katherine Kersten

obligations to family and community. I do believe that the sexes tend, as populations, to make choices that differ in certain ways. Women, for example, tend to find nurturing their children particularly fulfilling. But I disagree with the premise that no woman can be truly productive unless she is a wife and mother. Women can contribute to society in a multitude of ways: we are all richer because Maggie Thatcher and Jeane Kirkpatrick strayed from the hearth to exercise their talents in the public square.

SDI: Some Progress Better than None

Dear Sir:

Angelo Codevilla's "A Question of Patriotism: Why Isn't America Building Missile Defenses Today?" (Spring 1991) is an excellent run-down on the subject of strategic defenses, the obstacles to getting such defenses deployed, and the idiocy of constraining ourselves out of deference to that obsolete relic of the Cold War, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Mr. Codevilla and I are colleagues and have spent a good deal of time in efforts to promote strategic defenses of the United States and to oppose the baneful doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD).

His main point is that the SDI program has not resulted in the deployment of any defenses, and will not until the president forces large segments of the bureaucracy to abandon their opposition, and breaks up the curious alliance be-

To this I say: Amen. Anyone who has followed the publications of High Frontier has read that position often.

But there are parts of Mr. Codevilla's argument that overstate the case, and I am obliged to rebut them.

Conceived in Liberty

The notion that SDI was *conceived* as a program designed to abide forever with the ABM Treaty and thus *not* to provide defenses is wide of the mark. When President Reagan said, "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than avenge them?" he sounded a call for junking the MAD doctrine and thus the ABM Treaty, which is not much more than an attempt to codify MAD. True, Reagan allowed the MAD adherents at the Pentagon to lay out a program that was "research only," seeking an essentially perfect defense someday in the distant future. And he allowed bureaucrats in the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, colluding with the antis in the Pentagon, to force testing to comply with the ABM Treaty.

President Bush, thus far, has followed suit. But he has endorsed a new and affordable Phase I of SDI, Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), which is affordable, uses superb technology developed in the SDI program, is the proper answer to today's global situation, and is expandable to meet any return to the deliberate attack threats of yesteryear. It would employ "Brilliant Pebbles," spaceborne autonomous interceptors, in numbers adequate to kill in their

boost phase 40 missiles launched from any single point on earth. (Curiously, Mr. Codevilla notes this as a *weakness* of “Brilliant Pebbles.”) The ground-based elements include super-Patriots for protection of our forces overseas, and ground-based, space-intercept missiles such as ERIS, which have demonstrated their ability to kill warheads at an

basically a sham and a fraud, Mr. Codevilla denigrates everyone who has had a hand in supporting the program, from presidents to senators to the able men who have run the programs, and even the good citizens who have contributed to such organizations as High Frontier and The Heritage Foundation, fighting to keep SDI alive. And he

to remain defenseless? As missile technology spreads around the globe, the recent experiences of Tel Aviv and Riyadh provide an unequivocal response. But the administration has not yet, at least for the moment, decided to defend the country.

Hope in Brilliant Pebbles

There has been great progress in SDI technology. Sophisticated sensors, high-speed computers, and miniaturized components have led to the concept of small, inexpensive “Brilliant Pebbles” space-based interceptors. They greatly simplify the complex SDI architecture and make global defense both realistic and affordable.

At the same time, new high-tech versions of long-range, ground-based interceptors are emerging and a new Theater Missile Defense program is developing theater defenses that will be far superior to the Patriot.

The problem is clear. The solutions are within reach. But there remains fear of political opposition to a withdrawal from an arms-control agreement. Actually, Ronald Reagan showed the way in 1986 when he declared that the United States would no longer comply with the flawed SALT agreements. The arms-control fanatics, as Mr. Codevilla calls them, were just as protective of SALT then as they are of ABM now. But when President Reagan acted there was nary a whimper from Moscow or from NATO, and only the usual gnashing of teeth from the professional arms controllers.

Now it is up to President Bush to follow the trail blazed by Reagan. He should declare the ABM Treaty bypassed by technology and overtaken by events, and tell Moscow that the United States intends to defend itself with or without Soviet cooperation, but preferably with it.

Put in those terms, Moscow is likely to cooperate in moving beyond the ABM Treaty to a new security arrangement. If not, the case will have been made for the U.S. to withdraw from the constraints of the treaty. And once the issue is clearly framed as defending or not defending the nation, the domestic opposition that now seems so formidable

By describing the SDI program as basically a sham and a fraud, Mr. Codevilla denigrates everyone who has had a hand in supporting the program. —Daniel O. Graham

altitude of 100 miles. These systems are “hardware,” and they were not palmed off as “certifiably free of the intention of serving as an ABM component.” (Mr. Codevilla insists that no such hardware has been produced.)

Gee, Pals

The president committed himself to develop a system such as GPALS in his most recent State of the Union message. But, as usual, his national security advisor, Brent Scowcroft, long-time foe of SDI, quickly explained that this was *not* a deployment decision. And the president, when he discusses deployment, always adds the fatal caveat, “when ready,” which gives opponents more foot-dragging time.

Mr. Codevilla should not be painting those of us who are heartened by steps in the right direction as uninformed and foolish conservatives. We applauded President Reagan’s launching of SDI and his refusal to trade it off in arms-control deals, the advent of ERIS and “Brilliant Pebbles,” and the decision of President Bush to pursue GPALS, not because we were gullible, but because we, as opposed to Mr. Codevilla, believe half a loaf beats none at all. We have toiled for these steps; we have a right to appreciate progress toward our goal of deployed strategic defenses without being considered patsies.

By describing the SDI program as

denigrates the technology developed by SDI, which, by proving feasibility and lowering costs, is forcing minds to change in a reluctant Congress. True, GPALS does not call for Mr. Codevilla’s favorite technical solution—chemical lasers—but if his real objective is to see strategic defenses deployed, he should applaud the solutions at hand—kinetic energy systems and GPALS.

Daniel O. Graham

Lt. Gen., USA (ret.)

Director

High Frontier

Arlington, VA

Junking the ABM Treaty

Dear Sir:

My compliments on Angelo Codevilla’s “A Question of Patriotism,” a perceptive analysis of the missile defense dilemma America is now facing. He puts the bottom line right up front: we cannot use our existing technology, no matter how good it is, to defend ourselves as long as the administration continues to adhere to every jot and tittle of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972. It is inherently inconsistent to build defenses while complying with a treaty that prohibits the building of defenses.

The choice is simple: is it more in our national interest to defend the country or to continue to adhere to a 19-year-old treaty that requires us

will fade like a Cheshire cat.

“Defending America” could become one of the defining issues of the 1992 presidential campaign.

James T. Hackett

Manager, Policy Operations
Titan Corporation
and member of the President’s
General Advisory Committee
on Arms Control
San Diego, CA

Angelo Codevilla replies:

General Graham writes that “the notion that SDI was *conceived* as a program designed to abide forever with the ABM Treaty and thus *not* to provide defenses is wide of the mark.” But the only evidence he cites is some of President Reagan’s rhetoric. More to the point was President Reagan’s secret order to restrict U.S. activities in the anti-missile field even beyond the requirements of the ABM Treaty even though, as he acknowledged, this would cost time, money, and performance. Reagan’s (secretly) stated purpose was *exemplary* compliance with the ABM Treaty that he was (publicly) charging the Soviets were violating. Just as important, the founding document of SDI, the Fletcher Panel report, structured the program in ways that made it impossible for any useful device to come out of it. In the summer of 1983, as soon as Senator Malcolm Wallop saw the first draft of the Fletcher Panel report he predicted that SDI would spend money and produce nothing—and nothing is precisely what it has produced.

General Graham cites ERIS, which demonstrated its ability to kill warheads 100 miles in space, as a refutation of my claim that SDI has produced nothing and that a secret Department of Defense directive requires that certain proposed systems be certifiably free of the intention of serving as an ABM component. Anyone reading my article will notice that the above restriction applies to the first of the directive’s three categories, while ERIS falls under the third. Nevertheless, ERIS, which was started under the name HOE during the Ford administration, is *not* a usable anti-missile weapon because, under the secret DOD directive, it has been careful-

ly—and expensively—designed as a test vehicle.

Again and again Presidents Bush and Reagan have postponed indefinitely the question of *whether* to incorporate anti-missile defense into the United States’ military plans. The existence of SDI had provided them with political cover for equivocation.

Presidential Foot-Dragging

General Graham expresses confidence that George Bush’s words about GPALS mean that a decision has been made to defend the country, if only a little. No such decision has been made. President Bush has sincerely said that GPALS would be in full compliance with the ABM Treaty. Nor has Bush revoked President Reagan’s earlier, secret order to comply with ABM. And indeed General Graham notes that National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft—whose strategic understanding seems stuck in 1972—has emphasized that no decision has been made to deploy anything. General Graham recognizes that this is foot-dragging. But it is far more. Under these circumstances any weapon or sensor that the administration proudly includes in GPALS can be defined or deployed in ways that render it much less useful than it could be—much as the Patriot was de-scoped to be nearly useless against missiles.

General Graham lends himself to such ploys by talking as if the Soviet missile threat was yesterday’s problem. Check the figures. It is not. Those who have credibility as advocates of defense should not lead the American people to believe that an honest effort is being made to protect them, because none is.

General Graham’s remark that I regard it a weakness of hypothetical deployment of 1,000 Brilliant Pebbles that it could intercept only 40-odd missiles—under the best conditions—is difficult to understand. By the way, only half of these intercepts would be in boost-phase. Does General Graham regard this as a great achievement? Does the possibility that President Bush might bend his adherence to the American arms controllers’ vision of the ABM Treaty enough to let us have a token defense (more or less on the order

of magnitude specifically allowed by the treaty) justify all the hoopla and the billions that have been devoted to SDI?

SDI as Placebo

General Graham claims to prefer half a loaf to none. So do I. Even a slice—which SDI has yet to provide—is better than none. One must recognize the difference between any part of a steak, and the mere sizzle thereof. I repeat: there is no anti-missile defense today, and none at all is planned. The administration has successfully fought even raising the question of adherence to the ABM Treaty.

General Graham suggests that I denigrate various defenses based on kinetic energy because I prefer chemical lasers. In fact Senator Wallop, and I as his former assistant, have supported any and every anti-missile device—providing only that the proposal was to build. If there were a concrete proposal to defend against missiles with adequate numbers of kinetic-kill interceptors, I would support it wholeheartedly. *But there is no such proposal.*

James Hackett recognizes that we are now living with the basic choice made in 1972 not to have *any* anti-missile defense. We agree that the first step in reversing that choice is to confront it straightforwardly. In this regard we agree that SDI has been something of a political placebo. The reality of missile attacks and missile defense in the Gulf War may lead us to confront the issue of defense with the seriousness it deserves.

If and when we do, we will discover, as Mr. Hackett suggests, that the *political* (as opposed to the bureaucratic) opposition will be minuscule. The real fight is in Washington. It can be won only by forcing the administration out of its all-too-comfortable ambiguity.

Principled, But Powerless

Dear Sir:

Burton Yale Pines suggests in “Bull Moose Revolt: George Bush and the Shadow of William Howard Taft” (Winter 1991) that George Bush’s betrayal of his campaign promise to continue the Reagan Revolution (especially on taxes) is

akin to William Howard Taft's betrayal of his promise to continue the policies of Theodore Roosevelt (especially on tariff reform). Mr. Pines displays a strong command of the history of the Taft-TR struggle, but it by no means follows, as Mr. Pines argues, that TR's "torpedoing" of Taft in 1912 provides contemporary conservatives with the proper

easier time displacing a sitting president than Roosevelt had in 1912, the odds are against ultimate success ("success" is defined here as retaining control of the White House, not maintaining doctrinal purity). We should recall that Gerald Ford rebuffed Ronald Reagan's challenge in 1976 for his party's nomination, as Jimmy Carter did to Ted Kennedy

Conservatives must work within the Republican Party and, yes, whenever possible, within the Bush administration. There is no advantage in becoming a principled but impotent sect once more.

—Ernest van den Haag

model for dealing with George Bush, *i.e.*, a fratricidal war to deny him renomination.

First, using the 1910 versus 1990 mid-term congressional elections as a rough measure, the Progressive tide was much higher and broader in 1910 than was any such tide of conservatism in 1990. The Republican Party suffered a severe mid-term election defeat in 1910, presaging a Republican defeat in 1912. A Progressive groundswell against the Taft administration was clearly evident. By contrast, no such groundswell of conservative sentiment against Bush was evident in the mixed election returns of 1990. (Witness Newt Gingrich's reelection squeaker.) If conservatives are to split with Bush to ride a rising tide of conservatism into power, they should be sure there is a rising tide. It may already have come and gone for now.

Lack of Challengers

Second, in American politics you cannot beat somebody with nobody. There is no one on the horizon with the political stature and demonstrated popularity of a Theodore Roosevelt willing and able to challenge Bush. And we must remember that Roosevelt *lost* to Taft at the 1912 Republican convention, and *both lost* to Wilson in the general election.

Third, even though a contemporary challenger would have an

in 1980. But both sitting presidents were weakened by those challenges, which paved the way for their eventual electoral defeat.

The lesson of 1912 is *not* that a president can be punished by a disappointed faction within his party, but that the cost of "victory" will be very high—complete loss of control of the White House and Congress, and an erosion of conservative gains in the judiciary.

But there will be one saving consolation: conservatives will have plenty of time to contemplate and admire the purity of their principles from the vantage point of the unemployed and powerless.

Donald F. Anderson

Professor of Political Science
University of Michigan-Dearborn
Dearborn, MI

Bush: Better Than a Democrat

Dear Sir:

In "Bull Moose Revolt," Burton Yale Pines is convincing on Theodore Roosevelt's frustration that led him to oppose President Taft. Despite his enormous prestige, TR lost. Mr. Pines does not convince me of the advantages for conservatives of courting defeat by imitating TR's strategy, however frustrated they are with Bush. And we have no one of TR's stature to oppose Bush.

Therefore, contrary to the drift of Mr. Pines' essay, I think that conservatives must work within the Republican Party and, yes, whenever possible, within the Bush administration. There is no advantage in becoming a principled but impotent sect once more. Although not half as good as it should be, the Bush administration is miles better than a Democratic administration, the only realistic alternative. The strategy that Mr. Pines seems to favor might produce a Democratic president.

Ernest van den Haag
New York, NY

Broken Tax Promises

Dear Sir:

Burton Yale Pines argues persuasively that William Howard Taft's support for high tariffs caused a permanent rift within the Republican Party and thus was his undoing in the 1912 election. A more important factor, however, may have been the abandonment of his "pledge" during the 1908 presidential campaign to oppose the establishment of an income tax on the grounds of unconstitutionality.

As Mr. Pines notes, President Taft initially supported a bill that would have lowered tariffs. Even after the bill became perverted into a tariff-raising bill, Taft continued to support it. However, a coalition of Democrats and Progressive Republicans in the House of Representatives threatened to defeat any tariff increase. In those days the Democratic Party supported free trade, unlike now, and believed that government revenue should be raised primarily through income taxes.

Taft's Support of Income Taxes

A deal was offered, in which Democrats would support the tariff bill in return for Taft's endorsement of an income tax. At first, Taft was able to block consideration of the income tax on constitutional grounds—the Supreme Court had found the progressive income tax to be unconstitutional in 1895. However, on June 16, 1909, almost 81 years to the day prior to George Bush's similar breach of faith, Taft threw his support behind a constitutional amendment that would per-

mit establishment of a federal income tax.

The amendment received swift congressional approval and was sent to the states for ratification. Although the amendment did not receive final ratification by the states until 1913, after the election of Wilson, there is no doubt that Taft's support for it helped lay the political groundwork for its approval.

The parallels between this incident and last year's budget agreement are striking. Both presidents cavalierly broke a campaign pledge on taxes, which much of the American public had regarded as sacred, in order to pursue what they believed to be a higher goal—a tariff increase in the case of Taft, and a deficit-reduction pact in the case of Bush. Then, as now, this ultimately splintered the Republican Party to the Democrats' gain.

Stephen Moore
Cato Institute
Washington, DC

TR Ambiguous on Tariffs

Dear Sir:

In "Bull Moose Revolt," Burton Yale Pines operates from an inaccurate historical premise in his belief that it was the tariff issue that brought on the split between Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft in 1912. He accuses Taft of "repudiating the Roosevelt position" on the tariff. Quite the opposite is the case. Theodore Roosevelt was not comfortable with the tariff issue and he followed the lead of the protectionist wing of the GOP in Congress and the Republican Party between 1901 and 1909. He did not continue the reciprocity policy of William McKinley when he became president in 1901. After his election victory in 1904, Roosevelt put off action on tariff revision in favor of his campaign for railroad regulation that culminated in the Hepburn Act of 1906. He was willing, as he said in 1906, that his successor "be nominated on a platform which shall promise immediate action in the direction of revision" of the tariff, but he did not push it himself.

The language of the 1908 Republican platform did not

promise "tariff reform," as Mr. Pines would have it. The party's call "unequivocally for a revision of the tariff by a special session" after the 1908 election was deliberately ambiguous about the direction of revision to placate both wings of the party.

When the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill was under consideration in 1909, Roosevelt remarked to Henry Cabot Lodge, "You are bound to have dissatisfaction with any Tariff Bill, simply because, as far as I can see, there is no real ground for dissatisfaction, of a serious kind, with the present



tariff." During the 1910 elections, the New York Republican convention, controlled by the Roosevelt forces, praised the Payne-Aldrich Tariff in its state platform.

TR's Protectionist Example

Mr. Pines also accuses Taft of siding with the protectionist forces "two years later" and describes this occasion as part of Taft's conversion "from low tariffs to high tariffs." His article does not mention the issue of Canadian Reciprocity where Taft pursued lower duties with Canada, to the displeasure both of protectionists in the GOP and some of the midwestern Progressives who opposed lower duties on the products of their own states. At first Roosevelt supported Canadian Reciprocity. When he discovered that some of his Progressive allies opposed the measure, he changed his mind in

1912 and came out for "the immediate repeal of the treaty." Canadian rejection of the reciprocity agreement doomed Taft's policy, but in this instance he was in favor of free trade and Roosevelt was taking the protectionist posture. In the campaign of 1912, Roosevelt called the tariff issue "simply a red herring across the trail to distract the attention of the people from the real needs of the situation."

The split between Roosevelt and Taft in 1912 had many causes—personality differences, divergent views over the nature of presidential power, disagreements about conservation, and disputes about proper ways to regulate big business. The tariff played an insignificant role in the controversy. The Taft-Roosevelt quarrel had large importance for the history of the Republican Party in this century, but the tariff question cannot bear the analytic weight that Mr. Pines imputes to it. If it is removed from his story, as it should be, the ostensible connection with President Bush's budget policies disappears and the reader is left with the continuing historical interest that the Roosevelt-Taft battle will always have for students of American history. Its relevance to the choices that Republicans have to make in 1992 should perhaps be best left to those that Roosevelt called the "men in the arena."

Lewis L. Gould

Professor of American History
University of Texas
Austin, TX

Taft Was No Convert

Dear Sir:

About Burton Yale Pines' piece on William Howard Taft—I suppose it is true that President Taft could have threatened to veto the Payne-Aldrich tariff bill in its earlier stages, but then there would probably have been no bill at all. As Senate majority leader, Nelson Aldrich had the votes for a tariff increase, whereas what the president finally got did at least afford an average 5-percent reduction *ad valorem*. But there was never any question of Taft being converted "from low tariffs to high tariffs," as he indeed went on to back the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty very

strongly, and regarded it as his most significant legislative achievement that it passed the Senate (only to be rejected later by the Canadian parliament).


In 1911 my own grandfather led a delegation of Gloucester fishermen to the White House to protest any tariff concessions to the

controversy and its relevance to today's political situation. Donald Anderson is correct that "you cannot beat somebody with nobody." The conservative challenge is thus to find a "somebody" who, while perhaps not running against Bush directly in the primaries, assertively will challenge his policies and actions.

establishment long has been a conservative virtue. Were it not, then Ronald Reagan would not have challenged Gerald Ford in 1976.

The Bull Moose case I made reflects, of course, the situation of late 1990 when I wrote this article. Obviously, the political landscape has changed since then. In the wake of the Persian Gulf victory, the thought of challenging George Bush in a primary makes just about every potential conservative presidential hopeful cringe. Here Donald Anderson is absolutely correct. The "somebody" is not going to be challenged at the polls by a conservative.

What has not changed since the article was written, however, are the mounting problems that the Bush presidency is creating for conservatives. Bush's policies and performance on almost all issues—from coddling Gorbachev, to ignoring economic growth, to failing to devise a conservative civil-rights package, to giving only lip-service to the empowerment initiatives that will show blacks and Hispanics that their champions are conservatives, to giving the United Nations a veto over American foreign policy—are creating a legacy that will burden conservatives for decades. The only notable exceptions are how Bush fought the Persian Gulf War (though not how he conducted the diplomacy before and after the fighting) and how he is crafting a revolutionary U.S.-Mexico trade relationship.

What also remains unchanged since I wrote my article is that the duty of conservatives is to challenge Bush in a way that either prompts him to begin governing as a conservative or, failing this, that protects the conservative message from being corrupted and discredited by his presidency. Unchanged is the imperative that when the Bush presidency ends at mid-decade, conservatives must have the credibility to win office once again. 

The duty of conservatives is to challenge Bush in a way that either prompts him to begin governing as a conservative or, failing this, that protects the conservative message from being corrupted and discredited by his presidency.

—Burton Yale Pines

Canadian competition. Taft gave them five minutes, and a brief lecture on the need to put national interest ahead of local interests. When some members began to protest, they heard the words "This way, gentlemen" from the butler at the door.

No, Taft's problem was really not doctrinal—it was a command question with TR from the outset. TR opened and maintained a fourth branch of government at Oyster Bay immediately after his return from safari in 1910. The issues really didn't matter that much at all—it was the refusal to recognize the incumbent president as party leader that poisoned the well.

Andrew Gray
Washington, DC

Burton Yale Pines replies:

Policy Review's readers make important points and expand our understanding of the Roosevelt/Taft

Andrew Gray is kind to share his almost firsthand familiarity with the Taft style. And Stephen Moore usefully reminds us of yet another similarity between Taft and Bush: the ease with which they raise taxes.

Puzzling, however, are the observations by Ernest van den Haag, the endearing and widely respected conservative scholar. Though long-admired for his often maverick views, van den Haag sounds curiously establishmentarian when he says that "conservatives must work within the Republican Party." Such advice is troubling for two reasons. First, it would be a serious mistake for conservatives to wed themselves to any political party; indeed, my colleagues at The Heritage Foundation work closely with both Republican and Democratic lawmakers. Second, even were conservatives to declare themselves Republicans, it would be a mistake to work solely "within" the party. Willingness to buck the party

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The triumph of freedom does not mean that security threats from the Soviet Union or its successor regimes have disappeared. Substantial dangers still confront the West, both from the enormous Soviet military and from the disorder that attends the collapse of empires. The central threat from the Soviet Union that has preoccupied American military planners for the past 40 years—the threat of a blitzkrieg attack on Western Europe—has greatly diminished. But Soviet nuclear forces are likely to become more threatening, rather than less threatening, as a result of the present upheaval. The Soviet use of surrogates to destabilize the Third World, though temporarily in decline, could easily reemerge as an important threat. The disintegration of the empire opens the risk of war along the border between the Soviet/Russian and the Islamic worlds, as well as in European tinderboxes such as Moldavia. And the breakdown of the Kremlin's authority during a time of economic crisis is a recipe for instability that might be difficult to contain within Soviet borders.

Charles H. Fairbanks Jr.

Russian Roulette:

The Dangers of a Collapsing Empire

