

# POLICY *Review*

FEBRUARY & MARCH 2001, NO. 105

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# Pornography, Main Street To Wall Street

By HOLMAN W. JENKINS JR.

**P**ORNOGRAPHY IS NOT a subject one would expect to come up at a baby shower. But there I was when two Manhattan women of my acquaintance began discussing the web surfing habits of their husbands. It seems they had discovered the “history” folder on their spouses’ web browsers. That’s the folder that (unless you turn it off) maintains a list of web sites visited over the previous month or so. When they clicked, it popped open and revealed a list of porn sites running off the bottom of the screen.

What struck them most was the sheer astonishing breadth and variety of the porn trove. Tastes and fetishes that they wouldn’t have guessed existed are catered to by an endless universe of smut purveyors. They giggled over their discovery, disapproving but not terribly so. When one of the husbands came over, he giggled too. No harm done, right?

This came even as the presidential campaign was making a strange side-long excursion into panic about sex and violence (mostly violence) in the mainstream media. The Federal Trade Commission had just issued a report blaming Hollywood for marketing R-rated fare to children as young as eight.

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*Holman W. Jenkins Jr. writes the “Business World” column for the Wall Street Journal.*

The cacophony was deafening. Hearings were held before John McCain's Senate Commerce Committee. Hollywood executives were pilloried, denounced, and held up to public ignominy. Al Gore and Joe Lieberman promised that, if elected, they would give the entertainment industry six months to shape up — or else.

Of course, what “or else” meant was never clear. In quieter moments legislators admitted “or else” was nothing, because Washington wasn't about to get into the censorship business. Within a month of the election, the same FTC that had started the blaze solemnly pronounced that it had no intention of doing anything about the “abuses” it had uncovered. Nor would it advise Congress to do anything. This utter failure to propose a remedy was all the more striking when considered against the rhetoric the politicians had been spilling out a few weeks earlier, implying that entertainment violence was responsible for everything from the massacre at Columbine High School in Colorado to scholastic underachievement. Lieberman never missed a chance on the campaign trail to repeat his top applause line: “Parents shouldn't be forced to compete with popular culture to raise their children.”

**A**LARM OVER “sex and violence” in popular entertainment has been a recurring theme for at least a century. Yet it seems to recur without any progress in our understanding of the subject.

In fact, there is no reliable evidence of any causal link between imaginary violence in entertainment and violence in the real world. The nation has been witnessing a stark drop in the rates of murder, rape, and violent crime since the early 1990s. Does anyone suppose this was caused by a decline in violent themes in movies, TV shows, and video games?

Likewise, there has been a less striking but still significant decline in teenage motherhood, the spread of sexual diseases, and other indicators of promiscuity. We certainly can't credit this to any decline in the number of plot lines on “Friends” and other NBC sitcoms extolling the desirability of frequent casual sexual relationships. There is no question that a long-term transformation of sexual mores has been underway for decades, thanks to the pill, sex education, and so forth. Yes, the media undoubtedly serve as a transmission belt for changing attitudes. But that's a far cry from suggesting that people act on what they see in the media in a monkey-see, monkey-do manner.

Indeed, when you think about it, the assumption that sex in the entertainment media leads to sex in the world, or that violence leads to violence, is methodologically fishy. What foundation does this have except for a casual, intuitive belief that the imaginary must lead to the real? It seems just as plausible that imaginary sex might lead to violence or imaginary violence to sex. Or both might lead to shopping. The logic is not only questionable, but in a society as surfeited with every kind of entertainment as ours, the evidence that would allow any strong conclusion about the relationship between



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entertainment and social pathology is noticeably absent.

In fact, we know from the work of James Hamilton, an economist at Duke University, that the demand for violence in entertainment comes most strongly from young adults of both sexes. His study of Nielsen data shows that those most likely to tune into TV movies with violent themes are, first, males aged 18 to 34, then females aged 18 to 34. Both older and younger viewers are less interested in mayhem. Beyond doubt the big entertainment companies have figured this out, too. Young adults are their most prized demographic, the ones brand-name advertisers pay the most to reach. Yet if there seems to be a proliferation of violent entertainment, it's mostly illusory. Violent shows are less a staple of prime-time network fare than they were two decades ago (having been replaced, interestingly, by lawyer shows). Instead there has been a proliferation of all kinds of entertainment, as the multiplication of cable channels allows programming to be targeted more narrowly at different audiences. Now violent fare can be served up with less fear of annoying the audience who find violence distasteful or offensive.

More speculative is the question of why young adults demand violent-theme entertainment. Dolf Zillman, a psychologist at the University of Alabama, has studied the question and proposed an answer: Violent entertainment is really about justice. A question that particularly concerns young people is whether good or evil triumphs in the world, whether virtue is rewarded and meanness is punished. And it doesn't take a great deal of art (always in short supply in Hollywood) to encapsulate these themes in plots that make extensive use of violence. This makes sense, if only because the sheer prevalence of violent themes in popular entertainment suggests it needs some kind of explanation tying it to universal human concerns.

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**T**HAT'S NOT TO SAY there isn't plenty of room to criticize the entertainment media, but the focus ignores the proverbial elephant in the living room. While Republicans and Democrats were competing to see who could issue the most comprehensive denunciation of Hollywood depravity, they ignored an authentic and unprecedented phenomenon: the revolution in the availability of pornography.

Porn has moved out of a few segregated public spaces, the seedy book shops and triple-X theaters, and become ubiquitous on the web, on cable, in neighborhood video shops. Some consider this a good thing, since it promis-

es to put the red-light districts of our downtown areas out of business (with mixed results, however; see, for example, the January 1 *New York Times*, “With John Wayne and Sushi, Sex Shops Survive a Cleanup”). But I’m not sure we’re going to be happy with the bargain in the long run. The more accessible the material, the larger the number of people who will be willing to consume it (because they can do so discreetly). And here’s where the consequences get worrisome: the larger and more scalable the market, the more it can supply material to dovetail with every individual quirk or taste. Given the way porn seems to act on those who are most susceptible to it, we may be surprised at the results.

Trying to point this out (believe me, I know) is to invite scorn from liberal entertainment crusaders who accuse conservatives of being more afraid of sex than violence. I wrote a column in the *Wall Street Journal* on the subject during the presidential campaign, and the letters that came in response more often than not criticized me for muddying an important national debate over the “serious” problem of violence in the media by raising irrelevant objections about pornography.

Yet these critics have it backwards, I fear. Nobody has heard of self-help groups for people claiming to be “addicted” to sexual innuendo on “Friends” or to violence in Arnold Schwarzenegger films. Yet in the past few years, not only have organizations popped into being to aid people who feel a compulsive “addiction” to view pornography; the subject has also begun to arise with alarming frequency in divorce and custody proceedings. Internet porn, at least in the collective mind of the counseling industry, has emerged as a major threat to marriages. What’s more, if you have access to a newspaper database, you can find story after story about some locally prominent person being disgraced, arrested, or fired because of the discovery of a cache of porn on his home or office computer.

Such was the fate that recently befell a Harvard Divinity dean, a Disney Internet executive, countless college professors and school teachers, and other once-reputable citizens around the country. This is to say nothing of the mass firings that have rippled through numerous corporations (including the *New York Times*) after employees were caught misusing company computers to receive and distribute porn.

Dr. Mark Laaser, a co-founder of the Christian Alliance for Sexual Recovery (and himself a recovering “sex addict”), had this to say at a congressional hearing last year:

Many in the medical community feel that for a substance or activity to be addictive it must create a chemical tolerance. Alcoholics know, for example, that over the lifetime of their addiction, they must consume more and more alcohol to achieve the same effect. New research, such as by Drs. Harvey Milkman and Stan Sunderwirth, has demonstrated that sexual fantasy and activity, because of naturally produced brain chemicals, has the ability to create brain tolerance to sex. I have treated over a

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thousand male and female sex addicts. Almost all of them began with pornography.

Whether the medicalization of the phenomenon is appropriate is a fair question. But if a significant number of people believe their lives are being disrupted by an addiction to pornography, that already puts porn in a different category from run-of-the-mill entertainment sex and violence. All by itself, the fact that some people are seeking help entitles us to conclude something new and different is going on.

**T**HAT POLITICIANS would prefer to ignore the porn revolution and shout about a nonexistent crisis in media violence might seem a mystery at first. But media violence is a problem they're not really obliged to do anything about — that pesky amendment stands in the way. Plus, Hollywood is a powerful trade group. And the public clearly votes with its pocketbook in favor of the product.

To be sure, unstoppable technology plays a role in the ubiquity of pornography. But another factor is the near-collapse of obscenity enforcement since the Reagan-Bush years. Remember the Meese Commission on Pornography? Well, times surely changed with the arrival of the Clinton administration.

In the *New York Observer*, Dennis Hof, an associate of *Hustler* publisher Larry Flynt, gave as good a rendition of recent history as anyone could wish: "Here's what's happened. We've had eight years of lack of prosecution of a sex industry. Who's Bill Clinton going to prosecute with all his stuff going on? Janet Reno doesn't want any part of that. So the film industry has gone from 1,000 films eight years ago to 10,000 last year. Ten thousand pornographic movies. You've got Larry and [*Penthouse* publisher Bob] Guccione doing things that 10 years ago you'd go to prison for. Then you've got all the Internet stuff — dogs, horses, 12-year-old girls, all this crazed Third-World s— going on."

One reason the porn prosecutions dried up is that, shortly after taking office, Bill Clinton fired all the sitting U.S. attorneys. That wiped out an experienced cadre of prosecutors who had made obscenity a priority. After that, the administration focused exclusively on kiddie porn prosecutions, for all the obvious it-takes-a-village reasons. The Justice Department insisted it was merely making more efficient use of its resources: And indeed, while previous administrations had their successes, many garden-variety obscenity cases certainly did end badly for the government. Judges and juries have not always been friendly. But the threat of prosecution at least had the salutary effect of discouraging mainstream companies from involving themselves in the porn racket. That has changed in a big way.

Wall Street once wouldn't have touched the business with a 10-foot pole. Now it may not brag about the association, but reputable brokerages have been glad to help porn-related companies win public listings on U.S. stock

exchanges. Venture firms have been major backers of companies that provide billing and tracking services for on-line smut merchants. For that matter, Visa and Mastercard play a large role in the industry by processing its payments. (American Express recently stopped processing charges for “adult” sites, but the reason was the inordinate volume of “chargebacks” by customers who denied patronizing the sites when the bills came due.)

Though they don’t advertise the connection, respectable companies like AT&T, Time-Warner, and the Hilton hotel chain have quietly become major players in porn distribution. A few years ago the cable TV folks wouldn’t go near the stuff unless (as in New York City) the porn entrepreneurs managed to get on a mandated “public access” channel. The cable industry’s resistance has now completely crumbled. Consider the

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success of Hot Network, provided by Steve Hirsch’s Vivid Entertainment Group, the industry-leading producer of high-quality sex videos. Since its launch in 1999, Hot Network has taken the cable world by storm. As one cable executive anonymously told the *Journal’s* Sally Beatty, “The No. 1 complaint we get is that it’s not explicit enough.”

America Online, in a sense, is one of the biggest beneficiaries of the Internet porn wave, even though it doesn’t consider itself “in” the porn business. Yet in private moments, people at the company will acknowledge that a very large part of their subscriber traffic is people who use AOL to gain access to the pornucopia available on the Internet beyond AOL’s own content sites.

So huge has the industry become that it now has its own glitzy award ceremony sponsored by its own glossy trade magazine, *Adult Video News*. The Defiance Haven resort, on the island of St. Maarten in the Caribbean, has launched a new business host-

ing a procession of “adult travel” package tours. For a hefty sum, fans can spend three days partying and socializing with their favorite porn queens. Last October, the lineup included sex stars Taylor Wane, Julia Parton, and Bianca Trump.

Whole genres of pop music are now in the process of coalescing with the “respectable” porn industry, most notably represented by Vivid, whose stable of Vivid Girls is much in demand for autograph signings at Tower Records and local video outlets. The *New York Times* recently noted the “creepy” fact that rap music, professional wrestling, and porn “have aligned to shape a real audience, one that looks awfully hardened.” And both Fox News and MTV have invested airtime in exploring what Fox called the “rock-porn connection” (though MTV was comparatively weak on disapproval).

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Nobody knows how big the industry is, though the most quoted estimate is about \$5 billion in annual sales (with another \$1 billion for Internet porn). *Adult Video News* claims sex videos, mostly produced in suburban Los Angeles neighborhoods like Chatsworth and Reseda, generate more in sales and rental revenues than legitimate Hollywood manages to earn at the domestic box office. Porn probably provides more employment for Hollywood's army of film technicians and set personnel than mainstream film production does.

**Y**ET FOR ALL THE FIERY denunciations of mainstream Hollywood during the election campaign, even an acknowledgment of the porn industry's existence seemed almost taboo. This was strange. Wouldn't denouncing the porn explosion be a potential home run for any politician who might be seeking to ride America's renewed concern (as confirmed by every poll) with "values"?

One reason for the reluctance might be related to the cultural divide reflected in the election result (with Al Gore winning the heavily populated coasts, George Bush winning small-town and rural America). As Francis Fukuyama wrote in the *Wall Street Journal* shortly after the election, the division suggests that sexual mores after Bill Clinton have become a political minefield between two Americas that politicians have decided it's better to avoid:

That conservatives held a losing hand in the culture wars became painfully evident during the Monica Lewinsky impeachment saga. There is hardly anyone in the country who approved of President Clinton's behavior. But a substantial number of Americans disliked the Republicans even more intensely for what they perceived to be moralism on this issue . . . . [T]he perception remained that the Republicans were passing judgment on an area of personal behavior that was a matter of individual moral choice.

By acclamation, the one exception to the official blind eye is child pornography. Indeed, such is the enthusiasm to bust kiddie-porn miscreants that law enforcement has veered close to entrapment in some cases. The Disney executive's first trial ended in a hung jury for exactly this reason. As with the attack on mainstream media sex and violence, campaigners can present themselves as protecting children rather than policing the behavior of consenting adults.

Whatever the reason, the porn genie won't be stuffed back in the bottle. Yet this genie comes with a likely train of genuine social pathology whose limits we'll just have to discover. One can only speculate here, but pornographic sexual images are quite different from entertainment sex and violence: They are real. They are processed differently. The "suspension of disbelief" has always been baloney: The essential question for healthy psycho-



logical functioning is the ability to distinguish reality from fantasy. People watching a Schwarzenegger shoot-'em-up know it's make believe. That's why they can watch graphic depictions of murder and mayhem without flinching.

Likewise sexual quips on the typical tv sitcom, or even a steamy Sharon Stone scene, aren't arousing in the sense that pornography is. The fictional media don't play on the powerful chemical signals that real sexual stimuli activate, producing states of motivation so powerful they can temporarily overwhelm even strong sensations like hunger or fatigue. Now this stuff is coming into the homes of people who would otherwise never have encountered it. And porn lends itself to the power of digital technology, which can scale up a mass audience at virtually no additional cost per customer. Where it gets interesting, if that's the word, is that the same scalability allows more varied and narrow tastes to be served. If you have a susceptibility to, say, African American lesbians engaged in "water play" that you didn't know about, the web is the place to find out.

The people providing this material are a side of the business without the fixed addresses and scrubbed and healthy face of Vivid Entertainment and its Vivid Girls. In the early 1990s, the "mainstream" porn business got a black eye when one of its young stars, "Savannah," blew out her brains after a car accident. About the same time, another, Traci Lords, was revealed to have been underage when she made her films. Hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of her "product" had to be destroyed (and Lords, now reclothed as a "victim" of porn, went on to a career on network television, much to the annoyance of her former colleagues).

Since then, the "respectable" end of the porn business has made a point of hiring lobbyists, participating in charity, and campaigning for condoms against AIDS. There is no question that part of the industry has cleaned up its act. That, and its success at making celebrities out of a few leading porn stars, have made the industry increasingly acceptable company for the makers and marketers of mainstream pop culture.

But what about the other material, the "dogs, horses, 12-year-old girls, all this crazed Third-World s—"? To imagine that a great engine of exploitation and abuse doesn't lie behind this imagery is to live in a fantasy world. Just last year, for example, French porn star and 22-time surgical patient Lolo Ferrari died of a drug overdose at the age of 30. Much of the material arises in developing countries (especially Thailand and the Philippines) and makes use of subjects whose participation is driven by abject poverty if not outright duress.

**T**HOUGH THERE HAS been little study of the subject, the conventional wisdom of the porn industry is that the typical customer is a reasonably educated and affluent male in his late 30s or early 40s. It's not a business that has traditionally had any interest in marketing itself

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to kids. That said, the video revolution has made porn available on a scale and with an ease that didn't exist when I was in school. I'm told now that at college-age parties it has become de rigeur to have a sex video playing in the background. Not long ago a Florida coed protested successfully on civil rights grounds when her university stopped her from projecting a sex tape on the side of a campus building for a party she was throwing.

The Internet makes porn imagery even more easily available, and in virtually limitless variety. It would be a miracle if kids weren't finding this stuff, even if it means going around "filters" provided by their parents or their Internet service providers. A disabling obsession with porn is already frequently categorized as a paraphilia — a fetish, like pedophilia or coprophilia or an obsession with shoes. The standard view is that whatever causes someone to displace their sexual interest on a fetish object, it typically begins in adolescence or childhood. If exposure builds up tolerance, and tolerance makes the problem worse, having unlimited porn imagery within easy reach of every computer is likely to produce social effects that we haven't yet reckoned with.

Holding back these tides might seem a losing battle, but giving up the obscenity weapon certainly hasn't helped. Obscenity laws rest on the enforceability of a certain minimum "community standard." Where that minimum might lie has become a stumbling block for prosecutors, but the courts have generally upheld the right of communities to draw some kind of a line. Up until a few years ago, despite the unquestioned profits to be made delivering hard-core porn over cable lines, fear of political and legal repercussions kept the cable companies out of the business.

If the politicians want to launch a useful debate about the corrupting influence of the mass media, the place to start is not revisiting tired and unproven accusations about Hollywood sex and violence and public morality. For one thing, they're not going to do anything about a "problem" that has been debated at least since Elvis swiveled his hips on Ed Sullivan in the 1950s. On the other hand, it would seem within the normal job description of our political leaders to discuss a genuinely new phenomenon, one with consequences that are likely to be substantial if as yet unknown, and one where their own unheralded change in law enforcement priorities has played an important role. If the universalization of access to hard-core pornography isn't worth talking about, what is?

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
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# The Vice Presidency Grows Up

By ALVIN S. FELZENBERG

“**V**ICE PRESIDENT CHENEY to Wield Unusual Power,” said the headline on the jump page of a *Washington Post* story published late last year. The article speculated that George W. Bush’s vice president would function as the government’s CEO, with the president serving as chairman of the board. “Cheney to Play a Starring Role on Capitol Hill” proclaimed a front page *New York Times* article a week earlier. “Prime Minister Cheney?” asked the *Economist* on the cover of its year-end issue.

What was going on in the high temples of conventional wisdom as George W. Bush prepared to become the forty-third president of the United States? A certain amount of hype, perhaps. But these stories do reflect the enhanced role Richard Cheney will play in the new administration. Both because of the depth and breadth of his political experience (former White House chief of staff, former defense secretary, former member of the House leadership) and the political climate that awaits him (a 50-50 party split in

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*Alvin S. Felzenberg, who contributed “The Transition: A Guide for the President-elect” to the October/November issue of Policy Review, is a visiting fellow at the Heritage Foundation.*

the U.S. Senate), Cheney is poised to play a role unparalleled for a vice president. How involved in the administration he will be was much in evidence during the transition.

But this enhanced status and influence are not entirely a product of the particulars of Cheney's resume. They also reflect the increased power and influence the vice presidency has taken on in the past 50 years. Bush, by his own admission, had this in mind when he selected Cheney as his running mate primarily because of his experience in government.

The vice presidency has come a long way since Nelson Rockefeller dismissed it as "standby equipment." Now, vice presidents are senior advisors to the president, sometimes with a policy portfolio of their own, always as an integral part of an administration, and usually as an estimable political figure. By lore and tradition, vice presidents may command little respect. But based on their influence in recent years, they deserve far more.

This change has gone underappreciated, though its manifestations are everywhere. Pundits and politicians alike reflect the elevation of the office's status when they speak of a Bush-Quayle or a Clinton-Gore administration. Their counterparts in generations past never saw juxtaposed the names "Hoover-Curtis" or "Truman-Barkley" on anything other than campaign posters.

What accounts for the growing importance of the office of vice president? Several factors, including the age of jet travel, the power of television, cold war tensions, growing demands on the president's time — and, in a compressed period of time, a half dozen presidential illnesses, a presidential assassination, attempts on the lives of others, the resignation of a president, and impeachment. Each of these episodes brought increased attention to the nation's second highest office and the qualifications of the person filling it.

Since the office was created, one out of four vice presidents, whether through election in their own right or through death or resignation, became president. Every vice president elected or appointed since 1952 (Nixon, Johnson, Humphrey, Ford, Mondale, Quayle, Gore), except for two, either became a major party nominee for president or contended for the designation. (One of the two, Nelson Rockefeller, had competed for the GOP presidential nomination before and might have again, had Gerald Ford not appointed him vice president.) Two unsuccessful vice presidential candidates, Henry Cabot Lodge and Edmund S. Muskie, took a stab at their party's presidential nomination. A third, Bob Dole, received it.

All told, an office once deemed a political backwater has evolved into a recruitment field for presidents. Recent history shows that when presidential nominees select their running mates, they are also designating the "favorite" for their party's nomination four or eight years hence or even beyond.

It was for all these reasons that in 2000, both major contenders took more care in the selection of their running mates than their predecessors. Unlike in years past, both were deemed eminently qualified to become president should the need arise. They showed themselves worthy of that designa-

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tion in their debate, which had to have been the most substantive exchanges since vice presidential contenders began squaring off on television in 1976.

### An afterthought

**T**HE OFFICE'S RISE from a post of minor to major significance has been uneven. The vice presidency emerged in the minds of the Constitution's Framers as an afterthought. Their principal concern in establishing it was ensuring an orderly succession. Such is a problem monarchies do not have. Parliamentary democracies can form new governments in an instant. But republics that divide power among different branches and elect officials to specified terms need a designated method.

Although the Founders anticipated that vice presidents would succeed to the presidency, save for presiding over the Senate where he could vote in case of a tie, they did not give the vice president all that much to do. Benjamin Franklin, suggesting this was by intention, recommended the vice president be addressed as "Your Superfluous Excellency."

They also provided that the office's occupant be selected in a most peculiar manner. Believing the second most qualified man should fill the second highest office, they designated that the post be filled by awarding it to whomever received the second highest number of votes in the Electoral College. The first three elections held under these rules produced the two most distinguished vice presidents in history, John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.

Adams entered the post with no illusions of what was expected of him. "My country has in its wisdom contrived for me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived," he wrote. But he carried into office with him an asset no vice president can do without if he is to succeed, let alone advance his career: the complete trust of his president. This Adams returned in full measure. He cast 29 tie breaking votes in Washington's favor in eight years, making him one of the hardest working and most alert vice presidents in history.

The birth of the party system in Washington's second term decreed that Adams's relations with his vice president would be decidedly different from those he had enjoyed with Washington. Having been Adams's principal opponent in the campaign of 1796, Jefferson saw his post as vice president to be that of leader of the opposition. He spent his four years in the post plotting to replace Adams in the next election.

The election of 1800 brought to power a president and vice president of the same party, but produced a problem of a different nature. Jefferson and Aaron Burr tied in the electoral college. The decision went to the House of Representatives, as constitutionally provided. There, however, Burr, who had campaigned as Jefferson's running mate, decided to make a run for the presidency. Jefferson won on the thirty-sixth ballot. Some historians

attribute his victory to abstentions from Federalist supporters still loyal to the defeated Adams. Others credit it to the intervention of former Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton, who disagreed with Jefferson but distrusted Burr.

Burr used his first tie-breaking vote as vice president to signal his continued animosity toward his erstwhile rival. He cast his vote against a judiciary bill Jefferson very much wanted. Resolving that he had had enough, Jefferson had his partisans push through the Twelfth Amendment, which mandated that candidates for the top two offices run as tickets and that electors cast separate votes for each office.

Some, like Gouverneur Morris, who had crafted the language in the Constitution that created the vice presidency, thought a better solution would be to abolish the office. Historians like Arthur Schlesinger Jr. took a similar stand in the aftermath of Spiro Agnew's resignation as vice president in 1973 in the midst of a corruption and bribery scandal dating from his years as governor of Maryland. Morris prophesied that the office would experience a decline in prestige and be used for what he called "vote bait." That is precisely what happened as party bosses, political parties, and candidates began using the vice presidential nomination to shore up the ticket in portions of the country where it was weak.

Jefferson began the practice in 1804 when he replaced Burr with another New Yorker, George Clinton, longtime governor and uncle to the more famous DeWitt, future builder of the Erie Canal, and presidential hopeful in his own right. Deemed too old at the age of 69 to succeed Jefferson, the elder Clinton posed no threat to Jefferson's preferred heirs, Madison and Monroe. Yet because of his electoral popularity, Madison kept Clinton on his ticket in 1808, making him the first of two vice presidents to hold the office under two presidents. (John C. Calhoun later filled the role under John Quincy Adams and Andrew Jackson.)

The practice of merging competing factions at nominating conventions helps explain why all the vice presidents who succeeded to the presidency upon the death of a president in the nineteenth century — John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Andrew Johnson, and Chester A. Arthur — were passed over by the next presidential nominating convention. Harry Truman had it right when he observed that most vice presidents who succeeded to the presidency "were ridiculed in office, had their hearts broken, and lost any vestige of respect they had before." That was primarily because all came from the weaker faction in their party's electoral coalition and found themselves at loggerheads with the deceased president's supporters.

Tyler, a former Democrat, ran into trouble when he refused to embrace

## *The Vice Presidency Grows Up*

the “Whig” program the deceased William Henry Harrison (of “Tippicanoe and Tyler too”) had run on. Andrew Johnson was not even a Republican, but an antiseccessionist southern Democrat. He became the first president to be impeached, for obstructing the Reconstruction policies of the majority party, which had reluctantly agreed to grant him a place on Lincoln’s ticket as a show of “national unity” during the civil war.

Theodore Roosevelt, who had been foisted on McKinley’s ticket in 1900 by bosses upset with his reform agenda as governor of New York, broke the pattern in 1904, when he was nominated and elected to the presidency on his own. Calvin Coolidge did the same in 1924, helping establish a new pattern. Each ensuing “accidental president” was nominated for president. Truman and Lyndon Johnson won terms in their own right. Gerald Ford, the only appointed vice president to become president, was the only “accidental president” not to win election to the presidency, but he came quite close.

## Stormy relations

**F**ROM JACKSON’S DAY through Franklin Roosevelt’s, relationships between presidents and their vice presidents were, to say the least, mixed. Andrew Jackson and John C. Calhoun feuded over everything from etiquette to ambassadorial appointments to nullification. After Calhoun cast the deciding vote against confirming Jackson favorite Martin Van Buren as ambassador to the Court of St. James, Jackson replaced Calhoun on his ticket with Van Buren. Calhoun resigned before his term expired to join Jackson’s tormentors in the Senate. Van Buren, largely because of Jackson’s popularity and his own reputation as the “little magician,” became the last sitting vice president to be nominated for president until Richard Nixon in 1960 and the last elected prior to George Bush in 1988.

James K. Polk’s vice president, George Dallas, ended his political career when he cast a tie breaking vote in favor of a Polk initiated tariff reduction that was unpopular in Dallas’s state, Pennsylvania. Coolidge’s vice president, Charles Dawes, assured his political demise when he showed up too late to cast the deciding vote in favor of the president’s choice for attorney general.

Well into the twentieth century, the vice presidency’s primary function, other than that of “standby equipment,” was to serve as fodder for humorists. According to Finley Peter Dunn’s immortal “Mr. Dooley,” the presidency was “th’ highest office in the gift iv the people. Th’ vice presidency is th’ next highest and th’ lowest. It isn’t a crime exactly. Ye can’t be sent to jail f’r it, but it’s kind iv a disgrace. It’s like writin’ anonymous letters.”

Woodrow Wilson’s vice president, Thomas Riley Marshall, told the story of a woman who had two sons. One ran off to sea. The other became vice president. And neither was ever heard of again. On another occasion,

Marshall said the vice president was “like a man in a cataleptic fit; he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain, he is perfectly conscious of all that goes on, but has no part in it.”

Marshall’s witticisms gave way to solemnity after Wilson suffered a debilitating stroke. He dreaded that he would become president either through Wilson’s death or a congressional attempt to remove the ailing president. No procedure existed at the time that would have declared the presidency vacant except for impeachment. Few constitutional experts at the time considered incapacity a “high crime or misdemeanor.” Fearful that resignation would further damage her husband’s health, Mrs. Wilson began performing some of Wilson’s clerical and administrative chores without consulting Marshall.

Franklin Roosevelt enlisted his first vice president, John Nance Garner, a former speaker of the House, to help pass his legislative program. Feeling Roosevelt never appreciated his value to the administration and opposed to presidents serving more than two terms, Garner challenged FDR for the 1940 Democratic nomination. He is most famous for telling vice presidential hopeful Lyndon Johnson 20 years later that the office “was not worth a pitcher of warm spit.”

In his effort to replace Garner, Roosevelt began a practice that has been followed by every presidential nominee since. He announced his choice, expecting and demanding delegates to accede to it. Prior to 1940, with the notable exception of Jackson’s pick of Van Buren and Lincoln’s of Johnson, party bosses — often with the acquiescence of the presidential candidate’s managers, often not — selected both nominees. Henry Clay and Woodrow Wilson anxiously awaited word at home as to who their conventions decreed would be their running mates. Warren Harding’s managers exerted so heavy a hand dictating their preference that delegates rebelled and foisted the popular Massachusetts governor Calvin Coolidge onto the ticket.

In 1940, FDR demanded the convention select Henry Wallace as the vice presidential nominee. As dissent worked its way through the hall, he announced that he would not accept the convention’s (White House orchestrated) draft to a third nomination unless he ran with Wallace. Both were nominated.

## Substance, for a change

ONCE REELECTED, FDR became the first president to assign his vice president something substantive to do. He named Wallace to chair the Economic Defense Board during World War II. The vice president spent most of his time battling over turf with Reconstruction Finance Corporation Chairman Jesse Jones, whose agency had overlapping jurisdictions with his. Yet Wallace retained the president’s confidence.

Even that, though, was insufficient to assure him his job. Still concerned

## *The Vice Presidency Grows Up*

about Wallace's leftist leanings and wary about the president's health, party bosses remained strong enough, even at the height of a world war, to force a different nominee on Roosevelt in 1944. FDR notified the convention that, were he a delegate, he would vote for Wallace, but would accept its choice of Missouri Sen. Harry Truman.

When Truman demurred, FDR turned him around by passing word to him through an intermediary that "if he wants to break up the Democratic Party in the middle of a war, that is his responsibility." Returned to office, FDR never admitted Truman into his inner circle, as he had Wallace. He thought Truman so insignificant that he never bothered to brief him on the Manhattan Project.

Although Truman had selected his 1948 running mate, Alben Barkley, primarily for reasons of affability, a series of events transpired after Truman's presidency that assured Barkley's successors would never, if called upon, assume the powers of the presidency as ill-prepared as Truman was when he succeeded Roosevelt. One was the National Security Act of 1947, which provided the vice president a seat on the newly established National Security Council. Another was the election in 1952 of a master of organization, Dwight D. Eisenhower.

At first glance there was nothing in the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket to suggest that its election would greatly transform the nation's second office. The two had come together in a manner very much like the "balanced" tickets of the past. Nixon was from California. Ike lived in New York. Nixon had served in both houses of Congress. Eisenhower was not a professional politician. Through his successful pursuit of Soviet agent Alger Hiss, Nixon was a hero to conservatives. Eisenhower was a moderate. Ike was 62, Nixon, 39. When Nixon joined Eisenhower, few thought him ready to assume the presidency at a moment's notice. By the time he relinquished the post, everyone did. What happened in between? A lot.

Eisenhower came into office determined to make active use of his No. 2. He toyed with the idea of having the vice president function as a chief operating officer with himself serving as CEO, but he dropped the idea in favor of a military-style "staff" system, with his chief of staff, Sherman Adams, functioning in the COO role. In conformity with recommendations of a task force he chartered to study the office of the vice presidency, he decided to delegate to Nixon functions his predecessors rarely had.

One was to go on "good will" missions abroad, a task that whetted Nixon's already growing interest in foreign affairs. Nixon began his tenure with an extensive tour of Southeast Asia and ended it with the "Kitchen Debate" in Moscow with Nikita Khrushchev. In between were visits and

• *There was nothing in the Eisenhower-Nixon ticket to suggest it would greatly transform the nation's second office.*



repeat visits to every corner of the globe, including a widely covered venture to Latin America, then a hotbed of anti-American sentiment. In eight years Nixon also attended 217 national security meetings. Over time, he became a recognized expert on many foreign policy issues, which he discussed with fluidity.

In addition to his role in foreign policy, Nixon also had some domestic policy turf of his own. He served as head of the President's Committee on Government Contracts, and in that capacity pressed companies doing business with the government to abandon racially discriminatory practices. He won plaudits from business and labor when, in an ad hoc capacity, he helped settle a strike in the steel industry in 1959.

Because Eisenhower disliked partisan politics, Nixon carved for himself a role all his successors would later fill. He became the administration's "point man." His opponents regarded him more as its "hatchet man." Nixon performed well as a political partisan. As he campaigned for other candidates, he accumulated the *IOUS* that enabled him to win the 1960 presidential nomination with only token opposition.

Nixon grew in both visibility and stature when Eisenhower suffered a major heart attack, followed by a bout with ileitis, and a major stroke. Nixon's efforts to strike a proper balance between being prepared for power but not overeager for it became the model for future vice presidents. He presided over Cabinet and National Security Council meetings — but never sat in the president's chair.

After the president had fully recovered, he and Nixon exchanged a series of letters outlining the circumstances under which the vice president could act in the event of the president's disability and conditions under which the president might be determined unable to discharge his duties. Their exchange suggests an appreciation of the dilemma Marshall confronted during Wilson's illness 40 years earlier. The Nixon-Eisenhower exchange set the precedent for what became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

## Celebrity status

**T**HE ADVENT OF TELEVISION had a profound effect both on Nixon's career and on the evolution of the nation's second highest office. When he delivered his "Checkers" speech detailing his finances to a televised audience, Nixon acquired a celebrity status no previous vice presidential candidate had enjoyed. He retained it throughout his years in office, assuring his renomination in 1956.

His capacity to make news and attract attention extended to his wife and two young daughters, who together became the most covered "second family" in history. "Pat for First Lady" buttons became a staple of his 1960 presidential campaign. Voters were routinely kept informed of the latest comings and goings of Tricia and Julie.



## *The Vice Presidency Grows Up*

While Nixon's immediate successors as vice president continued the precedents he set, few until very recently built on them. Lyndon Johnson, the former Senate majority leader, grew embittered when John F. Kennedy failed to utilize his skills as a legislative technician. Kennedy did name Johnson chairman of Aeronautics and Space Council, an administration priority, but First Brother Robert made certain that LBJ remained outside Camelot's central orbit.

As president, Johnson showed a similar disdain for his own vice president, Hubert Humphrey. Recently released tapes have him berating Humphrey for not being more aggressive with obstinate Democrats, telling him that had he known Rep. Edith Green was so powerful, he would have selected her rather than Humphrey as running mate.

Through his selection of his 1968 running mate and the uses he made of him afterwards, Nixon appeared to display contempt for an office that had played so important a part in his rise. He rarely consulted with Spiro Agnew, and after a short time stripped Agnew of his newly acquired West Wing office. Unlike Nixon, Agnew, as vice president, showed no interest in honing his expertise in policy. He spent his time traveling the country, lambasting "radical liberals" and their allies through speeches Nixon aides William Safire and Patrick Buchanan had prepared.

The vice presidency took on increased importance in the aftermath of Watergate. Gerald Ford, the first vice president appointed to his post and confirmed by both houses of Congress under the terms of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, used his nine months in office to prepare himself for the presidency. He had gone into the post aware that the odds were strong that Nixon would vacate the office before the end of his term. Days before Nixon's resignation, Ford announced that he would cease defending Nixon and refrain from all comment on matters pertaining to Watergate, another indication of the fast-approaching end.

Once in office, Ford surprised his friends and angered his opponents when he announced his intention to appoint Nelson Rockefeller as vice president. After the instability that had beset the executive branch with the second resignation of a vice president and the first of a president in American history, Ford wanted to convey that he would be serving with someone universally deemed ready to become president.

Rockefeller, having been elected New York's governor four times, with service in the State Department under FDR and Ike also under his belt, was certainly that. Rockefeller had competed for the GOP presidential nomination in 1960 and 1968 and was preparing to run in 1976. Rockefeller had previously declined the second spot, arguing that he had never "wanted to be vice president of anything."

*The nation  
and world  
needed  
assurance  
that American  
leadership  
was stable.*

Yet he agreed to serve, because he shared Ford's concern that the nation and the world needed assurance that the American system of leadership was stable. His major condition was that he be named chairman of the Domestic Council — where he would, in the domestic field, command influence of the kind his protégé Henry Kissinger held over foreign policy.

Although Ford kept his promise, Rockefeller's hopes went unfulfilled. First he fell victim to a prolonged confirmation hearing in which leftist activists probed the Rockefeller family fortune. That delayed him from taking command of his post at the outset of Ford's administration. Once there, he found himself at loggerheads with other members of the president's team who either saw him as a rival to their own ambitions or at odds with the administration's policies.

With inflation and unemployment growing and Ford embarked on a veto strategy against the overwhelmingly liberal Democratic "Watergate Congress," the administration was not about to embrace costly initiatives of the kind Rockefeller was proposing. Moreover, Rockefeller's record as governor, which was decidedly liberal on both spending and social policy, earned him the wrath of party conservatives. Rockefeller further antagonized conservatives when he ruled from the Senate's presiding chair that a vote by simple majority rather than two-thirds could end filibusters. In the face of Ronald Reagan's hefty and spirited challenge in the primaries, Ford concluded that Rockefeller was a political liability and dropped him from his ticket months in advance of the 1976 convention.

Despite his frustrations in the policy arena, Rockefeller, because of his connections all over the world and independent sources of information, proved a valuable adviser to Ford. While he failed to persuade Ford to embrace most of his ideas, Rockefeller did provide information and advice to the president during weekly private lunches. This Ford-Rockefeller innovation became a part of the routine for every president and vice president since.

The office of the vice president also enjoyed enhanced ceremonial prestige during Rockefeller's abbreviated tenure. He designed its coat of arms and flag and pressed for and obtained the establishment of an official vice presidential residence, which he was the first to occupy.

## Major influence

**R**OCKEFELLER'S SUCCESSOR, Walter Mondale, was the first vice president to command major influence within and without the administration in which he served. His success stemmed from his self-effacing operating style, his greater experience in Washington than President Jimmy Carter, and his closeness to his party's dominant liberal wing. Unlike Rockefeller, Mondale did not seek "line responsibilities," preferring to participate as he chose in policy development. He requested and

## *The Vice Presidency Grows Up*

received all information that went to the president; obtained, at Carter's direction, support from White House staff and agency personnel; and maintained an able and independent staff.

Mondale endeared himself to Carter and his team in the course of their 1976 campaign. The two men had their campaign offices in the same place and had their staffs functioning as one by election day. The camaraderie between the two camps continued afterwards, with Carter taking many of Mondale's suggestions on personnel (he accepted several Mondale cabinet recommendations) and policy (pushing the administration to reverse spending cuts, establish the Department of Education, and attempt accommodation with the Soviet Union).

Mondale not only was able to bring his Senate staff with him (Lyndon Johnson had been allowed but two), but got two of his senior aides, David Aaron and Bert Carp, assigned to the No. 2 posts at the National Security and Domestic Councils, respectively. Through moves such as these, Mondale was assured a place within the information "loop" and never had to depend solely on White House aides for information. Carter and his team listened to Mondale because they liked him, found him loyal, and recognized his ability to retain able staff and keep himself well informed. His three principal advisers, James Johnson, Michael Berman, and Richard Moe, still command posts of considerable influence in Washington.

Mondale, unlike his predecessors, had no difficulty commanding an office in the West Wing, where he was part of the traffic pattern around the Oval Office. He was free to drop in on the president and his top aides at whim. At his weekly lunches with the president, Mondale went further than Rockefeller, sharing what political and other intelligence he had learned in addition to providing advice and recommending policies.

Although their respective staffs had not "meshed" as well as those of their predecessors, Ronald Reagan and George Bush devised a working relationship that, while not as personally close as the one between Carter and Mondale, exuded equal respect and trust. It began with Reagan's willingness to set aside "voodoo economics" and other criticism Bush had leveled against him and his proposals when they were competing for the 1980 presidential nomination.

With Reaganites simmering over the influence of "Bushies" in Reagan's administration, Reagan named Bush's friend and former campaign manager James Baker his chief of staff and retained other Bush advisers, including Republican National Committee Chairman Richard Bond, in high posts.

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Like Eisenhower and Ford, Reagan assigned Bush some line responsibility and called upon him during crises. Bush chaired Reagan's Task Force on Regulatory Relief and served as foreign policy "short stop" between dueling Secretary of State Alexander Haig and National Security Adviser Richard Allen.

Bush earned the trust of Reagan's inner circle through the dignity, reminiscent of Nixon's, with which he comported himself while Reagan was recovering from a near-fatal assassination attempt. Mindful of Rockefeller's experience, he avoided situations that placed him at odds with senior administration aides and conserved his time by delegating much of his line responsibility to trusted and competent aides such as his counsel, C. Boyden Gray.

*Al Gore  
provided  
"New  
Democrat"  
counterpoise  
to Hillary  
Clinton's  
liberal  
impulses.*

Bush upgraded the vice president's staff operation on Capitol Hill, where he actively lobbied on behalf of Reagan proposals. He regularly attended meetings of Senate committee chairmen, sat in on its Policy Conference, and kept up old ties with friends he had made through his years of service in the House.

Like Rockefeller and Mondale, Bush used his occasions alone with the president to share his views on policy matters. As a former CIA director, UN ambassador, and China envoy, he brought a unique perspective on foreign affairs. Nancy Reagan later remembered that her husband valued these meetings because he knew with certainty that nothing he and Bush discussed would be leaked.

Dan Quayle, like Bush, made Senate relations a priority during his tenure as vice president. A former senator who enjoyed friendships on both sides of the aisle, Quayle was prone to drop in unannounced on senators to "catch up" and make the "president's case." As Mondale had for liberals in Carter's administration, Quayle became the "in-house" advocate for conservatives in Bush's. While never voicing public criticism of the administration, he developed a reputation as a forceful voice for "movement conservatives" within the walls of the White House. Like Mondale and Bush, Quayle was credited by seasoned observers and old Washington hands for recruiting a staff of the highest caliber. Future *Weekly Standard* editor and publisher William Kristol was his chief of staff; future Rep. David McIntosh headed his most important policy shop, the Competitiveness Council.

Drawing on the Carter-Mondale precedent, Bill Clinton set out to make his vice president, Al Gore, as he would the first lady, a full partner in his administration. Early in his tenure, the press spoke of three "power centers" in the White House and speculated on what rivalries would ensue between the vice president and first lady. Competition did arise between the two over both policy and their standing with the president, with Gore providing

## *The Vice Presidency Grows Up*

“New Democrat” counterpoise to Hillary Clinton’s liberal impulses. He opposed her approach to health care reform and was one of the few senior Clinton advisers to urge the president to sign the Republican initiated welfare bill.

After the election of 1992, Clinton and Gore signed an unprecedented agreement delineating what powers Gore would exercise in the administration. While carrying no legal or constitutional authority, Clinton abided by its terms — although he did not always follow Gore’s advice. Clinton granted Gore a major influence over environmental and technology policy, had him supervise the “reinventing government” project, sent him out to build public support for the North American Free Trade Agreement, and delegated to him major aspects of U.S. relations toward Russia. Gore’s hand was seen in Clinton’s inclusion of environmental matters on the list of items over which the administration refused to compromise during two government shutdowns.


Like Mondale, Gore was able to have his principal advisers named to positions of influence. Clinton’s EPA director, Carol Browner, and Reed Hundt, the chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, were the two most prominent. Gore’s brother-in-law, Frank Hunger, headed the civil division of the Justice Department.

Dick Cheney is likely to build on the pattern established by his predecessors, carving out an even greater role for his office as he goes. Indeed, Cheney’s future may be a case of the man and the office finding each other.

One thing is certain: the second office has emerged from the shadows. No longer an afterthought, or a holding place, it has become a post of major influence and importance in its own right and the first place to look for possible future presidents of the United States.

**“Very, very important to the life of the United States, to the West, and, I am convinced, to freedom.”**

**—Jeane J. Kirkpatrick**



# **Commentary**

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# Why “Globalization” Didn’t Rescue Russia

By PAUL J. SAUNDERS

**R**USSIA HAS NOT LIVED up to its hype. After nine years of independence and tens of billions of dollars in international assistance — not to mention voluminous foreign advice — Russia is far from having met the expectations of a bright future so widespread in 1991, the time of the fall of communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union. Rather, Russia remains a poor, semi-authoritarian country — a considerable disappointment.

Boris Yeltsin’s surprise resignation just over a year ago rekindled long-frustrated hopes for rapid improvement. Instead of the ailing and erratic Yeltsin, who appeared to lack both the will and the political muscle to advance a radical reform agenda in his last years in office, Russia would have a younger, more vigorous leader backed by a newly supportive parliament. In fact, on Vladimir Putin’s first full day in office as president, President Clinton called the new Russian leader to tell him that he was “off to a good start” and that his appointment was “encouraging for democracy.” Secretary of State Madeleine Albright soon said that she was impressed by his “can-do approach.”

Despite this initial optimism from Clinton administration officials, however, Russia’s transformation under Putin has begun to look like one step forward and two steps back. While the country is experiencing modest economic growth, largely attributable to windfalls from high oil prices and a cheap currency, its political system and its foreign policy are increasingly troubling. The “dictatorship of law” proclaimed by the Russian president seems to be taking shape as simply a more effective version of the semi-

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*Paul J. Saunders is director of the Nixon Center.*



authoritarian system created by Yeltsin; justice is still dispensed selectively and is used in full force only against political opponents of the regime. Internationally, Moscow seems to be strengthening its ties with former Soviet allies such as North Korea while reviving decades-old efforts to expand and exploit differences between Washington and European capitals.

Taking into account these realities, we must ask why Russia has still not met the expectations that so many held for its future. Were our expectations realistic? If not, why not? What should we do?

## Great expectations

**T**HAT 1992 — the first year of Russian independence — should be a year of high hopes is hardly surprising. After all, the last months of 1991 were enormously exciting: They saw the end of 70 years of the Soviet empire and produced the enduring and heroic image of Boris Yeltsin fighting for freedom atop a tank in front of the Russian parliament building. The fact that the events of 1991 took place just after those of 1989, when communism collapsed in Eastern Europe, contributed to a widespread sense that democracy was sweeping the globe.

But by the end of 1992, Russia was plagued with hyperinflation, sharp political conflict, and considerable human suffering. By the end of 1993, Yeltsin had illegally — by his own admission in his memoir, *The Struggle for Russia* (1994) — disbanded the Russian Supreme Soviet and written a new constitution granting vast powers to the country's president, himself. The years 1994 and 1995 brought further troubling developments, most notably Russia's first brutal war in Chechnya and the odious "loans-for-shares" privatization. Yet throughout this period, and well beyond it, great expectations persisted regarding the development of democracy, the market, and "partnership" with the United States. Why did these expectations endure?

Part of the reason is, of course, that Russia was indeed making some progress. Since independence, Russia has held two presidential elections and three parliamentary elections. Each of these elections has been largely free, though most have been far from fair. Moreover, though cynical perspectives on Russia's underdeveloped democracy are widespread, many Russians have come to see elections as an essential component of their government's political legitimacy. Russia also managed to conquer hyperinflation — though at a terrible social cost — and at least nominally privatized a substantial portion of its economy. Finally, Russia avoided armed conflicts with its new neighbors, a fact that was morally and strategically appealing to the West; the former USSR did not become Yugoslavia writ large. Taken together, these developments allowed those already convinced of Russia's success to maintain their illusions.

Perhaps more important, however, was the fact that Russia's transformation took place in an environment dominated by an exciting new paradigm:



## Why “Globalization” Didn’t Rescue Russia

the theory of globalization. Probably best elaborated by *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman, the globalization thesis argues, in its simplest form, that the unstoppable flow of information across national borders is exposing a larger and larger share of the world’s population to the West’s prosperity. This creates domestic pressures for economic growth that can be met only with massive foreign investment which, in turn, depends upon the creation of political and economic institutions hospitable to a global “electronic herd” of investors. Not coincidentally, Friedman suggests, those very institutions also promote political democracy and market-based economics. Ultimately, because the electronic herd also dislikes the instability that results from interstate conflict, globalization also promotes peace among nations.

Though Friedman’s book on globalization, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree*, was not published until 1999, the fundamental tenets of the paradigm were already widely accepted — though not necessarily identified as such — by the early 1990s. In fact, they were clearly the foundation of the Clinton administration’s policy of democratic enlargement and its policy toward Russia in particular. In a September 1993 speech at Johns Hopkins’s School for Advanced International Studies outlining the “strategy of enlargement,” National Security Advisor Anthony Lake summarized this thinking, noting that “democracy and market economics are ascendant in this new era” and arguing that “to the extent democracy and markets hold sway in other nations, our own nation will be more secure, more prosperous, and more influential, while the broader world will be more humane and more peaceful.” The administration’s adoption of the globalization paradigm was evident not only in rhetoric but in action; less than one month after his inauguration, Clinton had already announced his intention to appoint a new undersecretary of state for Global Affairs with responsibility for a grab-bag of issues given heightened importance in the era of globalization, such as human rights, the environment, and narcotics trafficking.

### The failure of shock therapy

THE STRATEGY DEVELOPED to “globalize” Russia was known as “shock therapy.” Its implementation began with the January 1, 1992 elimination of price controls on most goods. The objective of shock therapy was, in essence, to create a market economy in Russia as quickly as possible. This was to be achieved by freeing prices and liberalizing trade policies, which would stimulate competition; and by privatization, which would create private property with all its attendant behavioral incentives for enterprises. At the same time, it was essential to make the ruble convertible and ensure that its value remained relatively stable. This meant controlling inflation and, therefore, keeping tight control of currency emissions and government spending.

Successful economic reform was to create a new middle class that would

become a powerful political constituency favoring the consolidation of economic and political reform in Russia. As Anthony Lake suggested, this would serve larger American interests by promoting peace between Russia and other democracies and, therefore, enhance American security.

Despite severe economic hardship and widespread dissatisfaction, which led to the replacement of acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar at the end of 1992, the Clinton administration quickly took up the banner of shock therapy upon entering office in 1993. In fact, administration officials applied heavy pressure to Boris Yeltsin to stick with the program throughout 1993, despite growing opposition in the Russian legislature. Only after Yeltsin's forcible dissolution of the Supreme Soviet in October and the victory of

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case for  
globalization.*

Communist and nationalist parties in the State Duma elections that followed did Strobe Talbott, then the coordinator of U.S. policy toward Russia, admit that Russians needed "less shock and more therapy." Nevertheless, the administration continued for years to press for rapid privatization, tight monetary policy, and other key components of the shock therapy program.

In a highly critical 1999 review of the role of the United States and international financial institutions in Russia's transition, former World Bank Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz suggests that the shock therapy approach, which he termed "the Washington Consensus," failed in Russia because it represented a fundamental misunderstanding of the reform process. He argued that policy makers adhered too strictly to neo-classical economic dogma and consequently gave little attention to the laws and institutions required for an effective market economy, to concepts such as corporate governance, or to the qualitative impact of their plans on Russia's citizens. Russia would have been much better off, Stiglitz suggested, if it had been advised to take a more gradual, consensus-based, bottom-up approach to reform that developed at least some key institutions before the conduct of large-scale privatization programs.

The eventual outcome of Russia's reform process is all the sadder when one takes into account the fact that from the vantage of 1992, Russia was supposed to be an "easy" case for globalization. At the time, in addition to having plentiful natural resources and a highly educated population, Russia was blessed by a vibrant free media, a leadership determined to pursue radical economic reform and rapid integration into the global economy, and a population eager to soak up American culture in any and every possible form. After a decade, Russia should have been well on the way to becoming a prosperous and friendly democracy. The fact that a country having so many advantages has failed to follow the course projected by globalization theory should raise serious questions.

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This is not to say that the globalization model is not useful; after all, it is readily apparent that the world has changed in fundamental ways in the past 10 years and that the globalization paradigm can explain much of what has happened. What is also clear, however, is that it does not explain everything — and that it can easily lead policy makers astray.

### Russian exceptions

**T**HE RUSSIAN CASE highlights four serious flaws in the globalization paradigm that facilitated unduly high expectations for Russia’s transformation. First of all, domestic pressures for change have not been nearly as strong in Russia as globalization seems to suggest they should be. While “new Russians” in Moscow and some other major cities rapidly became conspicuous consumers, most Russians just wanted what they called a “normal” life and did not feel particular yearnings to share in America’s post-industrial way of life. The continuing prevalence of nostalgia for the modest comforts of the Brezhnev era demonstrates that despite the wide dissemination of American and Western films and television programming — and the easy availability of other information about life abroad — most Russians are not yet so driven by a desire for specialty coffees, computer games, and sport utility vehicles to press for political or economic liberalization. Russians simply have not adopted Western lifestyles as the standard by which to judge their own.

In fact, a small but significant minority of Russians — including many in the first generation coming of age in the immediate post-Soviet period — are overtly hostile to American consumerism. Consider the popularity of a song called “Kill the Yankees,” which is not only a symbol of growing anti-American sentiment in Russia but a call to “kill the values of liberal, post-industrial society,” according to its author. The communal legacy of pre-Soviet rural Russia — and the storied ability of the Russian people to suffer any hardship — also limit pressure on the government to reform.

Second, because some investment will make its way to Russia even if the country makes only minimal political and economic progress, the economic pressure for reform is also not as significant as globalization predicts. To begin with, Russia’s abundant natural resources and large domestic market will draw investment from large multinational corporations unwilling to risk being shut out of Russia in the future. Thus Friedman’s “electronic herd” is not the only source of investment capital for Russia. Rather, firms producing goods and services (as opposed to portfolio investors) need to make a certain investment to establish the business infrastructure and relationships necessary to succeed in Russia if and when its overall economic conditions improve sufficiently to merit full-scale efforts. Unlike investors in hedge funds, for example, they cannot simply decide on a particular day to invest in the country and push a button to make it happen. Moreover, because the

potential profits in the energy sector in particular are quite substantial, diversified global firms have been willing to take risks.

As a related matter, the reality of the global economy is that multinational corporations compete more effectively when they enjoy economies of scale in both production and distribution. As a result, large multinationals must compete with one another for both global markets and substantial and diverse productive capacity. This similarly encourages modest investment in Russia — a market of 150 million — even in the face of continuing economic difficulties and political uncertainty. The fundamental condition required for investment of this type — and for the “place holding” investment described above — is predictability, not economic liberalism or even necessarily the rule of law.

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Another reason Russia is likely to win investment even in the absence of dramatic progress is more unique: The country’s massive capital flight during the 1990s virtually ensures a return of funds (now “foreign”). Again, the return of these funds does not require the consolidation of democracy or market reform; it demands only a sense of security that the state will not seek to recapture lost assets. This is, of course, a limited pool of money, some of which may already have been spent on consumption or invested in illiquid assets. But over the short term, it could provide a significant amount of capital for the Russian economy.

Finally, of course, for much of its post-independence history, Russia has been able to substitute massive multilateral credits for investment. This, too, is attributable to conditions specific to Russia: Because of its ominous nuclear arsenal, Russia was considered “too big to fail.” While this new form of “nuclear blackmail” is not accessible to most countries struggling with the global economy, some — such as North Korea — have been particularly successful at exploiting fear of their weakness to encourage foreign assistance. Vladimir Putin’s Russia has, of course, pointedly indicated that it no longer requires credits from international financial institutions (though Moscow is eager to reschedule Soviet-era debt).

It is true that none of these sources of investment are likely to provide sufficient funds to support meaningful long-term economic growth in Russia. Moreover, these sources of investment for Russia have no relevance for other nations struggling to cope in the global economy. In Russia, however, the combined total investment from these sources may well reduce pressure on the government sufficiently to permit the leadership to muddle along for some time.

A third flaw in the globalization paradigm that has been prominent in the Russian case is the lack of a persuasive relationship between economic

## Why “Globalization” Didn’t Rescue Russia

reform and democratization. In fact, Russia’s radical economic reformers were more often than not quite willing to cut corners in their pursuit of democracy to ensure the success of their economic agenda. Yeltsin’s forcible dissolution of the Supreme Soviet after months of conflict over his economic plans in 1993 is the prime example; the regular circumvention of the Russian Duma through “reform by decree” is another.

Developments in Vladimir Putin’s Russia also raise questions about the inevitability with which democratization will follow economic reform. The economic goals identified by Putin’s government seem to be precisely those recommended by advocates of the globalization paradigm; yet, the Kremlin’s political program seems increasingly authoritarian. Almost immediately after his inauguration, Putin began a two-front war on the only practical political checks on his power — Russia’s regional governors and the so-called oligarchs. Although his success against the governors remains mixed, the Russian president seems to have defeated the country’s two leading “opposition” oligarchs, Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, and to have tamed their media empires.

The Kremlin has also cracked down on Russia’s nascent nongovernmental sector. This has included renewed pressure on religious groups such as the Salvation Army, which has been denied renewal of its registration in Moscow, and on environmental groups. The pressure makes clear the ultimate limits on the effectiveness of NGOs in Russia, even well-financed Western groups. It also suggests that globalization proponents who hope that NGOs can be somehow used to outflank the Kremlin and work directly among the Russian people to promote democracy and Western values are likely to be disappointed.

No less disappointing to globalization theorists may be the fact that if Putin succeeds at fundamental economic reforms, Russia’s economy could become sufficiently attractive and predictable to draw considerable foreign investment without further democratization. Many Russians already advocate this so-called “Chilean model” for their country.

The final area in which the globalization paradigm fails in the Russian case is the linkage between prosperity and democracy, on one hand, and peace on the other. The notion that democracies do not fight one another formed the core of the Clinton administration’s justification for promoting democracy in Russia. President Clinton made this case early, in a 1993 speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, his first major essay of Russia policy: “If we can help Russia to remain increasingly democratic, we can leave an era of standoff behind us and explore expanding horizons of progress and peace,” the president said. This idea became a regular

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refrain of senior officials in his administration.

The contention that democracies are less likely to fight major wars with one another than other states has often been the basis for unrealistic expectations of harmony and cooperation. The early years of the U.S.-Russian relationship — during which Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev often gave considerably greater attention to “universal human values” than to narrow Russian interests — contributed to these illusions by creating a sense that Washington and Moscow no longer differed on fundamental issues and that Russia would acquiesce to U.S. wishes when it counted. The idea that global communications were homogenizing culture and values played a similar role in facilitating expectations of cooperative relations with Russia.

Nevertheless, it has become clear that the United States and Russia have profoundly different perspectives on a variety of issues ranging from NATO’s proper role to humanitarian intervention, national missile defense, and Caspian Basin pipeline routes. At a fundamental level, Russia is also clearly unwilling to be cast as America’s obedient junior partner. As a result, even if Russia were instantly transformed into a prosperous democracy, the U.S.-Russian relationship would remain tense and complex. In fact, a case can be made that a democratic Russia might take an even more assertive stance toward America: A foreign policy responsive to Russian public opinion would have to take into account the fact that some 85 percent of Russians now believe the U.S. is trying to dominate the world. A policy based on this notion would be unlikely to lead to the harmonious relations many globalization advocates seem to expect.

A broader problem is that peace is more than the absence of major interstate conflicts. A successful, democratic Russia could compromise very important and even vital American interests without engaging in direct hostilities of any kind. Continued Russian provision of nuclear and other sensitive technologies to Iran is an obvious example of how this could happen; diplomatic support for Saddam Hussein is another.

No less important, even if one accepts that democracies are less likely to fight wars with one another than other states, there is no evidence, as Christopher Lane argued in “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace” (*International Security*, Fall 1994), that they are less likely to engage in armed conflict with nondemocracies. Taking into account the small number of consolidated democracies among Russia’s immediate neighbors, a democratic Russia is hardly a guarantee against local aggression.

## American advice

**I**N ADDITION TO contributing to unrealistic expectations of Russia’s transformation, the globalization paradigm also influenced American policy profoundly. First, as suggested earlier, it contributed to a sense of historical inevitability that affected the tone of American advice to Russia.

## *Why “Globalization” Didn’t Rescue Russia*

In essence, senior U.S. officials told their Russian counterparts — and the Russian people — that the world was changing and Russia could only succeed by being on the right side of history. This was perhaps best illustrated by President Clinton himself in a September 1998 address to students at the Moscow State University for International Relations. Speaking just two weeks after Russia’s August 17 financial crisis, he repeatedly told Russians that their country must follow the “imperatives of the global marketplace” and the “rules of the game” to succeed. While it is certainly correct that Russia cannot expect sustained economic growth in the absence of fundamental reforms, the president’s speech was offensive to many Russians. Even an American journalist generally sympathetic to the administration noted the “lecturing tone” of Clinton’s remarks.

Importantly, the sense of inevitability facilitated by the globalization paradigm was moving in a particular direction: toward the American model. America’s economic success and preeminent place in the international system spawned a considerable literature in the 1990s arguing that the particular political, economic, and social arrangements established by the United States are the best suited to a globalizing world. A practical consequence of this renewed pride in “the American way” was a remarkable willingness to offer advice to Russia on even the most specific topics. One excellent example of this attitude is an April 1997 letter from Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers to First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly Chubais. The letter, which found its way into a Russian newspaper, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, included detailed policy advice for the country’s newly reorganized government, including tactical suggestions for winning approval of a new tax code in the State Duma and recommendations for restructuring Russia’s value-added tax (VAT).

The American propensity to offer guidance to Russia quickly became a sore point in the U.S.-Russian relationship. Today, the U.S. is widely viewed in Russia as an arrogant power that routinely interferes in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations and ought to be taken down a peg. In October 2000, Russian nationalists in the State Duma drafted a resolution demanding the right to observe America’s then forthcoming presidential elections. The unsuccessful draft expressed “profound concern about the danger of falsification of the results of the U.S. presidential elections, particularly in Texas, California, and other territories that were forced to join the United States.” (They expressed no specific concern over Florida.) Soon after it became clear that the election outcome would be murky for some time, President Putin himself wryly offered the assistance of the chairman of Russia’s Central Electoral Commission.

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The second consequence of the globalization paradigm for U.S. policy toward Russia was an undue emphasis on economics over politics. It seemed as if the U.S. government believed that American economic advice was so important for Russia's future that the means through which it was implemented were secondary. Thus, ironically, the United States was more or less openly allied with radical "reformers" prepared to use almost any political expedients necessary to impose their preferred economic policies.

Taking into account the sense of inevitability facilitated by the globalization paradigm, it is not surprising that top Russian and American officials developed strong working relationships with their counterparts. In addition to holding similar policy views, both sides seemed to believe that they collec-

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tively knew what was best for Russia — even if the country's citizens and their elected representatives in the legislature could not recognize it. Both also appeared somewhat insensitive to the social costs of their policy preferences.

It was thus that the "means" of Russia's transformation — economic reform — overtook the ends, democracy. The primacy of economics was apparent at the most fundamental level in the fact that assistance to Russia was conditioned not politically but economically and was managed not by the Group of Seven, for example, but by the International Monetary Fund. As a result, large multilateral credits continued to flow into Russia notwithstanding its brutal 1994-96 war in Chechnya and its unfair 1996 presidential campaign, which was characterized by lavish use of state funds for campaign expenditures and open manipulation of regional officials and the media. This could happen only because Russia's progress was evaluated primarily in terms of economic indicators — such as the inflation rate or the size of the country's budget deficit relative to its GDP — rather than the quality of its democracy. Russia's leadership was in fact rewarded for its use of undemocratic methods to achieve macroeconomic targets.

The emphasis on economics over politics also contributed to the administration's pressure on Russia for rapid reform whether or not it was politically sustainable. In fact, rapid reform was already quite unpopular by the end of 1992; parliamentary pressure to slow economic change at that time led to the replacement of acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar with Viktor Chernomyrdin in December. Despite this warning sign, however, the incoming Clinton administration pushed Boris Yeltsin to move quickly, and even endorsed his armored assault on the Supreme Soviet in October 1993 as a "democratic" solution to Yeltsin's disagreement with the parliament, as Strobe Talbott characterized it in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs



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Committee. It is difficult to imagine that Russia could be worse off today if Yeltsin had opted to work with the Supreme Soviet to develop a sustainable consensus on reform policy.

The final irony is that the economic policies that the Clinton administration urged the Kremlin to implement were in fact intended to serve political ends. The administration was not attempting to promote Russian economic success for its own sake, but rather to facilitate the development of a genuine middle class that would support and consolidate democracy. Tragically, neither objective was served.

### Realistic expectations

**I**N VIEW OF THE UNDUE expectations generated by the globalization paradigm — and the policy distortions it introduced — the new administration would do well to reevaluate the fundamental tenets of American foreign policy over the past eight years. In the Russian case, this means first and foremost developing expectations for Russia that are more realistic than those suggested by globalization theorists. The analysis above suggests at least four principles that must be accepted: that widespread popular pressure for economic or political reform is unlikely; that economic pressure for reform may be attenuated for some time; that even if Russia turns around, expectations for Russian democracy should remain modest at best; and that Russian foreign policy is likely to remain focused on the assertive (even if cautious) pursuit of Russian interests whether or not Russia achieves democracy.

More broadly, it is clear that a substantial effort must be made to undo perceptions of American arrogance, which are hardly limited to Russia. The first step must be an end to unsolicited advice to foreign governments on managing their own affairs, except of course in extreme cases such as genocide. The U.S. can and should explain what it will and will not support, but should not presume to tell others what policies best advance their own interests.

Similarly, the U.S. must give greater attention to the development of Russian democracy. Whether Russia is democratic — or at least semi-democratic, with leaders constrained by the rule of law and modest checks and balances — is much more important than how many enterprises remain under state control or what level of subsidies they receive. Only democracy can place significant and lasting constraints on Russia’s leaders. This should not suggest further intensive American involvement in Russian affairs; the United States should simply communicate clearly that Russia will not be treated like a democracy if it does not act like one.

Finally, to the extent that the globalization paradigm is valid, it describes an international system dominated by the United States and its values at almost every level. It is a system in which Russia — with a weak and moder-

ately sized economy, a culture that has modest regional influence at best, and a minuscule number of Internet connections — cannot hope to be a truly major player for some time. Thus, if Russia is to embrace globalization, its citizens must not only implement difficult reforms and open themselves to the outside world, but also radically alter their national self-image. Status as a former superpower means little in an increasingly interconnected world. To succeed in this environment, Russia needs to begin to develop its own hype — that is, to find its own role in the system — rather than striving to satisfy the expectations of others.

The key is to reconcile Russia's ambitions as a major power with the reality of its current condition. Unfortunately, the Clinton administration often

*A Russia that does not find a satisfactory place in the global system could threaten the entire edifice.*

bent over backwards to give Russia a role it had not yet won on merit. This was most obviously the case with Russian membership in the exclusive G-7 at a time when the country was neither economically advanced nor a real democracy. The subsequent collapse of the Russian economy — and the new war in Chechnya — have further weakened Russia's case that it is an equal partner to the U.S., Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, and Canada. Catering to Russia in this fashion serves only to make its process of self-definition more difficult.

Nevertheless, some of President Putin's early remarks have been encouraging; he has been blunt with the Russian people about their country's economic troubles and the constraints they place upon Russia's role in the world. A pragmatic approach to Russia's situation would use Russia's strengths, such as its natural resources, its educated workforce, and its success with certain advanced technologies (without proliferating dangerous technologies), to pull the rest of its economy into the twenty-first century. This would require difficult economic decisions, but could allow Russia to move from a role essentially as a regional power with a considerable nuclear arsenal to a real place at the table as a major power. It could also give Russia a sufficient stake in the system to moderate Russian behavior.

At the same time, the global system must bend somewhat to accommodate the diverse cultures and values of Russia and other key states. The single force to which the globalization paradigm may be most vulnerable is backlash from countries and social groups that believe they are being excluded or left behind. A Russia that does not find a satisfactory place in the global system could threaten the entire edifice through destabilizing behavior — particularly if China, Iran, or other major states similarly uncomfortable with the globalization paradigm should join the effort.

This is unlikely to mean a new Cold War or a global ideological struggle; Russia can afford neither. However, taking into account the enormous

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degree to which the international economy depends upon stability and predictability, provocative Russian behavior — again, especially in combination with others — could have a profound effect upon international markets and, therefore, on the system as a whole. Significantly, this does not require any kind of grand strategic alliance; limited tactical cooperation among Russia and other key states could be sufficient to threaten important American interests.

How would the world oil market react to a successful Iranian nuclear test made possible by Russian assistance? What if the test were followed by a unilateral declaration of Palestinian statehood defended by Russia and China in the United Nations Security Council? How would financial markets react to an Asian arms race facilitated by desperate Russian sales of missiles and missile technology to keep a still-struggling economy afloat? Would tottering Japanese banks survive the massive new wave of bad debt that could follow? What if energy markets and financial markets were stressed in this manner at nearly the same time?

These questions underscore the impact that globalization has on the international system as well as the dangers it presents — particularly if it is poorly understood. They also demonstrate why facilitating Russia’s efforts to find a place in the system must be a priority for the new administration.

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
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Leftover assumptions from the Cold War hamstring America's national defense planning.


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# Space Weapons: Refuting the Critics

By STEVEN LAMBAKIS

**C**LASHES OVER THE MILITARY use of space, usually a result of proposals to fund politically controversial weapons programs, have agitated and unsettled the country at various times throughout the space age. But though the world has changed, the intellectual and doctrinal foundations underlying the debate have not.

Since 1967, the Outer Space Treaty has banned the deployment of nuclear weapons in space. But what about other weapons? Although the United States has no plans to do so, it could deploy antisatellite (ASAT) or space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors using conventional explosives or high velocity impact. Currently, the Pentagon has technology development programs for the Kinetic Energy ASAT and the Space-Based Laser. In the long term, satellites or space planes could be designed to exploit high-energy laser, electromagnetic pulse, or high-power microwave technologies to degrade targets in space or on earth. President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative explored the feasibility of many such weapons systems. To some, these new-era tools of war hold out special military promise; to others, they represent a security and foreign relations nightmare.

Political excitement over the use of space also ripples through the foreign policy arena. Prompted by U.S. discussions and war games featuring space control and BMD weapons, in February 2000 the Chinese delegation to the United Nations Conference on Disarmament circulated a paper identifying

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“a present and pressing necessity” to prevent an arms race in outer space. A treaty forestalling the “weaponization” of space, argued the delegation, would have “the greatest bearing on global peace and security.”

Moscow agrees with Beijing on this subject. Russian officials regard the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty, which prohibits nationwide defenses against intercontinental ballistic missiles, as a bulwark against ideas for basing BMD interceptors and other conventional weapons in orbit. Russian President Vladimir Putin offered to host an international conference in 2001 to explore ways to prevent the “militarization” of outer space and enhance the current regime of international space law.

Historically, America’s vision has been that space should be free for transit and exploitation by all governments and private entities, provided such activities pose no harm to U.S. interests or security. Questions surrounding, first, the enforcement of this vision and, second, the possible use of space to strengthen America’s military prowess naturally will arise as the country struggles to resolve a more radical uncertainty: For purposes of national defense, should space be treated like the land, sea, and air? Or is there something different and sacrosanct about this forbidding environment?

Despite marked physical differences among the earthly and orbital environments, in my view there really are no meaningful characteristics that allow us to consider them differently from the point of view of policy and strategy. The ability to leverage outer space will continue to grow in importance for modern military forces and may make possible even more effective forms of combat.

Yet there are those who reach the opposite conclusion concerning the potential impact of space weapons on national security and international peace. They have argued their case in learned journals, the popular press, and before congressional committees — in many cases, repeating arguments first made decades ago. It is past time for a thorough review of the case for halting the progress of weapons at the edge of earth’s atmosphere.

## Stability then and now

**T**HE CASE FOR TREATING space as a sanctuary is grounded in two central concerns. The first is that the introduction of space weapons would radically destabilize security relationships. The second is that arming the heavens would undermine U.S. foreign policy by unnecessarily torturing relationships with allies (and potential warfighting partners) — and would cause anti-American coalitions to form and wage political and economic warfare against U.S. interests abroad.

The case against combat activities in space draws heavily on 1950s-vintage theories of strategic stability that evolved to support U.S. policy on nuclear weapons. As policy makers gave up on early disarmament initiatives on practical grounds, many who pondered defense schemes in a world with



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nuclear weapons focused on arms control and theories about the stability of deterrence. Responsible leaders sought political solutions and the establishment of international legal mechanisms for methodically reducing nuclear arms and improving transparency and predictability in decision making. This security approach sought to eliminate the possibility that the United States or the Soviet Union would perceive an opportunity for a “first strike” against the other. Such fears of nuclear instability and the escalation of regional conflicts have survived the Cold War and enliven commentary on national security today.

In this view, the military use of space has both stabilizing and destabilizing potential. Satellites perform nonthreatening, largely benign, and stabilizing military functions that contribute to nuclear deterrence and transparency. But weapons in space, especially antisatellite weapons, would risk impairing the very instruments and sensors we deploy in orbit to monitor potential enemies and maintain reliable communications. Reconnaissance satellites observe arms control compliance and provide strategic warning of an impending crisis. Infrared sensors on early warning satellites detect ballistic missile launches and, together with observation spacecraft, remain central pillars of peace and stability in the international system. A sudden attack against such spacecraft, in this view, would lead at once to heightened alert status and would aggravate instability in command structures. In today’s Russia, the situation may be even more dangerous, given the deterioration of command and control capabilities since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Misperceptions falling out of cloaked activities in space could lead to war and prime a conflict for escalation to higher levels of destruction, in this reasoning. Indeed, one may draw parallels with the famous gunfight at the OK Corral. When the first shot rang out in Tombstone, Ariz., the reflexive response of all was to shoot wildly at anything that moved. Assuming the proliferation of space weapons and a similar instance of provocation, combatants would be tempted to respond in a similar fashion. Each side would have very little time to assess the threat and select an appropriate response.

The deployment of space weapons, in the view of their critics, would accordingly increase sensitivity to vulnerability and needlessly heighten fears and tensions, thereby undermining deterrence. Out of fear of losing everything in a surprise war, a “first strike” against space assets (possibly a prelude to a first nuclear strike) could well make this fear self-fulfilling. In conflict, communications would be hindered, and our decision cycles would slow to the point at which we would not understand the events unfolding in space. The “fog of war” would assume a new density.

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In the view of space weapon critics, this is not the only danger. The deployment of spacecraft to gather and channel information of importance to the armed forces has militarized space already; but, they ask, can we not now draw the line to prevent the *weaponization* of space in a dangerous new arms race? After all, U.S. leaders ought not to assume that they can acquire space weapons unchallenged. Other states would respond. Moreover, those going second (or third or fourth) might have an easier time of it. They would strive to capitalize on years of American research and development, avoiding along the way early mistakes and exorbitant development costs. For prestige, foreign governments will not want to be left behind in this “Revolution in Military Affairs.” Indeed, out of self-interest, other states eventually would acquire capabilities to affect the course of war in space and even to strike the United States.

To build weapons for use in space, in this view, would be to recklessly disregard American history — in particular, U.S. experience with multiple, independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs. Our attempt to gain a technological edge over the Soviets in the 1970s backfired, critics argue. What resulted was a Soviet campaign to match and eventually surpass the U.S. MIRV capability. When the dust settled, each side had acquired the technology to increase substantially the number of warheads and destroy with alarming efficiency the other’s nuclear forces. We might, in this account, expect a similar result after Washington deploys its first space weapon.

## Upending foreign policy

**F**INALLY, CRITICS ASSERT, failure to exercise restraint in space arms would risk upsetting U.S. foreign policy and destabilizing international relationships. The United Nations has provided platforms for denouncing the militarization of space since the late 1950s, when U.S. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge expressed the hope before the General Assembly that “future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes.” Over the years, various U.N. state representatives have pleaded with the major powers to take the lead in preserving the purity of this environment.

In this view, deploying arms in environments unexploited by other states would earn for Washington the enmity of capitals around the world. They would see the strongest country in the world trying to become even stronger — and doing so in untraditional, unparalleled ways. This very condition would make it harder to retain friends and allies. The shadow of such weapons would alarm foreign capitals, much as the launch of Sputnik unnerved Washington.

The negative effect of space weapons on foreign opinion could have far-reaching consequences. The multinational coalition assembled by

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Washington to throw Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in 1991 might not have been possible if the United States had deployed space weapons in disregard of political sensitivities exhibited by the partnership countries. Washington's military plans, moreover, would provoke a costly hostility among potential adversaries and neutral parties in the absence of major threats.

Washington's October 1997 test of the Mid-Infrared Chemical Laser (MIRACL), developed under President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, against a dying U.S. Air Force satellite touched off some spirited international opposition. On balance, this experiment — a test of the ability of a laser based at White Sands, N.M., to degrade the effectiveness of a satellite's optical and infrared sensors — received scant attention in the foreign media. Yet a few editors, pundits, and analysts in Western Europe and Asia condemned and belittled Washington's development of systems to paralyze enemies by depriving them of their eyes and ears in space. To them, this event clearly signaled a new round in the arms race, and to many it foretold the revival of Reagan's "Star Wars" plan.

The idea of space warfare must create in the minds of government leaders around the world vivid images of merciless domination by a state with the power to rain fire upon unyielding enemies. Does Washington really want to conjure this image, critics ask. Do the American people want to provoke an arms race that, in the end, could leave their homes less secure once other states follow the U.S. lead?

Prudence counsels Washington to accommodate the concerns of other governments, in this assessment. The sensibility underlying this course is time-honored. In the words of *Federalist* No. 63:

An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national counsels may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed.

The principles of sound government, therefore, demand we pay heed to foreign opinion.

## Academic assumptions

**T**HE CASE AGAINST deploying weapons in space rests on a number of assumptions, often unstated. A careful look at the validity of these assumptions reveals serious problems — in many cases undermining the conclusions the critics draw.

One such assumption is that military developments over the past 50 years

have created a security environment in which certain tactical events or localized crises run an unacceptably high risk of triggering a general, possibly even nuclear, war. We are therefore more secure when we do nothing to upset the global military balance, especially in space — where we station key stabilizing assets.

Yet we have little experience in reality to ground this freely wielded and rather academic assumption. By definition, anything that causes instability in armed relationships is to be avoided. But would “shots” in space, any more than shots on the ground, be that cause?

When we look at what incites war, history instructs us that what matter most are the character and motivation of the states involved, along with the

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general balance of power (i.e., are we in the world of 1914, 1945, or 2001?). Fluctuations in national arsenals, be they based on earth or in space, do not determine, but rather more accurately are a reflection of, the course of politics among nations. In other words, it matters not so much that there are nuclear weapons, but rather whether Saddam Hussein or Tony Blair controls them and in what security context. The same may be said for space weapons.

The sway of major powers historically has regulated world stability. It follows that influential countries that support the rule of law and the right of all states to use orbits for nonaggressive purposes would help ensure stability in the age of satellites. The world is not more stable, in other words, if countries like the United States, a standard-bearer

for such ideas, “do nothing.” Washington’s deterrence and engagement strategies would assume new dimensions with the added influence of space weapons, the presence of which could help bolster peacemaking diplomacy and prevent aggression on earth or in space.

Insofar as we have no experience in space warfare, no cases exist to justify what is in essence a theoretically derived conclusion — that space combat must be destabilizing. We do know, however, that the causes of war are rarely so uncomplicated. Small events, by themselves, seldom ever explain large-scale events. When ardent Israeli nationalist Ariel Sharon visited this past fall the holy site around the Al Aksa Mosque at Jerusalem’s Temple Mount, his arrival fired up a series of riots among impassioned Palestinians and so widened the scale of violence that it kicked up the embers of regional war yet again. Yet the visit itself would have been inconsequential were it not for the inveterate hostility underlying Israeli-Palestinian relations.

Likewise, World War I may have symbolically begun with the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Yet a serious student of history would note that the alliances, the national goals and military plans, and the



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political, diplomatic, and military decisions of the major European powers during the preceding years and months were the true causes of the erosion in global strategic stability. By extension, if decisions to go to war are set on a hair-trigger, the reasons for the precarious circumstances extend far beyond whether a communications or imaging platform is destroyed in space rather than on earth.

Those who believe we run extraordinary risks stemming from clouded perceptions and misunderstandings in an age of computerized space warfare might want to take a look at some real-world situations of high volatility in which potentially provocative actions took place. Take, for example, the tragedies involving the USS *Stark* and USS *Vincennes*. In May 1987, an Iraqi F-1 Mirage jet fighter attacked the *Stark* on patrol to protect neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf, killing 37 sailors. Iraq, a “near-ally” of the United States at the time, had never before attacked a U.S. ship. Analysts concluded that misperception and faulty assumptions led to Iraq’s errant attack.

The memory of the USS *Stark* no doubt preoccupied the crew of the USS *Vincennes*, which little over a year later, in July 1988, was also on patrol in hostile Persian Gulf waters. The *Vincennes* crew was involved in a “half war” against Iran, and at the time was fending off surface attacks from small Iranian gunboats. Operating sophisticated technical systems under high stress and rules of engagement that allowed for anticipatory self-defense, the advanced Aegis cruiser fired anti-aircraft missiles at what it believed to be an Iranian military aircraft set on an attack course. The aircraft turned out to be a commercial Iran Air flight, and 290 people perished owing to mistakes in identification and communications.

To these examples we may add a long list of tactical blunders growing out of ambiguous circumstances and faulty intelligence, including the U.S. bombing in 1999 of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade during Kosovo operations. Yet though these tragic actions occurred in near-war or tinderbox situations, they did not escalate or exacerbate local instability. The world also survived U.S.-Soviet “near encounters” during the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1961 Cuban missile crisis, and the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. Guarded diplomacy won the day in all cases. Why would disputes affecting space be any different?

In other words, it is not at all self-evident that a sudden loss of a communications satellite, for example, would precipitate a wider-scale war or make warfare termination impossible. In the context of U.S.-Russian relations, communications systems to command authorities and forces are redundant. Urgent communications may be routed through land lines or the airwaves. Other means are also available to perform special reconnaissance missions for monitoring a crisis or compliance with an armistice. While improvements are needed, our ability to know what transpires in space is growing — so we are not always in the dark.

The burden is on the critics, therefore, to present convincing analogical evidence to support the notion that, in wartime or peacetime, attempts by

the United States to control space or exploit orbits for defensive or offensive purposes would increase significantly the chances for crisis instability or nuclear war. In Washington and other capitals, the historical pattern is to use every available means to clarify perceptions and to consider decisions that might lead to war or escalation with care, not dispatch.

## Drawing a line in space

**T**HE U.S. AND SOVIET experience with MIRVs is often brought up to show how Washington's "naïve" foray into missile madness provoked Moscow to respond in kind. But to arrive at this conclusion, one must suspend all awareness of the strategic context surrounding the MIRV decision and assume that America had (and still has) a monopoly on knowledge. While the United States appeared to lead the Soviet Union in MIRV technology, throughout the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks of the early 1970s, which featured the MIRV negotiations, Soviet missile engineers were already busily integrating the technology into their systems. At the time, it was generally expected that Soviet planners, who demonstrated true MIRV technology as early as 1973, would fully exploit this new innovation. U.S. actions, in other words, do not deserve blame for having provoked a Soviet countereffort.

Could we stop the historical progression of weaponry at the edge of earth? From the perspective of the strategist, a "line" between outer space and the atmosphere is strictly conceptual. Nothing in the world of tactics, operations, or strategy, and nothing in the logic of deterrence or the grammar of warfare, says there must be such a line. This leaves only the possibility of political decision to make it so. But the absence of universal political will means there is no practical way to enforce supporting treaties, laws, and proclamations.

One may ask, just because the United States unilaterally refrains from developing antisatellite weapons or space-based lasers, why do we assume that other countries will pause right alongside Washington? After all, not all innovations in war stem from provocation. While weapons developed and deployed by rival states surely influence decision making, it is unlikely that states procure weapons systems primarily to achieve a balance in arsenals. Some states certainly may strive to have what we have, but they also will strive to acquire and master those weapons that meet their unique security requirements.

Washington's very reliance on satellites for security, moreover, would appear to be a more plausible motivation behind any hostile state's desire to acquire satellite countermeasures. While China might wish to integrate ASATS into its arsenal to offset Washington's deployment of ASATS as part of a deterrence strategy ("you hit one of mine, I'll hit one of yours"), Beijing is likely to be more inclined to acquire satellite countermeasures independently



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of what Washington does in order to degrade U.S. space advantages, which may be used to support Taiwan.

To argue that states must follow Washington and deploy space weapons out of self-interest is to ignore the fact that self-interest has many faces. In the end, foreign officials must weigh personal, national, and party priorities and strategic requirements, understand political tradeoffs, and assess whether the national treasury and domestic resources could support plans to “match” U.S. weapons. Haiti’s security needs will not match those of Serbia, Iran’s will not match Canada’s, and India’s will not match those of the United States. Space control weapons, one must conclude, would not fit very well in the defense strategies of many nations. Foreign leaders, in other words, are not automatons. Between action and reaction always lies choice.

### No more coalitions?

**I**T IS FURTHER ASSUMED that deploying arms not possessed by other states in regions unexploited by other states would put the United States in a position to coerce, even terrify, other nations. One must note, however, that Washington already has the power to tyrannize and bully with its current arsenal — but it does not. The United States deploys unparalleled — even “uncustomary” — nuclear and conventional military forces and engages in peace and combat missions on a global basis. Yet the face of overwhelming American military might neither alarms allies nor incites aggression. The U.S. retreat from several forward bases and its positive global leadership, moreover, belie suspicions that, in this unipolar world, Washington harbors imperialist ambitions.

Recent criticisms surrounding the MIRACL test and the U.S. National Missile Defense program were well orchestrated and vociferous, but numerically shallow when put up against the larger body of international opinion. In fact, voices will inevitably rise, from all corners of the globe, to condemn U.S. military decisions and actions. Political assault is the price the United States pays for having global interests and power. There will always be attempts by foreign leaders and vocal minorities to influence U.S. procurement decisions through arms control and public condemnation. It costs little, and the potential gains are great.

Would a vigorous military space program alienate foreign governments to the point at which Washington could never again assemble a coalition similar to the one that defeated Saddam Hussein in 1991? This is doubtful. Leading up to the onset of war, the Iraqi leader’s actions, not President Bush’s initiatives, dominated foreign policy discussions abroad. Indeed, many Arab countries joined the coalition, despite America’s stout support for the much-hated Israel. Any significant anti-American rhetoric was quickly overshadowed by the singular goal of turning back naked aggression.

Similar international support may be expected in the future, even if the

United States were to deploy space-based interceptors to slap down ballistic missiles aimed at New York or Los Angeles or antisatellite weapons to blind prying eyes in times of crisis or conflict. When the stakes are high and the United States must act militarily in self-defense or to protect its interests, allies and friends are likely to judge U.S. activities in space to affect politico-strategic conditions on Earth appropriately and in context.

What about the *Federalist's* advice to seek the counsel of foreign parties to help resolve domestic policy squabbles? But the *Federalist* refers to *impartial* advice. To be impartial is to view both sides of a debate equally and without prejudice or bias, as would a judge. An infant nation far distant from the powerful capitals of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century might have little difficulty finding such counsel. Yet can we now say that in the foreign criticism thrown at the United States concerning its ASAT, ballistic missile defense, or directed energy programs, we can discern the voice of impartiality? Do we hear a voice of neutrality coming out of Beijing or Moscow? Can we declare with candor that Paris or Ottawa are sufficiently poised and disinterested to counsel Washington objectively? On this issue, politics divides hearts the world over.

## Stability revisited

WHETHER THE VAST, empty ocean enveloping earth will be traversable for military purposes and a battlefield where major political stakes are decided may be, ultimately, not a question for policy or deliberation but an inevitability. Yet having been brought up on a steady diet of bumper-sticker slogans concerning space and strategic stability, the country remains intellectually unprepared to discuss and deal with grave defense and foreign policy decisions involving space. "ASATS are destabilizing" and "space must remain a sanctuary" are punchy trumpet blasts, but they are not expressions of sober strategic thought.

A confident military power should strive to influence and be capable of controlling activities in all geographic environments affecting its prosperity and security. The United States does so on the land with its armies and border guards, at sea with a world-class navy, coast guards, and fortified bases, and in the air with fighters, bombers, and air defense assets.

Responsible leaders, it seems to follow, should strive to ensure a similar ability to influence and control activities in space. Given the increasingly commercial and international character of satellite operations, we must expect that America's public and private interests one day will be challenged or even attacked. To leave the initiative to others is to expose U.S. interests to the whims of the ambitious, the cunning, and the truculent.

A second reason for exploring new military uses of space is that they could provide our leadership and commanders life-saving options. Consider this. In fourth century BC Athens, the modern thinkers of the day proposed

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designing cities without traditional defenses — which included a street layout designed to confuse an invading enemy and a fortified wall around the city. Those who objected to such “old-fashioned” concepts proposed laying the streets out in tidy rows to improve the city’s appearance. Removal of the costly and aesthetically offensive walls would avoid a hostile appearance that might unnecessarily provoke Athens’ neighbors.

Critics of this “new thinking” believed that, while a visually pleasing and open city would be attractive, one should not adopt this approach at the expense of safety. The suggestion to remove the walls irked the more defense-minded, especially in light of the fact that the armies of the time were introducing new missiles and machines for improving sieges. The advocates for the city’s strategic defenses — the walls — argued that the city’s leaders would retain *the option* of treating the city as an open city, whereas the option of defense would not be available to leaders who chose to ignore the city’s military requirements. Particular weapons, in other words, do not commit a country to a particular policy course; rather, they offer offensive and defensive options in a world that often punishes inflexible policies and is unforgiving of those who blunder through decisions that can make the difference between war and peace.

Finally, strength at home and assertiveness abroad have ensured stability for the United States and much of the world during the past century. Capricious misfortune and aggression, after all, are the bane of the republic — and of international security. Military strength can help the United States and its allies direct chance more favorably and, in the worst of times, deter and turn aside aggression.

Vast practical consequences will fall out of policy choices concerning the nature of American space power, especially as they affect the composition of U.S. forces, military organization, and security strategy. The new administration and Congress must help the American people overcome a habit of viewing space weapons in isolation from America’s purpose. Should military requirements warrant and cost permit, space weapons could be invited to join the rest of the arsenal to secure American interests and contribute to global strategic stability.

The United States and its allies should resist enchantment with slogans that divert attention from new security possibilities, especially ballistic missile defense, which ought to be viewed in the broader context of space power. Far from jeopardizing stability and peaceful uses of space, American military power exercised on the edge of earth would contribute to world peace and freedom.



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# The Monochrome Society

By AMITAI ETZIONI

**VARIOUS** DEMOGRAPHERS and other social scientists have been predicting for years that the end of the white majority in the United States is near, and that there will be a majority of minorities. CNN broadcast a special program on the forthcoming majority of people of color in America.

President Clinton called attention to this shift in an address at the University of California, San Diego on a renewed national dialogue about race relations. His argument was that such a dialogue is especially needed as a preparation for the forthcoming end of the white majority, to occur somewhere in the middle of the next century. In his 2000 state of the union address, Clinton claimed that “within 10 years there will be no majority race in our largest state, California. In a little more than 50 years, there will be no majority race in America. In a more interconnected world, this diversity can be our greatest strength.” White House staffer Sylvia Mathews provided the figures as 53 percent white and 47 percent a mixture of other ethnic groups by 2050. Pointing to such figures, Clinton asked rhetorically if we should not act now to avoid America’s division into “separate, unequal and isolated” camps.

Some have reacted to the expected demise of the white majority with

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alarm or distress. In *The Disuniting of America* (1992) Arthur Schlesinger Jr. decries the “cult of ethnicity” that has undermined the concept of Americans as “one people.” He writes, “Watching ethnic conflict tear one nation after another apart, one cannot look with complacency at proposals to divide the United States into distinct and immutable ethnic and racial communities, each taught to cherish its own apartness from the rest.” He also criticizes the “diversity” agenda and multiculturalism, arguing that “the United States has to set a monocultural example in a world rent by savage ethnic conflict; the United States must demonstrate ‘how a highly differentiated society holds itself together.’”

Dale Maharidge, a professor and journalist who has conducted hundreds of interviews concerning race, class, and ethnicity in California, has devoted a book to *The Coming White Minority: California’s Eruptions and America’s Future* (1996). He reported that sometime between its publication and 2000, California’s population would be less than 50 percent white. As he writes, “‘Minorities’ will be in the majority,” a precursor to the 2050 state of racial composition nationwide, when “the nation will be almost half nonwhite.”

Maharidge comments that his interviews, observations, and research have shown that, especially in California,

whites are scared. The depth of white fear is underestimated and misunderstood by progressive thinkers and the media. Whites dread the unknown and not-so-distant tomorrow when a statistical turning point will be reached that could have very bad consequences for them. They fear the change that seems to be transforming their state into something different from the rest of the United States. They fear losing not only their jobs but also their culture. Some feel that California will become a version of South Africa, in which whites will lose power when minorities are the majority.

Whites in California have demonstrated their fear of the “browning” of America by forming residential “‘islands’ that are surrounded by vast ethnic or transitional communities, as well as deserts, mountain wilderness, and the ocean,” demonstrating, Maharidge predicts, “what the rest of America might become.” Whites and nonwhites alike also passed the anti-immigrant Proposition 187, which Maharidge links to these same fears about the end of the white majority. Maharidge warns,

California’s electoral discord has emanated from whites. There is ample evidence that white tension could escalate. What will California be like in 2010, when nonwhites make up 60 percent of the population? . . . And how will California’s actions influence the rest of the nation as non-Hispanic whites fall from 76 percent of the U.S. populace to just over half in 2050?

In contrast, John Isbister, a professor of economics at the University of



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California at Santa Cruz, asks us to ponder whether America is *too* white. He contends,

The decline in the white proportion is a healthy development for the country. . . . The principal case for a falling white proportion is simply this: it will be easier for us to transform a society of hostility and oppression into one of cooperation if we are dealing not with a majority versus several small minorities, but with groups of roughly equivalent size.

### One people

**A**S I SEE IT, both views — that of alarm and that which celebrates the ending of the white majority and the rise of a majority of minorities — are fundamentally wrong. These positions are implicitly and inadvertently racist: They assume that people's pigmentation, or, more generally, racial attributes, determine their visions, values, and votes. Actually, I claim and will show that very often the opposite is true. The fact is that America is blessed with an economic and political system as well as a culture and core values and much else that, while far from flawless, are embraced by most Americans of all races and ethnic groups. (To save breath, from here on, race is used to encompass ethnicity.) It is a grievous error to suggest that because American faces or skin tones may appear more diverse some 50 years from now, most Americans who hail from different social backgrounds will seek to follow a different agenda or hold a different creed from that of a white majority. While, of course, nobody can predict what people will believe or do 50 years hence, there is strong evidence that if they behave in any way that resembles current behavior of white, black, brown, yellow, red, or other Americans, they will share the same basic aspirations, core values, and mores. Moreover, current trends, during a period in which the nonwhite proportion of the population already has increased, further support the thesis that while American society may well change, whites and nonwhites will largely change together.

A fair number of findings, we shall see shortly, support the thesis that American society is basically much more of one color — if one looks at conduct and beliefs rather than pigmentation and other such external, skin-deep, indications.

A word about the inadvertent racism involved in the opposite position. To argue that all or most members of a given social group behave the way some do is the definition of prejudice. This holds true not merely when one argues that all (or most) Jews, blacks, or any other social group have some unsavory qualities, but also when one argues that all (or most) of a given group are antiwhite, alienated, and so on — because some (often actually a small minority) are.

One may argue that while of course there is no direct correlation between

race and political conduct, social thinking, and the values to which one subscribes, there are strong correlations. But is this true? Even if one controls for class differences? Or, is race but one factor among many that affect behavior? And if this is the case, might it be that singling out this biologically given and unyielding factor, rather than paying full attention to all the others, reflects a divisive political agenda rather than social fact? Above all, are there significant correlations between being nonwhite and most political, social, and ideological positions? I turn now to findings supporting the thesis that there are many more beliefs, dreams, and views that whites and non-whites of all colors share than those that divide them.

Some findings out of many that could be cited illustrate this point: A 1992 People for the American Way survey finds that most black and Hispanic Americans (86 percent and 85 percent, respectively) seek “fair treatment for all, without prejudice or discrimination.” One may expect that this value is of special concern to minorities, but white Americans feel the same way. As a result, the proportion of all Americans who agree with the quoted statement about the importance of fairness is a close 79 percent.

*Views about the nature of life in America are shared across racial lines.*

A 1991 poll of New York residents for the New York State United Teachers shows that the vast majority of respondents consider teaching “the common heritage and values that we share as Americans” to be “very important.” One may expect this statement to reflect a white, majoritarian value. However, minorities endorse this position more strongly than whites: 88 percent of Hispanics and 89 percent of blacks, compared to 70 percent of whites agree.

A nationwide poll finds that equal proportions of blacks and whites, 93 percent, concur that they would vote for a black presidential candidate. A 1997 report in *USA Today* noted poll findings that “over 80 percent of all respondents in every category — age, gender, race, location, education, and income — agree” with the statement that freedom must be tempered by personal responsibility.

In a Public Agenda survey, far from favoring placing stress on different heritages, approximately 85 percent of parents — 85 percent of all parents; 83 percent of African American parents; 89 percent of Hispanic parents; and 88 percent of foreign-born parents — agree with the statement, “To graduate from high school, students should be required to understand the common history and ideas that tie all Americans together.”

And far from stressing differences in the living conditions and economic status of different groups, views about the nature of life in America are shared across racial lines. Seventy percent of blacks and 60 percent of whites agree that “The way things are in America, people like me and my family have a good chance of improving our standard of living,” according to the

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National Opinion Research Center's (NORC) 1994 General Social Survey. Likewise, 81 percent of blacks and 79 percent of whites report to NORC that "the quality of life is better in America than in most other advanced industrial countries." And, roughly 80 percent of parents surveyed — 80 percent of foreign-born parents, 87 percent of Hispanic parents, 73 percent of African American parents, and 84 percent of all parents — agree that "The U.S. is a unique country that stands for something special in the world." Lawrence Otis Graham, an African American author, writing about African Americans, summed up the picture by stating: "blacks, like any other group, want to share in the American dream." *The American dream*, not some other or disparate one.

Close percentages of blacks (70 percent) and whites (65 percent) in a *Wall Street Journal* poll conducted in 1994 agreed, "The U.S. has made some or a lot of progress in easing black-white tensions in the past 10 years." In the same poll, 70 percent of whites and 65 percent of blacks say that "racial integration has been good for society."

Sociologist Alan Wolfe finds in his middle-class morality project, which surveyed whites, blacks, Hispanics, Asians, Native Americans, and "others," that a striking majority of respondents disagree or strongly disagree with the statement, "There are times when loyalty to an ethnic group or to a race should be valued over loyalty to the country as a whole."

Even in response to a deliberately loaded question, a 1997 *Time/CNN* poll shows that similarities between the races are much larger than differences. Asked, "Will race relations in this country ever get better?" Forty-three percent of blacks and 60 percent of whites reply in the affirmative. (Pollsters tend to focus on the 17 percent who strike a different position rather than on the 43 percent who embrace the same one.)

While Americans hold widely ranging opinions on *what* should be done about various matters of social policy, people across racial and ethnic categories identify the same issues as important to them, and to the country. For instance, in a 1996 survey whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans concur that education is "the most important issue facing [their] community today." Similarly, more than 80 percent of blacks, Latinos, and whites share the belief that "it is 'extremely important' to spend tax dollars on 'educational opportunities for children.'" In another survey, 54 percent of blacks and 61 percent of whites rank "increased economic opportunity" as the most important goal for blacks. And 97 percent of blacks and 92 percent of whites rate violent crime a "very serious or most serious problem" in a 1994 poll.

In a 1995 *Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard Survey Project* poll, whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans also agree about areas of life that have gotten worse or harder for "people like [them]" between 1985 and 1995. Between 45 percent and 55 percent agree that public schools have worsened; 50 percent to 60 percent agree that getting a good job is more difficult; between 48 percent and 55 percent within each

group agree that finding “decent, affordable housing” is tougher, and between 34 percent and 48 percent find it more challenging “for families like [theirs] to stay together.”

Other problems that trouble America’s communities highlight points of convergence among the views of members of various racial and ethnic groups. The Department of Justice reported in 1996, “Between 80 and 90 percent of black, white, and ‘other’ Americans agree that it is ‘extremely important’ to spend tax dollars on ‘reducing crime’ and ‘reducing illegal drug use’ among youth.” In addition, some shared public policy preferences emerge. Among whites, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans surveyed by the *Washington Post*/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard Survey

*All this is  
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social lines.*

Project, between 75 percent and 82 percent of each group feel “strongly” that Congress should balance the budget. Between 30 percent and 41 percent are convinced that Congress should instate limited tax breaks for business; between 46 percent and 55 percent concur that Congress should cut personal income taxes; between 53 percent and 58 percent agree that Congress should reform Medicare. Sixty-seven percent of all parents, 68 percent of African American parents, 66 percent of Hispanic parents, and 75 percent of foreign-born parents — close to 70 percent of each group — tell Public Agenda that the most important thing for public schools to do for new immigrant children is “to teach them

English as quickly as possible, even if this means they fall behind in other subjects.”

All this is not to suggest that there are no significant differences of opinion along social lines, especially when matters directly concern race relations. For instance, many whites and many blacks (although by no means all of either group) take rather different views of the guilt of O.J. Simpson. One survey will stand for many with similar findings that could be cited: 62 percent of whites believe Simpson was guilty of the murder of which he was accused and acquitted, in contrast to 55 percent of African Americans who believe he was not guilty. Likewise, concerning affirmative action, 51 percent of blacks in a 1997 poll “favor programs which give preferential treatment to racial minorities,” a much higher percentage than the 21 percent of whites who favor such programs. And a very large difference appears when one examines voting patterns. For instance, in 1998, 55 percent of whites versus 11 percent of African Americans voted for Republican congressional candidates.

Still, blacks and whites share similar attitudes toward the basic tenets of the American creed. A *Public Perspective* poll from 1998 finds that: “In the United States today, anyone who works hard enough can make it economically,” with 54 percent blacks and 66 percent whites affirming. A 1994



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national survey reports that: “A basic American belief has been that if you work hard you can get ahead — reach your goals and get more.” Sixty-seven percent of blacks respond “Yes, still true,” an affirmative response rate only 10 percent less than whites. Most blacks (77 percent) say they prefer equality of opportunity to equality of results (compared to 89 percent of whites). When it comes to “Do you see yourself as traditional or old fashioned on things such as sex, morality, family life, and religion, or not,” the difference between blacks and whites is only 5 percent, and when asked whether values in America are seriously declining, the difference is down to one point.

A question from an extensive 1996 national survey conducted at the University of Virginia, by James Davison Hunter and Carl Bowman, asks: “How strong would you say the U.S. decline or improvement is in its moral and ethical standards?” Twenty-three percent of blacks and 33 percent of whites said there was a strong decline, but 29 percent of blacks and 24 percent of whites said the standards were holding steady, and 40 percent of blacks and 38 percent of whites said there was a moderate decline. When asked, “How strong would you say the U.S. decline or improvement is in the area of family life,” 18 percent of blacks and 26 percent of whites said there was a strong decline while 42 percent of blacks and 40 percent of whites saw a moderate decline and 31 percent of blacks and 25 percent of whites said family life was holding steady.

Hunter and Bowman found that “the majority of Americans do not . . . engage in identity politics — a politics that insists that opinion is mainly a function of racial, ethnic, or gender identity or identities rooted in sexual preference.” While there are some disagreements on specific issues and policies, this study finds more similarities than discrepancies. Even when asked about such divisive issues as the direction of changes in race and ethnic relations, the similarities across lines are considerable. Thirty-two percent of blacks, 37 percent of Hispanics, and 40 percent of whites feel these relations are holding steady; 46 percent, 53 percent, and 44 percent, respectively, feel they have declined. (The rest feel they have improved.) That is, on most issues, four out of five — or more — agreed with one another, while those who differed amounted to less than 20 percent of all Americans. There is no anti-anything majority here, nor is there likely to be one in the future.

Similarly, 81 percent of blacks, like 71 percent of all Americans, in a 1998 Roper survey think that blacks and whites “generally get along fairly well.” A Harris survey in 1994 asked, “When today’s/your children reach your age do you expect that race relations will have improved, will have worsened, or will be about the same as today?” A close 48 percent of blacks and 51 percent of whites concur that relations will be better. The Gallup Organization finds in 1998 a similar position among whites and blacks (60 percent of

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whites and 54 percent of blacks agree) that only a few white people dislike blacks. Only 5 percent of blacks and 2 percent of whites say that “almost all white people dislike blacks.”

Notably, nearly half of both blacks and whites want to set racial questions aside as much as possible. In a 1995 survey for *Newsweek*, Princeton Survey Research Associates finds that 48 percent of blacks and 47 percent of whites agree that the Census Bureau should stop collecting information on race and ethnicity “in an effort to move toward a more color-blind society — even if it becomes more difficult to measure progress on civil rights and poverty programs.”

As already suggested, many pollsters and those who write about their findings tend to play up small differences and downplay large similarities. During my days at Columbia University’s Bureau of Applied Social Research we were advised to use the “fully-only” device. Thus, we would write that (say) fully 9 percent agreed with whatever we wanted to play up, while only 43 percent disagreed. It should hence be stressed that in most of the figures cited above the differences among the races are much smaller than the similarities. On most issues there are no findings that could be considered, even by a far-fetched interpretation, to show a “white” versus a “black” position, nor a single position of any group of people of other colors. That is, none of these findings suggest — in fact, they directly contradict — that race determines a person’s views, values, or votes.

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Most interestingly, *differences among social groups that include both blacks and whites are often larger than differences among races*. For instance, sociologist Janet Saltzman Chafetz concludes her study of such differences with the statement that “in any dimension one wishes to examine — income, education, occupation, political and social attitudes, etc. — the range of difference within one race or gender group is almost as great as that between various groups.” A 1994 Kansas City study shows that “income differences between age groups in a given race are greater than income differences between entire races.” While much has been made of the digital divide, Alan Westin — the most systematic surveyor of this field — reports that differences in the use of computers and the Internet are larger between men and women than between the races.

Rather little attention has been paid in this context to the fact that while African Americans are the least mainstreamed group, there is a growing black middle class, many members of which have adopted lifestyles and aspirations similar to those of other middle class Americans — and which diverge from those of other black Americans. For instance, a 1998 *Wall Street Journal* public opinion poll shows differences within distinct classes of



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a single race to be greater than differences among those races, on several, albeit not on all, key issues. For instance, 82 percent of middle class whites and 70 percent of non-middle class whites report satisfaction with their personal finances (a disparity of 12 percent), while 74 percent of middle class blacks and 56 percent of non-middle class blacks report such satisfaction (a difference of 18 percent). The differences of 12 percent and 18 percent respectively are higher than the differences in opinion between the races (8 percent difference between middle class whites and blacks, and 14 percent difference between non-middle class whites and blacks). (William J. Wilson is among the scholars who have pointed out the significance of class differences when studying racial differences.)

I am not suggesting that race makes no difference in a person's position, feelings, or thinking. And one can find polls, especially in response to single questions, that show strong racial influence. However, race does not *determine* a person's response and often, on all important matters, Americans of different social backgrounds share many convictions, hopes, and goals, even in recent years, as we see the beginning of the decline of the white majority. Moreover, each racial group is far from homogeneous in itself. Differences within each group abound, further contradicting any notion of a nonwhite united majority facing a unanimous white group, a view often promoted by champions of identity politics.

### Race as social construction

**M**ANY SOCIAL SCIENTISTS call into question the very category of race drawn on by those who foresee increasing racial diversity. Alain Corcos, author of several books on genetics, race, and racism, notes that "race is a slippery word," one that is understood in varying manners at various times, one without a single definition we may readily grasp. He writes in *The Myth of Human Races* (1984):

Race is a slippery word because it is a biological term, but we use it every day as a social term. . . . Social, political, and religious views are added to what are seen as biological differences. . . . Race also has been equated with national origin . . . with religion . . . with language.

The diversity of characteristics by which race is and has been defined points to its unsatisfactory quality as a tool for categorizing human beings. Both anthropological and genetic definitions of race prove inadequate, because while each describes divisions among the human population, each fails to provide reliable criteria for making such divisions. As Corcos notes, they "are vague. They do not tell us how large divisions between populations must be in order to label them races, nor do they tell us how many there are." Importantly, "[t]hese things are, of course, all matters of choice for the classifier."

Corcos notes that biological divisions do not hold up. “Geographical and social barriers have never been great enough to prevent members of one population from breeding with members of another. Therefore, any characteristic which may have arisen in one population at one time will be transferred later to other populations through mating.” Corcos further chronicles scientific and social scientific attempts to categorize humans into races: “Scientists have been unable to classify humanity into races using physical characteristics such as skin color, shape of nose or hair, eye color, brain size, etc. They also have been unable to use characteristics such as blood type or other genetic markers.”

Race, which has been magnified in recent decades by identity politics, is but an imprecise category.

Social anthropologist Audrey Smedley, professor at Virginia Commonwealth University, shares these observations. In *Race in North America: Origin and Evolution of a Worldview* (1993) she admits there are apparent biophysical differences among humans, but reminds us that “race originated as the imposition of an arbitrary value system on the facts of biological (phenotypic) variations in the human species.” That is, she suggests race is imposed from *without*, not generated from within. Race “was the cultural invention of arbitrary meanings applied to what appeared to be natural divisions within the human species. The meanings had social value but no intrinsic relationship to the biological diversity itself.”

Racial categories are learned rather than innate. Like other cultural traditions such as food, clothing, and musical preferences, racial categories are passed from generation to generation. Psychological anthropologist Lawrence Hirschfeld finds “that children as young as three have a complex understanding of society’s construction of racial categories. Children do not sort people into different races based only on physical differences. . . . [S]ociety’s ‘racial’ assignments provide more of a signature of ‘other’ than do physical differences. For children, race does not define the person.”

To put these concepts in plainer language: At first it seems obvious that there are black, brown, yellow, and white people. But upon second thought, we realize that there are great differences within each group, even if we choose to focus on, for example, skin color rather than on, say, manners. And these differences do not parallel one another. That is, persons with darker skin are not necessarily short (or tall), and so on. Race, which has been magnified in recent decades by identity politics, is but an imprecise social category, one that does not define human conduct any more than numerous other social attributes (especially income), and often to a much lesser extent.

Particularly telling is that many groups once considered separate races a

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hundred years ago are no longer viewed as such today. The classification changed in law, public policy, the press, and in the public mind. In the United States of 1910, Jews, Slavs, the Irish, Poles, and many other ethnic groups were considered races. Matthew Frye Jacobson refers to the category of race as “fabricated” in his aptly titled *Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race* (1999).

### “Asian Americans” and “Latinos”?

**T**HE VERY NOTION that there are social groups called “Asian Americans” or “Latinos” is largely a statistical artifact (reflecting the way social data are coded and reported), promoted by some ethnic leaders, and a shorthand the media find convenient. Most so-called Asian Americans do not see themselves as “Asian Americans,” and many resent being labeled this way. Many Japanese Americans do not feel a particular affinity to Filipino or Pakistani Americans, or to Korean Americans. And the feeling is rather reciprocal. As Professor Paul Watanabe of the University of Massachusetts, an expert on Asian Americans and himself an American of Japanese descent, put it in an interview with *Boston Globe Magazine*: “There’s this concept that all Asians are alike, that they have the same history, the same language, the same background. Nothing could be more incorrect.”

William Westerman of the International Institute of New Jersey complains about Americans who tend to ignore the cultural differences among Asian nations, which reflect thousands of years of tradition. He wonders how the citizens of the United States, Canada, and Mexico would feel if they were all treated as indistinguishable “North Americans.”

The same holds for the so-called Latinos, including three of my sons. Americans of Hispanic origin trace their origins to many different countries and cultures. Eduardo Diaz, a social service administrator, tells the *Seattle Times*: “there is no place called Hispanica. I think it’s degrading to be called something that doesn’t exist. Even Latino is a misnomer. We don’t speak Latin.” A Mexican American office worker remarked that when she is called Latina it makes her think “about some kind of island.” Many Americans from Central America think of themselves as “mestizo,” a term that refers to a mixture of Indian and European ancestry. Among those surveyed in the National Latino Political Survey in 1989, the greatest number of respondents choose to be labeled by their country of origin, as opposed to “pan-ethnic” terms such as “Hispanic” or “Latino.”

The significance of these and other such data is that far from seeing a country divided into two or three hardened minority camps, we are witnessing an extension of a traditional American picture: Americans of different origins identifying with groups of other Americans from the same country, at least for a while, but not with any large or more lasting group.

Far from there being a new coalition of nonwhite minorities soon to gain majority status (something President Clinton points to and Jesse Jackson dreams about as a rainbow, one that contains all colors but white), the groups differ greatly from each other — and within themselves.

The fact that various minorities do not share a uniform view, which could lead them to march lock-step with other minorities to a new America (as some on the left fantasize), is also reflected in elections. Cuban Americans tend to vote Republican, while other Americans of Hispanic origin are more likely to vote Democratic. Americans of Asian origin cannot be counted on to vote one way or another, either. First generation Vietnamese Americans tend to be strong anti-communists and favor the Republican party, while older Japanese and Chinese Americans are more often Democrats, and Filipino Americans are more or less equally divided between the parties. (Of the Filipino Americans registered to vote, 40 percent list themselves as Democrats, 38 percent as Republicans, and 17 percent as independent.)

## The lessons of “nonwhite”

SOME SOCIAL SCIENTISTS argue that we can learn about the future, in which nonwhite majorities will prevail, by examining the states and cities in which minorities already comprise the majorities. For instance, Peter Morrison, former head of the Population Research Center at RAND, suggests that one can see the future in cities that have a majority composed of minorities.

One clear way to examine the impact of the rise of nonwhite majorities is to study election results. They show, as did the survey data cited above, that people of a given racial background often do not vote for a candidate of their color — and above all, that nonwhite groups often do not jointly support any one candidate of any one color or racial background. Any suggestion that race or ethnicity determines for whom one casts one's vote is belied by the facts. For example, Peter Skerry notes in *Mexican Americans: The Ambivalent Minority*, “when first elected to the San Antonio City Council in 1975, [the popular Henry] Cisneros was the candidate of the Anglo establishment and received a higher proportion of Anglo than Mexican votes cast.”

We often encounter the future first in California. In a 1991 Los Angeles election for the California State Assembly, Korean American, Filipino American, and Japanese American groups each ran their own candidate, thus splitting the so called “Asian American” vote, not deterred by the fact that they thereby ensured the election of a white candidate.

In some cities that contain nonwhite majorities, we find white, black, and Hispanic mayors alternating, despite only relatively small changes in the composition of the city population. For instance, in Los Angeles, which is roughly 64 percent nonwhite (specifically, nearly 40 percent Hispanic, 14

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percent black, nearly 10 percent Asian, and .5 percent American Indian, according to the 1990 census), Tom Bradley, an African American, served as mayor for 20 years, until 1993, when the citizens elected Richard Riordan, a white politician. New York City and San Francisco also have in recent years alternated between white and black mayors without witnessing any dramatic changes in the racial and ethnic backgrounds of the city's inhabitants.

Additionally, Virginia, in which whites outnumber minorities significantly (1.5 million minorities and 4.8 million whites), has elected a black governor. L. Douglas Wilder served from 1989 to January 1994. In the rural and conservative second congressional district of Georgia, a two-thirds white voter majority reelected Sanford D. Bishop Jr., an African American Democrat. Washington state, comprising only 4.5 percent Asian Americans, elected Gary Locke in 1996, putting in office the first Asian American governor in the mainland United States. While one can find counter examples, the examples listed here indicate that the majority of minorities does not necessarily elect people of color, nor does the white majority necessarily elect white officials. Moreover, I expect more blurring in the future rather than less, given all the various vectors discussed in this analysis.

## Intermarriage

**L**AST BUT NOT LEAST, the figures used by those who project a majority of minorities or the end of a white majority are misleading. These figures are based on a simplistic projection of past trends. How simplistic these projections often are can be quickly gleaned from the Census projection that the number of Native Americans will grow from 2,433,000 in 2000, or approximately 1 percent of the total population, to 4,405,000, or approximately 1 percent of the total population by the year 2050, and to 6,442,000, or approximately 1 percent of the total population by the year 2100. That is, 100 years and *no* change.

This tendency to depict the future as a continuation of the past is particularly misleading because it ignores the rapidly rising category of racially mixed Americans, the result of a rising number of cross-racial marriages and a rejection of monoracial categories by some others, especially Hispanic Americans.

One of 12 marriages in 1995 (8.4 percent) were interracial/ethnic marriages. Intermarriage between Asian Americans and whites is particularly common; marriages between Hispanic Americans and whites are also rather frequent, while such marriages with African Americans are the least common. In 1998, out-marriage by Hispanics of all generations totaled 16.7 percent.

Intermarriage between black and other Americans is less common, but also rising. "In 1990, 84 percent of all married black people over the age of 65 were in both-black marriages, but only 53 percent of married blacks



under 25 were,” according to the Statistical Assessment Service. And the Census Bureau finds that over the past 20 years, the number of marriages between blacks and whites has more than quadrupled, increasing from 65,000 in 1970 to 296,000 in 1994. From 1960 to 1997, the percentage of all marriages that were interracial grew from 0.4 percent to 2.3 percent. Similarly, researchers Douglas Besharov and Timothy Sullivan found that the number of black-white marriages constituted 1.7 percent of all marriages in 1960, but represented 6 percent of all marriages in 1990. A study from the University of Michigan reports that in the 1940s about 2 percent of black men married white women, whereas by the 1980s about 8 percent did so. And while in the 1940s about 1 percent of married black women had married interracially, in the 1980s that figure had reached nearly 3 percent. The number of intermarriages also increases with each subsequent generation living in the U.S. In the mid-1990s, slightly under 20 percent of first generation Asian women were intermarried, as opposed to slightly under 30 percent of the second generation and slightly over 40 percent of the third generation. Slightly under 10 percent of first generation Hispanic women were intermarried, contrasting sharply with percentages in the mid 20s and mid 30s for second and third generation women, respectively. Black intermarriage rates were much lower, even though there was an increase over all — no figures were over 5 percent.

“This is the beginning point of a blending of the races,” predicts William Frey, a sociologist at the State University of New York at Albany. He added “that in households racial or ethnic attitudes will soften” as families realize that they can embrace many cultures without losing any one facet of their identity. All together, since 1970, the proportion of marriages among people of different racial or ethnic origin increased by 72 percent. The 1990 Census notes 1.5 million interracial marriages. Some put the number of children of mixed-race parents at 3 million, not including Hispanic mestizos and black Americans who have European or Indian ancestry.

## “Other”

**A**NOTHER INDICATION of some blurring of the lines among the races in American society can be gleaned from the fact that in the 1990 Census, 4 percent, or 9.8 million Americans, chose to classify themselves as “other,” i.e., not members of any particular racial group. In a Census 2000 practice run, this number had increased to 5.4 percent of the sample. The increase from 4 percent to 5.4 percent may seem minor, but given the size of the population, many hundreds of thousands are involved.

Even if the trends already cited do not accelerate and continue only at the present pace, the figures for 2050 may read something like the following: 51 percent white; 14 percent multiracial; 35 percent minorities. Far from dividing the country still further, the rise of the “others,” along with the fact that

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more and more Americans will be of mixed heritage, with divergent backgrounds, will serve to blur racial lines. That is, while there may well be more Americans of non-European origin, a growing number of the American white majority will have an Hispanic daughter- or son-in-law, an Asian stepfather or mother, and a whole rainbow of cousins. If one must find a simple image for the future of America, Tiger Woods, or Hawaii, as I see it, seems more appropriate than a view of a country in which Louis Farrakahn and his followers and the Aryan Nation are threatening one another.

Regrettably, identity politics at the Census Bureau is working in opposition to this salutary trend. The bureau released its 1990 data in two forms. One, a straightforward account; the other, "modified." Here it reconfigured the statistics by reboxing the 9.8 million "other" Americans into monoracial categories! For 2000, the bureau dropped the "other" category altogether. Informal conversations with colleagues at the bureau indicated that the Office of Management and Budget (which reviews all official questionnaires), yielded to pressure from several minority leaders. For instance, Ibrahim K. Sundiata from Brandeis University maintained that the "other" category reflects a drive to undermine black solidarity.

Other African American leaders worried that the category of "other" would decrease the number of blacks in the nation's official statistics, and thus undermine the enforcement of antidiscrimination statutes and numerous social programs based on racial statistics. The NAACP and the Asian American Legal Defense and Education Fund have both disapproved of watering down nonwhite groups. Rep. Carrie Meek, Florida Democrat, explained: "The multiracial category would cloud the count of discrete minorities who are assigned to a lower track in public schools . . . kept out of certain occupations and whose progress toward seniority or promotion has been skewered."

The decision to drop "other" makes it more difficult for Americans of mixed background, or those who wish to forgo racial labels, to declare themselves what I would like to call "All-American." Because the way the Census constructs its categories affects the way many others do — for instance, those overseeing admissions to colleges — the category of other or multiracial Americans may well not gain as fast as it would if the Census followed its 1990 format. This in effect forces at least 10 million Americans into racial categories they seek to shed or modify, and makes American society seem more divided along racial lines than it actually is.

Many Americans object to being racially categorized, or even change their minds during their lifetime. The children of a couple I know — he black, she white — viewed themselves as white in primary school, black as adolescents, and now one passes as white and the other as black. What is gained by forcing such people to officially declare themselves one or the other?

There are strong sociological reasons to argue that the U.S. Census should reintroduce a nonracial category. (Others have suggested that this category be named "multiracial.") At issue is how we view ourselves as a nation. Are

we going to continue to be divided by race? Or will we welcome the blurring of the lines that divide the races?

Whatever the motives, the 2000 Census allowed Americans to mark as many racial categories as their hearts desired — as long as they define themselves racially. The battle is already on as to how the results will be counted. African and Asian American groups demand that anyone who marks their race in any combination be counted as fully theirs. The Census Bureau has not yet announced its pleasure.

If the Census Bureau were to release the information referring to blended Americans as “multiracial” it would encourage the nation to view itself as less divided. There are several indications that the country is ready for widespread changes in our thinking about social categories. Georgia and Indiana have already required government agencies to use the multiracial category. In California there is an Association for Multi-Ethnic Americans, and Ohio, Illinois, Georgia, Indiana, and Michigan have introduced legislation to create a multiracial category on college applications.

One may wonder if the number of Americans involved is large enough to justify what at first seems like a tempest in a teapot. But the number of Americans who might qualify for the new category tends to be underestimated, on the assumption that only those of a mixed racial heritage fall into the “All-American” box. Actually, there are considerable differences in color and other racial features within all racial groups, which makes the question of who is in versus out much more flexible than it often seems. For instance, many dark-skinned Hispanics who do not see themselves as black, and many light-skinned African Americans who do not wish to pass as white, would be free to choose the new category.

One should also note that those who study race professionally, especially physical and cultural anthropologists, strongly object to the concept of racial categorization. They point out that no single gene can be used to differentiate one race from another; moreover, indicators from blood types to texture of hair vary a great deal both among and within groups considered to be of one race. Indeed, the American Anthropological Association passed a resolution stating that “differentiating species into biologically defined ‘race’ has proven meaningless and unscientific.”

## The merits of a new category

**D**ROPPING THE WHOLE social construction of race does not seem in the cards, even if the most far-reaching arguments against affirmative action and for a “color-blind” society win the day. However, there are strong sociological reasons to favor the inclusion of a multiracial category in the 2010 Census.

Introducing a multiracial category has the potential to soften racial lines that now divide America by rendering them more like economic differences

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and less like caste lines. Sociologists have long observed that a major reason the United States experiences relatively few confrontations along class lines is that Americans believe they can move from one economic stratum to another. (For instance, workers become foremen, and foremen become small businessmen, who are considered middle class.) Moreover, there are no sharp class demarcation lines as in Britain; in America many workers consider themselves middle class, dress up to go to work, and hide their tools and lunches in briefcases, while middle class super-liberal professors join labor unions. A major reason confrontations in America occur more often along racial lines is that color lines currently seem rigidly unchangeable.

If the new category is allowed, if more and more Americans choose this category in future decades, as there is every reason to expect given the high rates of intermarriage and a desire by millions of Americans to avoid being racially boxed in, the result may be a society in which differences are blurred.

Skeptics may suggest that how one marks a tiny box on the 2000 Census form is between oneself and the keepers of statistics. But, as this sociologist sees it, if the multiracial concept is allowed into the national statistics, it will also enter the social vocabulary. It will make American society less stratified along racial lines, less rigidly divided, and thus more communitarian.

At stake is the question of what kind of America we envision for the longer run. Some see a complete blur of racial lines with Americans constituting some kind of new hybrid race. *Time* ran a cover story on the subject, led by a computer composite of a future American with some features of each race, a rather handsome new breed (almond shaped eyes, straight but dark hair, milk chocolate skin). This would take much more than a change in racial nomenclature, but it could serve as a step in that direction.

Others are keen to maintain strict racial lines and oppose intermarriage; these same people often seek to maintain the races as separate “nations.” (The term is significant because it indicates a high degree of tribalism.) In a world full of interracial strife, this attitude — however understandable its defensive nature in response to racial prejudice and discrimination — leaves at least this communitarian greatly troubled. The more communitarian view seems to be one in which those who seek to uphold their separate group identities will do so (hopefully viewing themselves and being viewed as subgroups of a more encompassing community rather than as separate nations) but those who seek to redefine themselves will be enabled to do so, leading to an ever larger group that is free from racial categorization.

If a multiracial category is included further down the road, maybe in the 2010 Census, we may wish to add one more category, that of “multiethnic”

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origin, one most Americans might wish to check. Then we would live to recognize the full importance of my favorite African American saying: We came in many ships but we now ride in the same boat.

## Multiculturalism or American creed?

ALL THIS SUGGESTS that foreseeable changes in America's demography do not imply that the American creed is being or will be replaced by something called "multiculturalism." In *Strangers Among Us: How Latino Immigration is Transforming America* (1998), Roberto Suro reminds us that we do not need to divest ourselves of plurality in order to achieve harmony.

Americans have never thought of themselves as a single people as the Germans do. Although white, English-speaking Christians of European ancestry have set most of the norms for American society, there is still no sense of a *Volk* (a group that shares a common ancestry and culture and that embodies the national identity). Ideas, not biology, are what generate oneness and homogeneity in the United States, and so long as faith in those ideas has remained strong, the country has shown an extraordinary capacity to absorb people of many nationalities.

The American creed always has had room for a pluralism of subcultures, of people upholding some of the traditions and values of their countries of origin, from praying to playing in their own way. But American pluralism should be bound by a shared framework if America is to be spared ethnic tribalism of the kind that — when driven to extremes — has torn apart countries as different as Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and has even raised its ugly head in well-established democracies such as Canada and the United Kingdom (where Scottish separatism is on the rise).

The social, cultural, and legal elements that constitute the framework that holds together the diverse mosaic are well known. They include a commitment by all parties to the democratic way of life, to the Constitution and its Bill of Rights, and to mutual tolerance. The mosaic is further fortified by a strong conviction that one's station in life is determined by hard work and saving, by taking responsibility for oneself and one's family. And, most Americans still share a strong sense that while we are different in some ways, in more ways we are joined by the shared responsibilities of providing a good society for our children and ourselves, one free of racial and ethnic strife, and providing the world with a model of a country whose economy and polity are thriving.





## BOOKS

# Truth Without Justice?

By ELLIOTT ABRAMS

ROBERT I. ROTBERG & DENNIS THOMPSON, EDITORS. *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions*. PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS. 296 PAGES. \$55.00 cloth, \$18.95 paper

THE WAVE of democracy sweeping across the globe during the past 20 years has extended from the Iron Curtain countries to Latin America to Africa, and it has produced an enormous problem in dealing with the experience of dictatorship. "The past is never dead. It's not even past," William Faulkner wrote. Then how is it to be handled, as a nation emerges into some form of democracy? Shall the former rulers be tried and jailed, or even shot? Shall

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*Elliott Abrams, president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, served as assistant secretary of state for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs in the Reagan administration.*

Nuremberg tribunals be established? Or shall the officials of the former regime be amnestied, as if some form of collective amnesia had overtaken the people?

In roughly 15 countries, another alternative has been tried: the truth commission. Although most examples are found in Latin America, the most sophisticated truth commission was established in South Africa. Its record was the subject of a conference held in Cape Province, South Africa in May 1998, and *Truth v. Justice* includes versions of the papers delivered there. The papers presented are extraordinarily intelligent, and the collection is adequately balanced: Critics and defenders of the truth commission are here, and it is difficult to think of an argument that is not raised, debated, and fairly examined. While there are more pro than con chapters, the critics are given a fair shot and, in my view, win the argument.

What is the argument? The truth commission is a deviation from the expected outcome when power changes hands in an internal conflict. Typically throughout history, winners take power and then take revenge. The former rulers are punished for real or imagined crimes, their period of rule is denounced as criminal, and history is rewritten. This "format" is still reasonable when the past consists of what Rajeev Bhargava of Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi here calls "asymmetric barbarism": where there are clear divisions between perpetrators and victims, such as in Nazi Germany or perhaps in apartheid South Africa. In these cases, one side violates norms of justice while the other seeks only to enforce them. Andre du Toit of the

University of Cape Town calls this case the “regime of criminals,” and the idea is that they should be punished through the criminal justice system when the opportunity presents itself.

More difficult are the cases of “symmetric barbarism,” where “all hell has broken loose” and both sides are guilty of violating behavioral norms.

*The truth commission is a mechanism that, “privileging reconciliation over retribution,” focuses on permitting victims to tell their stories rather than on punishing perpetrators’ actions.*

Muslim/Hindu violence in India is the example given by Bhargava. Du Toit calls this the “criminal regime” case where, as he puts it, “the distinctions between perpetrators, victims, and beneficiaries are unclear and problematic and collaborators have a larger role.” This is the Eastern European communist case as well, and Vaclav Havel is quoted as explaining that “all of us are responsible, each to a different degree . . . none of us is merely a victim.”

Whatever the distinctions among the varieties of human rights abuses and undemocratic systems, the proponents of truth commissions argue that simple

criminal trials are inadequate to do justice. Or rather, “doing justice” is an inapposite concept; and for the nation as a whole, finding the truth about the past is a more important goal than meting out punishment to the guilty. The truth lays a sounder foundation for future democracy. The search for truth is a search for a common understanding of the past, a new history of the nation. It is a mechanism that, “privileging reconciliation over retribution,” focuses on permitting victims to tell their stories and regain their dignity rather than on punishing perpetrators’ actions.

Defenders compare the truth commission favorably to criminal trials, and the argument is powerful. The goal of a trial, as Ronald Slye of Seattle University (and a former consultant to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission) explains, is to determine that “we have sufficiently minimized the possibility that we may be about to punish an innocent person,” while the goal of commission amnesty hearings is to extract as much information as possible. Slye concludes: “there is no doubt that the quantity, and probably also the quality, of the information elicited from the amnesty hearings [conducted by the South African commission] was higher than what would have been elicited from criminal trials.” Victims’ stories are treated with great suspicion by defense attorneys and even by the court at trials, whereas the truth commission gives victims the chance to deliver their narratives to a sympathetic audience. The goal of the South African commission is suggested by its name, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; not only vengeance but even justice was made a subordinate goal.

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As Slye puts it, “reconciliation requires that the goals of both law and history be met — that some form of accountability (legal judgment) and understanding (historical judgment) be combined. An amnesty process like South Africa’s is the closest thing we have yet seen to achieve the goals of both disciplines.” For the South Africans learned from the Latin experiences in places like Argentina, Guatemala, and Chile, and understood that a process utterly without accountability was unsound — even as a tool for reconciliation. They therefore added to the mere historical functions of the commission — developing a narrative explanation of the past, including individual cases of abuse, murder, or disappearance — a means of dealing with individual perpetrators. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was empowered to grant amnesty, but never en bloc, never to classes of people or for all acts committed during a particular time period (as had been done in Latin America). There would be no amnesia, no immunity. Instead, the commission could grant amnesty to individuals in exchange for their full and candid testimony. Robert Rotberg of the Kennedy School at Harvard describes this as “forgiveness and reconciliation preceded by an accounting of violations, a confronting of perpetrators by victims.”

**T**HIS MECHANISM worked pretty well. If there were individuals who lied to the commission, there were many others in important cases, including such high ranking officials as former Defense Minister Magnus Malan, who ultimately came forward and spoke — and

spoke far more openly than it can be imagined they would have in a criminal trial. There was testimony about some of the most famous cases in the history of the South African struggle, such as the murder of Steve Biko, and the testimony, especially the words of the white former security officials, presented an account that could not otherwise have been compiled. The needs of history were served.

But whether those of justice were served remains the true debate. As is made very clear in the chapters by Amy Gutmann, Dennis Thompson, and Kent Greenawalt, there is a moral cost when justice is subordinated to “truth,” “history,” “reconciliation,” or any other goal. Gutmann and Thompson quote the brother of Griffiths Mxenge, a human rights lawyer who had been murdered by the police, after hearing the confession that gained the perpetrator amnesty: “once you know who did it, you want the next thing — you want justice.” They also note these lines from Alex Boraine, a contributor here and deputy chairman of the South African commission, about a woman listening to testimony by the killer of her husband:

After learning for the first time how her husband has died, she was asked if she could forgive the man who did it. Speaking slowly, in one of the native languages, her message came back through the interpreters: “No government can forgive.” Pause. “No commission can forgive.” Pause. “Only I can forgive.” Pause. “And I am not ready to forgive.”

Here is the deep moral problem of the truth commission as a substitute for

the criminal justice system: It short-circuits the mechanisms most societies have established to right wrongs by punishing wrongdoers. And if the South African commission was to compensate victims with money (money which has never been delivered, one must add), who can say that money substitutes for justice? Why does any-

*It was “morally defensible to argue that amnesty was the price South Africa had to pay for peace and stability.”*

one have the right to tell that woman, or Griffiths Mxenge’s family, that the murderers of their loved ones must go free?

There are at least two reasonable answers proposed in this volume: realism and democracy. The realist argument begins by noting that criminal trials are easy to imagine but difficult to pull off. Often, evidence is not available, witnesses will not appear, and convictions are impossible to obtain; this happened in some of the famous South African cases. This is the worst of all worlds, as the crimes of the past are exposed, nerves are rubbed raw, and yet justice and national reconciliation seem farther away than ever. Moreover, the heart of the realist argument is that truth commissions come into existence when one side in a conflict has not entirely vanquished the

other, and a bargain of some sort is necessary. The truth commission, in Bhargava’s view, is part of the transitional settlements “in which former oppressors refuse to share power unless guaranteed that they will escape the criminal justice system characteristic of a minimally decent society. Alternatively . . . former victims do not fully control the new order they have set up and lack the power to implement their own conception of justice.” And this bargain isn’t an entirely bad thing, either, as it avoids the temptation of “victims’ justice,” wherein the new rulers simply take revenge against the old and a new round of abuses occurs.

As Alex Boraine argues here, the outcome in South Africa was “a negotiated settlement, a political compromise,” and it was “the only one possible in the conditions of transition in 1994.” It was, he believes, “morally defensible to argue that amnesty was the price South Africa had to pay for peace and stability.” This justification has been widely heard in Latin America as well, even from those who believe it will be possible a decade later to change the nature of the bargain. In Chile and Argentina, for example, prosecutions that would have been impossible as part of a transition have been undertaken years after the return to democracy. So the realist argument may be defended not as a sacrifice of justice in return for truth, reconciliation, and a transition to democracy, but as a postponement of justice until conditions are safer.

**A** CRITICAL ALLY of the realist argument in defense of truth commissions is democracy, or the argument that the

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people have the right to choose truth and democracy over justice. Martha Minow of Harvard Law School makes this argument in her chapter:

When a democratic process selects a truth commission, a people summon the strength and vision to say to one another: focus on victims and try to restore their dignity; focus on truth and try to tell it whole. Redefine the victims as the entire society, and redefine justice as accountability. Seek repair, not revenge; reconciliation, not recrimination. Honor and attend in public to the process of remembering.

Whether the people, through democratic processes, have the right to replace criminal justice with this kind of verbiage can be debated; at least Minow is right in suggesting that no procedure *other* than a democratic vote could possibly do so. One principle that does emerge in this volume is the importance of getting a majority behind the truth commission — through a plebiscite or a parliamentary vote — rather than imposing it through a back-room deal.

Minow's words do reveal one of the worst aspects of the truth commission phenomenon, well illustrated here: the tendency to move from a hard-thinking realist defense of truth commissions as a necessary evil to a celebration of them in slippery moralistic language. Truth commissions move us from justice to "future-oriented societal moral considerations." They promote "healing." They avoid vengeance and bring us "justice as recognition" and "restorative justice." I do not find these poetic renditions very powerful, while the realist defenses are quite persuasive. Though she argues that truth commis-

sions "are not just second-best responses," Minow herself acknowledges that even the best defenses of truth commissions "cannot deny the legitimacy of a demand for punishment," and she is right. Some have even criticized the approach (with its emphasis on forgiveness rather than justice) as excessively Christian, noting for example that

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while the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission's chairman was Bishop Tutu, not all of South Africa's people are in fact Christians.

Is there anything for Americans to do? This volume provides a useful discussion of the possible international role, in a chapter by David Crocker of the University of Maryland. Clearly money and information can be helpful, so that new truth commissions can work decently well and learn from the achievements and mistakes of their predecessors. The need to avoid wholesale amnesties, for example, was a key les-



son South Africa learned from watching Latin America. But Crocker is careful to note how international “friends” can hurt as well. International “civil society” can also “weaken or prevent a society from effectively meeting the challenges of transitional justice.” “Intemperate appeals” to universal human rights can give some factions, such as the military, an excuse to complain about “outsiders” imposing foreign norms on the society. Moreover, aid that is too large and too loud

instead of nurturing robust domestic civil societies . . . in fact may insulate governmental efforts from domestic criticism. In turn this insulation may cause reduction of public deliberation, the narrowing of the national consensus, and, thereby, the loss of popular support for the government’s efforts. For example, instead of trying to address the objections of some of its most trenchant critics, South Africa’s TRC sometimes took refuge in the consolation offered by its many international supporters.

Doing justice during a transition from dictatorship to democracy requires an exceptional grasp of the particular society and its history, as well as a careful balancing of realism about the current correlation of forces against the desire for the punishment of wrongdoers from the ancien régime. The moral and factual debates are engrossing when at their best, as they are in this volume. Perhaps the greatest contribution outsiders can make is to think clearly about previous cases, and then write clearly about their own debates. *Truth v. Justice* easily meets that test.

## A Worthy Adversary

By TEVI TROY

ARTHUR SCHLESINGER JR. *A Life in the Twentieth Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950*. HOUGHTON MIFFLIN. 556 PAGES. \$28.95

**I**N 1991, political correctness was at its height, the nation’s top universities were instituting speech codes, and multiculturalists were trying to purge campus reading lists of DWEMS — dead white European males. As the debate raged on, Jesse Jackson, a two-time contender for the Democratic party presidential nomination, weighed in strongly on the side of the multiculturalists, leading groups of protesting Stanford students in chants of “Hey hey, ho ho, Western culture’s got to go.” At the same time, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. published *The Disuniting of America*, a defense of Western civilization and an attack on mindless multiculturalism. The contrast could not have been starker. Schlesinger, the high priest of an earlier era of liberalism, and Jackson, the high priest of liberalism’s current incarnation, clearly stood on very different sides of a cultural divide.

This was not the first time that Schlesinger broke from his fellow liber-

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*Tevi Troy is writing a book about intellectuals in the White House for Rowman and Littlefield.*

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als. In addition to his defense of the classics and of objective standards, Schlesinger had been a staunch anti-communist throughout his career. Unlike many of his colleagues on the left, and unlike even many of his neo-conservative critics who had earlier drifted away from youthful Marxist dalliances, Schlesinger always rejected communism and took a hard line on many Cold War issues.

Of course, none of this should suggest that Schlesinger is a conservative, or even a neoconservative drifting rightward with age. His writings reveal that Schlesinger is, and always was, an unflinching Democratic partisan. Yet despite his disdain for what he calls conservatism, there is readily discernible in Schlesinger (gasp) an unmistakable conservative temperament.

In addition to that temperament, reading Schlesinger also reveals as well a witty, learned man, with a good sense of humor and a willingness to make friends on both sides of the political aisle — all three sides if you count the Marxists. Schlesinger does not reject Western civilization, as so many of his leftist colleagues do, but he sees his brand of liberalism as the apotheosis of Western political development. Schlesinger's anti-communism, anti-multiculturalism, and good old-fashioned American nationalism have earned him often bitter critiques from the left, but Schlesinger, to his credit, has held his ground, convinced that History, his constant ally, is on his side.

Schlesinger's recent autobiography, *A Life in the Twentieth Century: Innocent Beginnings, 1917-1950* — his first book in almost 10 years — confirms this view. The mere fact that he felt the first 33 years of his life worthy

of a 556-page memoir demonstrates either hubris or a life truly worth living. Fortunately, Schlesinger's book covers a fascinating interval, in which he wrote three books, met everyone worth meeting, and provided a lively commentary detailing this eventful period. As Schlesinger modestly put it, "I have lived through interesting times and had the luck of knowing some interesting people."

SCHLESINGER WAS born in Columbus, Ohio, in 1917, the son of historian Arthur Schlesinger Sr. Schlesinger *pere* was a disciple of Charles Beard, the author of an *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* (1913) and the father of the Progressive school. The theories of historians like Schlesinger Sr. and Beard helped reshape the study of American history, paving the road for social history and the study of races and gender within history. Despite the apparent similarities, social history differs from the kind of racial and gender history we see on campuses today. As Schlesinger describes the difference between the two approaches, "my father and his generation saw multiculturalism as a stage in the absorption of newcomers into an American nationality and culture that they remolded as they entered." In the 1990s, in contrast, "Ideologues saw ethnicity as *the* defining experience for Americans. Multiculturalism in this militant version rejected the concept of a common culture and of a single American nationality." Although both generations of Schlesingers rejected the latter approach, Schlesinger Sr.'s theories helped pave the path for today's versions of gender and racial history.

Schlesinger had historians' genes on both sides of his family. His maternal grandfather was George Bancroft, "America's first major historian." With this impressive birthright, Schlesinger gravitated towards history at an early age, keeping a journal and reading voraciously. His wide reading is one of his most admirable characteristics.

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Schlesinger devoured the classics in his youth, and he spends dozens of pages detailing his reading. One particularly amusing memory skewers the Robinson family of Switzerland: "I remember liking *Swiss Family Robinson* as a child. But when I later read Johann Wyss's rip-off of *Crusoe* to my own children, the Robinson family seemed to me a pack of bloodthirsty Calvinists who spent an inordinate time (a) in praying and (b) in massacring inoffensive animals." One of Schlesinger's most sobering, yet tren-

chant, observations is that most people have read the bulk of books that they will read by the age of 25.

Another of Schlesinger's admirable characteristics is his love of country. Schlesinger's patriotism, which has been instrumental in his opposition to both communism and multiculturalism, developed out of the Schlesinger family's immigrant roots. When Schlesinger Sr. complained that other children mocked his own father's foreign accent, his father replied: "You tell them, son, that their parents had no choice about coming but I came because I wanted to — because I thought the United States the best country on earth." As a result of this, Arthur Jr. noted, "My father thereafter began to think of immigrants not as a chosen people but as a choosing people."

In addition to a profession, patriotism, and politics, Schlesinger Sr. also passed on his personal relationships to his son. From an early age, when the senior Schlesinger introduced his son to H.L. Mencken, to Schlesinger's appointment as a colleague of his father's at Harvard, Schlesinger's career consistently benefited from his father's reputation and connections. When the Schlesinger family fretted about the quality of education their son was receiving from his public school, Schlesinger Sr.'s connections saved the day: After young Schlesinger's "civics teacher had informed the class that the inhabitants of Albania were called Albinos and had white hair and pink eyes," Schlesinger Sr. "forthwith called his friend Corning Benton, the treasurer for Phillips Exeter Academy, and entered me as an upper middler for the autumn of 1931."

After Exeter, and a trip around the

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world, Schlesinger went to Harvard, where he began to establish his own relationships with the key players of the political establishment. He also undertook as his senior thesis a study of the nineteenth century Transcendentalist Orestes Brownson, which became his first published book.

After Harvard, he served as a Henry Fellow at Cambridge, and then as a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard, meeting even more future celebrities along the way. World War II interceded, but it did not interrupt Schlesinger's journey through the future stars of postwar America. While serving in the Office of War Information and later in the Office of Strategic Services, the precursor to the CIA, Schlesinger met Bill Casey, Wild Bill Donovan, John Kenneth Galbraith, Stewart Alsop, Walt Rostow, Leon Edel, and George Ball. Before Schlesinger's return from Europe, his publisher released his second book, *The Age of Jackson*. The book, which portrayed Andrew Jackson as a proto-New Deal Democrat, sold 90,000 copies, won the Pulitzer Prize, and transformed Schlesinger from young man on the make to made man.

Schlesinger moved to Washington and joined the salons of the Georgetown elite, especially *Washington Post* publisher Phil Graham and columnist Joe Alsop. He wrote freelance articles for *Fortune*, *Life*, and the *Atlantic*, and helped found the liberal anti-communist group Americans for Democratic Action. After a year of freelancing, Schlesinger returned to Harvard as a professor, but maintained his close ties to Washington. In 1948, he wrote the *Vital Center*, which urged a nationwide

anti-communist effort, a common rallying cry among both right and left. The *Vital Center* summarized the liberal anti-communist position that dominated American intellectual life in the 1950s.

**O**F COURSE, while his first 33 years are as interesting as anyone's have a right to be, the most eventful years of his life took place after Schlesinger's first volume comes to a close. In 1952 and 1956, Schlesinger served as speechwriter for Adlai Stevenson's presidential runs. Although Stevenson lost both races, the senator nevertheless helped shape future campaigns and presidential administrations by bringing teams of prominent intellectuals into his campaign. Stevenson recognized that in postwar America, the increasingly educated middle class provided a market for the writings of intellectuals, who in turn gained increasing sway over their new readers. After the Stevenson campaign, all subsequent presidential candidates hired or consulted with intellectuals in the course of their campaigns and administrations.

Schlesinger, of course, benefited from this development, serving, in his best-known job, as resident intellectual in the Kennedy White House. Despite the conventional view of Schlesinger's job as a top aide to Kennedy, his contemporaries had a different view. As Kennedy aides Kenneth P. O'Donnell and David F. Powers reported in *Johnny We Hardly Knew Ye: Memories of John Fitzgerald Kennedy* (1970), that Schlesinger was "special assistant without a special portfolio, to be a liaison man in charge of keeping Adlai Stevenson happy, to receive complaints



from the liberals, and to act as a sort of household devil's advocate who would complain about anything in the administration that bothered him." Robert Kennedy, as quoted in *Robert Kennedy in His Own Words: The Unpublished Recollections of the Kennedy Years* (1988), edited by Edwin O. Guthman and Jeffrey Shulman, recalled that his

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older brother "liked Arthur Schlesinger, but he thought he was a little bit of a nut sometimes. He thought he was sort of a gadfly and that he was having a helluva good time in Washington. He didn't do a helluva lot, but he was good to have around."

RFK's assessment was correct; Schlesinger had a helluva good time in his three years at the White House, where he wrote articles and film reviews, corresponded with the nation's intellectual and cultural elites, advised Kennedy on literary and some political

matters, and accumulated the research for his Pulitzer prize-winning book on the Kennedy administration, *A Thousand Days*. In short, his job at the White House paid him \$20,000 to be — Arthur Schlesinger Jr. For Kennedy, this was a bargain. Schlesinger, with his high standing in the intellectual community, helped Kennedy become president, gain good reviews as president, and become even more popular in the years following Kennedy's tragic assassination.

After the White House, Schlesinger continued to write, teach, and be politically active. He eventually left Harvard for the Graduate Center at City College in New York. And now, at 83, he has started publishing his own autobiography. Looking back over Schlesinger's career, one sees both pros and cons. On the pro side, already discussed, are his sense of humor, his intellect, his erudition, and his patriotism. On the liability side, there is that one nagging trait — his absolute inability to give conservatives or conservatism a fair shake. As with so many parts of his life, Schlesinger's definition of conservatism came from his dad. In *New Viewpoints on American History*, Schlesinger Sr. wrote, "The thinking conservative finds his chief allies in the self-complacency of comfortable mediocrity, in the apathy and stupidity of the toil-worn multitudes, and in the aggressive self-interest of the privileged classes." Schlesinger Jr. had a similarly dismissive view of conservatism, describing liberalism's two biggest competitors as follows: "Conservatism, rule by the business community; and socialism, rule by ideological planners."

This misapprehension of conser-



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vatism leads Schlesinger to exhibit poor judgment at times, particularly with respect to conservatives as individuals. In describing his classmates at Harvard, Schlesinger recalls “Caspar Weinberger, who later served as Ronald Reagan’s secretary of defense (and as hopelessly imperious a conservative in Harvard College as he was half a century later in the Pentagon).” Schlesinger never mentions Weinberger again, and the comment seems more a gratuitous shot at a future Republican Cabinet secretary than an accurate snapshot of Weinberger as a college student. Fortunately, Schlesinger elsewhere mentions a willingness to forge friendships, albeit grudging ones, across the ideological divide, with individuals like William F. Buckley Jr.

**M**ORE PROBLEMATIC is Schlesinger’s political analysis, which suffers from heavy, if not immovable, ideological blinders. Schlesinger’s famous “cycles” theory — that American history moves in 20-year waves between progressivism and reaction — is often forced. After the 1992 election, Schlesinger resurrected the theory, claiming that Clinton’s victory foreshadowed the start of a new liberal era. Two years later, when the GOP captured Congress for the first time in over four decades, the *Wall Street Journal* reprinted Schlesinger’s prediction, tweaking the historian for imposing ideology on his powers of analysis. And so with the Kennedys, where Schlesinger’s understandable closeness to the family prevents him from engaging in any kind of objective analysis. Hence his hagiographic treatment of both JFK and RFK.

Even taking into account his devotion to all things Kennedy, Schlesinger’s assets still outweigh his liabilities. He might not return the favor to conservatives, but Schlesinger belongs in the camp of worthy adversaries. He has served the cause of liberalism well and has consistently valued attributes — humor, erudition, and patriotism — that are equally valued on the right, yet too often absent among his nominal allies on the left. The first volume of his autobiography reveals a temperamental comrade for conservatives if not a political one, and there’s ample reason to look forward to subsequent volumes.

## Liberalism v. The Disabled

By ADAM WOLFSON

HANS S. REINDERS. *The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society*. UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME PRESS. 280 PAGES. \$35.00

**S**TUNNING DEVELOPMENTS in the field of biotech have lately filled the news, from the cloning of Dolly the sheep to the mapping of the human genome. And if the scientists are to be believed, it seems

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*Adam Wolfson is executive editor of the Public Interest.*

that soon the once fantastic and unimaginable will become feasible: human clones, custom-designed children, lifespans doubled, man-animal chimeras, even the replacement of *Homo sapiens* with what the *New Republic* has dubbed *Homo geneticus*. Should but half of these predicted breakthroughs occur, the moral and

*Whatever its shortcomings, and certainly there are many, the Americans with Disabilities Act, signed into law by President Bush and supported by Democrats and Republicans alike, was well-intentioned and has helped many.*

political repercussions would be significant. But even if only the seemingly most mundane among them — the doubling of the human life span — occurs, the political consequences would be large indeed, and not necessarily what we expect. As the philosopher Hans Jonas once pointed out, a revolutionary extension of the life span would usher in, paradoxically, the most reactionary of societies. Dominated by the old and security-conscious, lacking

the inventiveness and wonder of the young, such a society would hardly be the dynamo that cheerleaders of progress and technology like Virginia Postrel want — it would be a society of unending boredom and stasis.

Technology's unintended impact is the general subject of a new book by Hans S. Reinders. In *The Future of the Disabled in Liberal Society*, he subtly explores how genetic-testing technologies — ones that are already widely used and others that are just around the corner — adversely affect the standing of the disabled in liberal states. A professor of ethics, Reinders has written an intellectually challenging work of philosophy and social policy. He draws broadly from the social sciences, political theory, psychology, and literature in order to grapple with a question few of us are willing to face: Does liberalism, in fulfilling its principles of equality and autonomy, also succeed in undermining and destroying these very same principles, at least for a segment of the population — the disabled?

Here's how Reinders describes the process by which liberalism feeds upon its own most cherished ideals. Modern liberalism, as authoritatively formulated by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, is devoted to the supposedly value-free norms of equal respect and autonomy. These principles, taken a certain distance, have served the disabled well, creating a society that is more inclusive, that treats the disabled as fellow citizens, that goes the extra mile to provide equal access, that does not allow discrimination based on handicap. Whatever its shortcomings, and certainly there are many, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), signed into law in 1990 by President

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Bush and supported by Democrats and Republicans alike, was a well-intentioned piece of legislation that has helped many.

But what happens when the principles of equality and autonomy are extended further, as they have been, into the far-flung reaches of genetic testing? Increasingly, it is possible to test for physical or mental defects in embryo, not to mention eventually for eye color, height, sexual orientation, IQ, etc. What kind of moral guidance does liberalism have to offer us in deciding who should and who should not be born? None and worse than none, says Reinders.

The principle of autonomy, as developed by Dworkin and others, guarantees parents the absolute right to prevent the birth of less-than-perfect children, a choice many parents make. But the problem is not simply that liberal morality offers no guidelines in the difficult area of genetic testing, leaving these decisions to personal deliberation and pronouncing them strictly private choices. In the view of Reinders, the autonomy principle carries within itself an implicit value judgment about the lives of the disabled — namely, that such lives are not worth living. Considered on the simplest level, an individual's decision to abort a disabled child, when aggregated with many other such individual choices, casts a thick cloud of doubt on the value of the lives led by the disabled. It is, Reinders states, “utterly naïve” to suppose otherwise. And more fundamentally, because liberalism takes autonomy to be the essential quality of our humanity, it inevitably devalues the disabled who live with some measure of dependency.

Thus, concludes Reinders, liberal society today sends the following contradictory message to the disabled: As long as you're here, we'll take care of you as best we can — but better had you never been born.

*M*OREOVER, as increasing numbers of individuals opt to prevent the birth of disabled children, a certain informal but powerful social consensus will emerge. Reinders believes that people will begin to ask: Why should we bear the cost of supporting the disabled through special education programs and the like when the parents should have done the “responsible” thing by preventing the child's birth? And public support for the ADA and other such programs and initiatives will dwindle.

Defenders of genetic testing, Reinders notes, claim that no such critical public judgment is being made, only a private, medical decision to reduce individual suffering. But Reinders responds that the antisuffering principle is itself a value judgment, which imposes a specific meaning on disabled lives. Seen only darkly and incompletely through the distorting lens of suffering and privation, the lives of the disabled will no longer appear as genuinely human or worthy of full respect.

Liberal ideology's contradictions — how its principles of equal respect and absolute autonomy, once unloosed, lead to a lack of respect and loss of autonomy for some — is in certain respects an old story. Since the beginning of political science it has been noted that every regime is most likely to decay not from values foreign or hostile to its existence but as the direct result of the perversion of its own prin-

principles. In Plato's *Republic*, Socrates described how, for example, the democrat's devotion to absolute freedom leads ineluctably to absolute slavery. And Daniel Bell has described how capitalism creates a social ethos that is ultimately inhospitable to the virtues that make capitalism possible in the first place.

*How can liberalism's autonomy principle be kept within decent and reasonable bounds? And how can its commendable solicitude for the disabled be kept from sliding into lack of empathy for the lives they lead?*

The question is: How can liberalism's autonomy principle be kept within decent and reasonable bounds in the high-tech age? And how can its commendable solicitude for the disabled be kept from sliding into lack of empathy for the lives they lead? In Reinders' opinion, the liberalism dominant in the universities and law schools — the liberalism espoused by Dworkin, Rawls, and their acolytes — inevitably degenerates in this way.

Reinders notes that this is not to say that liberalism as such is irredeemable.

He admits parenthetically that the communitarian-liberalism defended by William Galston and others might not suffer from these defects, that it might be able to contain autonomy's destructive inclinations. But he leaves this avenue largely unexplored. Instead, he turns to a number of prominent critics of liberalism, including Alasdair MacIntyre, for answers.

Reinders does not recommend disallowing genetic testing or interfering with the liberal right of reproduction. He believes that such moves would be as wrong as they would be likely to bring about a fearful backlash against the disabled. And he acknowledges, drawing upon the experience of parents who have raised disabled children, just how difficult such a journey can be. What Reinders suggests instead is that to understand disability, we draw on moral resources that transcend liberalism's narrow view of people as autonomous choosers, as "rational agents" who exist independently of social roles. To Reinders, this is simply false to human experience. We should view ourselves as beings who are defined by the social relations we are born into. In the parlance of the philosophers, we are "embedded selves" defined by our social ties. And so, if one is to lead a truly human life, the truly good life, one cannot really "choose" to have or not have a disabled child, for social ties define who we are a priori. In some sense, we are claimed by that disabled child before he is ever born, whether we fully acknowledge this existential fact or not. In Reinders' succinct formulation: "Sociability constitutes morality, not the other way around."

While Reinders' philosophic explo-

ration of disability is profound, its policy implications are not entirely clear. Also, Reinders' book might have benefited from some history and comparative analysis. For example, how does the liberal-scientific approach to disability stack up against the treatment of the disabled in nonliberal societies? Such a broader context would further our understanding of liberal societies' successes and shortcomings in this area of social policy. However, if Reinders' is not the last word on the subject, he has done a great service by demonstrating how even a seemingly benign aspect of the high-tech revolution, genetic testing, will have unintended consequences none of us can greet with equanimity.

## Defining Moments

By MARK BOWDEN

WILLIAM IAN MILLER. *The Mystery of Courage*. HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 384 PAGES. \$29.95

WHEN I WAS 14 years old, waiting in a long line to board a school bus in front of my junior high school in suburban Maryland, a bully began knocking down all of the boys who were waiting in the line behind me.

The bully in this case was named Daniel, and I remember he had coarse

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*Mark Bowden is the author of Black Hawk Down.*

red hair and the beginnings of a mustache. It wasn't that he was that much bigger or older than the rest of us, but he was stronger and, more important, tougher — and he knew it.

Adult men these days rarely have their physical courage put to the test unless they look for opportunities, but as a boy such challenges were (and I suspect still are) routine. If I had been at the rear of the line, one of the first he approached, I'd have been knocked down with the rest. But I had time to think about it. Would I stand up to him or not? I was one of the smallest boys in the ninth grade. I was no match for him. But pride and anger clearly warred with good sense. I didn't think less of the boys being pushed down, but I was sure I didn't want to be one of them.

When Daniel stepped in front of me, I slugged him in the mouth. I will always remember, with amazement, the sudden throb of pain in my fist and the spot of blood that formed on his lip as he reeled a step backward in shock. I remember being surprised at the hardness of his teeth and jaw. I had never hit anyone in the face before. What was I thinking?

Daniel lit into me furiously. I did nothing after that first blow except back away desperately, ducking and covering my head. He landed a fist solidly on my skull, which I hope hurt his knuckles, but in my panic I felt no pain. A teacher mercifully materialized and pulled us apart before he could do any serious damage. Minutes later, sitting alongside each other in the principal's office, united now by a common enemy, Daniel urged me not to say that he had started it. I didn't. I looked at the swelling around his lip and the



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blood on the tissue in his hand, and flexed my swollen and sore right hand tenderly and happily. It remains one of the proudest moments of my life. Daniel continued bullying his way through the ninth grade, but he never again bothered me

And I never again considered myself a coward. This was a big deal to me

*We don't get far into Miller's book on courage before realizing that what we normally mean by that word varies so widely that even common definitions contradict.*

then, and remains important. It does not mean, of course, that I would be able to stand my ground in something like real combat, or even that I would rise to the occasion again if personally threatened. It hasn't cured my fear of heights. There have been times in my life when I've responded with less backbone than the situation demanded. But that small act of courage as a boy still heartens me. Whatever my failings, I believe that when the moment of truth arrives, I am at least capable of rising to the occasion.

I suspect that most men have similar memories that they nurture to give them strength. Perhaps we just forget

the times we shrank from a challenge and cling to the sparks of bravery. Maybe all men are capable of courage in defense of something. Some might hold dignity in higher regard than others, while others willing to endure embarrassment, personal ridicule, and abuse might fight furiously to defend someone they love. Extreme cowardice, I suspect, is as rare as fearlessness. That said, there is no doubt that some men are more naturally courageous than others.

*The Mystery of Courage* is William Ian Miller's engaging discussion of this essential virtue. The book examines in a delightfully clear-headed way a basic quality we all think we understand and admire, and which most of us would like to believe we possess. Miller is a law professor at the University of Michigan and the author of *The Anatomy of Disgust*, which like this book is difficult to categorize. They might be called sociology, but will disappoint those looking for charts and data. They might also be classified psychology, but will frustrate those looking for experimental evidence and behavioral theory. Miller is, above all, a humanist, someone who can discuss abstract concepts with admirable wisdom, wit, and learning.

We don't get far into Miller's book on courage before realizing that what we normally mean by that word, what we all assume we know, varies so widely that even common definitions contradict. For instance, is it cowardly or courageous to stand alone against overwhelming social and peer pressure? Put that way, we would say courageous. The maxim is: *Be true to yourself*. People have it on posters hanging over their desks. But suppose the man stand-

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ing alone is a soldier refusing to march with his platoon into combat. Here the refuser takes a lonesome personal stand, subjecting himself to abuse, scorn and even punishment. Yet he is, literally by definition, a coward.

Early in his book, Miller gives us the example of a “courageous coward,” taken from Alex Bowlby’s *Recollections of Rifleman Bowlby*, a memoir of the British campaign in Italy in 1944. Bowlby recalls a disturbing coward named Coke:

a soldier with a perpetually sour expression, dedicated to “looking after Number One,” insensitive to the claims of his comrades situated as miserably as himself. He was not well liked. He had to be bullied into action; he deserted more than once, though when caught the first time he actually looked shamefaced and remorsefully confessed himself a coward to his mates. But that was his last moral moment. Once he admitted his cowardice he became committed to it without shame. We see him next taunting the author for having stuck out in an action from which he (Coke) had absented himself. He flaunts his court martial “as if it were a decoration”: “I’ll be here when you are pushing up daisies.”

Like Bowlby, we find Coke despicable, but don’t we also feel a trace of respect for his defiance? As he is rolled away to be court martialed, Coke insults his comrades and predicts they’ll all be killed. “And we ’ope you’ll be f—ing shot!” one of the men replies. “I’ll be alive when you’re all f—ing dead,” Coke hurls back. Bowlby writes, “Although none of us would ever have

admitted it, I think we were all a little impressed. Coke had gone down with all guns firing.” Coke is cowardly but, in his own way, fearless. So perhaps courage is not so basic after all.

What is the difference between moral courage and physical courage? Is it as courageous to submit and endure as to rebel? Does the value of courage

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differ from one culture to another? During World War II, for instance, the unquestionable heroism of Japanese soldiers was dismissed as suicidal fanaticism by American Marines, who have a fierce tradition of their own. Does the courage of a man brought up in a society where free will and individual choice are paramount outstrip the heroism of one raised in a culture that demands blind obedience to authority? In the former case, a soldier who performs heroically is often choosing to do more than what he is asked. The citation for bravery reads “above and beyond the call of duty.” Japanese sol-

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diers were expected to either triumph in battle or die. Failure was so shameful that suicide was an honored tradition. A brave soldier in this culture is simply going along, living up to what is expected, or, in another sense, giving in to social and peer pressure. On purely objective grounds, should it be valued as highly?

Miller recounts the story of Yokota Yutaka, a Japanese warrior who suffered the enduring embarrassment of repeatedly surviving his suicide missions. Yutaka was a volunteer Kaiten pilot. The Kaiten was a huge torpedo:

The warhead carried 3,000 pounds of explosives, powerful enough to sink an aircraft carrier if properly aimed. Everything was in the aiming, and to ensure that this was a smart torpedo, a human pilot was provided with room right behind the warhead. Behind his space was the missile's propulsion system. If the Kaiten hit its target the pilot died one kind of death; if he missed — the Kaiten once discharged was not recoverable — he died another kind of death. The first way was glorious, the second a humiliation the price of which was variously starvation, suffocation, or, more properly, suicide by self-detonation.

Against all odds, every time Yutaka went through the stirring “ceremony of departure,” where he and the others chosen were presented ritual short swords and saluted as great warriors, his torpedo was not used and he had to return. Through no fault of his own, Yutaka was branded a coward, shunned and beaten by the other Kaiten pilots. When the war ends and Yutaka is still alive, he is overcome

with shame, first for not dying in the war, and second for lacking the will to kill himself honorably. We Westerners would see him as a man of extraordinary courage trapped in an unreasonable culture. Yutaka saw himself simply as a coward.

In wars where men are exposed to months and even years of intense fighting, even the most physically courageous have their limits. It is as though courage is drawn on like a bank account. Aware of this, soldiers learn to hoard it, saving their bravery for only those moments that matter most. Veterans know that a comrade who stays to the rear, or hides when the shooting starts on one day, might be leading the charge on another. For those who behaved cowardly in one engagement and survived, there was always hope of redemption. You might lose your reputation for courage, but you could earn it back.

There was no such luxury for the men I wrote about in *Black Hawk Down*, which tells the story of a 15-hour firefight in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993. For these men, many of whom had trained for years to prepare for combat, their actions on that one long day were permanently defining. Those who behaved bravely are forever brave, and those who trembled and cowered must live with that. It seems a particularly harsh standard.

If the broad scope of memoirs and battle accounts cited in *The Mystery of Courage* reveals one thing, it is unpredictability. Often the courageous play against type — the ones you would most expect to brave enemy fire are sometimes the first to cower, and the ones who seem most lacking are often those who most distinguish themselves.

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I am reminded of John Stebbins, a Ranger staff sergeant in Mogadishu who, deemed slightly softer than his hard-bodied comrades, was normally relegated to duties safely in the rear. Through an unlikely chain of circumstance, on October 3, 1993, Stebbins was inserted into the assault force and found himself thrust into the fiercest firefight in modern American history. Stebbins went berserk in battle, repeatedly exposing himself to enemy fire to defend his position until he was injured and literally pulled to safety. He was awarded the silver star.

Miller discusses the difference between rashness, which is how some more experienced soldiers saw Stebbins' actions, and courage, but concludes that the two cannot be easily disconnected. Still, we rightly admire the deliberate act of courage more than the impulsive one. One of the most powerful series of photographs I have ever seen, on display at the D-Day Museum in New Orleans, shows two defiant young German idealists moments before their execution by Nazi soldiers. The magnificent poise of these two teenagers, barely more than boy and girl, who chose to fight evil against impossible odds at a time when they could not have hoped to prevail, literally takes away my breath. I cannot imagine such depths of moral and physical courage.

Another telling example of courage's mystery and complexity is the story of Brad Thomas, a ranger who, having fought his way out of the chaos of Mogadishu to safety, was ordered to rearm and wade back into the fight. It is a truism of soldiering that anyone can be stirred, trained, pressured, or motivated to march into battle once; it

is much harder to rouse those who have seen the terror, the randomness of death and injury, the noise, blood, and confusion. Thomas refused. In what must have been a deeply humiliating moment, he stood before his comrades and informed his sergeant that he could not return to the fight. Minutes later, however, Thomas wrestled his fears

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down and voluntarily boarded a Humvee to return to the embattled city.

I had been told this story while I was researching *Black Hawk Down*, and tried for many months without success to find and interview Thomas, in part about this episode. When I finally got the chance, I elicited his own account of his momentary loss of nerve, which verified what I had been told. It was clear that Thomas was still embarrassed by it.

"Why is it important for you to tell that part of the story?" he asked.

I told him it was important because it defined courage better than any of

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the dozens of other episodes of bravery told in the book. Stebbins had demonstrated one kind of courage — perhaps akin to lashing out at a bully. Overtaken with anger, he had blinded himself to the consequences and struck back hard. He richly deserved his medal. But what about the man who felt fear grip his knees, who was so paralyzed by it that he is willing to suffer the shame of admitting it to his fellows, and who then managed to wrestle himself back together, screw his courage back in place, and do his duty.

“The important thing, Brad, is that you went back out.”

He reluctantly agreed to let me tell his story. Thomas went on to perform bravely. But even a man who cannot overcome his fear can come to be seen as brave. Miller opens his book with an account, from the Civil War memoir of Robert J. Burdette, who remembered a man he called “the good coward.” This man comported himself in all respects as a good soldier. He willed himself to march into battle again and again, but every time he faced enemy fire his will collapsed and he ran. Still, he always returned, and always forced himself to confront his fears again.

With what beating of heart, and straining of nerves, shortness of breath, and strenuous calling of all reserves of resolution and willpower, God knew, and the colonel half-guessed. A braver man, up to that point than any of us . . . The coward served through the war, and when the regiment marched home to welcome and honors, I think one of the bravest men with them was the coward. I know he was beaten in every fight he went

into, but he went in. And he fought. And such fighting! Much we knew about it, we laughing, shouting, devil-may-care school-boys playing with firearms!

What is a coward anyhow? Cravens, and dastards, and poltroons, we know at sight. But who are the cowards? And how do we distinguish them from the heroes? How does God tell?

For the most part we can tell. We know it when we see it.

*I*N *Courage*, Miller returns again and again to the stories of soldiers, and he makes a strong and important case against further watering down what we mean by the word. Today, we are apt to apply it to anyone who successfully has a baby, completes a 12-step program, recovers from an injury or illness, faces down a phobia, or even endures a difficult contract negotiation. In the case of bearing children, a task for which all men must remain eternally indebted to women, the martial concept of courage demands a female equivalent.

Contemporary gender, sexual, and ethnic politics argues that all are entitled to their stories of courage, that no one is to be denied the virtue simply by having been relegated to powerlessness. It is even suggested that being invisible to or disfavored by the dominant ideology is itself a form of courage. As we see, this move is not so new; Nietzsche complained that Christianity used a similar strategy against warrior values. The politics of identity is thus participating in



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an ancient battle – whose beginnings are as old as, even older than, the Stoics — as to whether courage is best manifested in aggression or enduring aggression, in victory or defeat, in the charge or in stolid sufferance and endurance.

Many accomplishments require bravery and are admirable, but we go too far when we apply the label of courage to what is more appropriately described simply as hard work.

Adventurous young people now invent bizarre and frivolous ways of testing themselves in thrill-seeking sports and “Xtreme” competitions, demonstrating that in the absence of war the need to test one’s courage remains important, especially to young men. But none of us will ever know for

sure whether we possess the kind of courage to perform well in battle unless and until we are put to the test, and it may be that none of us is or can be courageous all the time.

We are privileged to live in a time and place where tests of our physical courage are rare, and where we can practice moral courage without taking big risks. Miller reminds us that not so long ago, there was no difference between the two. In the not-too-distant past, taking an unpopular position very often meant severe physical punishment or execution. Today we can stand up for our principles in small ways every day without risking serious harm. And the good news is that moral courage proves to be more like a muscle than a bank account. The more you exercise it, the stronger it gets.

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## LETTERS

### *Making Sense of Missile Defense*

SIR, — Mark Davis's article "Reagan's Real Reason for SDI" (October/November 2000) is both timely and on target. Can, or should, any responsible government avoidably leave its citizens open to devastating attack? Our government did it for nearly a half century and got away with it — through the policy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Because it "worked" for 50 years does not necessarily mean it is the best possible policy or that it will work indefinitely.

The probability of a nuclear missile attack in any given year is quite small, but given enough years, the result approaches the inevitable. We must expect a serious challenge at some time in the future.

Can nuclear missile attacks be deflected or blunted? Not if we don't try. As matters stand now, there are three different methods of intercepting and destroying incoming missiles: 1) By laser interceptor in the launch phase. We have such a program in development. The laser is installed in a highly modified Boeing 747 which presumably would be within range, perhaps 100 miles, at the time of launch. 2) By interceptor rockets from the surface during the "ballistic" phase. We have

limited capability for such interception in place now, but it does not protect all regions of the country and could be overwhelmed by a massive missile launch. And 3) particle beam interceptors in low earth orbit. The latter concept does truly deserve the appellation of Star Wars, and most people suppose that it would require decades to develop. Not so. There is a particle beam device in almost every living room. The particle beam is the basis for every cathode-ray television tube.

Particle beam technology, directed streams of either protons or electrons, is well enough developed in the field of high-energy physics. The beams, to have effective range, must exist in a high-vacuum environment. Physicists and their technicians go to great lengths to sustain a high vacuum near the earth's surface, but high vacuum is the natural state of things at, say, 100 miles above the earth's surface.

Naysayers will object because of what is called "bloom," the mutual repulsion of like-charged particles: Such beams tend to lose their focus with distance. However, there is no reason I know of why an electron and proton beam cannot be melded. Instead of blooming, the mixed or melded beam would then tend to focus itself and become, in the process, a beam of neutral high-energy hydrogen atoms.

Would not particle beam weapons be prohibitively expensive? Not at all. Indeed, they would be much cheaper than either interceptor rockets or 747-mounted lasers. A beam accelerator could go into orbit with each of several *Challenger*-type space launches. The accelerators would be relatively inexpensive, likely no more than a few tens of millions of dollars per unit.

The beams would have a velocity of nearly the speed of light, thus making the ballistic intercept problem relatively simple. One “bottle” of compressed hydrogen would provide the raw material for millions of rounds of space shots. The source of energy for these rounds? An array of solar panels attached to the particle beam accelerator. (Such a panel was placed in orbit in early December 2000.)

A beam current, for example, of one ampere at 5 million electron-volts would produce beam power of 5 megawatts, the equivalent of 5,000 electric cooking range surface units of one kilowatt each. Anything in the path of such a beam, a beam say 6 inches in diameter, would simply vaporize.

What about decoys? Destroy them all. Unlike surface rocket interceptors, additional “rounds” of particle beam weapons are almost free.

We serve the cause of peace, not war, by maintaining the best feasible defense against incoming nuclear weapons. (Had we been prepared for World War II, that war would not have started.)

Share this technology with potential adversaries? Why not? If peace, not blackmail, is our aim, we should go out of our way to give other nations reason to feel secure.

The proposal here is a three-tiered defense system, one based on the surface of the earth, one airborne, one in low-orbit space. None has the certainty of being 100 percent effective but all three, coordinated, would make the probability of success of an ICBM attack so small as to discourage the effort.

ROBERT W. CLACK  
*Lake Wales, Fla.*

*Editor's note: Robert W. Clack is a retired nuclear engineer who worked, decades ago, on particle accelerators at the Radiation Laboratory at the University of California.*

## Thinking About The Next Pope

SIR, — Damon Linker’s analysis of the pope (“John Paul II, Intellectual,” October/November 2000), noting his intellectual strengths and lamenting the lack of recognition for them that he has received, suggests to me that John Paul is likely to be replaced by a very liberal pope who will share few of the current pope’s ideas or philosophical inclinations.

It was significant that the Democratic and Republican candidates for president and most other offices went to great lengths to avoid the subject of abortion, as well as any other major philosophical arguments advanced by Pope John Paul II. It is also significant that the Roman Catholic Church in America seems more concerned with maintaining access to federal funding for various education and social programs than it is in developing or advancing a philosophical or intellectual case for its theology.

It appears that the intellectualism of John Paul II has not given the Roman Catholic Church as a whole the intellectual respectability it needs in order to maintain its position among the developed nations of the world. Instead, the content of the pope’s encyclicals have been used against the

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Roman Catholic Church and its leadership to make it appear more medieval or “backward,” and more out of date or irrelevant to modern life, than ever.

The Roman Catholic Church seems to understand that it is losing ground in developed nations (it was at its peak in about 1980, and has been losing members and political clout ever since), and church leaders may see the United States as a source of funds to feed its global operations. Right now, the most likely new source of adherents to Catholicism is in the undeveloped regions of Africa and South America. All of this plays into ideas advanced by atheists and secular groups: that religion is something for primitive or aboriginal people, but unsuited or unnecessary in an advanced culture.

My guess is that John Paul II will be replaced by a pope much more focused on “pragmatic” and political issues than on philosophy. The next pope is likely to be a political liberal in the tradition of Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI. The Republicans might want to rethink the strategy of wooing Hispanic voters should that happen, since they will almost certainly be voting for Democrats.

BRIAN LYNCH  
*Austin, Texas*

### *The Case for Private Accounts*

SIR, — I am starting to lean towards privatizing at least a portion of Social Security benefits. (“Making the Most of the Surplus,” by Peter J. Ferrara, October/November 2000). But there

are still some important issues that deserve to be more fully considered.

We need to talk about people’s knowledge of investing. Will people day-trade this capital away? Is, then, the government, Big Brother, responsible for assisting these folks?

And, what about people already receiving Social Security? These folks didn’t have the opportunity to invest a portion of their Social Security benefits in private accounts (because of the pay-as-you-go method). They still need their benefits. Therefore, we would have to wait years before the system (or a portion of the system) allows us to invest in private accounts.

And then there is the question of the windfall financial planners will receive if law allows people to privatize.

But notwithstanding these questions, it’s clear that private Social Security accounts have the capability of changing so much.

ANTHONY COOK  
*Boston, Mass.*

### *We Can Keep The Republic*

SIR, — A comment on Tod Lindberg’s “A Republic, If We Can Keep It” (December 2000/January 2001). What is the use of power if one is not liable to use it? History is full of empire builders — Nebukadnezar, Alexander, Attila, Hitler. All had massive military power, and all used it to invade and conquer. History is a list of invasions and wars.

Yet, the United States and the rest of the civilized world now have a policy



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of recognition of established borders. Military might is now used to strengthen those borders, not cross them.

Therefore, it does not matter if the United States is the only “superpower.” Most nations recognize and defend all borders, even borders of other nations, due to self-interest. We don’t do it alone now, nor need we. This current situation, of international recognition and support of secure borders, may change. Right now, it is nice to be strong — but it is not critical.

The republican form of government is better than the other choices, monarchy and dictatorship. The latter suffer from two deficiencies. The first deficiency is the lack of protection of personal civil rights. But the most glaring deficiency is the way new leaders are produced, mainly by civil war or coup, which is very destructive. With the republican way of determining leaders, we avoid all that messy bother.

So, citizen apathy, ignorance, and lack of voter turnout, are relatively unimportant. I am not worried, as long as our form of government is contin-

ued. And the difference between ignorance and apathy is moot, because neither threatens the republic. The threat would come from dedicated, informed, motivated people who are organized for its overthrow. These are apparently small in number, and isolated. So, we have the ignorant masses who don’t care, and the informed activists who support the republic. I think that the republic is secure. The revolution is televised, but it consists of a “reality” game show.

JOE COTTON  
*Baltimore, Md.*

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