The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder

No. 887 | The Heritage Foundation 214 Massachusetts Avenue N.E. Washington, D.C. 20002-4999 (202) 546-4400

March 23, 1992

TRANSFORMING RUSSIA FROM ENEMY TO ALLY

INTRODUCTION

Russia has shed the Soviet empire, dissolved the Soviet Union, agreed to sweeping cuts in conventional and nuclear forces, reduced military spending significantly, cast off the yoke of totalitarianism, and installed a democratically elected government.

As a result, Russia no longer can be considered America's enemy. It is not yet, of course, an ally. Russia's leaders are taking a fresh look at the world, redefining Russian national security while at the same time struggling to keep their new democracy afloat. If they succeed, a new Russia can emerge. It can be a democratic Russia fully integrated into the West. If they falter, an assortment of ex-communists, ultra-nationalists, and disgruntled military officers seems ready to return Russia to the militarism of the past seventy years.

It thus is in America's interests to help Russia, the world's newest nuclear superpower, safely to make the transition from enemy to ally.

Formidable Force. Russia has over 18,000 nuclear warheads; its roughly 35,000 tanks make its land army Eurasia's most formidable. American security is tied inextricably to decisions made in Moscow and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Whether Russia completes the transition from enemy to ally will depend on how its new leaders define their nation's national security requirements. Central, too, will be their success in de-militarizing Russian society, diverting resources from an all-consuming military-industrial complex, and bringing a smaller military firmly under civilian control.

Disputes with Neighbors. Important as a factor in Russian security will be its ability peacefully to resolve disputes with its newly empowered neighbors, particularly Ukraine. While Russia is the main inheritor of Soviet might, the Soviet collapse also brought into being three other nuclear powers—Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Ukraine could be considered a mini-superpower in its own right, with its 6,000 tanks and army of perhaps one and a half million men. Russia has historical claims to Ukrainian territory and is embroiled in a dispute with Ukraine over control of former Soviet forces, which include the Black Sea fleet, tank armies, and air forces. The ability of Russia and Ukraine to resolve these differences peacefully will in large measure determine whether Russia is able to demilitarize, or is drawn into an arms buildup and perhaps even war with its new neighbors.

It is in America's power to help demilitarize Russia. America's objectives include a democratic Russia, at peace with its neighbors, and with its military forces and nuclear weapons under firm civilian control. Given the consequences of failure, and potential benefits of success, this goal should be George Bush's highest foreign policy priority.

Curiously, the Bush Administration, particularly the State Department and National Security Council, have been lax in defining United States policy toward the new Russia. Some members of the Administration, like National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, are believed to be skeptical, if not hostile, toward Russia's new leaders. It is time to end Washington's neglect of Russia.

America needs to strengthen Russia's democratic and free market institutions through humanitarian aid, technical assistance, and support. In addition, Bush urgently needs to help Russia alleviate the dangers to its democracy, and ultimately to American security, of a divided, disgruntled ex-Soviet military that is becoming a powerful and potentially dangerous political force. Toward this end Bush should:

- ✘ **Assist Russia and Ukraine in peacefully resolving their differences over control of ex-Soviet forces on their territories.** The U.S. could offer its "good offices" to negotiate a Russo-Ukrainian deal over how to divide former Soviet forces. Prolongation of the dispute threatens America's vital interests in the region and could aid a return to power of militarist forces in Moscow.

- ✘ **Urge Russian President Boris Yeltsin quickly to dissolve the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) military and create a Russian military.** Yeltsin's creation on March 16 of a Russian Defense Ministry, with himself as Acting Defense Minister, should be the first step toward establishing a Russian military force. This will help Yeltsin gain full authority over the military and break up the Soviet military that for forty years threatened U.S. and Western security. Current arrangements for unified command over ex-Soviet nuclear forces would remain in place.

- ✘ **Establish U.S.-Russian "enterprise funds" to give small business and agricultural loans to demobilized Russian military officers and former defense-sector workers.** The funds would help give the Russian military a stake in demobilization and in Russian democracy.
- ✘ **Create a Western-financed housing fund for demobilized Russian military officers.** The fund would pay private Russian construction companies to build houses for demobilized officers, helping to overcome the housing shortage that has been a major impediment to rapid demobilization of the CIS military.
- ✘ **Expand nuclear risk-reduction measures.** These should include joint intelligence efforts to track renegade nuclear scientists who might seek to sell their know-how to hostile states or terrorist organizations and a joint program to counter potential nuclear terrorism.
- ✘ **Forge cooperation on Strategic Defense.** Strategic defense, or SDI, offers a natural area of cooperation between the U.S. and Russia, both of which face the threat of ballistic missile proliferation.
- ✘ **Strengthen institutional lines between the U.S. and Russian military establishments.** These should include joint military maneuvers, Pentagon seminars for Russian officers on civil-military relations, and assistance to the Russian parliamentary defense committee in establishing procedures for developing and overseeing military budgets.

RUSSIA LOOKS AT THE WORLD

When Moscow's old communist leaders peeked over the Kremlin's thick walls, they saw a world populated by enemies: the Western powers at the gates of their empire, restive and potentially rebellious subject peoples of Eastern Europe, and their own Soviet citizens. To bully, intimidate, and eventually defeat their presumed enemies, the communist leadership built an internal security force and imperial military of unprecedented scale. Those leaders are gone, replaced by a new breed of Russians that just now is beginning to bring the world into focus through its own lenses.

None of Russia's new civilian leaders openly identifies America or NATO as a threat to Russian security. Certainly for Russian President Boris Yeltsin and those closest to him, as well as for the leaders of Russia's parliament, this is a sincere belief.[1] The danger foremost in the mind of Russia's leaders today is the threat to civilian rule posed by disgruntled elements of the former Soviet military, extreme

1 Based on extensive interviews with Russian parliamentary and executive branch officials throughout 1991 and through this March in Moscow and at The Heritage Foundation.



RUSSIAN SECURITY CONCERNS IN THE 1990s

Scale: 1000 Miles

nationalists, and unreconstructed communists. These of course are the very groups likely to revive militant anti-Americanism should they manage to seize power.

Other security concerns often mentioned by Russian officials include border conflicts with such newly independent states as Ukraine, or even autonomous regions within the Russian Federation, like Chechen-Ingush in Southeastern Russia or Tatarstan in the center of the country. There also is concern that conflict in the Caucasus to Russia's south (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), the Balkans (including Yugoslavia), or the Muslim Middle East could draw Russians into war. There is the possibility that China could take advantage of Russia's trouble to renew border claims leading to skirmishes like the March 1969 border fight over the Damansky Islands on the Ussury River in the Russian Far East.

Three Military Theaters. One of the most comprehensive views of post-Soviet Russian security is offered by Andrei Kortunov, Director of Foreign and Defense Policy at Moscow's formerly communist USA and Canada Institute, and currently an E. L. Wiegand fellow at The Heritage Foundation. Kortunov divides Russia into three potential military theaters: European, Southern, and Far Eastern. He sees no territorial threat from the European theater except for spillover ethnic conflicts such as that in Yugoslavia. The Southern theater he views as the most active, with the spread of radical Muslim influence and nuclear proliferation the primary threats. Purely in terms of military capability, the most imposing threat to Russia for Kortunov is China, in the Far Eastern theater.

To cover these three theaters, Kortunov envisions a professional military far smaller than today's force of roughly 3.5 million. He puts his emphasis on mobility, so that forces could turn quickly from one theater to the next. As for

nuclear weapons, Kortunov sees no need for Russia to maintain "parity" with America, and instead envisions a "sufficient" strategic nuclear force "more similar to France's than to America's."

Turning Inward. For most Russians, the former East-West military struggle is fading from view as concerns focus increasingly on internal, border, and regional issues. Andrei Kokoshin, a candidate for the post of Defense Minister, agrees with Kortunov that for the foreseeable future Russia will cease to play a global role, remaining primarily a regional actor along its borders. In Kokoshin's words, U.S.-Russian relations would be "defined by the fact" that Russia "would stop being a global superpower while the U.S. would remain as such."[2]

Of course even with Russia's change of political guard, many soldiers of the old regime remain influential and in positions of power. This especially is true within the military's General Staff, which remains stocked with Gorbachev holdovers, and to a lesser extent among Russia's formerly communist-dominated foreign policy intelligentsia. Thus remnants of confrontational Cold War thinking continue to creep into Russia's policy toward the West, even as new ideas spread.

For example, a televised January 29 Yeltsin speech in Moscow mixed Soviet-like ritual support for a total nuclear weapons test ban, the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and condemnation of America's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) with welcome, but contradictory, calls for cooperation on global anti-missile defenses. Yeltsin clearly is trying to reconcile the advice of such innovative "Young Turks" as Sergei Kondrakhin, Head of Staff of Russia's Parliamentary Defense Committee and Vladimir Lopatin, Deputy Chairman of Russia's State Committee on Defense, with the views of former Soviet military General Staff officers and such holdover former communist disinformation specialists as the USA and Canada Institute's chief, Georgi Arbatov. He called Yeltsin's proposal for U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defenses "impractical and useless," reviving dated claims that it would "serve the interest of both the American and Russian military-industrial complexes."[3]

THE SOVIET MILITARY: AN ARMY WITHOUT A COUNTRY

Even before the disintegration of the U.S.S.R, the Soviet military had become a force unto itself, operating largely outside of civilian control. Following the August 1991 attempted Soviet coup, the Communist Party and government organizations that had controlled the Soviet military collapsed in rapid succession. Gorbachev officially remained in charge, but in practice he had little effective

2 Andrei A. Kokoshin, *The Evolving International Security System: A View from Moscow* (Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analyses, December 1991), p. 36.

3 Arbatov *Izvestia* interview cited in Daniel Sneider, "Critics Take Aim at Yeltsin Proposal for Arms Control," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 14, 1992.

control, unable even to replace most of the military General Staff members who had supported the coup against him.

Once Yeltsin succeeded in ousting Gorbachev on December 25, 1991, Yeltsin inherited the Soviet military and its General Staff. In fact, before he forced Gorbachev to resign, Yeltsin first had to gain the blessing of the military, the only force in the country that could have stopped him. In the two weeks between the original signing on December 8, 1991, of the Commonwealth Treaty between Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine, and the dissolution of the Soviet state, Yeltsin held several meetings with the General Staff. In these, he promised to double officers' pay, build more military housing, and boost retirement benefits.[4]

Independent Actor. Hence even in the absence of the Soviet Union, the "Soviet" military remains, for the time being as the CIS military, under the command of Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov. Its tanks, planes, ships, and personnel are spread among the fifteen former Soviet republics, now all ostensibly sovereign states. With so many new masters—the eleven governments of the CIS —the former Soviet military in effect serves no one, and increasingly is an independent actor, pushed and pulled by the same political and economic forces tugging at the rest of Russian society.

In a Moscow meeting on January 15, some 5,000 officers demanded that the Soviet military remain intact and under a unified command.[5] While the meeting was intended as a display of the military's political muscle, dissention in the ranks was evident in the debate, and there was no clear evidence that the military, despite its warning, is prepared to take over the government to enforce its demand. On a somewhat ominous note, however, nearly 80 percent of the participants polled agreed that the military itself, not politicians, should have "the decisive vote" on the future of the Armed Forces.[6]

Contending Groups. The military's leadership is split between at least two contending groups. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff Viktor Samsonov, and General Konstantin Kobetz, have been outspoken in favor of retaining a strong, unified, conscript-based military of more than three million men. Shaposhnikov has argued strongly to keep military spending a budget priority, making the case that technology will "trickle down" from the military to civilian sectors.[7]

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4 Author's discussions with Russian parliamentarians.

5 See Neil Buckley, "Soviet army flexes its political muscles," *Financial Times*, January 16, 1992.

6 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, February 6, 1992.

7 Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, "After the Soviet Collapse: New realities, Old Illusions," London, January 1992. See also, Francis X. Clines, "Kremlin Clarifies Plans to Cut Troops," *New York Times*, October 3, 1991, p. 8, and interview with Shaposhnikov, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 7, 1992, transl. FBIS January 8, 1992.

A second, more reform-minded group includes Russia's State Committee for Defense Chairman Colonel Pavel Grachev, his influential deputy, Lopatin, and Parliamentary Security Committee Chairman Colonel Sergei Stepashain. This faction backs an all-professional Army of roughly 1.5 million.

Both sides agree, however that except for national guard forces of the individual republics, the former Soviet military, or at least most of it, should remain under a unified command. Even as the military leadership debates its future as a unified force, however, national sentiment in the independent states of the CIS is making increasingly likely the military's breakup and division along national lines.

National Divisions. Originally the Russian leadership hoped that the CIS would provide a framework for collecting most if not all Soviet military forces under one roof. Even a reformer like Lopatin foresaw all naval and air forces, as well as most tank armies, remaining under Commonwealth, and hence mainly Russian, control, with only small republican guard under the command of individual republic leaders.[8] But after the extended Commonwealth was established in Alma-Ata on December 21, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldava, Turkmenia, and Ukraine announced their intention to claim as their own virtually all troops and conventional weapons on their territory.[9] On January 11 Belarus followed suit.

On February 14, eight CIS members agreed to maintain a unified command over the bulk of their armed forces for an unspecified interim period, but three others—Azerbaijan, Moldova, and Ukraine—refused even this concession and announced plans immediately to form their own armies from the forces on their territories. Even a pro-CIS hard-liner like Shaposhnikov seems gradually to be accepting the fact that a unified CIS conventional force is untenable. Shaposhnikov now is calling for a three year "transition period" to divide the former Soviet military and officer corps among the independent states. The question of how these forces will be divided remains a sticking point.

One apparent point of agreement, at least for the time being, is that the approximately 30,000 nuclear weapons of the former Soviet arsenal will be under unified control and that ultimately Russia alone will be a nuclear weapons state. The Soviet command structure for control over the nuclear arsenal has been adopted virtually *in toto* by the CIS, with Yeltsin simply replacing Gorbachev at the top of the command chain.[10] The U.S. has received assurances from Belarus,

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8 Author's interview with Lopatin, Moscow, December 5, 1991.

9 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, January 2, 1992, p. 1.

10 In addition to Yeltsin, Shaposhnikov, as CIS military chief, also controls a Soviet version of the U.S. "football" (*chemodanchik* or "little suitcase" in Russian) containing the launch codes for nuclear weapons. In theory, Yeltsin or Shaposhnikov is bound by the December 21, 1991, Alma-Ata Agreement to consult with the leaders of the other nuclear states before authorizing a launch, although he almost surely has the physical capability to order at least Russia's weapons launched without their approval. The most detailed analysis of the Soviet nuclear weapons complex is Kurt Campbell, Ashton Carter, et al., *Soviet Nuclear Fission*, Harvard University

Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—the three other CIS nuclear weapon states—that they will eliminate all their long-range, or strategic, nuclear weapons by the end of 1994. No steps in this direction yet have been taken, however, and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbeyev in particular has given conflicting signals, privately assuring the U.S. that he would eliminate all strategic weapons, yet stating publicly on several occasions that he would not destroy all his strategic weapons until Russia did the same.[11] Shorter range, or tactical, nuclear weapons all are scheduled to be moved to Russian territory by this summer, but Ukraine has been dragging its heels on grounds that it has not received adequate assurances from Russia that the moved weapons will be destroyed.

THE UKRAINIAN CHALLENGE

The strongest pressure for breaking up the ex-Soviet armed forces is coming from Ukraine, and its President, former communist Leonid Kravchuk. In the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine found itself in possession of more military assets of the former Soviet army than any other ex-Soviet republic, except for Russia. Deployed on its territory are: 1.3 million former Soviet troops, the 350-vessel Black Sea Fleet, over 6,000 tanks, 2,605 tactical nuclear weapons, and 1,300 strategic nuclear weapons on 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles.

Ukrainian Separateness. Russo-Ukrainian animosity has deep historical roots and is not likely to disappear soon. Ukrainians make a point of their historical and cultural separateness from Russians, harkening back to the independent Kievan Rus', the first Slavic state; Ukrainians take pride that Kievan Prince Volodimir introduced Christianity to the Slavic peoples at the end of the first millenium.

Yet for the last three centuries most of Ukraine has been under Russian domination, first under the czars, then the communists. The Russian term for Ukrainians, *malorossy*, or "little Russians," sums up the Russian attitude toward Ukraine. Under Russian and Soviet domination, Ukraine was denied statehood or even a separate cultural identity, and often suffered brutally: an estimated seven million Ukrainians died from famine as a result of Stalin's enforced collectivization program and in the 1930s.

Not surprisingly, Ukrainian national security experts and politicians perceive "Russian expansionism" as the only real strategic threat to Ukrainian security.[12]

Center for Science and International Affairs, November 1991.

11 U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of The Honorable Reginald Bartholomew, Undersecretary of State for International Security Affairs, February 5, 1992.

12 Author's conversations in Washington and Kiev with Ukrainian national security experts including Dr. Stepan Khmara, a member of the Defense Committee of the Supreme Rada, Ukraine's parliament, and Dr. Alexandr Honcharenko, Chief of International Security and Strategic Priorities Department of the Institute for World Economy and International Relations.

They therefore view the creation of Ukrainian armed forces as necessary to deter Russian aggression. Hence Kravchuk has claimed virtually all non-nuclear forces in Ukraine as his own, while Shaposhnikov, so far with Russia's backing, maintains that virtually all air and naval forces, most tank forces, and even according to one account, most military property including officers' clubs and tennis courts, belong to the CIS.

Black Sea Fleet. The dispute over the former Soviet Union's Black Sea Fleet illustrates in microcosm the Russo-Ukrainian dispute. This fleet includes 90,000 sailors, 350 surface ships, 28 submarines, and 159 airplanes. Russia considers the fleet the property of the CIS on grounds that it is a nuclear-capable "strategic" force. Ukraine considers it "non-strategic," and therefore Ukraine's. On January 2, Kravchuk demanded that the entire fleet swear allegiance to Ukraine. On January 9, Yeltsin responded by declaring that "the Russian Black Sea Fleet was, is and will be." The two sides decided to negotiate. On January 23, Shaposhnikov suggested that Ukraine should get only 7 percent of the Fleet. Ukraine disagreed. On January 23, the Russian Supreme Soviet voted to re-examine the "constitutionality" of the 1954 transfer of the Black Sea island of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine; Crimea is home to the Black Sea Fleet base of Sevastopol.[13] Kravchuk responded by calling the vote a manifestation of the Russian "imperial disease."

The dispute goes on, along with the struggle over ex-Soviet soldiers, tanks, artillery pieces, aircraft, and other forces in Ukraine. If these disputes lead to increasing tension, or even conflict, they are bound to spill over into the issue of Ukrainian nuclear weapons. If Ukraine fears war with Russia, it is unlikely to abandon its nuclear weapons no matter what assurances thus far have been given.

Using the Conflict. While a large-scale military conflict between the two is unlikely, geography, history, and politics will make Russo-Ukrainian relations prone to tension for years, perhaps decades, to come. On both sides of the border, politicians have not been beyond using, and sometimes abetting, Russo-Ukrainian conflict to advance their careers. Even though he was elected on December 1, 1991, with 62 percent of the vote, Kravchuk in particular has an interest in "standing up to Moscow" to bolster his credentials as a nationalist in light of his former role as chief of ideology under Ukraine's Moscow-appointed communist boss, Vladimir Sherbitsky.

In Russia meanwhile, Vice President Alexander Rutskoy is shoring up a possible political challenge to Yeltsin by positioning himself as a Russian nationalist and raising territorial issues. Even Yeltsin is not beyond brinkmanship with Uk-

13 Stalin transferred Crimea from Russia to Ukraine in 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, signed by Ukrainian Cossack leader Bohdan Khmelnitsky and representatives of Russsian czar Alexei Romanov, which ceded much of Ukraine to Russia. Stalin of course believed at the time that the switch was meaningless since all real power resided in Moscow.

raine, stating through a spokesman on August 26 last year that Russia reserves the right to "adjust" borders with neighboring states.

RUSSIA MOVES TOWARD ITS OWN ARMED FORCE

In light of the intractability of Russia's conflict with Ukraine and the improbability of maintaining a unified CIS force, even without Ukraine, it looks increasingly likely that Russia will create its own armed forces out of the CIS force. Because it has clung to hopes of a unified CIS force, until March 16 Russia was the only former Soviet republic without a Defense Ministry or a Minister of Defense.

The nucleus of a Russian military already is in the making. Rutskoy on October 12 announced the formation of a Russian National Guard of 66,000.[14] In a televised New Year's address, Yeltsin referred to a National Guard of between 30,000 and 40,000 men.

In January, the Government of Russia introduced a military oath for members of the former Soviet armed forces stationed on its territory. Now soldiers swear allegiance to the "Russian Federation and its people."[15]

Pressure is growing among Russian military officers for the creation of a Russian force. Kobetz in early February advised that Russia should "openly state that it would defend its interests and build its own army."[16] A senior military advisor to Yeltsin, General Dmitry Volkogonov, in January advocated that Russia assume direct command of all formerly Soviet armed forces on its territory as well as the forces still deployed in Germany, the Baltic states, and elsewhere outside CIS borders.[17] And on February 23 Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Gennady Burbulis announced that Russia would set up its own Defense Ministry.[18] Yelstin on March 16 signed a decree setting up a Russian Defense Ministry and appointed himself Acting Minister of Defense. According to Volkogonov, Russia plans to create a force of 1.5 million, carved from the CIS military. For now, at least, there are no plans to disband the CIS military command.

WILL RUSSIA AGAIN BE A THREAT?

Although it now is under democratic leadership, Russia's eventual transformation into partner and ally of America by no means is assured. On the contrary. Without a major effort by the U.S. and the other Western states, and perhaps in spite of these best efforts, Russia could slip back quickly to authoritarianism and

14 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, October 15, 1991.
15 *Izvestia*, January 9, 1992.
16 *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, February 3, 1992.
17 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, February 13, 1992.
18 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty *Daily Report*, February 23, 1992.

militarism. On Russia's road from enemy to ally, there are many obstacles and potential diversions that ultimately could pose dangers to Russian democracy and to American security.

The main obstacle is the officer corps of the ex-Soviet military. Yeltsin cannot continue to hold power if the military decides to move against him or to throw its weight behind any of the neo-communist, extreme nationalist, or even fascist factions waiting in the wings.

The possibility of a military-backed coup against Yeltsin, or even a civil war if the military splits along pro- and anti-Yeltsin lines, poses dangers to America. The Russian military is disgruntled, disorganized, and increasingly politicized. A civil war could spill across former Soviet borders or mean divided control over CIS nuclear forces. A military coup likely would mark a return in some form of the expansionist state that for the past forty years has driven America to engage in a costly arms race and threatened America's interests in Europe and around the world.

A second obstacle is the potential for confusion and loss of control as parts of the former Soviet military begin to disintegrate and break up along national lines. As welcome as this development is in the long run, because it eliminates the security threat to America from a powerful and unified Soviet force, in the short run it creates problems. These include the possible loss of tight command over intercontinental nuclear forces and the potential sale by renegade military officers or even scientists of nuclear weapons or materials to outlaw states like Iran, Iraq, or Libya.

A final obstacle to Russia's transition from enemy to ally is the growing tension between the post-Soviet states of the CIS, particularly the behemoths, Russia and Ukraine. Aside from the risk of direct conflict between the two, the mere existence of tension nurtures and is used by neo-Soviet and other anti-democratic forces as a smokescreen to rally support for a return to militant, authoritarian rule.

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY AND AMERICAN POLICY

America's interest is to help Russia past these obstacles and to further its transition from enemy to ally. The goals are straightforward: a democratic Russia at peace with its neighbors; a Russian military firmly under civilian oversight and control and removed from politics; a Russian economy no longer dependent on military spending; and a Russia with firm, unified control over a vastly reduced ex-Soviet nuclear arsenal.

If this new Russia is created in coming years, Russia can be integrated fully into Western defense, including access to Western military high-technology and perhaps NATO membership. The time is not right for these steps now, since it still remains possible that Russia will slip back to authoritarianism. In the meantime, however, there is much America and its allies can do to keep Russia on the path of democracy and demilitarization.

The most important measures, of course, are those designed to support Russia's economic transition to a free market. These include humanitarian aid, technical assistance and advice, and even measures that will make the ruble a strong currency. A democratic, economically healthy Russia is the best assurance against the rise of a neo-Soviet regime.

Economic stabilization, however, will take time. In the meantime it is crucial for Bush to defuse the military threats to Russia's new democracy and its new relationship with America and the Western powers. Toward this end, Bush should:

✘ Assist Russia and Ukraine in peacefully resolving their differences over control of ex-Soviet forces on their territories.

Ukraine and Russia now are the two biggest nuclear powers in Europe and both have forces capable of reaching and destroying the U.S. It is in America's interest to avoid an arms race or possibly war between them. Moreover, the escalation of conflict between them would feed nationalist passions and likely strengthen the very authoritarian and militarist forces in Russia (and Ukraine) that could lead to a return to Russian or neo-Soviet expansionism. A failure to agree on the division of military equipment also would bring into question the ability of Russia and Ukraine to abide by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, important as a means of reassuring America's European allies as well as East Europeans against a Soviet-style re-militarization. Almost certainly a failure to reach agreement would put an end to Ukraine's announced intention to eliminate its long-range nuclear weapons by the end of 1994.

America already has taken it upon itself to mediate the Arab-Israeli dispute where arguably American security is far less directly at stake. America should offer its "good offices" to mediate the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the disposition of former Soviet military forces on their territory and possibly the territorial issues between them. Bush even could invite Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk to Camp David to work out a final settlement once preliminary negotiations had taken place. As added incentive, Bush should offer increased U.S. and allied support for economic recovery pending a speedy settlement of Russo-Ukrainian disputes, including the future of the Black Sea Fleet.

✘ Urge Yeltsin quickly to dissolve the CIS military and create a Russian military.

The Russian military would be formed from the ex-Soviet, now CIS, military force. The ex-Soviet Defense Ministry should be re-designated the Russian Defense Ministry rather than remaining a separate CIS entity. As soon as possible a Russian civilian Defense Minister should be appointed and Yelstin should step down from his post as Acting Defense Minister.

All nuclear forces would remain for the time being under a unified CIS command, but would come solely under Russian command once all non-Russian former Soviet republics give up their nuclear weapons.

Once it has carved its own army out of the former Soviet force, Russia will have to clarify its military relationships with each of the former Soviet Republics. Some, like the Baltic states and Ukraine, will want completely to separate their

own forces from Russia's, although some ethnically Russian officers may choose to stay on in these states serving their new governments. Some of the more poor states along Russia's southern border, including Khirgizia and perhaps even Kazakhstan, may seek closer defense ties to Russia. This might entail treaties to station some Russian troops on their territories to guard against external threats from such states as Iran and China.

✗ Establish U.S.-Russian "enterprise funds" to give small business and agricultural loans to demobilized Russian military officers and former defense-sector workers.

Enterprise funds now in place in Eastern Europe are governed by boards of directors comprised of private sector representatives from America and the host country. The funds give loans directly to individuals and groups seeking to set up businesses or farms; the loans do not go to the government. Russia's funds could be geared specifically toward demobilized military officers and former defense-sector workers seeking to set up small-scale enterprises.

Enterprise funds in Russia could be set up on regionally. A separate fund, for example, might serve the Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) region, now heavily dependent on military spending. The funds would help bolster Russia's democracy by reducing the risk of social upheaval posed by the former military officers and defense workers who will be thrown out of work by Russia's demobilization. Non-government investment should be sought by the funds, but up to $250 million in government funding also could be required.

✗ Create a Western-financed housing fund for demobilized Russian military officers.

A major impediment to cutting the size of the Russian army is that officers cannot find housing when they return home. The U.S., NATO allies, and Japan should establish a fund to build housing for former Soviet military officers after they are demobilized. The fund should be managed by a private board and all money should go to private Russian construction companies. Such a fund would give officers incentive to leave the military and give them a stake in Russia's democratization, as well as providing a boost to Russia's emerging private sector. German funding for ex-Soviet military housing, by contrast, has been spent to build housing on military bases for active forces, and much of this has been squandered on the inefficient ex-Soviet state construction industry.

✗ Expand nuclear risk-reduction measures.

Bush and the Congress give a high priority to the reduction of nuclear risks in the wake of the Soviet breakup. Bush wisely has pressed CIS leaders to keep former Soviet nuclear forces under a single, unified command; while the breakup of Soviet conventional forces along national lines is desirable because it divides the force into weaker pieces less threatening to the U.S. or its allies, the splintering of nuclear control merely multiplies the number of nuclear states capable of threatening America. For its part, the Congress last year appropriated $400 million to assist the transport, storage, protection, and destruction of Soviet nuclear weapons. America and Russia also will cooperate on ballistic missile early warn-

ing and may establish a center to help employ out-of-work Soviet nuclear scientists. Bush is off to a good start. He can do more including:[19]

- ☞ **A broad program to employ Soviet military scientists and laboratories** in joint scientific research and development projects including nuclear fusion, space exploration, and America's Superconducting Supercollider project to discover the building blocks of matter;
- ☞ **A cooperative intelligence effort** to track Russian atomic scientists and prevent them from working for hostile states or terrorist organizations;
- ☞ **A joint U.S. Russian effort to develop the technologies** and military means to track and destroy atomic warheads in the hands of terrorists or hostile states.

✘ Strengthen institutional links between the U.S. and Russian military establishments.

During the Cold War, exchanges of military personnel and other institutional links between U.S. and Soviet military forces were little more than public relations gimmicks. With the Soviet state committed to enmity with the West, Soviet military officers in contact with American counterparts were closely watched by the KGB, and many were themselves disinformation specialists and Communist Party loyalists. Today, however, this sort of contact can have real effect. With a Russian civilian leadership predisposed toward cooperation with America and eager to democratize Russian society, there is an opportunity over time to reverse the deep institutional animosity toward America that still exists among many former Soviet officers and soldiers and to help transform the former Soviet military into a law-abiding institution under political control.

A program to engage the ex-Soviet military could include: joint military exercises; cooperation with American forces in airlifting and distributing humanitarian aid within the CIS, Pentagon-sponsored seminars for Russian officers on civilian control of the military, and technical assistance to the Russian parliament on military oversight and budget issues. A special program office should be established in the Pentagon to develop and coordinate these programs with Russia.

✘ Forge cooperation on Strategic Defense.

With the U.S. and Russia both facing the prospect of an expanding missile threat from potentially hostile Third World countries, strategic defenses present a natural area of military cooperation. Yeltsin recognized this in his January 29 proposal for a joint U.S.-Russian global defense system. Secretary of State James

19 The following ideas are presented in greater detail in Jay P. Kosminsky, "U.S.-Russian Cooperation Can Reduce Nuclear Risks of Soviet Breakup," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 882, February 19, 1992.

Baker's announcement in Moscow on February 18 of a U.S.-Russian missile early warning system is an important step in the right direction.

The first stage of serious cooperation on SDI would involve the acquisition by the U.S. of advanced Russian technology. The Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Office has identified fifty technologies that would cut the development time and costs of America's strategic defense program, including high speed electric switches known as "tacitrons," electric rocket thrusters, space nuclear power, and liquid fuel rocket engines.

At first the transfer of military technology would have to be mainly one way, with America receiving Russian technology and expertise in return for its investment in Russia. Strict oversight procedures also would have to be in place to ensure that U.S. money is spent as intended. U.S. and Russian planners could begin working immediately on the design of common "architectures" for deployment and analyses of likely threats. If Russia remains over time on a democratic and peaceful path, defensive cooperation could expand into joint defensive weapon programs and deployments.

CONCLUSION

A new military superpower, Russia, is emerging from the ruins of the Soviet Union. Heir to the extant, if crumbling, Soviet military that for so many years threatened America and its allies, Russia's military future is America's concern. No longer enemy but not yet ally, Russia could in a few years be a tremendous strategic asset to America—perhaps even a NATO ally—or Russia could again be a danger to itself and the world. There is much Washington can do to move Russia in this direction. Doing so should be George Bush's highest foreign policy priority.

America's objectives include a democratic Russia, at peace with its neighbors, and with its military forces and nuclear weapons under firm civilian control.

Help From America. To help Russia toward these goals, the U.S. can offer its assistance in mediating the dangerous Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which threatens to inflame extreme nationalist and militarist passions in Russia and Ukraine. Bush also should encourage Yeltsin to disband the CIS armed forces, now operating outside of any real political authority, and to create a Russian military under his firm authority. To give Russian military officers a stake in Russia's demilitarization, America should create an "enterprise fund" to provide small-scale loans to help demobilized officers and ex-defense sector workers start small businesses and farms. The U.S. and its allies also can set up a fund to underwrite housing for demobilized officers.

America also can do more to help reduce the nuclear risks involved in the breakup of the Soviet Union, including more extensive programs to employ Soviet nuclear and other military scientists, and joint intelligence efforts to track renegade nuclear scientists and prevent nuclear terrorism. Strategic defense is another natural area of cooperation, given the increasing threat faced by Russia

and America from nuclear and missile proliferation around the world. Ties also should be forged with the Russian military, including joint exercises and assistance to the Russian parliament on improving military oversight and budgetary control.

Enduring Benefits. As the U.S. moves into the post-Soviet era, no foreign policy or national security issue is as important as the transformation of Russia from enemy to ally. Now, as Russia prepares to build its own armed forces, Bush can work closely with the Yeltsin government in assuring that the Russian defense establishment serves the cause of peace and stability. It may be, given the volatile situation in Russia, that America cannot forestall a return of militarism. But given the enduring benefits of success, for America and for Russia, Bush cannot afford to offer anything less than his best shot.

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