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BEYOND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE: AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE NATO, PRAGUE, AND MOSCOW SUMMITS

INTRODUCTION

President Bill Clinton leaves this week for Europe to discuss the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and U.S.-Russian relations. At his meetings in Brussels and Prague, Clinton should insist that NATO continue to be the premier collective security organization in Europe, able to defend America's vital economic and security interests in Europe into the 21st century. To do this, he should assure NATO allies that the U.S. will maintain an adequate military presence in Europe. He should also reach out to Central and Eastern European nations that suffered Soviet domination for nearly half a century and help to restore their rightful place in Western security institutions. Finally, while in Moscow, Clinton should encourage democrats to continue with reforms at home and choose cooperation over confrontation with the West.

The NATO "Partnership for Peace" (PFP) will provide the framework within which alliance transformation can take place. The PFP was proposed by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin October 20, 1993, at a meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, and endorsed by NATO foreign ministers on December 9, 1993, in Brussels. NATO heads of state will give final approval at their summit meeting in Brussels on January 10-11.

NATO leaders are expected to approve at the Brussels summit a process by which some, but not necessarily all, members will be able to use NATO facilities and capabilities for non-NATO contingencies, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The process, known as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF), will allow the United States to avoid military involvement in missions which have little bearing on U.S. national interests. Permitting the use of NATO bases, logistics networks, and communications capabilities will encourage America's European allies to continue regarding an American-led NATO as the only viable collective security organization in Europe.

Clinton's Partnership for Peace and the Combined Joint Task Force concept are necessary first steps toward eventual expansion of the alliance that acknowledges the dramatic changes Europe has seen in the past five years. They properly place the responsibility of membership on those nations, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, that claim they are ready for membership. These nations will be given the time they need—at their own pace and initiative—to modify their national security structures, armed forces, and budgets so that they can contribute to, rather than be a burden on, the alliance.

The Clinton Administration's proposals preserve the stability of the alliance at a time of great uncertainty in Europe and Eurasia. The recent elections in Russia, in which hard-line nationalists, communists, and other non-democrats polled well, underscore the need for NATO to be deliberate in expanding its security umbrella eastward.

During his trip to Europe, President Clinton can use approval of the PFP and CJTF as the framework within which to build a new transatlantic partnership between the United States and Europe for the 21st century. While at the NATO summit in Brussels, he should:

- ✓ **Support partnership offers** only to nations of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization or the European republics of the former Soviet Union, and exclude traditionally neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland;
- ✓ **Announce that the U.S. will support NATO membership** for key democratic partners as soon as they are ready for the military and financial responsibilities of alliance;
- ✓ **Encourage key allies to establish bilateral ties of assistance** with democratic partners that best demonstrate the initiative toward partnership and eventual membership;
- ✓ **Commit to a 1995 European Security Summit** of NATO and PFP partners to assess the progress toward additional membership;
- ✓ **Oppose partnership for Ukraine** until Kiev honors its international obligations to ratify the START I Treaty without qualification and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT);
- ✓ **Declare America's intention not to participate militarily in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations** which have no bearing on its vital national interests.

While meeting with Central and Eastern European leaders in Prague, Clinton should:

- ✓ **Declare the U.S. desire to see Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary enter NATO** as soon as they are ready;
- ✓ **Offer U.S. assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary** as they convert their national security structures and armed forces to be compatible with NATO membership.

From January 12-15, Clinton will meet with Russian President Boris Yeltsin. While in Moscow, Clinton should:

- ✓ **Declare his desire to see a democratic Russia join NATO** as soon as it is ready;
- ✓ **Offer U.S. assistance to Russia** to convert its national security structure and armed forces to be compatible with those of NATO nations;
- ✓ **Make no joint declarations of security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe** with President Yeltsin;
- ✓ **Discourage President Yeltsin's request for relaxation of combat strength limitations** imposed by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).

NATO ÜBER ALLES: EUROPE COMES FULL CIRCLE

By the time NATO defense ministers gathered at Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993 to lay the groundwork for the January 1994 summit, European and U.S. attitudes toward the Atlantic Alliance had come full circle since the end of the Cold War. The hope of many in 1989 that it was only a matter of time before a "United States of Europe" would provide for its own defense had given way by 1993 to frustration, highlighted by the failure of the European Community to stop the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia and a monetary crisis in the fall of 1992 that caused the collapse of the European monetary system. By the October 1993 meeting at Travemünde, the consensus sentiment was that NATO was here to stay, but that it also needed a redefinition of membership and mission.

Euphoria Turns to Frustration. When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, there was widespread satisfaction that NATO had done its job. As President George Bush noted in February 1990, "the Eastern European countries are throwing off the yoke of communism. The policy of NATO has prevailed."¹ What followed was an undeniable sense of euphoria. One analyst questioned whether or not communism's collapse and triumph of democratic capitalism marked the resolution of the Hegelian dialectic and, thus, "the end of history."² Responsible observers of America's Cold War foreign policy suggested that the U.S. military presence in Europe could soon be reduced to a token level as a united Europe shouldered greater responsibility for her own defense.³

For their part, throughout 1990 and 1991 the nations of the European Community negotiated the Treaty of European Union, signed at Maastricht, The Netherlands, in December 1991. The treaty established a "common foreign and security policy," the forerunner of a European collective security body that would also serve as a "European pillar" within NATO. The unspoken but obvious sentiment was that the Atlantic Alliance was anachronistic; the new world order demanded new European institutions that did not nec-

1 From a February 25, 1990, news conference, as cited in Kim R. Holmes and Jay Kosminsky, eds., *Reshaping Europe: Strategies for a Post-Cold War Europe* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1990), p. 202.

2 Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*, Summer 1989.

3 See Holmes and Kosminsky, *op. cit.*, p. 55ff.

essarily include the United States, and Maastricht was the first step toward establishing such institutions.


This euphoria began to give way by 1992 to the unsettling recognition that, while the Cold War had ended and the Soviet Union was gone, it was too early to tell what the final complexion of Europe would be. European public opinion was the first to reflect this: Danish voters rejected the Maastricht Treaty when it was put to a referendum in May 1992, while France—traditionally the country most desirous of a diminution of American influence in Europe—approved the treaty by just a narrow 51 percent to 49 percent in September 1992. Moreover, NATO retains overwhelming public support when compared with the Western European Union, the moribund security organization founded after World War II and designated in the Maastricht Treaty as Europe’s “defense component of the European Union.”⁴

The inability of the European Community to resolve its own political and military crisis in the former Yugoslavia also has contributed to the sense that a united Europe with a com-

mon foreign and security policy remains a distant hope. And as each member of the community struggles out of economic recession, the natural tensions of separate economic and social policies have led to dramatic anti-union actions, including the withdrawal of Great Britain from the European Monetary System in September 1992.

Finally, disturbing 1993 election results in Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and Russia have poured cold water on immediate hopes for a fundamentally new security order in Europe. In Poland and Lithuania, reconstituted versions of the former Communist Party won national elections, while nearly half of the parliamentary vote in the December 1993 Russian elections went to extremist parties of either the left or the right.

“**Plus ça change...**” Thus, by the fall of 1993, the terms of the European security debate had shifted from a gradual decline in NATO’s influence to a search for a “new U.S.-European strategic bargain”⁵ using the Atlantic Alliance as its foundation. Senator Rich-



4 Declaration of the Western European Union on the Role of the Western European Union and its Relations with the European Union and with the Atlantic Alliance, para. 2.

5 Ronald D. Asmus, Richard Kugler, and F. Stephen Larrabee, "America and Europe: A New Bargain, A New NATO,"

ard Lugar (R-IN) acknowledged the obvious in September 1993 when he noted that NATO is seen by European leaders as “the only credible organization that could make any difference”⁶ in post-Cold War European stability. Lugar spoke for many in the Atlantic Alliance when he asked:

Why are we [in NATO]? That is the basic question that has to be argued by the administration and by the Congress. I would say we are there because America must lead. There cannot be...European security...without the United States.⁷

Reflecting the new consensus, NATO defense ministers met at Travemünde in October 1993 to lay the groundwork for a revitalization of the alliance. While at Travemünde, the ministers had to grapple with three principal realities:

- ① **The U.S. wished to continue its significant military presence in Europe.** The Clinton Administration was committed to a presence of at least 100,000 troops;
- ② **The transition to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union was not complete, and should not be assumed.** Just three weeks earlier, an anti-reform coup in Moscow led to the occupation of the parliament building by the armed forces;
- ③ **Europe faced security challenges different from those of the Cold War, including regional and ethnic conflicts.**

The Clinton Administration proposed the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and the Combined Joint Task Force concept at Travemünde in response to these realities. The proposal met with broad support by the NATO defense ministers, and the run-up to the January 1994 NATO summit began in earnest. NATO foreign ministers endorsed the proposals in December 1993, and heads of state are expected to approve them at the summit.

THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace (PFP) is an invitation to non-members to begin working closely with NATO organizations—to become a “partner” of the alliance—and learn both the opportunities and responsibilities of membership in that complex organization. The offer envisions that each partner will negotiate with NATO to identify its desired level of participation. For example, the Czech Republic may offer NATO use of an ordnance firing range in exchange for the opportunity to learn NATO firing procedures. At the same time, NATO will establish a planning cell at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in Mons, Belgium, so that staff officers from partner nations can participate in NATO training and exercise planning.

unpublished study. The authors are RAND Corporation policy analysts; a published version can be found in “The Future of NATO” *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1993.

⁶ Address to the 1993 National Policy Forum, The Hudson Institute, September 8, 1993.

⁷ *Ibid.*

The strength of the PFP is that it is self-selective; it creates a “free market” for eventual NATO membership, depending on a partner’s willingness to participate in alliance diplomatic and military institutions and to transform its national security structures to resemble those of alliance nations. For example, while no specific criteria have been established, a partner hoping to be considered for NATO membership must satisfy basic requirements. These are:

- ✗ **Maintaining civilian control of military forces;**
- ✗ **Publishing defense budgets**
- ✗ **Reorganizing force structures and command authorities, while developing equipment and communications capabilities to make them compatible with NATO.**

Leaning Forward. Until the PFP was announced, many in Europe and the U.S. believed that NATO must “do something” for former Warsaw Pact countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had suffered under Soviet domination. Many continue to feel that NATO’s security guarantees should be extended to such countries as Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Typical of this sentiment was an opinion article from the Prague daily newspaper *Lidova Demokracie*, in which the author asserted that “the Yalta Accords on the post-war division of influence in Europe between the West and the East have not yet been replaced with anything else.”⁸ The same article compares the Travemünde meeting to the 1938 Munich Conference, at which British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain betrayed Czechoslovakia in the face of imminent Nazi occupation of the German-populated regions.

As understandable as such sentiment is, its advocates ignore the fact that the British and French capitulation at Munich came despite security guarantees each had made to Czechoslovakia. In fact, it was precisely because Britain and France were in no position to honor their guarantees that they sought a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Neither country was ready for war with Germany, and leaders in both countries felt Hitler’s desire for territorial expansion would be satisfied with portions of Czechoslovakia.⁹

The only parallel with Munich that exists today is that the great powers in Europe (including the United States) are equally unprepared to expand security guarantees beyond NATO as currently constituted. With the end of the Cold War, NATO public opinion favors fewer, not additional, military commitments. This is reflected in reduced public expenditure for defense: total NATO defense spending as a percent of gross domestic product has fallen from 5.1 percent in 1987 to 3.8 percent in 1991, and continues to fall.¹⁰

8 Editorial, “Frosty Wind From Yalta,” *Lidova Demokracie*, October 22, 1993. Cited in *USIA Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction*, October 22, 1993.

9 For an excellent discussion, see Paul Johnson, “The End of Old Europe,” in *Modern Times: The World From the Twenties to the Nineties*, Revised Edition (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1991).

10 See “Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries 1970-1991,” *NATO Review*, February, 1991, Table 3, p. 32, and *Report to the United States Congress by the Secretary of Defense on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, May 1993, Table A-3, p. A-12.

With public interest in NATO waning and defense budgets shrinking, European cries of another Munich sellout fall on deaf ears. The Partnership for Peace plan is, in fact, ahead of public opinion in most NATO countries. There is little or no public pressure in the U.S. and Western Europe to expand NATO beyond its current membership.

COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCES

If the Partnership for Peace takes a first, albeit tentative, step toward NATO membership expansion, the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept addresses the need for the alliance to redefine its missions for the threats it must face in post-Cold War Europe. NATO will find itself having to address crises that are short of the armed attack by hostile forces envisioned in the NATO treaty, including regional and ethnic conflicts such as in the former Yugoslavia. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations will also become more common, and NATO should have the capability to respond to such requirements. The Combined Joint Task Force concept is a step towards redefining future alliance missions.

How CJTFs Will Work. Details remain to be worked out, but CJTFs will probably be established as permanent “shadow” organizations within existing major subordinate commands in NATO, existing on paper only until they are needed to respond to an emergency. For example, the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces Central (AFCENT) will direct a senior officer within his command (a general or admiral of 1- to 3-star rank) to develop a standing contingency task force staff within the organization to respond, for example, to a regional crisis involving a mass exodus of refugees.

The CJTF would be available for crises to which NATO as a whole chooses not to respond. Such crises might be peacekeeping or humanitarian operations not covered in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, which provides for collective security against an “armed attack against one or more” members. As envisioned by NATO planners, CJTF activities may not even be in NATO’s area of operations as described in treaty Article 6.

Under these conditions, the CJTF would be “activated” and separated from its parent command (Allied Forces, Central in the example above), but augmented with NATO and non-NATO personnel as may be necessary given the crisis. For example, if a peacekeeping mission were established by the Commander of the CJTF, he may ask for and receive forces from non-NATO countries that wish to contribute. Furthermore, if the U.S. had chosen not to participate, it may still choose to lend non-combatant support in areas in which it has unique expertise, such as airlift and certain communications capabilities.

CJTFs would replicate an arrangement that already exists, for example, in the former Yugoslavia. The NATO major subordinate commander—the Commander in Chief of Allied Forces South (AFSOUTH)—has a French deputy commander, even though France is not a part of NATO’s integrated military command. A French general was assigned to this post because France has ground troops involved in the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia. In a similar fashion, non-NATO members such as Poland or Hungary could serve on CJTF staffs in some future contingency.

The CJTF will provide an avenue for participation in operations involving NATO members using NATO facilities for those nations pursuing the Partnership for Peace. For example, if the Czech Republic becomes a NATO partner, Prague may decide to assign

Czech staff officers and a Czech infantry battalion to a CJTF performing a peacekeeping operation in Romania.

At the same time, the CJTF preserves NATO as the premier security organization in Europe, giving it (and, thus, the United States) the "right of first refusal" on future conflicts. If the U.S. did not choose to participate in a peacekeeping operation in Romania, for example, then that operation could be conducted by a CJTF using NATO facilities without being considered as a NATO operation. As adjunct staffs to NATO major subordinate commands, CJTFs will have full access to and use of NATO facilities: headquarters, communications, tactical publications and procedures, and logistics. Thus, the European Union (formerly the European Community) will have a "defense component" as called for in the Maastricht Treaty, but one that has its roots in the Atlantic Alliance. Whether that defense component is an *ad hoc* collection of forces, a coalition of two or three willing European Union nations, or the entire ten-nation Western European Union will depend on the nature of the crisis. But if it is organized as a Combined Joint Task Force, it will be an outgrowth of NATO, and the transatlantic nature of European security will be perpetuated.

RUSSIA AND NATO EXPANSION

Russian official attitude toward NATO expansion has been erratic. In August 1993, President Boris Yeltsin made state visits to Poland and Slovakia, and said then that he would not object to NATO membership for either country. This understandably raised expectations in Central and Eastern Europe that the alliance would make offers of membership to the larger nations in the region.

Shortly after the anti-reform coup attempt in early October 1993, though, Yeltsin wrote a letter to NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner advising that Russia would perceive alliance expansion as a threatening gesture from the West. Many Russia observers believe that Yeltsin gained the support of the armed forces during the coup in part by agreeing to a harder line regarding foreign policy in the "near abroad," as the area of the former Soviet Union is called in Russian military doctrine.¹¹ That harder line presumably includes resistance to an Atlantic Alliance reinvigorated with new members from Central and Eastern Europe.

Reaction in aspiring NATO member states was to perceive Yeltsin's letter as a veto over the ultimate disposition of the alliance. "The West apparently respects more the views of Russia...than the wishes expressed by former Soviet satellites..."¹² was the way one Czech newspaper expressed the widespread sentiment in the region. Thus, when the NATO defense ministers met to discuss the American Partnership for Peace proposal in late October 1993, the belief throughout Central and Eastern Europe was that a more aggressive offer had been precluded by the Yeltsin letter to Wörner.

11 William E. Odom, "Yeltsin's Deal with the Devil," *Hudson Opinion*, Number 29, November 1993.

12 "Aspin: Healer of Illusions," *Svobodne Slovo*, October 22, 1993, as cited in *USIA Daily Digest of Foreign Media Reaction*, October 22, 1993.

In a December 1993 trip to Brussels, Yeltsin discussed the plan with Wörner, who subsequently said he believed "that there is a chance that Russia will participate" in the partnership.¹³ But just as Russia was warming to the idea of a closer relationship with NATO, the disappointing election results in Russia have reminded NATO of its core function: to defend the nations of Western Europe against an expansionist threat from the East. Such a threat can no longer be ruled out, given the strong support shown for the xenophobic and belligerent Vladimir Zhirinovskiy and his Liberal Democratic Party.

AN ACTIVIST AGENDA FOR PRESIDENT CLINTON

The PFP and CJTF concepts are a credible response to the demands for the transformation of NATO. They are certain to be approved by the alliance during the January 10-11 summit in Brussels.

But President Clinton should seize the opportunity at the NATO summit to outline a vision for NATO that goes beyond these transition arrangements. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were forcibly pulled from their traditional Western orientation after World War II. With the defeat of Soviet communism in the Cold War, the United States can now correct that tragedy by encouraging these important countries to become not only partners, but eventually members of NATO.

At the same time, Russia must be encouraged to continue on the path of democratic reform. President Clinton must balance Russia's concerns about an expansionist NATO with the need to check a revanchist Russia should reforms fail. By fostering a NATO partnership with Moscow, perhaps toward eventual membership in NATO as well, the U.S.-led Atlantic Alliance can straddle the gulf of mistrust that continues to exist between Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.

Clinton must demonstrate the leadership Europe expects from the United States as the only superpower. The President's comments throughout his trip will be closely watched for the signals that will determine the success or failure of the Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Force initiatives.

Thus, while in Brussels at the NATO summit, President Clinton should:

- ✓ **Support partnership offers only to nations of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization or the republics of the former Soviet Union.**

The international organizations in Europe comprise a confusing alphabet soup threatening to cancel each other's effectiveness: the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), the Western European Union (WEU), the European Union (EU), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), to name but a few. Unlike these organizations, NATO has the clarity of purpose and the diplomatic and military structures to plan, equip, and train for collective security.

13 "Russia Is 'Likely' to Join NATO Nations in 1994 Exercises," *The Los Angeles Times*, December 10, 1993, p. 2.

To prevent NATO from becoming another “talking salon” within Europe, where much is discussed but little accomplished, future membership in the alliance should be limited to those European nations that experienced Soviet domination and invasion. Doing so will limit the number of potential new NATO members, thus precluding an overextension of NATO’s borders and commitments. It will also permit NATO to focus on those countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary that are best suited to participate in NATO planning and training activities. Russia should be offered partnership and considered for eventual membership, as should the European republics of the former Soviet Union. A useful precedent is the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which applies only to those republics “west of the Urals.” This would properly preclude former Soviet Central Asia from consideration for future NATO membership.

In addition to trying to keep participation limited for practical considerations, there is an ideological consistency. If such Cold War neutral nations as Switzerland and Sweden could avoid the great clashes of ideals that World War II and the Cold War represented, then they ought not be offended by not being invited to take part in the partnership that will define the transatlantic security order into the 21st century.¹⁴

✓ **Announce that the U.S. will support NATO membership for key democratic partners as soon as they are ready for the military and financial responsibilities of alliance;**

The PFP announcement at Travemünde in late-October 1993 was met in Central and Eastern Europe with disappointment. The widespread belief among policy makers in Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest was that the U.S. decided not to offer them immediate membership because it did not want to appear to threaten Russia in the wake of the anti-reform coup attempt there three weeks before. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe fear being marginalized in a balance of power conflict between NATO and Russia; as expressed by Jiri Payne, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Czech Parliament, “The United States would like to have Russia as a strategic partner” in Europe.¹⁵

Such sentiment, while understandable, implies that the U.S. gets whatever it wants within the alliance, thus overstating the degree to which the U.S. is able to control events at NATO. The Partnership for Peace and Combined Joint Task Forces are the most that can now be expected of the alliance because of NATO public opposition to expanded defense commitments.

NATO aspirants will need time to become an asset rather than a burden to the alliance by converting their armed forces to make them compatible with those of their future allies. Moreover, NATO leaders will need time to prepare their publics for the additional commitments required by the expansion of NATO. The Partnership for Peace will provide that time, and should be used by NATO and the partners to pursue an ag-

14 Austrian neutrality was a condition imposed by NATO and Soviet Union in 1955. Nonetheless, at least for the initial moves toward NATO expansion that the PFP represents, Cold War neutrals are and ought to be of secondary priority behind the captive nations of the former Warsaw Treaty Organization and former Soviet Union.

15 “Closing of NATO Door Makes Czech Think About Spheres of Interest,” *Prague News*, December 2-16, 1993, p. 3.

gressive plan that can lead to membership. At Brussels, though, President Clinton should state unequivocally that future membership in the alliance will be determined by the initiative shown by PFP participants, and that the United States will support enlarging NATO not only when participants have made the necessary changes to their national security structures and armed forces, but when NATO determines that allowing them to join is in the collective interest of the alliance.

Such a declaration will give countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Russia the incentive to work closely with NATO to forge a partnership that transcends the need for early and overt security guarantees, which the allies are simply unprepared to make now. While no such guarantee would be implied by a unilateral U.S. declaration of this nature, it would give clear direction toward the goal of membership for those countries looking for U.S. leadership. Said the ambassador to the U.S. of one of these countries:

...the Brussels summit should unambiguously reiterate that the Atlantic Alliance is an open organization ready to accept new members whenever it sees the circumstances appropriate for such an expansion.¹⁶

✓ **Encourage key allies to establish bilateral ties of assistance with democratic partners that best demonstrate the initiative towards partnership and eventual membership.**

Those partners that wish to fulfill partnership agreements quickly and move toward NATO membership will need assistance on many fronts: advice, training, and equipment.¹⁷ Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary already have strong bilateral relationships with a number of key NATO allies, including the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Italy; there are several East-West officer exchange programs, for example.

During private talks with the leaders of key allies, Clinton should encourage them to expand ties with aspiring NATO allies, including Russia. This could be achieved by coordinating activities that can foster the transition to NATO membership. These could include:

- ✗ **Officer exchange programs between headquarters staffs;**
- ✗ **Exchange programs at military academies and war colleges;**
- ✗ **Joint training exercises at the company and battalion level;**
- ✗ **Defense equipment sales from the NATO nations' stockpiles;**
- ✗ **Training NATO aspirants in defense accounting and procurement procedures;**

16 "Comments on the Expansion of NATO and the 'Partnership for Peace' Initiative," Unpublished "non-paper" from a Central European Ambassador to the U.S., December 9, 1993.

17 A broad discussion of many of these areas can be found in Raoul Henri Alcalá, Rapporteur, *The United States, NATO, and Security Relations with Central and Eastern Europe*, The Atlantic Council of the United States Policy Paper, September 1993.

X Commit to a 1995 European Security Summit of NATO and PFP partners to assess the progress towards additional membership;

To prevent Clinton's partnership offer from being seen as little more than a cynical ploy to buy time before erecting yet another roadblock to future membership, the United States should take the lead in establishing a systematic review process by which partners can evaluate their progress. As part of this process, a summit of NATO members and partners should be convened in 1995 to review the progress of countries aspiring to membership.

The 1995 European Security Summit would be an opportunity to review the transatlantic security landscape with allies and their partners. At the same time, those partners that have made sufficient progress can be considered for NATO membership. NATO leaders might also consider establishing specific criteria for NATO membership at that summit. These could include ceilings on defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product, publicly available defense budgets, and civilian control of the armed forces

✓ Oppose partnership for Ukraine until Kiev honors its international obligations to ratify without qualification the START I Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

In September 1992, Ukraine freely acceded to the so-called Lisbon Protocol, named for the city in which the agreement between the U.S. and the four nuclear-armed republics of the former Soviet Union was signed. Kiev thus committed itself to ratifying the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In doing so, Ukraine became a successor state to the former Soviet Union, bound by the international obligations of those two treaties.

Since then, Ukraine has reneged on its commitment to ratify START I and the NPT. Despite repeated declarations that he would do so, President Leonid Kravchuk has found several reasons to avoid honoring the protocol. In November 1993, the Ukrainian Parliament ratified START I, but attached so many conditions and interpretations so as to make the action meaningless.

Whatever the reasons for these actions may be, Ukraine is failing to live up to an international commitment. That alone should disqualify it from participating in the Partnership for Peace and, by extension, from membership in NATO. If Kiev cannot live up to existing international commitments, there is no reason to believe that it would comply with the new ones that the Atlantic Alliance would impose. Therefore, until Ukraine ratifies START I and the NPT, it should not be invited to participate in the PFP.

✓ Declare America's intention not to participate militarily in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations which have no bearing on U.S. vital national interests.

One important aspect of the Combined Joint Task Force concept will be to permit the use of NATO facilities and capabilities for operations that do not constitute an armed attack on a NATO member (as prescribed in Article 5 of the NATO Treaty).

Such contingencies could include peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in places such as Bosnia or other areas of the former Yugoslavia.

Americans saw in 1993 the high cost of U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations where no vital national interests are at stake. More than two dozen young men died needlessly in Somalia in a humanitarian operation that was destined for tragedy once the objectives went beyond feeding the hungry. A cruel irony of America's superpower status is that such an expansion of objectives is all but inevitable once it chooses to become involved.¹⁸

If the American people equate Combined Joint Task Forces with peacekeeping, inasmuch as they now equate peacekeeping with what happened in Somalia, they will not support the expansion of NATO's missions the CJTFs represent. At the NATO summit, Clinton should declare that, as a rule, the U.S. will not involve U.S. combat forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations conducted by Combined Joint Task Forces. However, the U.S. may provide logistics and communications support.

While in Prague President Clinton should:

- ✓ **Declare a U.S. desire to see Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary enter NATO as soon as they are ready.**

NATO is not ready for new members. The instability in Europe argues in favor of some constancy, and NATO—the great Cold War agent of change—should be that constant. Moreover, the current member nations of the alliance are not yet prepared for the additional security commitments of expanded membership as they reduce defense budgets in the wake of the Cold War.

The great nations of Central and Eastern Europe understand the need for deliberateness. In the words of Poland's Foreign Minister:

[It] is practically beyond dispute that the entry of any country into NATO cannot happen overnight, that it has to be a process....[T]he Partnership for Peace will meet our needs, and will have our support, if it opens the prospect of NATO membership to partners....¹⁹

President Clinton should state without equivocation while visiting Prague that the U.S. understands the importance of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic participating in Western institutions such as NATO. He also should declare that the U.S. will support additional membership of NATO for democratic nations that participate in the Partnership for Peace and make the necessary changes to their security structures and armed forces that NATO requires.

Such a non-binding declaration from the United States will give these countries the hope they need: having once thrown off the communist yoke, they will not be ignored

18 For a full discussion, see Thomas P. Sheehy, "No More Somalias: Reconsidering Clinton's Doctrine of Military Humanitarianism," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounders* No. 968, December 20, 1993.

19 "Seven Statements on Poland's Security." Unpublished Remarks by Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland Dr. Andrzej Olechowski, December 1993.

by the one organization that can prevent them from wearing that yoke of tyranny again.

Czech President Vaclav Havel spoke for many when he expressed the esteem in which NATO is held:

If Western Europe can now enjoy such a measure of democracy and economic prosperity that it actually enjoys, it is undoubtedly due...to its having established together with the United States of America...this security alliance as a tool of protection of its freedom and of the values of Western civilization.²⁰

✓ **Offer U.S. assistance to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as they convert their national security structures and armed forces to be compatible with NATO membership.**

President Clinton should propose a series of bilateral assistance programs for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. These programs should include:

- ✗ Officer exchange programs between headquarters staffs;
- ✗ Exchange programs at military academies and war colleges;
- ✗ Joint training exercises at the company and battalion level;
- ✗ Defense equipment sales from U.S. stockpiles;
- ✗ Training in U.S. defense accounting and procurement procedures.

There are a number of potential funding sources for such programs, the cost of which would be minimal in any case. (Estimates of PFP costs per year vary from \$5 million to \$30 million.²¹) As part of established security assistance programs, several million dollars a year are already available for foreign officer training under the auspices of the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program.

There is yet another potential source of funding. Soon after the end of the Cold War, Senators Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Richard Lugar (R-IN) developed legislation to provide funding for the dismantling of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union. Since 1991, more than \$1 billion has been authorized to assist Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine in this way. The Clinton Administration should recommend that Congress authorize the use of Nunn-Lugar funds to support the Partnership for Peace.

Another potential source of funds is the President's defense conversion program. The Clinton Administration has proposed \$20 billion to help the U.S. defense industry convert from military to civilian production. Analysts at The Heritage Foundation have determined that Clinton's proposal will do more harm than good by encouraging defense firms with skills and capabilities unique and vital to America's defense indus-

20 Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review*, December 1991, p. 4.

21 "Money is Next NATO Hurdle In Integrating East Europeans," *Defense News*, December 13-19, 1993, p. 3.

trial base to abandon defense production.²² The Heritage analysts concluded that much of the \$20 billion will become little more than high-tech pork barrel funding for key congressional districts. This being the case, Clinton's defense conversion program should be canceled altogether, with a small amount of the money earmarked for the bilateral assistance programs described here.

While in Moscow, President Clinton should:

✓ **Declare his desire to see a democratic Russia enter NATO as soon as it is ready.**

When he first articulated his vision of strategic defense in March 1983, President Ronald Reagan understood that even a system designed for purely defensive purposes could be seen as threatening to a regime as insecure as the Soviet Union. Acknowledging this problem, Reagan boldly offered to share America's strategic defense technologies with the Soviet Union.

President Clinton can provide the same type of courageous vision by offering to bring Russia into the Atlantic Alliance. In Moscow, he should announce that the PFP is open to Moscow on the same terms offered to Prague, Warsaw, Budapest, and some nations of the former Soviet empire. Those terms include the prospect of future membership for those partners who restructure their armed forces and defense organizations to make them compatible with NATO.

Such an offer would undermine the sentiments expressed by such Russians as Yevgeny Primakov, head of the Russian foreign intelligence service, who noted last December that "an extension of NATO's territory to [Russia's] doorstep" would be a threat to Russian security.²³ It would also encourage Moscow to continue on the path of democratic institutional reform by encouraging civilian control of the armed forces and open defense budgets.

✓ **Offer U.S. assistance to Russia to convert its national security structure and armed forces to be compatible with NATO .**

President Clinton should make the same offer of assistance to Russia as recommended for Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. For funding, he should ask Congress to authorize the release of funds appropriated under the Nunn-Lugar legislation for denuclearization of the former Soviet Union. He should also use money saved from cancelling his defense conversion program.

✓ **Make no joint declarations of security guarantees for Central and Eastern Europe with President Yeltsin.**

Some in Central and Eastern Europe have expressed disappointment with the limited goals of the Partnership for Peace. They fear being sold out by the West, which

22 See Baker Spring, "Supporting the Force: The Industrial Base and Defense Conversion," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 964, October 22, 1993.

23 "NATO Backs Broader Links With Ex-Soviet Allies," *The New York Times*, December 3, 1993, p. 7.

puportedly fears antagonizing Russia, openly comparing the proposal to the Western powers' capitulation at Yalta during World War II.

Having lived through this experience, leaders in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are understandably leery of high-minded declarations from the West and Moscow regarding their future. Clinton should avoid granting Russia any special peacekeeping role in Central and Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union. Russian offers to participate in European peacekeeping operations should be handled within the context of Combined Joint Task Forces, an extension of NATO.

✓ **Discourage President Yeltsin's request for modifications to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE).**

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), between NATO, the republics of the former Soviet Union, and the former Warsaw Treaty Organization, was one of a series of historic agreements negotiated by Presidents Reagan and Bush that provided vivid, legal proof that the Cold War was over. The CFE Treaty, for example, precludes the stationing of troops by one signatory on the territory of another without the latter's approval. By reducing the number of conventional forces in Europe, and thereby eliminating the possibility of surprise attack, the treaty guarantees stability in Europe and is thus a linchpin of the post-Cold War security order.

In September 1993, Russia asked her treaty partners for relaxations of provisions limiting the number of tanks and other combat equipment in the so-called flank regions. The flank regions are described in the treaty as the borders around the "Atlantic-to-the-Urals" area in Europe to which the treaty applies. Relaxing the equipment limits in this way would permit the Russians to mass forces in such areas as the Transcaucasus, where there has been much ethnic and regional tension.

Thus far, NATO has resisted antagonizing Moscow by outright opposition to the Russian request, which has been bottled up by the treaty's cumbersome consultative procedure. However, the U.S. should be bold in preserving a treaty as important as CFE. Clinton's trip to Moscow offers an opportunity for the U.S. to publicly and unequivocally oppose a fundamental change to one of the pillars of post-Cold War Europe.²⁴ Therefore, Clinton should advise Yeltsin that the U.S. will oppose the Russian request for treaty relaxation.

CONCLUSION

President Clinton's first year foreign policy has been characterized by neglect, inconsistency, and drift. In the former Yugoslavia, the President antagonized America's European allies by raising the expectation of U.S. action but failing to deliver. In Somalia, the Administration allowed a humanitarian operation to become U.N.-led participation in a

24 President Clinton should be particularly concerned about an unravelling of the CFE Treaty. While his defense drawdown is excessive and ill-advised, it is unattainable without the lower European forces levels provided for in the CFE Treaty. See Lawrence T. Di Rita, et al., "Thumbs Down To The Bottom-Up Review," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 957, September 22, 1993, for a full analysis of the Clinton Administration's defense program

tribal feud, while a gang of Haitian thugs kept a U.S. warship from docking in Port-au-Prince to deliver U.S. and Canadian peacekeepers. Meanwhile, a concessionary approach to North Korean nuclear intransigence has allowed the hermit kingdom the time it needs to continue developing a nuclear weapon.

Despite his inauspicious start, the President has the opportunity to start his second year on a better note. To do this, he must exhibit firm leadership at the NATO summit and subsequent visits to Prague and Moscow. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) and Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept lay the groundwork for a transformation of the alliance at a pace that responds to American priorities: preserving NATO as the premier collective security institution in Europe; addressing the regional and ethnic threats facing the alliance; and beginning the process of expanding membership to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and perhaps even Russia.

The strength of the proposals the Administration will sponsor at the NATO summit are threefold:

- ① **The PFP reaches out to former adversaries in the Warsaw Treaty Organization and affords them the opportunity to work at their own level of interest and initiative with NATO political and military institutions**, without offering security guarantees or modifying the NATO Treaty in any way;
- ② **The CJTF concept preserves NATO as the point of departure for the European Union's defense component** by permitting the use of NATO facilities and capabilities for non-NATO operations;
- ③ **The PFP and CJTF together will put a NATO imprimatur on future peacekeeping and humanitarian operations** in Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union, even on those involving non-NATO participants in regions outside of NATO's traditional area of operations.

But the President must go further yet. Six months after the NATO summit, in June 1994, he will be in France for the 50th anniversary of the allied landings at Normandy Beach. The best possible tribute to the memory of the 10,000 brave young men who rest at Normandy will be if the President next week goes beyond the modest goals of the Partnership for Peace and creates a vision for European defense and security built on an expanded but still effective Atlantic Alliance.

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