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Winning the Peace

Readings and Recommendations for Post-Conflict Operations

The Heritage Foundation

Winning the Peace:

Readings and Recommendations for Post-Conflict Operations

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Foreword

Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Armed Forces have been engaged in either a peacekeeping or post-conflict operation on average every two years. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have proved to be most difficult during the post-conflict stages. And since the United States' conventional military power is overwhelming, future adversaries will only be more tempted to fight insurgency-style wars in the fashion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Consequently, America's military planners must realize this time that post-conflict operations will be a feature of military operations for the foreseeable future.

The stakes involved with these operations are no less serious than those associated with combat operations. President Bush has repeatedly explained the stakes for which the United States is fighting in Iraq by trying to imagine an alternative to U.S. victory there. The picture he paints is not pretty. American failure to continue with the mission until there is a functioning, self-sustaining security force, a legitimate, capable government, and an economy poised to grow will likely result in a takeover by radical Islamic groups that employ terror as their primary weapon. Such an Iraq could then become a base from which terrorist groups conduct global war, much like Afghanistan under the Taliban. The stakes in Iraq are high indeed. The post-conflict phase of operations, then, must succeed.

As a result of this strategic imperative, The Heritage Foundation has devoted considerable time and effort to developing a set of principles and recommendations that can be applied to post-conflict operations. The analyses in this report present a guide for building the kind of military America needs to secure its interests in the 21st century.

Edwin J. Feulner, Ph.D.
President
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Introduction

Military planners traditionally disdain conducting post-conflict missions. Their training emphasizes warfighting and, as a result, they tend to focus on that aspect of the job. The problem is that post-conflict missions and warfighting missions cannot be treated separately. "For whilst we are in full occupation of the country," wrote Clausewitz, the great 19th century military theorist, "the war may break out afresh, either in the interior or through assistance given by Allies. No doubt, this may also take place after a peace, but that shows nothing more than that every war does not carry in itself the elements for a complete decision and final settlement." Post-conflict operations, then, are not optional, but an absolutely necessary phase in the conduct of war.

Understanding the nature of these operations is essential. This requires an understanding of the differences between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict missions, and how those differences should help define strategic requirements.

Because military organizations are not designed specifically to carry out post-conflict operations, changes will be needed not only in force structure, but also in military culture. Planners will need the right mix of resources to succeed, but will also have to spend more time training and developing doctrine for post-conflict missions. These changes should include a review of the role contractors play in the post-conflict environment and how they can be better utilized.

After developing all of these themes, Heritage Foundation analysts attempted to create a set of flexible principles to help guide future preparation for post-conflict operations. The policy changes recommended in the following pages are, in many cases, prescriptions for institutional change. Implementing wide-ranging institutional reforms will not only establish better practices for dealing with post-conflict operations, they will also force future military leaders to address the unique challenges presented by post-conflict missions.

The analysis and recommendations that follow are compiled from The Heritage Foundation's work on the subject of post-conflict operations over the past three years. In addition, four lectures are included from a conference entitled "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces." The Heritage Foundation co-sponsored the conference, which was held in Paris on June 17–18, 2005.

Our hope is that the recommendations set forth will motivate forward-looking policies that will prevent America's military from slipping back into old habits and disdaining the thought of conducting post-conflict operations. Such changes will be successful if they apply the valuable lessons learned by American forces time and again in a way that will save lives in the future.

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Backgrounder

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Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., and Dana R. Dillon

The U.S. military has conducted an operation related to peacekeeping, peacemaking, or post-conflict occupation roughly every two years since the end of the Cold War. Ironically, despite these frequent post-conflict operations, there is no doctrine to guide the President and his Cabinet in planning for and conducting military interventions and post-conflict operations.

To meet these security challenges, Congress should require the executive branch to draft an interagency strategy for addressing the challenges of stabilizing countries after a conflict. The strategy should reflect the practical imperatives of occupying a defeated or failed state, establishing a legitimate government, securing U.S. vital national interests, and building up a civil society in the occupied state. Based on that doctrine, Congress should provide the legislative framework and resources to implement the strategic concept.

This approach recognizes the reality that, at times, military action is the only way to secure vital American interests. Therefore, this paper suggests principles that Congress should apply when drafting the legislation requiring creation of such a doctrine.

Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Operations

The military's role in warfighting is unquestioned, but its responsibilities in peace operations are both controversial and poorly understood. Although there are no universally accepted definitions, military peace operations can be divided into three types of actions: peacemaking, peacekeeping, and post-conflict or occupation activities.

Talking Points

- In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has relearned painful lessons on how to win the peace. Institutionalizing these lessons requires establishing a common national strategic concept for post-conflict operations.
- Post-conflict operations are among the most difficult to plan and execute, even under the best of circumstances. Expectations that post-conflict activities will be smooth, uncomplicated, frictionless, and nonviolent are unrealistic, as is the assumption that grievous policy errors or strategic misjudgments cause all difficulties.
- The Administration and Congress must adopt policies that ensure effective interagency operations and unity of effort.
- Successful post-conflict operations cannot be planned effectively in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon. Planning and implementation must be done in theater, in concert with the military combatant commands.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/bg1859.cfm

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Peacemaking involves the use or threat of violence to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to end conflict. It is also the most problematic of all peace operations. Maintaining neutrality is extremely difficult, particularly for the United States, a global power with interests in virtually every corner of the world. It is difficult to conceive of many conflicts in which America would be seen as a neutral power. Peacemaking should not be a routine mission for U.S. forces.[1]

Peacekeeping operations are undertaken with the consent of all major warring parties and are designed simply to implement a peace agreement. The need to conduct these operations is a matter of strategic judgment. The United States is engaged in a global war on terrorism, which may take many years and require extensive use of U.S. troops. The armed forces are already straining to meet the demands of global conflict. America needs to pace itself and reserve its military instruments for advancing vital national interests.

The United States should refrain from taking on major roles in peace enforcement operations. These activities offer substantially fewer risks than peacemaking, which means that many nations with only a modicum of military capability and some outside support can also perform them. The United States should reserve its forces for the great-power missions that require the preponderance of military power that only the United States can provide.[2]

Post-conflict operations include those minimum military activities that are required in the wake of war. After any campaign, the United States will have moral and legal obligations to restore order, provide a safe and secure environment for the population, and prevent a humanitarian crisis by ensuring that people are fed and preventing the spread of infectious disease. In short, the military's task is to provide a secure atmosphere for the reestablishment of civilian government, as well as domestic security and public safety regimes. In addition, maintaining a safe and secure environment in the post-conflict phase is vital for securing the national interest that precipitated U.S. involvement, whether that task is disarming and demobilizing an enemy force, hunting down the remnants of a deposed regime, or restoring a legitimate border.

Of these three types of operations, post-conflict missions (as opposed to nation-building) are arguably the only essential and appropriate task for U.S. military forces. Post-conflict activities are an integral part of any military campaign in which U.S. forces seize territory, either to free an occupied country, as with Kuwait in 1991, or to dispose of an enemy regime, as during the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. Such missions are not "optional" operations; they are an integral part of any military campaign.

Post-conflict operations are *not* the same as an "exit strategy," which implies that exiting the country is the focus of operations. Instead, achieving American national objectives must retain primacy during planning. Getting American troops out of the country may be an objective, but American troops are still stationed in Europe and Japan for reasons completely unrelated to the original objectives of World War II, the war that brought them there 60 years ago.

Despite the frequency of military intervention and the inevitable follow-on operations, there has been scant success in developing a sound doctrine to guide the planning. This is unacceptable. The United States should be just as efficient in fighting for peace as in fighting battles. Winning the peace is part of winning wars. As in preparing for combat, sound planning for peace requires the right organizations, training, and preparation. These have to be built on the lifeline of a guiding idea—a doctrine that shapes how organizations plan and prepare.

Why We Get It Wrong

Successful post-conflict operations will starve the seeds of future conflict. The United States has a long history of conducting post-conflict, stabiliza-

1. See James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "The U.S. Role in Peace Operations: Past, Perspective, and Prescriptions for the Future," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 795, August 14, 2003, at *www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl795.cfm*.
2. *Ibid.*

tion, and occupation operations. These are almost always approached in the same manner, with aspirations that at the end of the occupation the United States will leave behind a free-market, liberal state committed to the rule of law, a strong civil society, and peaceful intentions.

The goal is essentially the right one, but U.S. occupations have not always achieved it. In some cases, such as the Dominican Republic (1965), America largely failed. In others, like the occupation of Germany, Italy, and Japan after World War II, it succeeded, but only after numerous missteps and mistakes. In South Korea, the march to a full democracy and free-market economy took almost 50 years.

Many U.S. post-conflict planning efforts start with the "clean slate" solution: completely eliminating the existing government and all of its institutions. The clean slate method usually involves abolishing all vestiges of the previous regime including the military, police, and civil service bureaucracy. Denazification in postwar Germany and debaathification in Iraq are reflections of this tendency. Efforts usually go beyond just the government and include all institutions of civil society, from schools to currency exchange to industrial policy.

The clean slate solution is never satisfying, and results never meet expectations for two reasons.

Reason #1: The Fog of Peace

Post-conflict operations are among the most difficult to plan and execute, even under the best of circumstances. Expectations that post-conflict activities will be smooth, uncomplicated, frictionless, and nonviolent are unrealistic, as is the assumption that grievous policy errors or strategic misjudgments cause all difficulties. After all, the former enemy gets a vote, and how indigenous opposition forces or outside agitators choose to defy the occupation partially determines the course of events. For example, in postwar Germany, the poor organization and subsequent collapse of planned Nazi opposition made the Allies' task of reinstituting civil order significantly easier. The Office of Strategic Services estimated that the Allies would face a guerrilla army of about 40,000—an assessment that proved wildly inaccurate.

Additionally, it is often forgotten that there is a "fog of peace" that is equally as infamous as the "fog of war"—which rejects the notion that outcomes can be precisely predicted or that there is a prescribed rulebook for success that any military can follow.[3]

Postwar conditions in Europe offer a case in point. They were far from sanguine. For example, the displaced populations in postwar Europe (numbering 14 million people by some counts) combined with food shortages, housing shortages, ethnic and racial tensions, and scarcity of domestic police forces to create significant public safety and physical security concerns.[4]

Prewar assumptions are also a poor yardstick for measuring post-conflict performance. The current debate over planning for the number of forces needed to support the occupation of Iraq misses the point. As one prewar analysis conducted by the U.S. Army War College pointed out, criticizing prewar projections is unrealistic. The report concluded that any forecasts of actual troop numbers made before the actual postwar situation develops are "highly speculative."[5] Indeed, claims that force structure estimates were based on historical precedents from previous occupations are dubious. Given the diverse conditions and requirements for different operations, drawing useful comparisons appears unrealistic.

In fact, given that Iraq is the size of California, has porous borders, is awash with arms, and has a diverse population of about 25 million (with at least 10 million in eight major cities), it is amazing that any reputable defense analyst would confi-

3. Manfred K. Rotermund, *The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999), pp. 47–52.
4. Mark Wyman, *DPs: Europe's Displaced Persons, 1945–1951* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), pp. 15–27.
5. Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, *Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), p. 33.

dently argue that numbers alone might have made a difference. Considering the scope of the security challenge, 300,000 troops probably would have had just as much difficulty as 100,000. More troops would have helped, but numbers by themselves are not a silver-bullet solution. Iraq is in large part a reminder that difficulties and unexpected turns are the rule, not the exception.

Reason #2: The Rhythm of Habits

The inevitable difficulties of an occupation are exacerbated by the remarkable consistency in how the United States conducts occupations. Among the traditions, experiences, preconceptions, and practices that determine how America conducts an occupation, a "tradition of forgetting" is the most powerful force shaping its thinking. The armed forces concentrate on warfighting and eschew the challenges of dealing with the battlefield after the battle.

The U.S. Army's experience and knowledge about peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way. For example, the official report on the U.S. participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I noted that, "despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned."[6] After World War I, the tradition of forgetting continued. The Army's Field Service Regulations of 1923 (doctrinal guidance crafted to capture the lessons of World War I) made no mention of the occupation of the Rhineland or that there might be a need to conduct similar operations in the future.

As the United States prepared to enter World War II, the military discovered that it had virtually no capacity to manage the areas that it would likely need to occupy. In fact, one of the planners' first acts was to root out the report on lessons learned from the Rhineland occupation. The Army did not even a have a field manual on occupation management before 1940. A senior general was not appointed to plan overseas occupation operations until 1942—the same year that the Army created staff officer positions for division (and higher) units to advise commanders about civil affairs and established its first military government school.

Even then, the military undertook its occupation duties only reluctantly. When President Franklin D. Roosevelt wanted to free more shipping to ferry civil affairs personnel to Europe for occupation duties, the Pentagon complained about diverting resources from its warfighting tasks. The best way to prepare for the postwar period, the Joint Chiefs argued, "is to end the war quickly."[7] U.S. military forces remained reluctant occupiers throughout the postwar period.

After World War II, the Pentagon largely forgot about the problem and continued to reinvent solutions for each new peace operation. Fighting the battles of the Cold War remained the military's overwhelming preoccupation.

Arguably, America's military after the Cold War has a better appreciation for its post-conflict responsibilities. It could not forget these missions entirely because they had become a fact of life in the post–Cold War world. Yet it is not clear that the military has internalized the requirements for post-conflict operations. For example, Lieutenant General John Yeosock, who was initially given responsibility for overseeing operations in Kuwait in 1991, recalled that he received virtually no assets or planning assistance for the task and had been handed a "dripping bag of manure" that no one else wanted.[8]

Operations in Iraq today appear different only in scale and duration. Initial assessments of U.S. mil-

6. U. S. Army, *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 64.
7. U.S. Department of State, *Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*, in *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955), p. 536. For other examples, see Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1992), p. 153, and Daniel Fahey, Jr., *Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations and Analysis Concerning U.S. Civil Affairs/Military Government Operations*, February 1951.

itary operations in Iraq suggest that the military failed either to follow its own doctrine or to learn from past experiences. Halting efforts to rebuild Iraqi security forces and control arms in the country are just two examples.

Other aspects of the military's traditional approach appear to have detrimental effects as well. When American forces undertake peace missions, they try to make them mirror traditional military activities as much as possible. For example, during World War II, the military staff planning process for military government operations was virtually identical to the procedures for planning battles. Today, the staff process for planning operations other than war remains similar to the combat planning process, encouraging leaders to use similar techniques and procedures.

An approach to post-conflict activities that mirrors combat can result in misapplication of resources, inappropriate tasks and goals, and ineffective operations. In Europe after World War II, Army tank battalions and artillery brigades were ill-suited to occupation duties. They lacked appropriate equipment, such as non-lethal weapons to conduct crowd control. The infantry had few vehicles and lacked significant protection against booby traps and small-arms fire. Armored units had much fewer personnel, and their heavy tracked vehicles were unsuited to patrolling urban areas. Most troops lacked training in many critical security tasks such as conducting investigations, arrest, detention, search and seizure, interrogation, negotiation, and crowd control. Not until months after the occupation began did the Army begin to field constabulary units that were better suited to conduct a range of security tasks.[9] The U.S. constabulary forces served successfully but were soon disbanded.

Another persistent rhythm of habit is the armed forces' penchant for largely eschewing integrated interagency operations (activities involving more than one federal agency) and ignoring the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The result is that most peace operations lack cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness. During World War II, the military closely followed its tradition of divesting itself of non-combat tasks. Traditionally, the services preferred to establish a "firewall" between civilian and soldier activities to prevent civilian tasks from draining military resources.[10] As a result, there was scant cooperation between the Pentagon and other federal agencies or NGOs.[11] Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan do not seem to have begun any more auspiciously.

The "Disease and Unrest" Formula

The United States can learn from the past that it has consistently ignored. Lessons from the postwar occupations of Japan, Germany, and Austria suggest why the United States succeeded despite troubled occupations. In each case, after a period of over three years, the United States got the fundamentals of occupation right.

World War II planners called this the "disease and unrest" formula. They concluded that an occupation force must perform three tasks before reconstruction or nation building could begin:

- **Avert a humanitarian crisis.** The occupying forces must ensure that the population does not die *en masse* from disease, starvation, or exposure.

8. Steven Weingartner, ed., *In the Wake of the Storm: Gulf War Commanders Discuss Desert Storm* (Wheaton, Ill.: Cantigny First Division Foundation, 2000), p. 25.
9. Major James M. Snyder, "The Establishment and the Operations of the United States Constabulary 3 Oct. 1945–30 June 1947," Historical Subsection G3, U.S. Constabulary, in Halley G. Maddox Papers, Military History Institute, 1947.
10. This notion dovetailed well with contemporaneous administrative theory, which envisioned a clear delineation between the civilian and military functions of government. James Stever, "The Glass Firewall Between Military and Civil Administration," *Administration and Society*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 1999), pp. 28–49.
11. James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., *Waltzing into the Cold War* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 19–20. For a narrative of the debates on postwar policy between the Department of Defense and the Departments of State and Treasury, see Michael R. Beschloss, *The Conquerors: Roosevelt, Truman and the Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1941–1945* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002), *passim*.

- **Establish a legitimate government.** The occupiers need to create a political leadership that people widely perceive as credible to lead the long-term reconstruction effort.
- **Provide domestic security forces to support the government.** It is not essential that the nation is free of violence, but the occupiers need to ensure that the new leadership has adequate forces at its disposal to begin to establish a functioning civil society.

Once these tasks have been completed, post-conflict operations are essentially finished. The struggle for safety, growth, security, and liberty is not over, but the nation's fate is largely in the hands of its new leadership. In fact, one of the misnomers of "nation building" is that nations build nations. In virtually every case of successful reconstruction following an occupation, nations rebuilt themselves.

Postwar reconstruction in Europe is a case in point. Serious reconstruction did not begin until 1949. By that time, the mandate of the disease and unrest formula, despite the missteps of the occupation, had been achieved. U.S. reconstruction funds under the famous Marshall Plan did not begin flowing until 1949, and the use of Marshall funds was planned for and managed by the indigenous governments, not the United States. In addition, these funds were a small part of the investment that reconstructed Europe. Most of the resources for European "nation-building" came from the Europeans.[12]

There are already signs that a similar pattern is emerging in Iraq. As the conditions of the disease and unrest formula are being met, domestic leaders are taking control. In the near future, they will likely spearhead the rebuilding of their nation, albeit with continued support from the United States and other allies. In the end, implementing the disease and unrest formula is the prerequisite for building an enduring peace.[13]

Principles of Post-Conflict Operations

Applying the lessons of the past would require establishing a doctrine that breaks the rhythm of habits, the penchant to start over and make every occupation an *ad hoc* affair. It would require the military to provide the right forces, practices, and leadership for post-conflict missions. It would demand effective integrated interagency operations at the outset, establish modest goals for the occupation based on the disease and unrest formula rather than the clean slate solution, and preach patience and warn against operational overreach. It would caution that democracy, economic growth, and building civil society take time and that they are efforts that must be led by properly empowered and supported domestic leadership.

A set of sound principles for post-conflict operations would begin by defining the essential tasks that must be accomplished and describing how to organize assets to produce concrete results.

Principle #1: The President should determine clear, concise national objectives and stick to them.

Before deciding to engage in military operations, the President must articulate specific, clear, credible national interests and objectives. In some instances, this may involve regime changes, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. During the post-conflict operation, the transition authority should continue to measure its actions against those objectives. This is essential both for the efficient allocation of resources and to sustain public support.[14]

Throughout a military intervention, operations will necessarily change from destroying the old

12. Gunter Bischof and James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Marshall Plan Won't Work in Iraq," Heritage Foundation *Commentary,* October 13, 2003, at *www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed102303f.cfm*.

13. As Brian Crozier notes in a study on the history of post-conflict periods, winning the war and implementing the disease and unrest formula are necessary but insufficient for securing long-term peace. Long-term peace requires policies that lead to the development of strong civil societies and liberal, democratic, and free-market economies. Brian Crozier, *Political Victory: The Elusive Prize of Military Wars* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2005).

14. William M. Darley "War Policy, Public Support, and the Media," *Parameters*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Summer 2005), pp. 131–133, at *carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05summer/darley.pdf* (June 2, 2005).

regime's ability to rebuilding and defending the ability of the new coalition-imposed regime to exercise its authority in accordance with the disease and unrest formula.

Measuring success will change as well. During a military campaign, success is measured by military objectives, such as destruction of the enemy armed forces. In post-conflict operations, it is political, economic, and social metrics that measure success. Both of these contending operations must accomplish the original national objectives. A post-conflict doctrine will develop metrics for evaluating success in post-conflict operations.

Principle #2: Eliminating the regime while preserving the government is essential.

Success depends on identifying which parts of the enemy government constitute the regime and separating (and incapacitating) them from the formal bureaucracy and institutions that form the government of the country.

The United States must eliminate the previous regime's undesirable influences without affecting the efficiency of government functions. The formal government institutions provide government services to the civilian population, such as water, power, waste management, and public safety—all of which must be preserved, when possible, during the military campaign or, if destroyed, be quickly restored during the post-conflict operations.

In authoritarian political systems, regime elements may be more deeply embedded in the government than they are in democratic regimes. In some cases, the previous regime may have embedded laws and practices in the government that must be suspended or changed to accomplish U.S. objectives. Furthermore, bureaucratic managers, entire levels of bureaucracy, and even whole institutions may need to be replaced. For example, at the end of World War II, many Allied leaders felt that the Nazi Party was as much to blame for the war and Germany's crimes as Adolph Hitler and thus included the National Socialist Party in the regime purge.

On the other hand, changing too much of the government will negatively affect post-conflict operations. For example, Saddam Hussein had been head of the Iraqi government for 30 years, and it would be difficult to find an element of the government that he did not substantially influence. Nevertheless, before the Iraq War, the Iraqi army participated in a number of anti-Saddam coups. In fact, the Iraqi dictator created additional military institutions, such as the Republican Guard, to protect himself from the army. Nevertheless, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) dissolved the entire Iraqi army with considerable negative impact on the security situation for the coalition forces in Iraq.

The doctrine for post-conflict strategies should provide guidelines for identifying elements of the regime that hinder American and coalition objectives but preserve as much of the government as possible to serve post-conflict objectives.

Principle #3: Formulate a vision of the end state and develop a plan that will accomplish it.

Once a decision is made to use military force against a sovereign state, a new government may need to be established after the conflict. The new government and the civil society over which it will preside represent the end state. The form of the end-state regime must conform to the original U.S. national objectives for changing the regime and must be considered in the earliest operational planning.

This is not to say that U.S. support must commit to building a new regime in every instance, but policymakers must be fully aware of the consequences

Definitions

- **Regime.** A regime is a coherent but not wholly formal combination of individuals, groups, and institutions that exercise power over a national government.
- **Government.** A government is the formal combination of institutions that exercise legal authority over a country. The government is distinct from the regime because of the formal and relatively permanent nature of the institutions.

—Definition provided by Dr. Donald Emmerson, Stanford University.

of not doing so. A decision to leave the country without placing it on a path to becoming a stable, free, and productive state should be a conscious decision based on American national interests rather than the consequence of poor planning. As a report by the International Development Centre rightly points out:

> Too often in the past the responsibility to rebuild has been insufficiently recognized, the exit of the interveners has been poorly managed, the commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries have found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying problems that produced the original intervention action.[15]

For example, the American intervention in Haiti in 1995 is an example of a good end-state vision that lacked the necessary follow-through. The announced end state was a democratic Haiti. President Bill Clinton ordered diplomatic and military operations that replaced the military junta with the popularly elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. However, once the appearance of democracy was restored, American forces were pulled out before Haiti completed its democratic transition.[16] Consequently, Haiti is not a democracy today.

The NATO intervention in Kosovo is an example of an operation without an end-state objective. America and its NATO allies forced Serbia to evacuate Kosovo without ever defining what would replace the sovereign government. As a consequence, NATO soldiers still occupy the region, and Kosovo's status is still unresolved seven years later.

Likewise, the plan to reach the end state should define an appropriate role for the military. It should contain a clear vision for shifting from military to civilian control *after* the disease and unrest formula has been accomplished.

Principle #4: Post-conflict operations should be multilateral if possible, including other countries without compromising U.S. national objectives.

For regime change to be permanent, the old regime must lose international credibility and the new regime must gain international recognition. The best way to win that support is to build an international coalition before intervening. To be successful, a multi-country coalition does not need all of the world's countries, or even most countries, to participate. Furthermore, participating in military operations is desired but not required for coalition membership. The overriding imperative is that members of the coalition have clear and complementary objectives.

Since World War II, every American intervention that resulted in regime change was done in a multilateral environment. Even in the apparently rapid decision to invade Grenada, President Ronald Reagan cobbled together an international coalition from the region.

On the other hand, coalition building for the sake of coalition building contributes little to the success of, and may in fact be detrimental to, post-conflict efforts. Countries should be allowed to participate only if their membership does not impede implementation of the disease and unrest formula.

Principle #5: Post-conflict operations should involve many different U.S. agencies and thus require interagency coordination.

Post-conflict operations require more than Department of Defense participation. They will require that multiple U.S. agencies coordinate their activities, especially in the post-conflict phase of the regime change.

Issues will include restoring basic public services such as water, power, waste management, and public safety. Transportation and power generation infrastructure damaged by military operations will need to be rebuilt. Refugees will need to be

15. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, "The Responsibility to Protect," International Development Research Centre, December 2001, at *web.idrc.ca/en/ev-9436-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html* (June 2, 2005).

16. James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina, *America's Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2003), p. 84, at *www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1753* (June 2, 2005).

returned to their homes, prisoners of war repatriated, and members of the old regime tried for their crimes when necessary. For the new regime to become self-sufficient, the economy must be restarted and the country put back to work. All of these tasks will require some degree of coalition participation and interagency coordination.

Principle #6: Unity of effort is essential.

By its nature, regime change is a multi-agency operation and usually involves a coalition of other countries as well. Despite the multiplicity of actors, a single agency or headquarters must command the operations. Splitting authority for operations in Iraq between military commanders and a civilian administrator was a mistake and complicated the problems of implementing the disease and unrest formula. In contrast, the post–World War II operations remained under a single command authority, and this decision contributed to their success. Unity of command allowed the occupying forces to learn more quickly from their mistakes and to adapt better to unforeseen circumstances.

In future U.S. operations, the military should remain in charge until the disease and unrest formula has been accomplished. The decision to make the transfer to civilian authority should be made by the President.

Principle #7: Lessons learned need to be documented and implemented.

A sound doctrine requires a review based on experience. The United States has participated in numerous regime changes, but there is no mechanism to compile, analyze, and apply those experiences. Documenting lessons learned and using them to refine organizations and practices is an essential part of building and maintaining adequate capabilities for post-conflict activities.

Documenting lessons learned is important for ongoing operations as well as future missions. Post-conflict operations are inherently unpredictable. Occupying forces must be learning organizations that quickly discover their shortfalls and adapt.

Implementing a Post-Conflict Security Concept

In addition to getting the principles right, the United States needs the right kind of organizations to implement them. The United States simply lacked an adequate organizational structure for the initial occupation of Iraq.

Currently, the Department of State is setting up an Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance to create a core planning capability and a cadre of planners for post-conflict duties. The office will conduct initial planning for operations and then deploy its planners to serve in the field. However, the State Department's initiative, while well intentioned, is inadequate.

Successful post-conflict operations cannot be planned effectively in Foggy Bottom or the Pentagon. Planning and implementation must be done in theater, in concert with the military combatant commands, where planners can gain a first-hand appreciation of the challenges. The current U.S. embassy system provides each ambassador with an interagency "country team," but the ambassador's authority extends only to the borders of the country to which he or she is accredited.

Instead of building another bureaucracy in Washington, the Administration should be building interagency regional teams.[17] Specifically, four changes are needed:

- The skills needed to conduct effective post-conflict tasks must be brought together under regional teams. These skills are available across the American government and include the ability to manage hard and soft power—such as the capacity to destroy the old regime and then restore security, avert or alleviate a humanitarian crisis, and reestablish a legitimate government. To perform all of these functions, the regional teams must be able to work in a joint interagency and multinational environment.
- The armed services need specifically to teach the operational concepts and practices relevant

17. For one recommendation, see James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Missions, Responsibilities, and Geography: Rethinking How the Pentagon Commands the World," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1792, August 26, 2004, at *www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg1792.cfm*.

to post-conflict missions. The services already have advanced schools that instruct in the operational arts at their staff colleges, such as the Marine Corps' School for Advanced Warfighting. The curriculum in these schools should be expanded to include post-conflict missions.

- The combatant commands[18] should be included in the interagency staffs that are responsible for developing post-conflict contingency plans.[19] In the event of war, a post-conflict interagency group could be attached to the operation's joint force commander to provide the nucleus of an occupation staff. In addition, the joint force command should include a general-officer deputy commander who would oversee the planning group and assume command of the occupation force after the conflict.
- The Department of Defense should retain force training and force structure packages appropriate to post-conflict tasks. There are three ways to do this: (1) by training and equipping allies to perform these duties, (2) by retraining and reorganizing U.S. combat troops for the task, and (3) by maintaining special U.S. post-conflict forces. Special post-conflict units could be assembled from existing National Guard and Reserve units, including security, medical, engineer, and public affairs commands. Since many responsibilities involved in postwar duties are similar to homeland security missions, these forces could perform double duty.[20]

Conclusion

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has relearned painful lessons on how to win the peace. Institutionalizing these lessons requires establishing a common national strategic concept for occupation operations, one that eschews the clean slate solution in favor of the disease and unrest formula.

The 21st century has not seen the last of war. Regardless of the outcome of the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will no doubt be called upon again to conduct post-conflict tasks.

Current experiences clearly demonstrate that occupation operations are complex and difficult. If the United States wishes to meet future challenges more effectively, it must address the impediments to providing the right combination of hard and soft power. Innovations in doctrinal concepts, education, operational practices, and organization could provide the impetus for developing an appropriate post-conflict force for the next war.

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18. The combatant commands are established under the unified command plan, a document that describes the geographic boundaries and functions of the combatant commands charged with conducting U.S. military operations worldwide.
19. For one proposal, see John R. Boullé II, "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination," *Joint Force Quarterly*, Autumn/Winter 2001–2002, pp. 99–102, at *www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1929.pdf* (June 2, 2005).
20. James Jay Carafano, "Shaping the Future of Northern Command," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments *Backgrounder*, April 29, 2003, p. 12, at *www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20030429.NORTHCOM/B.20030429.NORTHCOM.pdf* (June 2, 2005).

Heritage Lectures

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Post-Conflict and Culture: Changing America's Military for 21st Century Missions

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

I want to thank Admiral Arthur Cebrowski and his team at the Defense Department's Office of Force Transformation for inviting me to participate in this workshop on the role of culture in transformation.[1] Too often, discussions on transforming military capabilities focus on the role of technology.

MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray rightly conclude in their book, *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050*, that from a historical perspective, adopting new technologies alone does not account for dramatic change.[2] Achieving enduring competitive military advantages through transformation also requires the intellectual capacity to conceptualize employing force differently than in the past—and that may require changing aspects of military culture.

The premise of my remarks is that missions, strategy, education, and organization can be instruments for changing military culture, which, in turn, can provide new and unprecedented capabilities. I want to argue that DOD culture does need to be changed

1. Transformation is innovation on a grand scale, undertaken to exploit major changes in the character of conflict. See testimony of Andrew F. Krepinevich before the Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate, April 9, 2002, at *www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/ArchiveT.20020409.Defense_Transfnrma/T.20020409.Defense_Transforma.htm.*
2. James Jay Carafano, review of MacGregor Knox and Williamson Murray, eds., *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), at *www.h-net.msu.edu/reviews/showrev.cgi?path=313141031920315.*

Talking Points

- The military's role in warfighting is unquestioned, but its responsibilities in peace operations are both controversial and poorly understood.
- The capacity to conduct post-conflict operations is one area where the military remains significantly deficient and the reasons for this are as much cultural as they are material.
- Changing military culture with respect to post-conflict operations could well require a set of initiatives that cut across the services' education, career professional development patterns, and organization.
- If the United States wishes to meet future challenges more effectively, it will have to address the cultural impediments to providing the right kind of military capabilities. Innovations in education, operational practices, and organization could provide the impetus for developing an appropriate post-conflict force for the next occupation.

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with regard to one mission in particular: the military's capacity to conduct post-conflict operations.[3] Traditionally, the United States plans and executes these tasks inefficiently, jeopardizing the strategic gains achieved through battle.

Defining Strategic Requirements

The military's role in warfighting is unquestioned, but its responsibilities in peace operations are both controversial and poorly understood. Though there are no universally agreed upon terms to describe them, military peace operations can be divided into three types of actions: peacemaking,[4] peacekeeping,[5] and post-conflict activities. Of these, arguably, post-conflict missions (as opposed to nation-building[6]) are the only essential and perhaps appropriate task for U.S. forces.

Post-conflict activities are an integral part of any military campaign in which U.S. forces are required to seize territory, either to free an occupied country, as was the case during the liberation of Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, or to dispose of an enemy regime, as during the post-war occupations of Germany and Japan. Such missions are not "optional" operations; they are an integral part of any military campaign.

In addition, the initial stages of any occupation have to be primarily a military-led effort. Only the occupation forces can provide the security and logistics needed to get the job done and offer a focal point for the unity of effort required to make the troubled transition from war to peace.

While this is an inevitable task for the U.S. military in any conflict, American troops rarely excel at this mission. Recent operations in Iraq, for example, do not appear to have been well organized or effectively implemented.[7]

I would argue that this reflects the military's traditional approach to post-conflict missions, which have always been ad hoc and haphazard. The capacity to conduct post-conflict operations is one area where the military remains significantly deficient and the reasons for this are as much cultural as they are material.[8]

3. Post-conflict operations include those minimum military activities that are required in the wake of war. After any campaign, the United States will have moral and legal obligations to restore order, provide a safe and secure environment for the population, ensure that people are being fed, and prevent the spread of infectious disease. In short, the military's task is to provide a secure atmosphere for the reestablishment of civilian government and domestic security and public safety regimes. In addition, maintaining a safe and secure environment in the post-conflict phase will be vital for ensuring the national interest that precipitated U.S. involvement to begin with, whether that task be disarming and demobilizing an enemy force, hunting down the remnants of a deposed regime, or restoring a legitimate border.
4. Peacemaking involves the use or threat of violence to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to end conflict. These are the most problematic of all peace operations. Maintaining neutrality is an especially difficult challenge. This is particularly true for the United States. As a global power with interests in virtually every corner of the world, it is difficult to conceive of many conflicts in which America would be seen as a neutral power. Peacemaking should not be a routine mission for U.S. forces. See James Jay Carafano, "The U.S. Role in Peace Operations: Past, Perspective, and Prescriptions for the Future," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 795, August 14, 2003, at *www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl795.cfm.*
5. Peacekeeping operations are undertaken with the consent of all major warring parties and are designed simply to implement a peace agreement. The need to conduct these operations is a matter of strategic judgment. The United States is engaged in a global war on terrorism, a war that may take many years and require the extensive use of our troops. The armed forces are already straining to meet the demands of global conflict. America needs to pace itself and reserve its military instruments for advancing vital national interests. The United States should refrain from taking on major roles in peace enforcement operations. These activities offer substantially fewer risks than peacemaking, but that means many nations with only a modicum of military capability and some outside support can also perform them. The United States should reserve its forces for the great-power missions that require the preponderance of military power that only the United States can provide. See Carafano, "The U.S. Role in Peace Operations."
6. Nation-building comprises a far broader range of political, military, social, and economic tasks associated with reconstruction of a country in the aftermath of war. Many of these activities are tasks for which military forces are neither well-suited nor appropriate.
7. James Jay Carafano, "After Iraq: Learning the War's Lessons," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1664, July 3, 2003, at *www.heritage.org/Research/MiddleEast/bg1664.cfm*.

Among the traditions, experiences, preconceptions, and routine practices that determine how the armed forces conduct post-conflict operations, the most powerful force shaping the services' thinking is a "tradition of forgetting." The services, particularly the Army, have a long record of conducting various kinds of peace missions. Traditionally, however, the armed forces concentrate on warfighting and eschew the challenges of dealing with the battlefield after the battle.

The Army's experience and knowledge in peace operations is a case in point. They have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way. For example, the official report on the U.S. participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I noted that, "despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly has not been learned."[9]

After World War I, the tradition of forgetting continued. As the United States prepared to enter World War II, the military discovered it had virtually no capacity to manage the areas it would likely have to occupy. The Army did not even a have a field manual on the subject before 1940. In fact, one of the planners' first acts was to root out the report on lessons learned from the Rhineland occupation.

After the Second World War, the Pentagon largely forgot about the problem and continued to reinvent solutions each time it faced a new peace operation. This tradition has changed little to the present day.

Other aspects of the military's traditional approach appear to have detrimental affects as well. When American forces do undertake peace missions, they try, as much as possible, to make them mirror traditional military activities. Such an approach can result in the misapplication of resources, inappropriate tasks and goals, and ineffective operations.

In addition, the armed forces largely eschew integrated joint, interagency, and coalition operations, as well as ignoring the role of non-governmental agencies. The result is that most operations lack cohesion, flexibility, and responsiveness.[10]

Changing a Military

If we agree that the military is poorly prepared to conduct missions—and that these are important tasks to get right—how can we insure that the armed forces are more ready to conduct these operations in the future?

I would argue that the obstacles to conducting post-conflict missions more effectively are largely cultural in origin. Therefore, changing military culture with respect to post-conflict operations could well require a set of initiatives that cut across the services' education, career professional development patterns, and organization. These innovations might include the following.

- The skills needed to conduct effective post-conflict tasks require "soft power"—not only the capacity to understand other nations and cul-

8. The military's reluctance to think deeply about the place of peace operations in military affairs derived from a rich tradition of Western military theory, typified by the 19th century Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who emphasized the primacy of winning battles and destroying the enemy's conventional troops. Clausewitz, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, could perhaps be forgiven for not even mentioning peace operations in his classic treatise *On War*. After all, peacekeeping operations were something new and novel in his time, first conducted by allied forces dismantling Napoleon's empire in 1815. Erwin A. Schmidl, "The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century," in Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., *Peace Operations: Between War and Peace* (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 7. For a detailed history of the occupation of France by the allies, see Thomas Veve, *Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1992).

9. *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and Armed Forces in Germany* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 64.

10. James Jay Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 11–13, 19–22. Typically in post-conflict planning, the U.S. military fails to implement the lessons of previous operations, coordinates poorly with allies and nongovernmental organizations, and participates inadequately in interagency planning.

tures, but also the ability to work in a joint, interagency, and multinational environment. These are sophisticated leader and staff proficiencies, required at many levels of command.

In the present military education system, however, much of the edification relevant to building these attributes is provided at the war colleges to a relatively elite group being groomed for senior leader and joint duty positions. This model is wrong on two counts.

First, I think these skills are needed by most leaders and staffs in both the active and reserve components,[11] not just an elite group within the profession.

Second, this education comes too late in an officer's career. Virtually every other career field provides "graduate level" education to members in their mid-20s to 30s. Only the military delays advanced education until its leaders are in their mid-40s.

- The armed services also need special schools specifically designed to teach the operational concepts and practices relevant to post-conflict missions. The services already have advanced schools (such as the Marine Corps' School for Advanced Warfighting) for instructing in the operational arts at their staff colleges. These courses train the military's finest planners. The curriculum in these courses should be expanded to include post-conflict missions.
- The combatant commands[12] should be reorganized to include interagency staffs with specific responsibility for developing post-conflict contingency plans in the same manner as current operational staffs plan for warfighting contingencies.[13] In the event of war, the post-conflict interagency group can be attached to the operation's joint force commander to provide the nucleus of an occupation staff.

  In addition, the joint force command should include a general-officer deputy commander who would oversee the work of the planning group and assume command of the occupation force after the conflict. These staffs and command positions could provide a series of operational assignments for the career development of a cadre of officers especially skilled in post-conflict duties.
- The military should also retain force training and force structure packages appropriate to post-conflict tasks. There are three ways to obtain commands suitable to post-conflict missions: (1) training and equipping allies to perform these duties, (2) retraining and reorganizing U.S. combat troops for the task, and (3) maintaining special U.S. post-conflict forces.

  I would argue that, as a great power, the United States needs all three of these options to provide the flexibility that will enable the nation to adapt to different strategic situations which might require different levels of commitments from U.S. forces. Special post-conflict units could be assembled from existing National Guard and Reserve units including security, medical, engineer, and public affairs commands. Since many of the responsibilities involved in post-war duties are similar in many ways to missions that might be required of homeland security units, these forces could perform double duty, having utility both overseas and at home.[14]

11. The Reserve Component, which includes both the Reserves and the National Guard, represents 47 percent of the nation's available military forces. See James Jay Carafano, "The Reserves and Homeland Security: Proposals, Progress, Problems Ahead," CSBA *Backgrounder*, June 19, 2002, at *www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20020619.The_Reserves_and_H/B.20020619.The_Reserves_and_H.htm*.
12. The combatant commands are established under the unified command plan (UCP), a document that describes the geographic boundaries and functions of the combatant commands charged with conducting U.S. military operations worldwide.
13. For one proposal, see John R. Boullé III, "Operational Planning and Conflict Termination," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Autumn/Winter 2001–2002), pp. 99–102.
14. James Jay Carafano, "Shaping the Future of Northern Command," CSBA *Backgrounder*, April 29, 2003, p. 12, at *www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/Archive/B.20030429.NORTHCOM/B.20030429.NORTHCOM.pdf*.

The Consequences of Cultural Change

The 21st century has not seen the last of war. Regardless of the outcome of the current operations in Iraq, the United States will no doubt again be called upon to conduct post-conflict tasks in the future.

There is at least one clear lesson from the current experience, a powerful reminder that these operations are complex and difficult: If the United States wishes to meet future challenges more effectively, it will have to address the cultural impediments to providing the right kind of military capabilities. Innovations in education, operational practices, and organization could provide the impetus for developing an appropriate post-conflict force for the next occupation.

—James J. Carafano, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were prepared for a symposium, "Introducing Innovation and Risk: Implications of Transforming the Culture of DOD," held by the Office of Force Transformation, U.S. Department of Defense, at the Institute for Defense Analyses in Arlington, Virginia.

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The U.S. Role in Peace Operations: Past, Perspective, and Prescriptions for the Future

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Americans are not well prepared to deliberate on U.S. participation in peace operations. They know little about their history. Most Americans learn about war from books in which battles end on one page and peace breaks out in the next chapter. The shadowland in between, where the military is used to constrain rather than to inflict violence, is rarely discussed. At the same time, the language used to describe and debate operations that could include anything from monitoring a border to battling insurgents is little known and poorly understood.

The armed forces' appreciation is not much better than that of the public at large. Among the traditions, experiences, preconceptions, and routine practices that determine how the military wages the fight for peace, the most powerful force shaping its thinking is a "tradition of forgetting." The services, particularly the Army, have a long record of conducting various kinds of peace missions. Traditionally, however, the armed forces concentrate on warfighting and eschew the challenges of dealing with the battlefield after the battle.

The Army's experience and knowledge in peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way. For example, the official report on the U.S. participation in the occupation of the Rhineland after World War I noted that, "despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, and elsewhere, the lesson seemingly

- The Army's experience and knowledge in peace operations have never been incorporated into mainstream military thinking in any major, systematic way.
- It is little wonder that in the post–Cold War world, soldiers, let alone policymakers and the public, have difficulty distinguishing between operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, or intelligently debating the appropriateness of potential interventions in Liberia or other trouble spots.
- The United States needs to better prepare for the post-conflict period. Someone has to have clear responsibility for the doctrine, detailed coordination, force requirements, and technologies required to efficiently mount these operations.
- The United States should reserve its forces for the great power missions that require the preponderance of military power that only the United States can provide.

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has not been learned."[1] After World War I, the tradition of forgetting continued. As the United States prepared to enter World War II, the military discovered it had virtually no capacity to manage the areas it would likely have to occupy. The Army did not even a have a field manual on the subject before 1940. In fact, one of the planners' first acts was to root out the report on lessons learned from the Rhineland occupation.[2] After the Second World War, the Pentagon largely forgot about the problem and continued to reinvent solutions each time it faced a new peace operation.

The military's reluctance to think deeply about the place of peace operations in military affairs derived from a rich tradition of Western military theory, typified by the 19th century Prussian thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who emphasized the primacy of winning battles and destroying the enemy's conventional troops. Clausewitz, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, could perhaps be forgiven for not even mentioning peace operations in his classic treatise *On War.* After all, peacekeeping operations were something new and novel in his time, first conducted by allied forces dismantling Napoleon's empire in 1815.[3] The U.S. military, which could look back on over a century of these operations by modern states, had less of an excuse.

It is little wonder that in the post–Cold War world, soldiers, let alone policymakers and the public, have difficulty distinguishing between operations in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, or for that matter intelligently debating the appropriateness of potential future interventions in Liberia or other world trouble spots.

Public policy debates would be greatly served by a common framework for describing the various kinds of military peace operations and their implications for U.S. security.[4]

Though there are no universally agreed upon terms to describe them, military peace operations can be divided into three types of actions.

POST-CONFLICT OPERATION

The first, and most clearly relevant for U.S. military forces, is a post-conflict operation. Post-conflict activities are an integral part of any military campaign in which U.S. forces are required to seize territory, either to free an occupied country, as was the case during the liberation of Kuwait during the 1991 Gulf War, or to dispose of an enemy regime, as during the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. Such missions are not "optional" operations; they are an integral part of any military campaign.

1. *American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918–1920: Report of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs and Armed Forces in Germany* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), p. 64.
2. James Jay Carafano, *Waltzing into the Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied Austria* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp.11–13, 19–22. Typically in post-conflict planning, the U.S. military fails to implement the lessons of previous operations, coordinates poorly with allies and nongovernmental organizations, and participates inadequately in interagency planning.
3. Erwin A. Schmidl, "The Evolution of Peace Operations from the Nineteenth Century," in *Peace Operations: Between War and Peace*, ed. Erwin A. Schmidl (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 7. For a detailed history of the occupation of France by the allies see, Thomas Veve, *Duke of Wellington and the British Army of Occupation in France, 1815–1818* (Westport, Ct: Greenwood Press, 1992).
4. In 1995, the Pentagon produced its first joint doctrine for military operations other than war, which included a general discussion on various kinds of peace actions. The categories included the following. Peace Building: post-conflict actions, predominately diplomatic and economic, that strengthen and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions in order to avoid a relapse into conflict; Peace Enforcement: the application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order; Peacekeeping: military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement, and, Peacemaking: The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute and resolves issues that led to it. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (June 16, 1995), III-12 to III-13. The Defense Department categorization is confusing. It also conflates both military and civilian activities into a single set of definitions. This paper suggests a simpler framework focused primarily on military operations.

The military's appropriate role in post-conflict activities is limited, but vital. Nation-building is a task for which military forces are neither well-suited nor appropriate. In addition, prolonged occupation ties up valuable military manpower that might be used elsewhere. Yet, after any campaign the United States will have moral and legal obligations to restore order, provide a safe and secure environment for the population, ensure people are being fed, and prevent the spread of infectious disease. In short, the military's task is to provide a secure atmosphere for the reestablishment of civilian government and domestic security and public safety regimes.

In addition, maintaining a safe and secure environment in the post-conflict phase will be vital for ensuring the national interest that precipitated U.S. involvement to begin with, whether that task be disarming and demobilizing an enemy force, hunting down the remnants of a deposed regime, or restoring a legitimate border.

Finally, the initial stages of any occupation have to be primarily a military-led effort. Only the occupation forces can provide the security and logistics needed to get the job done and offer a focal point for the unity of effort required to make the troubled transition from war to peace.

While this is an inevitable task for the U.S. military in any conflict, it is one that arguably receives little attention from the public, policymakers, or the military itself. In both the Iraq and Afghanistan operations there are abundant signs that public expectations have been far from realistic. Before the battle, everyone wants clear answers on what lies ahead, but there are few military activities more difficult than predicting the end state of a conflict. It is unlikely that, prior to the onset of post-conflict operations, the military can provide firm assessments on the cost, character, or duration of an occupation.

Once operations are underway, public expectations that post-conflict activities will be smooth uncomplicated, frictionless, and non-violent are equally unrealistic. There is a "fog of peace" that is equally as infamous as Clausewitz's "fog of war," which rejects the notion that any military activity can follow a prescribed rulebook.[5]

While civilian expectations and assumptions are usually wrong, the problems of public misperception are often aggravated by inadequate military preparations. Iraq may offer a case in point. Occupation duties are never easy, and it would be unrealistic to expect normalcy to quickly return to country that has been exploited by a ruthless dictator for decades. But while it is too soon to judge the effectiveness of the occupation, it does seem that preparations for the post-conflict period were inadequate.[6]

PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS

A second category of peace operations could be labeled peacemaking.[7] This involves the use or threat of violence to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to end conflict. These are the most problematic of all peace operations. The most significant challenge is determining the appropriate level of force and the correct rules of engagement, a calculus that in part requires the consent or at least the acquiescence of local warring factions. No mission is more contentious. The his-

5. See the discussion in Manfred K. Rotermund, *The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities* (Carlisle, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999), pp. 47–52.
6. In Iraq, initial post-conflict activities should have focused on providing a safe and secure environment, searching for weapons of mass destruction programs and the infrastructure that supports terrorism, and securing Iraq's oil resources for the future reconstruction of the country. See Baker Spring and Jack Spencer, "In Post-War Iraq, Use Military Forces to Secure Vital U.S. Interests, Not for Nation-Building," Heritage Foundation *Backgrounder* No. 1589, September 25, 2002. With the exception of averting a wide-spread humanitarian crisis and gaining quick control of the oil fields, in many respects U.S. operations seem to have missed their mark. Of particular concern, it does not seem the coalition had forces properly tailored to accomplish the main objective of the campaign, tracking down and rooting out the hidden elements of Iraq's illegal weapons programs.
7. The United Nations charter does not define this term. Peacemaking operations, however, are consistent with Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. U.N. military operations approved under Chapter VII (e.g., the Korean War, the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War) are coercive in nature and conducted when the consent of all parties in a conflict to cease hostilities has not been achieved.

tory of U.N. peacekeeping operations is replete with failures that resulted from an inordinate mismatch between available forces and actual requirements.[8]

Maintaining neutrality is an equally difficult challenge for peacemaking operations. This is particularly true for the United States. As a global power with interests in virtually every corner of the world, it is difficult to conceive of many conflicts where America would be seen as a neutral power. Even when a third-party intervention force is recognized as neutral, turning that status into a military advantage can be extremely problematic. An effort to appear neutral may actually prolong the conflict, preventing either side from defeating the other. Neutral intervention might mean little more than abetting "slow-motion savagery."[9]

The reality of peacemaking operations is that to inflict peace, military forces may have to go to war against one or more of the combating factions. This suggests that powers should become involved only where they are capable or willing to employ decisive force. There are cases in which small units have succeeded in ending fighting with a mere show of force. In addition, some have argued that if the international community had intervened with only a brigade-sized contingent of a few thousand troops in Rwanda in 1994, a horrific genocide could have been prevented. Such examples, and the humanitarian compulsions of Western powers, often lead to calls for intervening in intrastate conflicts—looking for cheap wins.

On the other hand, there are also instances, such as operations in Somalia, where the supporting countries, when faced with stiff opposition, were unwilling to escalate violence and withdrew in failure. These disasters do little to ameliorate conflict, damage the prestige of the intervening powers, and sour Western tastes for future operations.

The dynamics of peacemaking suggest it should receive the same careful consideration from states as deliberations over actually going to war. Nations or coalitions should be wary of engaging in these activities if they lack the will or capability to follow through. National interests should be commensurate with the lives and national treasure that might be required if peace fails and combat operations begin.

PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

A third category of peace operations might be called peacekeeping.[10] Here, operations are undertaken with the consent of all major warring parties, and are designed simply to implement a peace agreement. The United States is currently conducting a number of these missions around the world, including in the Sinai, Kosovo, and Bosnia.

These activities are usually the most clear-cut of any peace operation. The force requirements are known and relatively stable, and the threat of violence minimal or at least manageable. With less uncertainty and fewer resources potentially at stake, states are likely to be far more willing to participate even when less than vital national interests are on the line.

CONCLUSION

Of these three missions, post-conflict operations are undoubtedly one with which the United States must remain concerned in the future. They are an inevitable responsibility at the conclusion of a campaign. Ensuring that the military does the right things after the war and works with the right people are skills not easily learned and quickly forgotten. The United States needs to prepare better for the post-conflict period. Someone has to have clear responsibility for the doctrine, detailed coordination, force requirements, and technologies required to efficiently mount these operations.[11]

8. See, for example, the discussion of operations in Bosnia in Thomas R. Mockaitis, *Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict: The Sword or the Olive Branch?* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), p. 104.
9. Richard K Betts, "The Delusion of Impartial Intervention," in *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to Global Conflict*, eds. Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996), p. 335.
10. The United Nations Charter does not use this term. Peacekeeping operations, however, are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, and are conducted with the consent of all involved parties. A recent example of this is the 1999 U.N. operation in East Timor.
11. See, for example, John S. Haven, et al., "War Termination and Joint Planning," *Joint Force Quarterly* No. 8 (Summer 1995), pp. 95–101.

The need to conduct other peace operations is a matter of strategic judgment. The United States is engaged in a global war on terrorism, a war that may take many years, and require the extensive use of our troops. The armed forces are already straining to meet the demands of global conflict. America needs to pace itself and reserve its military instruments for advancing vital national interests. In that regard, peacemaking operations should be avoided, as they could well embroil the United States in conflicts that would require substantial military resources.

America should also refrain from taking on major roles in peace enforcement operations. These activities offer substantially fewer risks than peacemaking, but that means many nations with only a modicum of military capability and some outside support can also perform them. The United States should reserve its forces for the great power missions that require the preponderance of military power that only the United States can provide.

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Executive Memorandum

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The Pentagon and Postwar Contractor Support: Rethinking the Future

James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.

Postwar duties are not optional operations. They are part of the military's mission to fight and win wars. Operations in Iraq are no exception. There are important lessons to be learned from the occupation of Iraq. One of the most vital is understanding the private sector's potential to address critical security needs. Learning this lesson will require bold rethinking by the Department of Defense.

- In postwar environments, establishing effective domestic security forces must be the highest priority.
- Private sector firms have a demonstrated capacity to provide essential services including logistical support, training, equipping, and mentoring, as well as to augment indigenous police and military units.

What Is to Be Done? Nation building is a task for which military forces are neither well-suited nor appropriate. In addition, prolonged occupation ties up valuable military manpower that might be needed elsewhere. Yet, in any post-conflict operation, the United States will have moral and legal obligations to restore order, provide a safe and secure environment for the population, ensure that people are being fed, and prevent the spread of infectious diseases. During World War II, this was appropriately called "the disease and unrest formula."

Implementing the formula is never easy. Predicting the requirements for implementing "the disease and unrest formula" is the often the greatest challenge. Iraq has proven a case in point, which is why private sector efforts are so important. They can supply the means to rapidly expand the military's capacity, provide unanticipated services, and assist in reconstruction. Most important, contract support can free up military forces to focus on their core missions and speed the transition to normalcy.

Among the many tasks that the private sector can perform, security assistance is the most essential. Establishing security is a precondition for implementing the disease and unrest formula. In particular, establishing effective domestic security forces must be the highest priority. Private sector firms have a demonstrated capacity to provide essential services including logistical support, training, equipping, and mentoring, as well as to augment indigenous police and military units. In particular, private sector assets can assist in providing an important bridging capability during the period when American military forces withdraw and domestic forces take over.

Marrying the private sector's capacity to innovate and respond rapidly to changing demands with the government's need to be responsible and accountable for the conduct of operations is not an easy task. Improving on the occupation of Iraq

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will require the Pentagon to think differently about how best to integrate the private sector into public wars. However, the Pentagon cannot do this thinking in isolation. Post-conflict operations are an interagency activity that requires the support of many branches of the federal government. Congress has a significant role to play as well. Operations need to be conducted in a manner that informs the appropriations process and strengthens congressional ability to provide oversight of Defense Department activities.

Changing the status quo will mean learning the war's lessons. The United States needs to prepare more effectively for the post-conflict period. Someone must have clear responsibility for the doctrine, detailed coordination, force requirements, and technologies needed to conduct these operations. Today, in the halls of the Pentagon and the staff rooms of the combatant commands, roles and missions are dispersed too diffusely and only intermittently gain the attention of senior leaders. One of the services needs to be tasked with developing a core competency in post-conflict operations. (The Army is probably the best candidate.) In addition, a standing joint and interagency structure needs to be created for properly managing these missions. Part of this new competency must be the judicious use of contractor support. Specifically, the military needs to learn and apply three lessons:

Lesson #1: Rewrite Doctrine. The American military has an innate prejudice against contracting security operations, which it comes by honestly. The modern state was built on transforming military activities from a private enterprise to a public responsibility. Civil supremacy and control of the military is the hallmark of 20th century Western democracy. Yet the 21st century is a different place. The private sector of the 21st century has the means to compete with the military. The Pentagon needs to become more comfortable with the idea that companies can provide security services without threatening democratic institutions. The doctrine of the armed forces needs to acknowledge the importance of getting post-conflict activities right, including integrating the role of the private sector. This is a prerequisite for getting the military to make companies part of the plan rather than an afterthought.

Lesson #2: Gain the Confidence of Congress. The Pentagon will be unable to exploit the capacity of the private sector if doubts persist about the efficacy and legitimacy of contractor support. In any private sector activity, people understand the marketplace and make smart decisions when there is transparency. Security services are no different. Companies providing contractor support must help build trust and confidence in their services. They must establish best practices and professional standards—measures by which their actions should be judged.

Lesson #3: Restructure the Military. Contracting in Iraq was on a scale and complexity never imagined by Pentagon planners. Simply having the capacity to manage the contracts being let could have solved many of the most perplexing challenges. The military needs to build into its force structure the means to rapidly expand its ability to oversee private sector support. This might be done through building additional force structure in the National Guard or a reserve civilian contracting corps.

Conclusion. Learning these lessons will not be easy. They require thinking very differently about how to fight wars and win the peace. However, they are lessons that the Pentagon must learn if it truly wishes to leverage the advantages of the private sector.

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Heritage Lectures

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The Impact of the Imperial Wars (1898–1907) on the U.S. Army

Brian McAllister Linn

The United States Army as an institution devotes considerable attention to the study of history as a guide for current and future policy. Much of the current Army transformation program is justified by appeals to the supposed lessons of the past. Indeed, until recently, it was almost impossible to attend an Army transformation briefing that did not contain at least one slide on the Blitzkrieg and the Maginot Line. Historical vignettes illustrating tactics, leadership, and Army values fill doctrinal manuals, and professional journals often publish articles that draw parallels between the past and present. Military history also plays a significant role in professional military education, from ROTC classes to the Army War College.

The Army also has institutionalized the study of the past in places such as the Center of Military History, the Military History Institute, the Combat Studies Institute, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned. The Army's published histories on World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam Conflict remain the benchmark for operational history. Even academic historians, who have a philosophic bias against any practical application of their discipline, must acknowledge the quality of the research, the institutional effort expended on studying the past, and the sophistication of much of the historical analysis.

Yet, until comparatively recently, the Army has largely limited its focus on historical "lessons learned" to large-scale conventional operations or the "Big Wars"—particularly the Civil War and World War II and, to a lesser extent, peacetime periods of transfor-

Talking Points

- The United States Army devotes considerable attention to the study of history as a guide for current and future policy, yet it has largely ignored the study of the irregular conflicts that have been, and continue to be, the service's more common experience.
- The American experience in the Philippines during the 1899–1902 imperial wars showcases both senior and junior leaders' ability to adapt and innovate to local conditions, to recognize the nature of insurgency, and to develop highly effective counterinsurgency methods and policies.
- Today's military is far more structured, centralized, and bound by a doctrine that emphasizes large-scale conventional operations. The lack of attention to and interest in stability operations has had increasingly serious consequences for U.S. military policy.

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mation such as the post-1898 "Root Reforms," the 1919–41 Interwar Era, and the pre–Gulf War period which prepared it to fight such wars. Institutionally, the Army has largely ignored the study of the irregular conflicts that have been, and continue to be, the service's more common experience.

Indicative of the Army's limited focus is that it published an official history of the Gulf War in 1993, but not until 1998 did the Army historical program publish the first comprehensive analysis of Army counterinsurgency and stability operations between the Civil War and World War II.[1] A projected volume studying post-WWII operations has been hung up in the publication process for almost half a decade.

This year, with American troops engaged in a frustrating, bloody, and unpopular stability campaign in Iraq, the core curriculum at the Army's Command and General Staff College devoted only one lesson to studying guerrilla war—the same as it devoted to the campaigns of Frederick the Great and a fraction of what it devoted to World War II. The terms used for irregular warfare in military lexicon—"Operations Other than War" or "Stability and Support Operations"—indicate the professional military's conviction that these are tasks that are subordinate to, and detract from, their mission of "Warfighting."

Thus, to assess the impact of the Army's experience in pacification and stability operations in the Philippines in the early 20th century first requires some examination of the institutional and cultural factors that affected, and often inhibited, how this experience was assimilated.

From its origins in 1784, the United States standing army or "Regular Army" faced a competitive tradition of citizen soldiering that was believed, at least in many Americans' minds, to have demonstrated its prowess in unconventional warfare and "Indian fighting." Although much of its combat experience was in irregular warfare along the frontier, it was necessary for the Regular Army to develop a distinct identity. The design and construction of complex fortifications to protect the Atlantic seaports from foreign attack provided such an identity.

With the support of its civilian superiors, the post–War of 1812 Regulars defined professional expertise as the practice of "scientific warfare" of the kind practiced by the European Great Powers. The Army's strategic and intellectual tradition—outlined by Dennis Hart Mahan, Henry Halleck, and Emory Upton—focused on military engineering and large-scale conventional warfare. Frontier fighting, counter-guerrilla operations, and peacekeeping were dismissed as little more than skirmishing and police work.

The Regular Army's focus on campaigns and battles, and its denigration of irregular conflict and peacekeeping as a nuisance and distraction, was reinforced by the Civil War, and particularly by General Orders 100. Issued in 1863, these directives to Union forces incorporated both a philosophical explanation and practical methods for occupation and pacification within the larger context of conventional war. In making a clear distinction between "civilized" (conventional) and "savage" (guerrilla) war, G.O. 100 made popular resistance to military occupation a criminal activity and legitimized harsh retaliation against insurgents and the communities that supported them. The Army's success in suppressing guerrilla war in the Confederacy contributed to the belief that mastering conventional warfare was more professionally challenging.[2]

1. Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine, 1860–1941* (Washington: Center of Military History, 1998); Robert Scales, Terry Johnson, and Thomas Odom, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993). Some recent examples of the high quality of "official" Army analysis of irregular conflicts and peacekeeping are Roger F. Bauman and Lawrence F. Yates with Veralle F. Washington, "*My Clan Against the World*": *US and Coalition Forces in Somalia, 1992–1994* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 2004); Gordon W. Rudd, *Humanitarian Intervention: Assisting the Iraqi Kurds in Operation Provide Comfort, 1991* (Washington: Department of the Army, 2004); and *Armed Diplomacy: Two Centuries of American Campaigning* (Fort Leavenworth, Kan.: Combat Studies Institute, 2004).
2. Robert R. Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861–1865* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004); Robert Wooster, *The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865–1903* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988).

Peacekeeping and pacification also fell outside of what might be termed the "Regular Army Narrative." Most notably outlined by Upton, this cyclical interpretation of American military history posits that owing to its flawed military policy, the United States will never be ready for war.

In the Narrative, wartime victory—won by the enlightened leadership of Regular Army generals—is almost inevitably squandered. Politicians and the public demand immediate demobilization, soon weakening the armed forces to pathetic levels and denying them the resources needed to maintain their fighting efficiency. The Army's history in peacetime is interpreted as a constant battle by responsible and prescient military officers to avoid the destruction of the nation's security and to prepare for a future war that they alone foresee. Yet when this war then occurs, it is these same scorned military officers who step in and guide the Republic to victory.[3] What Roger Spiller has referred to as the "small change of soldiering"—peacekeeping, pacification, counterinsurgency, and similar duties—comprises almost no part of this Narrative, except perhaps to provide stirring tales of valor and to explain away any sub-par performance by the Regulars in the Big Wars.[4]

Given both its own institutional priorities and the power of the Regular Army Narrative, the Army has encountered numerous intellectual barriers to assimilating the lessons of its constabulary experience. In many ways, studying the impact of the Philippine conflicts provides as much insight into the problems inherent in overcoming these barriers as it does into such practical (and immediate) subjects as tactics and developing native forces.

Experience of Philippine Stability Operations

The Army's peacekeeping or stability experience in the Philippines can be divided into three parts.

- The first phase was a conventional war waged in central Luzon against Emilio Aguinaldo's nationalist forces from February to December 1899.
- The second phase was a pacification campaign for control of the archipelago that was effectively over by mid-1901 and officially ended in July 1902. During this phase, Filipino nationalists and other insurgents no longer sought victory on the battlefield, but rather to deny American control in the countryside through ambushes, harassment, and attacks on Filipinos who collaborated. In turn, the U.S. forces waged a series of regional pacification campaigns that gradually isolated the guerrillas from their civilian supporters.
- The third phase consisted of limited counterinsurgency campaigns against recalcitrant rebels, religious sects, brigands, and Muslim tribesmen, all of which were effectively suppressed by 1913.

In the Philippines, the Americans soon learned that effective pacification and peacekeeping was based on the realities of fighting in an archipelago and on local politics. The rebels lacked weaponry, training, and centralized leadership, and were too weak militarily to challenge more than small detachments of troops. Instead of a national war, resistance consisted of a series of regional conflicts waged by local political-military *jefes*. As a result, the nature of military operations varied greatly from island to island, from province to province, and even from village to village.

In some areas, such as Southern Luzon, many of the elite landowners were initially united in their resistance to the American rule, but they later supported the government in its campaigns against lower-class brigands. In other places, like the Muslim areas of the Southern Philippines, tribesmen supported the Army against Catholic Filipino rebels.

3. Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1904). The continued popularity of "Army Narrative" can be seen in recent autobiographies by senior Army officers: for example, Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, *American Soldier* (New York: Regan Books, 2004); Colin Powell and Joseph Persico, *My American Journey* (New York: Ballantine, 1996); and Norman Schwartzkopf, *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam, 1993).
4. Roger Spiller, "The Small Change of Soldiering and American Military Experience," *Australian Army Journal*, Vol. 2 (Winter 2004), pp. 165–175.

There, resistance only began after 1902 and came from some tribal leaders and individual jihadists; there was no unified religious opposition.

On the Visayan island of Samar, nationalist guerrillas united with a popular sect to wage a bloody guerrilla war from 1900 to 1902. But this alliance soon fractured, and when the sectarians revolted in 1904, many former nationalist guerrillas joined the Americans in hunting them down. On another Visayan island, Negros, the local elite welcomed the Americans as liberators, and the resistance movement consisted largely of another sect, the Babylanes, who were hostile to everyone. Such diverse and fragmented resistance occurred on the local level as well, so that it was not unusual for the American garrison in one town to be under constant sniping and attacks while their comrades a dozen miles away might not hear a shot fired for months.

At its simplest, American pacification—a term that meant both the restoration of peace and the imposition of law, order, and social control on the population—balanced coercion with conciliation. The latter was addressed by President William McKinley in his December 1898 "benevolent assimilation" instructions to the military commanders in the Philippines.

During the conventional war of 1899, the Army took some tentative but important steps in developing a plan for local government, incorporating Filipino troops, and establishing priorities for social reform. In 1900, the first year of the occupation/guerrilla war, Army headquarters in Manila emphasized a "hearts-and-minds" approach, seeking to provide honest and efficient administration, education, medicine, civic projects, and other social reforms. Although criticized by some officers in the field as out of touch and poorly suited to the far more important task of suppressing armed resistance, it played a vital role in securing acceptance of American colonial rule in many locales.

If conciliation was the official pacification policy, coercion was its less authorized but widely used counterpart. From the beginning of the fighting, soldiers destroyed property and otherwise punished those suspected of aiding the insurgents. In December 1901, following a resurgence of violence aimed at influencing the U.S. presidential elections, coercion became official with the issuing of General Orders 100. In areas that continued to violently oppose occupation, there was widespread burning of crops and homes, arrests and deportations, and population resettlement.

A third aspect of American pacification was the incorporation of large segments of the Filipino population. This occurred on several levels, from the appointment of civic officials (mayors and police) to the use of spies and porters and to the raising of military units. Although the Army high command was, in retrospect, far too cautious in authorizing the use of Filipino forces, these proved instrumental in the last campaigns of the Philippine War and the post-1902 counterinsurgency campaigns. The Philippine Scouts and Philippine Constabulary became the backbone of the colonial peacekeeping establishment, making the campaigns more intra-Filipino conflicts than Fil-American ones.[5]

Impact of the Imperial Wars on the Army

The occupation and pacification of the Philippines accelerated the Army's transformation from frontier constabulary to modern industrial-age military organization. Indeed, together with the Cuban campaign of 1898, they effectively destroyed the "Old Army" that had provided the nation's standing forces since 1784.[6] The Civil War veterans who had dominated the Army's senior levels since 1865 were forced to retire because of age, physical infirmity, or disease. By the official end of the Philippine War in 1902, the Army was a very different organization: Almost two-thirds of its nearly 3,000 officers had been commissioned in the last four years.

5. Brian McAllister Linn, *The Philippine War, 1899–1902* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), and *Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902–1940* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997).
6. Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784–1898* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

The new Army also had a new mission. Whereas most of the Old Army had been deployed on the frontier in peacekeeping duties, Secretary of War Elihu Root (1899–1903) declared the new Army would have one essential purpose in peacetime—to prepare to wage the nation's wars.

But, as has usually been the case, the war that the Army chose to prepare for was not the war that it had recently fought in the Caribbean and Philippines, nor indeed the minor conflicts it was still fighting in the archipelago. Rather, the Army focused on two future scenarios, one very old and one new. The old scenario was the defense of the coastline of the continental United States against an amphibious raid by a European Great Power. The second extended the threat of a raid to Pearl and Honolulu harbors in Hawaii and Manila and Subic bays in the Philippines. To meet both of these, the Army developed a thoroughly modern coastal defense system—complete with state-of-the-art weaponry and fortifications, highly sophisticated range-finding systems, and a cadre of expert gunners, engineers, and technicians. It also sought to create a "Mobile Army" of divisions and brigades, supplemented by the newly organized reserves (National Guard) and equipped with the newest weaponry.

It very quickly emerged that the commitment to guard the Pacific possessions was incompatible with creating this new model army. The primary problem was manpower. Although the Army was authorized at 100,0000 (four times its strength in 1898), its actual manpower hovered between 63,000 and 81,000 in the first decade of the 20th century. Economic prosperity in the civilian sector and bad pay and dismal living conditions in the service drove out officers and enlisted personnel. Repeated military commitments to the Caribbean and the Pacific meant sustained deployments: At times, almost half the Army was outside the continental United States.[7] A series of misguided personnel policies exacerbated the situation: Sometimes an officer would arrive after a three-month trip to Manila and then be reassigned and have to take the next transport back. Not until 1912 were the most serious problems addressed with the creation of a distinct overseas military organization, and then only by largely abandoning the pretense of adequately manning of the Philippines and Hawaii.

The imperial wars thus had a substantial effect on the postwar Army's evolution into the modern force, but that impact was largely negative. With few exceptions, the defense of the Pacific territories retarded Army transformation.

Effect of the Imperial Wars on Military Thought

It would be an exaggeration to state that the Army learned nothing from the imperial wars. Allan R. Millett has persuasively argued that they impressed Regulars with the potential of rapidly raised and trained citizen-soldiers, particularly the 35,000-man U.S. Volunteer force that did much of the fighting in the Philippines in 1900–1901. But too often, the lessons learned were merely the reaffirmation of existing prejudices, particularly the Regulars' long-held belief that pacification operations were "a thankless sort of service."[8]

The imperial wars also vindicated the Regular Army Narrative. The nation had been unprepared and overconfident, and, as one officer concluded, "we won the war thus mainly because our adversary was too weak to fight."[9] Moreover, the wars revealed much the Army had no wish to explore about its own often mediocre performance.[10] Army officers who sought "lessons learned" thus had to reconcile two somewhat contradictory objectives: first, to extract information that would increase the

7. Johnson Hagood, *Circular Relative to Pay of Officers and Enlisted Men of the Army* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1907).
8. William H. Carter, "The Next Head of the Army," *Munsey's Magazine*, Vol. 28 (March 1903), p. 811; Allan R. Millett, "Commentary," in Joe E. Dixon, ed., *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium* (Washington: U.S. Air Force Academy, 1980), pp. 176–180.
9. "Notes and Diaries," 121, Box 1, William E. Lassiter Papers, CU 3394, Special Collections, U.S. Military Academy Library, West Point, N.Y.

efficiency of their service; second, to protect their service's reputation. Not surprisingly, writers focused on problems that could be immediately addressed, particularly tactics.[11]

In fairness to Army military theorists, the Philippines provided a difficult problem of interpretation. Once the conventional war ended in late 1899, American pacification was based as much on individual officers' adjustment to local conditions as it was on policy from Army headquarters in Manila. Efforts to establish a coherent operational narrative floundered amidst the diversity of experiences. There was no centralized resistance, either political or ideological. Rather, soldiers faced a fragmented array of brigands, clans, sects, local paramilitaries, and so on. Troops spent the vast majority of their time on guard duty and patrolling the countryside; in building barracks, roads, and bridges; and in a host of civil affairs projects.

From 1900 to 1913, only two engagements may be termed battles; the rest were ambushes, firefights, and skirmishes. The major campaigns had little connection with each other and were won by implementing a variety of techniques to overcome the resistance in a particular locale; efforts to transplant these methods were seldom successful.

Perhaps most important, taken together, these pacification campaigns confirmed the prevailing Army belief that it was sufficient to extemporize from the existing tactics. Such improvisation, together with the advantages conveyed by better weapons, training, and logistics, all but guaranteed victory over time. In many ways, the very success of the Army mitigated against its having to learn from its experiences.

Nevertheless, conscientious officers could glean a great deal of insight into guerrilla warfare, peacekeeping, and pacification from the annual reports of the War Department between 1898 and 1907. In addition to presenting the analysis of the senior military commanders, these volumes also included a wide range of operational accounts ranging from small skirmishes to major battles.

The service journals printed several articles on combat on the Philippines, as well as on the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion. Some of these contained a wealth of information. For example, Major Hugh D. Wise's account of fighting sectarians on the island of Samar include not only a detailed study of enemy and American tactics, but also information on logistics, intelligence, and winning over the local population.[12] Robert L. Bullard contributed several articles on his experiences with Moros and emphasized that peacemaking was likely to be as important as warfighting in the Army's foreseeable future.[13] But Bullard's views were in a distinct minority, and he himself

10. For Army criticisms of its operations in the 1898 campaign, see S. D. Rockenbach, "Some Experiences and Impressions of a 2nd Lieutenant of Cavalry in the Santiago Campaign," *Cavalry Journal*, Vol. 40 (March–April 1931), p. 42; Spanish War Diary, Charles D. Rhodes Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; E. O. Cord, "The Battle of Caney: As Seen by a Member of Company B, 22nd Infantry," n.d., Box 221, Leonard Wood Papers, Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress; "One Soldier's Journey," George van Horn Moseley Papers, Box 1, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford, California; and "On the Edge: Personal Recollections of an American Officer," 1934, Cornelius de Witt Willcox Papers, U.S. Military Academy Library.

11. John Bigelow, *Reminisces of the Santiago Campaign* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1899); Arthur L. Wagner, *Report of the Santiago Campaign, 1898* (Kansas City: F. Hudson, 1908); Herbert H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba*, 3 vols. (1907, reprinted Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1970); and Todd R. Brereton, "First Lessons in Modern War: Arthur Wagner, the 1898 Santiago Campaign, and the U.S. Army Lesson-Learning," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 64 (January 2000), pp. 79–96.

12. Hugh D. Wise, "Notes on Field Service in Samar," *Journal of the U.S. Infantry Association*, Vol. 4 (July 1907), pp. 3–58. Between 1899 and 1904, the leading professional journal—the *Journal of the Military Service Institute*—contained six articles on combat in the Philippines, three on the Boer War, two on China, two on guerrilla war, and 10 on Philippine-related topics such as native scouts. On the distribution of War Department reports, see George C. Marshall, *Interviews and Reminiscences for Forrest C. Pogue*, rev. ed. (Lexington, Va.: George C. Marshall Research Foundation, 1991), p. 139.

13. Robert L. Bullard, "Military Pacification," *Journal of the Military Service Institute*, Vol. 46 (January–February 1910), pp. 1–24, and "Road Building Among the Moros," *Atlantic Monthly*, December 1903, pp. 818–826.

soon became, like many of his peers, an advocate of preparing the Army for Great Power conflict.

Indeed, far from drawing lessons for future counterinsurgency campaigns, there was far more concern that the imperial wars "played havoc" with officers' tactical judgment and "inculcated erroneous and regrettable ideas."[14] Major General Leonard Wood, for example, believed that in the Philippine War:

> [W]e were opposed by a very inferior enemy and moved as it suited us, conditions which do not exist when confronted by troops trained for war and well-handled. Lessons taught in schools of this sort are of little value and usually result in false deductions and a confidence which spells disaster when called upon to play the real game.[15]

Significantly, Wood's attitude was indicative of his service. The new tactical systems, first articulated in the *Field Service Regulations* of 1905, incorporated virtually nothing from the imperial wars. There was no effort to release a manual on small wars or bush tactics, and officers in the Philippines noted that many of the tactical formations recommended in their manuals were completely impractical in jungles or rice paddies.

Some individuals who might have been expected at the forefront of developing a small-wars doctrine were conspicuously silent. Henry T. Allen wrote articles on the Russo–Japanese War but nothing on what he had learned in almost five years as a combat officer and commandant of the Philippine Constabulary. Brigadier General J. Franklin Bell, widely viewed as the most effective commander in the Islands, was supposed to prepare a detailed narrative of the lessons he had learned. But Bell, perhaps wisely, decided it would be far too controversial and instead devoted his time to military education. The only record of Bell's policies comes from a staff officer who privately printed 500 copies of the general's telegraphic orders on the grounds that they were "classics on native warfare and were needed by not only the young officers of our army but by the older ones as well."[16]

The Army also failed to support the most ambitious effort to capture the lessons of the war, John R. M. Taylor's five-volume *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*. Fascinated by the dynamics of the guerrilla resistance, Taylor included over 1,000 captured documents that detailed the military structure, financial system, and strategy of the insurgents. Of equal importance, the documents showed how decentralized the guerrillas were, how divided by factions and personality clashes, and how they sought to ensure popular support. In sum, the work was an invaluable resource on the dynamics of agrarian insurgency, as useful to officers today as a century ago.

But Taylor's dislike of the civil government that replaced military rule offended former civil servant James A. LeRoy. LeRoy, who was writing his own history of the war, urged William Howard Taft to suppress Taylor's work completely rather than allow its revision. Taylor tried for years to reverse this decision. In 1914, he urged that at least the chapters on guerrilla war be distributed to the troops deployed to Vera Cruz. But the Army leadership refused to support him, and the book was soon forgotten. Only in 1971 was the book published, ironically by a Filipino historical association.[17]

Similarly, the Army made almost no effort to incorporate the lessons of the Philippine experience into its professional education system. At the staff college at Fort Leavenworth and the Army War College, students studied European-based "military science" and large-unit conflicts such as the Civil War, the German Wars of Unification, and the Russo–Japanese War. But it is virtually impossible to find any mention in the curriculum of the lessons learned in the Philippines on counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, or occupation. Between 1903 and 1911, the Army's strategic planning agency, the

14. Sand-30, "Trench, Parapet, or the Open," *Journal of the Military Service Institute*, Vol. 31 (July 1902), pp. 471–486.

15. Leonard Wood to AG, U.S. Army, 1 July 1907, Box 40, Wood Papers.

16. Milton F. Davis to Matthew F. Steele, 12 January 1903, Box 11, Matthew F. Steele Papers, Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

Army War College, compiled some 500 notecards relating to topics of military interest. These cards indexed reports on European armies, weaponry, the Russo–Japanese War, and translations of military articles but contained only one entry on the "Philippine Question" and none on guerrilla war, pacification, or counterinsurgency.[18]

In the Philippines, there was only slightly more interest. In the first decade after the end of the war, when fears of a new insurrection were widespread, there was some effort to maintain institutional memory. Troops were stationed in areas that were seen as potential centers of rebellion, headquarters circulated operational reports as a means of teaching tactics and techniques, and there were even surveys of combat officers. But with the end of the Pulahan campaign in 1907 and the rapid shift of the Scouts from pacification to preparing to repel invasion, this knowledge was soon forgotten.

In 1936, Charles H. Gerhardt, a staff officer in the Army's Philippine Department in Manila, was unable to locate a single study of military operations during the Philippine War. Yet when Gerhardt wrote his own history of this period, he focused entirely on the large-unit conventional operations in 1899. The ensuing far bloodier and far longer pacification and peacekeeping operations in the Islands he dismissed as no more than "a very extended police system" and thus unworthy of serious consideration for military study.[19]

Gerhardt's disinterest in the very operations that are today of far more interest than the long-forgotten battles of 1899 illustrates a central issue—and central problem—in understanding the impact of experience on military institutions. At the time he was writing, the Philippines had been internally peaceful for a quarter of a century; no Army officer seriously worried about a new insurrection or a resumption of guerrilla war. Indeed, most were preparing (and hoping) to withdraw from the Islands entirely when they became independent in 1946.

Gerhardt's focus was thus firmly fixed on what the Army had seen as its primary mission as far back as 1905: defending Manila Bay, and perhaps Luzon, from a Japanese invasion. Thus, he was seeking to draw lessons not on pacification, but on how conventional forces had campaigned in the same region which, it was widely believed, would be the primary battleground should Japan attack. Given that this very scenario would be played out within five years of his report, it is hard to fault Gerhardt's or the Army's priorities.

The Constant Refrain

It is a constant refrain that the United States military, and particularly the Army, always has to relearn the lessons of its past experience with counterinsurgency. This refrain is correct, but it begs far more complex and difficult questions about institutional culture and history. In its assessment of the imperial wars, and specifically in the Philippines, the Army found ample justification not only for its interpretation of history (the Regular Army Narrative), but also for its ability to perform "police" activities. The lessons that might have been learned

17. John R. M. Taylor to Secretary, War College Division, 24 August 1914, WCD 8699-2, Entry 296, RG 165, National Archives, Washington; John R. M. Taylor, *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States, 1898–1903: A Compilation of Documents and Introduction*, 5 vols. (1906, reprinted Pasay City, P.I.: The Eugenio Lopez Foundation, 1971); John M. Gates, "The Official Historian and the Well-Placed Critic: James A. LeRoy's Assessment of John R. M. Taylor's *The Philippine Insurrection Against the United States*," *The Public Historian*, Vol. 7 (Summer 1985), pp. 57–67; William T. Johnston, "Methods Used in Solving Problems Presented by Guerrilla Warfare in the Philippines," 10 July 1905, Roll 6, National Archives Microfilm Record M-1023.

18. T. W. Jones to Superintendent, USMA, 5 November 1905, Entry 301, RG 165; Army War College, Record Cards for Miscellaneous Correspondence, 1903–1910, Entry 291, RG 165; Timothy K. Nenninger, *The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army: Education, Professionalism, and the Officer Corps of the United States Army, 1881–1918* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978).

19. C. H. Gerhardt, "An Account of the Conduct of the Armed Forces of the U.S. in the Philippine Islands, 1898–1902, from the Viewpoint of the High Command," March 1936, Pre-Presidential Papers, Box 154 Philippine Island File, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.

from pacification and peacekeeping in the Islands appeared to confirm preexisting convictions about the importance of improvisation and adaptability.

But the very diversity of military experience in such localized and multi-faceted campaigns mitigated against their impact. Indeed, the nature of the fighting raised concern that officers were more likely to have learned the wrong lessons than they were to have learned the right ones. The conviction of much of the top American Expeditionary Forces' leadership—nearly all of them veterans of fighting in the Philippines—that rifle-and-bayonet–equipped light infantry could successfully assault German entrenchments is indicative that such concern was justified.

Finally, the threat of Japanese attack, which became apparent in 1905 and was an urgent priority by 1907, distracted the Army from assimilating the lessons of pacification. Believing that it was finally preparing for a Big War that was worthy of its professional expertise, the Army with some satisfaction turned to constructing coastal defenses and exercising brigades. Not for many more years would the need to relearn the lessons of pacification, peacekeeping, and occupation once again intrude upon the Army's consciousness.

Conclusion: Policy Implications

There is a great deal that both military officers and defense analysts can learn from studying the Philippine experience.

First, it remains the United States' most successful counterinsurgency campaign and reveals a wealth of information about recruiting and training native military forces, establishing viable civil governments and political parties, integrating civic development with military operations, and many other issues. There is also a great deal of practical information on tactics, logistics, intelligence collection, and administration.

Perhaps most important, the Philippines can provide conceptual tools for anticipating the consequences of both strategic policies and tactical measures today. For example, anyone with a historical awareness of the Philippine experience should have anticipated both the emergence of an insurgency in Iraq and the diverse nature of Iraqi armed resistance. Such historical awareness was clearly lacking, and in many respects, the American military occupation has given ample proof of the old adage that those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it.

Second, predetermined agendas will inhibit, if not completely prevent a military organization's ability to learn from the past. For much of the Regular Army military intellectual community, history was, is, and will continue to be a tool with which to better fight major conventional wars and, to a lesser extent, to understand the transformation process needed to prepare for such large-scale wars.

The implications for the future are that the Army will continue to seek guidance, inspiration, and vindication only from those historical precedents that justify a focus on large-scale conventional war—hence the interest in the Interwar Era—and ignore those that suggest more attention to stability operations. Policymakers must thus exercise a healthy skepticism of service arguments based on the "lessons of history."

Third, military culture plays a vital and often unrecognized role in how institutions incorporate and assimilate wartime experience and how they define themselves. In the past, and probably in the future, the Regular Army officer corps has confined its definition of military expertise almost entirely to large-scale conventional operations. It has been very resistant to any prolonged theoretical exploration of peacekeeping, pacification, occupation, stability operations, and counterinsurgency.

Given the military's very narrow definition of what constitutes its professional expertise, it is reasonable for civilian policymakers to expect senior military leaders to provide informed (if institutionally self-serving) guidance on large-scale operations, tactics, and weapons. It is not at all wise to assume equally informed advice on peacekeeping, pacification, stability operations, occupation, and counterinsurgency.

Fourth, the lack of attention to and interest in stability operations has had increasingly serious consequences for U.S. military policy. In the Philippines, both senior and junior leaders were able to adapt

and innovate to local conditions, to recognize the nature of the insurgency, and to develop highly effective counterinsurgency methods and policies.

But today's military is far more structured, centralized, and bound by a doctrine that emphasizes large-scale conventional operations. It is also far more committed to the full employment of sophisticated weapons systems whose impact as "force-multipliers" is dubious. A helicopter gunship may provide the equivalent firepower of an infantry company, but its maintenance also removes the equivalent of an infantry company from the field. Despite all the rhetoric of transformation, policymakers cannot expect military officers raised in a zero-defects RTC-exercise–driven institution to adapt and innovate to insurgencies with nearly the same facility as their far less intellectually and equipment-burdened predecessors did in 1900.

—Brian McAllister Linn is a professor of history at Texas A&M University. This analysis is adapted from a presentation delivered at a conference on "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces," held in Paris, France, and sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, the Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (Ministère de la Défense), the Royal United Services Institute, the Association of the United States Army, the Förderkreis Deutsches Heer, The Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy Paris.

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Boots on the Ground: The Impact of Stability Operations on the Armies That Must Conduct Them

Major General Jonathon P. Riley

I thought I would give you a divisional commander's view, informed by two years' service in Iraq with the British and U.S. armies, as well as in Sierra Leone and the Balkans. These operations have all been complex, involving kinetic warfighting, counter-insurgency, information operations, humanitarian support, civil–military cooperation (CIMIC),[1] and security-sector reform running concurrently in the same battle space.

Modern Challenges

The division[2] is, of course, a legacy structure. How, then, is it applicable to modern, complex operations? In my view, every level of command must add value to an operation. If it does not do so, it should be removed. The divisional level is the lowest level at which deep (shaping), close (decisive), and rear (sustainment) operations are organized, and the lowest level that plans and conducts operations simultaneously. The order of battle is irrelevant: If an organization does this, it is *de facto* a division. The temptation is, however, in this sort of operation, that because of the understandable pressures of day-to-day life, there is a tendency that a division will concern itself overmuch with the affairs of brigade commanders and insufficiently with its own business.

Therefore, the divisional level of command will have to concern itself with a variety of tasks much wider than the simple introduction of kinetic violence into the battle space. It may, for example, have to contend simultaneously with such things as:

- Planning, resourcing, and coordinating the effort to restructure the local security forces, and in par-

Talking Points

- Today's military divisions face challenges much greater than traditional warfare, including counter-insurgency and Operations Other Than War.
- Warfighting requires weapon systems that deliver destructive effect. Counter-insurgency and Operations Other Than War require intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance systems, and supporting intelligence processes of greater precision.
- The military has become used to uncertainty, used to cultural asymmetries, and good at switching from fighting to post-conflict operations.
- Low-tech skills built up over the years must not be abandoned. They are required for the complex operations, just as much as the high-tech equipment. While one can buy equipment, one has to grow experience.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
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ticular their command, control, communications CIS[3] and intelligence architecture;

- Our own surveillance reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting;
- Divisional level joint and combined operations, whether kinetic or otherwise;
- Coordinating and resourcing brigade operations, including the identification and committal of reserves;
- Coordination with higher political and military authorities in theatre and at home, including matters of logistics, communications, and administration;
- Future plans and contingency plans;
- Information operations;
- Media operations;
- Synchronization of military operations and information with the development of essential services, governance, and the economy, and
- Divisional Rear Operations.

This sort of complexity raises a question about the British Army's training at formation level. We claim that we train for the worst case—but do we? Our entire collective training regime and output is based on the maxim that warfighting is our most demanding activity and all other operations are seen as stepping down. Warfighting is undoubtedly highly demanding in terms of the tempo of operations, the morale component, the need for timely coordination at the formation level,[4] and the provision of logistic support. However, counter-insurgency and Operations Other Than War are arguably more complex and just as demanding in other ways. At the point of contact, a fight is a fight—whether in downtown Belfast, Al-Amarah, or Wireless Ridge.

Warfighting and Operations Other Than War

Warfighting requires weapon systems that deliver destructive effect; counter-insurgency and Operations Other Than War require intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance systems, and supporting intelligence processes, of greater precision. Firepower, although used, is at less of a premium in counter-insurgency. Warfighting intelligence training does little to prepare staffs for the fusion challenges of counter-insurgency operations. The flexibility required of commanders at all levels in counter-insurgency is also arguably greater. At its most intense, counter-insurgency may require any commander, even quite a junior one, to coordinate air, aviation, indirect fire and organic direct-fire weapons in a battle space in which humanitarian operations, coordination with non-governmental organizations and other government departments, and security-sector reform tasks are in progress at the same time. This level is rarely practiced during collective training, in which the emphasis is on battlegroup and brigade-level integration of effects. Although at a less demanding tempo than in warfighting, junior commanders may also find themselves responsible for briefing, tasking, enabling, and coordinating a variety of specialist agencies.

Arguably, the most challenging aspects of counter-insurgency operations are recognizing when to raise the tempo of our own operations to remain inside the enemy's decision-making cycle, and to respond appropriately. I am not therefore advocating stopping combined-arms[5] training, nor underestimating the importance of preparing and equipping for war.

1. *Civil-Military Cooperation* units act very much like a provincial reconstruction team (PRT). CIMIC builds schools and fixes roads and bridges. However, unlike a PRT, CIMIC only hires and supervises local people to do the work, with little hands-on involvement in projects. Also unlike a PRT, CIMIC maintains tactical perspective.
2. A *division* is a large military unit or formation usually consisting of around ten to fifteen thousand soldiers. In most armies a division is composed of several regiments or brigades, and in turn several divisions make up a corps.
3. *Communications Interface Shelter.*
4. *Formation level* refers to an organizational tier such as a brigade, division, corps, army, or army group.
5. *Combined Arms* is an approach to warfare that seeks to integrate different arms of a military (e.g., Army w/ Air Force) to achieve mutually complementary effects.

I am suggesting, however, that at times of high operational commitment levels, such as now, this approach must be modified to take account of the most demanding situation that will actually face the man on the ground, and not the most demanding situation that will ever face the British Army.

The Multinational Angle

What of the multinational angle? I was fortunate in both the Balkans and Iraq to have excellent, capable partner nations who were unstinting in their support. However, in a coalition, one must be aware of national caveats and red cards. Particularly in Iraq, I had to be careful never to issue an order unless I had first established that it could be obeyed. This paid off over the election period when requests for aviation and medical assistance—referred to Rome and The Hague—came back with a positive response in the truly remarkable time of 10 minutes. I could rarely get an answer from my own country in less than 10 days.

One must here distinguish coalitions from alliances. In some ways, coalitions are more effective than established alliances: Alliances have hard-wired, permanent structures with all the attendant bureaucracy. Every member, regardless of size, has an equal say. Coalitions have *ad hoc* structures, made for the moment, and the amount of influence is directly proportional to the size of contribution. This means that decision-making will be driven by the most powerful member—especially when one member is overwhelmingly powerful. It is a partnership, but a partnership of unequals.

The best solution is often a coalition formed of alliance members. In this way the military effectiveness of multi-nationality in a coalition will be partly a reflection of mutual trust and familiarity, partly a reflection of the longer-term development of common doctrine and procedures through established structures like those of NATO[6] and ABCA[7], and partly a function of tempo. In an operation such as in Iraq now, where tempo is low and risk is also low, multi-nationality can go to a low level. My Danish battlegroup, for example, had one or two British companies, two Danish companies, and a platoon of Lithuanians in one of its Danish companies. There is time to consult national capitals, and respect red cards in a way that is not possible on high-tempo, warfighting operations. So although the division in Iraq had three out of four multinational brigades or task forces, each with two or three nations with one dominant partner, this was a very manageable mix. Yet it should not be supposed that this degree of multi-nationality can be regarded as normal or acceptable in high-tempo, high-risk warfighting operations.

Security Sector Reform

Let me now turn to some of the challenges of security sector reform. Reforming a broken army is challenging, but the process is one that can readily be tackled by an organized military force, provided the right resources for infrastructure, equipment, sustainment, and training are applied. Some specialist teams are needed for specialist functions, but in general, everyone can take part in it. It does not require special training; it is often a matter of reproducing oneself. The British and French armies have shown this in Africa often enough.

Police reform is another matter. In southern Iraq, Britain stepped forward to take the lead in three of the four provinces. The fourth was taken by Italy. A model was applied that had already failed in Bosnia and Kosovo, and was failing in Iraq until rescued by the military and the Italians.

Great Britain—or indeed any other nation—must only step forward to take the lead on police reform if our policing model is appropriate to the problem. It was right, for example, for us to do this in Sierra Leone with its British colonial legacy. It was not right in Iraq, which has a legal and policing model on European lines. Beat Bobbies from Hampshire, and even Royal Ulster Constabulary men, concerned with human rights and traffic violations, are of limited use to a paramilitary police force fighting an insurgency. Moreover, police forces on British or

6. *NATO* or the *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* is an international organization for defense collaboration in support of the North Atlantic Treaty, signed in Washington, D.C., on April 4, 1949.
7. *American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies' Standardization Program.*

American lines do not come equipped with the organizational skills to reform an institution, to put systems in place, to build infrastructure, or to manage complex equipment. The correct lead nation for Iraqi policing was Italy. In the future, we should have the courage to decline the lead where it is inappropriate for us. Nor should we use contractors except for service provision (i.e., stores control or range management). Their usefulness is too constrained by factors such as force protection, doubtful motivation, and working practices. Only professionals—whether soldiers or policemen—can produce professionals.

The Role of Civil Police

To rescue the model in southern Iraq the military had to take over the lead in many areas from civil police. The military has now formed teams to take on the lead from the civil police advisers in key areas where the military—in the absence of a paramilitary police organization—is best placed to lead: organization, management, control systems, administration, leadership, paramilitary training, and equipment husbandry. My division was reinforced by Carabinieri[8] and Czech MP[9] contingents, and I was given U.S. IPLOs[10] under command. With the military in the lead in the areas I outlined, the civil police were able better to concentrate on:

- Criminal Intelligence—to set up an integrated system of criminal intelligence databasing and encourage liaison with other Iraqi intelligence agencies;
- Serious Crime Investigation—to address the weakness in felony investigation (the single biggest obstacle to successful prosecution of criminals) and put forward potential investigating officers for advanced training at the police academy;
- Forensic Investigation; and
- Tactical Support Units and SWAT[11] teams.

In these complex operations, the ability to expend resources on things such as security sector reform, rather than having to fight an insurgency, often depends on the degree of consent from the local population. I was able to devote resources to SSR[12] because I was not usually in the position of my counterpart in Baghdad: For the most part, I had consent. Consent is of course a relative, not an absolute concept. It can vary from place to place, and in time. It can be present at governmental level, but not on the ground—or vice versa. It is also not the same as compliance. In the Balkans, we were able to enforce compliance with the Dayton Agreement,[13] for example, through coercion. In southern Iraq, with a divisional AOR[14] five times the size of Kosovo and a population of six million, but with one-quarter of the troops deployed in Kosovo, there was little chance of enforcing compliance.

Consent

Consent therefore matters. But it does not come free; it has to be earned through things like profile, how you operate, how you form partnerships locally. And although it gives you freedom, it can also be a constraint. I did not have the problems of my counterpart in Baghdad, but if I needed to take direct action against an insurgent group, the option

8. The shortened (and common) name for the *Arma dei Carabinieri*, an Italian military corps of the gendarmerie type with police functions, which also serves as the Italian military police. Historically, a *Carabiniere* was a cavalry soldier armed with a carbine. Their motto is *Nei Secoli Fedeli* (Faithful for the Centuries).
9. *Military Police* are the police of a military organization, generally concerning themselves with law enforcement and security.
10. *Interagency Program Liaison Office.*
11. Stands for "Special Weapons and Tactics" or a specialized paramilitary police unit whose members are trained to perform dangerous operations and are typically equipped with heavier armaments than ordinary police officers.
12. *Security Sector Reform.*
13. The *Dayton Agreement* or *Dayton Accords* is the name given to the agreement at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, to end the war in the former Yugoslavia that had gone on for the previous three years, in particular the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14. A military acronym for "Area of Responsibility," referring to the geographic region assigned to a strategic military command.

of a large-scale speculative cordon and search or offensive operation was rarely available. I did no more than half a dozen of these at divisional level, more at lower levels. Usually I had to spend weeks painstakingly assembling intelligence to target particular people or places and then launch a quick and very accurate strike—and then be able to justify my actions in the local media by demonstrating finds of weapons, explosives, or wanted men. Provided one did this, consent would stand.

Nor is consent infinite, and the military can often be the prisoner of other lines of operation. Take the example of essential services in southern Iraq. For two years, the civil side has done little to improve the electricity supply, despite the expenditure of huge amounts of money. Demand has risen fourfold as people buy air conditioners, televisions, and freezers, but generation and transmission have scarcely moved at all. People who see no improvement in their lives as a result of regime change rapidly become disillusioned, and they take it out on the most visible element of the coalition—the uniformed military. The civil side has failed in Bosnia, failed in Kosovo, and is failing again in Iraq. If the U.S. in particular wants its program of exporting democracy to succeed, this has got to change. The military does not do reconstruction, it does CIMIC. So let me go into that a little.

Reconstruction and CIMIC

Governments, NGOs,[15] and major donors have a pretty poor record worldwide on capital reconstruction. What does this best is business. Business will flourish if three things are present:

- Good governance—for example a working legal system, minimal corruption, banking and financial systems, and so on;
- Security; and
- Essential services—there is no point in setting up business if the fax machine does not work.

If the military concentrates on security, the U.N. and the national government concentrates on governance, and the donors concentrate on essential services, we have a chance of setting those conditions. This, in my view, should be the model for the future.

So how does CIMIC fit into this? If one accepts that CIMIC activities are primarily about building and maintaining consent, then CIMIC carries out short-term projects, in line with long-term priorities, to address particular needs usually related to essential services and the creation of employment. However, to carry out CIMIC successfully requires resources. Moreover, for post-conflict reconstruction to work properly, short-term CIMIC and medium-term and long-term reconstruction all need to begin at the same time, and as early as possible. To follow up my earlier example of power generation, refurbishment of the network and the building of new power stations all need to be progressing in parallel with local-point power generation schemes that the military can put in place rapidly. CIMIC will therefore support bodies like DFID[16] or USAID[17] as they contribute to medium- and long-term elements, without getting in their way or taking reconstruction into the military fold. CIMIC must therefore be looked on, and funded as, complementary to—but not as an alternative to—reconstruction.

So how has the experience of operations like Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Iraq changed the British Army? We went into Northern Ireland only six years after the end of National Service.[18] The officers and NCOs[19] were used to a particular way of doing things: very hierarchical, very rigid. Of course we

15. A *non-governmental organization (NGO)* is an organization which is independent from the government. Although the definition can technically include for-profit corporations, the term is generally restricted to social and cultural groups, whose primary goal is not commercial.

16. *DFID* is the *United Kingdom Department for International Development* and its mission is "to promote sustainable development and eliminate world poverty."

17. *USAID* or *United States Agency for International Development* is the U.S. government organization responsible for most non-military foreign aid. An independent federal agency, it receives overall foreign policy guidance from the U.S. Secretary of State and seeks "to advance the political and economic interests of the United States."

had experience in campaigns like Malaya, Borneo, Aden, Cyprus, and Kenya, but these were really like pre-war imperial policing. In Northern Ireland we found ourselves fighting a sophisticated terrorist organization, in our own country, in the glare of the media. At the beginning, we were not very good at it. Fortunately, neither was the IRA. Since then the operational environment has become steadily more complex. We have had to delegate authority to lower levels, get used to uncertainty, and deal with the media. We are used to working with aid agencies, other government departments, and allies. We have learned to use complex equipment, procured for high-intensity fighting in the Cold War, in low-intensity dispersed operations. We have become used to uncertainty, used to cultural asymmetries, and reasonably good at switching from fighting to post-conflict activities.

Lessons Learned

At the same time, we have had to take risks with our warfighting capability, sacrificing our training for the general in order to rehearse for the particular. We spend much time deployed on low-tempo OOTW,[20] and have become unused to living in genuinely field conditions. We have become very subject to the long political screwdriver. Additionally, our government (and high command) has consistently failed to recognize that while embracing a degree of high technology, we should not in doing so abandon all those low-tech skills built up over the years. These are the ones required for the complex operations, just as much as the high-tech equipment. And while one can buy equipment, one has to grow experience. Yet every success is greeted with cuts, and at every turn we are expected to do the same job, in a more complex environment, with less.

Maj. Gen. Jonathon P. Riley is the Commanding General, Multinational Division (South–East) and General Officer Commanding British Forces Iraq. These remarks were delivered on June 18, 2005, at "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces," a conference in Paris, France, sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, the Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (Ministère de la Défense), the Royal United Services Institute, The Association of the United States Army, The Förderkreis Deutsches Heer, The Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy Paris.

18. *National Service* is the name that was given to the system of military conscription in Great Britain between 1949 and 1960.
19. An *NCO* or *non-commissioned officer* is an enlisted member of an armed force who has been delegated leadership or command authority by a commissioned officer. Typically, NCOs serve as administrative personnel, advisors to the officer corps, and as both supervisors of, and advocates for, the lower-ranking enlisted personnel.
20. *Operations Other Than War.*

Heritage Lectures

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The Impact of Peacekeeping and Stability Operations on the Armed Forces

Peter F. Herrly

The uses of armed force by the Western powers since 1990 have drawn the attention of researchers in Europe and the United States to the difficult issues involved in the maintenance of peace and stability. The associated military operations are not "war"—at least in the conventional, declared sense of the term—yet often involve savage and difficult combat. Previous conferences have focused on various aspects of these types of operations: the fundamental nature of armed conflict, the difficulties associated with the reconstruction of states after conflict, and the nature of the all-volunteer Western professional militaries.

This year's meeting investigated another aspect of peacekeeping and stability operations: the impact of these operations upon the armed forces that must conduct them. The history of such operations over many decades demonstrates that their complexity and lack of clarity on the ground poses serious and often confusing issues for the soldiers charged with their prosecution. These impacts surface in areas as disparate as military effectiveness and doctrine, interpretations of international law and the law of warfare, the sociology and psychology of armed forces, and the relations between armed forces and their parent populations.

Operations Other Than War

To keynote the 2005 conference, Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold of the Royal United Services Institute first noted how "not war-fighting" operations vary in intensity, duration, environment, risk and lethality, involvement with the civilian population, acceptance

Talking Points

- In a vicious operational environment, caring for the enemy, perhaps while extracting intelligence, demands high-quality professionalism. Playing it off the cuff is not the answer. Forces of democracies must do better.
- Well-chosen historical examples can yield great insights on current operations, especially in considering the varying impacts of operating in differing cultures and the complexities for military personnel found in dealing with other actors as opposed to enemy armies.
- Overall, while legal considerations are not an unbearable restraint if paid sufficient and careful consideration, issues of law establish tight boundaries which commanders neglect at peril to themselves and their mission.
- Pacifism presents a dangerous obstacle to European efforts, and American activism in the Middle East has not been well received. If matters are to improve, there is a need for a more pragmatic United States.

This paper, in its entirety, can be found at:
www.heritage.org/research/nationalsecurity/hl915.cfm

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and support at home, and the suitability and flexibility of rules of engagement.[1]

The anomaly faced by the United States and partners in a coalition, he continued, is that while victory in the sense of defeating the enemy's military power is comparatively easily gained, broader campaign aims—for instance, to create a self-sustaining pluralistic democracy in Iraq—may be not only more challenging than the military aim, but also best served by the nature of preceding military operations.

"As for the impact on the soldiers, sailors and airmen who undertake these non–war-fighting operations," said Admiral Cobbold,

> the risks are very real, and mean that a career in the Armed Forces is now markedly different from one in the Cold War, where lethal operations were exceptional, and peace-keeping implied that there was a peace to keep…. Physical injuries are not the only ones that debilitate. Psychological trauma can lead to mental injuries [like] Post Traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD.

These operations affect recruiting, affected by public perceptions of the operations and by feedback from the front line:

> Fighting itself does not seem to damage recruiting, rather it is the shadowy accompaniment. If the fighting force is strong up the chain of command and back into the Ministries of Defense, if the politicians support and sustain the troops both morally and materially, then damage will be little. If the community as a whole becomes detached from the operations and if politicians are seen to have behaved opportunistically, then trouble will be close behind….

Reservists are increasingly drawn into peace-support operations. This reliance stresses employers and reservists alike. "Reservists are part-timers, ready to do their bit when the devil rides. But when the devil is riding in many places around the world, every month of the year, for years on end, the rationale of being a reservist can weaken." Moreover, the admiral pointed out, reservists are not so deeply integrated into the military structure as regulars, and therefore prone to unexpected lapses. Their recruitment and retention can be vulnerable.

The professionalism of forces frequently involved with peace-support operations merits consideration. On the one hand, such operations build battle-readiness that can aid survival in theater. However, servicemen and women returning from deployments have some skill sets honed to a fine edge, while others have regressed. A mass of lessons must be identified and turned round with speed so that they can be learned in theater and the home base. But the enemy also learns lessons fast, so the command chain must be alert to the dangers of learning lessons relevant to the "last war," even if it is only a few days ago. This demands tactical and doctrinal agility of a high order.

Furthermore, military activity is but one strand that has to be integrated into the conduct of the overall campaign. The admiral noted that the demands for comprehensive training are higher for these operations than for war-fighting, particularly as the severity of extreme peace-support operations can equal, and even exceed, those of much war-fighting. The diversity of tasks, and sometimes their unexpected nature, means that the training manuals cannot cope with every eventuality. This in turn means that junior officers and NCOs may have to cope with situations drawing on inculcated values gained through education rather than procedures and tactics learned in training. Education takes time and has to be nurtured. "Growing education" is a big concept, dependent on national education systems and the setting and maintaining of recruiting standards.

The deeply regrettable incidents at Abu Ghraib, Camp Bread Basket, and Guantanamo cast a long shadow. The causes: Young people were put in positions of authority and sensitivity for which they were ill-prepared or underqualified. Others, more mature and higher in command, did not do well

1. See Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold, "The Effects of Operations Other Than War-Fighting on the Participants," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 894, August 19, 2005 (delivered June 18, 2005).

either. In a vicious operational environment, caring for the enemy, perhaps while extracting intelligence from them, demands high-quality professionalism. Playing it off the cuff is not the answer. Forces of democracies must do better.

In addition to training, effective support of the front line is essential. Governments must ensure that equipment works and is capable enough for the tasks in hand—always. Stores must be available in the quantity required, when required, wherever required. Shortfalls in support can fester, and the morale of deployed forces can swing in large oscillations with little notice and with little cause.

The media, ubiquitous and "fearless" in the pursuit of viewing and circulation figures, also have a vital role in monitoring good governance. They can drum up effective pressure on governments when support for the front line seems sloppy. However, inaccurate reporting may affect servicepeople in a negative fashion. Those in the front line may see the media output and react to it, perhaps giving excess credence to the journalists' wisdom. Families, upset by pessimistic forecasts and damning assessments, or weakened in resolve by community response to the output, may pass on their doubts to the front line.

To conclude, Admiral Cobbold reinforced what a multifaceted and intermeshed subject this is, noting that we live in a globalized world where the struggles are hugely asymmetric. Stability and peacekeeping operations come in many shapes and sizes, with characteristics prone to change rapidly; they are conducted by a vast array of actors, most of whom have discrete and not necessarily overt agendas, and they resist efforts to be coordinated. "Service-people…are ordinary people whom we ask to do extraordinary tasks. We, in the narrow and wider defense communities of democracies, need to be with them and sustain them, lest their successes are despite us, and their failures because of us."

Western Military Interventions in Context

Dr. Guillaume Piketty, Directeur de Recherche, Centre d'Histoire de Sciences Po, introduced the panel entitled "'Strangers in Strange Lands'? The Historical Context of Western Military Interventions." The changing nature of conflict in the past several decades has involved the Western world in a series of operations aimed at keeping the peace or, more problematically, maintaining "stability" in the search of a peace to maintain. Though these operations are very removed from the objectives and spirit of military enterprises associated with the previous era of colonialism, they still necessarily involve soldiers from one culture engaged in operations involving combat conducted in the midst of a very different culture.

Moreover, most often, these operations are faced with shadowy enemies or quasi-enemies whose only viable military options are those associated with guerrilla warfare. Thus, in discussing the impact of these stability operations upon the armies that conduct them, well-chosen historical examples can yield great insights on current operations, especially in considering the varying impacts of operating in differing cultures and the complexities for military personnel found in dealing with other actors as opposed to enemy armies.

In his introduction, Dr. Piketty focused on two aspects of peacekeeping as important today as during past operations: the nature of the individual soldier and the challenge of concluding such operations. He noted that the question of a soldier's identity—whether professional, volunteer, or recruited—gives insight into motivations. What is his sense of "just" or "unjust" war? Cultural restraints influence that identity.

The way in which an occupying force conducts its operations also has repercussions on the individual. Armies must combat resistance without replacing the local police. There appears to be an historical tendency to resort to brutal methods of control such as executions, aggression against civilians, and torture. When tolerated or employed by an army, these methods affect the individual. In peacekeeping operations, soldiers are confronted with a paradox: They are trained for warfare but must react passively.

These complexities point to the issue of training for stability and peacekeeping operations. As in the past, instructional methods must be vigorously invented and constantly adapted. Pressures from

journalistic, political, and legal forces "back home" complicate the situation.

Dr. Piketty next addressed withdrawing from and concluding stability operations. As in the historical cases presented by the panelists, modern peacekeeping troops confront the challenge of reinsertion to their respective societies. Returning soldiers cope with psychological consequences and sometimes a sense of guilt. Modern peacekeepers must find a place in a world that increasingly turns a blind eye to violence, where conflicts are "humanitarian" and bombardments "surgical strikes."

Dr. Piketty asserted that societal reaction to returnees merits attention as well. How are the mutilated, imprisoned, and injured received? The moral economy to which soldiers return determines to what extent they are accepted or "marginalized and rejected." Moral economy also defines the collective mindset towards representation and memorial of these operations.

Upon establishing the presence of these issues, equally challenging today as they have been historically, Dr. Piketty turned the discussion over to the panelists.

The historical perspective offered by the participants of Panel I was striking in its relevance and disturbingly familiar insights. Professor of History at Texas A&M University Brian Linn's evocation of the almost completely forgotten American counterinsurgency in the Philippines, for example, seems eerily reminiscent of events in Iraq since 2003.[2] Professor Linn portrayed the ease of the American conquest in 1898, the best benevolent intentions of the U.S. President, and the swift descent into a bitter guerrilla war where the insurgents used a variety of tactics including the 1900 equivalent of suicide bombers (aimed as much at sabotaging U.S.-led initiatives to improve the daily lives of Filipinos as they were at ensuring a steady stream of American casualties to weaken U.S. domestic support for the war).

The Philippine Insurrection also saw marked improvement in the initiative of small-unit leaders in the U.S. Army, the crucial nature of the effort to recruit and field Filipino troops and police able to secure their own country, and the drift by a few American military into the abuses of torture and execution. Also convincingly laid out was how in three to four difficult years the Army managed to turn the corner, so much so that the combat actions from 1902 onwards were more an intra-Filipino fight.

Another provocative insight was how the Army managed what would now be termed its after-action review process. The Army consciously chose to exclude lessons learned from the Philippine conflict. While somewhat understandable in view of the World War I conflict on the horizon, this left the U.S. Army with a void of baseline doctrine for the many counterinsurgencies that would punctuate its next century of existence. This was similar to the post–Vietnam War era, when the Army steadfastly turned its back on its counterinsurgency experience in order to focus exclusively on the challenge of conventional combat.

Claude d'Abzac Epezy and Pierre Journoud, Centre d'études d'histoire de la Défense (CEHD), discussed the aftermath of the war in Indochina (1946–1964) and its subsequent impact on French Army doctrine and organization in Algeria and later. The French Army experience in Indochina led to a focus on counter-revolutionary warfare—which, when transposed into the Algerian War context, led some of the French Army onto dangerous paths. That is, the necessity to influence the press and other aspects of the struggle over "information operations" inevitably led some of the French Army to move outside the military sphere. The results included the attempted coup of 1962. Afterwards, the French Army completely rejected concepts and tactics developed in these two wars, some of which in the military sphere were innovative and acceptable. But "the baby was thrown out with the bathwater."

Colonel David Benest, Defense Leadership and Management Center, United Kingdom, provided a third perspective by looking at the British experi-

2. See Brian McAllister Linn, "The Impact of the Imperial Wars (1898–1907) on the U.S. Army," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 908, November 14, 2005 (delivered June 18, 2005).

ence over the last century with stability operations, including a domestic operation with overtones of such, namely Northern Ireland. Colonel Benest focused on 1916 onwards and described the various waves and evolution of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) insurgency and the British responses.

As context for these operations, Colonel Benest reminded the conference that Britain had been involved in almost continuous counterinsurgency operations throughout the 20th century, most notably in South Africa, Palestine, Mesopotamia (Iraq), India, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo, and Aden. And throughout the Northern Ireland campaign that began in 1969, the British were also involved in high-intensity conflicts in the Falklands, the Gulf War, and Operations Iraqi Freedom (not to forget Korea and Suez in the 1950s.) His remarks focused on several major observations.

- The first is how operations in Northern Ireland from 1969–1999 evolved from what can be referred to as a "colonial" strategy to a "forensic" and surgical use of force.
- The second is how rules of engagement evolved. The best solution that presented itself was the guidance to soldiers given in the "Yellow Card," which has more or less stood the test of time and is still in use in Basra today. In essence, a soldier was permitted to use lethal force only where life had been or was about to be endangered and there was no other means of preventing further loss of life.
- The third concerns the crucial role that technology has played, both in the hands of the terrorist and as a countermeasure to terrorist attacks. One of the earliest uses of technology in the cause of Irish Republicanism can be traced to the submarine built in the U.S.A. in 1881, the "Fenian Ram" designed for attacks on British ships. The IRA also pioneered the vehicle-borne IED—hence the "VBIED" so common in Iraq today, together with "barrack buster" mortars, off-route mines, command wire-initiated IEDs (CWIEDs), and under-vehicle IEDs (UVIEDs). The Security Forces, equally, have evolved countermeasures such as specialist search and a range of non-lethal capabilities.
- The fourth notes the human dimension to this campaign. Casualties rose to over 3,700, of whom 2,050 were civilian. The scale of deployment is also noteworthy, with more troops deployed even today than in Iraq and Afghanistan combined. Human intelligence has been key to success. The media have been a continuous influence. Relations between the Armed Forces and Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) were not always as cordial as might have been expected after such a long period of cooperation, not least over issues such as tactics—the armed forces seeking unpredictability when the police needed routine. Finally, the culture of the Northern Irish had to be understood.

In conclusion, the British experience of Northern Ireland can be summarized as a very long and painful one. It has enshrined a combination of both high- and low-intensity conflict and "nation building." Those who insist that "there is no military solution" are of course merely stating the blindingly obvious, as could be said of any war at any time. On an optimistic note, the IRA cease-fire of July 1997 has held. But, pessimistically, Colonel Benest noted that this amounts to the 10th cease-fire since 1916.

The Clash of Cultures

From this historical foundation, the discussion shifted to the sociological perspective. The impact of peacekeeping and stability operations upon the sociology of the armies can vary from positive (for instance, the increased cooperation and mutual understanding among allied armies who participated in Balkans stability operations after 1995) to destabilizing, depending of course on the nature and intensity of the operations. The varying sociological and psychological impacts—anticipated and actual—are seen in areas as diverse as the impact upon military leadership, issues of recruiting and retention, and effects on military families.

Roland Marchal, Chargé de recherche at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), moderated a panel on "The Clash of Cultures: Sociological Perspectives" where three national views each illustrated a different aspect of

the impact of stability operations on Western armies and their parent populations.

In the case of Germany, Professor Jörn Thiessen, Leiter des Sozialwissenschaftlichen Instituts der Bundeswehr in Strausberg, addressed the implications for the Bundeswehr and its linkages with the German people, given the recent evolution towards a professional, power-projection military in Germany and the presence of German troops in the Balkans, Somalia, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Professor Thiessen presented the latest in polling data compiled by his organization. Concerning the relationship between the German Army and the German people, the various overseas operations of the German Army have left a rather strong acceptance of stability operations on the "soft" or humanitarian end of the scale, but there is as yet scant support for operations on the "combat" side of the scale.

Colonel (Retired) André Thièblemont, ethnosociologist, discussed the cultural, sociopolitical, and operational impacts of what the French Army often calls "external" operations, including upon the cohesion of the Army itself, especially its regimental system. Like Germany, the positive images and publicity that have followed French Army operations in the Balkans and elsewhere have substantially enhanced the image of the French Army in France. This has also contributed to the improvement of a certain ability "on the ground" on the part of young leaders.

Colonel Thièblemont's concerns stem from the way the French Army organizes its deployments, which he sees as producing the following negative effects:

- A marked decline in regimental cohesion, owing to the effects of four-month deployments and "mixing and matching" to create deployable units, and
- A decreasing focus on tasks associated with direct ground combat. This is in part the fault of the "Yellow Card" system of over-onerous rules of engagement.

Dr. Lenny Wong, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, looked at certain emerging principal impacts of current stability operations on the U.S. Army. Specifically, he has been studying the effects on operations in Afghanistan and Iraq on the U.S. Army's junior leaders and the task of developing adaptive leaders. Dr. Wong quoted President George W. Bush to say:

> Building a 21st century military will require more than new weapons. It will also require a renewed spirit of innovation in our officer corps. We cannot transform our military using old weapons or plans. Nor can we do it with an old bureaucratic mindset that frustrates the creativity and entrepreneurship that a 21st century military will need.

In his analysis of this challenge, Dr. Wong noted that the development of adaptive leaders is characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity. Today's soldiers are faced with many roles, including warrior, peacekeeper, engineer, mayor, and friend. These roles must be assumed in the face of a complex environment where cultural differences, warfare, and change produce numerous obstacles. When top-down guidance is limited to providing simply task and purpose, according to Dr. Wong's extensive recent field research, the result seems to be that junior leaders become confident, adaptive, flexible, innovative, and creative.

Impact of Law and Media

Next, the panel on "Operations on 'Complex Terrain': The Law and the Media" explored the context of stability operations in 2005, which operate within a myriad of legal constraints and in the modern "hyper-mediatized" environment. During the past decades, the interventions by major Western nations have witnessed an increasing involvement in planning and execution by staff lawyers and public affairs specialists. This undeniable growth in the importance and visibility of these heretofore rather marginal actors on military staffs reflects the growing importance of how these interventions are perceived by the populations of the intervening powers, the nations whose stability is being sought, and the "onlookers" (other nations in the world).

Opinions among the conferees differed as to the impact of legal operations. All agreed that today's military leaders are "joined at the hip" to lawyers: Major General Jonathon Riley had four lawyers of his own in his multinational division headquarters

in southern Iraq during the past year; his brigade commanders, one each. Dr. James Carafano stated, however, that the broad legal issues are settled: It is a function of executing within established boundaries. He did point out three challenges that exist in this area: which law applies among coalition partners; issues concerning non-lethal weapons; and the increased role of the private sector. General Riley pointed out that there often arises the question of which law applies as between host nation and intervening nation.

Overall, while it is clear that if they are paid sufficient and careful consideration, legal considerations do not constitute an unbearable constraint, issues of law nevertheless establish tight boundaries which commanders neglect at peril to themselves and their mission.

In the realm of media relations, the discussion centered around how the media observe (and perceive) stability operations and what are the impacts of planning and operating in the glare of modern jurisprudence and the modern media.

Laurent Boussié, France 2 war correspondent of much experience, shared his impressions of how his profession is evolving. According to his own experience, not much progress has been made in media coverage of these kinds of operations. The media scene itself has become confused. Television has less influence; what it means to be objective has changed (there is more pressure to show "how war really is," a lot of it from the impact of the Arab news media).

The West's militaries have tried to become more sophisticated about the press, but it is also true that they would like in a certain way to shape its coverage. At the same time, the press in certain countries tends to have a "jump on the same bandwagon" approach. In short, M. Boussié presented a complex picture, which undoubtedly complicates the lives of armies on the ground.

Isabelle Mariani of the French Conseil Superior de l'Audiovisuel then spoke from the government regulatory perspective. She laid out the reasons why the prospects of regulatory agencies actually controlling and/or moderating media behavior are increasingly very slim. In discussing these issues in 1985, French President François Mittérand said that liberty of the press is inalienable, but the challenge lies in how to organize this liberty. During the 20th century, law in France was preoccupied with how to regulate the press in time of war, but the escalating onslaught of non-press media has been progressively making any such regulation more and more problematic.

Dr. Carafano rejoined that while the media are an insoluble problem in stability operations, it might be overblown. When all is said and done, history shows that the media follow events, he maintained. The conferees then drew a connection between the history of the French Army in Algeria and the interaction of the military with the media in current operations: If military leaders are tempted by the dynamic of winning an "information campaign" to deal on a higher order of effectiveness with the media, this may lead them on to dangerous (political) ground.

Military and Political Science

In the final panel, "'Boots on the Ground': Perspectives in Military and Political Science," Frédéric Charillon, Director of the French Ministry of Defense's Center for Social Studies in Defense, moderated a wide-ranging series of presentations and spirited discussion.

Professor Christopher Coker talked about the impact of today's military mission and environment upon the soldier. He explored the evolution of concepts of honor, dignity, and sacrifice within the context of modern Western societies that increasingly impose other norms that undercut or are even antithetical to the old norms of honor (which stemmed from the individual's place in the regiment and society). Dignity came from one's own self traditionally, but increasingly society tries to codify dignity.

This has all crystallized around the issue of trauma, which seems to be substantially on the rise among Western militaries even as the actual difficulties of their operations to maintain peace and stability are less onerous in terms of numbers of casualties than those of all-out war. Trauma is on the rise because death is harder to define as meaningful anymore and stoicism in the West is in decline.

Thus, Western militaries confronted with the necessity of stability operations are actually faced with an acute sort of crisis: The very motives that drive them to these interventions are less and less motivating for the soldiers who must conduct them. This is exacerbated by the differences in values and norms between intervening countries and their militaries and the societies in which they are intervening. It is dangerous to try to impose one's own norms on another culture, and it is certainly not something that intrinsically motivates soldiers to sacrifice, especially with the excessive contractual perspective of today's service.

Dr. Douglas Johnson, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, then passed to another impact of stability operations on the military: their impact on doctrine and values. Taking the case of the U.S. Army, he traced its extensive history of stability operations from 1848 to the present. He stressed that one of the major impacts of such operations in the 19th century was that after the post–Civil War occupation of the American South, there arose a strong legal and doctrinal bias against soldiers performing police duties. This prohibition remained a strong constant throughout the 20th century, with various operational implications. For instance, in the Balkans during the 1990s, the Army was constantly searching for someone, some agency, to take the lead on policing.

In the 21st century, Dr. Johnson pointed out, the impacts of current action in Afghanistan and Iraq seem to be causing a doctrinal ferment. Operational requirements on the ground are causing commanders to look for ways to solve policing problems, and since doctrine is not intended as a straitjacket for commanders, they are doing so with some energy. But according to Dr. Johnson's reading of the current evolution of Army and joint doctrine, the major thrust is still to define stability operations in a much wider context than purely military (as opposed to expanding the military's doctrinal role). In fact, the U.S. military as a whole seems to be restating its belief that such operations must be a responsibility of government as a whole, working in a truly effective way at the interagency level.

Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlo Cabigioso, who commanded NATO forces in Kosovo and served as adviser to the Italian forces in Iraq, looked at these operations from the multinational point of view, because in the current environment, they are and will be inevitably conducted by coalitions. This imperative has major effects on the Western militaries. For instance, a principal value of NATO clearly lies in its long history of working out common procedures, common understanding, and common phrases. These are of inestimable value even—or especially—when operating with non-NATO partners.

Nevertheless, these coalition efforts are not without strain. When dealing with a mixture of forces, one must consider their background, culture, and history. Everyone wants respect for their culture, yet friction often arises—for instance, between Latin and "Anglo" cultures—with various feelings of superiority. In consequence, operational planners need to consider all national linkages. This complicates planning and is even more complex in the current operational climate, where psychological operations to disrupt the cohesion of an adversary are increasingly important. As for relations with the media, in his opinion, they have evolved; 15 years ago, commanders were afraid to talk to journalists, while today they are trained to do so (with a good rule to always tell the truth or not speak at all.)

Stability operations are not easy. They require continuous and sophisticated planning against uncertainty, a strong focus on intelligence and prevention, and truly multinational staffs, with a very broad-based appreciation of the interagency process and requirements.

Jean-Yves Haine, research fellow for European security at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), then directed the discussion to yet another perspective: that of organization and capability at the level of Europe and between Europe and the U.S. He noted that operations in the 1990s had revealed shortcomings in the overall European capacity to act effectively; examples included the traumas of the Balkans and Rwanda.

Kosovo became a turning point in trans-Atlantic relations. The gap in military capabilities along with the way in which the U.S. handled the war led

to the failure of coalition warfare. The endless political talk that accompanied this failure nearly killed NATO, and the result was that NATO was forced to reduce the number of participating nations.

Coalition warfare met with further difficulties between the U.S. and Europe regarding the response to September 11. While the U.S. has the luxury of exporting the fight, Europe does not have that option as terrorists are living there already and are harder to track. In addition, the notion of a "preemptive strike" does not exist for European militaries; they prefer using "preventive engagement" instead. Therefore, the temptation to take action in Iraq was greater for the U.S. than it was for Europe.

Professor Haine next examined the nature of European strategy as it has emerged. Composed of an inward-looking group of states, Europe's institutions remain process-oriented, and in the parliament there is a lack of trust between member states. Due to the risk-aversion factor, European strategy tends to lack capabilities, favoring quick-in, quick-out operations—those that are short-term, regulated by the UN, which result in peacekeeping troops taking over, such as with Africa.

Europe faces challenges including the end of conscription, the end of territorial defense, and the coordination of transformation efforts. A more difficult challenge to overcome is the growing opinion that the use of force is nearly unacceptable. Pacifism presents a dangerous obstacle to European efforts, and American activism in the Middle East has not been well received. If matters are to improve, there is a need for a more pragmatic United States. What is more, Europe is learning through trial and error, a process that is taking too long. This is likely to result in the stagnation of the current situation for another five to 10 years.

Major General Jonathon Riley, British Army, just-returned commander of the multinational division headquartered in Basra, presented a commander's view, informed by his service in Northern Ireland, Iraq, Sierra Leone, and the Balkans.[3] He insisted, first of all, that every level of command must add value to an operation and should be removed if it does not.

The divisional level is the lowest level at which deep, close, and rear operations are organized and the lowest level that plans and conducts operations simultaneously. Thus, the divisional level of command concerns itself with a variety of tasks: planning, resourcing, and coordinating local security forces; surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, and targeting; divisional-level joint operations; contingency plans; media operations; and coordination with higher political and military authorities in theatre and at home.

These complexities raise the issue of training for the "worst case." For the British Army at least, the collective training regime is based on the maxim that war-fighting is the most demanding activity and all other operations are seen as "stepping down." War-fighting is undoubtedly highly demanding, but counterinsurgency and operations other than war are arguably more complex and just as demanding in other ways. "And at the point of contact, a fight is a fight whether in down-town Belfast, Al Amarah, or Wireless Ridge." War-fighting requires weapon systems that deliver destructive effect; counterinsurgency and operations other than war require intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance systems of greater precision. War-fighting intelligence training does little to prepare staffs for the fusion challenges of counterinsurgency operations.

The flexibility required of commanders at all levels in counterinsurgency is also arguably greater. At its most intense, counterinsurgency may require any commander, even quite a junior one, to coordinate air, aviation, indirect-fire, and organic direct-fire weapons in a battlespace in which humanitarian operations, coordination with non-governmental organizations and other government departments, and security-sector reform tasks continue at the same time. This level is rarely practiced during collective training.

Drawing on experience in Iraq and the Balkans, General Riley then directed his focus to multina-

3. See Major General Jonathon P. Riley, "Boots on the Ground: The Impact of Stability Operations on the Armies That Must Conduct Them," Heritage Foundation *Lecture* No. 893, August 8, 2005 (delivered June 18, 2005).

tional operations. He warned that in coalitions, one must be aware of national caveats and "[so-called] red cards."

> In Iraq in particular, I had to be careful never to issue an order unless I had first established that it could be obeyed. This paid off over the election period when requests for aviation and medical assistance, referred to Rome and The Hague, came back with a positive response in the truly remarkable time of 10 minutes. I could rarely get an answer from my own country in less than 10 days.

However, in some ways, coalitions are more effective than established alliances. Alliances have hard-wired, permanent structures with all the attendant bureaucracy, and all members have equal say. Coalitions have ad-hoc structures, made for the moment, and the amount of influence is directly proportional to the size of the contribution. It is a partnership, but a partnership of unequals where decision-making is driven by the powerful.

Major General Riley found that the best solution is often a coalition centered around alliance members. In this way, the military effectiveness will be partly a reflection of mutual trust and familiarity, partly a reflection of the longer-term development of common doctrine and procedures, and partly a function of tempo. On an operation where tempo is low and risk is also low, multinationality can go to a low level. There is time to consult national capitals and respect red cards in a way that is not possible on high-tempo, war-fighting operations. But it should not be supposed that this degree of multinationality can be regarded as normal or acceptable in high-tempo operations.

Next, General Riley turned to some of the challenges of security-sector reform. Reforming a broken army is challenging but can readily be tackled by an organized military force. Some specialist teams are needed for specialist functions, but in general, everyone can take part in it. It does not require special training; it is often a matter of reproducing oneself.

Police reform is another matter. In southern Iraq, Britain stepped forward to take the lead in three of the four provinces. The fourth was taken by Italy. The British model was failing in Iraq until rescued by the military and the Italians. Great Britain—or, indeed, any other nation—must step forward to take the lead on police reform only if our policing model is appropriate to the problem. It was not right in Iraq, which has a legal and policing model on continental European lines. Moreover, police forces on British or American lines do not come equipped with the organizational skills to reform an institution, to put systems in place, to build infrastructure, to manage complex equipment. The correct lead nation for Iraqi policing was Italy. Contractor use should be limited as their usefulness is too constrained by factors such as force protection, doubtful motivation, and working practices. Only professionals, whether soldiers or policemen, can produce professionals.

In complex operations, the ability to expend resources on things like security-sector reform, rather than have to fight an insurgency, often depends on the degree of consent from the local population. Consent is of course a relative, not an absolute, concept. It can vary from place to place, and in time. It can be present at governmental level but not on the ground, or vice versa. It is also not the same as compliance: enforceable through coercion. Consent therefore matters, but it does not come free; it has to be earned through things like profile, how you operate, how you form partnerships locally. And although it gives you freedom, it can also be a constraint, as offensive operations must be justified to the people and the press for consent to stand.

Nor is consent infinite, and the military can often be the prisoner of other lines of operation. General Riley cited southern Iraq:

> For two years, the civil side has done nothing to improve the electricity supply. Demand has risen fourfold; but generation and transmission have scarcely moved at all. People who see no improvement in their lives as a result of regime change rapidly become disillusioned, and they take it out on the most visible element of the coalition—the uniformed military. The civil side has failed in Bosnia, failed in Kosovo, and is failing again in Iraq. If the US in particular wants its

> programme of exporting democracy to succeed, this has got to change.

General Riley concluded by asking how the experience of operations like Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, and Iraq has changed the British Army:

> Britain went into Northern Ireland only six years after the end of National Service. The officers and NCOs were used to a hierarchal, rigid way of doing things. Of course we had experience of campaigns like Malaya, Borneo, Aden, Cyprus and Kenya, but these were really a continuum pre-war Imperial Policing. In Northern Ireland British forces found themselves fighting a sophisticated terrorist organization, in their own country, in the glare of the media. At the beginning, neither side was very good at it. Since then the operational environment has become steadily more complex. They had to delegate authority to lower levels, get used to uncertainty, and deal with the media. They now work with aid agencies, other government departments and allies. Complex equipment is used, procured for high-intensity fighting in the Cold War, in low-intensity dispersed operations. They have become used to uncertainty, used to cultural asymmetries, and reasonably good at switching from fighting to post-conflict activities. At the same time risks were taken with war-fighting capability, sacrificing our training for the general in order to rehearse for the particular. Forces have become very subject to the long political screwdriver. And the British government (and high command) has consistently failed to recognize that while embracing a degree of high technology, low-tech skills built up over the years should not be abandoned. These are the ones required for the complex operations just as much as the high-tech equipment, and while one can buy equipment, one has to grow experience. Yet every success is greeted with cuts, and at every turn we are expected to do the same job, in a more complex environment, with less people.

—Peter F. Herrly, Colonel, U.S. Army (Retired), is the President of Herrly Group, an international consulting and executive development firm. The foregoing is a summary of the proceedings of a conference on "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces," held in Paris, France, on June 17–18, 2005, and sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, the Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (Ministère de la Défense), the Royal United Services Institute, the Association of the United States Army, the Förderkreis Deutsches Heer, The Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy Paris.

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The Effects of Operations Other Than War-fighting on the Participants

Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold

The nature of operations that are not war-fighting vary hugely, not only in their characteristics, but also in their purpose. They vary in intensity, timing, the variety of actors who take part, geographic spread, duration, the relationship to the preceding or succeeding war-fighting, which services are involved and which environment—land, sea, or air in varying combinations (in land alone the environments could include urban, mountain, desert, jungle, and more)—the size, the risk and lethality, proximity to and involvement with the civilian population in theatre, whether single nation or multinational, acceptance and support at home, and the Rules of Engagement and their suitability and flexibility for the prevailing situations. The nature of operations will change radically as will the rate of change. The purposes may range from coercion, to countering terrorism or insurgency, to peacekeeping or peace enforcement, to support for reconstruction and humanitarian operations—maybe just holding the ring whilst the politicians and diplomats dance.

The difference between these operations that somehow are not war-fighting and what is recognized as war-fighting is rather arcane. It is a matter largely of public statements and commensurate action, in starting and finishing. It is a different difference than that between war, which when declared has a legal nature, and everything else. Thus war can be different from war-fighting. In Iraq in March 2003, it was clear when the war-fighting started—more or less—but did it finish when the coalition took control of Baghdad on April 10, 2003, or when

Talking Points

- A career in the Armed Forces is now markedly different from one in the Cold War, where lethal operations were exceptional, and peacekeeping implied that there was a peace to keep.
- Counter-insurgency often is more lethal than war-fighting, with greater casualties and trauma to troops.
- Fighting rapidly adapting enemies demands tactical and doctrinal agility of a high order that puts a heavy load on the training organization. Experience repeatedly underlines the need to be able to introduce new capabilities at short notice.
- The actions of a few bad apples do stain the reputations of the whole barrel, and weaken the link between the deployed forces and the home communities. This can damage morale. But constraints have to clearly allow the job to be done effectively. Failure to achieve this can also damage morale.

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President Bush made his victory speech on board the USS *Lincoln* on May 2? If it is the latter, then there were plenty of stabilization operations taking place during war-fighting, not to mention the hiatus after April 10 when little happened.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, we all got used to the phrase "the 3-block war." Often ascribed to the former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Chuck Krulak, it is taken to mean that within a divisional area, the commander may face the need simultaneously to fight, to stabilize, and to provide humanitarian assistance. So war-fighting may not be so different from operations that are not war-fighting. Let us take two examples:

First, in Operation Iraqi Freedom, lasting 43 days, the U.S. Marines lost 40 killed; during the swift re-taking of Fallujah in November 2004, they lost 70 killed. So war is not necessarily more lethal. Perhaps Fallujah represented a swoop from counter-insurgency back into war-fighting and then out again.

Second, during an ambush outside Al-Amara on May 14, 2004, Private Johnson Beharry of the Princess of Wales' Royal Regiment displayed exceptional courage in the face of the enemy, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross, the first to be awarded since the Falklands War. As around that time there were 28 awards for gallantry to Beharry's battalion alone, the counter-insurgency was as intense, or more, than war. Even in the comparatively lower intensity currently prevalent in southeastern Iraq, the troops must remain ready to escalate to war-fighting at very short notice.

The anomaly faced by the United States and partners in a coalition is that in the sorts of war that are being fought, victory in the sense of defeating the enemy's military power is comparatively easily gained. It may not always be so—probably it won't—but that's another matter. The overall campaign aim in Iraq—to create a self-sustaining pluralistic democracy—was not only more challenging than the limited military aim, but was arguably not best served by the nature of the military operations.

The U.S., and perhaps Britain, were lulled into a sense of false security by the first Gulf War. There, the casualties taken in direct combat by the 500,000 U.S. military deployed were less than those same soldiers would have incurred had they remained in their barracks in the U.S. After financial contributions by non-fighting allies had been taken into account, the U.S. made a slight contingency profit, and of course President Bush Senior's popularity rose, for a while. War evidently was safer than peace, and financially and politically sound. Ironically, as the U.S., Britain, and other allies remain enmeshed in Iraq, that adage, trite in its origins, may still be painfully true.

I am not an enthusiast for definitions. Definitions change. The terror we try to counter today is very different from the prototype started in France in 1793. I believe it changed again after September 11, 2001. Moreover, the terrorists operating in Ireland between 1969 and 1999—often hailed as freedom fighters, not only by Irish Republicans but also in the U.S.—were different from Islamic terrorists operating under the al-Qaeda franchise. One size does not fit all terrorists. Nor does one tag fit all those opposing the coalition in Iraq today. Nor is Iraq the only operation going on today, nor is the U.S. involved in all of them.

From all this, my first deduction is that one needs to be wary of generalizing, and especially of applying such generalizations to future operations. Though I will be guilty of generalizing myself, I have kept in mind diverse operations that are not exemplified. Chief of these is the U.N. peacekeeping tragedy in Rwanda in 1994, that was so deeply shaming.

I now would like to develop some thoughts on how this hotch potch of operations that are not war-fighting, affect the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who undertake them.

Casualties Physical and Psychological

In these operations, the participants can get killed, injured, or otherwise damaged. The risks are very real, and mean that a career in the Armed Forces is now markedly different from one in the Cold War, where lethal operations were exceptional, and peacekeeping implied that there was a peace to keep. There were a number of valid exceptions, but the more lethal examples—Korea, Vietnam, Falklands—were by consensus war-fighting.

The casualty figures incurred by the U.S. and U.K. in Iraq during and after the war-fighting are instructive:

Table 1 HL 894

Casualties During and After War-fighting

	Killed	Wounded	Numbers serving
U.S. War-fighting	65	542	250,000
U.S. Post-War	1,619	11,806	
U.K. War-fighting	33	155	43,000
U.K. Post-War	56	2,800	8,500

By way of yardsticks, during the 1982 Falklands War, the U.K. had 255 killed and many more injured. Operations after the war were conventional peacekeeping, and direct combat casualties did not occur. During the Northern Ireland emergency, 452 members of the U.K. armed forces were killed, with 957 killed when the Northern Ireland dedicated forces are included (e.g., the Northern Ireland Territorial Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary, and Ulster Defense Regiment). In Vietnam, the U.S. lost 58,226 killed, and 153,303 injured, out of a maximum deployment of 550,000, whilst Australia lost 501 killed, and 3,131 injured, out of 47,000 maximum deployed.

Those that get killed are gone, and we hope not forgotten. Many of the injured stay in the services; others go either from choice or through disability. The injuries of those that stay may have an effect beyond those who are themselves injured. I believe this effect will vary from a totemic source of pride to being an omen of danger and uncertainty. Injured soldiers who go home will have an effect on the communities and this will feed back to soldiers still at the front. Physical injuries are not the only ones that debilitate. Psychological trauma can lead to mental injuries, often but not exclusively Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder or PTSD. The name is quite new, but the condition is not; something like it used to be called shell-shock, lack of moral fiber, or even cowardice. Hopefully, we have come a long way, but PTSD is an insidious condition. One soldier physically uninjured but suffering from PTSD declared that he would rather have lost an arm or a leg.

The figures for PTSD are worrying, not only because the causes of the condition are not clear, but also because they suggest different criteria can be used between theaters to characterize PTSD.

Some figures as percentages:

Table 2 HL 894

Troops with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder

Country	Conflict	Percent PTSD
British	Falklands	22
British	Gulf War	3
British	Iraq (03-05)	2
British	Bosnia (to 1996)	6
U.S.	Vietnam	18
U.S.	Gulf War	6
U.S.	Afghanistan	8
U.S.	Iraq (03-05)	12
Australia	Vietnam	11

A cursory analysis suggests that the length of time under stress, the intensity and variations of the stress, uncertainty as to outcome, extreme environmental conditions, and horrors amongst the civilian communities in which the operations are taking place, are amongst the factors that contribute. I suspect too that a multiplicity of these factors would accelerate the onset of PTSD. Maybe sound leadership and a supportive military ethos can retard it. PTSD seems to be no respecter of rank: certainly Lt. Gen. Romeo Dallaire, the Commander of the U.N. Mission for Rwanda in 1994, suffered from PTSD that was not diagnosed until 1998. Being overwhelmed by the atrocities of the genocide, and unable to do anything to stop it, must have contributed.

Recruiting and Retention

These operations affect recruiting and retention. Recruiting is affected by public perceptions of the operations but also by feedback from the front line. Fighting itself does not seem to damage recruiting; rather it is the shadowy accompaniment. If the fighting force is strong up the chain of command and back into the Ministries of Defense, if the politicians support and sustain the troops both morally and materially, then damage will be little. If the community as a whole becomes detached from the operations and if politicians are seen to have

behaved opportunistically, then trouble will be close behind. Retention seems to follow a similar path, though variations on the ground will cause retention to vary too. Repetitive deployments, a sense of making little progress, and a feeling of being cast adrift all damage retention. I found personally that retention generally held up well during deployments, but that when sailors got back to their families, and found that the country was under-whelmed by what they had been doing, by what had seemed so important whilst on deployment, then their resolve to undertake future deployments, with more extended separation from their families, wobbled.

Reservists are increasingly drawn into peace support operations. This reliance stresses employers and reservists alike. Reservists are part-timers, ready to do their bit when the devil rides. But when the devil is riding in many places around the world, every month of the year, for years on end, the rationale of being a reservist can weaken. Reservists may not be so thoroughly trained or so deeply integrated into the military structure as regulars. They may therefore be prone to unexpected lapses. Recruitment and retention amongst reservists can be vulnerable.

Training for Complex Challenges

The professionalism of forces frequently involved with peace support operations merits consideration. On the one hand, such operations build battle-readiness that can aid survival in theatre, and create a wariness that will enable soldiers to react decisively at early whiffs of danger. This in turn may engender a hardness or rigidity that may not help the agility to switch, say, from peace enforcement to humanitarian assistance in a moment. My impression is that servicemen and women returning from deployments have some skill-sets honed to a fine edge, whilst others have regressed. On return, they need not only substantial leave, but also some retraining before redeploying to other roles, and perhaps before redeploying to the same one.

A mass of lessons can be identified and need to be learned. The lessons need to be turned round with speed, so that the lessons can be learned in theatre, almost instantaneously, and certainly in the home base, before the next deployment departs. But the enemy also learns lessons fast, and without the bureaucracy to go with it, so the command chain must be alert to the dangers of learning lessons relevant to the "last war," even if it is only a few days ago. This demands tactical and doctrinal agility of a high order that puts a heavy load on the training organization. Experience repeatedly underlines the need to be able to introduce new capabilities at short notice. Consequently procurement, and its processes, need to be commensurately agile.

There is an adage that "the Army trains for war, and educates for everything else." Aligned with that is the belief that skills learned for war can readily be adapted for other operations, but the reverse is not true. I feel that this is, at least in part, a sound-bite from another time. Stabilization operations, because of their complexity and their tendency to lurch back into war-fighting (albeit briefly), are inherently harder to train for than war-fighting. War for the United States and allies against prospective enemies is likely to be relatively straightforward given the massive investment of money and technology by the U.S. The U.S. has shown itself resolute in the face of mounting casualties. For the U.K. the threat to war-fighting capabilities lies in constant trimming of investment and capabilities so that we have a reduced capability to fight and be interoperable with the U.S. Beyond the horizon there may lurk wars of national survival, but they are some way away. Operations after war, as we have often seen, can be bloodier and more problematic that war-fighting itself. They are "war-fighting plus." Consequently we should be acquiring capabilities, if the case can be properly made in each instance, that are not primarily required for war-fighting, but for the totality of these other operations.

The reasons have already been partially rehearsed. There are more actors from more countries and with more functions, the nature of the operations can change with bewildering rapidity and scope, and the constraints under which the operations are conducted are far tighter. Furthermore, military activity is but one strand that has to

be integrated into the conduct of the overall campaign. I believe the demands for comprehensive training are higher for these operations than for war-fighting, particularly as the severity of extreme peace support operations can equal, and even exceed, those of much war-fighting. The diversity of tasks, and sometimes their unexpected nature, means that the training manuals cannot cope with every eventuality. This in turn means that junior officers and NCOs may have to cope with situations drawing on inculcated values rather than procedures and tactics. These values are gained through education rather than training (though the division is not clear-cut). Education takes time and has to grow, has to be nurtured. A just-enough-just-in-time approach to training will not produce the goods. Growing education is a bigger concept than building military ethos, vital though the latter is. It may depend on national education systems, and the setting and maintaining of recruiting standards.

The deeply regrettable incidents at Abu Ghraib, Camp Bread Basket and, somewhat removed, Guantanamo cast a long shadow. At present the authorities seem to be dealing with the symptoms—more or less rigorously—not the causes. Young people were put in positions of authority and sensitivity for which they were ill-prepared or under-qualified. And there were mature people further up the chains of command who did not do too well either. In a vicious operational environment, caring for the enemy, perhaps whilst extracting intelligence from them, demands high-quality professionalism. There seems to be evidence that some reservists were asked to undertake roles for which they were not suited. Playing it off the cuff is not the answer; ill-judged actions of the moment will be scrutinized afterwards with all the wonders of hindsight and the rectitude of distance. Forces of democracies must do better, and few would conclude there are not more unseemly incidents still to be uncovered. The disproportionate damage such incidents cause underlines the imperative of radically reducing the likelihood of further recurrences.

The effect on service-people may be twofold. First the actions of a few bad apples do stain the reputations of the whole barrel, and weaken the link between the deployed forces and the home communities. This can damage morale. Second, the constraints have to allow, and clearly allow, the job to be done effectively. Failure to achieve this can also damage morale. Long ago, in the 1980s tanker war in the Gulf, the Royal Navy's Rules of Engagement were drawn up to allow an enemy the first shot at us. This was both scary and rather frustrating; the U.S. had more robust ROE and could engage more readily. As the U.S. was also operating under a different ratification state of the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, the people on the front line had a feeling that governments had not got their acts together.

Effective support of the front line by governments is seen to be essential. This is both political and material. Cheery visits by politicians transparently for their own political ends, are not welcomed; equally soldiers will not want to feel ignored. Equipment has got to work and be capable enough for the tasks in hand—always—and stores must be available in the quantity required, when required, wherever required. Shortfalls in support can fester, and the morale of deployed forces can swing in large oscillations with little notice and with little cause. One of the few dampening mechanisms is good leadership. Small privileges mean a lot, but so does their withdrawal.

Effect of the Media

The media, because of globalized communications, are ubiquitous and "fearless" in the pursuit of viewing and circulation figures. They also have a vital role in monitoring good governance, and can drum up effective pressure on governments when support for the front line seems sloppy. Journalists can be embedded, independent, or comment knowingly from afar. There are outstandingly good journalists, some who are bad, and quite a lot in between. A few "go native" and champion the cause of the forces with undue enthusiasm. Others pick relentlessly on the bad news and ignore the greater quantity of good news. Quite a few are sanctimonious. Too many put accuracy as a lower priority than their deadlines. They affect service-people on three layers. First, service-people see the media output and react to it, perhaps giving excess cre-

dence to the journalists' wisdom. Second, families see the output and can be upset by pessimistic forecasts and damning assessments, and they pass on their doubts to the front line. Third, communities see the output; they affect, and perhaps weaken the resolve of families, and thereby affect the front line. Governments struggle to inform the good journalists in good time, and to counter the less good persuasively. Much more needs to be done.

Globalization gives a strong measure of transparency, especially on the actions of the forces of democracies. There is little transparency and few constraints in dictatorships or amongst transnational terrorists. The media help to nurture this transparency. Governments have to accept that they will be embarrassed from time to time, often rightly. Equally the media have an obligation to evaluate evidence that comes to them rigorously. They might start with the proposition that terrorists will lie more than politicians. Peace support operations have to be conducted under the law, and the law is complex and demanding. Law is administered by lawyers, calmly, cleanly, and doubtless meticulously. The law (as interpreted in an aseptic court) and common sense (as interpreted on the spur of a dark and dangerous moment) do not necessarily make good bedfellows. Soldiers do not like their colleagues to mess up (Abu Ghraib and Camp Bread Basket), but they do not want to be tasked to fight with one arm behind their backs by authorities who subsequently disown them. It is easy to paint too black a picture, but there are big issues here, and if soldiers do not feel they are getting a fair deal, they will vote with their feet: another irritating characteristic of a democracy. It is the nature of these operations that decisions—perhaps to kill or be killed—are made and action is led, often at a very low level, where the leaders are inherently less comprehensively well trained or educated. The "strategic corporal" is an important person not necessarily best dealt with by a "long screwdriver." We have yet to see the full extent of the problems these factors can cause.

I have concentrated mainly on the factors that affect troops on the ground and on the situation today. Looking at the peace support operations conducted by the other services is important, but the issues are often less acute. Ships have been patrolling in the Gulf for upwards of 25 years, with hotter conflicts occasionally interposing. Aircraft patrolled the "no fly" zones in Iraq for a decade projecting substantial violence. The loading on the people involved was heavy and prolonged, perhaps generally not so intense (but that is contentious) but the issues remain much the same. I think too that the lessons from the 1990s are in principle much the same, but the circumstances have changed enormously, bringing their own principles with them.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I hope I have indicated what a multi-faceted and inter-meshed subject this is. I well realize that I have hardly scratched the surface of the subject, but I hope I may have stimulated a few itches. We (that is both the good and bad guys) live in a globalized world. The struggles are hugely asymmetric. The operations we are discussing not only come in many shapes and sizes, but they will change characteristics with bewildering rapidity; they are conducted by a vast array of actors most of whom have discrete and not necessarily overt agendas and they resist efforts to be coordinated. Few of our service-people are either saints or abject sinners; they are ordinary people whom we ask to do extraordinary tasks. We, in the narrow and wider defense communities of democracies, need to be with them and sustain them, lest their successes are despite us, and their failures because of us.

—Rear Admiral Richard Cobbold is the Director of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. These remarks were delivered on June 18, 2005, at "The Test of Terrain: The Impact of Stability Operations Upon the Armed Forces," a conference in Paris, France, sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the United States Army War College, the Centre d'Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (Ministère de la Défense), the Royal United Services Institute, The Association of the United States Army, The Förderkreis Deutsches Heer, The Heritage Foundation, and the United States Embassy Paris.