


BRAC Pack



“BRAC is more than just closing bases. It’s about providing the Department of Defense with the capability to make fairly dramatic changes in their force structure.”

—*Christopher Hellman, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, The Capital (Annapolis, MD), September 18, 2005*

“DoD data show that almost 85 percent of local DoD civilian jobs that were lost on bases as a result of realignments and closures have been replaced through development of the properties.”

—*The Government Accountability Office, The Hill, May 12, 2005*

“The role of the Defense Department is to provide security, not to provide jobs for Americans. There are plenty of agencies to stick their nose in the economic well-being of Americans.”

—*Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation, The Hill, May 12, 2005*

“The overall economy adjusted well and quickly to the shipyard closure. It [BRAC] was very traumatic, certainly for citizens who were directly affected, but I guess you could say that Charleston is an example that a community can successfully rebound.”

—*Charleston, SC Mayor Joe Riley on Charleston’s recovery from BRAC, The Union Leader (Manchester, NH), May 15, 2005*

“We have too much military infrastructure, and much of what we have is inadequate to our needs. As such, it’s especially important we not let unfounded fears of economic disaster hold up the BRAC process. Instead of worrying about getting off the BRAC list, local leaders should focus on getting on with the future.”

—*Jack Spencer, The Heritage Foundation, The Washington Times, August 7, 2005*

“America simply cannot do military transformation without BRAC. The Department of Defense is not a jobs program. It is not the role of the Defense Department to provide employment for Americans; it is to protect America so we can find other jobs.”

—*Kenneth Beeks, Vice President, Business Executives for National Security, The Macon Telegraph, March 12, 2005*

Introduction

The 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is almost complete. It is up to Congress to finish the race toward a better military, stronger civilian economy, and stronger America. The pages that follow contain a compilation of The Heritage Foundation's research on the 2005 BRAC round. The publication argues that base closures are important for military modernization and fiscal responsibility and that, furthermore, base closings can create opportunities for private economic development. Congress should focus on efficiently and effectively protecting the United States, not on saving specific bases.

Why the Pentagon Needs to Close Bases

BRAC is one of the most important—and controversial—issues affecting the future health of the armed forces, and it is critical to U.S. national security. It balances national defense priorities, supports the Pentagon's military modernization objective, saves the Department of Defense billions of dollars each year, and creates opportunities for private economic development.

BRAC recommendations are made in conjunction with clearly defined selection criteria. Future mission capabilities and the impact on operations are the list's overriding considerations, but economic impact is also measured. The fact is that conditions change, affecting the utility of many bases and how individual bases contribute to overall national security.

While the BRAC process makes a major contribution to advancing the Pentagon's larger transformation objective, there is no doubt that the closure or realignment of a base, with the accompanying economic considerations, makes for contentious political and public debate. Nonetheless, BRAC is necessary because it:

- **Advances the Pentagon's military modernization objective.** BRAC is an essential part of recalibrating U.S. basing infrastructure to reflect America's ever-changing national security requirements. It is also about changing how the Department of Defense supports troops, acquires hardware, repairs materiel, manages its personnel, and fights wars. Base closures and realignment allow resources to be focused on creating the military's infrastructure to support a 21st century military.
- **Promotes Fiscal Responsibility.** The previous four BRAC rounds have saved a total of roughly \$17 billion and are now saving about \$3 billion annually. The Defense Department estimates that this round will generate savings of approximately \$48 billion over the next 20 years. In an environment of increasingly scarce resources, the Defense Department should be able to reinvest these savings in other programs and operations.
- **Creates opportunities for private economic development.** The first few years after a base closure or realignment may be extremely difficult for an affected area. However, community leadership, planning, and federal assistance have helped communities adapt to base closings and realignments. With the many successes in diverse communities across the country, areas affected by the current BRAC round should draw on the experiences of these communities to develop a strong post-BRAC economic vitalization plan.

Strategic Move Forward

BRAC is part of a larger move toward an improved U.S. military and more vibrant local economies. Congress should make BRAC decisions based on national security requirements, not political considerations. This packet outlines the reasons why Congress should not act to reject the BRAC list.

—Alane Kochems

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Principles for Restructuring America's Global Military Infrastructure

by Jack Spencer – *WebMemo* No. 554, August 16, 2004

The United States will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This move is overdue.

BRAC Must Not Be Delayed

by Jack Spencer – *WebMemo* No. 507, May 20, 2004

The Armed Services Committee passed an amendment that would delay BRAC. Congress should reject this delay.

Guidelines for a Successful BRAC

by Jack Spencer – *Backgrounder* No. 1716, January 6, 2004

A successful Base Realignment and Closure will rid the Department of Defense of excess infrastructure, free resources, and ensure that the remaining infrastructure is appropriate.

Fear Not the Base-Closing List

by Jack Spencer
August 4, 2005

Attention, communities on the newest Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) list: Don't panic. Don't cancel your plans for a prosperous future. Don't waste your money on a lobbyist who promises to save your base, because he can't.

Instead, talk to leaders in communities that have gone through the process in years past. You'll find that, although initially painful, closings of outdated or unneeded military facilities don't keep local economies down for long.

A new study from The Heritage Foundation looked at prior base closures in three environments: Southern California, with its urban nature and heavy Navy presence; Indiana, less populated and with a strong Air Force component; and Alabama, more rural and primarily an Army location. It found that, in almost every case, communities that lost military facilities regained 90 percent or more of the displaced jobs and per capita income within six years.

They've done so thanks to forward-thinking local leadership that identified alternate uses for the facilities and enacted aggressive post-BRAC recovery plans.

The grandfather of all BRAC recovery efforts is purportedly the Portsmouth-Rochester, N.H., area. When Pease Air Force Base there closed in 1988, local leaders sprang into action. Today, few people remember the air base. But many do business at the Pease International Tradeport, and leaders from that area have advised officials elsewhere on how to recover from base closings.

Also, Williams Air Force Base in Mesa, Ariz., closed in 1991, is today Williams Gateway Airport, an international aviation and aerospace center and designated foreign trade zone.

Fort Devens in Ayer, Mass., another 1991 closure, has been transformed into a business campus with dozens of new tenants ranging from high-tech start-ups to Anheuser-Busch. The Charleston Naval Shipyard, BRAC class of '93, is now home to more than 100 private, local, state and federal organizations. Glenview, Ill., National Air Station, another '93 closure, is being developed into an upscale, master-planned North Shore community called The Glen.

England Air Force Base in Alexandria, La., has become the city's airport and a business campus for a variety of concerns. Bergstrom Air Force Base in Austin, Texas, is now that city's airport, serving 7.2 million passengers annually. Kelly Air Force Base in San Antonio has become a major logistics and distribution center and foreign trade zone.

Although local leadership is the key, Congress can help by doing the following

- Hold hearings on how communities have overcome past base closures. Help build confidence in communities that there is life after BRAC.
- Support the 2005 BRAC list. Rather than fight to keep facilities off the list, members of Congress should explain why BRAC is important and how they will help their communities respond.
- Help communities on the 2005 BRAC list and those from past lists communicate. Encourage communities that have emerged from the process successfully to lend their expertise to those just now going through it.

History shows that most communities recover quickly from BRAC. It won't necessarily be easy, but good local leadership and a sound economic revitalization plan can go a long way to ease the sting of losing a base. And good leadership in Congress would go a long way toward convincing communities that BRAC is not about jobs -- nor should it be. It's about national security.

We have too much military infrastructure, and much of what we have is inadequate to our needs. As such, it's especially important that we not let unfounded fears of economic disaster hold up the BRAC process.

Instead of worrying about getting off the BRAC list, local leaders should focus on getting on with the future.

Jack Spencer is a senior policy analyst for defense and national security at The Heritage Foundation.

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Web Memo



Published by The Heritage Foundation

BRAC Wars, Episode Three

by Jack Spencer and Kathy Gudgel
WebMemo #798
July 18, 2005

One of the most important issues in military transformation today is Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). The U.S. global basing infrastructure, including both its domestic and foreign components, must be recalibrated to reflect America's changing and unpredictable national security requirements. President George W. Bush has initiated a new round of BRAC designed to eliminate excess basing infrastructure and free up resources that can be reinvested into the Pentagon's critical transformation initiatives. At a recent event co-hosted by The Heritage Foundation and the Minuteman Institute for National Defense Studies, experts examined the issues surrounding the 2005 round of BRAC, specifically those that concern the National Guard and the states.

The National Security Framework

Since 9/11, planners have recognized several new truths about national security: homeland security is an important and growing component; the Pentagon neither can nor should provide all elements of security; many other agencies—beyond the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)—must contribute; and terrorism is not just a law enforcement problem, but also a “war” problem.

These conditions give rise to an important question with ramifications for national security structure and the relationship between the active and reserve component: “Who is responsible for what, domestically and internationally?” The inability to clearly answer this question in an environment of rapidly increasing operational tempo and BRAC decisions contributes to the frustration felt by commanders. One solution might be to institute a National Defense Panel or some legislative solution similar to Goldwater-Nichols. Such an approach could address the difficult issues of when force should be used, the role of the military within the continental United

States, the role of the Reserve Component, and the role of the Executive Branch bureaucracy. Whatever the solution, it must be:

- **Legislation Driven**—Creating a legal framework will clearly delineate responsibilities and provide consistency over time;
- **Comprehensive from the Federal Standpoint**—All relevant agencies must be included, from DOD to state governments;
- **Not Overseen by the Department of Defense**—Otherwise the analysis and recommendations will continue to be DOD-centric, when breadth of vision is required; and
- **Forward Looking**—The global war on terror is underway but may not be of infinite duration; other threats exist and should not be marginalized.

The View from the Trenches

This event benefited from the participation of two Adjutant Generals who are actively dealing with BRAC issues in their states. Although both had a series of concerns relating to their individual circumstances, they observed that there were problems with the information gathering mechanisms of BRAC. They echoed concerns voiced at previous events that neither they—nor their senior leadership—were fully part of the process. Another concern, they said, was that the contributions of the National Guard were not fully appreciated by Washington bureaucrats. Their conclusion was that these conditions resulted in a number of unfair BRAC decisions. Other panelists disagreed. They argued that the Pentagon had the responsibility to make decisions based on national security and that would rightly lead to a national security-centric process. Therefore, the information-gathering process would be focused more on national concerns than on state or local concerns. Any state or local security deficiencies caused by a base closure should be the responsibility of local communities. They suggested that these deficiencies would be a great starting point for local communities to develop post-BRAC redevelopment plans.

For more information on Base Realignment and Closure, see Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1867, "[BRAC and Per Capita Income](#)," *Webmemo* No. 748, "[Base Realignment and Closure: National Guard and Regional Implications](#)," *Executive Memorandum* No. 953, "[Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years](#)," *Webmemo* No. 507, "[BRAC Must Not Be Delayed](#)," and *Backgrounder* No. 1716, "[Guidelines for a Successful BRAC](#)," all available at heritage.org

Jack Spencer is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at the Heritage Foundation. Kathy Gudgel, Research Assistant in Defense and National Security, contributed to this piece. This paper is based on presentations given at "BRAC Wars

Episode Three: What Were They Thinking?," held at the National Guard Memorial Building on June 15, 2005.

Background

No. 1867
July 13, 2005



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BRAC and Per Capita Income

Jack Spencer

One of the primary criticisms of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is that it devastates communities economically. Aside from the fact that the Department of Defense (DOD) is not a jobs program, these criticisms are simply not true. Most affected communities have recovered nicely from past BRAC rounds, with approximately 90 percent of all jobs being replaced. Indeed, approximately 115,000 jobs have been created through past recovery efforts, and many communities have actually prospered.

To provide greater understanding of the economic impact of BRAC, The Heritage Foundation has analyzed the per capita income of every county in the United States that has had a base closed in past BRAC rounds. Not surprisingly, this analysis shows that after a small decrease, nearly all communities continue to experience strong growth in per capita income.

History and Status of BRAC 2005

On May 13, 2005, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld released the 2005 BRAC list, which proposes to close 33 major bases and nearly 120 smaller facilities and to realign a great many others. While the BRAC process is aimed at generating efficiencies for the Pentagon, better allocating scarce resources, and ensuring that the remaining infrastructure is appropriate for a 21st century military, many in Congress have been more concerned with the economic impact on their constituents.

After contentious yet successful BRAC rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the movement to begin

Talking Points

- BRAC is vital for national security reasons and should go forward. It will advance the Pentagon's modernization objective and allow the Pentagon to redirect scarce resources to more important programs and operations.
- In previous BRAC rounds, communities with post-BRAC revitalization plans and strong local leadership experienced economic growth.
- Congress should support the 2005 BRAC Commission and Secretary Rumsfeld's recommended list while simultaneously investigating and facilitating the efforts of affected communities to succeed after BRAC.
- BRAC is not about jobs; it is about national security. A successful BRAC will help the Pentagon to provide national security, and this is the most appropriate contribution that the Department of Defense can make to the U.S. economy.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg1867.cfm

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a fifth round began in 1997. A fifth round was not secure until Congress passed the 2003 Defense Authorization Act, which amended the original Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. However, in 2004, the House of Representatives inserted a provision in the FY 2005 Defense budget to delay BRAC beyond 2005. The Senate refusal to approve such language, and the threat of a presidential veto kept BRAC on track.

In March 2005, the President appointed former Secretary of Veterans Affairs Anthony J. Principi to head the BRAC Commission, and on May 13, 2005, Secretary Rumsfeld announced the proposed base closings and realignments to Congress and the commission. Further efforts to delay the 2005 BRAC process were also defeated in the House. There is some effort to bring legal action from the states regarding the relationship among state governors, National Guard facilities, and the BRAC process, but even this issue seems to be fading.

After detailed consultations, review, and visits to the bases under consideration, the BRAC Commission has until September 8 to send its conclusion to the President, who then has 15 days to accept or reject the commission's report. One aspect of the BRAC process that is slightly different from former years is that recent legislation requires a supermajority of seven commissioners (out of a total of nine) to add a base to the list.

According to Philip Grone, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment, bases chosen for closure or major realignment can expect the process to be completed within six years, and a series of policy reforms will enhance the DOD's ability to move forward to close or realign a base as expeditiously as possible to allow economic redevelopment of the affected areas.¹ The Pentagon's Office of Economic Adjustment exists to help communities adjust and make the transition to new opportunities in the wake of BRAC through planning grants and assistance.

Why the Pentagon Needs to Close Bases

BRAC is one of the most important—and controversial—issues affecting the future health of the armed forces, and it is critical to U.S. national security. It balances national defense priorities, supports the Pentagon's military modernization objective, saves the Department of Defense billions of dollars each year, and creates opportunities for private economic development.

BRAC recommendations are made in conjunction with clearly defined selection criteria. Future mission capabilities and the impact on operations are the list's overriding considerations, but economic impact is also measured. The fact is that conditions change, affecting the utility of many bases and how individual bases contribute to overall national security.

While the BRAC process makes a major contribution to advancing the Pentagon's larger transformation objective, there is no doubt that the closure or realignment of a base, with the accompanying economic considerations, makes for contentious political and public debate. Nonetheless, BRAC is necessary because it:

- **Advances the Pentagon's military modernization objective.** BRAC plays an integral part in recalibrating the U.S. basing infrastructure to reflect America's ever-changing national security requirements. However, BRAC is not just about closing and realigning bases, but also about changing how the Department of Defense supports troops, acquires hardware, repairs materiel, manages its personnel, and fights wars. BRAC helps to focus resources on realigning, training, and upgrading the military's infrastructure to support a 21st century fighting force. To afford these changes, the DOD must eliminate excess overhead and infrastructure and address outdated business practices. Closing and realigning bases further supports the increased drive toward joint utilization of assets among the services, which is one of the DOD's four pillars of military transformation.

1. Samantha Quigley, "Grone: BRAC 2005 Important for Many Reasons," Armed Forces Press Service, April 12, 2005, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2005/20050412_570.html (May 13, 2005).

- **Promotes Fiscal Responsibility.**


The previous four BRAC rounds have saved a total of roughly \$17 billion and are now saving about \$3 billion annually. Senior DOD officials estimate that the 2005 BRAC round will generate savings of approximately \$48 billion over the next 20 years. The Department of Defense estimates that five BRAC rounds will be saving \$12 billion per year by 2011.² In an environment of increasingly scarce resources, these figures represent significant savings that could be reinvested to support other DOD programs and operations.

- **Creates opportunities for private economic development.**

Clearly, the first few years after a base closure or realignment can be extremely difficult for an affected community. However, many communities that have experienced base closings or realignments have adapted through community leadership, planning, and federal assistance and have actually achieved higher rates of job and income growth. With so many post-BRAC successes in diverse communities across the country, any community affected by BRAC 2005 should be able to use the experiences of these communities to develop a strong post-BRAC economic vitalization plan.

BRAC and Per Capita Income

To understand the economic affects of BRAC on individuals more thoroughly, Heritage Foundation analysts undertook a detailed analysis of per capita income levels in the years before and after the past four BRAC rounds, to the extent allowed by the data. While they analyzed the incomes from every county that experienced a base closure in the past



four rounds, this report will look at three “clusters” of base closures in the nation. The three clusters were chosen based on past BRAC activity; current military presence; urban, rural, or suburban environment; Army, Navy, or Air Force concentration; and geographic location.



Using these parameters, the following results were obtained for these representational clusters. As these charts show, despite the different local conditions, the result is the same. The data demonstrate that economic survival and growth is the norm for post-BRAC communities.³

Southern California. Southern California has a significant Navy presence, is located on the West Coast, is urban, and has both past and current BRAC relationships.

Indiana. Indiana has a significant Air Force presence, is located in the Midwest, is less populated, and has both past and current BRAC relationships.

2. Business Executives for National Security, “Why Close Military Bases?” at www.bens.org/what_BRAC_why.html (May 27, 2005).

3. The complete data set is available from The Heritage Foundation upon request.



Alabama. Alabama has a significant Army presence, is located in the South, is more rural in nature, and has both past and current BRAC relationships.

Being Proactive: The Key to Post-BRAC Economic Vitalization

In the past, many communities across the country have pursued innovative post-BRAC vitalization plans. With BRAC 2005 well underway, the communities that will be affected by this round should consider beginning their community vitalization process early. They can avoid much of the economic hardship predicted by BRAC critics by learning from past BRAC successes and proactively developing economic response plans.

It is of vital importance for them to act proactively. They should not wait for the Pentagon, the federal government, or any other agency to tell them what to do. Instead, they should develop their own plans and tell the Pentagon and other government agencies what to do. The following are 10 examples of innovative approaches that communities used to exploit past BRAC rounds successfully and ensure economic survival and growth:

Williams Air Force Base (BRAC 1991: Mesa, Arizona) is now Williams Gateway Airport, an international aviation and aerospace center and designated foreign trade zone.⁴

Fort Devens (BRAC 1991: Ayer, Massachusetts) gained dozens of new tenants ranging from high-tech start-ups to Gillette and Anheuser-Busch.⁵

Charleston Naval Shipyard (BRAC 1993: Charleston, South Carolina) is now home to over 100 private, local, state, and federal organizations.⁶

Glenview Naval Air Station (BRAC 1993: Glenview, Illinois) is being developed into an upscale master-planned North Shore community called The Glen.⁷

Pease Air Force Base (BRAC 1988: Portsmouth–Rochester, New Hampshire) is now the Pease International Tradeport. Pease likes to take credit for “helping to write the book” on economic conversion.⁸

England Air Force Base (BRAC 1991: Alexandria, Louisiana) allowed local planners to take advantage of England’s varied assets to diversify the local economy.⁹

Bergstrom Air Force Base (BRAC 1991, Austin, Texas) is now Bergstrom–Austin International Airport, serving approximately 7.2 million passengers each year.¹⁰

Kelly Air Force Base (BRAC 1995: San Antonio, Texas) was developed into a major logistics and distribution center and foreign trade zone.¹¹

Reese Air Force Base (BRAC 1995: Lubbock, Texas) is now the Reese Technology Center, a “world-class research, education, and business campus.”¹²

Alameda Naval Facilities (BRAC 1993: Alameda, California) are currently occupied by nearly 85 industrial, recreational, and entertainment businesses.¹³

4. Williams Gateway Airport, “History,” at www.flywga.org/history.asp (May 27, 2005).

5. U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Renewal: Community Reuse of Former Military Bases,” April 21, 1999, at defenselink.mil/pubs/reuse042199.html (May 27, 2005).

6. U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Economic Adjustment, “Base Reuse Success Stories,” January 2002, at [www.oea.gov/OEAWeb.nsf/A30DA1AD7F2685A485256E8300517F2C/\\$File/Success%20Stories_02Jan.pdf](http://www.oea.gov/OEAWeb.nsf/A30DA1AD7F2685A485256E8300517F2C/$File/Success%20Stories_02Jan.pdf) (May 27, 2005).

7. Kasia Yuska, “Behind a Successful Base Closure: Opportunity and History Join Hands,” *Illinois Municipal Review*, September 2003, p. 9.

8. Taxpayers for Common Sense and Christopher Hellman, Center for Defense Information, *New Beginnings: How Base Closures Can Improve Local Economies and Transform America’s Military*, October 2001.

9. U.S. Air Force, Real Property Agency, “Fact Sheet: Air Force BRAC Success Stories,” updated May 5, 2005, at www.afarpa.hq.af.mil/factshts/success.htm (May 27, 2005).

10. Sergeant First Class Doug Sample, “BRAC Turned Out to Be Good News for Texas Capital,” *North Texas e-News*, March 16, 2005, at www.ntxe-news.com/cgi-bin/artman/exec/view.cgi?archive=9&num=24363 (May 27, 2005).

11. KellyUSA Web site, at www.kellyusa.org (May 27, 2005).

What Congress Should Do

As difficult as it may be in the current political and economic environment, Congress should keep in mind that BRAC is first and foremost about national security. To that end, Congress should:

- **Hold a set of hearings on how communities have successfully overcome past base closures.** The more Congress does to build confidence in communities across the country that there is life after BRAC, the greater will be the service that it provides to the nation. Many of the problems with BRAC are the result of communities assuming the worst and taking a defensive approach. They end up wasting valuable resources fighting inevitable closings because they believe that they have nothing to lose. It would be far better to use those resources to develop post-BRAC plans.
- **Support the BRAC Commission's 2005 BRAC list.** Congress should support the Pentagon and the BRAC list. This is what is best for the nation and, in the long run, for their constituents. Instead of making promises about fighting specific closings, Members of Congress should explain why BRAC is important and how they will help their communities to respond. This will ensure that local communities are better prepared for their base closings.
- **Coordinate communication between communities on the 2005 BRAC list and communities that have been on past BRAC lists.** Congress could do constituents a wonderful service by facilitating communications between current BRAC-listed communities and past BRAC communities. This would assist in learning lessons and developing ideas that might apply to their own situations.
- **Avoid undue politicization of the BRAC process.** So far, the BRAC 2005 has been as apolitical as anyone could have hoped. Neither the President nor Members of Congress should

attempt to use political pressure to change outcomes. It is legitimate for a community to question the Pentagon if it believes that the Pentagon made a mistake—which does happen—and should change the list to correct some national security oversight. However, changing the list through political pressure is very unhelpful. As it stands, every Member of Congress can blame the Pentagon for the decision to close a base, and that is good for everyone. Just one politically motivated change would open the floodgates to other changes, undermining the entire BRAC process.

Conclusion

History shows that most communities quickly recover from BRAC. Although this does not mean the transition will necessarily be easy, good leadership and a sound economic vitalization plan can help to ensure a successful process. It is essential that communities that find themselves on the BRAC list begin taking the initiative now to develop plans of action. While the Department of Defense will be available to assist, it is incumbent on each affected community and its leadership to develop an economic plan that reflects its unique nature.

Nevertheless, BRAC is not about jobs—nor should it be. It is about national security. The Pentagon has too much infrastructure, and much of what it has is outdated and unnecessary. A successful BRAC will help the Pentagon to provide national security, and this is the most appropriate contribution that the Department of Defense can make to the U.S. economy.

—*Jack Spencer is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.*

12. Reese Technology Center Current News, "Planned for Success," March 1, 2003, at www.reesecenter.com/news/publish/news_18.html (May 27, 2005).

13. U.S. Department of Defense, "Base Reuse Success Stories."

Web Memo

 Published by The Heritage Foundation

Base Realignment and Closure: National Guard and Regional Implications

by Jack Spencer and Kathy Gudgel
WebMemo #748
May 23, 2005

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is one of the most important—and controversial—issues affecting military transformation. U.S. basing infrastructure must be recalibrated to reflect America's forever changing national security requirements. In the wake of the release of the May 13 BRAC list, many observers wondered how realignment and closures will affect important military assets outside of the active duty component. At a recent conference hosted by The Heritage Foundation and the Minuteman Institute for National Defense Studies, experts considered the potential ramifications of the latest round of BRAC on the National Guard.

General Observations and Challenges

Conference participants made the following general observations on issues and challenges facing National Guard and Reserve units during the BRAC process.

Positive Points

- By law, BRAC is not used to eliminate units but to move units to other locations. The public perception that units will disappear is not correct. BRAC is about maximizing the national security value of available assets.
- Savings in BRAC come mostly from releasing civilian workers and correspondingly cutting back on operations expenses, maintenance, and similar areas—but not by eliminating military assets. While these savings may be economically painful to local communities, they support the goal of redistribution of assets to better meet Department of Defense needs.

- Services can use BRAC to reorganize assets more quickly than would otherwise be possible, without bureaucracy as a major impediment. The Air Force, for example, can increase efficiency through the BRAC process by consolidating multiple units of similar aircraft or moving active components into the Reserve Component.

Problems in the Process

- Using the same criteria to evaluate National Guard facilities as active duty bases is like comparing apples and oranges. Some National Guard units had difficulty answering BRAC's "data call" because BRAC information gathering mechanisms were designed for active duty bases. In addition, other factors—such as secrecy surrounding the BRAC information gathering process and the large numbers of facilities for which State Adjutant Generals are responsible (Kansas's Adjutant General, for example, is responsible for more than 60 armories and installations)—may impact National Guard participation in BRAC deliberations.
- The specter of legal action over whether BRAC can close National Guard facilities without the approval of their states' governors may cause difficulty for the BRAC commission.
- BRAC is about transformation, but with an increasing focus on "jointness," services must be sure to communicate amongst themselves during the BRAC process. In the past, some bases hosting multiple services have been closed or realigned without informing all the services operating at them. This can cause a major disconnect in operations.

Major Themes for the BRAC Process to Consider

Integration: This should be the dominant idea in national security. The National Guard is critical in both the vertical and horizontal chains of command and can be considered the "connective tissue" of the national security fabric.

Federated Responsibilities: In a recent speech to the nation's governors, President George W. Bush addressed his audience as his "fellow commanders-in-chief." Pentagon planning, however, does not reflect any deep understanding of this relationship. This understanding is important in the intersection—and the potential conflicts—that commanders who find themselves responsible for both Title 10 (active duty) and Title 32 (Guard/Reserve) missions may face.

Regional Perspectives: The state-by-state approach is not necessarily the best one. Using the Guard as regional responders—an idea prominent among National Guard planners—may better maximize the Guard's military value to the nation. Some experts suggest that NORTHCOM could shrink its own operations and devolve control to eight regional commands, under National Guard commanders

who could leverage their personal relationships with governors and local knowledge of resources, geography, and infrastructure.

Social Dimension of Strategy: Relationships with local communities are important for all military bases, but they are especially so for the National Guard. Service members are also members of the community, in some cases for many decades. Simply closing an armory may save money, but doing so further dissociates the military from the community and can create a vacuum in public consciousness. It is important that the public retain a sense of connectedness to “their” military members and their service.

While war fighting and efficiency concerns must drive the BRAC process, local concerns must also be considered to ensure a truly successful BRAC.

For more information on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), see Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 703, [Making the 2005 BRAC a Success](#), *Executive Memorandum* No. 953, [“Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years,”](#) *WebMemo* No. 507, [“BRAC Must Not Be Delayed,”](#) and *Backgrounder* No. 1716, [“Guidelines for a Successful BRAC,”](#) all available at Heritage.org.

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Background

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A Congressional Guide to Defense Transformation: Issues and Answers

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., Jack Spencer, and Kathy Gudgel

Transformation is transforming. The Pentagon employs the term “transformation” to describe its efforts to shift the military away from its Cold War posture and toward a structure that is better prepared for future conflict and threats. This process has always had two aspects. The first is transformation for transformation’s sake—applying emerging technologies to overmatch any potential adversary. That has always been the Pentagon’s priority. The second is transforming the military to address the diverse security challenges that the United States anticipates facing in the 21st century.

While both are valuable, mastering the second remains the more crucial. To its credit, the Administration has been *transforming* transformation to reflect this precedence. Yet the three critical questions that are raised most frequently in the transformation debate have still not been addressed adequately:

- What needs to be transformed?
- Should the U.S. build its force based on existing threats or around broad capability requirements?
- Should the U.S. focus its transformation efforts on platforms or on systems?

Ultimately, each question requires a complex answer. Not everything needs to undergo transformation, but some things certainly do. The United States must seek new capabilities within the context of potential threats, and neither platforms nor systems can be ignored. Understanding how to address each of these issues—as well as providing the robust

Talking Points

- The Pentagon uses “transformation” to describe its efforts to shift the military away from an instrument optimized to fight the Cold War to one capable of mastering future ways of conflict. Transforming the military to address the diverse security challenges that the United States anticipates facing in the 21st century must be the Pentagon’s priority.
- Changes in the U.S. armed forces alone are not enough. Transforming all the instruments of national power to better address 21st century challenges should be a priority issue for the Congress.
- Even if the Pentagon correctly determines how to address the challenges of mapping a course for transformation, it will be wasted effort if the Congress does not provide adequate resources. The greatest challenge facing today’s military is to avoid becoming a hollow force.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg1847.cfm

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defense budgets needed to transform today's military into the right armed forces for the decades ahead—must be a priority for Congress.

A Brief History of Transformation

The debate over radically restructuring modern militaries for future war predates the end of the Cold War.¹ After the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, calls for changes in the U.S. military became a clarion call. Some analysts argued that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of dramatic new military capabilities—such as stealth aircraft, precision-guided weapons, and information technologies like computers—presaged an era of transformation, “innovation on a grand scale,”² undertaken to exploit major changes in the character of conflict.

George W. Bush embraced the concept of transformation in his first major address on defense issues during his 1999 presidential campaign. At the Citadel, Bush declared that he wanted to “take advantage of a tremendous opportunity...created by a revolution in the technology of war... [T]he real goal is to move beyond marginal improvements—to replace existing programs...to skip a generation of technology.”³ These remarks created high expectations that the new Administration would endorse an approach to change that heavily emphasized transforming for transformation's sake.

The Pentagon's new leadership employed transformation rhetoric as well. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)—a mandatory report to Congress assessing the military's strategy, force

structure, missions, and resources—emphasized “capabilities-based planning,” developing new military means not tied to specific threats but based on pushing the limits of what could be achieved with operational concepts, organizations, and technologies.⁴ Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld also created an Office of Force Transformation. Among its many activities, the office crafted planning guidance that defined transformation as “a process that shapes the changing nature of military competition and cooperation.”⁵ These efforts portended a military transformation intent on achieving the over-matching and unprecedented conventional combat power promised in Bush's 1999 speech.

Uniformed military leaders embraced this image of transformation because it allowed admirals and generals to continue to focus on the mission with which they were most comfortable: the challenge of fighting and winning wars against conventional forces. Additionally, the open-ended nature of transformation left the services largely to define the process however they wished. For example, a Government Accountability Office report concluded that the Office of Force Transformation had no charter, formal responsibilities, or authority to direct changes.⁶ There were no measures of performance or means to judge progress and value. Thus, the services could label acquisition programs that had begun long before the end of the Cold War as transformational or define their goals and rationale with little more than colorful PowerPoint slides and a plethora of adjectives like “faster, lighter, and more lethal.”

1. Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, “Conclusion: The Future Behind Us,” in Williamson Murray and MacGregor Knox, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 3–4.
2. Andrew F. Krepinevich, testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 9, 2002, at www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/T.20020409.Defense_Transforma/T.20020409.Defense_Transforma.htm (April 13, 2005).
3. George W. Bush, “A Period of Consequence,” speech at the Citadel, Charleston, South Carolina, September 23, 1999, at www.citadel.edu/r3/pao/addresses/pres_bush.html (April 13, 2005).
4. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, September 30, 2001, at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (April 13, 2005).
5. U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, April 2003, p. 3, at www.defenselink.mil/brac/docs/transformationplanningapr03.pdf (April 13, 2005).
6. U.S. Government Accountability Office, *Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities*, GAO–05–70, December 2004, p. 19, www.gao.gov/new.items/d0570.pdf (April 13, 2005).

However, the Citadel speech was also infused with a call for an alternative approach to transformation that emphasizes changing to meet *all* the national security challenges of the 21st century. Bush spoke of preparing to deal with terrorism, ballistic and cruise missile threats, information warfare, protecting the homeland, and responding to disruption of finance, communication, transportation, and public health networks, as well as other dangers that looked little like conventional warfare.

The Pentagon's generals and admirals were less comfortable with notions of transformation that did not center on high-tech equipment and fighting conventional forces. Despite their intransigence, the second path to transformation appears to have become more deeply rooted in the Pentagon's thinking. The cancellation of the Army's Comanche helicopter seems to have been a case in point. The Army decided to forgo the new aircraft less because it intended to skip a generation in technology than because it realized that the money could be used to support a range of programs that would better enable the service to conduct all tasks requiring aviation support.⁷

Indeed, transforming to support more effectively the variety of future missions that the military might be called upon to perform has emerged as a Pentagon priority. For example, establishing missile defenses and creating U.S. Northern Command reflected an increasing emphasis on protecting the homeland, a mission that had been largely neglected before the September 11 terrorist attacks. The guidance issued for the impending 2005 Quadrennial Review included a "changing security environment" or "threat" matrix defining four broad areas of capabilities that the U.S. military needed to provide in the future: responding to conventional military threats, "irregular" challenges such as terrorism and insurgent campaigns, cata-

strophic dangers like weapons of mass destruction, and "disruptive" threats emanating from military competitors who develop new or unexpected capabilities, such as cyberattacks or biowarfare.⁸

However, after four years, the full character of the Pentagon's transformation strategy is still far from clear. For example, while the leadership has called for a mix of capabilities to meet many missions, its acquisition plans still call for—much as they did during the Cold War—buying a fleet of next-generation short-range, manned aircraft that will consume the lion's share of the Defense Department's procurement budget for years into the future.⁹

Key Transformation Questions

The results of this year's QDR will help to define what the Pentagon does next. The challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD) is to expand its capacity to address irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive dangers while retaining a robust capability to deal decisively with conventional military threats. One should not be sacrificed in pursuit of the other. Achieving this balance may require skipping a generation of technology in some cases. In other matters, modernizing or recapitalizing assets, changing strategies, or reorganizing current forces may be the right answer.

In the debate over setting the best course for the Pentagon's transformation efforts, three critical issues are routinely raised.

- **What needs to be transformed?** U.S. security is guaranteed by *all* of the elements of national power—the military, economic, diplomatic, informational, and political instruments that allow America to act in the world. Which instruments need the most radical reform?
- **Should threats or capabilities drive future military developments?** The 2001 QDR

7. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Canceling Comanche: All the Right Moves," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 433, February 25, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm433.cfm.

8. Jack Spencer and Kathy Gudgel, "The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review: Strategy and Threats," Heritage Foundation *WebMemo* No. 682, March 11, 2005, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm682.cfm.

9. Richard L. Kugler, "The Defense Budget: Meeting Requirements with Constrained Resources," in Michèle A. Flournoy, ed., *QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America's Security* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2001), pp. 125–129.

emphasized capabilities-based planning. The 2005 QDR argues that the “threat” matrix should define future needs. Which is right?

- **Should the military focus on developing platforms or systems?** Acquiring new platforms emphasizes fielding a new generation of ground vehicles, aircraft, and ships. Putting a priority on “system development” emphasizes overall systems performance, not individual platforms. Which approach is right?

Answering these questions is central to keeping the military on the right transformation path.

What to Transform?

The fundamental controversy regarding transformation is about what needs to be transformed. Much of the transformation debate centers on military capabilities.¹⁰ On the other hand, others argue that improving how the military is employed in concert with the other instruments of national power—a process often called interagency operations—is more important.¹¹

Calls for interagency reform cut across the political spectrum. “Our real national security goals transcend the Defense Department,” argued Newt Gingrich. “We do not today have an effective interagency process.... [I]t is the heart of our ability to operate around the planet and we frankly are not

very well organized for it.”¹² A recent report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies also concluded that transforming the interagency process, particularly cooperation with the armed forces, should be the highest priority.¹³

Improving the integration of defense activities with other agencies has always been problematic. Disparate organizational cultures, resources, and conflicting priorities make cooperation difficult. The DOD has made only a modicum of effort to improve the interagency process. For example, the Office of Force Transformation’s planning guidance states only that the DOD should “share information with other agencies on its transformation programs and encourage other agencies to follow suit.”¹⁴ Such direction offers little likelihood of dramatic change, despite some recent modest initiatives undertaken by the department.¹⁵

Even if the Defense Department was fully committed to transforming interagency operations, it lacks the authority to implement such a program without direction and support from the Administration. While the QDR identifies important issues requiring improved interagency processes and capabilities, as a DOD-authored document, it cannot really speak to how national security issues should be addressed across multiple agencies.

10. Ian Roxborough, “From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 32 (Autumn 2002), p. 75, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1332.pdf (April 16, 2005).

11. Scott W. Moore, “Today It’s Gold, Not Purple,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 20 (Autumn/Winter 1998–1999), pp. 100–105, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1820.pdf (April 16, 2005).

12. Newt Gingrich, “The Transformation of National Security,” speech at the Board of Overseers Meeting, Hoover Institution, July 18, 2002, at www-hoover.stanford.edu/research/conferences/boo2002july.html (April 13, 2005).

13. Clark A. Murdock, Michèle A. Flournoy, Christopher A. Williams, and Kurt M. Campbell, “Beyond Goldwater–Nichols: Defense Reform for a New Strategic Era,” Phase 1 Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies, March 2004, p. 9, at www.csis.org/isp/gn/phase1.pdf (April 14, 2005).

14. U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, p. 7.

15. The DOD has made some efforts to improve its cooperation with other federal departments. As part of its experimentation program, for example, the U.S. Joint Forces Command initiated a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) concept to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies that will improve planning and coordination within the government. See James T. Hill, statement before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives, March 13, 2003, p. 16, at armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2003/March/Hill.pdf (April 14, 2005). Another defense initiative is the National Defense University’s Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review (ITEA) program. See National Defense University, “Program for Interagency Transformation, Education and After Action Review,” at www.ndu.edu/ITEA/storage/535/ITEA_Overview_Revised_Web_site.pdf (April 14, 2005).

Congress and the Administration must play an active role. They could clearly signal the importance of transforming how government protects America by taking two steps:

- **Establishing a National Security Review** to provide an independent assessment of the QDR as part of an overall analysis of national security and to make recommendations on how to improve interagency cooperation. Without a government-wide assessment of America's national security apparatus, security functions could gravitate to the wrong agencies or departments.

The QDR tends to lead Congress and the Administration to focus excessively on military instruments as the best solutions to national security challenges at home and abroad. Indeed, "every problem looks like a nail, when all you have is a hammer." Congress should give equal attention to ensuring that all the U.S. national security instruments are adequate, complementary, and properly integrated.

- **Scrapping the Pentagon's network of regional commands.** The Unified Command Plan (UCP), the military's current global command scheme, was set up to fight a worldwide war with the Soviet Union. It is a relic. Regional military commands such as the European Command (EUCOM) should be abolished. They should be replaced with Joint Interagency Groups (InterGroups) designed for the challenges of the future, not the problems of the past.

The United States should maintain major military commands for working with U.S. allies in Europe and Northeast Asia and to protect the homeland. In addition, it should establish three InterGroups composed of interagency staffs and assets that are organized to provide the instruments of national power needed to

address U.S. security concerns in the world's most troubled regions.

1. A Latin America InterGroup would focus on drug, human, and arms trafficking; counterterrorism; civil–military relations; and trade liberalization.
2. An Africa–Middle East InterGroup would focus on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, economic development, fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases, peacekeeping training and support, transnational crime, and civil–military relations.
3. The Central and South Asia InterGroup would concentrate on counterterrorism, weapons proliferation, training police forces, anti-piracy measures, civil–military relations, transnational crime, and fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases.¹⁶

Changes in the military alone are not enough. Transforming all the instruments of national power to better address 21st century challenges must be a priority for Congress.

Threats or Capabilities?

Before the end of the Cold War, assessments of strategy, force structure, and modernization needs were based on evaluations of the Soviet threat. Even though the first QDR (1997) was conducted almost a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the review was still based on "threat scenarios," such as a war with North Korea.

In contrast, the 2001 QDR formalized a shift in defense planning to a new capabilities-based model. This approach aimed to drive developments based on "how an adversary might fight, rather than specifically whom the adversary might be, or where a war might occur."¹⁷ "It is clear," Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith told the Senate Armed Services Committee, "that the Defense Department needs to plan, but we must plan to be surprised." Feith argued that

16. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the Pentagon Commands the World," Heritage Foundation *Background* No. 1792, August 26, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1792.cfm.

17. U.S. Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, p. iv.

implementing the capabilities approach was an essential corrective to thinking that had long been based on the sure knowledge of the nature of the enemy that the United States would be likely to face in the future.

After four years of trying to implement a capabilities-based approach, and with America well into its second decade of post-Cold War operations, the issue of what should drive transformation is again up for debate. Should transformation continue to be driven by a capabilities-based approach, or is there reason to return to a traditional threat-based method of defining requirements?

The traditional threat-based model, centering on an easily identifiable threat, is certainly outmoded for today's security environment. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has rightly argued that "the old reliance on presence and mass reflects the last century's industrial age thinking."¹⁸

However, the capabilities-based model, despite its current favor with planners, also has shortcomings. The most significant problem is trying to write a budget. The capabilities-based model is open-ended. It is impossible to imagine, build, resource, and deploy every possible desired capability. It is also difficult to prioritize which new capabilities are the most important without a threat against which to measure requirements. The limiting factor in capabilities-based planning is budgetary, not strategic, when it should be a combination of both.

There is an alternative that incorporates the best aspects of each approach. It is not a new idea. In the early 1990s, then-Chairman of the Joints Chief of Staff Colin Powell developed such a model as part of the "Base Force" formulation. General Powell's thinking addressed both threats and capabilities in a combination approach to force sizing.¹⁹ A combination capabilities-based and threat-based model can assist planners by:

- Providing a broad strategic framework;
- Determining what types of capabilities potential adversaries might possess;
- Anticipating tactics;
- Developing capabilities to fill gaps, based on a meaningful risk assessment; and
- Directing resources to capabilities that are most likely to be needed.

Keeping DOD's transformation efforts on track will require ensuring that the QDR reflects a judicious combination of both threat-based and capabilities-based planning.

The 2005 QDR should revitalize and update the idea of a combined threat-based and capabilities-based approach to suit today's security challenges. The difference between General Powell's approach in the early 1990s and today's changed security environment is that the U.S. has a better appreciation for the nature of post-Cold War threats. Armed with this knowledge, the Pentagon must implement flexible planning systems based on a combination of capabilities-based and threat-based planning methods.

Systems or Platforms?

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the controversy over whether the Pentagon should focus on buying new platforms or emphasize building new "systems" (networks of weapons, equipment, people, and organizations linked by information technologies) has continued unabated. The Pentagon's rhetoric overwhelmingly emphasizes the importance of systems. "Networked forces and shared situational awareness," declares the Office of Transformation's planning guidance, "will transform warfare."²⁰ On the other hand, service acquisition programs continue to emphasize purchasing new platforms including light armored vehicles, manned fighter

18. Donald Rumsfeld, "Global Posture," testimony before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, September 23, 2004, at www.defenselink.mil/speeches/2004/sp20040923-secdef0783.html (April 14, 2005).

19. Lorna S. Jaffee, "The Development of the Base Force, 1989-1992," U.S. Department of Defense, Joint History Office, July 1993, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/history/baseforc.pdf (April 16, 2005).

20. U.S. Department of Defense, *Transformation Planning Guidance*, p. 5.

aircraft, and next-generation destroyers. DOD leadership is still struggling to determine the right balance between systems and platforms.

In practice, what matters most in joint warfare is overall systems performance, not individual platforms. In fact, given the right system, even old weapons can provide dramatic new capabilities. As Naval War College Professor Mackubin Owens points out, creating new ways of warfare is not an “all-or-nothing proposition”²¹ that requires scrapping all old weapons for new ones. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), which turns a bomb built in the 1950s into a precision-guided 21st-century weapon by adding a \$20,000 guidance kit, is a case in point.

That said, even in “systems-centric” warfare, platforms still matter. In war, systems do not always perform as expected. Sometimes they fail, leaving soldiers, sailors, and airmen dependent on their platforms. For example, it is unclear whether or not the military can yet achieve sufficient situational awareness of the battlefield to avoid all threats and completely give up the lethality and protection that some platforms provide in exchange for significantly lighter weight and greater speed. In close combat, robust platforms still matter. They are a hedge against the inevitable friction of battle that drags against any system in wartime.²²

While existing ships, planes, and tanks can be used in new and effective ways when plugged into these emerging information networks, the fact is that many of these platforms were developed for different times, different places, and different wars. Now is the time to develop a long-term investment

strategy for replacing them. Underfunding and overuse during the 1990s, followed by three years of war since September 11, 2001, have left the United States with military equipment that is worn down and aging. Large portions of the force will need to be replaced in the next decade. While this certainly presents problems, it also presents an opportunity to make significant changes in the force by implementing a coherent and focused modernization strategy.

There are three alternative approaches to buying new platforms: modernizing the current generation of weapons, investing in next-generation technologies, or developing totally new futuristic weapons.

Current-Generation Weapons. Current-generation platforms, often referred to as the “legacy force,” are the same as or marginally better than the military has had for the past 20 years. A modernization strategy that focuses on legacy weapons is the least expensive initially and the least time-consuming to put into operation. For example, instead of developing an advanced multi-role fighter, the U.S. Air Force could quickly build a consignment of F-16s—the mainstay of today’s Air Force that was developed during the 1970s. Or an aging weapons system could be upgraded to a new version, retaining most of the characteristics of the original system or program but employing some new technologies that yield only marginally improved capabilities.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of maintaining legacy forces are not insignificant. Less advanced systems cost more to maintain over their

21. Mackubin Thomas Owens, “Transforming Transformation: Defense-Planning Lessons from Iraq,” *National Review*, April 23, 2003, at www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens042303.asp (April 14, 2005). See also Williamson Murray and Thomas O’Leary, “Military Transformation and Legacy Forces,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 30 (Spring 2002), pp. 20–27, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0630.pdf (April 16, 2005). The authors examine cases of effective military transformation during the years between World War I and World War II and prior to the Persian Gulf War to demonstrate that new concepts of war can be introduced with forces using mostly extant capabilities and only a modicum of new technologies and advanced equipment.

22. Another example of the danger of overreliance on systems can be taken from the business world. The downfall of AT&T offers a case in point. The company had a brilliant vision to transform itself from a long-distance carrier to a full-service telecommunications provider, but every piece of their new system had to arrive on time and on budget for the whole thing to work: They did not, and the company’s profits plummeted, costing AT&T its blue chip status. See Paul Bracken, “Corporate Disasters: Some Lessons for Transformation,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 32 (Autumn 2002), p. 84, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1532.pdf (April 16, 2005).

lifetime, may lag behind the threat, and divert money away from the acquisition of new, more capable systems. Yet this path may be the best response when the quality of current equipment is suitable for anticipated future missions. For example, while it is possible to develop an entire new generation of land combat vehicles that can be deployed in C-130 aircraft, it is not clear that such a force is really necessary to meet the nation's strategic deployment needs. In many cases, purchasing new weapons to replace aging ones of the same class is the right answer. This approach will ensure a well-functioning and modern force until the threat environment dictates a change.

Next-Generation Weapons. Next-generation weapons are the evolutionary extension of existing weaponry. Instead of producing more of the same weapons or marginally improving existing platforms, investing in the next generation of weapons and applying new designs and technologies to current models will yield much more advanced capabilities.

Such new weapons systems should not only replace the previous generation, but also be significant upgrades to their predecessors. For example, while the F/A-18 E/F infuses new technology into an old design, the Joint Strike Fighter is the next generation of carrier-based tactical fighters, utilizing advanced technologies in both design and production. Yet the Joint Strike Fighter is still a continuation of the carrier-based weapons system. Although it incorporates many technological advances that give it a distinct advantage over the F/A-18 E/F, it only begins to redefine how the Navy will conduct its operations.

Investing in the next generation of weapons will enable the United States to maintain military superiority over potential adversaries that pursue similar capabilities. Furthermore, by building in cost-saving measures and employing efficient produc-

tion practices, these next-generation weapon systems could cost less over their lifetime.

However, a modernization strategy that relies too heavily on next-generation weaponry also has significant disadvantages. Next-generation weapons often require a greater initial investment to complete development and begin production. Furthermore, some evolutionary capabilities may not be sufficient to meet the next threat, making further investment useless. Buying next-generation systems may also prematurely "lock in" technology, committing the Pentagon to an expensive research and acquisition program for platforms that emerging new tactics or technologies may quickly render obsolete. Finally, investing too heavily in evolutionary systems could interfere with the Pentagon's ability to fund other critical transformation efforts, such as repositioning and reorganizing forces.

Transformational Weapons. Transformational weapons (or skipping a generation of technology) are platforms that bring new capabilities to bear that change how operations are conducted. Much as gunpowder, aircraft carriers, and nuclear weapons changed how wars were fought in the past, information technology is doing the same today. These could include such weapons as unmanned combat aircraft, long-range bombers that transverse space, or directed-energy weapons such as lasers and microwaves.²³ For example, the Chinese are developing passive air-defense systems that detect the slight turbulence of commercial radio and television waves caused by aircraft flight—a capability that could prove effective against America's stealthy aircraft. A revolutionary response would be to develop space bombers or hypersonic cruise missiles.

Skip-generation platforms might take advantage of emerging technologies, such as robotics, biotechnology, nanotechnology, and microelectronic mechanical systems.²⁴ By investing in

23. For example, see Jack Spencer and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The Use of Directed-Energy Weapons to Protect Critical Infrastructure," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1783, August 2, 2004, at www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1783.cfm.

24. For example, see Shannon L. Callahan, "Nanotechnology in a New Era of Strategic Competition," *Joint Force Quarterly*, No. 26 (Autumn 2000), p. 21, at www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0626.pdf (April 16, 2005).

them, the United States would be better prepared to defend its interests against future threats. Revolutionary systems also could be far less expensive to develop and deploy over the long term than much of today's force because they would be less manpower-intensive and would incorporate new, more efficient technologies.

A transformational modernization strategy also has certain disadvantages. Most of these systems exist only on paper or are early in their development. Developing them on a more rapid timetable would require a large up-front investment and involve a significant time lag before they could be deployed. Furthermore, funding for research, development, and acquisition of these systems would be diverted away from other systems that could be brought into the current force more rapidly, and there is always the risk that the technologies may never pan out. Most important, these systems do nothing to address current and near-term threats.

Ultimately, there is no one approach to defense modernization. Instead, Congress must look at programs and capabilities and individually assess which approach is best. In making those decisions, the following modernization principles offer a useful guide.

- **Long-term investments should not be made at the expense of near-term requirements.** A prudent modernization strategy requires a deft understanding of current and future threats to U.S. interests and America's current ability to counter them. Identifying future threats is important, but ignoring current threats is irresponsible. Preparing for future tasks cannot be done at the expense of sustaining the ability to conduct current missions.
- **Modernization efforts should not neglect warfighting.** Building defense programs that enhance the ability of the U.S. military to fight and win wars must remain a priority. Other capabilities should not be developed at the expense of warfighting means. Additionally, the military should not develop capabilities for nonessential missions, such as peacekeeping operations. Modernization should focus on

providing capabilities to secure U.S. vital national interests.

- **Modernization should sustain a competitive advantage for the United States over its potential adversaries.** Modernization should address the military's unmet needs.
- **Modernization should balance capabilities with efficiency.** Efforts to modernize the U.S. military should achieve efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
- **Modernization should respond to a technologically and strategically changing security environment.** The United States does not hold a monopoly on technological innovation. Much of the technology available to the United States is also available to potential future adversaries. Therefore, the United States must be prepared to face adversaries who may transform themselves.

In short, Congress needs to insist that the DOD place a premium on systems *and* platforms. Defense modernization strategy should look much like a sound financial portfolio, with a balance of investments that promote growth, hedge against risks, and preserve current assets.

Avoiding the Hollow Force

Even if the Pentagon correctly determines how to address the three key challenges of mapping a course for transformation, it will be wasted effort if the Congress does not provide adequate resources. The greatest challenge facing today's military is to avoid becoming a hollow force.

Reductions after World War II and the Vietnam War left the Army without sufficient soldiers, training, and modern equipment to handle its worldwide commitments. As a result, U.S. troops were dangerously unprepared for the Korean War and lacked the conventional forces to deter the Soviets in Western Europe throughout the 1970s.²⁵ To avoid a similar fate, today's military must have sufficient resources to balance overseas commitments, readiness needs, and transformation requirements.

One presidential term, particularly with the high demand for military forces in the war on terrorism, was not enough to provide the military with what

the U.S. needs for the 21st century. Iraq is making transforming even tougher. Operations are straining the force. Helicopters are wearing out at five times their anticipated rate. Trucks are going into overhaul five times faster than anticipated. America's military is serving the nation well, but it is becoming a tired warhorse.

After Iraq, there will be pressure to balance the budget on the back of defense cuts. Before work on the 2005 QDR began in earnest, the Pentagon began to float proposals for trimming spending. Getting the military back in shape will require sustained investments for the foreseeable future. Until the drawdown in Iraq begins, Congress must provide timely supplemental funding. After Iraq, robust annual defense budgets should be axiomatic. Keeping spending at about 4 percent of GDP (only half of Cold War spending levels, but about 25 percent higher than the Clinton years) is a reasonable goal for sustaining the resources needed to transform the military and provide trained and ready forces.

Next Steps for Transformation

The coming year could be a critical one for charting the course of transformation. The Pentagon must continue to emphasize transforming the force to meet the security challenges of the 21st century.

Congress and the Administration can support these efforts by insisting that the QDR address the

critical unresolved issues of the transformation debate. In particular, Congress should:

- **Insist** that transformation address not just the military, but all the requirements for effective interagency operations.
- **Demand** that the Pentagon develop a requirements process that balances the need to address threats and capabilities.
- **Require** a sophisticated platform modernization program to complement the armed forces' transformation efforts.

At the same time, Congress must provide adequate resources to support current operations, preserve combat readiness, and promote further transformation.

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This paper is part of The Heritage Foundation's Quadrennial Defense Review Project, a task force of representatives from research institutions, academia, and congressional offices studying the QDR process.

25. In 1980, Army Chief of Staff General Edward C. Meyer used the term "hollow Army" in congressional testimony to describe the shortage of soldiers available to fill the service's field units. The term is now widely used to characterize shortages of personnel, training, and equipment that significantly impinge on military readiness. U.S. Department of Defense, "CJSC Guide to the Chairman's Readiness System," September 1, 2000, p. 3. For an illustration of the "hollow army" and its impact on the Korean War, see William W. Epley, "America's First Cold War Army, 1945–1950," Association of the United States Army, Institute for Land Warfare Studies *Land Warfare Paper* No. 32, August 1999, at www.ausa.org/PDFdocs/lwp32.pdf (April 14, 2005). A similar pattern of neglect occurred after the Vietnam War. For example, see Vincent H. Demma, *Department of the Army Historical Summary, Fiscal Year 1989* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army, Center of Military History, 1998), p. 4, at www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/DAHSUM/1989/CH1.htm (April 14, 2005).

Web Memo



Published by The Heritage Foundation

Making the 2005 BRAC a Success

by Jack Spencer and Kathy Gudgel
WebMemo #703
March 29, 2005

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) is one of the most important—and controversial—issues affecting military transformation. U.S. basing infrastructure must be recalibrated to reflect America’s forever changing national security requirements. President Bush has initiated another round of BRAC to eliminate excess basing infrastructure and free resources for the Pentagon’s critical transformation initiatives. At a recent event co-hosted by The Heritage Foundation and the Minuteman Institute for National Defense Studies, experts examined the issues surrounding the 2005 round of BRAC.

The 2005 Round

There are two schools of thought on the current round of BRAC. One is that the Department of Defense has too much infrastructure and that money, resources, and personnel could be put to better use. The other view holds that with the U.S. military engaged in the war on terror, fighting in Iraq, and facing uncertain future threats, now is not the time for BRAC.

The Pentagon itself encourages the use of “best business practices,” and it is worth looking at the situation from a business perspective. No business could survive supporting the excess infrastructure that currently burdens the Department of Defense. For that reason, and despite some concerns about timing and impact on operational readiness, most experts agree that 2005 is the right time for another round of BRAC.

Undertaking a round of BRAC at this time offers a number of advantages:

- **Advances transformation.** BRAC is not just about closing and realigning bases, but also changing the way forces are supported and wars are fought. BRAC would help to focus resources on realigning, training, and moving a 21st century fighting force that has almost outgrown its 20th century support structure. This round of BRAC is intended to focus on realignment, not closure, and should have only a minimal impact on operational readiness.

- **Increases efficiency.** To accomplish its transformation goals, the Department of Defense must change the ways that it supports troops, acquires hardware, repairs materiel, and manages its personnel. To afford these changes, it must eliminate excess overhead and infrastructure and address outdated business practices. BRAC is an important part of this process. Any large organization must be in the asset management business.
- **Strengthens the military industrial base.** Eliminating excess overhead allows the private and public sectors of the defense industrial base to compete more successfully. BRAC allows companies that support national security to “take the slack out” and streamline their facilities, workforces, and so on.
- **Provides impetus to other economic development.** There is no question that the first few years after a base closure or realignment can be extremely difficult for an affected community. But many communities where bases have closed or realigned have successfully adapted through community leadership, planning, and federal assistance and actually gone on to achieve higher rates of job and income growth.

The Role of the BRAC Commission

Past BRAC Commissions (in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995) have shared several similarities:

- About 80 percent of the time, BRAC commissioners follow the Department of Defense’s recommendations. But recent Commissions have become increasingly activist.
- Commissions have been more inclined to delete bases from the Department of Defense’s BRAC list rather than add their own.

Communities that fear they may be “on the list” are likely to follow the BRAC Commission’s activities closely. Past rounds of BRAC show that if a community has a base on the list for realignment or closure, chances are high that that based will be realigned or closed. But if a community’s base is not on the original list, it is unlikely to be added. Recent legislation requires a majority of seven commissioners, out of nine total, to add a base to the list. Communities should remember that Congress does not select individual bases for BRAC but only has the opportunity vote down the entire list. If Congress chooses not to vote, then the Commission’s recommendations are automatically enacted.

Making the 2005 BRAC a Success

Participants provided the following suggestions for the success of this round of BRAC:

- Continue to make BRAC decisions based on national defense and security requirements, not political considerations.

- Ensure that uniformed military leadership, especially from the National Guard, is sufficiently represented in the process. The National Guard's state Adjutants General now have inadequate say in BRAC despite their vested interest in bases that may be BRAC candidates and the role that BRAC could play in resolving the imbalance between the active and reserve components.
- The BRAC process should balance community concerns with training and operational requirements. Encroachment and environmental concerns may harm relationships between communities and the Department of Defense in the next 10 to 15 years. Those involved in BRAC should look ahead to these issues arising.

For more information on Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), see Heritage Foundation *Executive Memorandum* No. 953, "[Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years](#)," *WebMemo* No. 507, "[BRAC Must Not Be Delayed](#)," and *Backgrounder* No. 1716, "[Guidelines for a Successful BRAC](#)," all available on Heritage.org.

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Executive Memorandum

No. 953
January 11, 2005



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Defense Priorities for the Next Four Years

Jack Spencer, James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Baker Spring

Having won re-election, President George W. Bush has a historic opportunity to continue the sweeping changes his Administration had begun in the Pentagon. The new Administration should continue to transform the military by developing the right set of skills and capabilities to meet the security threats of the 21st century, while retaining robust force levels and adequate funding for the military.

Maintaining Robust Defense Budgets. Although defense spending has increased ever since the Clinton Administration, chronic underfunding continues to burden all of the armed services. Even the most recent budget request contained shortfalls, including inadequate funding for such important programs as vehicle armor, military construction, aircraft survivability equipment, and ballistic missile submarine communications. Sustained long-term budget increases are necessary to ensure that America's forces are prepared for an unpredictable future.

The United States could reasonably afford to dedicate up to 4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to defense—a level of spending that would be well within historical norms. With the exception of 1948, the United States spent more than 4 percent of GDP on national security in every year from 1941 to 1995. Given a focused and well-balanced modernization strategy, this level of spending would be adequate to maintain a

force capable of protecting U.S. territory and interests today, as well as to field an adequate force in the future.

Ballistic Missile Defense. The Bush Administration is on the cusp of declaring operational a ballistic missile defense that can defend U.S. territory against limited ballistic missile strikes. The Administration's first priority should be to bring this operational capability online as soon as possible. Next, the Administration should move to expand and improve this limited defense, using its spiral development process to achieve a more robust global missile defense capability. The most important steps for building on this initial missile defense capability are: (1) aggressively pursuing options to deploy missile defense sensors and interceptors in space, (2) continuing to build the global command and control structure for managing missile defense assets, and (3) expanding missile defense cooperation with friends and allies around the world. Additional steps should include pursuing sea-based deployments of missile defense interceptors,

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- Although defense spending has increased, underfunding continues to burden all of the armed services.
 - America must prepare itself for the rigors of post-conflict operations in the 21st century.
 - U.S. basing infrastructure must be recalibrated for changing national security requirements.
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This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/em953.frm

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expanding the number of interceptor and sensor sites, continuing to improve the existing Patriot missile defense system, and proceeding with development of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system.

Post-Conflict Operations. As demonstrated in Iraq, the United States needs to prepare better for the rigors of post-conflict operations in the 21st century. To this end the United States must define the responsibilities of its armed forces in these operations as well as determine the legitimate roles for other agencies of the U.S. government, host nations, and international organizations. Once defined, the U.S. armed force should be structured to fulfill its mission without subjecting itself to unnecessary strain. During this process it will be necessary to distinguish between post-conflict operations and other operations other than war (OOTW), such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, and humanitarian missions. Although these OOTW missions may share some characteristics, they are not interchangeable.

Over the next four years the Administration should be very careful not to repeat the mistakes of previous Administrations. Even if commitments associated with the war on terrorism decrease, the United States should not become militarily involved in the same kind of missions as it took on in the 1990s. Instead, it should continue to rely on the model that was developed during the Australian-led intervention in East Timor and followed again in Liberia. In each of these cases the United States supported the effort with its unique capabilities, but the overall effort was led by regional interests.

The Military's Role in Homeland Security. Although the Pentagon is not the primary federal agent of homeland security, it does have a vital role to play and must dedicate a portion of its resources to that mission. Two aspects of that mission require particular attention. The National Guard must increase its capacity to respond to catastrophic threats and protection of critical infrastructure. Creating force structures, doctrine, and acquisition programs that could support both domestic security missions and overseas post-con-

flict and theater-support missions might best accomplish this. The military must also increase its capacity to support maritime security. This might be done by restructuring the Littoral Combat Ship program to support both theater missions and homeland security missions with the Coast Guard.

Transforming the Basing Infrastructure. The U.S. global (domestic and foreign) basing infrastructure must be recalibrated to reflect America's changing and unpredictable national security requirements. President Bush has undertaken two initiatives that will achieve this critical goal—initiating another round of Base Realignment and Closure at home and reconfiguring America's basing infrastructure abroad. This basing transformation is necessary because the current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy—the former Soviet Union. Today's threats, in stark contrast to those of the Cold War, are dynamic and unpredictable, and therefore demand a flexibility that is currently lacking. A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests. America's commitment to regional stability can no longer be measured by manpower alone. More efficient global basing infrastructure will free up manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains. Eliminating excess basing infrastructure will also free up resources that can be reinvested into the Pentagon's critical transformation initiatives. These efforts should top the Bush Administration's national security agenda for the next four years.

Conclusion. In his second term, President Bush has the opportunity to make generational changes to how the nation approaches national security. Doing so, however, will require making some tough decisions.

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The Quadrennial Defense Review: Some Guiding Principles

Dov S. Zakheim

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was originally mandated by Congress to address a perceived mismatch between the stated defense strategy and the forces and resources that were being made available to implement it. The first such review took place in 1997 in an atmosphere of such distrust that Congress had also legislated a parallel review to be conducted by an outside panel of experts—the National Defense Panel. However, in 2001 Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld employed the QDR as a vehicle for outlining his vision of transforming the way the Department of Defense (DOD) would conduct operations. His basic proposition, as he indicated in his preface to the QDR, was that “a new strategy for America’s defense...would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise, a strategy premised on the idea that to be effective abroad, America must be safe at home.”¹

The Parameters of the QDR

The QDR did indeed set out some new parameters for strategy and military operations. For decades prior to 2001, America had asserted that it would conduct two simultaneous operations, both of which would result in regime change. That assertion became increasingly less credible because the resources and forces necessary to accomplish such a task were simply not available to military planners, even as the notion of limiting contingencies to two did not match the realities of potential threats to the United States. The QDR, on the other hand, identified *four* potential contingencies, two of which required major combat forces to defeat an enemy

Talking Points

- The next Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) should be a forward-looking document. It should mandate a greater emphasis on security assistance, which requires close cooperation between the Department of Defense (DOD) and the State Department.
- The QDR should not limit its discussion of interagency and international cooperation to combat zones. DOD rightly has not claimed an inordinate role in protection of the homeland, but the QDR should further elaborate on that role and should emphasize that homeland defense includes anti-ballistic and anti-cruise missile capabilities.
- Most of all, the Defense Department urgently requires a Chief Management Officer, who could ensure that the most efficient business management processes are adopted and employed to husband precious defense resources.

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swiftly, and only one of which might be presumed—if the President so decreed—to attempt regime change.

The QDR also focused on threats to the American homeland: Drafts to that effect were produced well before September 11. Finally, the QDR emphasized flexibility by stressing the role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) and calling for systems and organizations that would promote greater responsiveness coupled with increased lethality.

The QDR also stressed the importance of balancing risk: Investments to deal with current threats had to be weighed against future risks and force management risks had to be weighed against institutional risks. All had to claim some share of the defense budget—none could be excluded.

Time for Change

The last four years have seen the realization of many of the previous QDR's objectives. Now it is time to consolidate those changes, review where they have fallen short or require revision, and plot new directions in light of recent events. It has been widely reported that the new QDR will stress the importance of unconventional, asymmetric threats to our nation, our forces, and our interests. These are being termed "irregular," "catastrophic," and "disruptive" threats.

"Irregular" threats involve terrorism, insurgency, civil war, and warfare that ignores the norms of international law. "Catastrophic" threats, which are seen as far less likely but far more dangerous to our way of life, would involve 9/11-type attacks, terrorist uses of weapons of mass destruction, or rogue state missile attacks on the American homeland. "Disruptive" threats would attempt to undermine American military superiority through the employment of breakthrough technologies and capabilities—notably in the realms of sensors, biotechnology, cyber operations, directed energy, and space.

All of these threats, which reportedly will be modeled in scenarios alongside models of more

conventional warfare, will call for a rather different investment pattern than one that seeks to further leverage our superiority over any potential peer competitor. On the one hand, our forces themselves will need to be more responsive to the most likely threat—that of irregular warfare. On the other hand, our technologies—and indeed the way we organize our defenses—must be attuned to more destabilizing catastrophic and disruptive threats. The events of 9/11 demonstrated that such threats, however unlikely they might appear, no longer could be ruled out as some paranoiac's pipedream. They must be taken seriously and appropriately accounted for.

A New Investment Pattern

The impact of a new investment pattern arising from the varied approach that is being mooted for the QDR will be greatest with respect to land and air forces. In particular, such an investment pattern would justify the changes that the Army Chief of Staff is undertaking to convert his division-centric force into one that is brigade-centric. A force of this type will embody increased firepower buttressed by enhanced command, control, and communications capabilities that are key to supporting rapid decision making in the field.

One could perhaps go even further in the direction of Army force structure reform and question the need for larger Corps-sized units, with their cumbersome bureaucratic infrastructures. Corps are geared to fighting along broad fronts; in other words, to fighting a major European land war—a contingency that is not likely to materialize for the foreseeable future. Perhaps two years ago, one might have argued that Corps were also necessary for a major land war in the Gulf. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) demonstrated that this was not the case at all. Those who are preparing the QDR might well wish to give such a proposal serious consideration.

Of course, OIF has provided many other important lessons to be learned, and the QDR is likely to reflect them. One lesson is that the total force con-

1. U.S. Department of Defense, "Quadrennial Defense Review Report," September 30, 2001, at www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (January 10, 2005), p. iii.

cept, as it applied in the past two decades, may no longer be relevant to the nature of military operations in the years ahead.

Reserves should not be the sole repositories of certain support and service support specialties, for example, military police, or civil affairs experts, which instead must revert in large part to active units. Reserve units should be altered to reflect more balance among those being deployed: There is no reason why some reserve units, for example, artillery units, rarely if ever get deployed, while others find themselves redeployed to the same theater virtually on an annual basis. The new QDR should be the source of a major reconsideration of the total force concept.

There is one other major Army force structure issue that the QDR is likely to—and must—confront, namely, the need for increased Army end-strength. It is currently the fashion to argue that the Army is stretched too thin, that it will be unable to take on new missions in addition to those to which it is already committed. Yet radical changes in current structure, including elimination of Corps-sized units and a shift in the mix of active and reserve missions, could well mitigate the need for increasing force structure. Then too, the plan to revise America's overseas military presence, which will affect the Army more than the other services and which was already foreshadowed in QDR 2001, could also serve as a tool for mitigating pressures to increase force structure. The new QDR should have much to say about the new overseas posture plan and how it will affect worldwide force posture.

Lessons from the Gulf Wars

If OIF (and to a lesser extent Operation Enduring Freedom [OEF]) have prompted changes in Army structure, they have also demonstrated the critical importance of Special Operations Forces. The previous QDR already highlighted the importance of these forces. OEF and then OIF proved that the thrust of QDR 2001 was absolutely on target. In fact, because the Special Operations Forces—no longer merely supporting forces, but *supported* forces—operated in significantly different ways in Afghanistan and Iraq, they demon-

strated both the versatility and flexibility that are the *sine qua non* of America's future force posture.

While it is not clear that the size of the SOF needs to be increased much beyond its current levels, modernization efforts should proceed apace. Moreover, SOF may prove to be the vehicle for resolving one of the thorniest difficulties that the United States encounters when seeking to operate with its allies and partners: the inability of the latter to match U.S. technology and capabilities on a sufficient scale to permit true interoperability. Special Forces are, by their nature, small, yet versatile, and the systems they employ, while individually expensive, do not consume large sums in aggregate. These forces could, therefore, be fielded by allies and friends with budgets a fraction the size of the DOD's. Yet they could acquit themselves well in the field, working harmoniously with our own SOF. This has already been the case with respect to several countries operating as part of the OEF and/or OIF coalitions.

A focus on non-traditional competitors and threats should also prompt a very different approach to tactical aviation, particularly within the Air Force. That service is under tremendous budgetary pressure and its future resources simply cannot sustain its stated needs. A costly space program, an anticipated need to modernize lift, a requirement for more tanker support, and programs to expand the capabilities and numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles are all competing for resources with two major tactical aviation programs, the F-22 and the JSF. Something will have to give, and among all these competing programs, the case for maintaining those two programs at currently projected acquisition rates seems the weakest. The QDR need not specify which of these two programs might be altered or what alterations should take place—but it could set the direction for the Air Force in a manner that will force the service to face up to the budgetary realities that confront it. This is especially important given a current and projected threat environment radically different from that which generated these programs.

In contrast to the Army, with its pressures for increasing end-strength, the Navy has promoted

efficiencies that are prompting end-strength reductions. Similarly, in contrast to the Air Force, the Navy, together with the Marine Corps, provides the ultimate initial hedge against the emergence of conflict against potential, or unexpected, adversaries. The Navy's challenge is to maintain that hedge even as it constrains the size of the fleet. The QDR should challenge the Navy to demonstrate the need for more large and costly submarines, for amphibious lift, and for larger surface ships. Aircraft carriers, on the other hand, proved their worth even in the war in landlocked Afghanistan, while the need for littoral combat ships is reinforced daily by events in the Gulf. Finally, the sea-basing concept is one that deserves serious support: It embodies both the flexibility required to support operations against irregular threats and buttresses the hedge against more conventional aggression.

Requirements for the Next QDR

Traditionally, planning documents such as the QDR have paid lip service to interagency cooperation, as well as to military cooperation with allies. In practical terms, neither the potential contributions of other departments, nor those of allies, have been a factor in calculating requirements and the resources to meet them. The spiraling costs of defense budgets, and both the external constraints upon budget growth—of which the deficit is but one—and internal constraints such as the growth in health care costs, mandate that the QDR be explicit about the impact of projected interagency and alliance cooperation on force requirements.

For example, it is arguable that the DOD should not plan to be the overwhelmingly preponderant large-scale contributor to so-called “Phase IV” nation-building operations as it is currently in Iraq. Rather, force and resource planning should posit circumstances akin to the Balkan and Afghan models, which involve a significantly larger proportion of allied and coalition partner force contributions and do not call for DOD civilian management of an occupied country.

In addition, the QDR should mandate a greater emphasis on security assistance, which of course

requires close cooperation with the State Department. In the eighteenth century Prime Minister William Pitt the Elder argued that, “[O]ur troops cost more to maintain than those of any other country. Our money, therefore, will be of most service to our allies, because it will enable them to raise and support a greater number of troops than those we can supply them with for the same sum.”² His dictum holds true for America today. Helping our allies develop small but capable forces of their own—including, but not limited to, Special Forces as noted above—will ultimately result in both human and material benefits to the United States.

The QDR should not limit its discussion of interagency and international cooperation to combat zones. DOD rightly has not claimed an inordinate role in protection of the homeland, but the QDR should further elaborate on that role and should emphasize that homeland defense includes anti-ballistic and anti-cruise missile capabilities. On the other hand, many aspects of the global War on Terrorism—notably, methods for combating Islamic extremism—involve expertise that resides outside the Department of Defense. The QDR should require a level of cooperation with other agencies that heretofore often has simply not materialized.

No one can doubt that this QDR, like its predecessor, will emphasize the importance of transforming aspects of DOD operations, including (indeed, especially) “back-office” operations. Business management modernization, re-capitalization of facilities, and acquisition reform must remain priority concerns for the next four years. The recent creation of a Joint Rapid Action Cell to hurry urgently required developmental systems into the field at the behest of commanders should be a prototype for a new approach to acquisition. To the extent that current regulations stand in the way, DOD should seek their modification. The Defense Department, and the nation, cannot afford any more quarter-century scandals such as the Comanche helicopter—which never made it to the field at all.

2. Cited in William Hague, *William Pitt the Younger* (London: HarperCollins, 2004), p. 10.

Most of all, the Defense Department urgently requires a Chief Management Officer, who could ensure that the most efficient business management processes are adopted and employed to husband precious defense resources.

Conclusion

The foregoing observations by no means exhaust the gamut of principles that should guide the formulation of the new QDR. More than anything else, the QDR should be a forward-looking document. The tendency to project current challenges one or two decades into the future is as natural to planners as it is unsatisfactory. Hopefully, our planners have learned not to view the future through the lenses of past wars. They should also be careful not to view it through the lenses of current wars.

Of one thing we can be sure: Just as no one could predict in mid-2001 that we would be at war in Afghanistan—and with our forces operating not only high technology systems, but doing so on horseback—so we can be certain that the nature of the next conflict that awaits us will be one that will take us by surprise. Our best hope is to provide for the most flexible and creative means possible so as to afford us the capability to react decisively and successfully against whatever surprise awaits us in the future.

—Dov S. Zakheim is Vice President at Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. He was formerly Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and Chief Financial Officer (2001–2004) and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Planning and Resources (1985–1987).

**Statement of Jack Spencer
Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National Security
The Heritage Foundation
Before the Overseas Basing Commission**

President George W. Bush announced on August 16, 2004, that the United States will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be applauded for this decision, which will advance America's national security.

America's global basing infrastructure must be transformed for several reasons:

1. The current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy—the Soviet Union—which no longer exists;
2. Today's threats—in stark contrast to those during the Cold War—are dynamic and unpredictable, and demand flexibility that is currently lacking;
3. A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests;
4. America's commitment to regional stability can no longer be measured by manpower alone;
5. A more efficient global basing infrastructure will free manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains;
6. Evolving military technology allows the United States to apply greater amounts of military force over greater distances in shorter periods of time; and
7. Diversifying basing infrastructure throughout vital regions will allow the United States to surge capability to crisis areas.

WHY GLOBAL BASE REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE IS NECESSARY

Defense Transformation Needs Global BRAC

The transformation debate often focuses on military platforms, investments, and operational concepts. All of these are important; wrong decisions on any of these fronts would lead to major setbacks. However, before transformation can fully succeed, the Pentagon must make the best use of its scarce resources and create an environment that invites and supports change. Global BRAC sets a good example in this regard and increases overall flexibility.

Relying on an infrastructure meant to support a Cold War force perpetuates the status quo. In other words, the current basing systems was developed to support a force geared toward a large, predictable, static enemy. Continuing to rely on this infrastructure will likely result in greater investments in capabilities that work best with that infrastructure. We see this now with huge investments in tactical aircraft and very little funding for long-range bomber investment.

Alternatively, changing the military overseas basing system to reflect the strategic and technological realities of the current century will help the rest of the Department of Defense to make similar changes. For example, current basing assumes that America's tactical/short-range-centric platforms and capabilities will be adequate to respond to future threats. In reality, the United States must be prepared to move capability over long distances. A basing infrastructure that reflects this future will more easily facilitate the programmatic changes necessary to make that long-range force possible.

Global Base Realignment and Closure Facilitates Joint Operations and Interoperability with Friends and Allies.

Perhaps the most critical element of defense transformation is the continued effort to achieve greater cooperation, or jointness, among the services. Restructuring the Department of Defense's support infrastructure—much as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 restructured the Pentagon bureaucracy—will compel the services to work together more closely.

One of the ways to advance this cause is to create an overseas basing infrastructure that puts a premium multi-mission training and on joint operations among the services as well as with friends and allies.

Global BRAC is a necessary step to further this cooperation among the services.

Encroachment and Over Regulation Is a Growing Problem at Home and Abroad

Expanding suburbs and exurbs and restrictive regulations are encroaching on many of America's bases at home and abroad, and the result has been and will be reduced training opportunities for the armed forces and reduced readiness. This is inconsistent with future military requirements, which demand more opportunities to train, not fewer.

At home, environmental regulation and lawsuits claiming that noise and other nuisances associated with military activity are having a detrimental effect on surrounding residential areas have already begun to interfere with the armed forces' day-to-day operations. Installations, such as California's Camp Pendleton and Fort Irwin, have already been forced to curtail their activities significantly in deference to environmental regulations.

A similar dynamic has emerged abroad where training has become more difficult in many host nations. Germany, for example, has severely limited America's ability to fly helicopters at night, conduct live-fire exercises, and conduct training maneuvers in heavy, tracked

vehicles. Bases in new host nations with fewer environmental regulations could provide new training opportunities.

Countries in Eastern Europe, for example, have attractive basing opportunities. The Tazsar air base in Hungary, which was used by U.S. forces to conduct operation into the Balkans, could be upgraded and expanded. Bulgaria offers Black Sea access with its ports of Varna and Burgas and air bases such as Dobritch in the Northeast and Kroumovo in the South. The Czech Republic, as well as other nations, offers a variety of basing options.

As the Global BRAC process moves forward, the United States should put a high priority on bases that are only minimally affected by nearby growth and environmental regulations and that are unlikely to be adversely affected in the future.

Global BRAC Can Increase Efficiency and Save Money

Today, maintaining excess base infrastructure at home and abroad is draining much-needed resources. Although saving money and improving efficiency should not drive the Global BRAC process, they should play a major role. Indeed, a characteristic of a transformed force is that it also is much more efficient.

To maximize efficiency on the battlefield, the Pentagon must begin by improving efficiency in its support structures. This efficiency will free up dollars that can be reinvested to help the Department of Defense achieve the rapid deployment capabilities that it seeks and build in the flexibility needed to respond to threats as they emerge in the future.

However, efficiency must not supercede military value. Part of the value that bases add to the force is providing surge capacity if the nation ever requires a large increase in military capabilities due to a rapid change in the security environment. Nevertheless, the requirement for surge capacity should not be used as an indiscriminate excuse not to close a particular base. It is simply a factor that should be considered in the Global BRAC process.

MODELS FOR THE FUTURE

If implemented properly, defense transformation, should decrease America's reliance on overseas basing in the long-term. A transformed military should be able to fight from long distances, surge manpower and capabilities within short time frames, and apply large quantities of military force globally with little warning. These attributes would allow the United States to keep a much larger percentage of its force at home without decreasing its commitment to the security of regions of vital national import.

This does not, however, eliminate the need to maintain overseas bases in the short-term. Because transformation has only begun and the vast percentage of U.S. platforms and programs arguably do not reflect a transformational agenda, the United States will still depend on an overseas presence in the foreseeable future. Even in the longer-term, so long

as the U.S. maintains global interests, it will likely have significant requirements for overseas bases.

So while it is unclear what America's basing requirements will be decades from now, it is clear that the current basing infrastructure reflects a by-gone era. It requires updating both in terms of the location and the type of bases.

America's European bases are home to over 116,000 troops, their 125,000 dependents, and 45,000 support personnel, plus their dependents. Because troops are stationed at these bases for years rather than on a rotational basis, this large civilian complement is necessary. But it means that the U.S. government must also provide support services for thousands of non-military personnel.

New bases will likely be smaller and maintain rotational forces. As the Army continues its efforts to develop self-deployable and modular brigades and lessens its reliance on much larger divisions, these bases will likely be geared more toward brigade-size forces. Deployments may resemble the old Reforger exercises (1969–1988), which demonstrated America's ability to move at least three brigades from the United States to Europe in short order. Smaller bases will also foster the mobility and strategic agility of America's forces. Small bases and rotational forces will, by their very natures, facilitate the lighter and more mobile force that is the Pentagon's aim.

South Korea could be a model for this future force. Equipment and infrastructure there remain on base, while troops rotate in and out on yearlong assignments. Families can stay at home because the troops are there for only short durations. While over 37,000 troops are stationed in South Korea, just over 4,000 dependents and 25,000 civilian support personnel join them. New bases could also be based on the deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the United States maintains over 3,000 troops on six-month rotations with virtually no dependents. In either case, the United States would have the flexibility to ramp up capabilities as needed.

Principles for Future Restructuring

The United States should adhere to four principles to ensure that force-restructuring decisions advance the national interests of both the United States and its allies:

1. Strategically, a base must advance America's overall objectives. The highest priority for any restructuring of America's bases must be to advance America's strategic objectives. These objectives include nurturing existing alliances and friendships; preventing a hostile power from dominating the Pacific, Europe, or the Middle East; and ensuring access to regional natural resources. Committing to regional stability and increasing geostrategic flexibility will facilitate these objectives. Moreover, bases situated to advance U.S. strategic objectives will be better prepared to take on emerging missions—such as anti-terrorism, infrastructure protection, and contraband interdiction—when appropriate.

With the increasing need for global operability, bases in the heart of Germany, for example, alone no longer serve the strategic purpose they did during the Cold War. Central Europe is no longer the fault line for future military conflict, and America's European basing structure should reflect that reality. Given that flashpoints for future conflict are likely to revolve around the Pacific, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa, establishing forward positions in closer geographical proximity to those regions would demonstrate America's commitment to the long-term security of the region. It would also allow the U.S. to respond rapidly to crises in those regions.

Furthermore, restructuring America's military bases overseas would increase its geostrategic flexibility. Currently, the United States is too dependent on a few countries. Developing a presence in other nations in vital regions would decrease America's dependence on Turkey, for example, and therefore ease pressure on that vital American ally. It is important that Ankara, situated in a very tough neighborhood, not be the sole pressure point when the U.S. projects forces eastward and southward from Europe. The political situation inside Turkey might force even a generally sympathetic regime in Ankara to resist America using Turkey as a jumping-off point, as has happened over Iraq. Basing in Bulgaria and Romania would shift some of the burden away from a hard-pressed American friend.

Taking that example further, basing in Bulgaria and Romania would provide Turkey, which will remain a key ally, the diplomatic cover it may need to help the United States by emphasizing such actions are regional in nature and not solely a case of the U.S.'s advancing its parochial interests through military means.

2. Operationally, a base must improve America's ability to respond to current threats as well as facilitate and enhance America's ongoing military transformation. Although global base restructuring may be costly, there are opportunities to take advantage of existing infrastructure in new host nations. For example, Soviet-era bases are available throughout Eastern Europe. While most would require significant improvements, some nations have already begun to upgrade them. Other nations in vital regions of the world will offer similar options. Furthermore, due to less stringent environmental regulations than those found in nations such as Germany, these bases would allow fuller training regimens, improving military readiness. And proximity to potential hot spots will make it easier for the United States to respond to crises and facilitate interoperability among America's likely allies.

Most importantly, operational restructuring should help alleviate some of the manpower issues that currently hinder the force. Decreased support requirements will free more troops for combat missions. And creating a base infrastructure abroad that reflects current national security requirements will facilitate efficient use of available resources.

3. Politically, the decision to maintain an existing base or open a new one must not be driven by political differences; yet, it must take into consideration the evolving political realities of the 21st century. Restructuring should not be seen as a response

to countries that opposed the war with Iraq. While fissures have emerged over the war, the United States must reaffirm that it values its traditional alliances, especially those with its European and Asian friends, and ensure that its restructuring efforts will benefit all. The United States must also stress that its commitment to a region's or nation's security cannot be judged by manpower alone. Technology allows the United States to project greater force with fewer soldiers than in the past.

That said, political realities must be acknowledged. For example, certain members of the German parliament attempted to limit American use of German airspace during the liberation of Iraq. Luckily, their efforts failed. If it had succeeded, it would have severely impeded U.S. operations. While the effort amounted to little, its very existence should demonstrate the problems with a heavy reliance on too few basing areas. In a world of rogue states, weapons of mass destruction, and global terrorist networks, America's ability to act decisively and quickly with coalitions of the willing depends on the critical word "willing."

On the other hand, Bulgaria and Romania opened their airspace unconditionally and offered use of their land and sea ports to U.S. forces during the Afghanistan conflict. Similar cooperation among Eastern European friends is ongoing in the war in Iraq.

Establishing a presence in new countries would also create a solid foundation for new relationships. Many potential host countries still have vivid memories of oppression by vicious dictators. A credible American presence in those countries would help to put the past behind them and to move on with new relationships. The security provided by this close military relationship would also allow these nations to fulfill their economic potential in the 21st century, similar to how America's security umbrella eased economic development in much of the world in the 20th century.

An American presence would also be hugely positive for the United States. The relationship would solidify a long-term friendship with many past adversaries and have a positive economic impact on the U.S. economy. Most important, however, is that it would advance America's national security.

4. Economically, base structure decisions must not be driven by cost concerns but should embrace economic prudence. Some argue that moving bases would be prohibitively expensive. While there are costs involved, cost concerns should not prohibit realignment if it enhances overall national security. Furthermore, by establishing smaller bases manned by rotational forces, the United States would not continue to incur the costs of maintaining the large, sprawling bases and family support infrastructure that were appropriate during the Cold War.

Critics of realignment argue that former host nations will lose out economically, but this is the same tired argument so often made against domestic base closings. While the U.S. presence in some countries may decrease, those nations will gain access to large swaths of usable and valuable terrain. As communities in the United States have found, land formerly occupied by bases can be put to economically productive

use, especially where growth is already encroaching on existing bases. Besides that, the fact is that the U.S. Department of Defense is not a jobs program.

Conclusion

There would be no compelling reason to redeploy global forces if it were not beneficial to all parties involved. Most importantly, however, force realignment will advance America's national security. For a variety of political, military, and strategic reasons, base restructuring is in America's interests. The world has entered a new era, and it is well past time for U.S. global force structure to reflect this reality.

Web Memo

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Principles for Restructuring America's Global Military Infrastructure

by Jack Spencer
WebMemo #554
August 16, 2004

President Bush announced today that the United States will alter its overseas basing infrastructure in the coming years. This realignment of forces could affect up to 70,000 servicemen currently stationed abroad and nearly as many dependants. The President should be applauded for this initiative to advance America's national security.

America's global basing infrastructure must be transformed for several reasons:

- The current base structure was developed to defend against a largely static and predictable enemy—the Soviet Union—that no longer exists;
- Today's threats, in stark contrast to those passed, are dynamic and unpredictable, and demand flexibility that is currently lacking;
- A flexible basing structure will promote adaptability in a world of diverse political, strategic, and diplomatic interests;
- America's commitment to regional stability can no longer be measured by manpower alone; and
- More efficient global basing infrastructure will free manpower resources and help to alleviate personnel strains.

Models for the Future

America's European bases are home to over 116,000 troops, 125,000 dependents, and 45,000 support personnel. Because troops are stationed at these bases for years rather

then on a rotational basis, this large civilian complement is necessary. But it means that the U.S. government must provide support services for thousands of non-military personnel.

New bases will likely be smaller and maintain rotational forces. As the Army continues its efforts to develop self-deployable and modular brigades and lessens its reliance on much larger divisions, these bases will likely be geared more toward brigade-size forces. Deployments may resemble the old Reforger exercises (1969-1988), which demonstrated America's ability to move at least three brigades from the United States to Europe in short order. Smaller bases will also foster the mobility and strategic agility of America's forces. Small bases and rotational forces will, by their very natures, facilitate the lighter and more mobile force that is the Pentagon's aim.

South Korea could be one model for future bases. Equipment and infrastructure there remain on base, while troops rotate in and out on yearlong assignments. Families can stay at home because of these quick rotations. The 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea are accompanied by just over 4,000 dependents and 25,000 civilian support personnel. New bases could also be based on the deployment in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the United States maintains over 3,000 troops on six-month rotations with virtually no dependents. In either case, the United States would have the flexibility to ramp up capabilities as needed.

Principles for Future Restructuring

The United States should adhere to four principles to ensure that force-restructuring decisions advance the national interests of both the United States and its allies:

1. **Strategically, a base must advance America's overall objectives.** The highest priority for any restructuring of America's bases must be to advance America's strategic objectives. These objectives include nurturing existing alliances and friendships, preventing a hostile power from dominating Europe or the Middle East, and ensuring access to regional natural resources. Committing to regional stability and increasing geostrategic flexibility will facilitate these objectives. Moreover, bases situated to advance U.S. strategic objectives will be better prepared to take on emerging missions, such as anti-terrorism, infrastructure protection, and contraband interdiction, when appropriate.
2. **Operationally, a base must improve America's ability to respond to current threats as well as facilitate and enhance America's ongoing military transformation.** Although base restructuring may be costly, Soviet-era bases are available throughout Eastern Europe; and while most would require significant improvements, some nations have already begun to upgrade them. Furthermore, due to less stringent environmental regulations than those found in Germany, such bases would allow fuller training regimens, improving military readiness. And proximity to potential hot spots will make it easier for the United States to respond to crises and will facilitate interoperability among America's likely allies.

Most importantly, operational restructuring should help alleviate some of the manpower issues that currently hinder the force. Decreased support requirements will free more troops for combat missions. And creating a base infrastructure abroad that reflects current national security priorities will promote efficient use of available resources.

3. **Politically, the decision to maintain an existing base or open a new one must not be driven by political differences; yet it must take into consideration the evolving political realities of the 21st century.**

Restructuring should not be seen as a rebuke to the countries that opposed the war with Iraq. While fissures emerged over the war, the United States must reaffirm that it values its traditional alliances, especially those with its European and Asian friends, and ensure its restructuring efforts will benefit all. The United States must also stress that its commitment to a region's or nation's security cannot be judged by manpower alone. Technology allows the United States to project greater force with less manpower than in the past.

4. **Economically, base structure decisions must not be driven by cost concerns but should embrace economic prudence.** Some argue that moving bases would be prohibitively expensive. While there are costs involved, cost concerns should not prohibit realignment if it enhances overall national security. There may be savings from realignment. By establishing smaller bases manned by rotational forces, the United States would not incur the same sort of costs that it now does to maintain the large, sprawling bases and family support infrastructure that were appropriate in the Cold War.

Finally, critics of realignment argue that former host nations will lose out economically, but this is the same tired argument so often made against domestic base closings. While the U.S. presence in some countries may decrease, those nations will gain access to large swaths of usable and valuable terrain. As communities in the United States have found, land formerly occupied by bases can be put to economically productive use, especially where growth already encroaches.

Conclusion

There would be no logic to the redeployment of America's global forces if it were not beneficial to all parties involved. Most importantly, however, force realignment will advance America's national security. For a variety of political, military, and strategic reasons, base restructuring is in America's interests. The world has entered a new era, and it is well past time for U.S. global force structure to reflect this reality.

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Web Memo



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BRAC Must Not Be Delayed

by Jack Spencer
WebMemo #507
May 20, 2004

The House Armed Services Committee recently passed an amendment to the 2005 Defense Authorization Act requiring the Department of Defense to conduct a series of studies before it can undertake the next round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). This amendment would delay BRAC for two years. No further amount of study will change the fact that the Pentagon maintains—and funds—approximately twenty-five percent in excess base infrastructure. Congress should reject any delay to BRAC.

Wrong Approaches

Those in favor of delaying BRAC have proposed several alternative approaches, but undertaking them would be a mistake.

Wrong Approach #1: The Pentagon must complete further force structure studies before moving forward with BRAC.

The heart of this argument is based on the notion that the U.S. armed forces are in the midst of a war and undergoing systemic changes and, therefore, cannot fully comprehend what future infrastructure requirements might be.

While the Pentagon's transformation efforts include a number of force structure and other relevant reviews, these do not preclude moving forward with BRAC. Indeed, the two can and should occur simultaneously to ensure consistency. The U.S. military was operating at an extremely high operations tempo during previous rounds of BRAC, and those rounds were extremely successful. Furthermore, the Pentagon has been in a state of continuous review for a number of years now and already has a sound understanding of what its force requirements are.

Wrong Approach #2: Foreign bases should be closed before closing bases at home.

America's foreign and domestic basing infrastructure is an important part of America's national security strategy, and where those bases are built should depend on how they enhance national security, not on whether or not they are in the United States. An integrated approach, involving both foreign and domestic bases, is vital to a successful BRAC process

Wrong Approach #3: America needs a larger military force and, therefore, more basing infrastructure.

Whether or not the military needs more troops, it certainly does not need 25 percent more troops—which is the amount of excess infrastructure the Pentagon currently maintains. Therefore, the BRAC process should move forward, taking into consideration the size of the force and its future needs.

Defense Transformation Needs BRAC

The transformation debate often focuses on military platforms, investments, and operational concepts. All of these are important; wrong decisions on any of these fronts would lead to major setbacks. However, before transformation can fully succeed, the Pentagon must make the best use of its scarce resources and create an environment that invites and supports change. BRAC sets a good example in this regard and increases overall flexibility.

Another round of BRAC would also advance long-term institutional objectives, including transformation. Relying on an infrastructure meant to support a Cold War force perpetuates the status quo. Alternatively, changing the military basing system to reflect the strategic and technological realities of the current century will help the rest of the Department of Defense to make similar changes.

BRAC Facilitates Joint Operations

Perhaps the most critical element of defense transformation is the continued effort to achieve greater cooperation, or jointness, among the services. Restructuring the Department of Defense's support infrastructure, much as the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 restructured the Pentagon bureaucracy, will compel the services to work together more closely.

One of the ways to advance this cause is to create a basing infrastructure that puts a premium on joint operations and multi-mission training.

BRAC is a necessary step to further this cooperation between the services.

Encroachment Is a Growing Problem

Expanding suburban and exurban areas are encroaching on many of America's bases, and the result will be reduced training opportunities for the armed forces and reduced readiness.

This is inconsistent with military transformation, which requires more opportunities to train, not fewer.

Throughout the country, the armed forces face lawsuits claiming that noise and other nuisances associated with military activity are having a detrimental effect on surrounding residential areas. As the population has grown—displacing plant and animal life and making some species more dependent on military land for habitat—environmental regulations have begun to interfere with the armed forces' day-to-day operations. Installations around the nation, such as California's Camp Pendleton and Fort Irwin, have already been forced to curtail their activities significantly in deference to environmental regulations.

As the BRAC process moves forward, it should put a high priority on bases that are only minimally affected by nearby growth and unlikely to be adversely affected in the future.

BRAC Must Address Global Basing Infrastructure

A successful BRAC should not be limited only to bases on U.S. territory. The United States is a global power and requires a global basing infrastructure, one far different from today's, however. The United States maintains an extensive basing system in Western Europe that reflects the static security environment of the Cold War rather than the unpredictable world of the 21st century. Similarly, many American facilities abroad are not conducive to either expeditionary warfare, in which the nation is now most likely to engage, or the force structure that will likely emerge from transformation.

Because the United States depends so heavily on its bases abroad, it must evaluate which bases may be vulnerable to closure by their host nations. This will allow the Pentagon to maintain adequate domestic infrastructure to support those forces if they are compelled to leave. Likewise, where such closure is unlikely, there is little need to maintain excess infrastructure at home to support those elements.

Ultimately, facilities abroad and at home should not be artificially separated. They are all integral elements of the same whole.

BRAC Will Increase Efficiency and Save Money

Today, maintaining excess base infrastructure is draining much-needed resources. Although saving money and improving efficiency should not drive the BRAC process, they should play a major role. Indeed, a characteristic of a transformed force is that it also is much more efficient.

To maximize efficiency on the battlefield, the Pentagon must begin by improving efficiency in its support structures. This efficiency will help the Department of Defense to achieve the rapid deployment capabilities that it seeks and build in the flexibility needed to respond to threats as they emerge in the future.

However, efficiency must not supercede military value. Part of the value that bases add to the force is providing surge capacity if the nation ever requires a large increase in military capabilities due to a rapid change in the security environment. Nevertheless, the requirement for surge capacity should not be used as an indiscriminate excuse not to close a particular base. It is simply a factor that should be considered in the BRAC process.

Go Forward with BRAC

An important step toward building the force of the future is to create an environment that invites change. The focus should be on creating a system, support structure, and bureaucracy that facilitates transformation. An intelligently executed BRAC 2005 will help to achieve this by creating a solid foundation on which to build the future force, and it will free the resources necessary to reinvest in the force of today and tomorrow. An integrated approach that considers both foreign and domestic bases in light of the *National Military Strategy and the Global Defense Posture Review* is the only sensible course of action.

Delaying the BRAC process further is a bad decision, and requiring additional studies to be completed before the process can commence is just not justified. BRAC is a difficult process for many, but it is, nonetheless, a necessary one.

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Background

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Guidelines for a Successful BRAC

Jack Spencer

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has released proposed selection criteria to guide the next round of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC).¹ This marks the beginning of the fifth round of base closings since 1988 and should be the last comprehensive realignment needed for some time.

Realignment and closure decisions are not made arbitrarily. The Pentagon, Congress, and the BRAC commission adhere to a predetermined set of criteria to guide them through the process. The Pentagon released its criteria in accordance with current BRAC legislation, which mandated their publication by December 31, 2003. Their appearance in the *Federal Register* on December 23 marks the beginning of the public comment period, which ends on January 28, 2004. The Pentagon must release its final criteria by February 16, 2004.

While many of the criteria are similar to those of past BRAC rounds, some have been updated to reflect new Pentagon objectives. These new criteria, along with the guidelines outlined in this paper, will be critical to a process that produces the maximum savings and efficiency for the taxpayer.

A successful BRAC is essential to the Pentagon's modernization plans because it will not only rid the Department of Defense of excess infrastructure and free resources, but also ensure that the remaining infra-

1. Department of Defense, "Draft Selection Criteria for Closing and Realigning Military Installations Inside the United States," *Federal Register*, Vol. 68, No. 246 (December 23, 2003), p. 74222.

Talking Points

To ensure a BRAC process that advances the Pentagon's larger transformation objectives, the final selection criteria should reflect the following guidelines:

- Basing infrastructure should encourage and facilitate joint operations, training, and overall cooperation among the services.
- Realignment decisions must consider present and future encroachment dilemmas.
- BRAC should be a global exercise.
- No base should be left off the table.
- Realignment and closure decisions should minimize excess infrastructure and increase efficiency.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/nationalsecurity/bg1716.cfm

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structure is appropriate for a 21st century military. Poor BRAC decisions could lead to an inadequate infrastructure that, although it may generate savings, neither supports the current force nor prepares the armed forces for future challenges.

While military value was always at the forefront of realignment decisions and must remain so, the savings potential was a driving factor in the past. Indeed, monetary interests have largely defined the success of previous BRAC rounds. Although saving money through efficiency remains important, this round has much higher stakes. If intelligently executed, BRAC can help to ensure a successful long-term defense transformation.

BRAC 2005

The 2005 round will be the culmination of a three-decade pursuit to achieve balance between the military force and the infrastructure required to support it. The Department of Defense has already gone through four rounds of BRAC and is currently enjoying the fruits of that laborious process.

The previous four rounds have saved a total of roughly \$17 billion and are now saving about \$3 billion annually. Despite this, the 2005 round was one of the most difficult to secure. After contentious, yet successful, rounds in 1988, 1991, 1993, and 1995, the movement to begin a fifth round began in 1997. A fifth round was not secured until Congress passed the 2003 Defense Authorization Act, which amended the original Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990.

According to past criteria, judgments were supposed to be based on military value, return on

Proposed BRAC Selection Criteria

Military Value

1. The current and future mission capabilities and the impact on operational readiness of the Department of Defense's total force, including the impact on joint warfighting, training, and readiness.
2. The availability and condition of land, facilities and associated airspace (including training areas suitable for maneuver by ground, naval, or air forces throughout a diversity of climate and terrain areas and staging areas for the use of the Armed Forces in homeland defense missions) at both existing and potential receiving locations.
3. The ability to accommodate contingency, mobilization, and future total force requirements at both existing and potential receiving locations to support operations and training.
4. The cost of operations and the manpower implications.

Other Considerations

5. The extent and timing of potential costs and savings, including the number of years, beginning with the date of completion of the closure or realignment, for the savings to exceed the costs.
6. The economic impact on existing communities in the vicinity of military installations.
7. The ability of both the existing and potential receiving communities' infrastructure to support forces, missions, and personnel.
8. The environmental impact, including the impact of costs related to potential environmental restoration, waste management, and environmental compliance activities.

Source: Department of Defense, "Draft Selection Criteria for Closing and Realignment Military Installations Inside the United States," *Federal Register*, Vol. 68, No. 246 (December 23, 2003), p. 74222.

investment, and impacts on the environment and local economy. The legislation for BRAC 2005 recommends that similar criteria be maintained. However, while these criteria are necessary to help the principals decide what to consider when making realignment and closure decisions, they did not advance a broader strategic vision. The new criteria do, and that is why it is important that they be finalized.

The Pentagon is currently attempting to transform the armed forces from an industrial-age military built for the Cold War to a digital-age force prepared to respond to the emerging threats of the 21st century. BRAC 2005 is important to this transformation in two ways.

First, the savings generated by BRAC can be reinvested into the force.

Second, a transformed force will require a transformed infrastructure.

While the criteria will ensure that military, economic, and environmental value will all be considered, a broader set of guidelines that work hand in hand with the criteria would guide the process toward achieving the Pentagon's transformation objective and minimize external political pressure, which often does not reflect the interests of the nation. The final selection criteria should reflect the following five guidelines:

- **Guideline #1.** Basing infrastructure should encourage and facilitate joint operations, training, and overall cooperation among the services.
- **Guideline #2.** Realignment decisions must consider present and future encroachment dilemmas.
- **Guideline #3.** BRAC should be a global exercise.
- **Guideline #4.** No base should be left off the table.
- **Guideline #5.** Realignment and closure decisions should minimize excess infrastructure and increase efficiency.

Such a set of principled, strategic guidelines would provide policymakers with an objective metric by which to direct the overall BRAC process. This is essential for a number of reasons.

First, one of the primary obstacles to BRAC's achievement of maximum effectiveness is politics. Following principled guidelines can help to minimize decisions that are based more on a facility's value to a politician's reelection campaign than its value to national security.

Furthermore, these guidelines would funnel closure and realignment decisions toward achieving the larger objective of force transformation. Guidelines intended to save money and achieve efficiency

will likely be quite different from guidelines designed to advance transformation.

A Brief History of BRAC

The effort to close down excess military infrastructure has been going on for decades.² Indeed, in the 1960s, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara headed an effort to close bases, and the end of the Vietnam War led to another round of closures in the early 1970s. Although these efforts achieved the goal of reducing excess infrastructure, they were plagued by accusations that the executive branch was using the closings to punish foes in Congress. Congress responded by creating a series of legislative obstacles that prohibited the Pentagon from closing bases without the consent of Congress.

By the mid-1980s, the Department of Defense was once again burdened with excess infrastructure. In an effort to address the issue, Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) requested that Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger identify a series of bases that could be closed. Although no action resulted from Secretary Weinberger's list, this effort gave rise to the Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Realignment and Closure Act of 1988,³ which formed the first BRAC commission and laid the groundwork for future commissions.

The next three rounds of BRAC were a direct result of the end of the Cold War. Then-Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney recognized the need for significant reductions in base infrastructure and led the effort to obtain congressional approval for additional reductions. Congress passed the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990. This act addressed the shortcomings and criticisms of the 1988 round and provided the model for BRACs in 1991, 1993, and 1995, which have all been completed.

The push for the 2005 round of BRAC began in earnest in 1998 with the publication of *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*,⁴ which stated that the Pentagon still maintained an excess base capacity of nearly 25 percent.⁵

2. For a comprehensive history of base closings, see "History of Base Closings," Chapter 1 in Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, *Report to the President*, 1991, and Colonel Stephen R. Schwalbe, USAF, "An Expose on Base Realignment and Closure Commissions," *Air and Space Chronicles*, June 10, 2003.

3. Public Law 100-526.

BRAC is a Requirement for Defense Transformation

The transformation debate often focuses on military platforms, investments, and operational concepts. All of these things are important; wrong decisions on any of these fronts would create major obstacles. However, before transformation can fully succeed, the Pentagon must maximize its scarce resources and create an environment that invites and supports change, which is why BRAC is so important.

Another round of BRAC will not only relieve the Pentagon of excess infrastructure, generating savings that can be reinvested into the force, but also could advance longer-term institutional objectives, such as transformation. Relying on an infrastructure meant to support a Cold War force will perpetuate the status quo. Alternatively, changing the military basing system to reflect the strategic and technological realities of the 21st century will help the rest of the Department of Defense to make similar changes.

Guidelines for a Successful BRAC

The primary objective of BRAC 2005 should be to facilitate long-term defense transformation while ensuring that today's force can operate effectively and efficiently. While savings have been the result of most BRAC realignment decisions, monetary judgments should not drive BRAC 2005. Likewise, every effort must be made to minimize the impact of parochial political concerns.

The following guidelines will help to ensure that the process advances transformation, pursues—but is not driven by—monetary saving, and minimizes politics.

Guideline #1: Basing infrastructure should encourage and facilitate joint operations, training, and overall cooperation among the services.

Perhaps the most critical element of defense transformation is the continued effort to achieve greater cooperation, or jointness, among the services. Restructuring the Department of Defense's support infrastructure, in much the same way the Goldwater–Nichols Act of 1986 restructured the Pentagon bureaucracy, can compel the services to work together more closely.

One of the ways to advance this cause is to create a basing infrastructure that puts a premium on joint operations and multimission training.

Guideline #2: Realignment decisions must consider present and future encroachment dilemmas.

Growing populations and regulations are encroaching on many of America's bases, and the result has been reduced training opportunities for the armed forces and a negative effect on readiness. This is inconsistent with the requirements of transformation, which will necessitate more training opportunities, not fewer.

Throughout the country, lawsuits continue to be filed against the armed forces, arguing that noise and other nuisances associated with military activity are having a detrimental affect on surrounding residential areas.⁶ As the population has grown—displacing plant and animal life, making them more dependent on military land for habitat—environmental regulations have begun to interfere with the armed forces' day-to-day operations. Installations around the nation, such as California's Camp Pendleton and Fort Irwin, have already been forced to curtail their activities significantly in deference to environmental regulations.⁷

As the BRAC process moves forward, it should put a high priority on bases that are only minimally affected by surrounding populations and unlikely to be adversely affected in the future.

4. One of the obstacles to defense transformation that have emerged in recent years is understanding the term "transformation" and overdefining it to the point that much of its original meaning has been lost. For the purpose of this discussion, "transformation" should be understood as the process of converting America's industrial-age, Cold War-era armed forces into a modern digital-age force that puts a premium on flexibility.
5. U.S. Department of Defense, *The Report of the Department of Defense on Base Realignment and Closure*, April 1998.
6. For an example of a lawsuit (over noise levels), see James M. Davis, "Military Bases, Training Ranges Threatened by Civil Suits," *Nation's Cities Weekly*, May 7, 2001.
7. Julie Cart, "Showdown with Iraq: Military Seeks an Exemption of Its Own," *Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 2003.

Guideline #3: BRAC should be a global exercise.

A successful BRAC should not limit its scope to bases on U.S. territory. The United States is a global power and requires a global basing infrastructure. However, the United States still maintains an extensive basing system in Western Europe that reflects the static security environment of the Cold War rather than the unpredictable world of the 21st century. Similarly, many American facilities abroad are not conducive either to the type of expeditionary warfare that the nation is most likely to engage in future conflicts or to the force structure that will likely emerge from transformation.

Furthermore, because the United States depends so heavily on its bases abroad, it must evaluate which bases may be more politically vulnerable. This will allow the Pentagon to ensure that it maintains adequate domestic infrastructure to support those forces if they are compelled to leave. Likewise, if the United States is relatively sure that a host nation will not ask its forces to leave, there is little need to maintain excess infrastructure state-side to support those elements.

Ultimately, facilities abroad and at home should not be artificially separated. They are all integral elements of the armed forces support infrastructure and should be viewed as parts of the same whole.

Guideline #4: No base should be left off the table.

One method of protecting the political interests of elected officials in the past has been to remove certain facilities from even being considered for closure or realignment. While this may be in the near-term interests of some politicians, it is not in the long-term interests of the nation. Indeed, if those politicians would work on putting the land to some other productive use instead of protecting it from BRAC, they might even find that their political interests are best served by regaining control of some facilities from the Pentagon.⁸

Guaranteeing that every facility is subject to BRAC will have a number of positive outcomes.

First, it protects the integrity of the process by ensuring fairness. It is no secret that those with the most political power would have the best chance of taking their bases off the table. This opens the entire process up to legitimate criticism of being overpoliticized.

Second, it increases the likelihood that those bases with the greatest military value will be sustained. If a base has great military value, it will not be closed and therefore does not require special protections. On the other hand, politicians may seek special protections for those bases that they view as politically beneficial but that are of dubious military value.

Finally, keeping all bases open to BRAC scrutiny protects politicians. It makes BRAC easier for them to support by detaching them further from the process of deciding which bases stay and which go.

Guideline #5. Realignment and closure decisions should minimize excess infrastructure and increase efficiency.

Today, maintaining an excess base infrastructure of roughly 25 percent is draining much-needed resources. Although saving money and creating efficiency should not drive the BRAC process, it should play a role. Indeed, a characteristic of a transformed force is that it also is much more efficient.

To maximize efficiency on the battlefield, the Pentagon must begin with efficiency in its support structures. This efficiency will help the Department of Defense to achieve the rapid deployment capabilities that it seeks and also build in the flexibility needed to respond to threats as they emerge in the future.

However, efficiency must not supersede military value. Part of the value that bases add to the force is providing surge capacity if the nation ever requires a large increase in military capabilities due to a rapid change in the security environment. Nevertheless, the requirement for surge capacity should not be used as an indiscriminate excuse not to close

8. For a description of how communities have found success after base closings, see Christopher Hellman, "New Beginnings: How Base Closure Can Improve Local Economies and Transform America's Military," Taxpayers for Common Sense, October 2001.

a particular base. It is simply a factor that should be considered in the BRAC process.

Conclusion

The wholesale transformation of the armed forces is neither required nor desirable. Any initiative that attempted to do so would likely lead to large-scale opposition and, ultimately, failure.

Therefore, an important step toward building the force of the future is to create an environment that invites change. The focus should be on creating a

system, support structure, and bureaucracy that facilitates transformation. An intelligently executed BRAC 2005 will help to achieve this by creating a solid foundation on which to build the future force, and it will free the resources necessary to reinvest in the force of today and tomorrow.

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Military Bases Recommended for Closure by the President and the Base Realignment and Closure Commission, 2005

